Unveiling the Role of Integration

Policies in Countering Anti-Immigrant

Sentiment and Nationalism:
A Comparative Analysis in the Context of Mass
Migration in Germany and Sweden

MEGAN KING (525146)

International Public Management and Public Policy
MSc Thesis
Supervisor: Saliha Mentinsoy
Second Reader:
Erasmus University Rotterdam
June 30th, 2023
Word Count: 14,725 (need to cut!)
 Executive Summary

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Table of Contents Page
1. Introduction
1.1 Social relevance
1.2 Scientific relevance
1.3 Study outline
2. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Economic Explanation
2.3 Cultural Explanation
2.4 Implemented EU Migration Policies
2.5 Conclusion
3. Theoretical Framework
3.1 Anti-immigrant backlash
3.2 Strength of Integration Policies
4. Methodology
4.1 Conceptualisation and operationalisation
Independent Variable
Dependent Variable
Mediating Variable
Confounding Variables
4.2 Research Strategy
4.3 Case Selection
4.4 Data Collection
4.5 Limitations
5. Data Analysis
5.1 Germany
5.2 Sweden
5.3 Comparison & reflection
6. Conclusion
6.1 Conclusion
6.2 Discussion

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 6.3 Limitations & future research
Reference List
Appendix

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List of Tables Page

4
List of figures Page

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 Introduction
Political debates over immigration policy have been rising in volume and intensity in
recent years. On the one hand, immigration is seen as an economic and cultural lifeline supplying
key industries with skilled workers stimulating new life into the nation. On the other, there are
concerns that immigrants take away jobs from local workers, subtract more from the
government, and undermine traditional culture. These concerns have encouraged the recent rise
of much tighter immigration controls in several countries while also fostering the growth of
extremist anti-immigrant political movements in many parts of Europe. It is for this reason, of
the many facets of globalisation, immigration is arguably the most heavily researched,
controversial, and politically charged component. With international public opinion polls
indicating that while the public may be more open to international trade and financial integration,
there prevails an alarming skepticism towards expanding the inflow of immigration and
integration. It is this that the world saw unfold during the 2015 migration crisis. While member
states of the European Union seemingly welcomed Syrian refugees with open arms, behind
closed doors there was a disturbing rise in support for far-right parties, countries such as France,
Austria, Switzerland, and Italy, all successfully obtained voters by explicitly embracing anti-
immigrant messages (Malhotra et al, 2013). Even large mainstream parties in seemingly
progressive and liberal countries such as Sweden have taken stances against immigration in
appeals to the electorate. Allowing one to suggest a correlation between immigration and rising
support for right-wing parties within the European Union. The existing literature thus far has
painted a picture of perceived economic and cultural threats in explaining voters’ opposition to
immigration.
Many have taken this further, stating the apprehensions surrounding immigration and the
perceived erosion of national identity have fueled a sharp increase in electoral support for right-
wing populist movements across the continent. This rise in opposition to mass immigration has
had profound implications for the political landscape in Europe. Between 2015 and 2016, Europe
experienced the arrival of over 2 million asylum seekers and migrants, pushing the existing
system to its limits. While the number of irregular migrants entering Europe has since declined,
the repercussions of this influx have endured. The prevailing sentiment among Europeans is that
their governments have lost control, fueling a pessimistic view of European societies' ability to
effectively integrate the overwhelming number of newcomers. Consequently, these attitudes

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have had far-reaching effects on European politics. Support for this interpretation finds
resonance in Eurobarometer polls, which consistently identify immigration and terrorism as the
two most pressing issues facing the European Union. Understanding immigration as a threat to
security and national identity has become deeply entwined with public opinion. Moreover,
empirical evidence indicates that the failure to control external immigration and the difficulties
in integrating newcomers statistically elevate radical parties that espouse nativist and even racist
ideologies. Thus, European policy towards immigration and integration is often seen as a
reactive response to public sentiment, allowing one to categorise the events of 2015 as a defining
moment in the EU's history and its approach to immigration.
Scholars have documented 2015 as a year marked by the largest increase in support for
populist radical right movements in decades (Rooduijn et al., 2019). Consequently, the so-called
refugee crisis of 2015 has sparked critical debates on national identity and belonging within the
EU. However, it is essential to recognize that the rise of nationalism is not uniform across all
countries. Rather, one would expect variations in this trend based on a range of factors, primarily
the strength of a country's integration policy. Countries with robust integration policies that
successfully assimilate migrants into society and the daily lives of the native population are
likely to experience less polarization, nationalism, and xenophobia, thereby diminishing the rise
of right-wing parties compared to countries with weaker policies.
Thus, the weight of the evidence makes it captivating to suggest the following as a
problem statement for enquiry. The surge in support for far-right parties, coupled with the rise of
anti-immigrant sentiment and nationalism in Europe (namely Sweden and Germany), has
become a pressing concern in recent years. Stemming from mass migration, the influx of
refugees during the 2015 crisis triggered debates about the effectiveness of integration policies in
curbing these negative trends. Yet, despite recognizing the significance of integration policies,
there is a need to thoroughly examine their impact and establish whether they can effectively
address anti-immigrant sentiment and nationalism. This problem statement, therefore, highlights
the need to investigate the role and effectiveness of integration policies in mitigating the rise of
anti-immigrant sentiment and nationalism, ultimately contributing to informed policy
development and social cohesion in Europe. Therefore, allowing one to ask the following
research question: How effective are integration policies in mitigating the increase in anti-
immigrant sentiment and nationalism triggered by mass migration?

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Social relevance
Lehnert, Miller and Wonka (2007) state social relevance of a study refer to the extent to
which it intensifies the understanding of a social and political phenomenon that 1) affects people
and 2) makes a difference based on specified standards. Concerning the first half of this
definition, the mass influx of migrants has a dramatic effect on the social cohesion of a
community, which indirectly affects the individual. It is this that integration policy specifically
strives to target. Whereas, in reference to the second half of the definition the results obtained
through this study’s comparative analysis serve as a platform for policymakers to see the
importance of constructing and implementing a successful and strong integration policy to
combat the negative side effects of sudden mass migration.
Scientific relevance
The scientific relevance of research is dependent on the contribution it makes to the
existing body of literature in the related field (Lehnert, Miller & Wonka, 2007). As will be
discussed in the literature review, the impact of mass migration towards the rise of far-right
parties has been extensively studied. Yet, what has remained neglected until recently has been
how subsequent policies can mediate this relationship, with a particular focus on the influence of
integration policy. Therefore, this research will contribute to the literature by providing a
relatively new perspective on this relationship. Existing literature, while plentiful in terms of
immigration policy analysis, accrediting rising nationalism to mass migration, has not yet
explicitly researched the extent to which integration policy can curb the negative effects of mass
migration on social cohesion and nationalism. Therefore, the partial relevance of the following
research stems from a gap in the literature. By examining the effectiveness of integration policies
in mitigating these negative trends, the research can contribute to a better understanding of how
European countries can navigate the complexities of mass migration.
Furthermore, contributes to the academic discourse by adding empirical evidence and
nuanced perspectives to the existing body of knowledge. By conducting a comparative study and
analyzing the interplay between immigration, integration policies, and nationalist sentiments, one
can shed light on the complex dynamics that shape public attitudes towards immigration and the
effectiveness of policy responses. Ultimately, contributing to the development of evidence-based
policies and practices that counteract the rise of nationalism in European societies. Moreover,

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this relationship will be examined by testing the existing literature via the analysis of two
empirical cases (Lehner, Miller & Wonka, 2007).
Outline of the study
This thesis will be divided into several sections. In chapter two, an overview of the
literature around the explanation for the rising anti-immigrant sentiment will be presented
through two common frameworks. This literature review elaborates on the cultural and economic
explanations, introducing the debate between in-groups and out-groups of migrants. In the end, a
brief introduction will be given about the relationship between mass migration and growing
support for radical right-wing parties. In chapter three, this particular relationship will be studied
more in-depth in the theoretical framework. At the end of this chapter, a theoretical mechanism
and hypotheses will be presented, indicating the mediational role of integration policies. Chapter
four outlines the research approach and methodology of this study. Including an elaboration of
the research design, case selection, operationalization, data collection and address’s reliability
and validity of the study. The analysis of the research is conducted in chapter five. This section is
divided between the two selected cases, concluding with a comparison. Lastly, chapter six
consists of a discussion and conclusion of the findings of this research. Furthermore, this section
includes a discussion of specific research limitations and recommendations for future research.

Literature Review
The effects of migration on a host country have been studied extensively, with specific
attention on the relationship between mass migration and rising xenophobia. Scholars have
utilised the migration crisis of 2015 to investigate how such an extraneous event triggered the
subsequent national sentiment and policies that swiftly followed. Moreover, integration policies
have been a subject of interest, analysing their implementation and success. Yet, where the gap
in the literature emerges is accredited to the combination of these three focus areas. Thus, the
extent to which integration policies can be considered a useful means of controlling nationalism
as a result of mass migration has yet to be determined. Understanding what is meant by
‘integration’ provides a foundation to divide existing research surrounding immigration policies
into two distinct frameworks. According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM),
‘integration’ is understood depending on the country and context, generally being defined as the
process of adaptation between the host society and the migrants themselves (). Successful

