AQIL SHAH AND BUSHRA ASIF
Pakistan in 2014
Democracy under the Military’s Shadow
ABSTRACT
A year after assuming power, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government faced
a political crisis fomented by the pro-military opposition leader Imran Khan, who
mobilized his supporters to protest alleged electoral rigging in the 2013 poll. Khan
had to call off the protests after the Pakistani Taliban’s grisly terrorist attack on an
army-run school in retaliation for the army’s offensive against them in North
Waziristan.
K E Y W O R D S : Pakistan, democracy, military, terrorism, Taliban
A S 2014 D R E W T O A C L O S E , T H E Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N)
government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif appeared to have weathered
a political crisis in the form of protests mobilized by the cricketer-turned-
politician Imran Khan and the Canada-based Pakistani cleric-cum-politician
Tahirul Qadri. While Qadri was seeking to bring an inqilab (revolution) to
replace the constitutional order, Khan’s protests were focused on alleged
electoral fraud in the May 2013 parliamentary elections. Khan claims these
were rigged in the PML-N’s favor, thus depriving his own Pakistan Tehreek-
e-Insaf (Pakistan Movement for Justice, PTI) of certain victory.1
A QIL S HAH is a Visiting Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College,
Hanover, New Hampshire, U.S.A. Starting in Fall 2015, he will be Wick Cary Assistant Professor of
South Asian Politics in the Department of International Studies at the University of Oklahoma.
B USHRA A SIF is a Visiting Scholar at Dartmouth College. Email: <aqil.shah@dartmouth.edu>.
1. The PTI is a right of center party that projects itself as an alternative to the two major parties,
the PPP (Pakistan People’s Party) and the PML-N, based on its non-dynastic and presumably honest
leadership. It has combined an anti-corruption message with a virulent anti-Americanism popular
with many in Pakistan’s urban middle classes. In the 2008 elections, Khan won the sole National
Assembly (NA) seat for the party. However, the party emerged as the third largest in the NA in the
May 2013 elections, and formed a coalition provincial government with the Islamist Jamaat-i-Islami
(JI) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).
Asian Survey, Vol. 55, Number 1, pp. 48–59. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2015 by
the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission
to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and
Permissions website, http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/AS.2015.55.1.48.
48
SHAH AND ASIF / PAKISTAN IN 2014 49
Throughout the latter part of the year, the unrest dashed hopes that a gov-
ernment with a strong electoral mandate would be able to focus its energies on
tackling serious economic and security problems such as the pressing energy
crisis and terrorism. The silver lining was that unlike in the past, when poli-
ticians would typically ‘‘knock on the garrison’s doors’’ to cow their rivals in
government, the opposition PPP, the Awami National Party (ANP), and even
the Islamist JI rallied behind the government to thwart any extra-constitutional
intervention by the military, widely believed to be behind Khan’s protests.
DOMESTIC POLITICS
Democratic Spoilers
The 2013 election represented Pakistan’s first democratic turnover of power
from one elected civilian government that had completed its term in office to
another—a political landmark in a country where all previous democratic
transitions have been aborted by military interventions. The incumbent PPP
graciously accepted its defeat without crying foul. Another hopeful sign for
the future of democracy in Pakistan was the high national voter turnout
(55%–60%), despite the real threat of violence from the Tehreek-e Taliban
Pakistan (TTP, generally called the Pakistani Taliban).
Khan and his supporters rejected the election results despite having gained
power in KP (formerly known as the Northwest Frontier Province, NWFP)
through the same electoral process. Initially, the PTI sought to rectify this
alleged fraud by challenging the results of various constituencies in election
tribunals. Failing to achieve the desired result, Khan upped the ante by threat-
ening to take to the streets unless Sharif resigned, with fresh elections to be
held under a caretaker ‘‘technocratic’’ government.
While electoral malpractice is not uncommon in transitional contexts,
independent election observers deemed the vote relatively free and fair.2
Besides, the election had been run by the relatively neutral Election Com-
mission headed by respected retired Supreme Court Justice Fakhruddin G.
Ebrahim, and non-partisan federal and provincial caretaker governments
headed by chief executives appointed with PTI’s consent. Yet, Khan felt
2. ‘‘The 2013 National and Provincial Assembly Elections in Pakistan: Final Report,’’ Joint
International Election Observation Mission, National Democratic Institute and the Asian Network
for Free Elections, 2013, p. 4, <https://www.ndi.org/node/20569>, accessed November 7, 2014.
