PAKISTAN IN 2002

Democracy, Terrorism, and

Brinkmanship

Ian Talbot

Abstract
This article focuses on three areas that dominated Pakistan during 2002. The first was the transi-
tion to democracy in October. The background to the elections and the controversies surround-
ing this are examined along with the main party groupings and the outcomes. Second, the article
considers the tense relations with India that threatened war both in January and May. The mili-
tary standoff is explained in terms of the cross-border terrorism issue. Third, the article explains
that Pakistan itself was a major victim of terrorism during the year. These outrages were de-
signed to hit out at soft Western targets and to undermine the Musharraf government.
Uncertainties abounded in Pakistan throughout much of the year. These arose firstly from the
military standoff with India that followed the December 13, 2001, attack on India’s Parliament;
secondly, from the threat of terrorist outrages within Pakistan; and thirdly, from anxieties con-
cerning the future of civil-military relations in the wake of the October parliamentary elections.

Brinkmanship
India recalled its High Commissioner to Islamabad and
terminated cross-border bus and rail links in response to the December 13
terrorist incident. In a move that threatened war, it deployed its troops along
the border and positioned its short-range nuclear-capable missiles in East
Punjab. India accused Pakistan of supporting the militant Lashkar-i-Taiba
(The Army of the Pure)1 group that allegedly carried out the parliament at-
tack. Islamabad’s official response was to deny these allegations and to ac-

Ian Talbot is Professor of South Asian Studies in the Coventry Busi-

ness School at Coventry University, Coventry, U.K.
Asian Survey, 43:1, pp. 198–207. ISSN: 0004–4687
Ó 2003 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
Send Requests for Permission to Reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California
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1. The Lashkar-i-Taiba (LT) is the militant arm of the salafi (pious pioneers of Islam) move-
ment. Markaz-al-Dawat-wal-Irshad organizational headquarters have been based since 1987 at
Murdike. In December 2001, the LT shifted its headquarters to Muzaffarabad in Azad (“Free,”

198
 PAKISTAN IN 2002 199
cuse New Delhi of “stage-managing” the episode. Diplomatic pressure on
Pakistan intensified, early in January, with telephone calls from U.S. Presi-
dent Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell to Islamabad. These were
followed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s visit to the subcontinent.
Blair signed a joint declaration with his Indian counterpart, condemning all
those who supported or financed terrorism. Islamabad responded with arrests
of LT militants. The key to defusing this stage of the crisis between the
subcontinent’s nuclear rivals was Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf’s pri-
vate decision to curb the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) 2 backing for non-
indigenous Islamic militant groups fighting in Kashmir. This was followed
by a nationally televised speech on January 12.
In the speech, Musharraf announced a ban not only on the LT, but also on
four other militant sectarian organizations: Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (Pakistan
Army of the Prophet’s Companions), Tehrik-i-Jaferia Pakistan (Pakistan’s
Shia Movement), Tanzim Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Mohammadi (Organization for
the Establishment of the Law of Mohammad), and Jaish-i-Mohammad
(Force of Mohammad). Further measures included the registering of relig-
ious schools and foreign students and teachers, and a limitation of the use of
loudspeakers in mosques. While declaring continued diplomatic and political
support for Kashmiris, the president emphasized that Pakistan would not be
used for carrying out terrorist or subversive activities inside and outside the
country. He also announced the establishment of “speedy trial courts” to try
those involved in terrorism and sectarian killing. Pakistani politicians gave
the address a mixed reception, but President Bush termed it “candid, coura-
geous, and statesman-like,” while the British prime minister applauded its
“forceful defence of a tolerant and moderate Islam.”3
The increase in infiltration into Indian-administered Kashmir in April fol-
lowing the melting of the winter snows led Indian government officials to
dismiss Musharraf’s speech as mere rhetoric. The massacre at Kaluchak, an
army camp near Jammu, on May 14 raised tensions to an even higher level
than they had been at the beginning of the year. The following day Indian
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee told the Lok Sabha (lower house of the
Indian Parliament) that India would have to retaliate. Parliament responded
by unanimously adopting a resolution that criticized Pakistan for its support
for cross-border militancy. In order to deter limited strikes on alleged terror-
ist training camps in Azad (Free) Kashmir, Pakistani military spokesmen