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integration is essential for the well-being of migrants and the harmony of society as a whole. It
is, for this reason, integration policy frameworks should take into consideration the rights and
obligations of migrants and host societies, including access to the labour market, health and
social services, and education for children and adults. Integration implies obligation and respect
for a core set of values binding migrants and their host communities.
From this understanding, an empirical foundation will be formulated by synthesising the
existing body of literature dominating explanations for rising anti-immigrant sentiment and
ensuing nationalism; cultural and economic. Finally, an interrogation of the literary debate on
existing immigration policies will be investigated. Allowing the curation of a foundation for
empirical investigation.
Cultural Explanation
An emerging consensus found in migration literature has suggested the success of far-
right parties may be understood as a ‘cultural backlash’ (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Whereby
cultural values have risen in importance shaping voter behaviour, and the association of cultural
concerns over immigration resulting in far-right party support at the individual level. This is a
response suggested by researchers to the cultural risks of immigration, with voters voting on
cultural complaints over immigration. Most empirical studies have supported the cultural
explanation. In terms of anti-immigration attitudes, findings regarding the labour-market
competition hypothesis are highly contested (Malhotra et al, 2013; Hainmueller and Hopkins,
2014). Thus, economic explanations are often understood as secondary (Lubbers and Güveli,
2007; Inglehart and Norris, 2016), given the greater predictive power of cultural concerns over
immigration at the individual level.
The transnational cleavage divides multinational voters from nationalist voters.
According to Inglehart and Norris, this is the result of rapid and profound value change. Since at
the core of the transnational cleavage is a cultural conflict, scholars emphasise the importance of
this dimension in driving far-right party success. Thus, the main proposition of the cultural
grievance is the perceived incompatibility between native and immigrant behavioural norms and
cultural values (Golder, 2016). Implying there is a fear that immigrants will erode the national
culture. This cultural threat intensifies prejudice against immigrant groups, with the assumption
of communities bringing in high crime rates, opposing values, and challenging traditions. Thus,
voters opt for parties who are centred on limiting immigration. According to this view, far-right

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party support can be best understood as a ‘cultural backlash’, reacting to value change by hose
fearing the erosion of their cultural values and place emphasis on national identity (Halikipoulou
and Vlandas, 2020). A large amount of the existing literature finds support for the cultural
grievance hypothesis at the individual level (Lubbers and Güveli, 2007; Lucassen and Lubbers,
2012; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Halikipoulou and Vlandas, 2020). Complementing findings
that ever-present cultural concerns are an underlying course of opposition to immigration
(Hainmuller and Hopkins, 2014). Moreover, the literature emphasises the association between
cultural concerns and nationalistic attitudes as part of this trend towards cultural explanations for
far-right party support and rising immigration scepticism.
Economic Explanation
While the literature has consistently shown cultural concerns to make up the majority of
predictors of opposition to immigration, findings regarding the labour market competition
hypothesis (LMC) are equally compelling (Malhotra et al, 2013). The LMC hypothesis is
outlined as a predictor of which of the native population will be most opposed to immigration
from foreign workers who possess similar skill levels to their own. Recent studies of individual
attitudes toward immigration emphasize concerns about labour-market competition as a
prominent source of anti-immigrant sentiment, in particular among less-educated or less-skilled
citizens who fear rising job competition with low-skilled immigrants willing to work for much
lower wages (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). Such studies anticipate the role of education,
implying individuals will oppose the immigration of workers with similar skills to their own but
support the immigration of workers with different skill levels. Hainmuller and Hiscox () found
that people with higher levels of education and occupational skills are more likely to favour
immigration regardless of the skill attributes of the immigrants in question. Allowing for the
literature to suggest there be an educated preference in explaining the economic apprehension of
immigration. This indirectly targets the lower class, with many refugees or migrants looking to
assimilate into the host country through lower-tier jobs, which are occupied mostly by the lower
class of the native population (Malhotra, 2013). It is this which has plagued the majority of
literature examining anti-immigrant attitudes focusing on if a perception of labour market threat
directly results in a shift in preferences on immigration. Scholars have researched this further,
drawing correlations between rising numbers of immigrants and perceived job insecurity by the
native population, thus resulting in the dominance of an economic explanation, highlighting the

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principal source of apprehension to immigration for natives largely has to do with socio-
economic insecurity (Dustmann and Preston, 2001; Gang and Rivera-Batiz, 1994; Mayda, 2006;
Scheve and Slaughter 2001).
The European literature examining the characteristics of immigrants and the determinants
of immigration attitudes focuses on the estimation of the labour market impact of European
migration flows, thus, the existing literature has conceived greater economic hardship as
conductive of higher levels of majority hostility towards minority groups (O’Connell, 2006).
Allowing for the implication that economic deprivation (perceived or actual) is linked to out-
group hostility. The literature further supports this explanation concerning the rise of anti-
immigrant sentiment in Europe, with rising electoral support for far-right parties (O’Connell,
2006). However, a notable observation stems from this support that has been more prevalent in
wealthier and more materially secure societies than in poorer ones, therefore challenging prior
statements in the literature that the economic explanation is largely associated with the lower
working class. Nonetheless, the literature has pointed to the following economic explanation for
rising anti-immigration attitudes throughout the EU, as economic scarcity increases, concerns
over economic rivalry rise. Many studies conclude that realistic fears about the economic effects
of labour-market competition among low-skilled, blue-collar workers lie at the heart of much of
the anti-immigration feeling (Hainmuller and Hiscox, 2007). These studies rest their analysis on
the premise that the distributive effects of immigration anticipate that low-skilled (and less
educated) native workers will lose out when forced to compete for jobs with low-skilled
immigrants (Borjas, 1999).
Implemented EU Migration Policies
Strategies for managing the international flows of migration have become an integral part
of the political agenda and literature. With legislation implemented at both the national level and
the wider European Union level (Joppke, 2010). While the European Council plays an important
role in setting the strategic agenda of migration policies, gearing them towards the establishment
of effective, humanitarian, and safe policies (Lavenex, 2011). Scholars have indicated that
member states can internalise European legislation according to their respective national laws,
therefore explaining the varying entry and citizenship legislation amongst member states
(Kostakopoulou, 2008). According to Hein de Haas (2014), one can explain policy formulation
through four analytical dimensions of migration theories, these include 1) the size of migration

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levels, 2) the geographical dimension, 3) the chronological dimension and 4) the social
dimension. Through this one can understand the varying degrees of applicability of legislation
depending on migrants’ occupations, abilities, income, and ethnic groups. It is through this that
the literature indicates immigration policies favour those with certain social and professional
status, with policies in many member states facilitating the entry and assimilation of highly
skilled migrants from predominantly Western countries, over those fleeing war-torn nations
(Dumitrescu, 2018).
Furthermore, the existing literature paints a picture of the external EU migration policies
relating to the EU’s foundational values and rule of law (Rijpma & Cremona, 2007), thus
indicating the EU’s powers in migration management have been put to use to project EU
migration policies beyond the EU legal order. Common values have emerged as part of the
Union’s constitutional development and representation of collective identity, with key values
consisting of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the
rule of law (Rijpma & Cremona, 2007). The promotion of such common values as explicit
objectives of policies is evident in the Maastricht Treaty (Rijpma & Cremona, 2007). The
literature presents migration as a non-traditional security threat, bringing together member states
to combat a ‘common evil’ (within the constitutional framework in what became known as the
Third Pillar) (Guild, 2013). Internal EU policies have therefore been suggested to be related to
migration controls, producing effects beyond the EU’s legal order (Joppke, 2010). Cooperation
on matters of migration, however, have been increasingly integrated into the framework of EU
external relations (). Even in aspects where the member states retain competence, they are legally
constrained by the community law principle of loyal cooperation which affects the ways those
competencies can be exercised in practice and imposes obligations of information and
consultations (Guild, 2013).
Regardless, migration policies produced by the member states are aimed at governing
mobility into and across the EU, with the common concern shaping policies being traced back to
the concern that immigrants come into the host country to take advantage of the labour market,
thus relating to the economic explanation (Castles & Miller, 2009). Therefore, European
citizenship policies maintain that governments tend to approach immigration as either a threat or
opportunity for the construction of (supra)national identity (Bauböck, 2012; Modood et al, 2006;
Wodak, 2012). Allowing one to draw from the literature that member states adopt European

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legislation according to national laws, with the priority of many agendas resting on not only
entry into the country but also on the objective of the ‘effective integration of migrants’
(Dumitrescu, 2018). It is from this, one can assume migration policies themselves to be a product
of immigrant sentiment, and influencing the attitudes of the wider population towards migrants
themselves (Dumitrescu, 2018).
Conclusion
The question of what drives these anti-immigrational attitudes in seemingly advanced and
liberal countries has resulted in a pool of scholarly research, all examining a diverse range of
factors. Yet, the majority of such literature points to two possible explanations; economic
vulnerability and declining cultural cohesion. Allowing one to suggest the alignment of
economic and cultural interests to drive the far-right party's success through anti-immigration
voter coalitions. Therefore, in utilising the two existing frameworks, scholars have posed
questions asking; Is the main motivator for opposition to immigration the threat of economic
competition? Or is it a deeper animosity toward foreigners and foreign cultures? The answer to
these questions is critical in understanding the politics of integration, the source of anti-
immigrant sentiment and the rising support for far-right parties. If anti-immigrant sentiments are
indeed primarily based on economic calculations, there are ways policymakers might address
them, such as targeting forms of adjustment assistance and job creation programs toward the
communities or industries in which the economic impact is felt most heavily.
A bridge between these two explanations is evident through a new perspective, one in
which the pool of existing literature is limited. Suggesting the rise in anti-immigrant sentiment
and electoral success of right-wing parties as accredited to the strength of a nation’s integration
policy. Limited literature has suggested the process and extent immigrants are assimilated into
society both directly and indirectly influences the levels of hostility and resentment expressed by
the native population, through either cultural or economic components. It is therefore compelling
to further inquire about the influence of integration policy and its contribution towards Europe’s
increasing anti-immigration stance and xenophobia. Therefore, paving the way for the following
research question investigating the relationship between the number of migrants/refugees taken
in during 2015, and the rise in nationalism /populism as mediated by integration policy. This
study will investigate the role of integration policies based on the plethora of theories made
available in the literature. A systematic review of the existing body of research allows the

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identification of a gap to emerge in the literature surrounding the role of integration policies in
limiting the extent to which a country falls victim to extreme xenophobic political movements. It
is this gap that the following study aims to fill.