50 ASIAN SURVEY 55:1
cheated and raised allegations that caretaker governments, especially the
caretaker chief minister of Punjab, Najam Sethi, misused their power, influ-
encing administrative officials to ensure a PML-N victory. But rather than
furnishing credible evidence of these accusations, the party concocted con-
spiracy theories, blaming then-Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar
Chaudhry, former Chief of the Army Staff General Perez Kayani, and even
foreign powers (India and Israel), for the PML-N’s victory.
When all else failed, Khan vowed to mobilize a ‘‘million man’’ azadi
(freedom) march against the government on August 14, the country’s inde-
pendence day. Soon after, Qadri announced his planned rally from Lahore to
Islamabad. Qadri had arrived from Canada in June to try to bring about
a revolution, just as he had done in 2013. On June 17, clashes between his
supporters and police outside the headquarters of his party, the Pakistan
Awami Tehreek (PAT), in Lahore left 14 dead and 80 injured. Qadri used
the incident to highlight the brutality of the political status quo, holding
Prime Minister Sharif and his brother, Shahbaz Sharif, chief minister of the
Punjab Province, responsible for the deaths.
Khan and Qadri coordinated their marches, both reaching Islamabad on
August 16. Anticipating another confrontation between marchers and police,
the government banned political gatherings in the capital. It also called out
the army ‘‘in aid of civil power’’ under Article 245 of the Constitution,
ostensibly to thwart terrorist attacks. However, the Sharif government with-
drew the ban and allowed the protesters to camp out on Constitution Ave-
nue, the main road leading to Parliament, with the proviso that they would
not breach the ‘‘red zone,’’ a highly sensitive area housing the prime minister’s
residence, Parliament buildings, the Supreme Court, and foreign missions.
Khan and Qadri quickly backtracked on their pledge to the government
and insisted on Sharif’s resignation, with Qadri urging his supporters to
engage in ‘‘civil disobedience’’ by refusing to pay taxes and utility bills. When
the government did not respond to their demands, the two allegedly incited
their supporters to cross into the ‘‘red zone.’’ On August 19, the marchers
removed the police barricades protecting the security zone and gathered
outside the Parliament building. Although the government ordered the police
to desist from using force, clashes broke out when the protesters tried to
march toward the prime minister’s house. They ultimately made an attempt
to storm the Parliament and also ransacked the headquarters of the state
broadcaster, the Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV).
SHAH AND ASIF / PAKISTAN IN 2014 51
Khan’s campaign failed to get wider political traction because opposition
parties such as the PPP opposed his actions and stood solidly behind the
government. In September, a special joint session of the two houses of
Parliament passed a consensus resolution condemning the sit-ins and reiter-
ating their ‘‘unequivocal, unwavering and unqualified resolve’’ to protect the
Constitution and the democratic process.3 In a further blow to Khan, the
Supreme Court dismissed petitions contesting the legality of the May 2013
elections on account of alleged vote rigging.
As crowds at Khan’s rallies began to dwindle by October, Qadri called off
his party’s sit-in, asserting that it had served the purpose of ‘‘awakening the
nation.’’ He said he was moving to the next stage of his mission to bring ‘‘a
revolution for the poor’’ by holding marches in major cities. Qadri then
suddenly left Pakistan for his adopted home in Canada amid rumors that
he had struck a compromise with the Sharifs. Khan, however, remained
adamant on continuing his agitation until Nawaz Sharif resigned. With his
campaign losing steam, Khan made a last ditch effort to raise the political
stakes by announcing a plan to paralyze major urban centers to force an
independent judicial inquiry into the May 2013 election. On December 8,
Khan’s attempt to shut down Faisalabad, Pakistan’s textile hub and a tradi-
tional PML-N stronghold, led to clashes between the supporters of his party
and the ruling PML-N, and resulted in the death of a PTI worker. Khan tried
to use this ‘‘martyrdom’’ to galvanize his supporters. The party was able to
cause a partial shutdown of Karachi, Pakistan’s biggest city; it then moved its
protests to Lahore, the Sharifs’ hometown and capital of Punjab.
However, the Pakistani Taliban’s December 16 terrorist attack on the
Army Public School in Peshawar, which killed 150 people, most of them
children, thwarted Khan’s plans. Amid the shock and national outcry pro-
duced by the attack, Khan called off the protests to show solidarity with the
government; he continued to insist that Sharif form an independent judicial
commission to investigate electoral irregularities.