i.e., Pakistani) Kashmir. The LT has been active in the Kashmir jihad, and was penetrated by al-
Qaeda. It is committed to a global struggle for Islamic supremacy.
2. For details on the army intelligence agency that rose to prominence during the Afghan War,
see Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and
Ethnicity (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan Press, 1997), pp. 94–112.
3. Dawn newspaper (Karachi, in English), January 14, 2002.
 200 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIII, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2003

warned that such actions could trigger a wider conflict. India reinforced its
navy in the Arabian Sea, and Vajpayee, in a speech to soldiers at Kupwara on
May 22, called on them to be prepared for sacrifices, “because it’s now time
for a decisive fight.”4 Pakistan defiantly upped the stakes over the weekend
of May 25–26 with test firings of both short- and medium-range missiles
capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. The following day, President
Musharraf addressed the nation in a resolute, rather than conciliatory, tone.
Jaswant Singh, India’s external affairs minister, termed the speech “disap-
pointing” and “dangerous” and maintained that “the epicentre of terrorism”
was in Pakistan.5 The war of words was accompanied by intensive shelling.
Villagers caught in the crossfire were forced to move to safer places. A fur-
ther ominous sign was the flooding of the strategic canal that stands between
the city of Lahore and the border with India at Wagah less than a half-hour
drive away.
International diplomacy involving Russia, the U.S., and Britain moved up
a gear as the prospect of war loomed. Russian President Vladimir Putin
sought to use a regional summit to reopen Indo-Pakistani dialogue. Indian
National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra met with Russian Defense Minis-
ter Sergei Ivanov. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, Deputy U.S. Secre-
tary of State Richard Armitage, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld all
shuttled to the subcontinent. Immense pressure was exerted on Islamabad to
curb cross-border terrorism. Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes and
hostile and agressive
External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh maintained a belligerent tone
throughout, and commentary in the media openly talked of fighting and win-
ning a nuclear war. This formed the context for the crucial decision by Brit-
ain and America on May 31 not only to advise their nationals against travel to
India, but to offer dependents of government staff and less-essential staff the
opportunity to return home if they chose. The following week the advice was
upgraded, and all British and U.S. citizens were warned that they should
leave the subcontinent. The advice both reflected the seriousness of the situa-
tion and was designed to have a demonstration effect not only on the influen-
tial middle class but also on the leaders of India’s increasingly powerful
software and IT industry.
By the end of the first week of June, both countries had inched away from
the brink of conflict, as the intense international pressure began to have its
effect. Fears of war were also exacting a heavy economic price. This was the
result of the increased expenditures arising from troop mobilization on the
border, declining overseas investment, and increasing insurance costs for in-
ternational trade. In a repetition of the January crisis, President Musharraf

4. Ibid., May 23, 2002

5. Hindustan Times (New Delhi), May 28, 2002.
 PAKISTAN IN 2002 201
again secured support from his generals to order a stop to infiltration of mili-
tants across the line of control. Despite the easing of tensions, Indian offi-
cials made it clear that there would be no major withdrawal of troops from
the border areas. This stance was reinforced by the massacre of nine Hindu
pilgrims near Pahalagam on August 6 by terrorists who had allegedly infil-
trated from Pakistan. Pakistan was implicitly blamed when gunmen two
months later massacred 30 worshippers after storming the Akshardham Tem-
ple in Gandhinagar, Gujarat.