Theoretical Framework
The refugee crisis of 2015 marks a crucial turning point in the history of the EU, fueling
political debates about borders, immigration, and national belonging. Several country studies in
Germany, Greece and Sweden indicate that far-right parties benefited from the refugee crisis
(Emilsson, 2020; Vasilakis, 2018; Art, 2018). The rising support for populist radical right-wing
parties implies that the refugee crisis toughened citizen’s views of immigration while
strengthening national identification. Leaving one with the following puzzle: while the refugee
crisis is portrayed as a political crisis deepening conflict and paving the way for the far right,
public opinion at first sight does not appear to have drastically changed. Aside from the study of
Stockemer et al (2020), little research exists on how the refugee crisis and the subsequent
integration policy of Member States affected nationalistic and anti-immigration sentiments.
It is not realistic to expect an undeviating effect for all citizens across the EU.
Alternatively, one would expect the effect of the refugee crisis on public opinion to be
conditional on two factors. Frist, it is hypothesised that the refugee crisis will exert the strongest
impact in countries that received the most immigrants. Simply because the refugee crisis had the
largest impact in these countries and thus this will resonate the most in the public and political
debates of these countries. It is for this reason, both Germany and Sweden have been selected for
this study, having received the highest number of migrants in relation to their respective native
population () Secondly, it is hypothesised that the stronger a nations integration policy, the less
nationalism and support for far-right parties will rise. Therefore, based on this one can formulate
two possible ways in which large inflows of refugees might have impacted such attitudes. These
include the backlash hypothesis and the assimilation hypothesis. The backlash hypothesis builds
upon the ethnic threat theory (Davidov and Semyonov, 2017; Quillian, 1995), predicting that if a
large number of migrants enter a community, the existing population becomes more critical of
immigration and acquires a more exclusive national identity. One can further couple this with the
aforementioned cultural explanation to xenophobia. Allowing one to draw the conclusion rising
level of migrants results in an increase of radical right-wing and nationalist attitudes. This has

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previously been studied at the local level (Dinas et al., 2019; Dustmann et al., 2019), however it
is compelling to see the immersion of this on a national level. Alternatively, the assimilation
hypothesis assumes this rise in nationalism and xenophobia will be curbed dependent on the
strength of a nation’s integration policies. Those whom encourage assimilation of migrants into
the community will subsequently see a smaller rise in support for the radical right, than those
who possess a weaker integration policy.
Anti-immigrant backlash. Ethnic threat literature theorises that the presence of many
immigrants in a country will be perceived as threatening to citizens who belong to the majority
group (). This could be the result of rising competition over economic resources, job
competition, housing, or health care. Or more drastically, migrant groups may be interpreted as a
threat to their pre-exisitng way of life (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Quillian, 1995). More
explicitly scholars have outlined that it is the sudden and sharp increase in migrant numbers
which induces negative reactions rather than the presence of migrants alone. Kaufmann (2017)
suggested that the presence of a small number of migrants results in citizens accepting their
assimilation, whereas steep increases provoke fear. It is compelling to see how the migration
crisis played into these circumstances. With many viewing the crisis in 2015 as an unexpected
wave of mass migration exogenous to the EU and its following policies. Allowing one to
investigate how a nation’s integration policy can promote or discourage xenophobia in terms of
sudden and mass migration. Some have suggested that the migration inflow were relatively small
when compared with the size of the host countries’ population, yet in countries like Sweden the
migrant population made up 17% of the population (UN report). Moreover, when coupled with
studies such as those in Demark (Dustmann et al., 2019) and Greece (Dinas et al., 2019), outline
how sudden sharp increases of migration in specific regions result in support for the populist
radical right. Allowing one to hypothesis the following:
H1a: As the number of migrants entering a country increase, support for immigration
will decrease.
It would be expected that such effects on public opinion are not restricted to views of
immigration but also will stimulate feelings of nationalism. Nationalism refers to feelings of
identification with the nation. In contemporary literature on nationalism and citizenship,
distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism prevail (Aichholzer et al., 2021; Ariely, 2012;
Bonikowski, 2017). Thus, one can assume that a cultural understanding of the nation is at the

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heart of most contemporary nationalisms (Brubaker, 2017). This interpretation of the nation
proclaims that the culture of the nation is grounded in a set of shared values and customs. Ethnic
nationalists consider these values and customs as highly important, defining who we are as a
nation and creating harmony. Implying that immigrants who bring in different customs and
values are considered a threat to the nation and will ultimately fail to assimilate. This portrays an
‘in group’ and an ‘out group’ of who belongs. One could understand this as the establishment of
an ideal immigrant (one who closely aligns with the values and customs of the nation). A context
of perceived threat to the in-group increases bias against the outgroup and produces exclusionary
measures, further contributing to the rise in nationalist and populist sentiment, and the
subsequent need for a strong integration policy to curb these residual effects.
H1b: As the number of migrants entering a country increase, nationalism will increase.
The hypothesis previously outlined assumed a backlash against immigration across the
whole population. If we accept this as fact, then it is compelling to expect integration policy to
play a role in the extent to which nationalism does indeed increase as a result of an influx of
migrants.
Citizens often select and interpret new information in line with exisitng beliefs (Taber
and Lodge, 2006). Even though left-right positions are not strongly correlated to nationalistic and
anti-immigration attitudes, right-wing Europeans are on average more critical of immigration and
the prospects of integrating ethnic minorities (De Vries et al., 2013; Hainmuller and Hopkins,
2014). The trigger of an influx of a large number of refugees can be expected to strengthen
existing worries about uncontrollable immigration among right-wing citizens. By contrast,
among left-wing citizens, support for immigration is generally higher to begin with. With the
adoption of a more human rights framework, images of migrant’s journeys strengthen notions
that people have the right to seek asylum. In response to the migration crisis, Germany adopted a
manifestation of a ‘welcoming culture’ (wilkommenkultur) on the one hand, and the rise of the
radical right with Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) on the other hand.
Assimilation. In Germany, the opposition to chancellor Angela Merkel’s ‘welcoming
culture’ was voiced most strongly by the radical right. If we understand that migration results in
increasing anti-immigrant sentiment in a host country, one can shift focus towards how policies
can mitigate this effect through effective integration of migrants.

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 H2a: Countries with a large influx of migrants and strong integration policies will
experience lower levels of rising nationalism.
A country’s integration policies matter because the way that governments treat immigrants
strongly influences how well immigrants and the public both interact and think of each other.
Immigrants are frequently portrayed as threatening national culture by right-wing actors. Thus, in
response to the refugee crisis politicians are likely to emphasise the threat of immigrants to the
national culture, resulting in an over exposure to these arguments. However, prior scholarly
research has shown immigrants who are emersed in the community are more tolerated by the
native population (). This may be because the native population is more exposed to migrant
communities in their everyday life, and thus one could suggest successful assimilation to result
in a reduction of both hostility and apprehension expressed by native communities.
H2b: Countries with a large influx of migrants and weak integration policies will
experience higher levels of rising nationalism.
These hypotheses will be applied to Germany and Sweden respectively, allowing one to
determine if it is plausible that the strength of a country’s integration policy acts as a facilitator
for considerable increases in nationalism. Moreover, when coupled with Castles and Miller’s
(1993) investigation of integration policies, it is compelling to view this as a mediating variable
to the above hypotheses. It is important to account for how scholars have described the
theoretical basis as to what constitutes integration policy in this analysis.
To discuss integration policy is to first envision a policy that is distinct from immigration
policy, such as border control and rights of entry. It instead accepts notions of a coherent society
and permanent settlement (Favell, 2001). Building a policy on the basis of inclusion, assimilation
and cohesion is to be taken at the national level rather than the broader EU level (Favell, 2001).
Thus, allowing for nations to adopt tailored policies which best fit their distinct context specific
issues. This is persuasive as each country faces their own unique set of challenges in the
implementation of policies, provisions, and social interventions, yet when combined, they all
tackle the issue of overarching integration of migrant communities within society. Furthermore,
scholars have presented four models of integration policies: assimilationist, differentialist,
multiculturalist and universalist (). Such models combine the most relevant variables in
immigration integration policies, suggesting the state has a decisive influence on the course of
immigrant integration, and the ways in which this is conducted indirectly influences the extent to

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which one supports or rejects the influx of migrants into a community. Thus, providing substance
to the extent to which integration policies matter in the analysis of rising populism and
nationalism. Moreover, scholars have identified a list of areas that integration policy acts as a
framework. This includes the following (Favell, 2001):

a. Legal and social protection.

b. Naturalisation and citizenship rights.
c. Anti-discrimination laws.
d. Equal opportunities.
e. Redistribution of targeted socio-economic funds for minorities in deprived areas.
f. Policy on public housing.
g. Policy on law and order.
h. Multicultural education policy.
i. Policies and laws on tolerating cultural practices.
j. Languages and culture courses in host society’s culture.

From this, the importance of investigating the role of integration policy becomes apparent.
Yet, the way this is done can have a significant impact on the levels of nationalism and
populism, thus it is plausible for one to assume integration policies play a crucial role in this
analysis. On the one hand, integration policies that are inclusive can reduce feelings of
marginalisation, which are associated with nationalist sentiment. Providing migrants with equal
access and opportunities, fostering a sense of belonging and social cohesion to mitigate the
emergence of nationalist movements. However, on the other hand, one can see this as too
permissive or as means to fuel nationalism by feeding into the pre-existing bias that migrants are
taking advantage of a host country’s resources. In some cases, populist parties can use such
policies as a rallying tool to mobilise support for anti-immigration movements. Thus, based on
the weight of the evidence it is compelling to expect integration to influence levels of
nationalism and populism.
Moreover, when conducting the analysis, it is important to note the potential alternative
explanations for this relationship. For today’s populism, we can carve out four root causes:
economic instability, cultural alienation, globalisation and historical and political traumas

