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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

The Peace Palace

The Hague, The Netherlands

THE 2025 PHILIP C. JESSUP INTERNATIONAL LAW

MOOT COURT COMPETITION

CASE CONCERNING THE NAEGEA SEA

THE UNION OF AMBROSIA

(APPLICANT)
V.
THE REPUBLIC OF ROVINIA
(RESPONDENT)

MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT

2025
 TABLE OF CONTENT

Rights and Obligation of the International community when there are competing claims
to the legitimate presidency of the state ........................................................................................3
A) Legitimacy of Transitional council as Government of Ambrosia ...........................................3
i. The Transitional Council Exercised Effective Control Over Ambrosia ...................................4
ii. Exercise of governmental authority ............................................................................................. 4
B) Will of people in recognition the legitimacy of transitional council ................................... 5

C) The Council's Formation Was Necessitated by Constitutional Crisis .................................... 5

D) International Recognition received by The Transitional Council ........................................... 6

Invocation of immunity of government official accused of grave Human Rights

violations .............................................................................................................................................. 8
A) Ms. Cross former government official is not entitled to immunity. ........................................8
i. Immunity for acts performed in official capacity does not apply to human rights violations
under Article 7 of The International Law Commission Draft Articles on Immunity ................. 8
ii. United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property
(2004) supports Rovinia claim that Ms. Cross should not be granted immunity for human
rights violations for which she is accused. ....................................................................................... 9
B) Rovinia’s assertion of criminal jurisdiction for “enforced disappearance” over Ms. Cross,
and her arrest and prosecution, are fully consistent with international law. .............................. 10
i. Legal Basis for Accusations under The International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance. .......................................................................................... 10
ii. International Precedents Supporting the Prosecution of Ms. Cross ...................................... 11
iii. Failure of Ambrosia to Investigate Enforced disappearance amounting to Human Rights
violation. ............................................................................................................................................. 12
C) Universal Jurisdiction of Rovinia to prosecute Ms. Cross. .................................................. 12
i. Rovinia Justifying its Jurisdiction .............................................................................................. 13
ii. Principle of Universal Jurisdiction ..................................................................................................
D) ICJ’s lack of jurisdiction to address the matter of arrest and prosecution of Ms. Cross by
Rovinia .............................................................................................................................................. 14

The legal consequences of receding coastline for the maritime zone of coastal state
A) Ambrosia's Fixed Baselines Violate the Requirements of UNCLOS. ................................... 14
i. Ambulatory Baselines as the Norm Under UNCLOS ............................................................... 15
ii. Violation of UNCLOS Article 5 .................................................................................................. 15
iii. Erosion of High Seas Freedoms ................................................................................................ 16
iv. Undermining Maritime Stability and Predictability ................................................................. 17
B) Ambrosia's Fixed Baselines Lack Sufficient Legal Basis. ..................................................... 17
i. Lack of Customary Practice Established ..................................................................................... 17
ii. No Legal Justification in the Vienna Convention ..................................................................... 18
iii. Contravention of UNCLOS's Purpose and Principles ............................................................. 19
C) Rovinia's Rights and the Broader Implications of Ambrosia's Fixed Baselines. ................ 20
i. Triton Shoal as High Seas .............................................................................................................. 20
ii. Inequitable Impacts on Other States ........................................................................................... 21
iii. Lack of Global Acceptance and Legal Precedents ................................................................... 21

The interpretation of the compromissory clause in a treaty creating a regional

organization.
A) The Limits of the ICJ's Jurisdiction Under the OCDP Charter ............................................... 21

i. The Arrest Warrant Case and the Principle of Domestic Jurisdiction ..................................... 24
ii Distinguishing the OCDP Charter from the CERD Convention .............................................. 25
B) Interpreting the Compromissory Clause in the OCDP Charter
.............................................................................................................................................................. 26

i. Applying the Principles of Treaty Interpretation ............................................................................... 26

ii The Lack of a Compromissory Clause Similar to Article 22 of CERD ............................................ 26

Prayer for relief ................................................................................................................................ 27

 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

UN Documents, Treaties, and Conventions:

1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – For baseline requirements
and high seas freedoms.

2. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – Referenced regarding treaty interpretation and
modification.

3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 1(1) – Concerning
the right of self-determination.

4. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Article 20 – On self-determination and

governance legitimacy.

5. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance –
For defining and prosecuting enforced disappearances.

6. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Article 9– Concerning acts by

persons exercising governmental authority.

ICJ Cases:

1. Tinoco Arbitration (1923)– Regarding effective control in recognizing governments.

2. Arantzazu Mendi Case – Establishing legitimacy of governments based on effective

control.

3. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969) – For principles of predictability and stability in
maritime delimitation.

4. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda – On state responsibility for human rights
violations.

5. Belgium v. Senegal– Emphasizing obligations to prosecute or extradite for jus cogens

crimes.

6. Monetary Gold Case (Italy v. France, United Kingdom, and United States)– Establishing
the principle of consent in ICJ jurisdiction.

7. Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) (1994) – On maintaining stability in

international law.

8. Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France; New Zealand v. France) (1974)– Emphasizing
the integrity of the international legal order.

9. Portugal v. Australia – Reinforcing the principle of consent in ICJ jurisdiction.

Other International and Domestic Cases:

1. Mohamed v. Breish – Regarding recognition of de facto governments.

2. State v. Dosso (1958) – Cited for the doctrine of necessity in governance.

3. Gdynia Amerika Linie v. Boguslawski– On recognition of governments arising during

crises.

4. Samantar v. Yousuf– Limiting immunity for officials involved in serious crimes.

5. Letelier v. Republic of Chile – Rejecting immunity for politically motivated assassinations.

6. Khurts Bat v. The Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court – On denying
immunity in abuse of authority cases.

7. United States v. Roy M. Belfast, Jr. – Applying universal jurisdiction for serious human
rights violations.
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

Issue 1: Rights and obligations of the international community when there are competing
claims to the legitimate presidency of a state.

Rovinia submits that its recognition of the Transitional Council as the legitimate government
of Ambrosia was in accordance with international law. This was based on the Council's
effective control over Ambrosia's territory and government functions, the necessity of the
Council's formation due to a constitutional crisis caused by the absent Vice-President Zavala,
and the Council's broad recognition compared to the limited support for Zavala's claim. Rovinia
argues that the effective control doctrine, the will of the Ambrosian people, and the principle
of necessity justify the Council's legitimacy, in contrast to Zavala's lack of effective
governance. Rovinia further contends that its actions aligned with legal principles emphasizing
effective control over formal constitutional legitimacy.