Terrorism
Musharraf, throughout the standoff with India, had to draw a distinction be-
tween support for what were in Pakistan termed “genuine” freedom fighters
(i.e., indigenous Kashmiri militants) and his commitment to the war against
international terrorism. His banning of extremist sectarian groups was a nec-
essary measure in the face of rising sectarian violence, but it created the pos-
sibility of cooperation between them and al-Qaeda and Taliban groups who
had fled across the porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
There were a number of terrorist outrages during 2002 that were directed
against both Western interests and the Musharraf regime. Five persons were
killed, including an American diplomat’s wife and daughter, following a gre-
nade attack on March 17 on the Protestant International Church in Is-
lamabad’s diplomatic enclave. Two months later, 14 persons were killed
when a bus carrying French naval construction workers was blown up in a
car-bombing outside Karachi’s Sheraton Hotel. In June, there was another
huge car bomb blast, this time outside the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, which
claimed eight lives. During the first week of August, there were successive
attacks on a Christian missionary school at Murree and the chapel of a Chris-
tian hospital in Taxila, which claimed 10 lives. The Council of Islamic Ideol-
ogy, Pakistan’s leading religious affairs advisory body, condemned these as
“heinous crimes,” saying they not only tarnished Pakistan’s image but also
stigmatized Islam, “a religion of peace.”6 A further attack on September 25
on the Karachi offices of the Christian welfare organization Peace and Justice
claimed seven lives.
Despite the crackdown on such extremist groups as Lashkar-i-Jhangvi
(Jhangvi Army)7 and Jaish-i-Mohammad, there was growing evidence of co-
operation between banned groups in Pakistan and al-Qaeda and Taliban fugi-
tives from Afghanistan. The Punjab Inspector General of Police claimed that

6. Dawn, August 13, 2002.

7. This militant group emerged in the early 1990s as an anti-Shia and anti-Iranian fighting
force made up of Afghan war veterans. It was more extremist and violent in its actions than its
parent Sipah-i-Sabha organization.
 202 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIII, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2003

the terrorists involved in the Taxila and Murree atrocities were Afghanistan-
trained and belonged to a banned militant organization. The Pakistan govern-
ment said it had arrested around 300 of these infiltrators during the first half
of 2002. The attack outside the Karachi Consulate was believed by the police
to be the work of al-Qaeda.8 The attempt to investigate such linkages re-
sulted in the kidnapping and murder of Wall Street Journal journalist Daniel
Pearl.9 In mid-July, the Anti-Terrorism Court, sitting in Hyderabad Central
Jail, sentenced the British-born militant Omar Sheikh10 to death in the Pearl
matter on murder, conspiracy and abduction charges. Further evidence of the
government’s intent regarding terrorism was demonstrated by its cooperation
with the U.S. military in the hunting down of al-Qaeda forces along the Af-
ghan border. Pakistan’s first-ever military intervention in the Waziristan tri-
bal area took place in support of the American Operation Mountain Lion.
Ten Pakistani soldiers were killed in an encounter at Kazha Panga village
with al-Qaeda forces on June 26. These operations failed to shed further light
on the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden. Later in the year a number of suc-
cesses occurred in breaking up al-Qaeda networks. The key al-Qaeda sus-
pect, Ramzi bin Al-Shaiba, who was widely held responsible for coordinating
financial transactions for 9/11 from Hamburg, was captured exactly a year
later, after a dramatic gunbattle in Karachi. Such breakthroughs helped bol-
ster Musharraf’s reputation, which had been tarnished in the West by his
attempts to institute a “guided democracy.” These had commenced with the
Presidential Referendum of April 30.

Return to Democracy?
The Election Commission announced a 70% turnout, with 98% of those who
voted providing a mandate for General Musharraf to serve the nation as Pres-
ident for a further five years. Voting irregularities, coupled with the absence
of formal identification requirements and of electoral rolls, tarnished the re-
sult and invoked memories of General Zia ul-Haq’s 1984 rigged referendum
that “legitimized” his power as president. The misuse of public money and
the machinery of government during electioneering had been identified by
Musharraf as features of the “sham democracy” of 1988–99 that he had
overthrown and had pledged to reform. Moreover, the Nazims,11 or district
administrators, the cornerstone of the vaunted devolution of power, had been
inducted into a partisan role similar to that of the Basic Democrats under