The Not-so-Neutral Army
The army’s role in the crisis was controversial at best, and anti-democratic at
worst. Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif, who is not
3. ‘‘Sit-ins Can’t Force Resignation, Says PM,’’ Dawn, September 20, 2014.
52 ASIAN SURVEY 55:1
related to the prime minister, stepped in to mediate the conflict even though
the Constitution specifically proscribes military interference in politics and
assigns him no such role. He met with Khan and Qadri to hear their demands
and reportedly promised them that the military would ensure a transparent
inquiry into the alleged vote rigging. As the crisis turned violent on August
30, the corps commanders’ conference (a military policymaking forum
chaired by the COAS and comprising army commanders and high-ranking
principal staff officers) called an emergency meeting and issued a statement
expressing its concern about the ‘‘large scale injuries and loss of lives’’ and
warning the government that it would not hesitate in ‘‘ensuring security of
the state’’ unless the crisis was resolved quickly and peacefully.4
While the army categorically denied allegations that it was backing the
protesters,5 the behavior of troops deployed to protect key government in-
stallations belied such claims. The soldiers simply stood by and watched as
protesters breached the outer fence of Parliament, which further emboldened
them to take over the nearby PTV building.6
Ironically, the most damning evidence of the Army’s backing of Khan
came from PTI president Javed Hashmi, who fell out with the party over its
decision to march on the prime minister’s house. Hashmi alleged that the
PTI was following a ‘‘script’’ written by the ‘‘badge bearers,’’ a euphemism for
the generals, asserting that they had instructed Khan to coordinate his pro-
tests with Qadri to put greater pressure on the government.7
Why would the military, which has repeatedly expressed its loyalty to the
democratic process since leaving power in 2007–08, support politicians
intent on destabilizing the government? As the political scientist Adam Prze-
worski put it, it is one thing to remove the military from politics and quite
another to ‘‘remove politics from the military.’’8 The Pakistan Army retreated
to the barracks at the time not because of any commitment to democratic
norms and practices but because military rule lacked legitimacy and faced
4. ISPR (Inter-Services Public Relations), press release, no. PR184/2014-ISPR, <https://www.
ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o¼t-press_release&date¼2014/8/31>.
5. ‘‘Rebutting Allegations: Army, ISI Not Backing Protesting Parties, Says ISPR,’’ Express Tri-
bune, September 2, 2014.
6. Editorial, ‘‘Army’s Questionable Decisions,’’ Dawn, September 2, 2014.
7. ‘‘Imran Khan Said Can’t Move Forward without Army: Hashmi,’’ The News, September 1,
2014.
8. Book jacket blurb: Zoltan Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic
Armies in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).
SHAH AND ASIF / PAKISTAN IN 2014 53
strident opposition from civil society. Hence, its tolerance of democracy is
conditional on civilian governments’ performance and non-interference in
the military’s ‘‘reserve domains’’: national security policy, nuclear weapons,
corporate autonomy, and relations with India, Afghanistan, and the U.S.
The generals have resented Sharif’s attempts to exert civilian control over
the military since the 1990s. For example, when he was prime minister
previously (1997–99), Sharif fired then-Army chief General Jahangir Karamat
for publicly criticizing his government, sparking consternation in the rank
and file. Sharif then tried to sack his handpicked Army chief, Pervez Mushar-
raf, for sabotaging a peace process with India by sending troops into the
Kargil sector of Kashmir. In response, the military overthrew Sharif in a coup
in October 1999 and ultimately sent him into exile in Saudi Arabia.
Since assuming power in 2013, Sharif has once again irked the military, for
example, by seeking to normalize relations with India. The government has
also challenged the military’s presumptions of impunity. Acting on an injunc-
tion from the Supreme Court to prosecute Musharraf (who returned to
Pakistan to contest the May 2013 elections) for suspending the Constitution
and imposing emergency rule as president in November 2007, it initiated
treason charges against him in November 2013. A three-judge Special Court
indicted Musharraf in April 2014. Not surprisingly, the military interpreted
the trial as an affront to the ‘‘dignity’’ of the institution, openly articulating its
opposition when the government reportedly ignored advice to ‘‘move on’’ by
letting Musharraf travel abroad for medical treatment.9 By backing the pro-
testers, the military essentially sought to cut Sharif down to size.
