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14 Articles
2022
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Recommended Citation
Gross, Elaine (2022) "Denial of Housing to African Americans: Post-Slavery Reflections from a Civil Rights
Advocate," Touro Law Review: Vol. 38: No. 2, Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss2/5
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
ABSTRACT
*
Elaine Gross, MSW draws on her experience as the Founder and President of
ERASE Racism in writing this article. ERASE Racism is a regional civil rights
organization that leads public policy advocacy campaigns and related initiatives to
promote racial equity in areas such as housing, public school education, and
community development. I would like to thank Olivia Ildefonso, Ph.D. and Folasade
Famakinwa, J.D., M.S. for their research assistance.
589
I. INTRODUCTION
After the end of the Civil War in April 1865 (June was the
surrender of the last sizable confederate armies), the United States
government, seemingly, laid the foundation for the formerly enslaved
Africans to be full citizens of the United States, with equal access to
housing under the law of the land.
In December 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment 1 to the United
States Constitution sought to outlaw slavery throughout the United
States. Congress passed the amendment, and the former confederate
states revised their state constitutions to include abolition of slavery
and ratified the amendment. This amendment covered the United
States as well as “any place subject to their jurisdiction.”2
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, which included multiple
provisions, established that all persons born in the United States,
regardless of race, color, or “previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude,” were entitled to basic rights of citizenship “in
1
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
2
Id. § 1.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
every State and Territory in the United States.”3 The law further
declared that all such individuals were entitled to the following specific
rights:
[1.] [T]o make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
and give evidence [in court] . . . [2. to] give evidence,
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real
and personal property . . . and [3.] to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding .
..4
The law also provided for the conviction and punishment of
individuals who violated the law under what was codified as 18 U.S.C.
§ 242.5 This amendment was vetoed by then President Andrew
Johnson. After an override of the veto by the United States Congress,
it became law in April 1866.
The Fourteenth Amendment, which had been proposed at that
time, provided that all those “born or naturalized in the United States,”
which included former enslaved persons, were “citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside.” 6 It also stated that no
State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty or property . . . nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 7
It was ratified in July 1868.
Yet, the evidence in the following six “Lessons Learned”
sections of this Article demonstrate the failures of federal, state, and
local governments to acknowledge and act on the humanity and
citizenship of African Americans. We see time and again the
undermining of basic rights, including, but not limited to
nondiscriminatory housing for African Americans. We now examine
the impact with regard to the housing issue.
3
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by the Enforcement
Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870)) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983).
4
Id.
5
See 18 U.S.C. § 242.
6
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7
Id.
8
U.S. CONST. amend XIII.
9
The Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81, 81-92 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631).
10
Id.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
11
The term “Government” is used throughout this Article, broadly referring to such
elements as the executive and legislative branches, the judicial branch, and the
enforcement authorities at federal, state and local levels.
12
RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA, at vii-viii (2018).
13
Id.
14
Id. at 63.
15
Id.
very low interest rates and longer repayment periods—15 and then 25
years.16
HOLC created color-coded maps of neighborhoods for every
major metropolitan region. Areas with African American residents
were colored red and white neighborhoods were colored green. 17 Real
estate agents who knew the racial composition of the local
neighborhoods were important partners for this process. At the time,
the ethics code of the National Association of Real Estate Boards—the
governing body for the real estate agents—stated that the agents should
maintain racially segregated neighborhoods.18
The purpose of the maps was to gauge risk for issuing the new
loans in order to prevent a massive number of foreclosures, and risk
was determined by race. 19 A middle-class African American
community with single family homes would be colored red just like
any other neighborhood with African American residents. When
reviewing the information from the completed forms that were used
to create the maps, you can see in the section entitled “Detrimental
Influences,” there is “Colored infiltration” and “infiltration of
negros.”20 In accordance with HOLC policy, the race of the resident
was used to determine risk and thus the color of red on the map. 21 The
presence of African American residents was used as a signal for high
risk, and the presence of white residents signaled that the new loans
could be used there to forestall foreclosures.
In 1934, the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) was
created to help first-time homebuyers. Again, this program was
designed to benefit white people only. 22 These government-backed
mortgages included a whites-only requirement, and the FHA
Underwriting Manual stated its preference for physical barriers
separating whites from African Americans such as highways or
16
Id.
17
Mapping Inequality: Redlining in New Deal America, UNIV. OF RICHMOND: DIGIT.
SCHOLARSHIP LAB, https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/#loc=5/39.1/-
94.58 (last visited Mar. 7, 2022).
18
NAT’L ASS’N REAL ESTATE BDS., CODE OF ETHICS 7 (1924).
19
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 64.
20
Mapping Inequality, supra note 17.
21
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 64.
22
Id. at 64-65.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
35
Id.
36
Id. at 70.
37
Id. at 71.
38
CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STATS.,
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2022).
39
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 70.
40
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2020, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=Housing%20Value%20and%20Purchase%2
0Price&g=1600000US3642081 (last visited May 26, 2022).
41
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 68-69.
42
Id.; Rachelle Blidner, Long Island Divided: Part 8—Favored for Whites:
Levittown, NEWSDAY (Nov. 12, 2019), https://projects.newsday.com/long-
island/levittown-demographics-real-estate.
43
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 70-71.
44
Id. at VII, XV, 178-79.
45
Id. at 71.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
46
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 88; see also Equal Opportunity in Housing, 27 Fed.
Reg. 11527 (1962).
47
Go Deeper: Where Race Lives, PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/race/000_About/002_06_a-godeeper.htm (last visited June 6,
2022).
48
Olivia Winslow, Long Island Divided: Part 10—Dividing Lines, Visible and
Invisible, NEWSDAY (Nov. 17, 2019), https://projects.newsday.com/long-
island/segregation-real-estate-history.
49
2020 DEC Redistricting Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?t=Black%20or%20African%20American&g=1
600000US3642081&tid=DECENNIALPL2020.P1 (last visited May 26, 2022).
50
John R. Logan & Brian Stults, The Persistence of Segregation in the Metropolis:
New Findings from the 2020 Census, U.S. 2010 PROJECT (2021),
https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity.
51
Id. at 18.
52
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at viii.
53
Id. at 235.
54
Id.
55
Id. at xvii.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
56
Id. at 81.
57
Id. at 82, 268; Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
58
Id. at 85.
59
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
60
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 89.
61
Id. at 86.
from persons who have executed but do not seek judicial enforcement
of such covenants.’”62
Shelley ruled that courts could not order eviction of African
Americans.63 In 1953, the United States Supreme Court in Barrows v.
Jackson64 ruled that “the Fourteenth Amendment precluded state
courts not only from evicting African Americans from homes
purchased in defiance of a restrictive covenant but also from
adjudicating suits to recover damages from property owners who made
such sales.”65
The FHA continued to finance developments with restrictive
covenants, including Levittown. 66 Restrictive covenants, and housing
discrimination more broadly, were not explicitly banned until the 1968
Fair Housing Act,67 which will be discussed later in this Article.
Before there was an FHA, community residents and realtors
were freely segregating neighborhoods.68 Racial covenants in deeds
were used.69 In fact, the FHA adopted the racial covenant practice used
in local communities.70 Local residents and municipalities continued
to try a variety of strategies to ensure racial restrictions. 71 They
couldn’t count on the original developer to care about what happens
with resale.72 Increasingly, to avoid using the courts, residents created
contracts amongst themselves agreeing that neighbors could sue
directly if someone broke the contract. 73 That required recruiting
everyone in the neighborhood to voluntarily agree, which did not
always happen.74 For further protections, they created neighborhood
associations for the same purpose. 75 Bylaws for the association would
contain racial restrictions.76 To mandate participation in the
associations, subdivision developers would include a requirement that,
62
Id.
63
Id. at 85.
64
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1952).
65
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 90.
66
Id. at 86.
67
Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619.
68
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 12-14, 77.
69
Id. at 78-81.
70
Id. at 82-83.
71
Id. at 122-37.
72
Id. at 79-82.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 79.
75
Id. at 80-82.
76
Id. at 79.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
85
Id.
86
See generally Linda Fisher, Target Marketing of Subprime Loans: Racialized
Consumer Fraud & Reverse Redlining, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 121, 121-55 (2009).
87
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 75.
88
For documented examples of how the United States government and local
governments have systematically subjugated African Americans, see Kenneth
Jackson, Race, Ethnicity, and Real Estate Appraisal: The Home Owners Loan
Corporation and the Federal Housing Association, 6 J. URB. HIST. 419, 419-52
(1980). See generally THOMAS SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE
AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (2005); ALLAN SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO :
THE MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETTO, 1890-1920 (1967); DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID (1993).
89
245 U.S. 60 (1917).
90
Id. at 82.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
91
See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 45.
92
Elaine Gross, Housing Discrimination and Local Control, NYU FURMAN CTR.
(Mar. 19, 2019), https://furmancenter.org/research/iri/essay/housing-discrimination-
and-local-control.
93
See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
94
See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 2021).
95
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?t=Race%20and%20Ethnicity&g=0500000US3
6059,36103&tid=ACSDT5Y2020.B03002 (last visited May 25, 2022) (providing
these statistics which were derived from the Census Bureau’s ACS interactive data
tool).
96
ERASE Racism, Unequal Resources for Long Island Students Based on Race 8,
(May 2022)
https://www.eraseracismny.org/storage/documents/Unequal_Resources_for_Long_
Island_Students_Based_on_Race_ERASE_Racism_2022_Report.pdf.
97
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2010 and 2019, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=Suffolk&t=-00%20-
%20All%20available%20races&y=2019 (last visited Mar. 7, 2022) (providing
statistics which were derived from the Census Bureau’s ACS interactive data tool).
98
Long Island Housing Data Profiles, REG’L PLAN. ASS’N (Oct. 2020),
https://rpa.org/work/reports/long-island-housing-data-profiles.
99
Counties, N.Y.S. EDUC. DEP’T., https://data.nysed.gov/lists.php?type=county (last
visited Mar. 7, 2022).
100
John R. Logan & Brian J. Stults. Metropolitan Segregation: No Breakthrough in
Sight, BROWN UNIV. (Aug. 12, 2021),
https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity/Data/Report/report08122021.pdf.
101
Noah Kazis, Ending Exclusionary Zoning in New York City’s Suburbs, N.Y.U.
FURMAN CTR. 1, 9 (Nov. 9, 2020),
https://furmancenter.org/files/Ending_Exclusionary_Zoning_in_New_York_Citys_
Suburbs.pdf.
102
2018 Indicators Report, LONG ISLAND INDEX, at 9,
http://www.longislandindex.org/data_posts/long-island-index-2018-report (last
visited June 6, 2022).
103
REGIONAL PLAN. ASS’N., BE MY NEIGHBOR: UNTAPPED HOUSING SOLUTIONS:
ADUS AND CONVERSIONS (July 2020), https://rpa.org/work/reports/be-my-neighbor.
104
Long Island Housing Data Profiles, supra note 98.
105
Id.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
106
Kazis, supra note 101, at 12-15.
107
Binyamin Appelbaum, Long Island, We Need to Talk (About Housing), N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 24, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/opinion/long-island-
housing.html.
108
Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 15 (1988).
109
Id.
110
Randi F. Marshall, Opinion, The Point: 43 Years Later, A Huntington Affordable
Housing Project Looks Ready, NEWSDAY (Dec. 15, 2021),
newsday.com/opinion/matinecock-court-o18319.
the Fair Housing Act.111 The United States alleged that two housing
programs to develop below-market rate housing for first-time
homeowners and senior citizens discriminated against African
Americans, because the programs gave a preference to residents of the
predominantly white Town.112 The Government asserted that this
preference produced a discriminatory result, because very few African
Americans (3 percent of residents) live in the Town and less than one
percent of the Black families living there were eligible for the
program.113 Income-eligible Black residents nearby were blocked
from participating. Town officials tried to avoid depositions, but a
federal judge ruled in February 2022 that the officials could not do
so.114
In MHANY Management Inc. and New York Communities for
Change, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Garden City and Garden City
Board of Trustees,115 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed a lower court’s decision that the Village of
Garden City intentionally discriminated against people of color and
thus violated the federal Fair Housing Act116 in its zoning decision to
abandon a multi-family residential district in favor of a residential
townhouse district.117 At the time, Garden City was largely white and
2.6% minority (defined as Hispanic/Latino or as both non-Hispanic
and Black).118
ERASE Racism submitted its original administrative
complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”) on April 28, 2014, alleging that Nassau County violated the
111
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619.
112
United States v. Town of Oyster Bay, No. CV-14-2317, 2022 WL 1458176 at *1
(E.D.N.Y. 2014); see also Press Release, United States Sues Town of Oyster Bay for
Housing Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: U.S. ATT’YS OFF. E.D.N.Y. (Apr. 10,
2014), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/united-states-sues-town-oyster-bay-
housing-discrimination.