8. Dawn, June 14, 2002.

9. See Idrees Bakhtiar, “Pearl and After,” The Herald (Karachi), March 2002, p. 32 ff.
10. For details of his career, see Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Ter-
ror (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), pp. 210–15.
11. Under the August 14, 2000, plan for devolution of power to local governments, the
elected Nazim became the executive head of the district.
 PAKISTAN IN 2002 203
Ayub Khan.12 The regime’s “bubble of good governance” had been burst.
Musharraf publicly admitted on television that he had been informed about
cases of vote rigging, for which he expressed regret.
The Referendum dispelled the good impression created in January by the
decision to reintroduce joint electorates for minorities in the forthcoming par-
liamentary elections. Although Musharraf repeatedly declared that these
would be free and fair, and that international observers were welcome, the
raft of constitutional amendments, along with the Political Parties Ordinance
that followed the Referendum, encouraged skeptics, both at home and over-
seas, to believe that their outcome would result only in a guided democracy.
On June 22, the government promulgated an ordinance making it mandatory
for all candidates to the national and provincial assemblies to be University
graduates. Eligibility was later extended to graduates of Islamic educational
institutions.13 Opposition spokesmen declared that this was part of pre-poll
rigging to exclude those who were likely to stand against the president. Less
than a week later, the National Reconstruction Bureau headed by Lieutenant-
General (retd.) Tanvir Naqvi unveiled a package of 29 proposed constitu-
tional amendments. Article 58 (Dissolution of the National Assembly) re-
stored the powers of the president to “relieve” the prime minister and the
cabinet of their functions and dissolve the national assembly. It was also
proposed that a National Security Council be established that would be
chaired by the president and include the service chiefs, along with the prime
minister and the chief ministers of the provinces. This was to serve as a
forum for discussion of not just security issues but also matters relating to
democracy, governance, and interprovincial harmony. The council would
also participate in the president’s decision making regarding the dissolution
of Parliament. The Legal Framework Order of August 21 confirmed these
proposals. President Musharraf maintained that the constitutional amend-
ments incorporated by his government were irreversible and would not re-
quire validation by the parliament formed after the October polls.14
An earlier controversial presidential ordinance issued July 6 disqualified a
person from holding office if they had served twice as prime minister or chief
minister, even if these periods of office had been uncompleted. This ruling

12. Ayub Khan led Pakistan’s first military coup on October 7, 1958. A year later, he intro-
duced the Basic Democracies scheme, which was a five-tier structure of administration based on
indirect representation that stretched from the rural Union Councils to two Provincial Develop-
ment Advisory Councils. For a detailed analysis of the Basic Democracy scheme, see Ian Tal-
bot, Pakistan: A Modern History (London: Hurst & Company, 1999), pp. 153–56.
13. This was designed to encourage fresh faces among parliamentary aspirants. In the event,
traditional power brokers who might have been disqualified coopted their better-educated sisters
and wives. See, for example, Herald (Karachi), October 2002, pp. 68–69.
14. Dawn, August 22, 2002.
 204 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIII, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2003