Issue 2: Invocation of immunity of government official accused of grave Human Rights

violation.

Rovinia asserts that Ms. Cross, Ambrosia's former Interior Minister, is not entitled to immunity
for her alleged involvement in human rights violations, specifically enforced disappearances.
Rovinia argues that immunity ratione materiae does not extend to crimes under international
law, such as crimes against humanity and enforced disappearances, based on the ILC Draft
Articles on Immunity and customary international law. Rovinia contends its prosecution of Ms.
Cross is fully consistent with international law, as the prohibition of enforced disappearances
is a jus cogens norm, and Ambrosia's failure to investigate the allegations justifies Rovinia's
exercise of universal jurisdiction.

Issue 3: The legal consequences of receding coastlines for the maritime zones of coastal
states.

Rovinia submits that Ambrosia's Baseline Freezing Law, which establishes fixed baselines
regardless of coastal recession, violates the UNCLOS requirement for ambulatory baselines
based on the actual low-water line. Rovinia argues that this unilateral action undermines the
object and purpose of UNCLOS, erodes high seas freedoms, and disrupts the predictability and

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stability of the international law of the sea. Rovinia contends that Ambrosia lacks a sufficient
legal basis for its fixed baselines, as the practice does not constitute a recognized rule of
customary international law, and the Vienna Convention's provisions do not justify such a
departure from UNCLOS principles.

Issue 4: The interpretation of the compromissory clause in a treaty creating a regional

organization.

Rovinia argues that the ICJ lacks jurisdiction to address the matter of Ms. Cross's arrest and
prosecution, as the events predate the entry into force of the OCDP Charter's compromissory
clause in Article XXI. Rovinia further contends that the domestic criminal proceedings against
Ms. Cross fall within the exception for matters of domestic jurisdiction under Article XXI(b)(ii)
of the OCDP Charter. Rovinia submits that the language, context, and negotiating history of
the OCDP Charter's compromissory clause differ from the broader compromissory clause in
the CERD Convention, and thus the ICJ should interpret Article XXI OCDP Charter more
narrowly and decline to exercise jurisdiction over this dispute.

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PLEADINGS

Issue 1. The rights and obligations of other members of the international community
when two persons claim to be the legitimate president of a state.

A. Legitimacy of Transitional council as Government of Ambrosia

Rovinia submits that its recognition of the Transitional Council as the legitimate government
of Ambrosia was in accordance with international law. This determination was based on three
key elements: The Council's effective control over Ambrosia's territory and government
functions, the necessity of the Council's formation due to a constitutional crisis caused by the
absent Vice-President Zavala, and the Council's broad recognition compared to the limited
support for Zavala's claim.

Rovinia's actions aligned with legal principles emphasizing effective governance and de facto
control over formal constitutional legitimacy, justifying its support for the Transitional Council
as the rightful authority in Ambrosia.

i. The Transitional Council Exercised Effective Control Over Ambrosia

The Effective Control Doctrine is pivotal in determining governmental legitimacy under

international law. The Transitional Council under MS. Piretis exhibited effective control over
Ambrosia's territory and government functions. This is supported by the precedent established
in Tinoco Arbitration (1923)1. Which underscores that effective control is a primary factor in
assessing governmental legitimacy.

The Council garnered support from key members across various branches of government
including executives, legislators, police forces, intelligence agencies, and armed forces
demonstrating its capacity to govern effectively.

Moreover under, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)2

1
Aguilar-Amory and Royal Bank of Canada claims (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), 1 R.I.A.A. 369 (Oct. 18, 1923).
2
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

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Article 1(1): - “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development”3.

Substantial popular support further legitimized the Transitional Council's authority. The
presence of public backing indicates that the Council was not merely a temporary arrangement
but rather a government that reflected the will of the people4. This aligns with international
norms that prioritize effective governance and popular consent as essential components for
recognizing governments.

In the Case of Arantzazu Mendi5, where the court held that the recognition of a government
that wields effective control (De-facto)6 during a conflict grants legitimacy to its actions. This
principle establishes that governmental authority is recognized based on its capacity to
maintain order, regardless of the circumstances leading to its rise.

Rovinia's recognition of the Transitional Council aligns with this precedent, as the Council has
successfully established effective governance in Ambrosia amid political turmoil. The case
underscores that effective control legitimizes a government, thereby supporting Rovinia’s
stance in recognizing the Transitional Council as the legitimate authority in Ambrosia.

ii. Exercise of governmental authority

The Transitional Council effectively assumed and performed all essential governmental
functions, as recognized by Rovinia's Foreign Ministry. It ensured the maintenance of public
order, continued administration of vital state programs, exercised control over state finances,
and implemented comprehensive reconstruction efforts. The Council's exercise of effective
control far exceeded the authority claimed by Ms. Zavala, who asserted continued legitimacy
as Acting President despite significant shortcomings. Ms. Zavala abandoned her governmental
responsibilities by remaining abroad, lost the confidence of key cabinet members as evidenced
by mass resignations, and failed to maintain effective control over Ambrosian territory and
institutions.

3
Article 1(1), (ICCPR)
4
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
5
The Arantzazu Mendi, [1939] A.C. 256 (H.L.).
6
M.N Shaw pg 391

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B. Will of people in recognition the legitimacy of transitional council

Under article 20 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 7.“Article 20 of the
African Charter stipulates that "all peoples shall have the right to existence” and emphasizes
self-determination. This provision affirms that legitimacy comes from the will of the people
to determine their political status and governance” 8.

Rovinia’s recognition of the Transitional Council reflects this principle of self-determination.

The Council has emerged from a popular need for effective governance during a crisis,
demonstrating the will of the Ambrosian people. Thus, recognizing the Council not only
adheres to international legal standards but also upholds the fundamental rights of the
Ambrosian people to govern themselves, fully aligning with Article 20.

In Mohamed v. Breish Case9, where the court ruled that recognition of a de facto government
acknowledges its sovereignty and governance capacity, irrespective of the government's
methods of establishment. This ruling emphasizes that practical functionality can determine
governmental legitimacy.