113
Id.
114
Ted Philips, Federal Judge Denies Bid by Oyster Bay Officials to Avoid
Depositions, NEWSDAY (Feb. 8, 2022), newsday.com/long-
island/Nassau/depositions-lawsuit-housing-discrimination-town-board-n34587.
115
4 F. Supp. 3d 549 (2014).
116
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619.
117
Mhany Mgmt. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 2016).
118
Decl. of Nancy McArdle at 3, ACORN v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. 05CV2301, 2009
WL 2923435 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2009).
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
Fair Housing Act119 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964120 by
discriminating against African Americans and perpetuating racial
segregation in the administration of its housing and community
development programs.121 The Complaint identifies violations
committed by the County itself, as well as the County’s failure to
enforce federal civil rights requirements on members of the Nassau
Urban County Consortium. 122 The Complaint was amended on May
28, 2014 to include additional facts. HUD accepted the Complaint on
July 18, 2014.123 As of the writing of this Article, this Complaint
remains unresolved.
The Complaint’s central allegation is that the County
discriminates on the basis of race and color, and perpetuates racial
segregation by its actions or omissions with respect to: (a) its own
funding of housing and community development activities in
jurisdictions that are members of the Nassau Urban County
Consortium—a collective of Nassau County municipalities that are
given access to competitive grant funds from HUD’s Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program; (b) its own decisions
with respect to dedicating County-owned land for the development of
affordable housing; and (c) failing or refusing to withhold funding or
other County benefits from members of the Nassau Urban County
Consortium that maintain zoning and land use laws, policies and
practices with a discriminatory effect. 124
With policies like local control, it is fair to say that residential
segregation is firmly and stunningly in place. Local control has no
doubt been carried to extremes on Long Island; 125 however, the
dynamic is not unique to this region.
In another suburban region just to the north of Long Island, the
Anti-Discrimination Center’s False Claims Act lawsuit126 targeting
119
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619.
120
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
121
Housing Discrimination Complaint against Nassau Cnty., filed by ERASE
Racism (Apr. 28, 2014),
https://www.eraseracismny.org/storage/documents/HUD_Administrative_Complai
nt.pdf.
122
Id.
123
Case Nos. 02-14-0400-8 and 02-14-0029-6.
124
Id.
125
Kazis, supra note 101.
126
United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
Cty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
127
Anti-Discrimination Center, Westchester Case,
http://www.antibiaslaw.com/westchester-case.
128
Logan & Stults, supra note 100.
129
ERASE RACISM, UNEQUAL RESOURCES FOR LONG ISLAND STUDENTS BASED ON
RACE 8-24, (May 2022)
https://www.eraseracismny.org/storage/documents/Unequal_Resources_for_Long_
Island_Students_Based_on_Race_ERASE_Racism_2022_Report.pdf.
130
ERASE RACISM, 2017 INFOGRAPHIC: SCHOOL SEGREGATION ON LONG ISLAND
(2017), https://www.eraseracismny.org/component/content/article/1/498.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
131
See Joie Tyrell, Long Island Places 20 High Schools on United States News &
World Report's Annual List, NEWSDAY (Apr. 27, 2021),
https://www.newsday.com/long-island/education/u-s-news-world-report-long-
island-schools-1.50227626; see also New York State Education at a Glance, N.Y.S.
EDUC. DEP’T (Mar. 24, 2022), https://data.nysed.gov.
132
Race–The Power of an Illusion, Episode Two: The Story We Tell, PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/race/000_About/002_04-about-02-01.htm (last visited Mar. 9,
2022).
133
Inventing Black and White: Holocaust and Human Behavior, FACING HIST. &
OURSELVES, https://www.facinghistory.org/holocaust-and-human-behavior/chapter-
2/inventing-black-and-white (last visited March 9, 2022).
134
Race, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST., https://www.genome.gov/genetics-
glossary/Race (last visited Mar. 9, 2022).
134
Megan Gannon, Race Is a Social Construct, Scientists Argue, SCI. AM. (Feb. 5,
2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/race-is-a-social-construct-
scientists-argue; see generally SUNG-MIN AHN ET AL., THE FIRST KOREAN GENOME
SEQUENCE AND ANALYSIS: FULL GENOME SEQUENCING FOR A SOCIO-ETHNIC GROUP
1622-29 (2009). We note here that the study found that there were significant genetic
variations between individuals from the same racial group as well as genetic
similarities between individuals from different racial groups.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
135
See generally EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY AND RACISM IN THE
POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2001).
136
See Jan Ransom, Amy Cooper Faces Charges After Calling Police on Black Bird-
Watcher, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/06/nyregion/amy-cooper-false-report-
charge.html.
137
Ms. McIntosh is a white woman born in Brooklyn and raised in New Jersey.
138
Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, PEACE &
FREEDOM, July/Aug. 1989, at 10.
139
Id.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
140
42 U.S.C. §3601.
141
History of Fair Housing, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV. (Mar. 25, 2022, 2:00
PM),
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/aboutfheo/history.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
negate the positive steps that have been taken by the Obama and now
the Biden administrations. Nor am I ignoring the positive steps taken
by the New York State Assembly, Senate, and the New York State
Governor in December 2021 when nine bills were signed into law,
which would increase accountability and enforcement of fair housing
laws.148 Even in the face of these gains, when we add in the actions of
non-government entities such as banks and the real estate agencies, we
are failing to protect African Americans.
The United Nations (“UN”) Fact Sheet 21 entitled The Right to
Adequate Housing can be used as a framework to examine more deeply
the state of Long Island housing.149 This UN document provides that
adequate housing was recognized as part of the right to an adequate
standard of living in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights.150
When Fact Sheet 21 talks about “[k]ey aspects of the right to
adequate housing” in the section called entitlements, it includes
“[e]qual and non-discriminatory access to adequate housing.”151 It
further describes what is meant by discrimination:
Discrimination means any distinction, exclusion or
restriction made on the basis of the specific
characteristics of an individual such as race, religion,
age or sex, which has the effect or purpose of impairing
or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of
human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is linked to
the marginalization of specific population groups and is
generally at the root of structural inequalities within
societies . . . . In housing, discrimination can take the
form of discriminatory laws, policies or measures;
zoning regulations; exclusionary policy development;
exclusion from housing benefits; denial of security of
tenure; lack of access to credit; limited participation in
148
Governor Hochul Signs Legislative Package to Combat Housing Discrimination,
supra note 144.
149
See generally OFF. U.N. HIGH COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE
HOUSING: FACT SHEET NO. 21 (2009),
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/FS21_rev_1_Ho
using_en.pdf.
150
Id. at 3.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 10.
153
Logan & Stults, supra note 100, at 17.
154
Id. at 16.
155
Id. at 20.
156
Id. at 6.
157
Id. at 21, 25.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
158
ERASE RACISM, 2012 SURVEY RESEARCH REPORT: HOUSING AND
NEIGHBORHOOD PREFERENCES OF AFRICAN AMERICANS ON LONG ISLAND (2012),
https://www.eraseracismny.org/storage/documents/FINAL_ERASE_Racism_2012
_Housing_Survey_Report_web_version.pdf.
159
Maria Krysan & Reynolds Farley, The Residential Preferences of Blacks: Do They
Explain Persistent Segregation?, 80 SOC. FORCES 937 (2002). “African Americans
overwhelmingly prefer 50–50 areas, a density far too high for most whites . . . [w]hite
preferences also play a key role, since whites are reluctant to move into
neighborhoods with more than a few African Americans.” Id. at 937; Reynolds
Farley et al., The Residential Preferences of Blacks and Whites: A Four‐Metropolis
Analysis, 8 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE, 763-800 (1997). “Whites’ willingness to move
into a neighborhood is inversely related to the density of blacks living there. Blacks
prefer integrated neighborhoods, but ones with a substantial representation of
blacks.” Id. at 763; Maria Krysan, Community Undesirability in Black and White:
Examining Racial Residential Preferences through Community Perceptions, 49 SOC.
PROBS. 521, 521-43 (2002). “[B]lacks rate most communities as more desirable than
whites, and African Americans find desirable many of the communities in which they
are the numerical minority. Whites rate mixed race communities as undesirable, in
part because of a desire to avoid black neighbors, but also because of what may be
an over-inflated perception of crime in those communities.” Id. at 521; Maria Krysan
et al., Does Race Matter in Neighborhood Preferences? Results from a Video
Experiment, 115 AM. J. SOCIO. 527, 527-59 (2009). “Whites said the all‐white
neighborhoods were most desirable. The independent effect of racial composition
was smaller among blacks and blacks identified the racially mixed neighborhood as
most desirable.” Id. at 527.
160
Ann Choi et al., Long Island Divided, NEWSDAY (Nov. 17, 2019),
https://projects.newsday.com/long-island/real-estate-agents-investigation/.
161
OFF. U.N. HIGH COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 149.
162
Id. at 31 (emphasis in original).
163
Id. at 33.
164
Id.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
165
The Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
166
See Fair Housing Assistance Program (FHAP), U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/partners/FHAP
(“HUD provides FHAP funding annually on a noncompetitive basis to state and local
agencies that administer fair housing laws that provide rights and remedies that are
substantially equivalent to those provided by the Fair Housing Act.”).
167
Nassau County, N.Y. LOCAL LAW NO. 9-2006 (2012). This is a local law to
amend chapter 272 of the Laws of 1939, constituting the Nassau County
Administrative Code, in relation to the Nassau County Commission on Human
Rights.
I won’t recite all the details, but the short story is that even
though we got the amended laws passed, we had limited success in
implementing the full impact and intent of the laws. One County
Executive was fully supportive. He had already begun to revamp the
Human Rights Commission governing board and was looking to beef
up the staff. But after he lost his bid for re-election, our conversations
with the new County Executive made it clear that they had no interest
in supporting fair housing.
What the Nassau law included that the New York State law did
not have at the time was source of income protection (SOI) which
prohibits discrimination against renters and homebuyers based on such
legal sources of their income other than a paycheck, including social
security payments, any form of government assistance, or child
support. At a later date, SOI protection was included in the Suffolk
law as well, under a new, more supportive County Executive.
Fair housing laws offer protections to groups of people with
certain characteristics or protected classes, such as race and religion.
Our new law protected people from being discriminated against based
on legal SOI. This phenomenon involved building managers refusing
housing to tenants who were using some forms of legal non-wage
income—private or public assistance such as housing vouchers,
alimony payments, and disability payments or government subsidies.
If the county was not going to be a refuge, we needed to change the
state statute. In 2016, we organized a statewide coalition to push for
an SOI amendment to the New York State Human Rights Law. In
2019, that amendment passed and was signed by Governor Cuomo. 168
There’s a lot more to tell about this story, including lobby days
in Albany and supportive op-eds, but I’ll just say that I was very
grateful to our partners in this journey, especially the New York Office
of Enterprise Community Partners, a national nonprofit that exists to
increase the supply of affordable homes and to advance racial equity
in housing, which assumed key coordination responsibilities in
collaboration with our leadership team of four nonprofits.
168
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2015); see also for an announcement:
Governor Cuomo and Legislative Leaders Announce FY 2020 Enacted Budget
Includes Measure Prohibiting Discrimination Against Tenants Based on Source of
Income, N.Y.S. DIV. HUM. RTS. (Apr. 26, 2019), https://dhr.ny.gov/source-of-
income-press-release.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
3. Legal Action
169
A fair housing tester is an individual who is trained by a fair housing
organization(s) and acts as a prospective renter or homebuyer. Individuals are
usually paired in a way that allows the fair housing organization to uncover possible
discrimination based on a protected characteristic, such as Black-White pairings to
investigate racial discrimination or woman-man pairings to investigate gender
discrimination. At the same time, paired testers are provided profiles that show them
to be the same in characteristics that might influence their rental or home buying
prospects or process, such as same income, the number of bedrooms they seek, etc.
For example, a Black tester and a White tester might both attempt to rent from the
same landlord. They are given profiles that are similar in terms of their income,
occupation, preferences for number of bedrooms, gender, etc. The testers record
their interactions with the landlord, allowing the fair housing organization to evaluate
whether the landlord treats the White tester more positively than the Black tester
and/or rents the apartment to the White tester over the Black tester.
170
See generally ERASE Racism Inc. v. LLR Realty LLC, No. CV 13-4821, 2013
WL 11089020 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013); ERASE Racism Inc. v. Empire
Management American Corporation, No. CV 15-03376, (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
171
Choi et al., supra note 160.
172
Id.