underlined the fact that Musharraf would not brook cohabitation with either
deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League
(Nawaz) (PML[N]) or former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. It was espe-
cially damaging to the electoral prospects of the PML(N), which had been hit
by further defections to the pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-
e-Azam) (PML[Q]) after the Presidential Referendum.
The Political Parties Order gave the parties the deadline of August 5 to
submit a certificate of intraparty elections and thus become eligible to receive
an election symbol from the Election Commission. Benazir Bhutto was
unanimously elected as Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) chairperson, but the
party would have been debarred from registering because her non-appearance
in court on corruption charges had been made a convictable offense, thereby
disqualifying her from holding party office. The PPP was thus forced to form
a new political entity, the PPP Parliamentarians (PPPP), headed by the Sindhi
landlord Makhdoom Amin Fahim. Benazir Bhutto finally ruled out a return
to Pakistan following the rejection of her nomination papers. Nawaz Sharif,
in an unprecedented act of political solidarity, withdrew his own papers on
August 31 in protest. Hopes of large-scale seat adjustment between the PPPP
and PML(N) foundered, however, mainly because of local rivalries. Hit by
defections, in keeping with the tradition of Punjabi political opportunism, the
PML(N) thus entered the elections with the moral high ground following its
“illegal” 1999 dismissal but precious little else.
Two new political groupings fought the elections. The first was the Grand
National Alliance (GNA). This brought together the so-called “king’s party”
of the PML(Q) and the National Alliance of pro-government parties headed
by the Millat, party of former President Farooq Leghari. The PML(Q) was
the driving force of the GNA. Its president was former Punjab Governor
Mian Mohammad Azhar, while its powerful Punjab leader was Pervaz Elahi,
one of the political family of the Chaudhrys of Gujarat. The second new
grouping was the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (United Council of Action)
(MMA). The alliance, headed by Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani, bridged
both the Sunni-Shia sectarian divide as well as the doctrinal Islamist, tradi-
tionalist one represented respectively by the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Jamiat-i-
Ulema-i-Islam. The driving force was provided by Jamaat-i-Islami. The se-
rious ideological differences were papered over by a common anti-American
stance. The MMA decried the presence of U.S. bases in Pakistan for the war
on terrorism. It also condemned the bombing of innocent Pushtuns in Af-
ghanistan during the conflict with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The ambiguous
stance of the traditional nationalist parties in Balochistan and the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP) on these matters enabled the MMA to bite deep
into the support of the Awami National Party (ANP).
 PAKISTAN IN 2002 205
October Polls
The October polls differed hugely from the last national elections in 1997 in
terms of their rules, the number of constituencies, and the character of the
electioneering. The electorate was increased by around seven million to
more than 72 million registered voters, following the lowering of the voting
age to 18. Joint electorates and the reservation of seats were reintroduced.
The 60 reserved women’s seats in the National Assembly were to be filled by
the parties on the basis of their performance in the general seats. In line with
the 1998 Census, these were increased in both the National and Provincial
Assemblies. The National Assembly seats increased from 217 in 1997 to
342. The Provincial Assemblies were to continue to form the electoral col-
lege for the Senate, whose seats were increased from 87 to 100.
Electioneering was conducted in the same restricted atmosphere as were
the polls for local bodies. It was only at the beginning of September that the
ban on political activities was lifted. This gave just 39 days for election-
eering. Processions and rallies were disallowed, thereby draining the elec-
tions of much of their color. The galvanizing effects of a return to the
Pakistan political arena by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were never felt.
The result was a low-key campaign. In these circumstances, mobilization by
feudal or biraderi (kinship group) loyalties overshadowed party platforms. A
further sign of the weakness of the party system was the contest by over 70
parties. Opposition parties constantly cried foul. They cited instances of
election cells being established in governor’s houses, intimidation of opposi-
tion candidates designed to ensure they switched allegiance to the “king’s
party,” and the provision of fake degrees from religious institutions to ensure
the eligibility of pro-government contestants.15 The press reported instances
of Nazims supporting PML(Q) candidates.

Outcome of the Polls

The official turnout of just over 40% was better than that of the 1997 elec-
tions, and the same as in the 1993 polls. A number of parties on polling day
claimed that the turnout was less than 25%. The greatest gains were achieved
by the MMA. These were made at the expense of the ANP-PPPP alliance in
the Frontier, and the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party in Balochistan. The
PML(N) was hit by the successes of the PML(Q) and a revitalized PPPP in its
Punjab heartland. The once-formidable party captured just 16 National As-
sembly seats and 37 Punjab Provincial Assembly seats. It was only in Lahore
that Nawaz Sharif’s League was able to stem the tide. The success of the
MMA in both the national and provincial polls raised anxieties amongst secu-
larists that it would use its influence, especially in the Senate, to introduce a

