183R

IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

AT THE PEACE PALACE,

THE HAGUE,

THE NETHERLANDS

THE CASE CONCERNING THE STERREN FORTY

THE REPUBLIC OF ANTRANO

(APPLICANT)

V.

THE KINGDOM OF REMISIA

(RESPONDENT)

MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT

THE 2024 PHILIP C. JESSUP INTERNATIONAL LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES..................................................................................................................iii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..........................................................................................................x
QUESTIONS PRESENTED..................................................................................................................xi
STATEMENT OF FACTS...................................................................................................................xii
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS.............................................................................................................xvi
PLEADINGS 1
I. ANTRANO LACKS STANDING TO BRING THE MATTER OF THE STERREN FORTY’S
NATIONALITY TO THIS COURT 1
A. Antrano Lacks Standing Because It Cannot Exert Diplomatic Protection Over
the Sterren Forty 1
B. Antrano Lacks Standing Because There is No Erga Omnes Partes Obligation
to Guarantee Nationality Under Treaty Law 1
1. An unequivocal guarantee to nationality is not an erga omnes partes
obligation under the CRS 2
2. An unequivocal guarantee to nationality is not an erga omnes partes
obligation under the CSP 3
3. An unequivocal guarantee to nationality is not an erga omnes partes
obligation under the ICCPR 3
C. Antrano Lacks Standing Because Statelessness is Not an Erga Omnes
Obligation Under Customary International Law 4
1. Statelessness is not a jus cogens norm 4
2. Statelessness is not an obligation owed to the international community
5
II. REMISIA COMPLIED WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT REVOKED THE STERREN
FORTY’S NATIONALITY 6
A. Remisia Complied with Customary International Law when It Revoked the
Sterren Forty’s Nationality 6
1. Remisia is permitted to maintain its domestic nationality laws without
interference 6
2. Remisia complied with international and regional human rights
instruments
B. Remisia Complied with its Treaty Obligations when it Revoked the Sterren
Forty’s Nationality 8
1. Remisia complied with CRS Article 8 when it revoked the Sterren
Forty’s nationality8
i
 2. Remisia complied with CSP Article 27 when it revoked the Sterren
Forty’s nationality9
3. Remisia complied with ICCPR Articles 19, 21, and 14 when it revoked
the Sterren Forty’s nationality 10
III. ANTRANO VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT DENIED A REMISIAN NATIONAL
CONSULAR ACCESS TO REMISIA WHILE DETAINED IN ANTRANO 11
A. Antrano Violated its Treaty Obligations when it Denied a Remisian National
Access to Remisian Consular Representatives 13
1. Antrano violated VCCR Articles 36 and 5 when it failed to inform and
grant a Remisian national access to a Remisian consular representative
13
2. Antrano violated ICCPR Articles 9 and 14 when it failed to inform and
grant a Remisian citizen access to a Remisian consular representative
16
B. Antrano Violated Customary International Law when it Denied a Remisian
Citizen Access to Remisian Consular Representatives 17
IV. REMISIA COMPLIED WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW DR.
MALEX ENTRY INTO REMISIA 19
A. Remisia Complied with its Treaty Obligations when it Denied Entry to Dr.
Malex...............................................................................................................20
1. Remisia complied with UN Charter Article 2(7) by maintaining its
sovereign authority of its domestic affairs 20
2. Remisia complied with CPI Article 6 when it denied entry to Dr.
Malex 21
3. Remisia complied with VCDR Article 9 when it denied a diplomatic
agent entry into its territory 23
B. Remisia Complied with its Customary International Law Obligations when it
Denied Entry to Dr. Malex 23
1. Customary international law recognizes States are free to act in
absence of a prohibitory rule 23
2. Customary international law recognizes the sovereignty of States to
maintain the integrity of their borders 24
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF.........................................................................................26

ii
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND CONVENTIONS

American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica”, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 7
Charter of the United Nations, Oct. 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI 21
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law, July 1, 1937,
179 L.N.T.S 89 7
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979,
1249 U.N.T.S. 13 18
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S.
15. 22
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 passim
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 18
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S.
117 3, 18, 19
Council of Europe, European Convention on Nationality, Nov. 6, 1997, E.T.S. 166. 18
Council of Europe, European Convention on Consular Functions, Dec. 11, 1967, E.T.S 6 17
IACHR, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, Res. XXX 18
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21,
1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 18
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 passim
League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, Sept. 15, 1994,
[ST/HR/]CHR/NONE/2004/40/Rev.1 18
OAS, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 7
OAU, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, July 11, 1990,
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 18
Tunisia, Declaration under the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (done at New
York on August 30, 1961) 9
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 24 April 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 passim
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 2, 3, 8,

CASES
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect
of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Reports 403, (July 22) 24

iii
Acosta-Calderón v. Ecuador, IACtHR (ser. C) No. 129 (2005) 15
Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, IACtHR (ser. C) No. 254 (2006) 15
Anudo Ochieng Anudo v. United Republic of Tanzania, App. No. 012/2015, ACtHPR,
(2018) 18
Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 177 (Dec. 15) 22
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Gam. v. Myan.), Preliminary Objections, 2020 I.C.J. Rep. 477 (July 22) 1, 2
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgments,
2005 I.C.J. Rep 168 (Dec. 19) 6, 24
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 12
(Mar. 31) 14
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J.
Rep. 3, (Feb. 5) 1, 4, 5
Brief of Amici Curiae Republic of Argentina, Republic of Brazil, Republic of Ecuador, and
Republic of Mexico in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Paraguay v. Gilmore
(No. 97–1390), 14
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4 (Apr. 9) 6
East Timor (Port. v. Austl.) 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 90 (June 30) 5
El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09, ECtHR (2012)
15
Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, IACtHR (ser. C) No. 282, (Aug. 28, 2014) 19
Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829) 17
Genovese v. Malta, App. No. 53124/09, ECtHR, (2011) 19
Girls Yean and Bosico v Dominican Republic, IACtHR (ser. C) No. 130, (2005) 18
Jadhav (India v. Pak.), Judgment, 2019 I.C.J. Rep. 418, (July 17) 14, 15
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment,
2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99, (Feb. 3) 18
K2 v. U.K.., App. No. 42387/13, ECtHR (Feb. 7, 2017) 7, 8
Karassev v. Finland, App. No. 31414/96, ECtHR, (1999) 18, 19
Kawas Fernández v. Honduras, IACtHR (ser. C) No. 118 (2009) 7
LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 466, (June 27) 14, 15, 16
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion,
1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, (June 21) 5, 20, 21

iv
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, (July 9) 5
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226,
(July 8) 5, 24
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, (June 27) 6, 7, 18
Mukong v. Cameroon, Communication No. 458/1991, HRComm, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, (July 21, 1994) 10
Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B)
no. 4, (Feb. 7) 5, 12
North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3 para. 77 (Feb. 20)
18
Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 11 (Apr. 6). passim
Pham v. U.K., App. No. 37478/20, ECtHR, (Apr. 19, 2021) 19
Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica,
Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, IACtHR (ser. A) No. 4, (Jan. 19, 1984) 19
Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment,
2012 I.C.J. Rep. 422, (July 20) 1, 2, 17
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 15, (May 28) 2
Riener v. Bulgaria, App. No. 46343/99, ECtHR, (2006) 18
Robert John Penessis v. United Republic of Tanzania, App. No. 013/2015, ACtHPR, (2019)
18
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) 17
S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, (Sept. 7) 24
Slivenko v. Latvia, App. No. 48321/99, ECtHR, (2002) 18, 19
South West Africa (Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6
(July 18) 1, 5
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J.
Rep. 3 (May 24). 14, 23

UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS

3 UN, Article 34 in REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS, SUPPLEMENTS NO.
10 (2000-2009) (forthcoming) 21
4 UN, LAWS CONCERNING NATIONALITY (1954) 7

v
Draft Convention on the Reduction of Future Statelessness, 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 143
(1954) 3
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Dec. 10, 1948) 7, 18
G.A. Res. 46/59 (Dec. 9, 1991) 21
G.A. Res. 49/169, (Dec. 23, 1994) 18
G.A. Res. 50/152, (Dec. 21 1995) 18
G.A. Res. 56/83, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
(Jan. 28, 2002) 2, 4, 5
G.A. Res. 61/137 (Dec. 19, 2006) 18
G.A. Res. 67/149 (December 20, 2012) 18
G.A. Res. 68/141 (December 18, 2013) 18
G.A. Res. 70/135 (Dec. 17, 2015) 18
HRComm, Communication No. 1450/2006, Views of the Human Rights Committee Under
Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, UN Doc. CCPR/C/93/D/1450/2006, (Aug. 5, 2008) 16
HRComm, General Comment No. 35, Article 9, Liberty and Security of Person, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/35, (Dec. 16, 2014) 16
ILC, Draft Articles on Consular Relations with Commentaries, 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 92,
(1961) 14
ILC, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, 30, UN Doc. A/65/10 (2006)
12
ILC, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 26, (2006). 11, 12
ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with
Commentaries, art. 42(b)(ii), 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 31, (2001) 2
ILC, Draft Conclusions on Identification and Legal Consequences of Peremptory Norms of
General International Law (Jus Cogens), 2, UN. Doc. A/74/10 (2022) 5
Press Release, UNHRC, Myanmar Refuses Access to UN Special Rapporteur (Dec. 20 2017)
24
Press Release, UNSC, Security Council Rejects Text to Investigate Complaint Concerning Non-
Compliance of Biological Weapons Convention by Ukraine, United States, UN Doc.
SC/15095 (Nov. 2, 2022 25
The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due
Process of Law, IACtHR (ser. C) No. OC-16/99, (1999) 17
UN High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, (2014). 3
UN High Comm’r for Refugees, PREVENTING AND REDUCING STATELESSNESS, (2010) 4
UN High Comm’n Hum. Rts., The Rights OF NON-Citizens 5 (2005) 14

vi
UN Secretary-General, Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, UN Doc.
A/HRC/25/28 (Dec. 19, 2013) 4
UN Secretary-General, Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, UN Doc.
A/HRC/19/43 (Dec. 19, 2011) 4, 19
UN Secretary-General, Impact of the Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality on the Enjoyment of
the Rights of Children Concerned, UN. Doc. A/HRC/31/29 (Dec. 16, 2015) 4
UNGA, 1961 Signatory States, Declarations and Reservations on the Reduction of Statelessness,
30 August 1961 (Apr. 19, 2012). 9
UNHCR, Expert Meeting, Interpreting the 1961 Statelessness Convention and Avoiding
Statelessness resulting from Loss and Deprivation of Nationality, Summary Conclusion,
(2013) 19
UNHCR, Guidelines on Statelessness No. 5: Loss and Deprivation of Nationality under Articles
5-9 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, HCR/GS/20/05, (May
2020) 18