173
Elaine Gross, ERASE Racism Testimony on Governor Hochul's ADU Proposed
Legislation, ERASE RACISM (Jan. 27, 2022),
https://www.eraseracismny.org/component/content/article/28/968.
174
Id.
175
FINAL INVESTIGATIVE REPORT FAIR HOUSING & DISCRIMINATION ON LONG
ISLAND, REPORT FROM THE NEW YORK STATE SENATE STANDING COMMITTEES ON
INVESTIGATIONS & GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; HOUSING, CONSTRUCTION &
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT; & CONSUMER PROTECTION 58-59 (Jan. 27, 2021).
176
Id.
177
Governor Hochul Signs Legislative Package to Combat Housing Discrimination,
supra note 144.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
178
ERASE Racism, Civil Rights Rollback: United States Government Actions to
Reduce Civil Rights in Housing and Public Education (Oct. 2019),
http://www.eraseracismny.org/storage/documents/Reports/rollback_report_FINAL
_REPORT.pdf.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
See generally Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 11459 (Feb. 15, 2013).
182
Elaine Gross, Erase Structural Racism: 5 Steps Joe Biden Can Take to Make U.S.
Laws, Policies More Just, USA TODAY (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/02/04/5-steps-joe-bide-can-take-
erase-structural-racism-american-law-column/4369978001. The five steps are as
follows:
First, treat violent white nationalists as domestic
terrorists…Second, employ a racial equity lens as a decision-
making tool to ensure that the federal government no longer
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
184
See generally EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-
BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED
STATES (2d ed. 2016).
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Michael Tesler, The Return of Old-Fashioned Racism to White Americans’
Partisan Preferences in the Early Obama Era, 75 J. POL. 110, 115-16 (2013).
188
Critical race theory is an academic legal concept which argues that structural
racism is a significant factor in the legal system, including how laws are written,
passed, enacted, and implemented. Further, its tenets argue that race is a social
construct and racism is not simply a product of individual bias or interpersonal
prejudice; instead, they argue that racism is deeply entrenched in legal systems and
policies. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 21 (3d ed. 2017).
189
See Educational Gag Orders, PEN AM., 2016, at 1.
190
Id. at 8.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
191
The Pledge of Allegiance, USHISTORY.ORG,
http://www.ushistory.org/documents/pledge.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2022).
192
See generally ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC
STORY OF AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION (2010).
193
Lynchings by Year and Race, UNIV. MO., KANSAS CITY,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/lynchingyear.html (last visited
Mar. 7, 2022). University of Missouri, Kansas City has compiled lynching figures
by state, race, and year.
194
Id.
195
When the first school cases were brought challenging northern segregation, the
United States Supreme Court curtailed remedies by creating the distinction between
de jure, or intentional, legally sanctioned segregation which warranted judicial
intervention, and de facto, or unintentional social segregation that occurred
“naturally” through alleged choice rather than government action. De facto
segregation does not trigger judicial remedies. Thus, there could be no inter-district
busing between urban and suburban schools to integrate rather than desegregate
northern schools without a showing of intentional illegal government action
intending to keep the races apart. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 756-57
(1974); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 1049, 1098, 1100-02 (1978) (highlighting the courts’ flawed distinction of de
jure segregation in the early school cases as a justification for separation).
196
See Alexis C. Madrigal, When the Revolution was Televised, ATLANTIC (Apr. 1,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/04/televisions-civil-
rights-revolution/554639/.
197
See WILKERSON, supra note 192.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
IV. CONCLUSION
198
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
199
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17; The Fair Housing Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
200
POLICY LINK & USC PROGRAM ENV’T & REG’L EQUITY: AN EQUITY PROFILE OF
LONG ISLAND 15-16, 100-04 (2017).
201
See generally MICHAEL AVERY & DANIELLE MCLAUGHLIN, THE FEDERALIST
SOCIETY: HOW CONSERVATIVES TOOK THE LAW BACK FROM THE LIBERALS (2013).
202
Kelly Welch, Black Criminal Stereotypes and Racial Profiling, J. CONTEMP.
CRIM. JUST. 276, 281-84 (2007).
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
203
John R. Logan, The Persistence of Segregation in the 21st Century Metropolis,
CITY CMTY., June 1, 2013, at 1, 4-5.
204
Annie Lowry, Income Inequality Might Take Toll on Growth, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/business/economy/income-
inequality-may-take-toll-on-growth.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
205
Id.
206
Benjamin Landy, A Tale of Two Recoveries: Wealth Inequality After the Great
Recession, CENTURY FOUND. (Aug. 28, 2013), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/a-
tale-of-two-recoveries-wealth-inequality-after-the-great-recession.
207
PBS NewsHour, Obama v. Romney: The First 2012 Presidential Debate,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 3, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfaBRyCKRhk; PBS
NewsHour, Obama v. Romney: The Second 2012 Presidential Debate, YOUTUBE
(Oct. 16, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jhXgbrkFJ_s; PBS NewsHour,
Obama v. Romney: The Third 2012 Presidential Debate, YOUTUBE (Oct. 22, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jhXgbrkFJ_s.
208
Richard Fry & Paul Taylor, The Rise of Racial Segregation by Income, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Mar. 26, 2022, 2:29 PM), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/08/01/the-
rise-of-residential-segregation-by-income/1/. Here on Long Island, despite
increased diversity, racial isolation, especially among Hispanics, is rising.
209
Disparate impact is a focus on “discriminatory effects” as a way to provide
evidence for discrimination. As noted in a brief by the Federal Register,
“discrimination under the [Fair Housing] Act may be established through evidence
of discriminatory effects, i.e., facially neutral practices with an unjustified
discriminatory effect.” Reinstatement of HUD’s Discriminatory Effects Standard,
86 Fed. Reg. 33590 (proposed June 25, 2021) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
This means that a fair housing organization can demonstrate fair housing violations
without needing to demonstrate an intent to discriminate.
210
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
211
ERASE Racism, Unequal Resources for Long Island Students Based on Race
(May 2022),
https://www.eraseracismny.org/storage/documents/Unequal_Resources_for_Long_
Island_Students_Based_on_Race_ERASE_Racism_2022_Report.pdf.
212
John R. Logan. The Persistence of Segregation in the 21st Century Metropolis,
12 CITY & COMMUNITY 4, 5 (2013): 10.1111/cico.12021. doi:10.1111/cico.12021.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
213
See, e.g., Republican National Party, The 2012 Republican National Convention
Platform 35, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2012). The Platform states:
School choice–whether through charter schools, open enrollment
requests, college lab schools, virtual schools, career and technical
education programs, vouchers, or tax credits–is important for all
children, especially for families with children trapped in failing
schools. Getting those youngsters into decent learning
environments and helping them to realize their full potential is the
greatest civil rights challenge of our time.
Id. at 36.
214
The first reverse discrimination cases were brought on behalf of men, represented
by the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project headed by then Associate Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg. The strategy was to do away with gender classifications that had
previously been labeled “benign” or protective of women. Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion). On the same day as Kahn
was argued before the United States Supreme Court, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
312 (1974) was also heard. DeFunis was the first reverse race discrimination case
to arrive at the Court, but was dismissed as moot because the plaintiff had been
admitted to University of Washington School of Law and was about to finish law
school. Id. at 317-18; see Rosalie Berger Levinson, Gender-Based Affirmative
Action and Reverse Gender Bias: Beyond Gratz, Parents Involved, and Ricci, 34
HARV. J. L. & GENDER 1, 5-9 (2011). For the reverse race discrimination cases that
began reaching the Supreme Court in the late 1970s, see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (discussing employment); Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (discussing medical school
admissions); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (discussing
a minority set-aside program); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (discussing
law school admissions); and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (discussing
college admissions).
215
Harper’s Index, HARPER’S MAG., Apr. 2013, at 15.
216
Kevin Phillips, the architect of the Republican Party’s “southern strategy”
admitted that the very basis of the strategy was to optimize racial hostility among
working class white ethnic voters and African Americans who now saw hope in the
1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act. James Boyd, Nixon’s Southern
Strategy: It’s All in the Charts, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 1970),
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/books/phillips-southern.pdf. The red state-
blue state maps tracking the 2012 Presidential election demonstrated how effective
the strategy has been in luring white southern Democrats to the Republican rolls.
217
Voting Laws Roundup: February 2022, BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (Feb. 9, 2022),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-
february-
2022?ms=gad_voting%20laws_587514441261_8626214133_130570618446&gcli
d=CjwKCAjwxZqSBhAHEiwASr9n9CG_riMTKfLpn0y6facg1EHNjXW4SqSwS
3UWVMy5Ee5GogzHQayeNhoCXBgQAvD_BwE.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
nation. The elected and civic leadership should reflect that diversity
and power should be shared. That is my vision: where race and
ethnicity will not be determinative of one’s ability to access
nondiscriminatory housing, and more broadly one’s place in the
economic, social, or political order. How we get there requires a
structural analysis, because any attempt to stop re-segregation and to
promote an integrated public life requires structural change.
Furthermore, where we want to go needs to reflect structural
alternatives to seemingly intractable problems like housing
discrimination and racially segregated schools, as is the case for Long
Island. Blacks and Latinos in the region do not have access to highly
resourced school districts, especially when compared to districts that
are predominantly white. 218 Despite the fact that student enrollment
for all districts on Long Island is 16 percent Black, 28 percent
Hispanic, 10 percent Asian, and 41 percent white, the number of school
districts with over 90% Black and Latino is increasing.219 And it’s
these hyper-segregated districts that have the least access to resources,
such as overall per pupil funding, AP courses, and guidance
counselors.220
If our vision only addresses how individuals treat other
individuals and does not recognize the power of institutions to
maintain the status quo, our efforts will fall far short.
As an example, under No Child Left Behind 221 and now Race
to the Top,222 the prescription for addressing the achievement gap in
Long Island schools includes a multitude of strategies but does not
challenge the existence of racially segregated schools which have
unequal resources for their Black and Hispanic students.223 But don’t,
218
ERASE Racism, supra note 211.
219
Id. at 11.
220
Id. at 16-24.
221
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered section of 20 U.S.C.) (repealed by Every Student
Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.)).
222
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 14005-
6, 123 Stat. 115, 282-84 (2009). U.S. Dep't Of Educ., Race To The Top Program
Executive Summary (Nov. 2009) https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED557422.pdf. In
2007, the United States Congress passed, and President Barack Obama signed it into
law.
223
Unequal Resources for Long Island Students Based on Race, ERASE RACISM
(May 2022),
https://www.eraseracismny.org/storage/documents/Unequal_Resources_for_Long_
Island_Students_Based_on_Race_ERASE_Racism_2022_Report.pdf.
224
See generally Dennis J. Condron et al., Racial Segregation and the Black/White
Achievement Gap, 1992-2009, 54 SOCIO. Q. 130 (2013).
225
See CTR. FOR RSCH. EDUC. OUTCOMES, Multiple Choice: Charter School
Performance in 16 States, STAN. UNIV., June 2009, at 1. A longitudinal study
showed that 17 percent of charter schools outperformed public schools; however,
nearly half showed no difference, and 37 percent performed considerably below
public schools. Id.
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Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans
Too often, there are those who think we just need a different
discourse based on the facts and those who think, “Enough talking,
let’s just push through policy changes that we need using direct
action.” Both groups would probably agree that they also need to map
out a strategy for change that takes into account political realities.
Even if they are both interested in structural changes, which some
social justice activists may not be, they may skip two additional
important components of the policy change strategy: 1) figuring out
exactly how existing institutions can support the values underpinning
the change we want, i.e., systematically considering power dynamics
in our democracy; and 2) creating a narrative that is easy to understand,
that ties into familiar values and constructs that ordinary people,
thought-leaders, and decision-makers can embrace.
The narrative will need to re-legitimize the role of government,
re-affirm the call for well-meaning people of all races to take a stand
for racial equity, and reconstruct who we are as “Americans.” We
would need to dismantle the normalized white supremacy ideology.
Despite the abolition of slavery and legalized Jim Crow, the white
supremacy ideology is not dead. As discussed in this Article, white
supremacy is inscribed in our society’s geography, government, laws,
and private and public institutions. We need to replace it with a
narrative of racial equity and inclusion, which would be embraced by
a large segment of our political leaders, civic leaders, and the general
populace.
Lawyers played a pivotal role throughout the Civil Rights
Movement of the 1950s and 1960s, which pushed through sweeping,
societal changes to enfranchise disenfranchised Blacks. 226 There are
many lessons to learn from the successes during that period. Clearly,
the ability of lawyers to use the rule of law in support of greater equity
is priceless. Unfortunately, the rule of law is now, once again, being
used to protect racial inequity and cement in place structural
impediments that deny racial groups, which are perceived as
undeserving, access to opportunity. 227 I would suggest that civil rights
attorneys revisit the demand for equal rights and the principle that
separate is not equal, neither for housing nor public-school
226
See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS (Basic Books 1994).