15. Ibid., September 6, 2002.

 206 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIII, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2003

stream of Islamization measures. MMA control of the police and civil ad-
ministration in sensitive frontier areas also raised questions about the contin-
ued effectiveness of military operations against al-Qaeda groups. The limited
appeal of MMA outside Pushtun areas, however, resulted in the party’s third-
place finish among the main political groupings in the hung national Parlia-
ment. The MMA captured 53 of the National Assembly seats; the PPPP had
secured 62, and the PML(Q) led the way with 76. The provincial results saw
the MMA secure 48 out of 99 seats in the Frontier Assembly. The PML(Q)
captured 129 of 297 general seats in the Punjab, while PPPP secured 50 of
130 seats in Sindh.
The elections reversed the trend in the 1990s toward a two-party system.
The absence of a clearcut winner raised questions about the stability of any
future government. On a more positive note, the outcome was regarded as
legitimate and enabled Pakistan’s different religious and ethnic voices to be
heard. It also created a need for the politics of accommodation and negotia-
tion that had been markedly lacking in the past. The Legal Framework Order
2002 introduced on August 21 many amendments to the 1973 Constitution.
These controversially included the restoration of the President’s power to dis-
miss the government and the setting up of the National Security Council.
Such measures ensured that the army would continue to exert a powerful
influence. The outcome of the elections was to be a guided democracy rather
than untrammeled civilian rule.
It was not until November 23, forty days after the elections, that the
PML(Q) candidate Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali became prime minister, hav-
ing secured 170 of the 342 votes in the National Assembly election for leader
of the house. The first Baloch to hold this office, he was clearly regarded as
President Musharraf’s nominee. The weeks before had witnessed protracted
negotiations between the parties. At various moments, a grand coalition gov-
ernment of national consensus, or conversely one of the opposition parties
including the PPPP and MMA, had appeared on the cards. Jamali had finally
been able to cobble together a majority, following the president’s “exemp-
tion” of certain key rules in the Legal Framework Order concerning violation
of party discipline. Shortly afterward, ten PPPP assembly members formed
their own grouping called the Forward Bloc. These members, who subse-
quently termed themselves (PPP-Patriots) voted for Jamali. Their leaders,
Rao Sikander Iqbal and Faisal Saleh Hayat, were rewarded with ministerial
posts. By the time of the mandatory December 30 vote of confidence, the
number of members of the bloc had risen to 17. Jamali not only survived the
vote but was able to increase his support to 188 members. The PPP was a
clear loser, as it was locked out of power, not only at the Center, but also in
Sind where it had emerged as the largest party. After a long delay, the
PML(Q) under the leadership of Ali Mohammad Mahar had formed a gov-
 PAKISTAN IN 2002 207
ernment backed by the Muttahida Qaumi Movement. The latter party had
shifted its position back and forth from opposition to support for the PML(Q)
at both the national and provincial levels.
While the outcomes had been much to President Musharraf’s liking, the
delays in ministry formation revealed that all might not be plain sailing in
2003. The opportunism of many of the PML(Q) supporters gave the lie to
Musharraf’s claims that his rule had ushered in a new type of more principled
politics. The only fresh faces in the Parliament belonged to the MMA. The
very inexperience of the forty-two-year-old Akram Durrani’s (MMA) gov-
ernment in the NWFP, together with the province’s reliance on the federal
government for funds, meant that despite Western fears, the MMA appeared
to opt for a pragmatic approach regarding the continuing hunt for al-Qaeda
members in the border areas. There was an attack early in December on the
Macedonian Consulate in Karachi linked with al-Qaeda.16 Members of the
banned Jaish-i-Mohammad movement were allegedly behind a grenade at-
tack on a Christmas Day service at a Presbyterian Church at Chianwali in
Daska.17 Three young girls died and 16 others were injured in the assault.
Pakistan ended the year as it had begun, the victim of terrorist outrages.

16. Ibid., December 6, 2002.

17. Ibid., December 27, 2002.