Rovinia's decision to recognize the Transitional Council, which has effectively governed
Ambrosia, is consistent with this legal framework. The principle established in this case
supports the view that recognition of the Transitional Council is lawful, as it demonstrates the
practical ability to govern and maintain stability, aligning with Rovinia’s commitment to
supporting effective governance.

These arguments illustrate that the legitimacy of governmental authority is rooted in effective
control, necessity, and the people's right to self-determination10, which the Transitional
Council embodies in the current context of Ambrosia.

C. The Council's Formation Was Necessitated by Constitutional Crisis

The actions taken by Vice-President Zavala led to a constitutional crisis that necessitated the
formation of the Transitional Council. Her consistent absence during national emergencies such
as Hurricane Luna coupled with resignations from seven cabinet ministers citing her lack of

7
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
8
Rachel Murray, Article 20: Peoples' Right to Existence, Self-determination and Freedom from Foreign
Domination, in The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 398-406 (2019)
9
BOOK CITATION MN SHAW
10
Ibid.

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leadership rendered the government effectively non-functional. In this context, the Tinoco Case
(Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 1923) 11 supports the legitimacy of governments that emerge to
fill constitutional vacuums. It establishes that even if such governments do not strictly adhere
to constitutional procedures, they can still be recognized if they arise out of necessity.

Zavala’s inability to provide effective leadership during crises exemplified her failure to fulfil
her constitutional duties. This created an environment where the establishment of a Transitional
Council became not only necessary but also justified under international law principles that
allow for governance structures to emerge in times of political instability.

The formation of Transitional council comes under “The Doctrine of Necessity”12 stated in
the case of State v. Dosso (1958)13, refers to the legal principle that extraordinary measures,
even if unconstitutional, may be justified if they are taken to preserve the stability and
continuity of the state.

Also, In the Gdynia Amerika Linie v. Boguslawski Case14, which elucidates the concept of
necessity in governance15. The UK recognized the communist provisional government in
Poland post-World War II, valid only for actions taken after it established effective control.
This ruling underscores that governments can be recognized based on their capability to govern
effectively during crises.

Rovinia’s recognition of the Transitional Council is justified under this context of necessity.
The Council arose as a response to Vice-President Zavala's inability to govern effectively
during a national emergency. Thus, the Gdynia precedent reaffirms that recognition is
warranted when a government emerges to stabilize and maintain order, validating Rovinia's
support for the Transitional Council.

D. International Recognition received by The Transitional Council

International recognition plays a crucial role in legitimizing governments on the global stage.
The Transitional Council received significant acknowledgment from 25 states compared to
only 15 states continuing to recognize Zavala’s authority. This disparity aligns with the

11
Tinoco Claims Arbitration (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), 1 R.I.A.A. 369 (Oct. 18, 1923).
12
State v. Dosso, PLD 1958 SC 533 (Pakistan).
13
Ibid.
14
Gdynia Amerika Linie v. Boguslawski, [1951] 1 K.B. 162 at 173; [1953] A.C. 11, 45; [1950] 2 All E.R. 355
(C.A.).
15
Gdynia-Ameryka Linie Zeglugowe Spolka Akcyjna v. Boguslawski, [1952] A.C. 292 (H.L.).

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“Estrada Doctrine”16, which emphasizes de facto control17 over formal constitutional

legitimacy in international relations.

The widespread support for the Transitional Council indicates a shift in international perception
regarding governance in Ambrosia. This recognition reflects a broader trend within
international law prioritizing effective control and governance capabilities over mere
adherence to constitutional frameworks.

Furthermore, under Article 9 of Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts

which states18,

Conduct carried out in the absence or default of the official authorities

“The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising elements of the
governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in
circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority” 19.

Under Article 9, Rovinia's actions can be justified as a response to the absence or default of
official authorities in Ambrosia. During the relevant period, Ambrosia was experiencing
significant political instability. Acting President Zavala had effectively abandoned her duties
by remaining abroad, leaving no functional leadership. The Transitional Council, though
established through extraordinary means, was exercising effective control over the territory and
performing essential governmental functions, including maintaining law and order and
providing public services.

Rovinia recognized the Transitional Council based on its effective control and demonstrated
ability to act as the de facto government of Ambrosia. This recognition aligned with the
principles of Article 9, as the Council was exercising governmental authority in circumstances
where official authorities were absent or incapable of governing. Furthermore, Rovinia acted
in good faith, relying on the Transitional Council to address international obligations and

16
The American Journal of International Law Vol. 25, No. 4 (Oct., 1931), pp. 719-723 (5 pages) Published By:
Cambridge University Press
17
M.N Show pg 391
18
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001).
19
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 9, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001).

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disputes, which included consenting to actions such as the waiver of immunity for ‘The
Falcon’.

Thus, Rovinia's conduct in recognizing and interacting with the Transitional Council was
consistent with international law, as it responded to the absence of functioning official
authorities in Ambrosia, fulfilling the requirements under Article 9 of ARSIWA20.

_______________________________________________________________________

Issue 2: Invocation of immunity of government official accused of grave Human Rights

violation.

A. Ms. Cross former government official is not entitled to immunity.

i. Immunity for acts performed in official capacity does not apply to human rights
violations under Article 7 of The International Law Commission Draft Articles on
Immunity21.

1. International law clearly delineates the scope of immunity granted to state officials.
Immunity ratione materiae22, which protects officials for acts conducted in their official
capacity, does not extend to grave violations of human rights, as these acts cannot be
classified as legitimate official functions. Ms. Cross's involvement in abduction and
enforced disappearances constitutes conduct outside the lawful scope of her duties.
2. The International Law Commission Draft Articles on Immunity, particularly Article 7,
explicitly states that immunity ratione materiae does not apply to crimes under
international law, including crimes against humanity and enforced disappearances. These
provisions reinforce the principle that human rights violations are not shielded under the
guise of official capacity.

20
Ibid.
21
Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction art. 7, in
Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 69th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/72/10 (2017).
22
'Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae' (Jus Mundi) https://jusmundi.com/en/document/publication/en-jurisdiction-
ratione-materiae

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ii. United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (2004) 23
supports Rovinia claim that Ms. Cross should not be granted immunity for human rights
violations for which she is accused.