227
Wendy Leo Moore, Maintaining Supremacy By Blocking Affirmative Action, 17
CONTEXTS 54-59 (2018).
228
Gary Orfield et al., E Pluribus...Separation: Deepening Double Segregation for
More Students, CIVIL RTS. PROJECT (Sept. 19, 2012),
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-
diversity/mlk-national/e-pluribus...separation-deepening-double-segregation-for-
more-students.
229
Bayard Rustin, ‘Negro Revolution in 1965’ Speech at the Center for Democratic
Institutions, AM. RADIOWORKS,
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/blackspeech/brustin.html.
230
Id.
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Human Rights
I had not. Nevertheless, the imbalance of power between my colleague and myself made it
imprudent to show my annoyance, so I answered that Black people never thought racism had ended.
Not only do we know it still exists, I told him, but we also continue to experience it, often in our own
workplaces.
He was shocked.
He had what I have come to call the “not here” syndrome—denying that racism is a problem in your
own organization, even when you are willing to acknowledge it as prevalent in society, outside your
own organization or home. The “not here” syndrome is at work when someone bemoans Trump’s
election but confidently declares, as this colleague did, “There’s no racism here; at least none that
I’ve seen.” Racism was only “out there, not here.” Ironically, while my colleague trusted me to
represent Black people’s views on the racism that Trump and his supporters so boldly expressed, he
did not trust me to speak about what I have personally experienced as the only Black faculty member
This Is What Racism Looks Like
This series aims to explain how racism operates within organizations and create
conversation about racial justice, dignity, and belonging.
FOLLOW THIS SERIES
at our school. His epiphany that racism persists in the United States left him unconvinced that it is a
problem at our own university. And there was nothing I could say to convince him otherwise.
Regardless of Black people’s dignity, expertise, or professional achievements, employers treat Black
employees as unfit to interpret our own experiences. Even Black scholars with deep knowledge of the
vast and damning literature on racism find that our expertise is unwelcome within our colleges and
universities. We can talk about it at conferences but not in our organizations’ conference rooms.
White colleagues who have never given serious thought to racism believe themselves more fit to
identify it; more capable of being “objective” or “reasonable.” They almost seem to pity us for our
sensitivity to signals of racism. They believe that what they cannot see must not exist, overlooking
the possibility that they do not see racism because it does not happen to them.
For instance, when I confided in a colleague one day that a student in my class had declared support
for white nationalism—a student whose evaluation of my teaching would one day be treated as a data
point in deciding whether or not I could keep my job—the colleague simply replied, “I’m sure you’ll
figure out how to handle it.” Although I cannot be sure that he was in complete denial, his casual
response conveyed that, at best, he saw this student as a “bad apple” rather than as a symptom of a
rotten tree—of the culture and systems. In his mind, there might be a few racist students at our
university, but there was not enough racism to justify my alarm. Yet, he showed sensitivity and
concern in discussions we had about racial inequity outside of our university. He, too, had the “not
here” syndrome.
I have often wondered how white people can be blind to racial inequity in their workplace—the place
where they spent most of their time. Research suggests that one reason is a greater tendency among
white Americans to overestimate how much the United States has progressed toward racial
economic parity. They do so even after reading about the persistence of racism. Rather than
attending to facts, white people often base their estimates on examples of high-status Black people,
taking the success of a few as evidence of mass progress.
Turning away from evidence of racism also serves as psychological self-protection. Denying or
downplaying racism helps white people maintain the view that they, personally, hold no racial
prejudice and, more critically, are disconnected from (and therefore not responsible for) the history
of racism within the United States that has served to benefit them politically, socially, and
economically. Nobody wants to dwell on painful truths that reflect poorly upon them and their
friends, family, and beloved institutions.
Research has shown that people often identify strongly with the organization that employs them. Not
only are they part of the organization, but the organization is a part of them. Organizational identity
is a source of self-esteem and satisfies that most fundamental of human needs to belong to a valued
collective. Although identifying with one’s employer can support well-being and performance, it can
also reduce employees’ willingness to recognize the organization’s pitfalls. Research by business
management scholars Elizabeth E. Umphress, John B. Bingham, and Marie S. Mitchell has found
that people who are highly identified with their employer are more likely to engage in unethical
actions that benefit the organization. In addition to self-protection, people with strong organizational
identity may be motivated to deny racism in their organization if they think acknowledgment is a
slippery slope toward discrimination claims that are costly to the organization’s reputation and
bottom line.
Despite such paranoia about lawsuits, research suggests that employees are less likely to lodge
formal discrimination complaints if they feel that their organization shows true concern about their
experiences of racism. Based on my experience, few Black people are interested in the potential
monetary costs, mental health, and career costs that can result from claiming discrimination. We
simply want our organizations to listen and act.
Black people hired under these initiatives could encounter a culture that is as dismissive of their
experiences and insights as ever. Indeed, anemic as Blackrock’s hiring goals may seem to be,
organizations that signal commitment to racial diversity often encounter a countervailing wave of
heightened racism denial among white employees. The very programs we count on to remedy
racism in employment can actually strengthen the tendency to deny that racism is, in fact, “here, not
there.” Numerous studies, for example, have found that people are less likely to see a company as
discriminatory if it has a diversity program, even in the face of objective evidence of discrimination.
A 2018 study by Columbia Business School’s Seval Gündemir & Adam Galinsky found that when a
company either claims a commitment to multiculturalism or wins a diversity award, observers are
more likely to see Black employees’ claims of racial discrimination as illegitimate. Furthermore,
there is evidence that when organizations prioritize the hiring of Black employees and strive to
remove discriminatory barriers to employment, white employees may not only deny anti-Black
racism but also allege that white people are the real victims of discrimination.
Although diversity training might seem to be the obvious tool for managing such reactions, it also
heightens denial. Implicit bias training, the approach that has become standard for companies
ranging from Google to McDonald's, has shown little evidence of effecting lasting change in
individual racial attitudes. The main message of such training is that all of us carry unconscious
biases against other social groups. However, simply making people aware that they have unconscious
biases does not necessarily motivate them to address or remedy those biases. In fact, diversity
training participants with the lowest initial cultural competence and knowledge are the least likely to
show interest in further training. One large study published at the Harvard Business Review in 2019
showed that employees who took part in a diversity training intervention were more likely to
recognize their bias, but the training only increased inclusive behaviors among female and racial
minority employees. Another study by Cornell University’s associate professor of management and
organizations at the Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management Michelle M. Duguid
and Airbnb’s Global Head of Diversity Melissa C. Thomas-Hunt found that white people expressed
more racially biased attitudes and behaviors after learning in diversity training that racial
stereotyping is highly prevalent.
Given the ineffectiveness of implicit bias training at the individual level, it is not surprising that
there is no evidence that it catalyzes organizational change. By locating racism in the individual
rather than the system, it obviates the need to consider bias in the organization’s policies. It fails to
communicate that the survival of systemic racism does not depend only on individual attitudes.
People with the best of intentions may perpetuate systemic racism simply by implementing policies
conceived of during a time when the exclusion of racial minorities was not only considered normal,
but also necessary. For example, the use of student evaluations to judge faculty performance came
into being before most institutions were hiring Black faculty. Yet there is substantial evidence that
gender and racial bias influence these measures. Though a department chair may sincerely wish to
see a Black faculty member succeed, they perpetuate institutional racism with their failure to accept
evidence of the harm caused by student evaluations.
The consequences of racism denial in workplaces reach well beyond those in my admittedly
privileged position as a highly educated and well-compensated college professor. Gaps in pay,
benefits, and access to jobs perpetuate less wealth and poorer health among Black people. Low-wage
Black workers have played an outsized role in keeping the United States operating through the
COVID-19 pandemic, delivering groceries, washing bedpans, and even cleaning up after white
supremacist rioters. But companies have not been generous in return. Business groups continue to
lobby against minimum wage increases, benefits for gig workers, and safe working conditions—the
very changes Black workers need to recover from the significant toll the pandemic has taken on their
communities.
Even the Business Roundtable’s announcement of support for federal paid leave legislation defies
optimism. This league of companies that collectively employs 19 million people is advocating
limiting federal paid leave only to employees currently covered by the Family Medical Leave Act,
excluding 62 percent of low-wage workers (who are disproportionately people of color and women).
The Roundtable’s position does not inspire confidence that US corporations have realized racial
inequity is both “out there” and “in here.” No amount of diversity training or pledges can compensate
for this denial.
I can speak now. But I do not want to. Like so many other Black people, I am tired. I am also angry. I
am angry that people did not have enough respect to listen to me before. I am angry that it took
George Floyd for people to want to listen. I am angry that none of this newfound sympathy will undo
the emotional strain and career damage I have sustained over years of fighting alone. A few years
ago, in 2017, the weight of the anxiety and rage that I felt from that fight led me to decide to let it go.
My health was suffering. I chose to save myself by accepting that the institution is what it is and that
I have no power to change it. I stopped risking further alienation from my colleagues by talking
about race at work. As a Black woman, I made the same choice then about which the poet Paul
Laurence Dunbar wrote in 1895—to don “the mask that grins and lies.” As with all masks, mine is
silent. I still carry the knowledge and pain of the reality that racism is pervasive, but I, to borrow
again from Dunbar, “let the world dream otherwise.”
Charlice Hurst is an assistant professor in the University of Notre Dame’s Mendoza College of
Business. Her teaching and research are centered around social innovation, systems thinking, and
racial economic justice.
DOI: 10.48558/djgd-9p08
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public discourse
Martha Augoustinos
University of Adelaide, Australia
Danielle Every
University of South Australia
As Van Dijk (1992) has documented, one of the pervasive features of contemporary race
discourse is the denial of prejudice. During the last 50 years, social norms against openly
expressing racist sentiments has led to the development of ways of talking that present
negative views of out-groups as reasonable and justified, while at the same time protect-
ing speakers from charges of racism and prejudice. It goes without saying that a ‘preju-
diced’ or ‘racist’ identity is no longer a valued identity. Negative representations and
evaluations of minorities are commonly preceded by ubiquitous disclaimers such as ‘I’m
not racist but . . . ’ or ‘I have nothing against migrants but ... ’. Contemporary race talk,
therefore, is strategically organized to deny racism.
A closely related but largely ignored phenomenon associated with the denial of prej-
udice is a political climate that creates what is tantamount to a social taboo against mak-
ing accusations of racism in the first place (Augoustinos and Every, 2007). Such charges
and accusations are invariably met with not only strong denials, but also moral outrage
and are often treated as more extreme than racism itself. This Special Edition publishes
new discursive work on the delicate discursive and argumentative management of
accusations of racism and their accompanying denials.
New racism
There is now a large body of research analysing the discursive and rhetorical properties of
the new racism (Barker, 1981). Studies in Western liberal democracies including Australia
Corresponding author:
Martha Augoustinos, School of Psychology, Level 4, Hughes Building, University of Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia.
Email: martha.augoustinos@adelaide.edu.au
252 Discourse & Society 21(3)
(Augoustinos et al., 2005; Rapley, 1998), Belgium (Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998),
Britain (Condor et al., 2006; Jones, 2000; Lynn and Lea, 2003), New Zealand (Nairn and
McCreanor, 1991; Wetherell and Potter, 1992), The Netherlands (Van Dijk, 1991, 1993,
1997; Verkuyten, 1998) and the USA (Goldberg, 1996; Santa Ana, 1999) have identified
pervasive discursive repertoires and rhetorical devices that are combined flexibly by
majority group members to justify negative evaluations of minority out-groups. Those
who wish to express negative views against out-groups in the contemporary historical
climate take care to construct these views as justified, warranted and rational (Billig,
1988), denying, mitigating, justifying and excusing negative acts and views towards
minorities in order to position themselves as decent, moral, reasonable citizens (Condor
et al., 2006). Such denials not only attend to the positive self-presentation of the speaker,
but also allow what otherwise would be ‘unsayable’ to be said.
Given the flexible and ambivalent nature of contemporary race discourse, critical
voices, that identify and attempt to make accountable racist practices in Western societ-
ies, are easily silenced and dismissed by such denials. As Van Dijk (1992: 90) argues,
‘Accusations of racism . . . tend to be seen as more serious social infractions than racist
attitudes or actions themselves’. This, of course, raises special challenges for the devel-
opment of effective anti-racist practices and for naming racism when it takes place. How
can racist or discriminatory practices be challenged, when there are increasing social
taboos around identifying, naming and categorizing persons, groups, events and
practices as ‘racist’?