19
(Aiginger, 2020). Economic factors can range from low growth, rising unemployment and
inequality. These factors can be accredited to the economic fallout of 2009, with central banks in
the US finding higher success and trust in national policies rather than those such as the
coordinated European policy effort (Aiginger, 2020). A more recent example of this was evident
during Donald Trump’s campaign back in 2015, with appeals made to the masses of bringing
industry back home. Additionally, the rising income inequality amongst individuals further
drives today’s populism. While economic insecurity has previously been used to explain
populism, alone it does not prove or disprove the suggested hypotheses, it rather ignores the
influence of migrants on this relationship.
Research describes these changes in value systems as incremental shifts in Western
society's values, which might be linked to cultural alienation for populist support (Aiginger,
2020). People may join nationalist movements that pledge to protect their way of life if they feel
that their cultural identity is at danger. This may take place as a result of growing cultural
diversity, shifting social standards, or a decline in religiosity. Combined with perceived threats to
national identity, it is compelling to see how this can also fuel nationalism and populism
(Inglehart & Norris, 2016). This can include concerns about not only immigration but also
globalization, or multiculturalism eroding the cultural identity of the nation. Therefore, those
with high levels of nationalism can be assumed to have weaker integration policies. This may be
done as a means to maintain a ‘separate but equal’ stance, and protect a nation’s culture, values,
and norms.
Moreover, political factors can also contribute to high levels of nationalism and
populism. People may resort to alternative political movements that promise to address these
issues if they believe that the political system is corrupt, insensitive to their interests, or
dominated by an elite class. This may be especially apparent when major political parties fall
short of their promises or come out as unresponsive to the issues facing the general populace.
One can attribute this to the growth of nationalism and populism together with historical
traumas. National identity can be shaped by collective memories of past traumas or perceived
injustices, and nationalist movements that aim to make amends for the past or bring the nation
back to its previous glory can be fueled by these memories. This can include regrets over wars,
colonization, or economic exploitation. When combined with socioeconomic or cultural

20
circumstances that foster a sense of unease or alienation, these memories may be especially
potent.
It is worth noting, these factors are not mutually exclusive, they are complex and can
interact with one another. For instance, economic uncertainty may exacerbate political
discontent, which might then feed populism and nationalism. Understanding these dynamics as
an alternative explanation to the research is essential to comprehending the emergence and
growth of populist and nationalist movements in many situations, as it is highly plausible such a
rise in xenophobia is not wholly accredited to rising levels of immigration or mitigated by
effective integration policy.

Figure 1.
Graph outlining the rising number of asylum and first-time asylum applicants in the EU.

Source: Eurostat, 2021.

Above one can visualise how the migration crisis of 2015 can be understood as an
unexpected wave of mass migration, of which the EU was not adequately prepared to handle.
Such a strain on the existing policies, may have fed into the worries of the population towards
the negative impact of mass migration on social cohesion and cultural norms. Allowing for such
an exogenous event to be understood as a single cultural phenomenon worth investigating. While
the figure outlines that migration levels decreased, they never returned back to pre-crisis levels
seen between 2011 and 2014. One could interpret this as a driving factor behind rising
21
nationalism, with the native population fearing the erosion of their country and culture. It is for
this reason, one can hypothesis the migration crisis triggered rising nationalism. As well as
encouraged nations to better formulate and implement integration policy as an effect means of
curbing this negative effect to mass migration. The following analysis can be understood through
the conceptual model below.

Figure 2.
Conceptual model of migration’s effect on rising nationalism and populism in host countries.

67Whereby, the independent variable is the number of migrants accepted by a host

country during the 2015 refugee crisis, and the dependent variable is the rise of nationalism and
populism in the host country. Finally, the mediator variable in this study is integration policies,
this variable is believed to influence the relationship between the independent and dependent
variable, as seen in the conceptual model, explaining the process by which the independent
effects the dependent variable. Moreover, the independent variable is manipulated by the
government or other actors and is assumed to have an effect on the rising levels of far-right party
support. Meanwhile, the dependent variable’s change is believed to be affected and measured in
response to changes in migration levels. The conceptual model can also interchange the
integration policy according to the model of integration utilised, as there is an assumed
difference in the outcome of each model type.

Methodology

22
 This research understands rising levels of migrants in a country as the cause behind the
increasing nationalism in Germany and Sweden. Drawing on integration policies as a mediating
variable to determine the extent to which the implication of such policies can be attributed to the
extent a country falls victim of anti-immigration sentiment. Before advancing, the variables must
be operationalised according to the way in which they will be used. As well as discuss potential
confounding variables and selection biases that may affect the analysis.
Conceptualisation and operationalisation
Independent Variable. The independent variable in this study is the number of migrants
accepted by host countries. This variable can be operationalized as the actual number of migrants
that a particular country accepted during a given time period. This is a critical factor shaping the
social, economic, and political landscape of the host countries. The higher the number of
migrants, the more significant the impact on the host country (UNHCR Refugee Statistics, n.d.).
Furthermore, studies have indicated that hostility exerted towards incoming migrant groups is
particularly high when groups came in large numbers. Outlining the importance of this variable .
Now that migration levels have been conceptualised, it is critical to outline how this will be
measured. Reports from the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) will be utilised to
examine the number of migrants taken in during 2015 by the selected Member States.
Dependent Variable. Moreover, the dependent variable in this study is the rise of
nationalism and populism in the host countries. This variable can be operationalized through
various measures, such as public opinion polls, voting patterns, or the number of political parties
with a nationalist or populist platform. For example, the percentage of votes for right wing
parties in national elections can be a measure of the dependent variable. This measure will assist
in determining the extent to which the acceptance of refugees contributed to the rise of
nationalist and populist sentiment in the host countries. Thus, support for right-wing parties will
be used as supplementary evidence to support the argument, rather than its own separate
variable/argument.
Overall, nationalism is based on three key tenets. First, it is fundamentally linked to the idea
that the world may be divided into nations in terms of its social, cultural, and political makeup
(Billig, 1995; Wimmer & Schiller, 2002). Second, it is believed essential for citizens to feel
wholly devoted to just one nation (Dekker et al. 2003; Brubaker 2020). Third, it primarily rests
on the idea that authoritarian thought processes give rise to patriotic views (Blank and Schmidt

23
2003; Wessel 2019). According to a prominent line of empirical research, nationalism is the
idealisation of one's country (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Blank and Schmidt 2003;
Bonikowski 2016), meaning that the country is viewed as the supreme (secular) authority that
individuals should submit to. So, in every situation, an insensitive loyalty to the country is a
constitutive aspect. According to this view, nationalists are thought to defend their country
regardless of whether it is correct or wrong (de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003). These relationships
lead to the conclusion that nationalism is associated with emotions of superiority toward other
nations and a desire for dominance (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Heinrich 2020; Osborne et
al. 2017). The literature on nationalism highlights an exclusionary conception of the nation
based on ethnic membership criteria, with nationalists feeling entitled to impose their supposedly
superior morale on others (de Lamater et al. 1969; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Blank and
Schmidt 2003). Indicators of nationalism are useful in identifying its existence and determining
the potency of nationalism within a nation or society, it is this which the following research aims
to shed light on.
Nationalism will be assessed for each country respectively through the use of surveys
produced by European Social Survey, European Value Survey and Eurobarometer. Allowing one
to draw cross country/case comparisons through standardised questions targeted towards the
larger population.
Mediating Variable. Finally, the mediating variable in this study is integration policies.
Integration policies can be operationalised in different ways, such as the level of access to
education, employment, housing, and social services granted to refugees, or the extent to which
refugees are required to assimilate to the cultural norms of the host country. For example, we can
look at the percentage of refugees who have successfully integrated into the host country's
workforce or education system. Integration policies play a critical role in determining the success
of the integration process of migrants, and they can mitigate or exacerbate the tensions between
the refugees and the host country's population, which can be furthered in our understanding of
nationalistic sentiment expressed by the native population and rising levels of populism. For this
study integration policies integration policies will be understood as the level of measures a
government takes towards and makes available for successful assimilation and the process by
which immigrants and their children come to feel and become participants in the life of their
country of destination, and in its schools, workplaces, and communities (Migration policy

24
institute, 2023). Moreover, the strength of a country’s integration policy can be understood
through its MIPEX score, whereby an analysis of a country’s changes in policy, and migrants’
access and assimilation in the labour market, health care, education, political participation,
access to nationality, family reunification, permanent residence and anti-discrimination produce
a score out of 100. Allowing for a ranking of country’s who have successful and strong
integration policies. From this it was found that Sweden held the highest MIPEX score with 86,
placing it in the top 10. Whereas Germany scored a 58 placing it in the temporary ranking
position (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2020).
Finally, integration policies, will be assessed through MIPEX scores, produced by the
Migrant Integration Policy Index. MIPEX 2020 is associated with the CrossMigration project,
funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the
grant agreement Ares (2017) 5627812–770121 (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2020). The

given scores are based on a set of indicators covering eight policy areas that has been designed to
benchmark current laws and policies against the highest standards through consultations with top
scholars and institutions using and conducting comparative research in their area of expertise.
These indicators include family reunification, permanent residence, labor market mobility, anti-
discrimination, education, political participation, health, and access to nationality. This index is a
tool specifically designed to compare the integration policies of all 28 EU member states, along
with those of 10 other countries (Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand,
Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and the USA). Through 167 policy indicators, this index attempts
to create a multi-layered picture of migrants’ opportunities to participate in their new
environment. Moreover, three dimensions have been identified to interrogate a country’s overall
approach to integration, these include basic rights, equal opportunities, and secure future.
Countries are then then sorted in groups based on their scores on those dimensions, representing
different country’s approaches to integration. Four main approaches are identified as the
following: comprehensive integration, equality on paper, temporary integration, and immigration
without integration. Within each of these four categories, there are a range of policies. In other
words, countries with the same approach to integration may have more or less developed
policies. Therefore, countries are categorised under 10 different groups that reflect their overall
approach to integration and their level of policy development. The MIPEX 2020 ranking ranks
these groups according to the average score of the countries within each group.