TREATISES, MANUALS, AND BOOKS

BOS. U. SCH. L., STATELESSNESS AND NATIONAL POLICY IN TUNISIA (2023) 9
GUILIO BARTOLINI, The Historical Roots of the Due Diligence Standard in DUE DILIGENCE IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (Heidi Krieger et al. eds. 2020) 7
STANFORD CRIM. JUSTICE CTR, VIRTUAL JUSTICE? A NATIONAL STUDY ANALYZING THE
TRANSITION TO REMOTE CRIMINAL COURT (2021) 22
The Right to Consular Access in A JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S MANUAL: IMMIGRATION AND
CONSULAR ACCESS SUPPLEMENT, 11 SUPP. COLUMBIA HUM. RTS. L.R. 70 (2018) 16

ARTICLES, JOURNALS, AND WORKING PAPERS

Adam Entous, Israel Denies Entry to U.N. Rights Investigator, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2008),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-israel-un-sb-idUSTRE4BE33A20081215
24
Anne Sanders, Video-Hearings in Europe Before, During and After the COVID-19 Pandemic, 12
INT’L J. COURT ADMIN. 1, (2020) 22
Cindy Buys, Do Unto Others: The Importance of Better Compliance with Consular Notification
Rights, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 461 (2011) 13
Craig Meyers, “Checkbook Citizenship”: Renewed Relevance for the Nottebohm Ruling, E-
INT’L. RELATIONS (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/88004. 12
D. R. Gilmour, The Meaning of ‘Intervene’ within Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter,
An Historical Perspective, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q., (1967). 20

vii
Dechlan Brennan, 2 State Governments in Australia Block UN Visits to Prisons, THE DIPLOMAT
(Nov. 19, 2022), https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/2-state-governments-in-australia-
block-un-visits-to-prisons 24
Francisca Fernando et al., Citizenship for Sale, INT’L MONETARY FUND (2021). 12
G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group, G20 Denial of Entry Experts Network Inaugural Meeting,
Chairman’s Summary (Oct. 14, 2015). 22
Gehan Gunatilleke, Justifying Limitations on the Freedom of Expression, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 91
(2021).10
Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and
International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287 (1995) 7
Jeffrey L. Blackman, State Successions and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an Effective
Nationality Under International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1141 (1998) 4
Kelebogile Zvobgo et al., Reserving Rights: Explaining Human Rights Treaty Reservations, 64
INT'L STUDIES Q., 785, 797 (2020)
Luca Bucken & Rene de Groot, Deprivation of Nationality under Article 8 (3) of the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 25 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 38
(2018).9
Luke Hurst, Buying EU Citizenship: What are Golden Passports and Visas and How Do They
Work?, EURONEWS (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.euronews.com/2020/10/20/buying-eu-
citizenship-what-are-golden-passports-and-visas-and-how-do-they-work. 11
Maarten P. Bolhuis & Joris van Wijk, Citizenship Deprivation as a Counterterrorism Measure
in Europe; Possible Follow-Up Scenarios, Human Rights Infringements and the Effect on
Counterterrorism, 22 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 338 (2020). 3
Medes Malaihollo, Due Diligence in International Environmental Law and International Human
Rights Law: A Comparative Legal Study of the Nationally Determined Contributions
under the Paris Agreement and Positive Obligations under the European Convention on
Human Rights, 68 NETHERLANDS INT’L. LR 121 (2021) 7
Michelle Foster, Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring Refugees to Seek
Protection in Another State, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 223 (2007) 6
Mike Ives, Myanmar Vows to Block U.N. Investigators From Entering, N.Y. TIMES (June 30,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/world/asia/myanmar-united-nations-
rohingya.html 24
Mohammad Alipour, The Competence of the Security Council Over Situations or Disputes
Arising from Human Rights Violations by a State Under Chapter VI of the United
Nations Charter, HUNGARIAN J. LEGAL STUDIES 1, (2023). 20
Petra Weingerl & Matjaz Tratnik, Citizenship by Investment Programs from the Perspective of
International and EU Law, 11 LEXONOMICA 95 (2019). 12
Satvinder S. Juss, Nationality Law, Sovereignty, and the Doctrine of Exclusive Domestic
Jurisdiction, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 219 (1994) 6

viii
Tsilly Dagan & Talia Fisher, State Inc., 27 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 661 (2018). 11
UN Expert 'Denied Zimbabwe Entry' 2009, BBC (Oct. 29, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8329984.stm 24
William J. Aceves, Actio Popularis - The Class Action in International Law, 2003 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 356 (2003) 1
William J. Aceves, The Right of Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law. Advisory Opinion OC-16-99, 94 AM. J. INT’L. L.
555 (2000). 17
Willian J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of Rights, Wrongs,
and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSACTIONAL L. 257 (1998) 13

ix
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Under Articles 36(1) and 40 of the Statute of the Court, the Kingdom of Remisia
(“Remisia”) and the Republic of Antrano (“Antrano”) have agreed to submit the present dispute
to the International Court of Justice by a Special Agreement (“Compromis”) done in The Hague,
The Netherlands, on the fourteenth day of September 2023. According to Article 2 of the
Compromis, Antrano shall appear as Applicant and Remisia as Respondent, without prejudice to
any question of the burden of proof. According to Article 5 of the Compromis, each party shall
accept any judgment as final and binding and execute it in good faith.

x
 QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Whether Antrano lacks standing to bring the dispute of the Sterren Forty’s nationality to
this Court.

II. Whether Remisia complied with international law when it revoked the Sterren Forty’s
Remisian nationality.

III. Whether Antrano violated international law when it denied Saki Shaw, a Remisian
citizen, Remisian consular access while detained in Antrano.

IV. Whether Remisia complied with international law when it denied Dr. Malex entry into
Remisia.

xi
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Kingdom of Remisia (“Remisia”), a land-locked country in the Isidre Plateau, is a

constitutional monarchy governed by Queen Khasat. Remisia’s two million citizens deeply
venerate the monarchy. The Republic of Antrano (“Antrano”) is an island country in the Mahali
Archipelago.

THE DISRESPECT TO THE CROWN ACT

The Remisian legislature adopted the Disrespect to the Crown Act (“DCA”) in 1955.
Under the DCA, any Remisian who defames, insults, or threatens the monarch may be
imprisoned up to five years. Additionally, once convicted, the individual’s nationality may be
revoked, and he may be subject to expulsion following his sentence.

SHAWCORPS MINING

Saki Shaw was born in Molvania in 1970. Shaw’s family founded the Shaw Corporation
(“ShawCorp”), a multinational mining conglomerate. She heads Lithos Limited, a wholly owned
subsidiary of ShawCorp.
In 1988, Shaw met Queen Khasat. They formed a close and long-lasting friendship. In
2015, Shaw proposed a joint venture between Lithos Limited and the Remisian Ministry of
Mines. This proposal aimed to increase Remisian cobalt mining over the next ten years.
Queen Khasat forwarded Shaw’s proposal to Prime Minister Van Sezan. On November
10, 2015, Shaw and Prime Minister Sezan agreed to the joint venture. After conducting standard
due diligence tests and finding no substantial environmental consequences, the Remisian
Ministry of Mines approved permits for seven mining sites. The mines employ more than 4,000
Remisians. Further, the mines produce significant public revenue through export taxes.
In 2008, Queen Khasat signed the Naturalization by Investment Act (“NIA”). The NIA
grants Remisian nationality to any applicant who invests over 500,000 euros into the Remisian
economy. Remisia enacted the NIA to raise revenue and promote Queen Khasat’s goal of
encouraging foreign investment. From 2008 until 2021, the NIA generated over 1.5 billion euros
in gross revenue. As part of the joint venture between Remisia and Lithos Limited, Shaw
contributed 500,000 euros to apply for nationality under the Act. Shaw naturalized as Remisian
on June 1, 2016.

xii
THE STERREN FORTY

In September 2019, Remisian university students rallied against the alleged

environmental hazards caused by cobalt mining. The leaders of these rallies founded the Isidre
League of Student Activists (“ILSA”). In December, ILSA issued a manifesto calling for the
immediate end of all cobalt mining in Remisia.
Between February 3 and February 8, 2020, over 30,000 demonstrators joined ILSA
protests, displaying placards that read, “The Queen’s friend is threatening our future;” others
chanting “Her Majesty has betrayed us.” On February 8, 2020, protestors chained themselves to
mining machinery and blocked entrances to the mining facilities, completely halting mining
operations and blocking thousands of Remisia’s from being able to arrive to their jobs . Seven
students, the leaders of ILSA, were arrested. Although the Remisian Minister of Mines released
the ILSA leaders, disruptive rallies continued across Remisia for three more weeks.
On February 27, 2020, forty protestors, including the seven ILSA leaders, formed a
human chain blockading the Sterren Palace, Queen Khasat’s primary residence. Global news
outlets coined the forty instigators “the Sterren Forty.”
After one month of continuous civil unrest, Remisia detained more than 1,000 protestors
across the country. The Remisian Attorney-General charged all protestors under the DCA.
However, the Attorney-General dismissed the charges for any person who wrote an apology to
the Queen. Of the detainees, two-hundred and thirty, including the Sterren Forty, refused to
apologize. Consequently, the court pronounced a guilty verdict for those two hundred and thirty
protestors. One-hundred and ninty demonstrators were sentenced to one to three years in
Remisian prison. However, the Sterren Forty, who had protested at the gates of the Sterren
Palace, received five-year sentences and revocation of their nationality as established by the
DCA.
The Sterren Forty appealed to the Supreme Court of Remisia arguing that stripping them
of their nationality, rendering them stateless, violated international law. The Supreme Court
upheld the sentences, asserting the evidence of the Sterren Forty’s disloyalty was manifested and
their sentences complied with domestic and international law. Subsequently, Remisia issued the
Sterren Forty non-citizen identity cards and imprisoned them in the national penitentiary, where
they remain to this day.

xiii
RESOLUTION 99997

In April 2021, Antrano President Iyali spoke at an Antranan ceremony about Antrano’s
mission to protect stateless people, alluding to Remisia’s response to its domestic unrest.
Following the speech, Remisia’s foreign minister stated in a diplomatic note that President
Iyali’s speech interefered in Remisia’s domestic affairs.
In January 2022, Antrano became President of the United Nations Security Council
(“UNSC”). The Antranan Ambassador to the UN submitted a memorandum to the Secretary-
General and the UNSC claiming Remisia’s application of the DCA to ILSA protesters violated
international law. The UNSC heard testimony from both Antranan and Remisian representatives.
Following testimony, the UNSC adopted Resolution 99997, establishing the United Nations
Inspection Mission to Remisia (“UNIMR”), invoked under Article 34 of the UN Charter.
UNIMR aimed to investigate and report the facts surrounding the Sterren Forty’s arrest,
nationality revocation, and detainment.