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Upon assuming power, Nawaz Sharif decided to retain both the foreign
policy and defense portfolios. Some observers saw the move as indicating
he was determined to set the course on bilateral relations with both India and
Afghanistan, which would focus on enhancing economic ties. With respect to
India, the Sharif government adopted a conciliatory tone from the outset,
pledging to bury the past and to liberalize bilateral trade ties.10 However, the
9. ‘‘A Day after the Indictment: Government Advised to Let Musharraf See His Mother,’’ Express
Tribune, April 2, 2014.
10. ‘‘Military Blocking Pakistan, India Trade Deal, Says Shahbaz Sharif,’’ Guardian, February 13,
2014.
54 ASIAN SURVEY 55:1
military reportedly impeded progress on trade issues by opposing any nor-
malization short of a resolution of the Kashmir conflict. Undeterred, Sharif
was the first leader to call and congratulate India’s Narendra Modi on his
election, and attended his inauguration as prime minister despite opposition
from the military, influential pro-military sections of the media, and hard-
liners in his own party. The two premiers held a bilateral meeting on the
sidelines of the ceremony and agreed to hold foreign secretary-level talks as
a likely first step toward reviving the ‘‘Composite Dialogue’’ process, which
India suspended after the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. However, India
cancelled the meeting scheduled for August 25 after Pakistani High Com-
missioner to India Abdul Basit met with Kashmiri separatist leaders of the All
Parties Hurriyat (Freedom) Conference (APHC), which New Delhi
described as ‘‘interference in India’s internal affairs.’’
There was hope for a potential meeting between Sharif and Modi on the
sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York in September. The
meeting never materialized. Clearly weakened by political troubles at home,
Sharif instead used his address to the Assembly to appease the military by
reiterating Pakistan’s traditional stance on Kashmir, urging the world body to
resolve the conflict between the two countries ‘‘in accord with the wishes of
the people of Jammu and Kashmir.’’
Tensions on the diplomatic front were exacerbated by some of the worst
violations of the ceasefire agreement in place in Kashmir since 2003. With
each side blaming the other for initiating hostilities, heavy shelling across the
Line of Control (LoC) in October killed at least 20 civilians and injured
dozens on both sides. Indian Defense Minister Arun Jaitley warned Islama-
bad of ‘‘unaffordable’’ costs if it continued with its ‘‘adventurism.’’ In return,
his Pakistani counterpart, Khawaja Asif, promised a ‘‘befitting reply to Indian
aggression.’’ Pakistan also formally complained to the U.N. about India’s
alleged border violations, urging Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon to help
resolve the Kashmir conflict through his good offices.
Tackling Terrorism, Selectively
For years, the Pakistani army has resisted U.S. pressure to launch an offensive
in North Waziristan, which has served as a sanctuary for terrorist groups like
the Pakistani Taliban, the Haqqani network, and foreign militants since the
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The army’s main rationale was that it
SHAH AND ASIF / PAKISTAN IN 2014 55
lacked the capacity to launch an assault because it was already stretched thin
by existing counterinsurgency deployments in the other tribal areas. How-
ever, the army’s reluctance was more probably the result of its considered
policy of fighting only some militant groups, such as the Pakistani Taliban,
which had declared war on the Pakistani state. At the same time, it backs
militant groups, such as the Haqqani network and the Mullah Omar-led
Afghan Taliban, as a hedge against an Indian presence and influence in
Afghanistan. Reiterating the establishment’s posture, Sartaj Aziz, the prime
minister’s advisor on National Security and Foreign Affairs, told the BBC
that Pakistan had no reason to target militant groups that ‘‘do not pose
a threat to the state.’’11
In June 2014, the army finally launched a military operation named Zarb-
e-Azb (the Strike of the Azb, the Prophet Mohammad’s sword) in North
Waziristan against the backdrop of stalled peace talks between the govern-
ment and the Pakistani Taliban. The immediate trigger for the action was the
daring June 8 terrorist raid on Pakistan’s main international airport in Kara-
chi, reportedly carried out by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) on
behalf of the Pakistani Taliban. Another factor was Chinese pressure on
Pakistan to root out the Uighur militants holed up in North Waziristan who
have carried out deadly terrorist attacks in China. The decision was also
reportedly prompted by Senator Carl Levin’s (chairman of the U.S. Senate’s
Armed Services Committee) proposed amendment to the 2015 U.S. Defense
Authorization Act that linked reimbursements for military operations to
Pakistan to certification from the U.S. defense secretary that the Pakistan
army was fighting the Haqqani network and disrupting its safe havens.