1. Limitation to Civil Jurisdiction

The Convention explicitly addresses state immunity from civil jurisdiction and does not extend
its scope to immunity from criminal jurisdiction. Since the case against Ms. Cross concerns
criminal charges, the immunity provisions of the Convention do not apply.

2. Customary International Law and the Convention’s Influence

The Convention has influenced the development of customary international law. The
customary law reflects a restrictive approach to immunity, especially in cases involving serious
violations of international law, such as human rights abuses. Courts in various jurisdictions
have limited immunity claims in cases of serious crimes, following the restrictive doctrine
codified in the Convention.

3. Distinction Between Sovereign Acts and Private or Criminal Acts

Under the restrictive doctrine24 enshrined in the Convention, immunity applies only to acts
performed in the exercise of sovereign power (acta de jure imperii)25. Acts that are private,
commercial, or outside legitimate sovereign functions (acta de jure gestionis)26 do not enjoy
immunity.

Rovinia asserts that human rights violations are not legitimate sovereign acts, and thus do not
qualify for immunity under international law. Instead, such acts fall outside the protective scope
of state immunity, particularly when criminal responsibility is involved.

a) International Precedents
1. The case of Samantar v. Yousuf 27is a landmark precedent in this regard. The U.S. Supreme
Court held that a former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Somalia was not

23
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, Dec. 2, 2004, G.A. Res.
59/38, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38.
24

Yohei Okada, Can Acta Jure Gestionis Be Attributable to the State? A Restrictive Doctrine of State
25

Responsibility, European Journal of International Law, Volume 34, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 383–414,
26
27
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).

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entitled to immunity concerning civil claims for rape, torture, and extrajudicial killings, he
authorized while in office. The court ruled that the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA)28 does not extend to individual government officials as they are not considered
agencies or instrumentalities of the state. This case underscores that granting immunity to
Ms. Cross for acts amounting to human rights violations would be inconsistent with
established legal principles.
2. Similarly, in Letelier v. Republic of Chile29, U.S. courts ruled against granting immunity
to the Chilean state for the assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt. The court
held that politically motivated assassinations do not fall within the protection of the
FSIA30, as such acts constitute tortious conduct. Ms. Cross’s participation in enforced
disappearances, a comparable violation, cannot be protected by immunity.
3. In Khurts Bat v. The Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court 31, the High Court
in the UK dismissed claims of immunity raised by Khurts Bat, a high-ranking Mongolian
official, regarding allegations of abuse of power. The court ruled that immunity does not
extend to actions involving abuse of authority, further affirming that Ms. Cross’s claim of
immunity is untenable under customary international law.

B) Rovinia’s assertion of criminal jurisdiction for “enforced disappearance 32” over Ms.
Cross, and her arrest and prosecution, are fully consistent with international law.

i. Legal Basis for Accusations under The International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

1. On May 1, 2024, the Rovinian General Prosecutor’s Office filed a complaint against Ms.
Cross for “enforced disappearance,” a crime incorporated into the Rovinian Criminal Code
in 2007. This crime is defined as:

28
U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)
29
Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984).
30
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–1611.
31
Khurts Bât v. The Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court, [2011] EWHC 2029 (Admin), [2012] 3
W.L.R. 180, [2011] All E.R. (D) 293.
32
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Dec. 20, 2006, 2716
U.N.T.S. 3.

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“The deprivation of liberty by agents acting with official authority, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which places such a person outside the protection of the law.”

2. The evidence presented includes communications and directives from Ms. Cross explicitly
authorizing abductions. This evidence underscores her direct involvement in planning and
executing acts constituting grave human rights violations. Following the admissibility of
the complaint, the Permola Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant, and Ms. Cross was
taken into custody in Rovinia.

ii) International Precedents Supporting the Prosecution of Ms. Cross

1. In Belgium v. Senegal33, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on Senegal’s

obligation to prosecute or extradite Hissène Habré, former President of Chad, for crimes against
humanity, including torture and genocide. The ICJ emphasized that states are obligated under
the 1984 Convention Against Torture to prosecute or extradite individuals accused of jus
cogens crimes. The ruling established that the prohibition of torture constitutes a peremptory
norm of international law, from which no derogation is permissible. Ms. Cross’s alleged
involvement in enforced disappearances similarly constitutes a jus cogens violation, precluding
any claim to immunity.

2. The ICJ’s ruling in the Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda34 case further
underscores the responsibility of states to hold individuals accountable for grave human rights
violations. The Court ordered reparations for damages arising from Uganda’s unlawful military
intervention and human rights violations in the DRC, highlighting the principle of
accountability for crimes against humanity.

3. Under Article 6 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance35, states are required to prosecute individuals responsible for
enforced disappearances. The prohibition of enforced disappearances is a peremptory norm
of international law, obligating all states to take necessary measures to ensure

33
International Court of Justice, Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.),
Judgment, ICJ GL No 144, ICGJ 437 (ICJ 2012).
34
International Court of Justice, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, ICJ GL No 116, [2005] I.C.J. Rep. 168.
35
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance art. 6, Dec. 20, 2006,
2716 U.N.T.S. 3.

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accountability. Article 736 further requires states to impose appropriate penalties for such
crimes. Ms. Cross’s alleged actions fall squarely within these provisions, mandating her
prosecution.

iii. Failure of Ambrosia to Investigate Enforced disappearance amounting to Human

Rights violation.

1. The updated report of 12 June 2024 by Human Rights International (HRI) highlights
Ambrosia’s failure of investigation. The addendum, titled “The One Who Got Away,”
presented previously undisclosed evidence, including statements from police officers,
official documents bearing Ms. Cross’s signature authorizing illegal arrests, and logs of
her visits to detention facilities. Notably, the report indicated that the Prosecutor
General had access to some of this evidence before closing the investigation in January
2023. This raises serious concerns about Ambrosia’s commitment to impartial justice,
justifying Rovinia’s prosecution to ensure accountability where Ambrosia has failed.
2. Article 3 of The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance37 obliges states to investigate enforced disappearances
committed by individuals acting with state authorization. Despite allegations of Ms.
Cross’s involvement in abductions under the ILSA program, Ambrosian authorities
neglected to conduct a thorough investigation. This failure to uphold its investigative
duty under international law underscores a significant lapse in ensuring justice and
accountability for grave human rights violations.