THE ARREST OF SAKI SHAW

In April 2014, Molvania issued an arrest warrant for Saki Shaw resulting from allegations
against ShawCorps and its subsidiaries. Given Shaw no longer lived in Molvania, the Molvanian
Attorney-General requested Antrano extradite her upon entry into Antrano for an upcoming
ShawCorp meeting.
On March 15, 2022, Shaw legally entered Antrano with a valid Remisian passport. The
following day, Antranan police detained Shaw on the authority of the Molvanian extradition
request. Shaw was taken into custody where both her Molvanian and Remisian passports were
confiscated. As a Remisian national, Shaw demanded Remisian consular representation. The
Antranan chief of police denied her request, asserting Antrano does not recognize purchased
nationality and Shaw’s admittance by Antrano immigration officials into Antrano with a
Remisian passport was done in error.

Remisia’s UN Ambassador delivered a message to the Foreign Ministry of Antrano

asserting its right to a consular meeting with Shaw. However, Antrano responded to Remisia
maintaining Remisia could only communicate with Shaw through Molvania as her Remisian
nationality was not recognized. Two weeks later, Saki Shaw died of a heart attack.

xiv
DR. TULOUS MALEX

Performing under Resolution 99997, the UNIMR began conducting their research on the
Sterren Forty. Dr. Tulous Malex, an Antranan expert on statelessness, was elected to lead the
UNIMR. Dr. Malex requested to meet with the Sterren Forty. Remisia’s UN Ambassador wrote
to the Secretary-General announcing Remisia would not permit Dr. Malex’s entry into the
country to, asserting Dr. Malex, an Antrano national, would inappropriately interfere in
Remisia’s domestic affairs. The Security Council President responded, alleging that to deny Dr.
Malex entry into Remisia violates Remisia’s UN membership obligations and Resolution 99997.
On July 25, 2022, Dr. Malex informed Remisia he would travel to Remisia from August
10 to August 20, 2022. On August 9, 2022, Dr. Malex boarded a flight to Remisia. Dr. Malex
arrived at the Remisian airport where he was stopped at passport control. Remisian border agents
denied his entry and boarded Dr. Malex on a return flight to New York.

On August 15, 2023, the Remisian and Antranan Foreign Ministers met to arbitrate an
agreement. The parties successfully negotiated the terms of the Special Agreement and submitted
it to the Registrar of this Court.

xv
 SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

I. Antrano lacks standing to dispute the revocation of the Sterren Forty’s nationality before
this Court. As a threshold matter, Antrano cannot exert diplomatic protection over the
Sterren Forty because Antrano has no connections to the injured parties. Further, per treaty
law, Remisia did not breach its erga omnes partes obligations under the CRS, CSP, and
ICCPR because a guarantee to nationality is not a common interest of the treaties. Finally,
under customary international law, statelessness is not considered a jus cogens norm, and,
thus, is not considered an erga omnes obligation.

II. Remisia complied with international law when it revoked the Sterren Forty’s nationality.
Under treaty and customary international law, there are permissible exceptions when a
State may revoke an individual’s nationality. The DCA adheres to these exceptions. Under
customary international law, Remisia is permitted to maintain its domestic nationality laws
without interference pursuant to the principle of nonintervention. Additionally, Remisia
complied with customary human rights instruments because the revocation of the Sterren
Forty’s nationality was foreseeable. Next, Remisia complied with treaty law by submitting
a valid reservation under the CRS. Additionally, Remisia, complied with the CSP by
issuing non-citizen identity cards to the Sterren Forty. Finally, Remisia complied with
Articles 19 and 21 of the ICCPR by validly limiting speech and assembly, as well as
Article 14 by providing the Sterren Forty with a fair trial and due process.

III. Antrano violated international law when it denied a Remisian national consular access to
Remisa while detained in Antrano. By denying Saki Shaw consular access to Remisia,
Antrano violated its treaty obligations under the VCCR and ICCPR, as well as its
customary international law obligations. First, Antrano violated Articles 36 and 5 of the
VCCR by failing to notify and provide Shaw her right to communicate with Remisian
consular representatives. Second, Antrano violated Articles 9 and 14 of the ICCPR by
denying her right to liberty and right to due process, respectively. Finally, Antrano's
arbitrary deprivation of Shaw’s Remisian nationality constitutes a violation of customary
international law. Because the deprivation does not serve a legitimate purpose and is not

xvi
 proportional, Antrano arbitrarily deprived Shaw of her Remisian nationality. Accordingly,
Antrano violated customary international law.

IV. Remisia complied with international law when it refused to allow Dr. Malex entry into
Remsia. Because UNSC Resolution 99997’s adoption was in violation of Article 27(3) of
the UN Charter, it is void. If this Court finds Resolution 99997 is valid, Remisia still
complied with Article 2(7) of The UN Charter by maintaining its sovereign authority of its
domestic affairs. Further, Remisia complied with the CPI when it denied entry to Dr. Malex
as his travel to Remisia is not necessary. Additionally, Remisia complied with Article 9 of
the VCDR when it denied a diplomatic agent entry into its territory. Finally, Remisia
Complied with its international law obligations when it denied entry to Dr. Malex.
Customary international law does not specifically prohibit states from denying entry, and
therefore Remisa is free to act in absence of this prohibitory rule. In denying entry to Dr.
Malex, Remisia stopped Antrano from intervention into Remisian domestic affairs. Finally,
international law recognizes the sovereignty of States to maintain the integrity of their
borders through the principle of non-intervention.

xvii
 PLEADINGS

I. ANTRANO LACKS STANDING TO BRING THE MATTER OF THE STERREN FORTY’S

NATIONALITY TO THIS COURT

Antrano lacks standing to dispute the revocation of the Sterren Forty’s nationality
because: (1) Antrano cannot exert diplomatic protection over the Sterren Forty; (2) there was no
erga omnes partes breach under treaty law; and (3) statelessness is not a jus cogens norm.

A. Antrano Lacks Standing Because It Cannot Exert Diplomatic Protection

Over the Sterren Forty.

To have standing in this Court, a State must cite direct injury to the State itself or to its
nationals.1 Antrano lacks such injury. Without direct injury, a State cannot exert diplomatic
protection over the injured nationals.2 In Nottebohm, this Court ruled nationality is determined
through “any genuine intention to establish a durable link” to a State.3
Here, the Sterren Forty have no genuine links to Antrano because their sole nationality is
Remisian,4 and there is no indication the Sterren Forty have connections to Antrano. Without a
demonstrable link to the Sterren Forty, Antrano can neither prove injury nor exert diplomatic
protection. Permitting such would constitute an actio popularis claim, which this Court has
affirmatively rejected.5

B. Antrano Lacks Standing Because There is no Erga Omnes Partes

Obligation to Guarantee Nationality Under Treaty Law

Erga omnes partes obligations are common interests in a treaty “owed by any State party
to all other States parties to the [treaty].” 6 These obligations are collective obligations each State
1
South West Africa (Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶ 88 (July 18) [“South
West Africa”].
2
Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 11 (Apr. 6) [“Nottebohm”]. See also Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Company, (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 46 (Feb. 5) [“Barcelona
Traction”].
3
Nottebohm, supra note 2, 11.
4
Compromis, para. 34.
5
South West Africa, supra note 1; William J. Aceves, Actio Popularis - The Class Action in International Law,
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 356 (2003).
6
See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Gam. v. Myan.),
Preliminary Objections, 2020 I.C.J. Rep. 477, ¶ 41 (July 22) [“Application of Genocide Convention”]; Questions
Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 422, ¶ 68 (July 20)
[“Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite”]; Barcelona Traction, supra note 2, ¶ 68.
1
party has an interest to comply.7 Erga omnes partes obligations arise when non-compliance with
the obligation would “radically . . . change” all parties’ commitment to upholding the obligation. 8
Although any party may claim injury on the collective’s behalf for erga omnes partes breaches,9
this Court has only applied this theory in limited circumstances.10
To establish an erga omnes partes obligation, this Court considers the treaty’s common
interests.11 Common interests are found in cooperative treaty regimes where States lack
individual interests,12 but rather share “a common interest [in] the accomplishment of those high
purposes which are the raison d’être of the [c]onvention.”13 These interests are found in the
treaty’s object and purpose,14 which can be determined through analyzing its text, context,
negotiating history, and surrounding circumstances.15
While Antrano submits Remisia is bound to certain erga omnes partes obligations under
the CRS, CSP, and ICCPR,16 an unequivocal guarantee to nationality is not a common interest of
any of these treaties.17 Therefore, under certain conditions, it is permissible for Remisia to revoke
its own people’s nationality; the violation of the DCA being one of these conditions.

1. An unequivocal guarantee to nationality is not an erga omnes partes

obligation under the CRS.

Although a common interest of the CRS is to provide feasible conditions for States to
prevent statelessness,18 it does not create a unequivocal guarantee to nationality. 19 Rather, it

7
Barcelona Traction, supra note 2, ¶ 68.
8
G.A. Res. 56/83, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 42(b)(ii) (Jan. 28,
2002) [“(D)ARSIWA”].
9
Id.; Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with
Commentaries, art. 42(b)(ii), 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 31, para. 15 (2001) [“(D)ARSIWA Commentaries”].
10
See Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, supra note 6; See Application of Genocide Convention, supra note 6, ¶¶
111-12; Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory
Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 15, 22 (May 28) [“Reservations to the Convention Advisory Opinion”].
11
See Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, supra note 6, ¶ 68. See also Reservations to the Convention Advisory
Opinion, supra note 10, ¶ 23.
12
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, supra note 6, ¶ 68.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [“VCLT”].
16
Compromis, para. 62.
17
See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, arts. 8(3)(a)(ii) & 8(3)(b), Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175
[“CRS”].
18
Id. pmbl.
19
Id. art. 8(3)(a)(ii), 8(3)(b) (1961).
2
establishes safeguards to reduce statelessness by ensuring, when appropriate, nationality is not
revoked arbitrarily.20 In the Draft Convention on the Reduction of Future Statelessness,
considered a part of the CRS’s trauvaux preparatoires,21 the drafters observed “it was not
feasible to suggest measures for the total and immediate elimination of present statelessness.” 22
For example, in circumstances where individuals demonstrated disloyalty to the State, an
individual’s nationality may be revoked even if it renders him stateless. 23 Preventing a State from
revoking nationality in exigent circumstances would force the State to maintain an individual
within its borders who may jeopardize the State's vital interests. 24 Therefore, an unequivocal
guarantee to nationality is not a common interest to the CRS and Remisia did not breach its erga
omnes partes obligation under this treaty.