25
 Confounding variables. It is important to note there are several confounding variables
which may affect the analysis of the relationship between the number of migrants, integration
policies, and the rise of nationalism and populism. For instance, these include the economic and
social conditions of the host country, the level of education and income of the population, and
the history of migration and multiculturalism in the country can all affect the relationship
between the variables. Additionally, selection biases may arise if the countries that accepted the
highest number of refugees differ systematically from those that accepted fewer refugees. It is
therefore important to consider these factors in the case selection, while also being aware of
potential selection bias in doing so.
Far-right parties can provide supplementary evidence to support the argument that the
acceptance of refugees contributed to the rise of nationalism and populism in the host countries.
These parties often have an anti-immigrant and anti-refugee platform, and their success in the
elections can be a measure of the extent to which the population shares their sentiment ().
However, it is essential to note that the far-right parties may have their own agendas and biases,
which may affect the accuracy of their representation of public opinion. Nonetheless, the
relationship between the number of migrants, integration policies, and the rise of nationalism and
populism is complex and multi-faceted. While the number of refugees accepted by the host
country is a critical factor, integration policies and other confounding variables can significantly
affect the outcome.
Research Strategy
This study will be a qualitative, comparative, co-variational case study with a deductive
approach based on a document and content analysis. The study is a deductive study since it
analyses whether pre-established theories are fitted to the empirical results found in this study.
The suggested theory is that the number of migrants accepted by a host country during the 2015
refugee crisis contributes to the rise of nationalism and populism, and that integration policies
affect this relationship. Therefore, research will require the collection of data to test this theory
and to see if there is evidence to support or refute it. It is for this reason the study will be based
on a comparative, co-variational case study design to study this effect.
Data Collection
The rising nationalism and populism experienced by the identified countries will be
assessed through a triangular approach utilising world value survey, European social survey, and

26
Eurobarometer. Allowing the identification of nationalist feelings, and the progression or
changes evident through this. Moreover, populism will be measured through a careful
investigation of voting shares in the populist parties of each country respectively. Moreover,
immigration records will be used to assess how many migrants were accepted or entered the
country. Policy records will indicate what each countries integration policy entailed.
The triangular approach to collect data involves the use of three large-scale survey datasets: the
European Values Survey, the European Social Survey, and the Eurobarometer. These polls are
useful for gauging nationalist sentiment in a variety of ways, including how people feel about
immigration, multiculturalism, and national identity (See Appendix). By combining the data
from numerous surveys, the study will be able to pinpoint historical nationalist sentiment trends
and shifts. Additionally, looking into how many votes populist parties receive in each nation.
This method enables the study to assess the level of populism in each nation and how it connects
to nationalist sentiment. Additionally, the study will compile information from immigration
records to determine how many migrants were admitted to or entered each nation. Understanding
the contribution of immigration to the emergence of nationalism and populism will benefit from
this information. In order to assess each nation's integration policy and gain insight into how the
government's actions effect nationalist and populist feeling, the research will also look at policy
records. Overall, the data collection offers a thorough method for comprehending the emergence
of populism and nationalism in the cited countries. A comprehensive understanding of the
elements that lead to the emergence of nationalism and populism will be provided by the
combination of large-scale surveys, voting shares of populist parties, immigration records, and
policy records. Offering a complex and in-depth investigation of the research topic.
Case Selection
In this study, the unit of analysis will be countries. This will be a small-N study, namely
N=2. The purpose of this instead of a statistical analysis is the ability to go in depth, allowing
one to determine in richer detail the links between integration policy and a country’s
susceptibility to rising levels of nationalism. Allowing a comparative analysis between the
countries to find the triggering variable, such a study is more feasible with a smaller number of
cases, rather than a larger statistical test. For this study, a most similar case design will be used.
Most similar case study design is a research design that involves comparing cases that are similar
to each other in many respects, but that differ in terms of the outcome or phenomenon of interest.

27
In this design, the cases are selected that are as similar as possible, but that have experienced
different outcomes or effects. The goal of the most similar case study design is to identify the
factors or variables that may be responsible for the observed differences in outcomes or effects.
Allowing, an identification of key variables and factors that may be associated with the
phenomenon of interest. In practice, this means that the countries will have varying levels of
nationalism/populism as a result of their differing integration policies, despite all being EU
member states and arguably holding the same values as a result of this. In order to explain their
selection, the countries must also be comparable in all other aspects that could affect the
relationship under study. By doing this, it is possible to analyse the levels of political economy,
electoral systems, and development. The investigation of the desired outcome involves all three
of these areas, so choosing nations that are comparable on these measurements is crucial.
Allowing for the establishment of a most different case study design. The nations chosen have
similar scores on the three areas identified, yet have implemented different integration policies,
leading to varying outcomes in terms of the rise of nationalism and populism, as attested to by
various studies. The following might be asked through this: How comparable are Sweden and
Germany?
The case's comparability in terms of economic growth and political economy can be
determined by looking at each country's Human Development Index (HDI) and Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) per capita. The following nations rank highest in Statista's 2021 human
development index: Germany (0.942), and Sweden (0.947). Making it compelling to observe the
consistency in the development-related rating of the chosen cases. Similar results are observed
when comparing the political economies of each country according to their GDP per capita, with
Sweden rating 123.0, and Germany 120.0 (Eurostat, 2022). Such similarity in these areas of
economy and development makes it convincing to understand why one would choose such
countries for this examination. Moreover, it is possible to argue that each nation has the
resources needed to effectively implement integration policies and accommodate migrants on a
par with one another.
To assess each nation's viability in the study, it is also crucial to look into voter
participation. For this reason, before the four countries were chosen, the voting turnout for each
of them was examined. The scores from 2021–2022 are as follows: 84.21% (Sweden), and
76.58% (Germany), both showing strong voter turnout in parliamentary elections, according to

28
the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Since it sheds light on the
level of political engagement and motivation of the population, voter turnout measurement is a
crucial step in understanding the rise in support for right-wing parties. High voter participation
may indicate that the electorate is extremely involved and interested in the election, which could
lead to a more accurate portrayal of the electorate's opinions. A low voter turnout, on the other
hand, can be a sign that people are bored or fed up with politics, which could bias the results in
favor of particular parties or candidates.
Further compatibility between Sweden and Germany stems from both nations accepting
the most migrants in comparison to their native population than any other EU Member State
during the 2015 crisis. Allowing for both countries to experience a sudden shock of mass
migration into their respective communities, disrupting social cohesion. As a result, both
countries experienced a rise in voter support for radical right-wing parties. In Sweden this took
shape through the Swedish Democrats (SD), while in Germany this was through Alternative for
Germany (AfD). Nonetheless, when investigating election polls for each party, it is evident there
was a significant rise in both nations in terms of party support. In Sweden, the right-wing
populist Swedish Democrats emerged as the second-most popular party in the country’s recent
election. Their strong performance is the culmination of steady growth over the last six
parliamentary elections and the near doubling of their vote share since the 2014 election. In 2014
the SD 9.67% of votes, whereas in 2019 this number increased to 15.34% (European Parliament,
2019). As for Germany, AfD received 7.10% of votes in an election, compared to 2019 whereby
they successfully secured 11% of votes (European Parliament, 2019).
Furthermore, high voter turnout is frequently linked to more liberal and progressive
political viewpoints, whereas low voter turnout is frequently linked to more right-wing and
conservative viewpoints. Allowing for a further justification in the selection of the countries to
be their high comparability, yet difference in terms of integration policy. It is this which allows
one to assume the role of integration policy to be the determining factor in the different levels of
rising nationalism and populism.

Table 1.
Table showing the difference in MIPEX scores, and number of migrants taken by each country.

29
 Countries MIPEX score Number of Migrants (2015)
Germany 58 441,899
Sweden 86 156,110

Limitations
Although the proposed methodology appears thorough and appropriate for the topic of
inquiry, this study has a number of limitations that could compromise the validity and reliability
of the results. Sample bias, social desirability bias, data accessibility, contextual considerations,
and an excessive dependence on secondary data are a few of these drawbacks. Since respondents
are self-selected and may not be representative of the overall community, using survey datasets
could result in sampling bias. Additionally, the European Commission, which conducts the
Eurobarometer poll, may create bias. Likewise, respondents may give responses to survey
questions that are socially acceptable, which could undermine the validity of the findings. For
example, respondents may underreport their nationalist feelings or overreport their acceptance of
immigrants to conform to social norms. The availability of data from the identified surveys and
other sources may limit the scope and depth of the study. In some cases, data may be outdated or
not available for all the identified countries, which may limit the generalisability of the findings.
In addition, the use of secondary data may limit the researcher's control over the data collection
process, and the quality of the data may be affected by errors or inconsistencies in the original
sources. Thus, the study may not fully capture the contextual factors that contribute to the rise of
nationalism and populism in each country. Factors such as those outlined as potential extraneous
variables may have an impact on nationalist feelings and populism, and thus may not be fully
captured by the data sources. Overall, while the proposed methodology provides a
comprehensive approach to understanding the rise of nationalism and populism in the identified
countries, the limitations of the study should be considered when interpreting the findings.

Data analysis
Germany
Germany welcomed more refugees than any other EU member state (Hertner, 2021). The
large influx of people—many of whom were Syrian refugees—posed an overwhelming political
problem. This same phenomenon took place in Sweden, while the number of migrants was

30
significantly lower than Germany, in relation to the percentage of native population, they too
took in one of the largest amounts of migrants in the EU. For Germany, this contributed to the
growth of the xenophobic and far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) bringing into focus
continuing discussions about the position of migrants in German society. The migrant crisis and
threat posed by the AfD encouraged it to become even more active. Until 2013, Germany did not
see immigration as a pressing issue for policymakers, with salience of the issue only peaking in
late 2015 and remaining at the top of the political and public agenda since. (support from survey)
It is this which paved the way for AfD to rise in profile as Germany’s foremost anti-immigrant
party. Moreover, German public opinion has been keen on a government that controls and
manages migration effectively, rather than one which prevents migrants from settling all together
(Vehrkamp & Wratil, 2017). Coupled with the public opinion that immigrants need to earn their
right to acquire citizenship, the rising support for parties who made it clear this was their main
goal grew in support. The graph below depicts this growth in party support starting from its
curation in 2013. From this it is clear, mass support for AfD peaked in around 2015, which one
can accurately accredit to the migration crisis. Yet, in the years following voter support appears
to have fallen, yet never reaching pre-crisis levels. Allowing for one to interpret its permanence
as a dominate party within Germany.