Critical voices are also effectively silenced by the widespread marginalization and
denigration of those who ‘speak up’ and challenge racism. Van Dijk (1992: 90) writes:
the person who accuses the other as racist is in turn accused of inverted racism against whites,
as oversensitive and exaggerating, as intolerant and generally as ‘seeing racism where there is
none’ … Moreover, such accusations are seen to impose taboos, prevent free speech and a ‘true’
or ‘honest’ assessment of the ethnic situation. In other words, denials of racism often turn into
counter-accusations of intolerant and intolerable anti-racism.
Paul Sheehan (1998) alleged that ‘racist’ was a loaded term employed by the ‘Thought
Police’ (post-modern academics, Labor politicians and members of the ‘elite multicultur-
alism industry’) to silence their opponents. As in Belgium and the UK, ‘the elites’ has
become a powerful derogatory categorization applied to those who oppose conservative
and reactionary policies on immigration, refugees and indigenous peoples. As such, anti-
racists are constructed as an out of touch, privileged minority. As part of the maintenance
of social inequity, the construction of anti-racists as pernicious, oppressive, discrimina-
tory or just plain crazy (the ‘loony left’) is a potent way of silencing prejudice claims.
This research on the negative construction of anti-racists suggests that such critics
must attend to pervasive concerns that accusations of racism may be perceived to be
unreasonable and extreme. Indeed, Jones’ (2000) analysis of political discourse in the
UK on new asylum laws found that politicians opposing such laws rarely explicitly
invoked the category of racism when justifying their condemnation. Similarly, Every and
Augoustinos (2007) found that in the Australian parliament, refugee advocates opposing
restrictive laws also avoided making direct allegations of racism against such laws. Both
studies found that, instead, critics deployed euphemisms for racism such as describing
the government as ‘playing the race card’ or appealing to the ‘Conservative-minded’
vote. These ‘softened’ euphemisms for racism functioned to criticize such policies whilst
maintaining a reasonable and rational subject position.
In this Special Issue, we present analyses which examine the fine detail of how speak-
ers make and manage accusations of racism and in turn how they are responded to by
interlocutors through the use of ubiquitous disclaimers and denials. At the same time, the
articles in this Issue provide naturalistic data in which claims of racism are produced by
social participants themselves (rather than analysts) and examine how these claims are
managed and attended to in social interaction in a variety of social and institutional set-
tings (Edwards, 2003). In this way, the articles also attend to the indexicality and contin-
gency of contested meanings of ‘racism’ in social interaction. Thus, rather than
attempting to define what ‘really’ constitutes ‘racism’, these articles also examine the
production of racism as an everyday contested phenomenon (Van den Berg et al., 2003).
naming the behaviour of the housemates as ‘racist’ but instead employing euphemisms
such as ‘bullying’, ‘mocking’, ‘cruel’ and ‘offensive’ behaviour; and using a distanced
footing by attributing the allegations of racism to third parties (the audience, media and
the British nation). These discursive practices serve to demonstrate the increasing social
delicacy that interactants orient to when racism becomes a publicly accountable matter.
Indeed, the analysis also suggests that by avoiding explicitly naming racism in such
highly visible public settings, racism is represented as a highly unusual and exceptional
occurrence rather than as a routine and normative feature of everyday life.
The second article in this issue by Chiang examines the discursive and rhetorical
management of a highly charged televised debate in February 2008 between CNN anchor
Lou Dobbs, and the President of La Raza (a Hispanic civil rights group) Janet Murguia,
about the defeat of the immigration amnesty legislation in the USA. The analysis dem-
onstrates the dramatic escalation of the debate between the two protagonists which cul-
minates in direct accusations by Murguia that Dobbs was guilty of propagating hate
speech against Hispanic immigrants on his programme. Within the cut and thrust of this
heated argumentative exchange, we see how Dobbs defends against this explicit charge
in the face of evidence and ‘facts’ that Murguia cites to support her claims. In contrast to
the previous article which demonstrated the interactional delicacy of making accusations
of racism, this article provides a dramatic instance in which one interactant holds another
– specifically in this case, an individual who has widespread media influence – person-
ally accountable for propagating racism. Finally, we see how Dobbs shuts down the
debate by invoking the First Amendment and the sanctity of free speech in America. This
argumentative resource functions as a rhetorically self-sufficient or bottom-line argu-
ment that needs no further warrant or elaboration.
Hanson-Easey and Augoustinos shift focus to analyse the discourse of political elites
in articulating and defending contentious government policy to reduce the Sudanese
humanitarian refugee quota in Australia. Again, the data are media interviews, this time
between the Immigration Minister and journalists who questioned the government’s
motives for introducing the legislation: suggestions by the media that the government
was once again playing the ‘race card’ on the eve of a Federal election. We see in this
analysis several examples of how the Minister’s factual claims about the unique ‘integra-
tion’ problems of this particular group of refugees were challenged by interviewers, and
in turn how the Minister fends off attributions of racism by deploying a range of discur-
sive resources such as the use of specific membership category devices, empiricist war-
ranting, appeals to consensus, stake inoculation and the deployment of causal and
historical narratives that construct the Sudanese as a uniquely problematic group.
Moreover, the analysis also suggests that while political elites have become particularly
adept at avoiding the use of the category ‘race’, supplanting it with de-racialized terms
such as ‘culture’, there are nonetheless occasions when ‘race’ ‘is worth the risk in allow-
ing a political speaker to conjure fear inducing imagery and causal inferences in ways
that advance a political project’.
As the number of displaced persons from underdeveloped nations seeking refuge in
Western liberal democracies continues to increase, many of these countries have wit-
nessed polarized public debates on the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers. The
final article by Goodman and Burke examines how British university students in focus
Augoustinos and Every 255
groups discuss whether or not it is racist to oppose asylum seekers. Goodman and Burke
demonstrate the dilemmatic way in which this issue is discursively managed in the talk
of students: although participants acknowledge and recognize that opposition to asylum
seeking can be and is often perceived to be racist, at the same time most participants
argued that this characterization was unfair. Rather, the rejection of and opposition to
asylum is more likely to be based on what were constructed as reasonable, practical and
economic concerns. The analysis examines how the word ‘just’ is used structurally to
‘both align with the taboo against prejudice’ and with the increasing sensitivities associ-
ated with making racist accusations. Racist accusations were constructed by participants
as ‘over-simplistic’ explanations for opposing asylum, which functioned to gloss over
reasonable and practical (non-racist) reasons and which also served to stifle free speech
in the community. As in Chiang’s analysis, free speech is appealed to as a rhetorically
self-sufficient argument that does not require further warrant.
Together, these articles offer new insights into the increasing delicacy of making
accusations of racism and how speakers manage their moral accountability (both in
accusing of and denying racism) in public discourse. Indeed, given the increasing
salience of contentious debates in the media around issues pertaining to race, immigra-
tion and ethnicity, as discourse analysts we have a wealth of publicly available data from
which we can draw to analyse the finer details of how speakers orient and attend to these
issues in everyday informal and formal talk. We hope that, taken together, the articles
in this Special Issue make a significant contribution to our growing understanding of
contemporary race discourse.
Acknowledgements
We are very grateful to Teun van Dijk and the anonymous reviewers for their comments and advice
on the manuscripts comprising this Special Issue.
References
Augoustinos, M. and Every, D. (2007) ‘Contemporary Racist Discourse: Taboos Against Racism
and Making Racist Accusations’, in A. Weatherall, B. Watson and C. Gallois (eds) Language,
Discourse and Social Psychology, pp. 233–54. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Augoustinos, M., Tuffin, K. and Every, D. (2005) ‘New Racism, Meritocracy and Individualism:
Constraining Affirmative Action in Education’, Discourse & Society 16: 315–39.
Barker, M. (1981) The New Racism. London: Junction Books.
Billig, M. (1988) ‘The Notion of “Prejudice”: Some Rhetorical and Ideological Aspects’, Text 8:
91–110.
Blommaert, J. and Verschueren, J. (1998) Debating Diversity: Analysing the Discourse of
Tolerance. London: Routledge.
Condor, S., Abell, J., Figgou, L., Gibson, S. and Stevenson, C. (2006) ‘“They’re not Racist . . . ”:
Prejudice Denial, Mitigation and Suppression in Dialogue’, British Journal of Social
Psychology 45: 441–62.
Edwards, D. (2003) ‘Analyzing Racial Discourse: The Discursive Psychology of Mind-world
Relationships’, in H. van den Berg, H. Houtcoup-Steenstra and M. Wetherell (eds) Analyzing
Race Talk: Multidisciplinary Approaches to the Interview. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
256 Discourse & Society 21(3)
Martha Augoustinos is Professor and Co-Director of the Discourse and Social Psychology
Group (DASP) in the School of Psychology, University of Adelaide. Martha has pub-
lished widely on ‘race’ and prejudice in Australia and in the field of discursive psychol-
ogy. She is co-editor with Kate Reynolds of Understanding Prejudice, Racism and Social
Conflict (Sage, 2001) and co-author of Social Cognition: An Integrated Introduction
(2nd edition, Sage, 2006) with Iain Walker and Ngaire Donaghue.
To cite this article: Amanda Gebhard, Gabriela Novotna, Heather Carter & Funke
Oba (2023) Racism plays a disappearing act: discourses of denial in one anti-
discrimination campaign in higher education, Whiteness and Education, 8:2, 229-247, DOI:
10.1080/23793406.2022.2072760
This article analyses the public discourses circulated by one university campaign
ostensibly developed to raise awareness about and counter racism. At the time of the
campaign’s launch, we, the authors, were collaborating on a research project exam
ining the experiences of racialised students1 in the helping professions – in the
Faculties of Social Work, Education, and Nursing – at the university delivering the
campaign. Our emerging research findings, based on qualitative data from semi-
structured interviews with students who self-identified as racialised, were painting
a picture of the university space as lonely and isolating; participants recounted
experiences of racism on campus and practicum settings in a multitude of forms
(e.g., McNeil, Oba and Kalu 2020; Novotna et al. 2020; Reid et al. 2020). During
research meetings, which were taking place against the backdrop of the campaign,
the focus of this article and thus an interrelated research project began to take
shape, as we considered the campaign’s messaging through anti-racist lenses.
Because those in a position of authority at universities can profoundly shape how
racism is presented and addressed (Iverson 2012), we felt compelled to analyse on
a deeper level our concerns that a campaign that professed to be combatting racism
Locating ourselves
Our social locations are inseparable from this research and the analysis. While we share
an interest in anti-racism, our lived experiences within this system of oppression we
study as academics are mediated by our own intersecting identity markers and how we
are perceived. As a white settler woman of Eastern European ancestry, I (Gebhard) have
navigated a system of education structured to ensure my academic success and ‘belonged’
by virtue of my white skin. Throughout my early schooling and my trajectory into
academia, the explicit and hidden curriculum of whiteness propelled me forward while
ensuring my successes would be individualised. I, (Novotna), identify as a white woman,
who moved to Canada for my postsecondary studies and later decided to pursue an
academic career. While my whiteness grants me membership into the dominant group in
Canada, my Eastern European origins and English being my additional language simul
taneously position me as the ‘Other’. I (Carter) identify as a Métis woman, but my light
skin and red hair grant me membership to the dominant white culture of the province.
My ‘White-seeming privilege’ (Downey 2018) and Indigeneity coalesce in a personal
identity of amalgamated ‘imposterhood’ (Mercier 2010), advantaging and disadvantaging
me within academia and society at large. I, (Oba) identify as an Indigenous African Black
woman. As a settler in Turtle land, I share a history of colonisation with Indigenous
people. We experience the academy as a site of colonialism that perpetuates insidious
anti-black racism that juxtaposes Black bodies with whiteness-defined as pure, pristine
and moral, while Black people (pupils, students, faculty) are relics of Tarzan, dangerous
and deviant (Kumsa, Mfoafo-M’Carthy, and Sadia 2014).
Context
‘We are, I believe, a very open and friendly city. I know we are.’
(Michael Fougere cited in Canadian Press 2019, emphasis added)
On the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
21 March 2019, the University of Regina launched a campaign entitled ‘You Belong
Here.’ The stated purpose of the campaign was to ‘ . . . reinforce the institution’s
commitment to be a welcoming place, where behaviours such as bullying, abuse, harass
ment and discrimination are not tolerated or accepted’ (Shepherd 2019). While this
statement did not specifically reference racism, a second rationale provided for the
campaign was that ‘The recent attacks in New Zealand highlight that racism is
a serious and widespread problem’ (Shepherd 2019), and the official campaign slogan
was announced as You Belong Here. Racism Doesn’t. A similar version of this statement,
and the peculiar use of racism as a reason for self-adulation, was cited by the city’s mayor
in a media statements unrelated to the campaign about incidents involving white young
men who threw coffee at black students while laughing and filming the act, cited in the
opening to this section.