While the military vowed to ‘‘eliminate’’ all terrorist groups holed up in the
area ‘‘regardless of hue and color,’’12 it reportedly continued to shelter the
Haqqanis who were relocated to the adjoining Kurram Agency (District).13 In
fact, the army’s local commander admitted that even the Taliban leadership had
already escaped the area in anticipation of the military assault.14
11. Should We Antagonize All Groups, Asks Aziz,’’ Express Tribune, November 18, 2014.
12. ‘‘Zarb-e-Azb Operation: 120 Suspected Militants Killed in North Waziristan,’’ Dawn, June 16,
2014.
13. ‘‘The Battle for Kurram,’’ News on Sunday, August 24, 2014, <http://tns.thenews.com.pk/
battle-for-kurram-agency/#.VIczp4c810w>, accessed December 1, 2014.
14. ‘‘Taliban Fled Pakistani Offensive before It Began,’’ BBC News, July 10, 2014, <http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-asia-28241352>, accessed November 11, 2014.
56 ASIAN SURVEY 55:1
Since launching the operation, the military claims that it has killed over
1,100 militants and destroyed 200 hideouts. It also launched an assault in
Khyber Agency in October 2014 against the TTP-affiliated Lashkar-i-Islam
(LI), and claims to have killed 135 militants and arrested 250, including key
commanders. However, it is hard to verify the military’s claims because it has
blocked media access to the area.
While Zarb-e-Azb has deprived militants of their sanctuary in North
Waziristan, its human cost has been high. The assault displaced approxi-
mately one million people from their homes during the scorching summer
months. And the military’s claims of spectacular success are at least partly
contradicted by the TTP’s continued ability to carry out terrorist attacks
across Pakistan. The Peshawar school attack was only the latest, albeit the
most horrific, in a series of attacks. On August 14, militants attacked two
military air force bases in Quetta, and on November 2, the TTP splinter
group Jamatul Ahrar carried out a suicide bombing at the Wagah border
between India and Pakistan that killed more than 60 people and left over 100
injured.
The Peshawar attack caused outrage across Pakistan because of the terror-
ists’ systematic killing of schoolchildren. In response, the Sharif government
vowed to deal with all terrorists without distinction by taking the fight
beyond FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas, a group of seven
semi-autonomous Agencies and six Frontier Regions [FR] in northwestern
Pakistan governed by the central government) to Pakistan’s cities and villages.
The government hurriedly lifted the moratorium on executions for terrorists
on death row. Sharif also formed a parliamentary committee to evolve an
action plan for dealing with terrorism. The committee proposed several
measures, which were approved in an All Parties Conference, including
setting up special military courts for trying terrorism cases, strengthening the
ineffectual National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA), creating a special
anti-terrorism force, regulating madrassahs, banning hate-spreading litera-
ture, and cracking down on terrorist financing. On January 6, 2015, Parlia-
ment approved the 21st Constitutional Amendment Act, providing the legal
basis for the establishment of military courts, which will operate for a period
of two years.15 The courts have caused great controversy. The official
15. See Constitution (Twenty First Amendment) Act, 2015, <http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/
documents/1420800195_264.pdf>, accessed January 18, 2015.
SHAH AND ASIF / PAKISTAN IN 2014 57
rationale behind this extraordinary step is that terrorists exploit weaknesses in
Pakistan’s legal system that can only be overcome by military courts. Critics,
such as the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), point out that
such courts would undermine the judicial system and increase the military’s
role in civilian affairs.
Ultimately, the success of any counterterrorism strategy would depend on
whether the military is ready to abandon its pick-and-choose approach. As of
yet, there are no indications that the generals will target the Afghan Taliban,
the Haqqanis, or militant proxies such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which
fights Indian troops in Kashmir and has carried out terrorist attacks in
mainland India.
Indeed, the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqanis stepped up their violent
attacks against Afghan and Western civilian and military targets in anticipa-
tion of the planned U.S. troop drawdown in Afghanistan in January. Peace in
Afghanistan is in good measure linked to Pakistan’s policy choices. While
Kabul has consistently pointed to Pakistan’s hand in sponsoring terrorism,
tensions between the countries have thawed, especially after newly elected
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani paid a visit to Pakistan in November 2014.