C) Universal Jurisdiction of Rovinia to prosecute Ms. Cross.

i. Rovinia Justifying its Jurisdiction

1. Since Ms. Cross was physically present in Rovinia, the courts have personal jurisdiction
over her under Rovinian law, regardless of where the alleged crimes were committed.
2. President Slimm expressed concern that President Derey’s demonstrated use of broad
pardon powers could be used to shield Ms. Cross from prosecution or punishment. Even if

36
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance art. 7, Dec. 20, 2006,
2716 U.N.T.S. 3.
37
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance art. 3, Dec. 20, 2006,
2716 U.N.T.S. 3.

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Ambrosia were to hold a trial, the confidentiality measures Derey suggested could prevent
public accountability.

ii. Principle of Universal Jurisdiction

1. Rovinia’s exercise of universal jurisdiction over Ms. Cross is supported by the principle
that grave human rights violations, such as enforced disappearances, torture, and crimes
against humanity, are subject to prosecution regardless of where they occur. Universal
jurisdiction serves as a mechanism to address instances where states fail to fulfill their
obligations to investigate and prosecute such crimes.

a. International Precedents

1. The case of United States v. Roy M. Belfast, Jr38., also known as Charles Taylor Jr.,
illustrates the application of universal jurisdiction by national courts over serious human
rights violations, such as torture. In this case, the United States prosecuted Belfast under
the Torture Act for acts committed in Liberia between 1999 and 2003, despite the crimes
occurring outside U.S. territory and involving a non-U.S. citizen.
2. By invoking universal jurisdiction, Rovinia aligns with international legal principles and
precedents that permit states to prosecute serious human rights violations, regardless of
where they were committed or the nationality of the accused. This approach ensures that
perpetrators like Ms. Cross are held accountable, reinforcing the global commitment to
human rights and justice.
3. Similarly, The Belgium v. Senegal 39
case demonstrates that a state can prosecute serious
human rights violations committed elsewhere, reinforcing the legitimacy of Rovinia's
actions. The international community's backing of Habré's prosecution underscores the
global endorsement of universal jurisdiction in addressing impunity for grave human rights
abuses.

D) ICJ’s lack of jurisdiction to address the matter of arrest and prosecution of Ms. Cross

A) Rovinia contends that the situation involving Ms. Cross arose before Article XXI of the
OCDP Charter (the compromissory clause conferring jurisdiction on the ICJ) entered into

38
United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 2010)
39
Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment, ICJ GL No 144,
ICGJ 437 (ICJ 2012).

13
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force on 15 May 2021. Thus, the issue is excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction as per Article
XXI(b)(i) of the OCDP Charter, which precludes jurisdiction over disputes arising from facts
predating its effect.

Rovinia further argues that the matter concerns its domestic criminal jurisdiction, which is
explicitly excluded under Article XXI(b)(ii). Since the arrest and prosecution of Ms. Cross are
domestic judicial matters, they fall outside the scope of the ICJ’s jurisdiction.

A) Supporting International Precedents

1. The ICJ in the case Monetary Gold case (Italy v. France, United Kingdom, and United
States40 held that, although it had jurisdiction over the respondent states (France, the UK,
and the US), it could not rule on the case without first deciding Albania’s legal rights. Since
Albania had not consented to the ICJ’s jurisdiction, the Court declined to proceed, stating
that it could not determine a dispute involving a third party’s legal interests without that
party’s consent.
2. The ICJ in the case Portugal v. Australia41 reiterated the principle established in the
Monetary Gold case (Italy v. France, United Kingdom, and United States)42 which states
that the Court cannot decide a dispute if doing so requires ruling on the legal rights or
obligations of a third state that has not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction.
3. The ICJ’s ruling in the East Timor and Monetary Gold case 43highlights the fundamental
principle that jurisdiction is based on state consent. Rovinia argues that since the events
concerning Ms. Cross predate the entry into force of Article XXI of the OCDP Charter
and involve its domestic criminal law, it has not consented to the ICJ’s jurisdiction over
this matter. Therefore, applying the logic of the East Timor case, the ICJ should decline to
hear Ambrosia’s claim regarding Ms. Cross.

___________________________________________________________________________

40
Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., U.K. & U.S.), Judgment, [1954] I.C.J. Rep. 19,
ICGJ 183 (ICJ 1954).
41
East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30).
42
Ibid
43
East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30); Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr.,
U.K., & U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 19 (June 15).

14
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Issue 3: The legal consequences of receding coastlines for the maritime zones of coastal
states

A. Ambrosia's Fixed Baselines Violate the Requirements of UNCLOS44.

i. Ambulatory Baselines as the Norm Under UNCLOS

1. UNCLOS explicitly requires that normal baselines be based on the actual low-water
line, which changes with the recession of coastlines.

- Article 5 of UNCLOS 45states that "Except where otherwise provided in this Convention,
the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along
the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State." This
provision establishes the principle of ambulatory baselines, where the baseline shifts in
accordance with changes in the coastline.

- The principle of ambulatory baselines, where maritime zones shift in accordance with
changes in the coastline, is the established norm under UNCLOS.46 This ensures that a state's
maritime claims accurately reflect the physical reality of its coastline and prevents arbitrary
claims.

2. Ambrosia's Freezing Law contravenes this fundamental requirement, undermining the

integrity and purpose of the Convention.

- By fixing its baselines at a static point in time, regardless of subsequent coastal recession,
Ambrosia is acting in direct violation of the explicit provisions of Article 5 of UNCLOS47.

- Such unilateral action by a state to redefine its baselines in a manner that is incompatible
with the object and purpose of UNCLOS is unlawful under international law. Allowing
Ambrosia to disregard this fundamental obligation would set a dangerous precedent, opening
the door for other states to similarly disregard the explicit provisions of the Convention.

ii. Violation of UNCLOS Article 5

44
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
45
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 5, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
46
Ibid.
47
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 5, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

15
 899R

1. Article 5 of UNCLOS 48mandates that the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the
territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast.

- Article 5 of UNCLOS 49states that "Except where otherwise provided in this Convention,
the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along
the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State." This
provision establishes that the normal baseline for determining a coastal state's territorial sea is
the actual low-water line along its coastline.