Integration Policy

31
 Having previously held low priority, Germany, like the majority of MIPEX countries,
strengthened its integration policies from 2014 to 2019, gaining one point on the MIPEX scale of
100. Yet, further analysis shows Germany did not substantially alter its integration strategy in
response to the large-scale arrivals in 2015–2016, but instead enhanced its execution through
collections of procedures and funds (). Improving the integration policy's supply side in the
process. Resulting in its current score of 58/100 (MIPEX, 2020), placing it in the temporary
category ranking. Greater assistance for equal socioeconomic chances for newcomers was the
government's top aim. The federal and state governments increased educational guidance and
materials like "Reading for Beginners" (Lesestart) and the app "Starting German," and started to
address one minor area of weakness—education—in Germany. Moreover, German policymakers
have expressed the responsibility of successful integration policy rests on society as a collective.
Thus, integration is not mutually exclusive from society; it also requires migrants to commit
themselves, thus public opinion polls indicate 75% of Germans agree integration can only
succeed if it is a mutual process between the individual and society. (Eurobarometer)
Analysing Germany’s integration policy through a differentialist lens (Entzinger & Scholten,
2014) one can see assimilation to the dominant culture as a primary criterion for allocating
citizenship, thus so long as migrants agree to adopt the mainstream culture of the host country
they are permitted to citizenship. This view is further supported through results obtained by
Eurobarometer’s survey, with many requiring the adoption of their native language, values, and
norms in order to be granted permanent residence.

32
 The integration policy implemented in Germany aimed to address the challenges posed by
rising nationalism, promoting social cohesion by means of language, education, economic
integration, social support, and community engagement. One of the key aspects of integration
policy was to focus on language training and education for refugees. With 90% of the public
stating a need for migrants to speak the native language of the host country, it was essential
policy makers provided effective language courses and access to education to successfully
integrate individuals into society, find employment, and contribute to the economy. The success
of this policy can be determined by the number of migrants who after arriving in Germany, can
successfully understand and speak the language. The figure below indicates the number of
migrants who can successfully speak German. Not only is language proficiency crucial for social
interaction, breaking down barriers and fostering understanding among different communities,
but also measures the active success of the policy.
INSERT FIGURE OF NUMBER THAT SPEAK GERMAN VS THOSE THAT DON’T
The integration policy also emphasized the importance of economic integration, assisting
migrants in finding employment. The policy aimed to enhance their self-sufficiency and reduce
their dependency on welfare benefits. As the literature outlined previously, this concern of
migrants straining the welfare system was suggested as one of the primary factors behind the
public falling victim of rising xenophobia towards migrant groups, thus contributing to the

33
growth of subsequent parties who promised to fix these issues. By integrating migrants into the
economy, this approach helps dispel negative stereotypes and counteracts the perception that
refugees are a burden on the economy. However further analysis shows this to be only partially
successful, with ___% of the public maintaining the perspective that migrants drain the welfare
system.
Additionally, the integration policy placed significant emphasis on providing social
support to refugees. This involved initiatives such as mentorship programs, community centers,
and intercultural dialogue to encourage interaction between refugees and local residents. By
promoting social integration and fostering relationships, these measures help break down
prejudices and build trust within communities. However, when analysing the extent to which this
rings true, Eurobarometer paints a different picture. Only 19% of Germans interact daily with
migrants, whereas 25% percent never do. Therefore, the extent to which the integration policy
successfully fosters social cohesion, is limited. Allowing one to discredit the success of the
policy, and in turn imply perhaps Germany’s weak integration policy paved the success of AfD.
The lack of social interaction could also be interpreted as a means of fostering separation
between ‘them’ and ‘us’. Therefore, one can state, as a result of Germany’s weak integration
policy, prejudice remained towards migrant groups, thus limiting the extent to which the rise in
nationalism was successfully mediated.

National sentiment towards migrants

34
 Coupled with public opinion, Germany’s integration approach encouraged the public to
see immigrants as their neighbours, but also unequal to native German citizens. Allowing for one
to interpret this approach as fundamentally ‘separate but equal’. Integration policies emerge as
one of the strongest factors shaping not only the public’s willingness to accept and interact with
immigrants, but also immigrants’ own attitudes, belonging, participation in their new home
country. It is therefore enlightening to analyse national sentiment towards migrants and the
influence this opinion has on the growth of far-right parties. It is undeniable to see based on
empirical evidence that public opinion towards refugees has predominately been driven by
economic pragmatism (Eurobarometer, 2021). Additionally, attitudes towards immigration are a
multidimensional construct, thus when framing attitudes people consider economic and cultural
impact, and if a country has an obligation to host migrants into their perception how worthy a
migrant is to assimilation (Talò, 2017).
When coupled with the integration policy, one can imply public perception of migrants
corresponds with the exisitng trend. Based on survey’s there is still a large percentage of the
German population holding apprehensions and mistrust towards the complete immersion of
migrant communities into society. Adding weight to the argument that German integration policy
has had a weak impact on the successful promotion of social cohesion and combating rising
nationalism.

Policy influence

35
 The analysis shows Germany’s approach is average for western OECD countries. With
its integration policy leaving non-EU migrants insecure about their future in the country and only
go halfway to provide them with equal basic rights. The main weakness in Germany’s approach
is that non-EU migrants face greater delays, uncertainty, and obstacles to secure their future in
Germany than in nearly all MIPEX countries. Moreover, when examining the extent to which its
integration policy successfully curbed the rising nationalism, its influence is minimal. While
inherent support for AfD did not continuously rise at the rate it did during the crisis, it never
reverted to its pre-crisis levels, indicating its permanence and dominance in the political
atmosphere for many Germans. Reaching an audience rejecting social cohesion and assimilation
of migrants. While the policy itself may have taken active strives to promote the successful
assimilation of migrants in terms of language and education programmes, the extent to which
these where wholly successful is limited. Many nativists maintain their stance about the
immersion of migrants into society, adopting a ‘separate but equal’ perspective, thus discrediting
the extent to which integration policies wholly promoted social cohesion throughout Germany,
while simultaneously curbing rising nationalism through support for AfD.
Sweden
Like Germany, Sweden was one of Europe’s main receivers of asylum seekers during the
refugee crisis, with almost 163,000 applicants (Swedish Migration Agency, 2019). When
compared to the number of native citizens, this intake of migrants was astronomical. In response,
the government took measures to curb the potential negative impacts of adopting such a high
number of migrants. Some of these included the temporary reinstallation of border checks,
restrictions on the attainment of residence permits, and the attempts to facilitate the repatriation
of rejected asylum seekers to their countries of origin (). Traditionally, the Nordic countries have
the reputation of having generous policies towards migrants. Yet, recently this attitude evolved
to be more hostile with the rise of populist parties. In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats have
gained enough votes to become represented in parliament (). Since then, the party has grown in
popularity with its anti-multicultural and anti-integration arguments remaining high on the
party’s agenda. Coupled with opinion polls showing the frictions on Swedish society left by high
migration levels, it is compelling to see many voters expressing immigration and integration as
their main area of concern (). Allowing for the staggering growth in voting shares for SD, as
depicted in the graph below.

36
Integration Policy
Unlike Germany, Sweden did not fundamentally change its existing approach to
integration, rather it focused on improving implementation and introducing restrictions on family
reunification and health policies. Resulting in a one-point decrease in its MIPEX score, and an
overall score of 86% at the time of the most recent measurement in 2020. Placing it in the top
five highest scoring countries in the index, meaning it adopts a comprehensive and successful
approach to integration, guaranteeing equal rights, opportunities and security for immigrants and
citizens alike. Policies therefore encourage the public to see immigrants as their equals,
neighbours, and potential citizens (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2020). An analysis of actual
success of this is evident in the results obtained by Eurobarometer, outlining the extent to which
the public felt comfortable having a migrant as one of the following: doctor, family members,
work colleague, manager etc. The figure below visualises this.

37
 Based on the figure above, it is convincing to state Sweden’s integration policy
successfully promoted trust and social cohesion between migrants and natives. This success is
amplified when compared with the comfortability of the German public towards migrants
composing the same pillars of society. As outlined in the figure below, the overall strength and
success of Sweden’s approach in nearly double. Allowing one to accurately state, Sweden
implemented a strong policy, which successfully obtained social tolerance and cohesion.

Figure 4.

Graph showing the percentage of individuals who feel comfortable having an immigrant as one
of the following.

38
Source: Eurobarometer, 2021.

A further explanation for the success of Sweden’s tolerance towards migrants stems from
its integration policy itself. Efforts were made to provide suitable accommodation, ensuring
migrants are placed in diverse communities. Thus, promoting integration at the residential level,
fostering interactions between refugees and the local population, and creating opportunities for
social cohesion. This perspective explains why Sweden scored higher than Germany in
answering the number of interactions they have with migrants and tolerance towards migrants.
With 83% of the Swedish public stating they are totally comfortable with a migrant being their
neighbour, compared to only 46% of the German public holding the same view (Eurobarometer).
By fostering a society that values diversity, integration policies seek to counteract nationalist
tendencies, promoting inclusivity and understanding.
Further understanding of Sweden’s policy stems from a universalist framework, as
outlined by Entzinger and Scholten (2014), this lens does not define migrants in terms of their
cultural or ethnic background, rather it refrains from explicitly demanding newcomers to adopt
the mainstream culture, minimising the role of the state. Despite Sweden adopting a largely
universalist approach in many aspects, public opinion suggests in terms of integration policy this
is not the case. With __% of the public stating the state and the public alike hold a mutual
obligation to successful assimilation. Yet, where this framework rings true, is evident in the
means provided by the state, unlike in Germany, language and education programmes are less
evident despite __% stating a need for migrants to adopt the language.