The campaign took off with a flurry of promotional events, including the distribution
of t-shirts, stickers, and posters emblazoned with the logo; a multicultural food festival
hosted by the student union; the circulation of videos via Facebook; and announcements
about an upcoming speaker series. Contrary to the campaign’s slogan, racist belief
systems have long belonged to the settler population of the province of Saskatchewan
232 A. GEBHARD ET AL.
(Green 2011; Lavasseur 2014; Starblanket and Hunt 2020). As asserted by Foucault,
‘knowledge linked to power, not only assumes the authority of “the truth” but has the
power to make itself true’ (Foucault 1979, 27). The mayor’s disbelief at racism in the city
is an example of how the province’s historical and contemporary white settler colonial
domination has become largely understood through a lens of meritocracy (Schick and
St. Denis 2003). ‘Settler colonialism is a territorial project that is centred on the accu
mulation and control of dispossessed land’ (Nunn 2018, 8) and has been legitimised in
the Canadian Prairies by racist ideologies that simultaneously construct white people as
superior and BIPOC as inferior (Gebhard, McLean and St. Denis 2022; Starblanket and
Hunt 2020).
Situated on Treaty 4 Territory and the homeland of the Métis Nation2 in the province
of Saskatchewan, the University of Regina serves over 15,000 students. Approximately
16% of the student body are international students, 13% self-declare as Indigenous and
32% self-identify as a visible minority (University of Regina 2020). The student demo
graphics mirror the province of Saskatchewan (Statistics Canada 2017), one of three of
Canada’s western prairie provinces. The colonial history of Saskatchewan and current
attitudes of racism that racialise Indigenous people, as well as non-white Canadians and
newcomers, have created an ideological landscape where white skin signifies entitlement
to the resources of the province and the nation state, including the resource of education
(Thobani 2007). Like their Indigenous counterparts, Black and people of colour experi
ence racism in Canada daily (Este, Lorenzetti and Sato 2018; Oba 2018; Salloum and
Polischuk 2020), including within post-secondary institutions, in spite of mission state
ments claiming to recognise and support diversity (e.g., University of Regina 2020a).
Although racism in the province continues to be brought to the foreground of public
consciousness through events highlighting the prevalence of racial inequities, hegemonic
discourses are often deployed as rhetoric of platitudes that can serve to further heighten
racial tensions. Racialised groups often carry the responsibility of naming, confronting
and addressing the racism they are faced with in their daily lives, at the risk of social
penalty (Kumsa, Mfoafo-M’Carthy, and Sadia 2014).
competitive neoliberal times (e.g., Henry et al. 2017; Olssen 2016). The diversity and
inclusion rhetoric perpetuates insider/outsider dichotomy, suggesting non-white indivi
duals need to be granted access by dominant group members (Iverson 2012). BIPOC do
not report the sense of belonging frequently promoted as hallmarks of the university
(Oba 2018; Solórzano, Ceja, and Yosso 2000). Educational exclusions are manifested in
BIPOC’s disappointment with a lack of non-dominant content in the university curri
cula, objectification, isolation and alienation (Henry and Tator 2009). Racialised students
are often a tokenised presence in universities perceived as likely to under-perform or in
need of additional support due to ‘cultural differences’ (Henry and Tator 2009), and find
the university space reflective of monocultural views and ideologies (Battiste 2013).
establishing recurring discourses in the documents, Gebhard synthesised and wrote the
analysis; Novotna, Carter and Oba provided regular feedback on the draft, which was
stored in a cloud document accessible to all authors at all times. In our final stages, we
returned to the original data, engaging in an iterative process that led to a deepened
examination of the consequences of the identified discourses.
Discourse analysis is not about following a particular set of steps, but requires
confidence in one’s analytic prowess (Cheng 2018). We were interested in dominant
narratives about race and racism circulated through the documents; that is, what about
these topics was maintained as true, natural and good, as well as the counter-narratives
they served to exclude (Weedon 1987/1997). Viewing the documents as layered with
discourses that maintain a particular version of truth about diversity, equity, and racism
in higher education, we asked questions of the data to unpack these particular versions of
truth as well as the versions that were excluded. Key questions that guided our discourse
analysis were the following: What does this text take for granted about race and racism at
the University? How are these assumptions reflective of anti-racist scholarship? What
subjectivities (who people ‘get to be’) are made possible by the truth patterns, and how do
these open up or forestall possibilities for transformation? Asking questions that reveal
the data’s unstated assumptions and the larger consequences of these assumptions is the
starting point of producing findings distinguishable from what one would find in
a thematic analysis. In the latter, the researcher typically aims to describe and summarise
a data set, which is often taken at face value. In discourse analysis, the aim is to go beyond
a description of textual data, and to examine its underlying and (un)stated assumptions.
Importantly, while we understand the discourses as circulated by individuals, they do
not originate from individuals; therefore, we endeavoured to ‘keep the focus on the . . .
discourse, not the person who produces it’ (Wood and Kroger 2000, 78). Wetherell and
Potter (1992) also underline the interest in discourse analysis is in language and not in
language users. Similarly, we do not analyse the intention of the speakers or producers of
the messages; not only do discourses have consequences beyond intentions, speculation
about intentions merely obscures analysis of consequence and effect.
Following poststructuralist tradition, we reject the notion of one true interpretation of
the data (Wood and Kroger 2000). The knowledge we produce in this research emerged
because we ‘asked certain questions and used certain frameworks to produce the answers’
(Kumashiro 2015, 8), and we underline this to signal the postructural paradigm that
views all data analysis as partial and incomplete (Jackson and Mazzei 2012). We did not
set out to unveil a singular truth, but to examine whose interests and ideologies are served
by the particular constructs of race, racism, and whiteness circulated by the campaign.
structure wherein racialised students are treated unequally (Nieto 2008, 28). Bonilla-Silva
2018) explains contemporary racism sounds and appears very ‘nice’ on a surface level;
importantly, the promulgation of kindness and respect re-inscribes the knowledge that to
be racist, one must participate in outright acts of hatred (Leonardo 2013). When racism is
understood as an individual affliction ‘located within a small, aberrant pocket of the
population’ (Nelson 2015, 345), there is no credible basis for action.
Appeals to sameness
The next excerpts originate from the publicity surrounding the first event in the speakers’
series of You Belong Here, a key component of the campaign which featured public
lectures.
In his upcoming presentation, Anthony Mclean will challenge audience members to
think critically about unconscious biases and deliver a powerful message about creating
an inclusive environment. He’ll argue that regardless of our race, religion, socio-
economic background, or sexual orientation, we all want to feel a sense of belonging
(Waldrop 2019).
Uncovering discriminatory unconscious biases can be an eye-opening and unsettling
experience, but it is one that helps create a University community where everybody feels
valued and knows they belong (Waldrop 2019).
We all have unconscious biases. They are learned stereotypes that are automatic,
unintentional, deeply ingrained within our beliefs, universal, and have the ability to
affect our behaviour (Waldrop 2019).
These excerpts suggest the speaker would unsettle the audience members through
a focus on unpacking discriminatory, unconscious biases. However, the speech itself met
expectations of the dominant group in terms of overall lightness of subject matter that
did not name racism until the discussion period. Recognising people are really not that
different from each other as a solution to inequity emerged as the lecture’s key message.
The speaker encouraged a racially diverse audience of faculty, staff and students to seek
out each other’s commonalities, to demonstrate ‘You have much more in common than
you realise’ (McLean 2019). The speaker encouraged the audience to raise their hand if
they could relate to a series of statements, including: ‘ . . . if you cry at car commercials,’
‘ . . . if you love dogs,’ and ‘ . . . if you love popping the bubbles in bubble wrap.’ The
audience was also encouraged, ‘when they see someone different from themselves,’ to be
curious instead of judgemental, not to focus on their perceived religion or race, and to
instead wonder about, for example, ‘what movie made them cry.’
Through this well-intended activity promoting sameness, whiteness operates as an
invisible norm; the real difference that difference makes in the lives of individuals
whose ways of being do not conform to white mainstream expectations can be
diminished or ignored. According to Schick (2010), ‘a type of easy universalism
suggests that people “are just people” in contrast to the reality that social hierarchies
have widely different consequences that advantage some to the detriment of others’
(54). Further, the speaker’s examples reference a particular cultural framework that is
not shared by everyone, which is a cultural framework reflective of mainstream,
Eurocentric, consumerist culture, to ‘function in ways that privilege whiteness, so
that whiteness persists as an identification that is worth knowing and as an
238 A. GEBHARD ET AL.
identification worth performing’ (Schick 2002, 101). Emotions are not universal or
naturally occurring, but shaped ‘by our biases and beliefs, our cultural frameworks’
(DiAngelo 2018, 132). Whiteness is held as the invisible norm when the values and
characteristics of the dominant group are espoused as the unspoken, neutral standard
against which all ‘others’ are evaluated, and must conform to in order to ‘belong.’ The
appeal to a universalised humanity as a remedy for inequality not only ignores that
humans are different from each other, but produces whiteness as humanity itself. The
third speaker in the speaker series made statements that bumped up against the
messages of sameness promoted by the first speaker. While speaker one urged their
audience to recognise ‘we are all the same,’ the third speaker discussed the impacts of
‘having to pretend and present yourself in a way to make [white] people feel like you
were like them’ (Sciarpelletti 2020).
Producing everyone as equally responsible for inequity was also reinscribed through
an emphasis on unconscious biases in the first speaker’s lecture, a message consistent
with unconscious bias training that encourages everyone to accept they are
a ‘suppressed racist (or at least [exhibit] a strong racial preference)’ (Noon 2018).
Framing the problem of racism as ‘unconscious biases’ equally belonging to everyone
shifts the lens away from the devastating impacts of racism on BIPOC, and leaves white
people unaccountable for examining internalised racist beliefs about the inferiority of
BIPOC and white supremacy. Perpetuating the knowledge that everyone holds uncon
scious biases without a discussion of power relations also serves to safeguard the
dominant belief held by white people about the existence of ‘reverse racism’ and
oppression – the idea that allows whites to claim ‘People of colour are just as racist
as whites’ or ‘It goes both ways’ – ubiquitous claims in the context of this study.
According to Bourne (2019), concepts such as individual or unconscious ‘bias’ obscure
structural analyses of racism as institutionalised, ignores historical injustices, reduces
racist acts to individual ‘flaws’ and provides simplistic solutions to a complex social
problem.
Diversity as ‘valuable’
Producing the university as an always already progressive space, appreciative of diver
sity, was presented in the University’s promotion of the second speaker in the cam
paign speaker series. The advertisements called for acknowledging the ‘power of
a diverse and inclusive workplace, and the need to convey the message of diversity as
beneficial for all of us’ (University of Regina 2020b). The poster text quoted the speaker
stating, ‘Extensive research has confirmed how important it is to build teams whose
members don’t all look or think the same way. Diversity and inclusion are valuable to
any team, in any setting, and lead to more creativity and innovation. And yet, there’s
still a lot of work to do. While most business leaders now understand why having
a diverse and inclusive culture is critical to performance, they don’t necessarily know
how to achieve that goal’ (University of Regina 2020b). Ascribing a social and eco
nomic value to the Other constitutes a type of commodification that has become
integral to neoliberal postsecondary education (Evans 2020; Leong 2013). The presence
of non-white individuals is justified and ironically measured by the majority (Leong
2013).
WHITENESS AND EDUCATION 239
Furthermore, the last excerpt reiterates a discourse that depicts the ‘Other’ as
requiring permission to participate in white institutions (Iverson 2012), and unwit
tingly acknowledges white dominance by granting the dominant group the power to
include and exclude ‘the Other’. Another example of this occurs in a video advertise
ment (University of Regina 2019) posted on social media. The video opens with people
appearing to represent faculty of colour, stating ‘You belong here.’ This is followed by
eight separate statements of ‘I belong here’ spoken by racialised students in various
languages. A white student subsequently takes the screen and the script changes from
‘I belong here’ to ‘You belong here, racism doesn’t.’ The white student is thus posi
tioned as not only belonging automatically, but holding the authority to affirm the
belonging of their peers of colour, sending a message about who belongs unequivocally
and whose membership depends on the approval of the dominant group. This approval
is often contingent upon racialized university members' willingness to uphold the
institution as an equal playing field.