- Ambrosia's fixed baselines, which do not reflect the actual low-water line, directly violate
the explicit provisions of Article 5.

- In UNCLOS the term "low-water line" is intentionally chosen to ensure that coastal states
could not unilaterally fix their baselines, but rather had to account for the dynamic nature of
coastlines. Allowing Ambrosia to disregard this fundamental obligation would set a dangerous
precedent, opening the door for other states to similarly disregard the explicit provisions of the
Convention.

iii. Erosion of High Seas Freedoms

1. Ambrosia's fixed baselines unlawfully expand its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) into
areas that would otherwise be classified as the high seas.

- Under Article 86 of UNCLOS50, the high seas are defined as "all parts of the sea that are
not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a
State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State."

- By fixing its baselines, Ambrosia is attempting to encroach upon these high seas areas,
infringing on the freedom of the high seas, including Rovinia's rights to engage in fishing and
other commercial activities in these international waters, as protected under Article 87 of
UNCLOS.

2. This expansion of maritime claims undermines the delicate balance of rights and
obligations established by UNCLOS.

48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
50
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 86, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

16
 899R

- The freedom of the high seas is a foundational principle of UNCLOS, ensuring that the
oceans remain open to all states for a variety of uses (Article 87).

- Allowing such redrawing of maritime boundaries by Ambrosia would erode these high seas
freedoms, to the detriment of the entire international community.

iv. Undermining Maritime Stability and Predictability

1. The fixed baseline approach disrupts long-standing principles of maritime boundary

delimitation, creating uncertainty and instability in international law.

- In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark;

Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) (1969) 51, the ICJ emphasized the importance of
predictability and stability in the law of the sea, stating that "the delimitation of continental
shelf areas between adjacent States must be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable
principles." The Court held that the established principles of international law should be
respected to maintain the predictability and coherence of the global maritime order.

- Abandoning the ambulatory baseline system, which has been the accepted norm under
UNCLOS, would undermine the predictability and coherence of the global maritime order.

2. In the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) (1994) case, the ICJ stressed
the importance of respecting established principles of international law to maintain the stability
of the international legal system. The Court cautioned against actions that could undermine the
integrity of the international legal order.

- Allowing Ambrosia's fixed baselines would open the door for other states to similarly
disregard accepted norms, threatening the integrity of the UNCLOS52 regime.

B. Ambrosia's Fixed Baselines Lack Sufficient Legal Basis.

i. Lack of Customary Practice Established

1. The adoption of fixed baselines by six out of seven states on the Paine Peninsula does
not constitute the formation of a recognized regional customary norm.

51
North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, (1969) I.C.J. Rep. 3, ICGJ 150 (ICJ
1969).
52
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

17
 899R

- In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969)53, the ICJ established that the widespread
and consistent practice of states, accompanied by opinio juris, is required for the formation of
a new rule of customary international law. The Court held that the relevant state practice must
be "both extensive and virtually uniform" to give rise to a new customary rule.

- The failure of the OCDP Assembly to endorse fixed baselines demonstrates the lack of
regional consensus on this issue, undermining any claim that a regional customary norm has
emerged. The limited adoption of fixed baselines globally, outside the Paine Peninsula region,
indicates a lack of widespread state practice to support this approach as a rule of customary
international law.

2. Customary international law requires more than just regional practice; it must be
shown to reflect a general practice accepted as law by the international community as a
whole.

- In the South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) (1966) 54,
the ICJ emphasized that the mere repetition of the same practice by various states does not, by
itself, create a rule of customary international law. The Court stated that such practice must be
"accepted as law (opinio juris)" by the international community.

- The limited adoption of fixed baselines globally, outside the Paine Peninsula region,
indicates a lack of widespread state practice to support this approach as a rule of customary
international law.

ii. No Legal Justification in the Vienna Convention

1. Ambrosia's invocation of the "fundamental change of circumstances" exception under

Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 55is misplaced.

- Article 62 of the Vienna Convention56provides that "A fundamental change of

circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion
of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for
terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) the existence of those circumstances

53
North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, (1969) I.C.J. Rep. 3, ICGJ 150 (ICJ
1969).
54
South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, Judgment, [1966] I.C.J. Rep. 6.
55
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 62, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
56
Ibid.

18
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constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the
effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed
under the treaty."

- The impacts of sea-level rise and coastal recession, while significant, do not constitute the
type of fundamental change in the treaty relationship envisioned under Article 62 that would
justify Ambrosia's action to modify its treaty obligations under UNCLOS57.

2. The Vienna Convention's provisions on treaty modification and termination do not

provide a legal basis for Ambrosia's fixed baselines.

- The purpose of Article 62 58is to allow states to withdraw from or terminate a treaty due to
unforeseeable changes in circumstances, not to permit unilateral adjustments to the terms of a
treaty. Allowing states to invoke Article 62 as a justification for modifying their treaty
obligations would undermine the stability and predictability of the international legal system.

iii. Contravention of UNCLOS's Purpose and Principles

1. Ambrosia's fixed baselines prioritize its own state interests over the equitable access to
maritime resources and the environmental protection objectives of UNCLOS.

- The preamble of UNCLOS 59emphasizes the need to establish "a legal order for the seas
and oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful
uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the
conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine
environment."

- Ambrosia's actions undermine these fundamental principles of cooperation, sustainable

development, and the common heritage of mankind that are central to the UNCLOS
framework.

2. Allowing fixed baselines would set a precedent that could lead to further fragmentation
and the erosion of the delicate balance of rights and obligations under the UNCLOS
regime.

57
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
58
Ibid.
59
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea pmbl., Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

19
 899R

- In the Nuclear Tests cases (Australia v. France; New Zealand v. France) (1974) 60, the ICJ
stressed the importance of preserving the integrity of the international legal order, cautioning
against actions that could undermine established norms and principles. The Court emphasized
that the maintenance of the stability and coherence of the international legal system is a
fundamental consideration. 61

- Upholding Ambrosia's fixed baselines would create a dangerous precedent that could inspire
other states to disregard the carefully crafted balance of rights and obligations under UNCLOS.

C. Rovinia's Rights and the Broader Implications of Ambrosia's Fixed Baselines.

i. Triton Shoal as High Seas

1. The Triton Shoal, which Ambrosia claims is within its EEZ due to its fixed baselines, is
in fact located in the high seas.