39
National sentiment towards migrants
By capturing the perspectives of the Swedish population, these surveys offer a quantitative
basis for assessing public sentiment and evaluating the success of integration efforts in lowering
nationalism.
Policy influence
Comparison
Germany and Sweden have made efforts to receive and integrate newcomers, and both
countries strive for a multicultural society. Implying that in an ideal society, newcomers enjoy
equal opportunities, while they are able to maintain their heritage culture, and identity. In both
countries this ideal is only partially put into practice, with non-Western migrants facing far
greater challenges to integration than Western migrants—but the systematic analysis of the
MIPEX scores showed that Sweden out-performs Germany in all domains of migrant integration,
scoring especially well in terms of labor market integration. This interpretation of the data is
further supported when refereeing to public opinion obtained through the surveys (see appendix).
The different performances in terms of migrant integration can be partly ascribed to the
fact that Sweden developed a much more comprehensive integration policy than Germany.
During the previous government’s tenure, immigration and acceptance rates for migrants have
increased, notwithstanding the strong anti-immigration discourse maintained by the Secretary of
State for Asylum, Migration, and Administrative Simplification. In general, Sweden is a more
migrant-friendly nation than Germany, offering newcomers the same social welfare provisions as
native-born Swedes. This reveals that Sweden regards migrants as highly valuable. This might be
partially related to the fact that Sweden is a relatively large country with a small population, but
it also signifies cultural differences (Sweden aims to be a leading nation in terms of humanitarian
aid and social equality), and a failure of Germany’s government to identify and use migrants’
human capital in an efficient way. More generally, migration is framed in Sweden in terms of
opportunities, while the German government has presented migration as a burden. In fact,
immigration can be both—an opportunity and a burden—and much depends on the willingness
of migrants to adapt to the host society, and the willingness of the receiving society—both the
government and the native population—to assist them in this process. This ideal collaborative
process for successful integration was shown to be of importance to 75% of German
respondents, and 80% of Swedish respondents (Eurobarometer, 2021). The better migrants

40
perform, for instance, in the labor market, the less they drain from social welfare provisions, and
the more they contribute to the maintenance of the social system itself.
It is therefore wiser to put the greatest efforts into the integration of migrants and to
develop policies which counteract segregation and discrimination in all domains of society. This
requires a positive, open attitude from the receiving society. Governments set an example for
society at large by the type of policies they develop and apply, but maybe even more so by the
language which politicians use in public. Both countries have implemented integration policies
and made efforts to address the challenges associated with rising nationalism and anti-immigrant
sentiments. Yet, the two adopt drastically different means of implementing this ideal policy.
With Germany focusing on language training, vocational programs, and economic integration
measures to facilitate integration. Sweden has emphasized a more socio-economic approach with
language acquisition, education, housing, and community engagement. Undoubtably, public
opinion plays a significant role in shaping both integration policies and wider politics. The
attitudes of the native population towards migrants can influence the implementation and
effectiveness of integration measures. As well as the way in which party’s frame themselves to
gain electoral support. Public opinion surveys indicate that attitudes towards immigration and
integration have varied in both Germany and Sweden, with shifts in sentiment over time
(European Value Survey, __; European Social Survey, __; Eurobarometer, 2021).
Ultimately, determining which country’s integration policy successfully lowered anti-
immigrant attitudes requires a detailed assessment of specific policies, their outcomes, and their
alignment with the broader social, economic, and political context of each country. With
Germany scoring the lowest in terms of tolerance of migrants in everyday scenarios. Perhaps one
could suggest the lower support for the standards of assimilation to be explained by a
fundamental lack of tolerance for permanent assimilation of migrants, of which has been
encouraged by a weak integration policy. Thereby limiting the extent to which migrants are
woven with the public’s daily life. Whereas, in Sweden, despite its higher standards of necessary
means for integration the surveys indicated a drastically higher level of tolerance towards
migrants. While the analysis shows Germany is less comfortable with migrants than Sweden,
many suggest the existing integration policy is adequate, with 33% stating the integration of
migrants is successful. Yet, this position is challenged when analysing the number of the
population who either interact with migrants daily or has a friend/family member from a migrant

41
community. In Germany this number is shockingly low, with only 11% having a friend who is a
migrant. In Sweden this figure reaches 21%, nearly double that of Germany. Therefore, adding
weight to the statement, Sweden’s integration policy has been more successful than Germany in
fostering social cohesion and the integration of migrants. However, in relation to the extent to
which this has also successfully controlled rising nationalist sentiment, the evidence is less
compelling.
Despite the rising tolerance of Swedes towards migrants, there remains an ever-increasing
number of votes and support for the SD. Meaning nationalism is still on the rise, and the
comfortability of the general public in adopting more migrants in minimal. Thus, the extent to
which strong integration policy results in a decrease in nationalism is minimal. Furthermore, for
Germany, despite an overtly weak integration policy, AfD is growing at a slower and less drastic
pace than the SD. Therefore, based on this trend, we can say a country’s integration policy
contributes to its population’s perception of migrants, but has a minimal effect on the extent it
can restrict the rise in nationalism. Despite Sweden having the strongest integration policy, it
holds a stronger rise in nationalism than Germany, as evident in voter support for the SD in
comparison to AfD. The discussion will outline possible explanations for this.
(insert graph combining the rise in SD and AfD voter support)

Discussion and Conclusion

Conclusion
The reason for studying Germany and Sweden as the two cases for this research was that
the countries are relatively similar and comparable to each other in many political, economic,
and social aspects. Nonetheless, the purpose of this research was to investigate whether the

42
countries have progressed in terms of nationalism differently due to one aspect, integration
policies. In the existing literature, scholars emphasised apprehensions towards migrants stem
from cultural and economic explanations. The more the public senses cultural and economic
erosion, the less social cohesion would flourish, resulting in higher levels of nationalism. As
evident in support for far-right parties, claiming limit migrant groups erosion of a host country’s
culture, norms, and values. This translated to a rise in nationalism expressed by the host
population. These studies often pointed to perceived economic and social strain and competition
as causes for this phenomenon. So, while the evidence remains mixed, nowadays the negative
relationship prevails.
In Germany, the relationship between the public and migrants was complex. Having
adopted a variety of policies and frameworks, the country largely struggled with successful
integration and social cohesion. Resulting in a large amount of distrust towards migrant
communities prevailing despite the implementation of integration policies. During the first few
years following the migration crisis, support for Germany’s far-right party AfD rapidly grew in
support, having emerged as the country’s predominant anti-immigrant party. While this is a
development which positively supports the relationship between integration policies and
nationalism, the initial expectations have not been wholly fulfilled.
Similarly, Sweden has progressed in terms of the level of migrant integration in the
country. Especially on the level of social cohesion, assimilation in the labour market, and other
relevant fields. Sweden scores progressively high on the MIPEX index, claiming its places in the
top five strongest integration policies. However, despite this harmonized multicultural society,
support for the far-right party SD prevails at an alarming rate. Hence, limiting the extent to
which strong integration policies can limit the growth of nationalism.
Findings
In order to establish what the influence of integration policies has been on diminishing
the rising nationalism, the hypothesis created in the beginning of this study will be answered:

H1a: As the number of migrants entering a country increase, support for immigration will
decrease.

43
The weight of the evidence makes it convincing to state upon the mass influx of migrants to both
countries, support for immigration decreased, as seen with the rise in support for parties who
promoted anti-immigration policies and views. Therefore, the hypothesis is supported.

H1b: As the number of migrants entering a country increase, nationalism will increase.
Regarding nationalism, Germany and Sweden’s large large influx of migrants in comparison to
their native population, resulted in rising levels of nationalism following the 2015 crisis.
Therefore, the hypothesis is supported

H2a: Countries with a large influx of migrants and strong integration policies will experience
lower levels of rising nationalism.
Despite Sweden’s strong integration policy and large influx of migrants, there remained a high
degree of nationalism. Therefore, the hypothesis is not supported.

H2b: Countries with a large influx of migrants and weak integration policies will experience
higher levels of rising nationalism.
While Germany had a weak integration policy and a large influx of migrants, nationalism did not
rise at a significantly higher level than Sweden. Therefore, the hypothesis is not supported.

Based on these findings, it can be concluded that while it was expected that a strong
integration policy would have the capability to dimmish the rise in nationalism, this was not
entirely true. Alternatively, in Sweden, where their integration policy is praised by organisations
for being the strongest globally, the level of nationalism continued to drastically increase.
Therefore, the impact of integration policy on nationalism was only moderately positive.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of integration policy on
nationalism, through the case of Germany and Sweden. The majority of the literature outlined an
expected positive relationship between the two variables (increasing levels of migrants and
nationalism). What made the case of Sweden and Germany interesting, is that both had taken in a
high influx of migrants in 2015 in relation to the percentage of the native population. Which as
the literature outlined contributed towards the sharp increase in far-right party support. While

44
Sweden is commonly referred to as a universalist state, providing equal opportunities to migrants
and natives alike, Germany is understood to preserve a distinction between ‘them and us’. Yet
despite this distinction there remained a rise in support for far-right parties (SD and AfD) in both
nations. Calling into question the extent to which a strong integration policy can mediate this
relationship, thus creating the perfect antipode to the literature. Even though the results of the
study are not in line with the expectations based on the literature, there are similarities. First, the
literature expected a rise in support for far-right parties as a result of rising number of migrants
in a host country. In other words, the more migrants in a country, the more nationalistic and anti-
immigrant it becomes. According to Inglehart & Norris (2016), the success of far-right parties
may be understood as a ‘cultural backlash’, whereby cultural values have risen in importance in
adjacence to cultural concerns paired with immigration. One can interpret this in line with
increasing levels of nationalism, as voters fear the erosion of cultural norms and values at the
hands of migrants and a multicultural society (Halikipoulou & Vlandas, 2020). This became
reality following the 2015 crisis, when the crisis pushed hundreds of thousands of migrants onto
Europe’s shores. Resulting in not only cultural fears but also economic, as seen through the
labour market competition hypothesis (Malhotra et al, 2013). Allowing for the implication that
economic deprivation is linked to out-group hostility, ultimately resulting in rising support for
anti-immigrant parties whose primary agenda was to amend this rivalry between the migrant and
native population. As a result, Germany and Sweden saw the rising dominance of far-right
parties following 2015.
Secondly, the role of integration policies came to light. Without successfully integrating
migrants into society, there is a higher likelihood of maintained or increased hostility and distrust
towards the ‘out group’. Which was expected to translate into voter support for far-right parties.
Implying, if a nation implements a strong integration policy, the extent to which their country
increases dominance of populist parties is of a lesser extent than those who implement weaker
policies. Coupled with the public backlash previous immigration policies received, such as
Merkle’s ‘welcome culture’, Germany was careful to not appear overly liberal in its acceptance
of migrants, instead portraying the influx as a moral obligation. Yet from the public’s view, it
becomes clear that this was not the case, rather it was this approach which pushed many into the
arms of AfD. With 89% of AfD voters stating they thought Merkle’s immigration policies
ignored the concerns of the people (). Hence, as predicted by the literature, far-right parties