2. An unequivocal guarantee to nationality is not an erga omnes partes

obligation under the CSP

Similarly, the object and purpose of the CSP is not to guarantee nationality, but provide
minimum standards of treatment to individuals already classified as stateless. 25 This core purpose
does not apply to the Sterren Forty, whose treatment is not in question. 26 The drafters intended
for the CSP to be exclusive to this purpose and designated safeguards against the prevention of
statelessness to the CRS.27 Therefore, because the CSP does not concern matters involving the
conferral or revocation of nationality, there is no common interest in the CSP to guarantee
nationality. Accordingly, Remisia did not breach its erga omnes partes obligations under this
treaty.

3. An unequivocal guarantee to nationality is not an erga omnes partes

obligation under the ICCPR

20
Id. art. 8; See infra II(A)(2).
21
VCLT, supra note 15, art. 33.
22
Draft Convention on the Reduction of Future Statelessness, 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 143, 147, para. 29 (1954).
23
See CRS, supra note 17, at art. 8(3)(a)(ii). See also Luca Bucken & Rene de Groot, Deprivation of Nationality
under Article 8 (3) of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 25 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L.
38, 39 (2018). See also Maarten P. Bolhuis & Joris van Wijk, Citizenship Deprivation as a Counterterrorism
Measure in Europe; Possible Follow-Up Scenarios, Human Rights Infringements and the Effect on
Counterterrorism, 22 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 338, 341-349 (2020).
24
Infra II(B)(1).
25
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 1, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117. [“CSP”]
26
Infra II(B)(2).
27
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons 3 (2014).
3
 The object and purpose of the ICCPR is to “promote universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and freedoms” to “all members of the human family.” 28 Although
nationality is important to the enjoyment of rights,29 the ICCPR does not require nationality to
enjoy these freedoms. Rather, the core purpose and objective of the ICCPR is to ensure human
rights regardless of an individual’s nationality or status.30
Requiring nationality to enjoy the rights enshrined in the ICCPR would exclude stateless
persons from its protection, which contravenes the object and purpose of the treaty. 31 Moreover,
Article 2 guarantees the enjoyment of these rights “without distinction” to an individual's
nationality or status.32 As such, there is no erga omnes partes obligation to guarantee nationality
under the ICCPR, and Antrano lacks standing to bring this claim.

C. Antrano Lacks Standing Because Statelessness is not an Erga Omnes

Obligation Under Customary International Law.

Antrano lacks standing because statelessness is not an erga omnes obligation under
customary international law.33 This Court established in Barcelona Traction that erga omnes
obligations are “obligations of a State toward the international community as a whole.” 34 Distinct
from erga omnes partes obligations, erga omnes obligations are “by their very nature . . . the
concern of all States” where “all States [are] held to have a legal interest in their protection.” 35

1. Statelessness is not a jus cogens norm.

Erga omnes obligations reflect jus cogens norms.36 This Court has identified several erga
omnes obligations, including prohibitions against genocide, slavery, and racial discrimination, 37
28
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pmbl., Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [“ICCPR”].
29
See UNHCR, PREVENTING AND REDUCING STATELESSNESS, n.85 (2010); UN Secretary-General, Human Rights
and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/28 (Dec. 19, 2013) [“HRC Res. 25/28”];
Jeffrey L. Blackman, State Successions and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an Effective Nationality Under
International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1141, 1148 (1998). See generally UN Secretary-General, Human Rights and
Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/43 (Dec. 19, 2011); UN Secretary-General, Impact of the
Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality on the Enjoyment of the Rights of Children Concerned, UN. Doc.
A/HRC/31/29 (Dec. 16, 2015).
30
ICCPR, supra note 28.
31
Id.
32
Id. art. 2.
33
(D)ARSIWA, supra note 8, art. 48.
34
Barcelona Traction, supra note 2, ¶ 33.
35
Id.
36
Id. See also (D)ARSIWA, supra note 8, art. 48(1)(b).
37
Barcelona Traction, supra note 2, ¶ 34.
4
as well as the right to self-determination. 38 Erga omnes obligations continue to be formed
through customary international law39 and are identified by their non-derogable character. 40
Statelessness has neither been considered a jus cogens norm, nor an erga omnes obligation, given
treaties such as the CRS and CSP still permit forms of derogation.41
Further, this Court has determined moral reasoning alone cannot constitute the basis of an
erga omnes obligation.42 Simply because Antrano feels strongly about the plight of statelessness
does not mean this issue rises to the level of erga omnes. Considering the lack of consensus
about statelessness and its protections, this Court should not rely on Antrano’s moral reasoning
alone to render statelessness an erga omnes obligation.

2. Statelessness is not an obligation owed to the international

community.

A State may “invoke the responsibility of another State if the obligation breached . . .
radically [changes] the position of all other States.” 43 A guarantee to nationality is not an
obligation owed to the international community as a whole because it is a matter of domaine
réservé.44
Furthermore, if this Court were to determine statelessness is an obligation owed to the
international community as a whole, the breach of this obligation would not radically change the
position of all other States to which the obligation is owed. Although the status of stateless
persons may impact other States, the resulting effect is too attenuated to determine what the

38
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004
I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 155 (July 9) [“Construction of a Wall Advisory Opinion”]; East Timor (Port. v. Austl.) 1995 I.C.J.
Rep. 90, ¶ 29 (June 30); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16,
paras. 52-53 (June 21) [“Namibia Advisory Opinion”].
39
Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on Identification and Legal Consequences of Peremptory Norms of General
International Law (Jus Cogens), 2, UN. Doc. A/74/10 (2022) [“Draft on Preemptory Norms”]; Barcelona Traction,
supra note 2, ¶ 34; Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 38.
40
Draft on Preemptory Norms, supra note 39. See also Construction of a Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 38, ¶
155; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 79 (July 8).
41
See CRS, supra note 17.
42
South West Africa, supra note 1, ¶ 78.
43
(D)ARSIWA, supra note 9, art. 4.
44
Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) no. 4, at 24 (Feb. 7)
[“PCIJ Nationality Decrees Advisory Opinion”].
5
consequence would look like.45 In fact, most stateless persons are stateless within their own
countries meaning the effect of statelessness on other States is uncertain.46
Moreover, given the safeguards created by the CSP to protect stateless persons, even if a
State revokes the nationality of its nationals, it is required to afford them certain protections
within its borders. Therefore, the consequences stemming from the revocation of nationality does
not extend so far as to impact other States’ performance of this obligation. Therefore,
statelessness is not an erga omnes obligation and Antrano lacks standing.

II. REMISIA COMPLIED WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT REVOKED THE STERREN
FORTY’S NATIONALITY.

Under treaty and customary international law, there are permissible exceptions when a
State may revoke an individual’s nationality. The DCA adheres to the exceptions.

A. Remisia Complied with Customary International Law when it Revoked

the Sterren Forty’s Nationality

Remisia complied with customary international law when it revoked the Sterren Forty’s
nationality. It adhered to the principle of non-intervention and abided by the principles enshrined
within international and regional human rights instruments.

1. Remisia is permitted to maintain its domestic nationality laws

without interference.

The principle of non-intervention prohibits a State from intervening into another State’s
domaine réservé.47 This Court affirmed the principle of non-intervention as “part and parcel of
customary international law.”48 Naturalization, regulation, and revocation of nationality are
inherent aspects of a State's domestic affairs and fall within the ambit of its sovereign

45
MICHELLE FOSTER, Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring Refugees to Seek Protection in
another State, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 223, 224-225 (2007).
46
Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, supra note 27, at 5.
47
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep.
14, paras. 202, 205 (June 27) [“Military and Paramilitary Activities”].
48
Id. para. 276. See also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgments,
2005 I.C.J. Rep 168, para. 164 (Dec. 19); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 35 (Apr. 9).
6
privileges.49 Customary international law reaffirms how States historically maintained sovereign
authority to confer nationality, which exclusively is within a State's domestic affairs. 50
As a domestic law regulating nationality, 51 the DCA reflects Remisia’s exercise of
sovereign authority within its domestic jurisdiction. Therefore, the principle of non-intervention
preserves Remisia’s right to create and administer domestic laws without undue interference by
Antrano.52

2. Remisia complied with international and regional human rights

instruments.

Even if the right to nationality is absolute, Remisia complied with this obligation as
interpreted through international and regional human rights instruments. This Court recognizes
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as customary international law. 53 Article 15(2) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts “no [person] shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
nationality.”54 Various regional treaties and human rights courts55 have affirmed this principle,
concluding if the revocation of nationality is foreseeable, it is not arbitrarily. 56 Foreseeability is
constructive rather than actual knowledge.57 To be foreseeable, laws governing the withdrawal
must be clear and accessible.58
In K2 v. The United Kingdom, the ECtHR focused on whether the revocation of
nationality was arbitrary as set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights. 59 The

49
Satvinder S. Juss, Nationality Law, Sovereignty, and the Doctrine of Exclusive Domestic Jurisdiction, 9 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 219, 222 (1994).
50
Nottebohm, supra note 2. See also Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law,
art. 2, July 1, 1937, 179 L.N.T.S 89. See generally 4 U.N., LAWS CONCERNING NATIONALITY (1954).
51
Compromis, para. 7.
52
Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 47, ¶ 276.
53
Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 337 (1995).
54
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 15(2) (Dec. 10, 1948) [“UDHR”].
55
OAS, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 20, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 . See also Kawas
Fernández v. Honduras, IACtHR (ser. C) No. 118 (2009); K2 v. U.K.., App. No. 42387/13, ECtHR (Feb. 7, 2017).
56
See GUILIO BARTOLINI, The Historical Roots of the Due Diligence Standard in DUE DILIGENCE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 23-41 (Heidi Krieger et al. eds. 2020). See also Medes Malaihollo, Due Diligence in
International Environmental Law and International Human Rights Law: A Comparative Legal Study of the
Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement and Positive Obligations under the European
Convention on Human Rights, 68 NETHERLANDS INT’L. LR 121, n.105 (2021).
57
Malaihollo, supra note 56 n.106.
58
Id.
59
K2, supra note 56, para. 61.
7
ECtHR determined nationality revocation is not arbitrary if it was conducted: (1) in accordance
with the law, (2) in a timely manner, and (3) with sufficient procedural safeguards.60
Here, the Sterren Forty’s was revoked following a valid and timely legal process
conducted in accordance with the law. 61 The Sterren Forty had constructive knowledge of the
potential revocation because the DCA explicitly specifies that disloyal conduct to the Queen
results in a loss of nationality.62 Further, Remisia offered ample opportunity for the Sterren Forty
to revoke their defaming comments, putting them on notice about their unlawful behavior. 63
Finally, the Sterren Forty had the opportunity to appeal, therefore enjoying sufficient procedural
safeguards to their revocation.64 Therefore, Remisia complied with customary international law
when it revoked the Sterren Forty’s nationality.