After the Peshawar attack, Kabul responded positively to General Sharif’s
request to track down the head of the TTP, Mullah Fazlullah, believed to be
hiding in eastern Afghanistan.
Will Pakistan’s military really change its policies? The generals have
claimed they fear that a post-NATO Afghanistan will be a replay of the
civil war in that country in the 1990s when regional powers such as Russia,
India, and Iran competed for influence through their Afghan proxies in the
wake of the Soviet troop withdrawal. Hence, top military officers are likely
to continue to support groups such as the Afghan Taliban to maintain their
influence over developments in Afghanistan. By reasserting its power vis-à-
vis the Sharif government, which had sought to exercise control over
foreign policy, especially toward India, the military has also signaled that
it will not countenance any change in its reserve domains without its
consent.
SILENCING DISSENT AND DIFFERENCE
Adding to the political turmoil was Pakistan’s slide into increasing political
and religious intolerance continued in 2014. For example, the International
58 ASIAN SURVEY 55:1
Federation of Journalists (IFJ) declared the country to be the most dangerous
in the world for journalists, ahead of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. During the
year, a total of 13 journalists were killed, aside from the threats, harassment,
and intimidation journalists routinely face at the hands of Islamist militants
and the military’s intelligence services.16 In April, Hamid Mir, one of the
country’s most prominent journalists, survived an assassination attempt by
unknown gunmen in Karachi. His family immediately alleged that the attack
was carried out by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) because of Mir’s
coverage of the disappearances and killings of separatists in Baluchistan at the
hands of the agency. Mir’s employer, the popular Geo TV, took the unprec-
edented step of broadcasting the allegations, specifically, naming then-ISI
Director-General Lieutenant General Zaheerul Islam Abbasi for ordering the
attack. The ISI reacted by having the Ministry of Defense petition the
country’s electronic media regulator to revoke Geo TV’s transmission license
and to initiate criminal charges against its management for defaming the state.
The military’s reaction stirred up a nationalist frenzy against Geo TV. In
several cities, ISI-backed militant organizations such as the Jamat-ud-Dawa
staged angry protests, while pro-military media organizations questioned
the patriotism of Mir and Geo TV. Geo and its affiliated newspapers were
banned from military bases and units, and the channel was subsequently
blocked in various parts of the country.
Another worrying development is the growing incidence of vigilante vio-
lence targeting religious minorities accused of blasphemy, which is often
instigated by religious leaders. For example, in November, an enraged mob
beat a Christian Pakistani couple to death and burned their bodies in a brick
kiln near Lahore for allegedly desecrating a copy of the Quran. The year also
saw several gruesome crimes against women, the so-called honor killings. In
May, a pregnant woman, Farzana Parveen, was stoned to death by her family
outside the Lahore High Court for marrying against their wishes. Similarly,
just a month later, 17-year-old Muafia Bibi and her husband Sajjad were
dragged from their home in the Punjab, tied up, and slaughtered in broad
daylight by her relatives for the same reason. While perpetrators in both cases
were arrested and charged with murder, many other such cases have gone
unreported and therefore unpunished, often because of out of court com-
promises to forgive the attacker, usually a relative.
16. ‘‘Two Pakistani Journalists Killed,’’ Guardian, October 9, 2014.
SHAH AND ASIF / PAKISTAN IN 2014 59
CONCLUSION
The year 2015 could see more of the same political uncertainty and instability
that plagued 2014. While Imran Khan may choose to revive his protests, his
campaign has already helped the army reassert itself vis-à-vis Sharif. The
generals would likely continue to prefer exercising behind-the-scenes influ-
ence to toppling Sharif in a coup. Directly seizing the government would not
only embroil the military in Pakistan’s complex political, economic, and
security problems, it would also be domestically unpopular and internation-
ally unwelcome.
In the wake of the Peshawar attack on schoolchildren, Pakistan’s civilian
leadership led by Sharif showed an unprecedented resolve to tackle the men-
ace of terrorism. However, it is unclear whether the Pakistan military will
actually abandon its selective implementation of counterterrorism. In fact,
given the uncertain geopolitical situation in Afghanistan once American
combat troops leave, it is more likely that the generals will continue to follow
their failed policy of separating their terrorist assets and liabilities, for exam-
ple, sheltering the Afghan Taliban while targeting the Pakistani Taliban, as
the only way to ensure what they perceive as Pakistan’s national security.