45
profited off rising concerns of migrants (POLL STAT), in the shape of a cultural backlash. With
German support for the far-right doubling after the migration crisis. Important is that this study
was not an examination of the correlation between rising migrant levels and perceived populism,
yet an analysis of the role integration policies played in limiting nationalism.
As concluded in the section above, the relationship was moderately positive. Nonetheless,
it is interesting to discuss why the objective, limiting the growth of nationalism, was not wholly
met. In other words, why was the relationship between stronger integration policies and lower
levels of nationalism not significantly positive? Nationalism often thrives on the notion of
individual nations having control over their own destiny. Integration policies that transfer
decision-making authority to supranational bodies may be seen as diminishing national
autonomy. This perceived loss of control can strengthen nationalist sentiments. Thus, despite a
strong policy, nationalism can still flourish.
Another reason why the expected relationship has not been significantly positive is that
the policy is of threat of a political backlash. Stronger integration policies can lead to a political
backlash from nationalist parties or groups who perceive the policies as eroding national
sovereignty. These parties may gain popularity and influence, further fueling nationalist
sentiments and hindering the objective of reducing nationalism. Therefore, while Sweden
expressed higher tolerance towards migrants as a result of their strong integration, this did not
directly translate in a lower support for the SD. Therefore, limiting the extent to which one
results in the other. This leads to the question what would have happened to the level of
nationalism if the policy had never been implemented? To answer this, one can look to the
analysis of Germany, where despite the weak integration policy resulting in a lower tolerance of
migrant communities, the sharp increasing support for the far-right did not continue on the same
magnitude as seen in Sweden. Possible explanations for this can come from size comparisons of
the countries in terms of population. Perhaps statistically, it appears the SD continued rising
significantly in support when compared to Germany merely because their population is smaller.
Moreover, Germany has significantly more parties to choose from, which could serve as a further
explanation. Or could it be that the pressures of mass migration will inevitably cause a society to
lean towards xenophobic nationalism?
Moreover, a final alternative explanation for the existing relationship could come from
the economic position of the country. As the literature outlined, countries with a strong socio-

46
economic position as less likely to fall victim to anti-immigrant views. Thereby limiting the
appeal of far-right parties. Thus, it is plausible to infer countries suffering from economic crisis
are more likely to lean towards populism, this relationship however could serve as a platform for
further research.
Limitations of research design and future research
When conducting qualitative research, establishing full causality can be difficult.
Regardless of the fact that this study takes reliability and validity measures into account, it is
impossible to fully exclude the relationship from other influences. Moreover, when
operationalizing the variables used in this study, these cannot be excluded from selection bias.
Especially since this study focuses on the broader concept of nationalism, the selection for the
indicators can never be fully objective. Selection bias may also apply to the case selection in
general. Countries who received the most migrants during the crisis are more likely to experience
strains on society. Therefore, creating a biased position for case selection.
Moreover, it is difficult to assign the studied effect completely to the role of integration
policies or the migration crisis. As indicated above, concerns over migration were rising before
2015, while this extraneous event accelerated the growing anti-immigrant sentiment throughout
Europe, this phenomenon is not mutually exclusive to this event. Related to this is the fact that
the integration policy only had a small-time frame to positively influence the level nationalism.
While Sweden portrayed the relationship between strong integration policy and increasing
tolerance of migrants. It cannot be directly assumed this will also translate into voter’s political
views. While integration policies may curate a cohesive society, they do not holistically mitigate
the fears of cultural and economic backlash. Therefore, it is difficult to expect major changes in
the level of voter support for far-right parties and subsequent lowering levels of nationalism.
Such developments take time, thus perhaps investigating this relationship over a larger time
period would provide better insights.
Following this study, several recommendations can be made for future research. Research
could investigate the distinctive economic, political, or social impact and consequences of
integration policy, broadening the consequences beyond merely rising nationalism, as all three
factors play a significant role. Secondly, expanding the number of cases utilised could provide
further insights. Rather than examining two countries, perhaps looking at the role of integration

47
policy in mitigating nationalism in a diverse selection of cases with different levels of migration
could be insightful.
Based on the discussion above, it becomes clear that while a strong integration policy
was successful in promoting social cohesion and limiting the threat of a cultural backlash, it was
not wholly successful in terms of attributing lower levels of nationalism to this same strong
integration policy.

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 Appendix

European Social Survey:

 Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants

o B44 And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally
undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?
 Immigrants make country worse or better place to live
o B45 Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live
here from other countries?
 Qualification for immigration: speak country's official language
o D1-6 Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in
deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be
able to come and live here. Please use this card. Firstly, how important should it be
for them to... ...be able to speak [country's official language(s)]?
 Qualification for immigration: committed to way of life in country
o D1-6 Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in
deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be
able to come and live here. Please use this card. Firstly, how important should it be
for them to... ...be committed to the way of life in [country]?

European Value Survey

 Don’t like immigrants/foreign workers as neighbours

 Willing to fight for your country
 Are you proud to be a citizen of your country?
 Immigrants: impact the development of [your country]
 Immigrants take away jobs from [nationality]
 Immigrants increase crime problems
 Immigrants are a strain on welfare system
 It is better if immigrants maintain/not maintain their own customs?
 It is important to have been born in [country]
 Important: to respect [country nationality] political institutions and laws
 Important: to have [country nationality] ancestry
 Important: to be able to speak [national language]
 Important: to share [national] culture
 Important: to be born in Europe
 Important: to share European culture
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  Are you concerned with: immigrants
 Important: to have European ancestry

Table showing Eruobarometer survey answers 519 – Integration of Immigrants in the European
Union (Sweden and Germany) 2021.

Question Germany Sweden

To what extent do you agree
or not with the following
statements?

77% agrees 92% agrees

a. Actively promoting
the integration of
immigrants is a
necessary investment
in the long run for
(OUR COUNTRY)
b. The government is
53% agrees 43% agrees
doing enough to
actively promote the
integration of
immigrants into our
society.

Thinking about the successful

integration of immigrants into
society, which of the
following statements is
closest to your personal
view?

a. Immigrants 19% 13%

themselves are mostly

55
 responsible.
b. Society is mostly
4% 7%
responsible
c. Integration is a two-
75% 80%
way process where
immigrants and
society are both
responsible
d. Don’t know
2% 0%

Generally speaking, how 46% successful 41% successful

successful or not is the
integration of most
immigrants living in the
city/area where you live?
Generally speaking, how 38% successful 25% successful
successful or not is the
integration of most
immigrants living in (OUR
COUNTRY)?
People have different views
about what it means to be
well integrated into society.
How important is each of the
following for the successful
integration of immigrants in
your country?

a. Being able to speak

90% 98%
the country
language/being able to

56
 speak at least one of
the official languages
of the country?
b. Contributing to the
welfare system by
paying taxes 72% 94%
c. Being committed to
the way of life in the
country by accepting
78% 95%
the values and norms
of society
d. Having educational
qualifications and
skills that are
81% 94%
sufficient to find a job
e. Feeling like a member
of society

71% 97% agree

Generally speaking, do you
think immigration from
outside the EU is more of a
problem or more of an
opportunity for (OUR
COUNTRY) today?

27%
a. More of a problem 31%
b. Is more of an 26%
31%

57
 opportunity
c. Equally a problem and
an opportunity 43% 34%
d. Is neither a problem
3% 3%
or opportunity
e. Don’t know
1% 1%
Generally speaking, would
you say that there are more
immigrants who are staying
legally or illegally in (OUR
COUNTRY)?
48% 83%
a. There are more
immigrants who are
staying legally
23% 5%
b. There are more
immigrants who are
staying illegally
c. There are about the 21% 7%
same number of
legally and illegally
staying immigrants
3% 1%
d. You cannot tell
whether immigrants
are staying legally or
illegally
e. Don’t know
5% 4%

Overall, to what extent do 38% informed 69% informed

you think that you are well
informed or not about

58
immigration and integration
related matters?
How do you
predominantly/mainly obtain
the relevant information on
immigration and integration
related matters?
58% 75%
a. Newspaper/tv/radio
b. Social media and 18% 11%
networks
9% 4%
c. Discussions with
family and trusted
friends
d. Observations on what 7% 3%
is going on in my
local area
e. Discussions with 6% 5%
colleagues
1% 1%
f. Other
g. Don’t know 1% 1%

Would you personally feel

comfortable or uncomfortable
having an immigrant as your

51% totally comfortable 87% totally comfortable

a. Friend
b. Work colleague 48% totally comfortable 86% totally comfortable
c. Neighbour
46% totally comfortable 83% totally comfortable
d. Doctor
49% totally comfortable 75% totally comfortable
e. Family member
(including partner)

59
 f. Manager
44% totally comfortable 76% totally comfortable

77% totally comfortable

42% totally comfortable
Which of the following
statements applies best to you

a. You have friends who

43% 58%
are immigrants
currently living in
(OUR COUNTRY)
b. You have both friends
11% 21%
and family members
who are immigrants
currently living in
(OUR COUNTRY)
7% 5%
c. You have family
members who are
immigrants currently
living in (OUR
COUNTRY)
d. None 37% 15%

e. Refusal 1% 0%
f. Don’t know
1%
1%

On average, how often do

you interact socially with
immigrants?

19% 29%
a. Daily
b. Once a week 25% 33%

60
 c. Once a month
d. One a year
22% 21%
e. Less often or never 8% 7%
f. Not applicable
25% 10%

1% 0%

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