B. Remisia Complied with its Treaty Obligations when it Revoked the

Sterren Forty’s Nationality

In addition to its obligations under customary international law, Remisia complied with
its treaty obligations under the CRS, CSP, and ICCPR when it revoked the Sterren Forty’s
nationality.

1. Remisia complied with Article 8 of the CRS when it revoked the

Sterren Forty’s nationality.

Article 8(3)(a) of the CRS permits exceptions to revoking nationality in circumstances of

statelessness if a State submits a reservation under the Article’s exceptions. 65 Reservations
“exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to
that State[.]”66 With the possibility of abstaining from certain provisions, States are more willing
to ratify multilateral treaties.67 To be valid, reservations must comport with the treaty’s object
and purpose.68

60
Id. at para. 61.
61
Compromis, paras. 33, 34.
62
Compromis para. 7.
63
Compromis, para. 31.
64
Compromis, para. 34.
65
CRS, supra note 17, art. 8(3)(a).
66
VCLT, supra note 15, art. 2(1)(d) and 19-23.
67
Kelebogile Zvobgo et al., Reserving Rights: Explaining Human Rights Treaty Reservations, 64 INT'L STUDIES Q.,
785, 797 (2020).
68
VCLT, supra note 15, art. 19(c).
8
 States have submitted reservations under Article 8(3) similar to Remisia’s, 69 while
receiving objections similar to one Antrano’s. 70 Yet, these reservation remains valid.71 Under its
own valid reservation, Remisia properly invoked Article 8(3)(a)’s exception when it revoked the
Sterren Forty’s nationality. Despite objections from Antrano and three other States, Remisia’s
reservation comports with the object and purpose of the CRS.
Remisia’s reservation falls squarely within the exception available under Article 8(3)(a)
(ii), which provides a State may deprive a person of his nationality if the individual
“inconsistently with his duty of loyalty to the . . . State . . . has conducted himself in a manner
seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State.” 72 Here, under the DCA, nationality may
only be revoked if an individual proves himself disloyal to the Queen. 73 Therefore, because the
DCA accords with Article 8(3)’s exception, Remisia's reservation does not defy the CRS's object
and purpose.

2. Remisia complied with Article 27 of the CSP when it revoked the

Sterren Forty’s nationality.

Article 27 of the CSP requires a State to “issue identity papers to any stateless person in
their territory who does not possess a valid travel document.” 74 By issuing non-citizen identity
cards, Remisia complied with this provision. 75 reflecting Remisia’s commitment to fulfill its
obligations under the CSP.76 Therefore, Remisia complied with the CSP when it revoked the
Sterren Forty’s nationality.

3. Remisia complied with ICCPR Articles 19, 21, and 14 when it

revoked the Sterren Forty’s nationality.

Remisia complied with Articles 19, 21, and 14 of the ICCPR when it revoked the Sterren
Forty’s nationality.

69
See UNGA, 1961 Signatory States, Declarations and Reservations on the Reduction of Statelessness, 30 August
1961 at 2 (Apr. 19, 2012).
70
Tunisia, Declaration under the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (done at New York on August 30,
1961). Compromis, para. 11.
71
Bos. U. Sch. L., STATELESSNESS AND NATIONAL POLICY IN TUNISIA 45 (2023).
72
CRS, supra note 17, art. 8(3)(a)(ii).
73
Compromis, para. 7.
74
CRS, supra note 17, art. 27.
75
Compromis, para. 34.
76
Compromis, para. 34.
9
 i. Remisia complied with Article 19 when it revoked the Sterren
Forty’s nationality.

ICCPR Article 19(3) permits limitations on freedom of speech when necessary to protect
the reputation and rights of others,77 public order, and national security,78 particularly in cases
where speech instigates or promotes actions that threaten the stability or well-being of a nation. 79
Courts evaluate three factors to determine the lawfulness of a State’s Article 19(3) restriction. 80
The enacted limitation must (1) be provided for by domestic law, (2) address one of the
legitimate aims expressed in Article 19(3), and (3) be strictly necessary for that purpose. 81
Given the Sterren Forty’s critiques of the Queen were aimed at marring her reputation,
Remisia’s application of the DCA complied with Article 19(3). Additionally, the Sterren Forty’s
speech directly contributed to nationwide civil unrest impacting Remisia’s public order, resulting
in arrests and demonstrations crippling Remisia’s mining industry for weeks. 82 By helping
coordinate these demonstrations, the Sterren Forty posed a national security threat to Remisia.
Therefore, Remisia is justified in limiting the Sterren Forty’s speech.

ii. Remisia complied with Article 21 when it revoked the Sterren

Forty’s nationality.

Furthermore, Article 21 protects the right to peaceful assembly. 83 However, the right to
assembly is not absolute when it endangers public order, health, safety, or the freedoms and
rights of others.84 Given Remisia's actions complied with Article 19(3), it also complied with
Article 21. Indeed, over the span of four months, Remisia permitted the Sterren Forty and other
demonstrators to participate in peaceful protests.85 However, it was not until the Sterren Forty
violated the DCA by insulting the Queen and inciting nationwide civil unrest did Remisia take
action against them.

77
ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 19(3)(a).
78
ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 19(3)(b).
79
See generally Gehan Gunatilleke, Justifying Limitations on the Freedom of Expression, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 91
(2021).
80
Mukong v. Cameroon, Communication No. 458/1991, HRComm, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, para. 9.7
(July 21, 1994).
81
Id.
82
Compromis, para. 30.
83
ICCPR, supra note 28, at art. 21.
84
Id.
85
Compromis, para. 23.
10
 iii. Remisia complied with Article 14 when it revoked the Sterren
Forty’s nationality.

Finally, Article 14 of the ICCPR outlines the principles of fair trial and due process. 86 It
guarantees the right of an individual to be treated fairly and equitably by his legal system. 87 By
providing the Sterren Forty a trial and opportunity to appeal their nationality revocation, Remisia
complied with this Article.88

III. ANTRANO VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT DENIED A REMISIAN NATIONAL

CONSULAR ACCESS TO REMISIA WHILE DETAINED IN ANTRANO

As a threshold issue, Antrano must recognize Saki Shaw’s Remisian nationality. While
States maintain sovereign authority to confer nationality through domestic laws, they must
acknowledge and respect the nationality laws of other sovereign States. 89 Antrano’s failure to
recognize a Remisian citizen’s nationality is inconsistent with the duty States of to respect other
State’s nationality laws.90 Indeed, similar systems to the NIA are common among State
practice.91 Similar to the benefits Remisia receives from the NIA, 92 these nationality programs
contribute to the sustainment of the State and its international economic relations. 93
Although nationals must demonstrate a genuine link to the State, States have discretion to
choose the nature of these links.94 Here, Remisia chooses to grant nationality to those who apply
for citizenship under the NIA.95 The NIA is consistent with State practice that defines a genuine
link through business and personal investments to the State. 96 Thus, Shaw’s NIA citizenship
through constitutes a genuine link to Remisia, therefore bestowing her Remisian nationality.

86
ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 14.
87
Id.
88
Compromis, paras. 26, 33, 34. See supra II(A)(2).
89
Nottebohm, supra note 2, 23.
90
Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 26, art. 3 (2006).
91
Tsilly Dagan & Talia Fisher, State Inc., 27 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 661, 664-666 (2018). See also Luke
Hurst, Buying EU Citizenship: What are Golden Passports and Visas and How Do They Work?, EURONEWS (Oct.
20, 2020), https://www.euronews.com/2020/10/20/buying-eu-citizenship-what-are-golden-passports-and-visas-and-
how-do-they-work.
92
Compromis, paras. 11, 13.
93
See Francisca Fernando et al., Citizenship for Sale, INT’L MONETARY FUND (2021).
94
Petra Weingerl & Matjaz Tratnik, Citizenship by Investment Programs from the Perspective of International and
EU Law, 11 LEXONOMICA 95-126 (2019). See also Nationality Decrees Advisory Opinion, supra note 44, at ¶ 24.
95
Compromis, paras. 11-13
96
Id. at para. 194.
11
 Should this Court not recognize the validity of Shaw’s NIA citizenship, she nevertheless
maintains a genuine link to Remisia through other connections. Under Nottebohm, nationality
depends on an individual’s genuine link to the State. 97 These links include family ties, economic
involvement, participation in social and cultural life, and intention to remain linked to that
country.98
The International Law Commission—the UN commission tasked with codifying
international law—noted Nottebohm imposes a variety of problems to non-traditional forms of
citizenship.99 Indeed, regional courts have recognized the “genuine link” test leads to
discrimination and interferes with state sovereignty in establishing citizenship standards. 100
Therefore, States have expanded beyond the genuine link test to establish nationality.101
Here, in addition to Shaw’s intention to gain Remisian nationality, 102 her business and
personal connections to Remisia render her a Remisian national. To start, Shaw chose to remain
connected to Remisan life and culture given her longstanding relationship with Queen Khasat. 103
Moreover, for nearly a decade, Shaw expanded her business into Remisia, conducting a joint
venture with the State.104 In fact, Remisia receives mutual benefit from Shaw’s business as it
created thousands of Remisian jobs.105 Therefore, her close relational ties and economic
involvement in Remisia make her a national of Remisia.106
In contrast, Shaw lacks a genuine link with Molvania because she has resided outside the
country for over a decade with no intention to return. 107 Given Shaw no longer has ties to
Molvania, it cannot best represent her interests in consular protection. Accordingly, by denying
Shaw—a Remisian national—consular access to Remisia, Antrano violated (1) its treaty
obligations under the VCCR and ICCPR, and (2) its customary international law obligations.