Silencing Counternarratives
The production of the campaign as evidence that equity has been achieved on campus
was bolstered by highlighting interviews with faculty and students of colour who spoke
positively about the campaign and their experiences at university in media coverage. The
notion of exclusion is very important in discourse analysis and we must consider how
some discourses are kept in existence in ways that keep other statements out of circula
tion (Mills 2003). Storytelling from the perspective of critical race scholars is ‘not valued
so much for its truth content as its truth effects; its ability to affect our actions and our
orientation to the Other’ (Leonardo 2013, 20). In keeping with this framework for
examining publicised positive stories, we are not claiming the untruthfulness of indivi
duals’ accounts but are instead interested in how stories have the ability to uphold
discourses of denial and silence counternarratives that would be an ‘antidote to the
majority’s line of thinking’ through ‘recountings of how race affects minority lives’
(Leonardo 2013, 20).
In one newspaper story released one year after the campaign started, one Black faculty
member describes being handed a ‘You Belong Here’ t-shirt upon their return to the
university after a leave of absence. The professor is quoted as explaining they had
originally left because they ‘didn’t feel that I belonged here. Nobody told me
I belonged here at that time and everything I saw on the job, the way people sometimes
asked me where I came from “originally” and when I intended to return there, and many
other indicators gave me the impression that I didn’t really belong here’ (University of
Regina 2020a). The story goes on to tell of the faculty member’s return to work at the
university: ‘In late 2019, my supervisor welcomed me and gave me a grey shirt with a bold
message on the front: “You Belong Here: Racism Doesn’t.” That almost melted my heart.
It was a powerful message that left a powerful impression . . . I am impressed with the
change I am seeing. We know there is a lot of work to be done as the University
transforms itself into a more welcoming community where everyone can have a full
sense of belonging, but we must recognise the work that is being done, especially the
genuine and honest openness to engage in public discussions of these issues’ (University
of Regina 2020a).
240 A. GEBHARD ET AL.
Always already
The below publicised statements about the campaign underline how the messaging of
You Belong Here became regulated by the discourses of a post-racial society, depicting
the university as a space that was always already a space where racism does not exist, or as
a space that has already achieved equality for everyone, even before the campaign.
The campaign reinforces the message that the University is a welcoming institution
that is open to all. It also raises awareness of the behaviours and attitudes – such as
bullying, abuse, harassment, and discrimination – that are not acceptable on the
University’s campuses (Campbell 2019).
‘In a world that continues to be plagued by racial intolerance, discrimination, and
violence, it is important for our University to set a positive example.’ (Campbell 2019)
‘The University has a long history of being a welcoming Institution’ (Campbell 2019)
The University has been forward thinking and progressive since 1978, when it was
already ahead of its times in its creation of a sexual orientation clause. The university
today is at the forefront of diversity and inclusion movements today (Campbell 2019).
Where racism was originally proclaimed to be ‘everywhere’ at the outset of the
campaign, it was suddenly nowhere soon after the campaign was launched. This is
a narrative consistent with general white Canadian beliefs that racism in Canada is non-
existent (Hiranandani 2011). Scholars contend that racism requires denial in order to
flourish (e.g., Kendi 2019; Nelson 2015), and by reiterating this discourse, the campaign
forestalled anti-racist actions that require acknowledging that racism operates on campus
WHITENESS AND EDUCATION 241
in order to be justified. The campaign was quickly transformed into a celebratory story
about the accomplishments of the university. If there was ever a problem of racism on
campus, reminders of the university’s past initiatives to promote inclusivity were high
lighted as evidence that equality has been achieved, giving rise to celebration instead of
transformative education and actions. Ladhani and Sitter (2020) might describe this
posturing as ‘competency language’ and ‘diversity management’ which guards the insti
tutional and national image of Canada as a fair nation that celebrates diversity, a message
echoed in the following Twitter feed: ‘You belong here, racism doesn’t! Racism has no
place at the University of Regina or at your Student Union. We pride ourselves in offering
jobs, food, and cultural connections to our students from 48 countries around the globe
and those from right here in Canada. #yqrbelong #sask’ (Wiskar 2019). Celebratory anti-
racist messaging, embedded in institutional practices that make space for diversity,
becomes an efficient way to perpetuate stereotypes about the Other and commodify its
presence on campus (Evans, J 2020; Nelson 2015). The messaging surrounding the
campaign depicts the university as an exemplar of progress and imbued with good-will
towards minoritised groups – versions of nationalist narratives that portray Canada as
a model multicultural society (Thobani 2007). The self-adulatory nature of the campaign
is consistent with Canada’s multicultural discourses that produce the country as welcom
ing to all, and different from the United States, characterisations that make anti-racist
education difficult.
Conclusion
How does a university-wide awareness campaign both disrupt and re-inscribe main
stream discourses about racism? How do the discourses open up and foreclose the
possibilities for anti-racist action and meaningful changes for racialised members of
the university? This discourse analysis reveals the discourses of the campaign and
subjectivities to which they give rise are consistent with those that anti-racist scholars
have long contended forestall meaningful anti-racist action and change. We do not
question the sincerity of the campaign leaders for the university to be a space where all
students, regardless of identity and backgrounds, are welcomed. However, we suggest
hegemonic discourses circulated by the campaign largely centred around the denial of
racism, erasing the possibility of an understanding that racism and other forms of
oppression are ongoing, have grave impacts on racialised faculty and students, and
forestall anti-racist actions. This study illuminates how well-intentioned campaigns can
easily succumb to the forces of privilege and oppression they were ostensibly seeking to
dismantle.
A simple Google search for the You Belong Here slogan reveals how ubiquitous the
discourses of diversity and inclusion in postsecondary education have become across
North American campuses (e.g. Mount Royal University, 2020; Southern Methodist
University, 2020; UBC Okanagan, 2020; University of South Florida, 2020). The cam
paigns’ messaging – You Belong Here – became the linchpin of communication strategies
touting the solutions to structural racism by the promising to racialised people that all are
welcome and accepted. Rankine (2014) suggests that positive effects of anti-racism
242 A. GEBHARD ET AL.
campaigns are only assumed, as many only vaguely identify audiences and goals, with
education about diversity remaining the sole strategy and without any specific beha
vioural or institutional changes.
What changes then are required from the dominant group, from the knowledge
produced by the campaign? Very few, we contend. Instead, the messaging of the
campaign encourages dominant group members to continue displaying the qualities
and ideals they have supposedly always upheld. In keeping with national narratives,
these are goodwill and benevolence towards all. The campaign missed an opportunity to
have any profound educational value; while it presented an opportunity to engage in
discussions about racism, the discourses employed in the campaign failed to provide
a nuanced and scholarly-based analysis of racism in academia. It therefore fell into the
pitfall of a premature and false sense of accomplishment through employment of
a narrowly defined terrain of racism as individual transgressions. While messaging at
the outset of the campaign defined racism as a reality on campus, the reality quickly
became redefined as one of equality already achieved. The implication of the discourse of
denial is that there becomes no legitimate basis for opposition to racism or structural
anti-racist action by the university and gives rise to familiar white subjectivities who see
themselves outside the system of racism, exemplifying Bonilla-Silva’s 2018 ‘racism with
out racists.’
Taking place against a backdrop of rising neoliberalism, the superficial treatment of
diversity as a means for achieving competitive status renders racialised students and
faculty as objects and commodities. Research on the denial of racism in the context of
neo-liberalism is important for future studies – a conversation already started by
scholars abroad (see Dunn et al. 2011). Similarly, diversification of students and faculty
alone does not signal fundamental change if not accompanied by the interrogation of
the normative centre of whiteness and colonialism. In the absence of an acknowl
edgement of the colonial origins of higher education, universities’ inclusivity efforts
risk reinforcing instead of shifting unequal power relations. Anti-racism requires long-
term commitment to fundamental change, and an engagement with scholarship that
has long criticised continued recycling of discourses of denial over radical action and
education that would transform the academy. Campaigns professing to combat racism
or any form of oppression must refrain from applying yet another shiny veneer to
detract from more difficult and sustained commitments that hold potential for more
equitable outcomes.
Notes
1. The term ‘racialised’ is employed in this paper to refer to individuals who identify as Black,
Indigenous and People of Colour (BIPOC), and we also use the term BIPOC. While not
a homogenous group, BIPOC – albeit always in differential and shifting ways – have been
racialised; that is, systems of white dominance have attempted to categorise and define who
they are (Gonzalez-Sobrino and Goss 2019; Ladson-Billings 1998; St Denis 2010). While we
recognise white people are also racialised in that white is a socially constructed category, our
usage of the term implies to be racialised is to be othered, and we follow scholars who
emphasise the unequal power relations involved in racialising processes (e.g., Ladson-
Billings 1998; Razack 1998). The term person of colour is used to acknowledge the work
WHITENESS AND EDUCATION 243
Acknowledgments
Kathy Hogarth, Barbara McNeil, Florence Luhanga, Latoya Reid, Uwakwe Kalu.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada [430-
2018-01135].
ORCID
Amanda Gebhard http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6046-3838
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“It’s Not in Your Head”: Gaslighting, ‘Splaining, Victim Blaming, and Other
Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions
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ASSOCIATION FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
Abstract
Secondary microaggressions refer to the ways in which people of historically dominant groups negate the realities
of people of marginalized groups. Gaslighting describes the act of manipulating others to doubt themselves or
question their own sanity; people confronted for committing microaggressions deny the existence of their biases, often
convincing the targets of microaggressions to question their own perceptions. ‘Splaining (derived from mansplaining/
Whitesplaining) is an act in which a person of a dominant group speaks for or provides rationale to people of
marginalized groups about topics related to oppression or inequity. Victim blaming refers to assigning fault to people
who experience violence or wrongdoing and is used as a tool to discredit people of marginalized groups who speak
out against microaggressions or any injustices. Finally, abandonment and neglect refer to a bystander’s failure to address
or acknowledge microaggressions. Although these terms are commonly known among marginalized communities (and
frequently used in popular media), there is a dearth in academic literature that substantiates these phenomena and
relates them to microaggressions. The purpose of this article is to review these concepts in the psychological literature
and to demonstrate the psychological harm caused by these behaviors on interpersonal and systemic levels.
Keywords
microaggressions, discrimination, racism, mansplaining, Whitesplaining, gaslighting, victim blaming, transphobia
Microaggressions are subtle, nuanced forms of discrimi- focus on concepts such as gaslighting, ‘splaining, victim
nation that are experienced by racial and ethnic minori- blaming, and abandonment and neglect as terms that
ties, women, LGBTQIA+ people, religious minorities, warrant greater attention in academic discourse.
individuals with mental illnesses, and people of other
historically marginalized groups (Torino et al., 2018);
A Brief Overview of Microaggression
the term itself has been used so much that it has been
integrated into our country’s everyday lexicon, even Theory and Research
entering the Merriam Webster dictionary in 2017 (Nadal, Sue et al. (2007) defined microaggressions as “brief and
2018). The commonplace use of the term—fueled by commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, and environ-
the vast amount of research produced on the topic—has mental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional,
increased our understanding of microaggressions and that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial
ability to recognize them. As this awareness grows, so slights and insults to the target person or group”
does the opportunity to confront and disrupt microag- (p. 273). Originally used to describe experiences Black
gressive behavior. However, attempts at exposing
microaggressions can leave targets vulnerable to further
Corresponding Author:
harm. In this article, we explore harmful responses to Veronica E. Johnson, Department of Psychology, John Jay College of
calling attention to microaggressive behavior, which we Criminal Justice, City University of New York
deem secondary microaggressions. We specifically Email: vjohnson@jjay.cuny.edu
Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions 1025
people commonly had when interacting with Whites microaggression resulted from race, gender, both, or
(Pierce, 1970), microaggressions have been linked to some other combination of one’s identity groups).
the experiences of people from various marginalized Despite the cognitive and emotional energy expended
identities such as religious minorities (Nadal et al., by targets in identifying microaggressions (Pitcan et al.,
2010), women (Lewis et al., 2016), queer and trans 2018), studies suggest that marginalized individuals
people (Nadal, 2013; Nadal et al., 2012), and other regularly experience and identify microaggressions;
people of color, including those with intersecting mar- more than 90% of most study samples report having
ginalized identities, such as Black women (Williams & experienced microaggressions on a regular basis
Lewis, 2019). (Barber et al., 2020; Woodford et al., 2014). Therefore,
Microassaults refer to verbal and nonverbal attacks if targets can overcome this ambiguity and identify the
intended to hurt a target through name-calling, avoidant microaggression, they are left to either sit and ruminate
behavior, or purposeful discriminatory actions; micro- on the matter or confront the person. As Sue et al.
insults refer to subtle verbal or nonverbal behavior that (2007) noted, both options can leave targets vulnerable
conveys rudeness, insensitivity, and insulting messages to further harm.
about one’s identity; and microinvalidations include Targets of microaggressions show a pattern of quietly
communications that exclude, negate, or nullify the shouldering the impact of microaggressive behavior out
psychological thoughts, feelings, or experiences of of fear of retaliation from the perpetrator or others
members of marginalized groups (Sue et al., 2007). involved and/or reinforcing negative stereotypes about
Microaggressions are theorized to exist on a continuum their group if they choose to confront the perpetrator
ranging from overt, intentional, and explicit to subtle, (Sue et al., 2008). However, this latter choice comes at
unintentional, and implicit. Unintentional and/or subtle the expense of their own well-being. Targets report
microaggressions are often outside of the awareness of feelings of guilt, embarrassment, shame, regret, and
the perpetrator and/or target. Even when perpetrators remorse after unconfronted microaggressive behavior.
are aware of their intention, they may deny malicious Furthermore, the internalization of these feelings has
intent when confronted. Therefore, all forms of micro- long-lasting effects on the target’s self-confidence, work
aggressions have some degree of invisibility but are far performance, and mental and physical health (Holder
from innocuous. et al., 2015; Lewis et al., 2013).