- Article 86 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)62 defines
the high seas as "all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in
the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an
archipelagic State." This provision establishes that the high seas encompass those areas of the
ocean that lie beyond the limits of a state's exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

- Since the Triton Shoal is located beyond the 200 nautical mile limit of Ambrosia's EEZ, as
determined by its fixed baselines, it falls within the category of the high seas under UNCLOS.
Consequently, Rovinia has the lawful right to issue fishing licenses and engage in other
commercial activities in this area, as it is beyond the maritime zones established by Ambrosia
under the Convention.

2. Ambrosia's attempt to extend its EEZ over the Triton Shoal violates Rovinia's freedoms
of the high seas under UNCLOS.

- Article 87 of UNCLOS 63enshrines the freedom of the high seas, which includes the freedom
of fishing, the freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations, the freedom of

60
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, [1974] I.C.J. Rep. 253, ICGJ 133 (ICJ 1974); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v.
Fr.), Judgment, [1974] I.C.J. Rep. 457.
61
'Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France)' (Jus Mundi) https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-nuclear-tests-
australia-v-france-judgment-friday-20th-december-1974
62
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 86, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
63
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 87, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

20
 899R

navigation, and the freedom of scientific research. These freedoms are fundamental principles
of the international law of the sea.

- By fixing its baselines to encompass the Triton Shoal within its EEZ, Ambrosia is infringing
upon Rovinia's rights and freedoms in the high seas area, which are protected under Article 87
of UNCLOS.64 This action by Ambrosia undermines the delicate balance of rights and
obligations established by the Convention, to the detriment of Rovinia and the broader
international community.

ii. Inequitable Impacts on Other States

1. Ambrosia's fixed baselines could create inequities by depriving other states, including
landlocked or geographically disadvantaged ones, of potential access to marine resources.

- Articles 69 and 70 of UNCLOS 65

recognize the rights of landlocked and geographically
disadvantaged states to participate in the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive
economic zones of coastal states in the same region or subregion.

- The dynamic nature of maritime zones, as reflected in the ambulatory baseline principle,
helps maintain this equitable framework by allowing the zones to shift in accordance with
changes in coastlines. However, Ambrosia's fixed baselines disrupt this balance, potentially
depriving other states in the region of their rightful access to the marine resources within the
Triton Shoal area.

2. Freezing baselines would undermine the adaptability and sustainable management of

the oceans, as envisioned by the UNCLOS framework.

- The preamble of UNCLOS 66

emphasizes the need for the "conservation of their living
resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment." This reflects
the Convention's overarching objective of promoting the sustainable use and management of
the world's oceans and their resources.

- Ambrosia's fixed baselines, however, create a rigid maritime regime that is ill-equipped to
adapt to the dynamic challenges posed by climate change. This approach undermines the

64
Ibid.
65
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 69-70, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
66
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea pmbl., Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

21
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adaptability and flexibility that is crucial for the effective and sustainable governance of the
marine environment.

iii. Lack of Global Acceptance and Legal Precedents

1. The Limited Recognition of Fixed Baselines in International Law

In contrast to ambulatory baselines, fixed baselines lack widespread recognition and

acceptance in international law, whether through treaties or established state practice, despite
the adoption by six out of seven states on the Paine Peninsula.

- UNCLOS67 does not contain any provisions that explicitly permit or endorse the use of
fixed baselines by coastal states. The limited adoption of fixed baselines globally, outside the
Paine Peninsula region, indicates a lack of widespread state practice to support this approach
as a recognized rule of international law.

- In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark;

Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) (1969) 68, the ICJ emphasized the importance of
predictability and stability in the law of the sea, stating that "the delimitation of continental
shelf areas between adjacent States must be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable
principles." The Court held that the established principles of international law should be
respected to maintain the predictability and coherence of the global maritime order.

- This case law demonstrates the ICJ's recognition of the importance of preserving the
predictability and stability of the international law of the sea. The Court emphasized that the
delimitation of maritime boundaries must be carried out in accordance with established
principles of international law, in order to maintain the coherence and predictability of the
global maritime regime.

- Abandoning the ambulatory baseline system, which has been the accepted norm under
UNCLOS, would undermine the predictability and coherence of the global maritime order, as
recognized by the ICJ in this landmark decision.

67
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
68
North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, (1969) I.C.J. Rep. 3, ICGJ 150 (ICJ
1969).

22
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2. In the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) (1994) case69, the ICJ stressed
the importance of respecting established principles of international law to maintain the stability
of the international legal system. The Court cautioned against actions that could undermine the
integrity of the international legal order.

- This case highlights the ICJ's emphasis on the critical importance of upholding established
principles of international law in order to preserve the stability and integrity of the broader
international legal system. The Court warned against actions that could threaten the coherence
and functioning of the international legal order.

- Allowing Ambrosia's fixed baselines would open the door for other states to similarly
disregard accepted norms and principles of the international law of the sea, as embodied in
UNCLOS70. This could lead to further fragmentation and erosion of the delicate balance of
maritime rights and obligations that the Convention has sought to establish, undermining the
stability and integrity of the global maritime order, as cautioned by the ICJ in this case.

3. In the Nuclear Tests cases (Australia v. France; New Zealand v. France) (1974)71, the ICJ
stressed the importance of preserving the integrity of the international legal order, cautioning
against actions that could undermine established norms and principles. The Court emphasized
that the maintenance of the stability and coherence of the international legal system is a
fundamental consideration.

- These cases further reinforce the ICJ's recognition of the paramount importance of
preserving the integrity and stability of the international legal system. The Court cautioned
against actions that could undermine the established norms and principles that form the
foundation of international law.

- Upholding Ambrosia's fixed baselines would create a dangerous precedent that could inspire
other states to disregard the carefully crafted balance of rights and obligations under
UNCLOS.72 This could lead to further fragmentation and erosion of the international law of

69
Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, [1994] I.C.J. Rep. 6.
70
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
71
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, [1974] I.C.J. Rep. 253, ICGJ 133 (ICJ 1974); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v.
Fr.), Judgment, [1974] I.C.J. Rep. 457.
72
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

23
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the sea, threatening the stability and coherence of the broader international legal order, as
emphasized by the ICJ in these precedents.