97
Nottebohm, supra note 2, 23.
98
Id.
99
Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, 30, U.N. Doc. A/65/10 (2006).
100
Craig Meyers, “Checkbook Citizenship”: Renewed Relevance for the Nottebohm Ruling, E-INT’L. RELATIONS
(Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/88004.
101
Id.
102
Compromis, para. 19
103
Compromis, para. 15
104
Compromis, para. 17
105
Compromis, para. 21.
106
Compromis, paras. 15, 17.
107
Compromis, para. 16.
12
 A. Antrano Violated its Treaty Obligations when it Denied a Remisian
National Access to Remisian Consular Representatives

Antrano violated its treaty obligations under the VCCR and ICCPR when it denied Shaw,
a Remisian national,108 access to Remisian consular representatives. First, Antrano violated
Articles 36 and 5 of the VCCR by failing to notify and provide Shaw her right to communicate
with Remisian consular representatives. Second, Antrano violated Articles 9 and 14 of the
ICCPR by denying her right to liberty and right to due process, respectively.

1. Antrano violated Articles 36 and 5 of the VCCR when it failed to

inform and grant a Remisian national access to a Remisian consular
representative

Under Article 36 of the VCCR, consular officers must be able to access nationals
detained in a foreign State.109 The core objective of the VCCR is to ensure a party can perform its
consular duties within other party’s jurisdictions.110 Permitting such consular access to nationals
is essential for maintaining peace between States. 111 Adherence to these rights is essential for the
effective execution of consular duties.112 Indeed, the right to consular access is binding and non-
derogable.113 Further, Article 36’s rights are coextensive to both the individual and the State. 114
Accordingly, any rights violated by Antrano owed to Remisia violate Shaw's rights. Therefore,
Antrano’s failure to recognize the NIA does not nullify Shaw and Remisia's Article 36 rights. 115
Article 36(1)(b) mandates States to allow communication between detained foreign
nationals and their consular representatives.116 As a Remisian national, Shaw must be permitted
to communicate with Remisian consular representatives. This Court reiterates the importance of
108
Supra Part III.
109
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, 24 April 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [“VCCR”].
110
Id., pmbl.
111
Willian J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 31
VAND. J. TRANSACTIONAL L. 257, 314 (1998).
112
Brief of Amici Curiae Republic of Argentina, Republic of Brazil, Republic of Ecuador, and Republic of Mexico
in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Paraguay v. Gilmore (No. 97–1390), annex 28. See generally Cindy
Buys, Do Unto Others: The Importance of Better Compliance with Consular Notification Rights, 21 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L. L. 461 (2011).
113
UN HIGH COMM’N HUM. RTS., THE RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENS 5 (2005).
114
Jadhav (India v. Pak.), Judgment, 2019 I.C.J. Rep. 418, para. 123 (July 17) [“Jadhav”].; Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 12, paras. 40, 47 (Mar. 31) [“Avena”]; LaGrand (Ger.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 466, para. 77 (June 27) [“LaGrand”].
115
Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Consular Relations with Commentaries, 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 92, 113
(1961) [“VCCR with Commentaries”].
116
VCCR, art. 36(1)(b).
13
consular access in its decisions. 117 In Avena, this Court outlines three obligations for the
detaining State: (1) to inform the detainee of their right to be notified of their entitlement to their
national State’s consulate; (2) to allow the national State’s consular representative access to the
detainee upon request; and (3) to deliver messages between the national State’s consular
representative and the detainee.118 Remisia submits Antrano fulfilled the first obligation outlined
in Avena because Shaw asserted her VCCR rights at the moment of arrest. Nevertheless, Antrano
violated the other obligations owed to Shaw.
Pursuant to Remisia's right to be accessed upon Shaw’s request, Antrano must notify
Remisia of Shaw’s presence in Antano’s jurisdiction without delay. 119 The term “without delay”
is interpreted by this Court to mean notification must be given to the appropriate consulate once
the detaining State recognizes the detainee is a foreign national. 120 Regional human rights courts
have affirmed the need for timely notice to the State. 121 Indeed, this Court acknowledges timely
notice is essential for both the individual to have his rights protected, as well as the State's right
to protect its nationals.122 In LaGrand, this Court ruled the United States violated Germany's
rights under Article 36(1)(b) when it failed to notify both Germany and Germany's nationals of
their right to reciprocal consular access.123
Although Shaw's knowledge of her rights is distinguishable to the detainees in LaGrand,
Remisia's rights were violated similar to Germany's because Remisia did not receive notice of
Shaw's detainment.124 Here, because Shaw is a Remisian national, 125 Remisia is entitled to
notification of Shaw’s detention. However, Remisia only became aware of her detention days
after her arrest.126 Moreover, there are no facts indicating whether Remisia received this
notification from Antrano.127 Therefore, akin to Germany, Remisia was deprived of the
opportunity to assist its nationals.
117
Jadhav, supra note 114, ¶ 123. See also Avena, supra note 114, ¶¶ 40, 47. See generally United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (May 24).
118
Avena, supra note 114, ¶ 61. See also, Jadhav, supra note 114, ¶ 133.
119
ILC, Draft Articles on Consular Relations with Commentaries, 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 92, 112 (1961).
120
Avena, supra note 114, ¶ 63.
121
See Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, IACtHR (ser. C) No. 254, para. 48 (2006); Acosta-Calderón v. Ecuador,
IACtHR (ser. C) No. 129, para. 101(g) (2005).
122
LaGrand, supra note 114, ¶ 73.
123
Id.
124
Compromis, para. 45.
125
Supra III.
126
Compromis, para. 45.
127
Compromis, para. 45.
14
 Without notifying Remisia of Shaw's detention, Antrano also failed to abide by the
obligation to deliver messages between Shaw and Remisia. Detaining States must allow the
detainee's national State to communicate with the detainee while in custody or prison. 128 This
Court found in Jadhav that these communications are essential to safeguard the rights of the
detained individual and to arrange legal representation.129
Here, Antrano violated Article 36(1)(b) by failing to provide Shaw consular access to
Remisia. Immediately after discovering Shaw's detainment, Remisia asserted its right to access
Shaw to Antrano.130 However, Antrano denied Remisia the right to communicate with Shaw
because it did not recognize her Remisian nationality.131
Instead, Antrano redirected Remisia to communicate with Shaw through Molvanian
consular representatives.132 Antrano’s failure to facilitate communication between Shaw and
Remisian consular representatives resulted in Shaw’s prolonged detention in Antrano without
representation.133 Therefore, by failing to provide notice and denying consular access to Remisia,
Antrano violated VCCR Article 36.
Additionally, VCCR Article 36’s rights are necessary to perform the consular functions
listed in Article 5.134 Under Article 5 the detaining State must safeguard “the interests of the
sending State and of its nationals.”135 This Court determined in LaGrand the United States's
failure to protect the interests of Germany and its citizens through Article 36 resulted in a
violation of Article 5.136 Within the context of Antrano's Article 36 violation, it violated Article 5
by failing to protect the rights and interests of Shaw and her national State, Remisia.

2. Antrano violated ICCPR Articles 9 and 14 when it failed to inform

and grant a Remisian citizen access to a Remisian consular
representative

128
VCCR with Commentaries, supra 14, 113.
129
Jadhav, supra note 114, ¶ 118. See also El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No.
39630/09, ECtHR, para. 236 (2012).
130
Compromis, para. 45.
131
Compromis, para. 45.
132
Compromis, para. 45.
133
Compromis, para. 47.
134
LaGrand, supra note 114, ¶ 73.
135
VCCR, art. 5(a).
136
LaGrand, supra note 114, at ¶ 73.
15
 Antrano violated its treaty obligations under the ICCPR when it denied Shaw, a Remisian
national,137 access to Remisian consular representatives. Antrano violated Articles 9 and 14 of the
ICCPR by denying her right to liberty and right to due process, respectively.

i. Antrano violated ICCPR Article 9 when it failed to provide a

Remisian citizen access to a Remisian consular representative

Article 9 of the ICCPR enshrines the “right to liberty and security of person.” 138 This
includes the right to consular assistance when detained in a foreign State. 139 If a State does not
provide consular access to a detainee, it violates Article 9. 140 Although Antrano provided Shaw
access to the Molvanian consulate, such access was inadequate because (1) it was not the
consulate of her national State and (2) it was not her preferred consulate access. 141 Courts have
established an individual is entitled to decline consular officer assistance. 142 Thus, the failure to
grant Shaw access to consular services from her preferred consulate, Remisia, constituted a
breach of Article 9 of the ICCPR.
Antrano was obliged to provide Shaw access to Remisia consular representatives because
Remisia is Shaw's national State.143 Further, even if this Court does not find Remisia to be
Shaw's national State, Antrano failed to provide Shaw adequate consular access because it gave
Molvania unauthorized access to Shaw.144 Therefore, to deny Shaw access to Remisian consular
assistance is a violation of Article 9 of the ICCPR.

ii. Antrano violated ICCPR Article 14 when it failed to provide

due process to a detained Remisian citizen

137
See supra III.
138
ICCPR, supra note 28, at art. 9.
139
See HRComm, General Comment No. 35, Article 9, Liberty and Security of Person, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35,
para. 58 (Dec. 16, 2014) [“HRComm General Comment No. 35”]; HRComm, Communication No. 1450/2006,
Views of the Human Rights Committee Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/93/D/1450/2006, para. 7.3 (Aug. 5, 2008).
140
Eur. Consult. Ass., European Convention on Consular Functions, E.T.S 6, Doc. 11.XII.1967 art 2(2) (1967); The
Right to Consular Access in A JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S MANUAL: IMMIGRATION AND CONSULAR ACCESS
SUPPLEMENT, 11 SUPP. COLUMBLA HUM. RTS. L.R. 70 (2018); Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829);
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
141
Compromis, para. 44.
142
The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law,
IACtHR (ser. C) No. OC-16/99, paras. 83-87 (1999) [“The Right to Information on Consular Assistance”].
143
See supra III.
144
Compromis, para. 44.
16
 Antrano violated Article 14 of the ICCPR when it deprived Shaw due process while
detained in Antrano. Under Article 14 detainees must receive due process before courts. 145 This
includes “hav[ing] adequate time and facilities [to] prepare [a] defence” and “to communicate
with counsel of [her] own choosing.”146 Extradition requests traditionally require judgment
before a court to determine whether a State should fulfill the request.147
By denying Shaw access to Remisian consular representatives, Antrano deprived her
right to communicate with counsel of her own choosing for her extradition proceedings. 148
Molvania cannot properly represent Shaw. Molvania’s conflict of interest stems from the fact
that it is overly invested in the outcome of Shaw’s Molvanian criminal proceedings. 149 Without
legal counsel, Shaw was further deprived of the time and facilities required to adequately prepare
her defense for her extradition case. Therefore, Antrano violated ICCPR Article 14 by denying
Shaw her right to due process while detained in Antrano.

B. Antrano Violated Customary International Law when it Denied a

Remisian Citizen Access to Remisian Consular Representatives

Antrano's arbitrary deprivation of Shaw’s Remisian nationality constitutes a violation of

customary international law. The right to a nationality is protected under international treaties, 150
regional agreements,151 and UN resolutions.152 Regional human rights courts reaffirm the
importance of this right, finding its arbitrary deprivation harms the basic liberties of those

145
See generally ICCPR, supra note 28, at art. 14.
146
ICCPR, supra note 28, at art. 14. See also The Right to Information on Consular Assistance, supra note 142,
para. 124. See William J. Aceves, The Right of Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law. Advisory Opinion OC-16-99, 94 AM. J. INT’L. L. 555, 559 (2000).
147
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, supra note 6, at ¶¶ 92-95.
148
Compromis, para. 47.
149
Compromis, para. 16.
150
See generally CSP supra note 25; CRS, supra note 17. See also ICCPR, supra note 28, at art. 23(3); International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 5(d)(iii), Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S.
195; Convention on the Rights of the Child, arts. 7 & 8, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, art. 9, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
151
See American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica”, art. 20, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123; OAU, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, art. 6, July 11, 1990,
CAB/LEG/24.9/49; IACHR, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. xix, May 2, 1948, Res.
XXX; League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, art. 29(1) Sept. 15 1994,
[ST/HR/]CHR/NONE/2004/40/Rev.1; Council of Europe, European Convention on Nationality, art. 4(a), Nov. 6,
1997, E.T.S. 166.
152
UDHR, supra note 54, at art. 15. See also G.A. Res. 49/169, para. 8 (Dec. 23, 1994); G.A. Res. 50/152, prmbl.
(Dec. 21 1995); G.A. Res. 61/137, para. 7 (Dec. 19, 2006); G.A. Res. 67/149, para. 7(December 20, 2012); G.A.
Res. 68/141, para. 9 (December 18, 2013); G.A. Res. 70/135, para. 12 (Dec. 17, 2015).
17
affected.153 Typically, the refusal of citizenship takes the form of an automatic cancellation of
nationality through legal processes. This often results in complete loss of citizenship rights when
one spends an extended duration abroad.154
By failing to recognize Shaw’s nationality, Antrano deprived her of the benefits of
Remisian nationality. The right to a nationality is widely and consistently accepted, therefore it
reflects customary international law.155 Although States maintain sovereign authority to govern
this right,156 their margin of discretion is narrow and must ensure the deprivation of nationality is
not arbitrary.157
To ensure a deprivation is not arbitrary, the loss must be “prescribed by law,” “achiev[e]
a legitimate aim,” and be proportionate.158 Although Antrano’s statutory non-recognition of
purchased nationality is prescribed by law,159 the law itself does not achieve a legitimate aim.
Antrano's laws do not recognize purchased nationality, or any passports issued under such an
arrangement.160 In fact, Antrano has expressed no reason for their nonrecognition of purchased
nationality.161 The only legitimate aims afforded to deprive nationality stem from CRS Articles 7
and 8.162 Remisian law considers citizenship and nationality synonymous. 163 Therefore, if any of

153
See Riener v. Bulgaria, App. No. 46343/99, ECtHR, para. 151 (2006); Karassev v. Finland, App. No. 31414/96,
ECtHR, para. 5 (1999); Slivenko v. Latvia, App. No. 48321/99, ECtHR, para. 98 (2002); Girls Yean and Bosico v
Dominican Republic, IACtHR (ser. C) No. 130, para. 140 (2005); Anudo Ochieng Anudo v. United Republic of
Tanzania, App. No. 012/2015, ACtHPR, para. 78 (2018); Robert John Penessis v. United Republic of Tanzania,
App. No. 013/2015, ACtHPR, para. 87 (2019).
154
UNHCR, Guidelines on Statelessness No. 5: Loss and Deprivation of Nationality under Articles 5-9 of the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, HCR/GS/20/05, para. 49 (May 2020) [“UNHRC Guidelines on
Statelessness No. 5”].
155
Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 47, at ¶ 183. See also Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger.
v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99, ¶ 55 (Feb. 3); North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v.
Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3 ¶ 77 (Feb. 20).
156
CSP supra note 25, at art. 12(1). Nottebohm, supra note 2, at 23.
157
Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-
4/84, IACtHR (ser. A) No. 4, para. 32 (Jan. 19, 1984). See also Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican
Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, IACtHR (ser. C) No. 282, para. 256 (Aug. 28,
2014).
158
HRC Res. 25/28, supra note 29, at para. 4. See UNHRC Guidelines on Statelessness No. 5, supra note 154, at
paras. 62, 91-9. See also Pham v. U.K., App. No. 37478/20, ECtHR, para. 3 (Apr. 19, 2021); Genovese v. Malta,
App. No. 53124/09, ECtHR, para. 30 (2011); Karassev v. Finland, App. No. 31414/96, ECtHR, para. 5 (1999).
159
Clarifications, para. 8.
160
Compromis, para. 43(1).
161
Id.
162
Supra II(B)(1), See also, UN Secretary-General, Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, UN
Doc. A/HRC/25/28, para. 4 (Dec. 19, 2013).
163
Clarifications, para. 2.
18
the hundreds of individuals164 with purchased Remisian nationality were to travel to Antrano,
they would automatically lose the benefits and protection of their Remisian nationality.
Even if this Court finds Antrano’s law has a legitimate aim, the deprivation is not
proportionate. Proportionality must consider the deprivation’s consequences. 165 The
consequences here have already manifested: Shaw was detained for weeks in an Antranan jail
without access to legal representation.166
Had Antrano recognized Shaw's valid Remisian nationality, Shaw would have received
legal representation who may have prevented her prolonged detention. Therefore, the
consequences of the deprivation of her nationality were disproportionate to any conceivable
legitimate aim Antrano's law upholds. Because the deprivation does not serve a legitimate
purpose and is not proportional, Antrano arbitrarily deprived Shaw of her Remisian nationality.
Accordingly, Antrano violated customary international law.

IV. REMISIA COMPLIED WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW DR.
MALEX ENTRY INTO REMISIA

As a threshold matter, UNSC Resolution 99997 is void. Article 27(3) of the UN Charter
provides that in voting on UNSC resolutions, "a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting." 167
In Namibia, this Court ruled that a dispute exists when a State labels the issue as such. 168 Here,
Antrano explicitly referenced the issue under UNSC Resolution 99997 as a dispute.169
Under Article 27(3), because the resolution was voted on in a manner that violates this
Article, the resolution is void.170 Therefore, under Antrano's own admission, it should have
abstained from voting upon UNSC Resolution 99997 as a party to the dispute. Even if this Court
determines UNSC Resolution 99997 is valid, Remisia complied with international law when it
denied Dr. Malex entry.

164
Compromis, para. 13.
165
See Slivenko v. Latvia, App. No. 48321/99, ECtHR, para. 98 (2002); Karassev v. Finland, Application No.
31414/96, ECtHR, para. 10 (1999). See also UNHCR, Expert Meeting, Interpreting the 1961 Statelessness
Convention and Avoiding Statelessness resulting from Loss and Deprivation of Nationality, Summary Conclusion,
paras. 21-22 (2013).
166
Compromis, para. 47.
167
UN Charter, art. 27(3).
168
Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra 38, at ¶ 25.
169
Compromis, para. 39.
170
Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 38, at ¶¶ 52-53.
19
 A. Remisia Complied with its Treaty Obligations when it Denied Entry to
Dr. Malex

Remisia denied entry to Dr. Malex in accordance with treaty law. The UNC maintains
Remisia, as a sovereign state, has the right to control its territorial borders.

1. Remisia complied with UN Charter Article 2(7) by maintaining its

sovereign authority of its domestic affairs

Remisia complied with Article 2(7) of the UN Charter because UNSC Resolution 99997
is not binding. Therefore, any attempt to enforce it constitutes UN interference in Remisia’s
domaine réservé. Under Article 2(7), the UN is prohibited from interfering with a State's
domestic affairs.171 The only exception to Article 2(7) is “enforcement measures under Chapter
VII.”172 Here, no such enforcement measures exist. Rather, the dispute at issue arises under
Chapter VI, which may be limited by Article 2(7)'s conditions.173
Although scholars dispute whether Chapter VI is binding, 174 this Court stressed in its
Namibia case, “[t]he language of a [UNSC Resolution] should be carefully analysed before a
conclusion can be made as to its binding effect." 175 There, it ruled UNSC Resolution 269
concerning South Africa's presence in Namibia was binding. 176 This was because the Court
determined UN Charter Article 25, under which Resolution 269 was invoked, was a non-
disposable article granting the UNSC “its essential functions and powers under the Charter.” 177
In contrast, UNSC Resolution 99997 is invoked under Article 34. 178 Article 34 grants the
UNSC power to investigate disputes that “might lead to international friction . . . in order to
determine whether the continuance of the dispute . . . is likely to endanger the maintenance of

171
UN Charter, art. 2(7).
172
UN Charter, art. 2(7).
173
UN Charter, art. 2(7). See also Mohammad Alipour, The Competence of the Security Council Over Situations or
Disputes Arising from Human Rights Violations by a State Under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter,
HUNGARIAN J. LEGAL STUDIES 1, 9 (2023).
174
D. R. Gilmour, The Meaning of ‘Intervene’ within Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter, An Historical
Perspective, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q., 346–49 (1967).
175
Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 38, at ¶ 114.
176
Id. at ¶ 116.
177
Id.
178
Compromis, Annex A, pmbl. See also Compromis, para. 39.
20
international peace and security.”179 Unlike Article 25, which grants the UNSC its power as a UN
body,180 Article 34 is a subsidiary function of the UNSC and is not essential to its operation.
Indeed, in its Repertory of Practice relating to Article 34, the UN acknowledges Article
34 requires “the consent of host countries" to operate UNSC missions.” 181 Therefore, Article 34
should not be considered a binding provision under Chapter VI. Given Article 34’s broad scope,
to hold it as binding would contravene the fundamental purpose of Chapter VI by allowing States
to frivolously invoke the UNSC’s power to interfere in domestic affairs. Here, Remisia did not
give the UNSC consent to conduct its fact-finding mission into the DCA. 182 Therefore, UNSC
Resolution 99997 is not binding upon Remisia.
Should this Court hold UNSC Resolution 99997 binding, it would permit the UNSC to
breach UN Charter Article 2(7). Nationality laws are wholly within the domestic jurisdiction of a
State unless the laws arbitrarily deprive nationality. 183 Remisia's nationality laws do not. 184 By
requiring Remisia to permit Dr. Malex entry and inspect the condition of its nationality laws, the
UN is impermissibly intervening in Remisia's domestic affairs. Accordingly, Remisia complied
with Article 2(7) by asserting its sovereign authority against UN intervention in Remisian
domestic affairs.