Rovinia submits that Ambrosia's Baseline Freezing Law is incompatible with the requirements
and principles of UNCLOS73, and lacks sufficient legal justification under international law.
Upholding Ambrosia's fixed baselines would undermine the delicate balance of rights and
obligations in the global maritime regime, and set a dangerous precedent that could lead to
further fragmentation and instability of the international legal order.

__________________________________________________________________________

Issue 4: The interpretation of the compromissory clause in a treaty creating a regional

organization.

A. The Limits of the ICJ's Jurisdiction Under the OCDP Charter

i. The Arrest Warrant Case and the Principle of Domestic Jurisdiction

- In the Arrest Warrant case74, the ICJ held that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by national
courts is a matter of domestic jurisdiction. In this case, the dispute was between the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Belgium 75over an arrest warrant issued by Belgium for a
Congolese minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, for alleged war crimes and crimes against
humanity.76 The key issue before the ICJ was whether the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by
Belgium over a Congolese official was a matter within the DRC's domestic jurisdiction.

The ICJ emphasized that "the functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs are such that,
throughout the duration of his or her office, he or she when abroad enjoys full immunity from
criminal jurisdiction." The Court held that the DRC had the sovereign prerogative to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over its own officials, and that Belgium's actions had infringed upon the
DRC's sovereignty.

2. Rovinia argues that this precedent from the Arrest Warrant case supports its position that the
prosecution of Ms. Cross for the crime of enforced disappearance is a matter that falls within

73
Ibid.
74
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2002, p. 3.
75
Ibid.
76
Ibid., para. 54.

24
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Rovinia's domestic jurisdiction, and is therefore excluded from the ICJ's jurisdiction under
Article XXI(b)(ii) of the OCDP Charter. Rovinia contends that, like the DRC in the Arrest
Warrant case, it has the sovereign prerogative to prosecute Ms. Cross for a domestic crime,
which the ICJ should not interfere with. Rovinia submits that the ICJ should respect the
principle of state sovereignty and avoid encroaching on Rovinia's authority to prosecute Ms.
Cross, as this would be analogous to the Court's refusal to rule on the DRC's interests in the
Arrest Warrant case77.

ii. Distinguishing the OCDP Charter from the CERD Convention

- Rovinia argues that the language, context, and negotiating history of the OCDP Charter's
compromissory clause are distinct from those of the CERD Convention.78 Whereas Article 22
of CERD79 was broadly worded, granting the ICJ jurisdiction over "any dispute" related to the
interpretation or application of the Convention, Article XXI of the OCDP Charter contains
specific exceptions and limitations on the ICJ's jurisdiction, such as those in Article XXI(b).

- Rovinia contends that the ICJ's reasoning in finding jurisdiction in the Georgia v. Russian
Federation (Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, CERD) case 80, based on the CERD Convention, does not necessarily
apply to the interpretation of the OCDP Charter. In the Georgia v. Russia case81, the ICJ held
that it "has jurisdiction under Article 22 of CERD to consider the dispute brought before it by
Georgia" and that "the conditions for the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 22 of CERD
are met." Rovinia argues that the OCDP Charter has a different subject matter and context
compared to CERD, and the Court's consideration of CERD's object and purpose may not be
relevant to the interpretation of the OCDP Charter.

77
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2002, p. 3.
78
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Judgment (Preliminary Objections), I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 70, paras. 148, 184.
79
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 22, Dec. 21, 1965, 660
U.N.T.S. 195.
80
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor.
v. Russ.), Provisional Measures, 2008 I.C.J. 353 (Oct. 15).
81
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Judgment (Preliminary Objections), I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 70, paras. 148, 184.

25
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Rovinia contends that the ICJ's broader interpretation of the compromissory clause in the
CERD Convention case 82
does not compel a similar interpretation of the more limited
compromissory clause in the OCDP Charter.

B. Interpreting the Compromissory Clause in the OCDP Charter

i. Applying the Principles of Treaty Interpretation

- Rovinia argues that the ICJ must interpret the compromissory clause in Article XXI of the
OCDP Charter in accordance with the principles of treaty interpretation under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention requires that a treaty
be interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms, in their
context, and in light of the treaty's object and purpose.

- Rovinia insists that this principle of interpretation requires a narrower interpretation of the
ICJ's jurisdiction compared to the one adopted in the CERD Convention case. The specific
language, context, and negotiating history of the OCDP Charter's compromissory clause,
Rovinia argues, support a more limited scope of the ICJ's jurisdiction. Rovinia submits that the
ICJ should not simply apply the broader interpretation from the Georgia v. Russia case, but
should instead carefully examine the unique features of the OCDP Charter's compromissory
clause.

ii. The Lack of a Compromissory Clause Similar to Article 22 of CERD

- Rovinia emphasizes that the OCDP Charter, unlike the CERD Convention, does not contain
a compromissory clause similar to Article 22. The OCDP Charter's compromissory clause,
found in Article XXI of OCDP Charter, is more limited in scope and subject to specific
exceptions, such as those related to domestic jurisdiction in Article XXI(b).

- Rovinia contends that this distinction undermines Ambrosia's attempt to draw a parallel
between the two cases and the Court's interpretation of the compromissory clauses. Rovinia
argues that the broader interpretation of the compromissory clause in the CERD Convention
case should not be directly applied to the more limited and specific compromissory clause in
the OCDP Charter.

82
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660
U.N.T.S. 195.

26
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

The Republic of Rovinia, respectfully requests that this Honourable Court adjudge and
declare that:

I. Rovinia’s prosecution of Ms. Gertrude Cross is lawful, and fully consistent with
international law.

II. Rovinia’s issuance of fishing licenses in the Triton Shoal is lawful, and in conformity
with international law, as the Triton Shoal is located in the high seas, beyond Ambrosia’s
exclusive economic zone.

III. Rovinia’s judicial seizure and sale of “The Falcon” on the basis of the Transitional
Council’s waiver of immunity were in accordance with international law.

IV. The Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Ambrosia’s submission concerning the arrest
and prosecution of Ms. Gertrude Cross.

Award any other remedy this Honourable Court deems just, proper and in accordance with
equity and good conscience.

Rovinia further requests that the Court dismiss all claims made by the Union of Ambrosia and
order Ambrosia to bear the costs of these proceedings.

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