2. Remisia complied with CPI Article 6 when it denied entry to Dr.

Malex

Article VII, Section 26 of CPI requires travel documents to be afforded to experts on UN

missions.185 However, this Court’s Conventions on the Privileges and Immunities advisory
opinion noted "[w]hile some experts have necessarily to travel in order to perform their tasks,
others can perform them without having to travel."186 Here, Dr. Malex's can perform his tasks
without traveling to Remisia.

179
UN Charter, art. 34.
180
UN Charter, art. 25; Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 38, at ¶ 116.
181
3 UN, Article 34 in REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS, SUPPLEMENTS NO. 10 (2000-2009)
para. 5 (forthcoming); See also G.A. Res. 46/59 at para. 19 (Dec. 9, 1991).
182
Compromis, para. 52.
183
Supra II(A)(2).
184
Id.
185
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, art. VII, sec. 26, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S.
15.
186
Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 177, ¶ 50 (Dec. 15).
21
 While the text of UNSC Resolution 99997 requires civilian experts appointed must
conduct in-person interviews, it also affords them the ability to hire support staff for their
mission.187 Rather than visiting Remisia, Dr. Malex had full authority to appoint Remisian
citizens to interview the Sterren Forty. Indeed, after receiving a formal rejection of entry from
Remisia's UN Ambassador,188 Dr. Malex had ample opportunity to create a taskforce comprised
of Remisian nationals to complete his professional responsibilities.
Further, the Sterren Forty agreed to conduct their trials by Zoom. 189 Thus, even if Dr.
Malex's presence were necessary, he would have been able to attend interviews via Zoom with
in-person support staff. Indeed, State practice has evolved to allow remote participation for a
variety of legal proceedings, including trials and prison interviews. 190 As such, Dr. Malex's travel
to Remisia was not necessary, and there was no necessity for Dr. Malex to enter Remisia.
States have denied entry to UN experts on a variety of grounds, one of which includes
maintenance of public order and national security. 191 As established, the Sterren Forty pose a risk
to Remisia's public order and national security. 192 Allowing Dr. Malex into the country would
reignite protests in Remisia, because his presence supports the Sterren Forty’s ideologies. Thus,
his privileges and immunities under the CPI may not be invoked against Remisia as it would
jeopardize the State’s peace and security.

3. Remisia complied with VCDR Article 9 when it denied a diplomatic

agent entry into its territory

Although Dr. Malex claims to be an independent expert, the underlying motivation of his
mission to Remisia is to represent Antrano's interests in reducing statelessness. Therefore, Dr.
Malex should be considered a diplomatic agent and his mission a diplomatic mission. 193 Article
3(a) of the VCDR describes a diplomatic mission as, inter alia, "[r]epresenting the sending State

187
Compromis, Annex A.(1)(b).
188
Compromis, para. 52.
189
Compromis, para. 33.
190
STANFORD CRIM. JUSTICE CTR, VIRTUAL JUSTICE? A NATIONAL STUDY ANALYZING THE TRANSITION TO
REMOTE CRIMINAL COURT 6-8 (2021). See also Anne Sanders, Video-Hearings in Europe Before, During and After
the COVID-19 Pandemic, 12 INT’L J. COURT ADMIN. 1, 3-7 (2020).
191
G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group, G20 Denial of Entry Experts Network Inaugural Meeting, Chairman’s
Summary (Oct. 14, 2015).
192
Supra II(B)(3)(a).
193
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 1(b), Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
22
in the receiving State." Here, Dr. Malex is visiting Remisia with the intent to represent Antrano's
interests in reducing statelessness.
Further, as the head of the mission, Dr. Malex is considered a diplomatic agent. With this
status, under VCDR Article 9, Remisia may deny his entry “at any time without having to
explain its decision[.]” Indeed, this Court in Diplomatic and Consular Staff highlighted that
diplomatic premises are inviolable, but entry is subject to the consent of the receiving state. 194
Accordingly, Remisia complied with its treaty obligations under the VCDR by denying Dr.
Malex entry into Remisia.

B. Remisia Complied with its Customary International Law Obligations

when it Denied Entry to Dr. Malex

Customary international law does not specifically prohibit states from denying entry, and
the Lotus principle supports the idea that states possess broad discretion in regulating entry into
their territories. In denying entry to Dr. Malex, Remisia was not allowing intervention into its
domestic affairs.

1. Customary international law recognizes States are free to act in

absence of a prohibitory rule

Absent a rule prohibiting action, “[a] State remains free to adopt the principles which it
regards as best and most suitable.” 195 Under the Lotus principle, Remisia is free to deny Dr.
Malex access to its jails. Indeed, there is no general prohibition in international law preventing
States from denying UN experts entry into their territories. 196 In Remisia's situation, allowing
otherwise would conflict with its interests to protect public order and national security. As such,
it is entitled under the Lotus principle to deny Dr. Malex's entry into Remisia. Therefore, because

194
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 3, para. 77
(May 12).
195
S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 at para. 19 (Sept. 7). See also Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 40, at ¶ 20; Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Reports 403, para. 79 (July 22).
196
Press Release, UNHRC, Myanmar Refuses Access to UN Special Rapporteur (Dec. 20 2017); Adam Entous,
Israel Denies Entry to U.N. Rights Investigator, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2008), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
palestinians-israel-un-sb-idUSTRE4BE33A20081215/ ; UN Expert 'Denied Zimbabwe Entry' 2009, BBC (Oct. 29,
2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8329984.stm; Dechlan Brennan, 2 State Governments in Australia Block
UN Visits to Prisons, THE DIPLOMAT (Nov. 19, 2022), https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/2-state-governments-in-
australia-block-un-visits-to-prisons; Mike Ives, Myanmar Vows to Block U.N. Investigators From Entering, N.Y.
TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/world/asia/myanmar-united-nations-rohingya.html.
23
Remisia is not explicitly prohibited by any law to deny Dr. Malex entry, its denial was in
compliance with customary international law.

2. Customary international law recognizes the sovereignty of States to

maintain the integrity of their borders

This Court affirmed the principle of non-intervention is “part and parcel of customary
international law.”197 This principle prohibits States from intervening into another State’s
domaine réservé.198 In Military and Paramilitary Activities, this Court ruled the United States
violated the principle of non-intervention by interfering with Nicaragua's internal affairs through
funding the Contras, a political group who opposed the Nicaraguan government. 199 Similar to the
United States, Antrano is leveraging the funding and power of its position in the UNSC to
interfere with Remisian domestic policies that Antrano opposes.
As an Antranan civilian expert on statelessness, Dr. Malex is incapable of acting as a
neutral representative in his assigned mission to Remisia. Instead, Antrano's statements about Dr.
Malex's mission200 reveal the pretext of his mission is to achieve Antrano's political goal of
“eliminating the stain of statelessness.”201 By erroneously labeling the DCA as a law facilitating
statelessness, Antrano's intentions through UNSC Resolution 99997 are to coerce Remisia into
changing its domestic nationality laws.
Antrano has no reason to initiate a fact-finding mission into the circumstances around the
Sterren Forty’s nationality revocation because the Sterren Forty's judicial proceedings were
public and livestreamed.202 Indeed, the UN had access to all necessary evidence to determine the
condition of the Sterren Forty’s nationality revocation. 203 Further, there is no evidence the
Sterren Forty suffered human rights abuses during their detention. Therefore, there is no need to
investigate their prison conditions. The UNSC should not have approved Resolution 99997

197
Supra II(A)(1). See also Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 47, ¶ 276. See also Armed Activities on
the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment (Merits) 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, para. 164 (Dec.
19).
198
Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 47, ¶¶ 202, 205.
199
Id. at 242.
200
Compromis, paras. 50, 59.
201
Compromis, para. 59.
202
Compromis, paras. 35, 49.
203
Compromis, paras. 35, 49.
24
because, as their previous practice indicates, calls for fact-finding missions without ample
evidence are denied.204
Antrano used its position as president of the UNSC 205 to initiate a baseless fact-finding
mission under Resolution 99997. This mission was to forward Antrano's own political
motivations to eradicate statelessness.206 However, Remisia's application of the DCA was well
within its right to protect its national security and public order. 207 Antrano used the UN body to
forward its own political agenda against Remisia’s sovereign interest. Therefore, Remisia
complied with customary international law by preventing Antrano from interfering in Remisia’s
domestic affairs.

204
Press Release, UNSC, Security Council Rejects Text to Investigate Complaint Concerning Non-Compliance of
Biological Weapons Convention by Ukraine, United States, UN Doc. SC/15095 (Nov. 2, 2022).
205
Compromis, para. 39.
206
Compromis, paras. 3,4, 36, 50, 59; Annex A. pmbl.
207
Supra II(B)(3)(a).
25
 CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

The Kingdom of Remisia respectfully requests this Court to adjudicate that:

I. Antrano lacks standing to bring the dispute of the Sterren Forty’s nationality to this
Court.

II. Remisia complied with international law when it revoked the Sterren Forty’s
Remisian nationality.

III. Antrano violated international law when it denied Saki Shaw, a Remisian citizen,
Remisian consular access while detained in Antrano.

IV. Remisia complied with international law when it denied Dr. Malex entry into
Remisia.

26