The extant literature shows that the impact of these If targets choose confrontation, they externalize
microaggressions is anything but micro—as some critics blame for the incident onto the perpetrator, potentially
have misunderstood—and is associated with a number mitigating their own feelings of shame, blame, and guilt.
of adverse physical and psychological consequences. However, they do so at varying levels of risk to them-
Racial and ethnic microaggressions have been associ- selves in other ways. Targets frequently have to circum-
ated with declining physical health, depression, exces- vent fears of being further invalidated or reinforcing
sive substance use, lowered self-esteem, suicide negative stereotypes about their own group (e.g., being
ideation, and somatic complaints (for a review, see seen as an angry Black woman) when confronting
Nadal, 2018). Researchers have also linked microag- microaggressions. Empirical evidence supports this
gressions to trauma-related symptoms in people of notion; targets report that using confrontation opened
color (Moody & Lewis, 2019; Nadal et al., 2020; Torres them up to further microaggressive experiences (e.g.,
& Taknint, 2015). Queer populations appear to suffer being further invalidated, being called “oversensitive”
increased anxiety and stress, decreased self-esteem, and and “paranoid”; Nadal et al., 2013; Sue et al., 2009). As
detrimental therapeutic outcomes as a result of micro- Minikel-Lacocque (2013) noted, it is the aftermath of the
aggressive experiences ( Johnson, 2014; Shelton & original microaggressive act, as opposed to the initial
Delgado-Romero, 2013; Torres & Taknint, 2015). Some microaggression itself, that carries most of the weight.
researchers have also demonstrated that microaggres-
sions targeting trans people are associated with nega- Epistemic injustice and
tive affect, emotional withdrawal, and suicide-related
behaviors (Howe, 2019).
microaggressions
Some scholars have suggested that targets should give
the offender “the benefit of the doubt” in the face of
Responding to microaggressions microaggressive behavior (Haidt, 2017). However, this
As Sue et al. (2007) discussed in their foundational suggestion ignores the harm that often befalls targets
article, recognizing and responding to microaggressions after microaggressive experiences go unadressed (e.g.,
puts the target in a catch-22. The target is first presented internalizing negative emotions such as anger, guilt,
with attributional ambiguity (e.g., questioning if the and shame; Sue et al., 2019; Williams, 2020). On the
1026 Johnson et al.
other hand, active forms of coping (e.g., confrontation) dominant groups (e.g., White people, men, cisgender
may raise levels of anxiety for targets who may fear people) often discount the account of people of mar-
retaliation or backlash in particular settings (e.g., work ginalized groups because they do not experience the
or school; Sue et al., 2019). Still, challenging microag- world in the same way and thereby may not even real-
gressive behavior (e.g., confrontation) may disrupt the ize that discrimination is a typical and salient everyday
internalization of anger and other negative emotions experience for people without power or privilege. In
and increase self-efficacy in the aftermath of microag- this way, people with privilege are like fish in water,
gressive experiences for targets (Brondolo et al., 2009; in that they do not recognize the water until (or unless)
Sue et al., 2019). Further, confronting microaggressions they are removed from it (Brown et al., 2003).
serves as an important intervention in raising awareness On individual levels, testimonial injustice—instances
of microaggressions and reducing perpetration on a in which a person’s credibility is diminished as a result
societal level. However, there are a number of barriers of prejudice, often unknown and unrecognized by the
to disrupting microaggressions. perpetrator—leads to further invalidation and harm of
Epistemic injustice provides a useful framework for targets in the aftermath of microaggressive experiences.
understanding how and why microaggressions are Virtually all qualitative examinations of microaggres-
resistant to disruption both interpersonally and on sys- sions reveal people of color, queer and trans people,
temic levels. Epistemic injustice refers to the tendency and women’s fears of being further invalidated if they
in society to not believe speakers as a result of implic- were to contest microaggressions (Nadal et al., 2013;
itly or explicitly prejudicial thinking (Fricker, 2007). Pitcan et al., 2018; Sue et al., 2009). Further, denial from
Specifically, hermeneutical injustice refers to instances perpetrators is thought to come in various forms, rang-
in which someone’s experiences are not well under- ing from simple denial of intentionality (“I didn’t mean
stood by themselves and/or by others because these it like that!”) to shifting responsibility for the target’s
experiences do not fit any concepts known to them or harm back onto the target (“You’re so sensitive!” or
others. This lack of knowledge is due largely to historic “You’re paranoid”). These reactions become particularly
exclusion of some groups of people from societal activi- dangerous when perpetrators weaponize already widely
ties (e.g., scholarship, journalism) that shape which held negative stereotypes about marginalized groups
concepts become well known. Microaggressions, we against targets (e.g., Black women are angry).
argue, are particularly susceptible to hermeneutical The main purpose of this article is to focus on sec-
injustice because of their subtlety and invisibility to the ondary microaggressions, or harmful reactions to micro-
perpetrator. aggressions that then become microaggressions
On a systemic level, there is perhaps no clearer themselves. We focus specifically on four main con-
example of hermeneutical injustice with regard to cepts: victim blaming, gaslighting, ‘splaining, and aban-
microaggressions than the critiques of the microaggres- donment and neglect. Although these secondary
sions research program (MRP). Critics undermine the microaggressions have been introduced to the Ameri-
MRP by emphasizing the common lack of intentionality can lexicon via mainstream and social media, they have
of the perpetrator, as well as a perceived oversensitivity received minimal attention in academic discourse. Fur-
of the target and subjectivity of the assessment of ther, we situate these terms in our understanding of
microaggressions (for a review, see Torino et al., 2018). hermeneutical and testimonial injustice and provide
“Pure nonsense,” “ridiculous,” and “irrational” have all recommendations for future directions for researchers
described critics’ reactions to microaggression research who hope to further investigate these experiences.
(Sue et al., 2008). In addition, critics routinely attempt
to challenge the legitimacy of microaggression research Statement of Reflexivity and
by offering alternative explanations for microaggressive
experiences ranging from miscommunication to psy-
Theoretical Underpinnings
chopathology of the target. Further, they suggest micro- Before we delve into our proposed model of secondary
aggressions do not occur more often, or amount to microaggressions, it is crucial that we examine how our
more harm, than the everyday hassles or indignities identities and experiences may influence our under-
people of any race, gender, sexual orientation, or reli- standings and personal connections to the topics we
gious affiliation might face (Lukianoff & Haidt, 2015). discuss (Fine, 2013). Authors V. E. Johnson, D. R. G.
However, these criticisms prove to be microaggressions Sissoko, and R. King identity as Black women, and
themselves in that they invalidate and deny the lived author K. L. Nadal identifies as a Brown Asian man;
experiences of marginalized peoples, who are more accordingly, our experiences as people of color inform
likely to recognize microaggressions because they are the ways we understand these concepts both academi-
targets of such experiences. On the contrary, people of cally and personally. In fact, throughout this article we
Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions 1027
offer both empirical evidence and anecdotal examples Blaming the Victim critically analyzed how the dismissal
of how secondary microaggressions may be manifested of racism and the social environment as determinants
to demonstrate what we know from academic literature of racial disparities results in the faulty logic of victim
as well as what we know from our lived experiences. blaming. Since then, the term has been applied to a
Further, we understand that we each have other unique variety of areas and gained particular traction in the
identities that influence our lens. Collectively, we iden- areas of gendered violence and racism (Dressel, 1994;
tify as academics, New Yorkers, able-bodied, and Dukes & Gaither, 2017; Eigenberg & Policastro, 2017;
people with access to education and other economic George & Martínez, 2002; Saucier et al., 2010).
resources; individually, some of us identify as American- In psychological literature, victim blaming is usually
born, immigrants, queer, working class, upwardly mobile, defined as fully or partially blaming people for their
and so forth. Thus, we acknowledge how our multiple misfortunes (Harber et al., 2015). However, victim blam-
identities, individually and collectively, influence our ing can occur on an individual level (e.g., blaming a
framework. woman for getting sexually assaulted) and collective
Relatedly, we center our models through the lens of social identity level (e.g., blaming African American
intersectionality theory, which Crenshaw (1989) initially culture for economic disparities; Mekawi & Todd, 2018;
proposed as a way of understanding how Black women Ryan, 1976). Victim blaming can be conceptualized as
navigate multiple forms of systemic oppression. We a form of testimonial injustice in which the victim’s
understand that, in the context of intersectionality the- credibility may be undermined by preconceived notions
ory, whereas people of one marginalized group are based on negative stereotypes. This process results in
harmed by secondary microaggressions, people of mul- the placement of responsibility about an objectively
tiple marginalized groups (e.g., Black women, LGBTQ negative outcome onto the victim. In the context of
people of color) may encounter secondary microag- hermeneutical injustice, victim blaming may occur
gressions in even more deleterious ways. Further, we when a victim is unable to coherently label or identify
also recognize that people of multiple privileged identi- their experience and the listener is unfamiliar with the
ties (i.e., White cisgender heterosexual men) may com- subject matter (e.g., subtle racism, systemic oppres-
mit microaggressions that could result in increased sion), which may result in blaming victims for their
harm or impact given their compounded privileged interpretation of the interaction.
identities (Collins, 1990; Crenshaw, 1989; Wang, 2012). Victim blaming not only affects individuals but also
has the potential to undermine the credibility of a col-
lective as a whole (e.g., racial minority groups, women,
Forms of Secondary Microaggressions
LGBTQIA+ communities). Popular stereotypes that
When people who commit microaggressions respond result in victim blaming include gender-based violence
in ways that further invalidate or deny the target’s expe- myths (e.g., “If she had not had too much to drink, she
rience of the microaggression, they exacerbate the would not have been raped”; Sleath & Bull, 2012) and
given situation and inflict even more harm on the target. generalizations of behavior based on race (e.g., “Black
In agreement with Sue and colleagues’ (2007) defini- people are more likely to engage in criminal activity”;
tions of microinvalidations, or “communications that Dukes & Gaither, 2017). These stereotypes lead to the
exclude, negate, or nullify the psychological thoughts, diminished credibility of victims, and the overassign-
feelings, or experiential reality” (p. 274), we focus on ment of responsibility for negative outcomes (e.g.,
three types of secondary microaggressions that can be sexual assault, racial disparities) is placed on the victim.
expressed verbally (i.e., victim blaming, gaslighting, People with intersecting marginalized identities are par-
and ‘splaining) and one type of secondary microaggres- ticularly vulnerable to victim blaming (Dotson, 2011;
sion that can be expressed behaviorally (i.e., abandon- Stewart, 2019). For example, stereotypes have rendered
ment and neglect). See Fig. 1 for an example of primary Black women’s social identity as “epistemologically dis-
and secondary microaggressions. advantaged” (p. 245), whereby the audience does not
recognize the victim as a credible source of knowledge
(Dotson, 2011).
Victim blaming
Stewart (2019) argued that affective responses to
The phrase “blaming the victim” was coined by sociolo- victim blaming can lead to a feedback loop, whereby
gist William Ryan in response to the Moynihan report the victim’s display of emotions is used to justify the
(Moynihan, 1965), which posited that racial econo undermining of the victim’s credibility—which may lead
mic disparities—and poverty in Black communities to further victim blaming by reinforcing that the victim
specifically—resulted from the of rise of single-parent is “too emotional” or “too angry.” Furthermore, emo-
households in Black families. Ryan’s (1976) book tions are used to create new stereotypes that affect
1028 Johnson et al.
Primary Microaggression
“Wow, You Are So Well
Spoken!”
Inaction: Ignoring
the Comment Protection: “Thank You.” Avoidance: Leaving the Situation
Secondary Microaggression
Primary/Secondary Perpetrator Bystander Response
Neglect
Victim Blaming
Abandonment
‘Splaining Gaslighting
credibility and result in repeated testimonial injustice In the context of microaggressions, victim blaming
(e.g., the trope of the angry Black woman; Stewart, has already been understood as a primary microaggres-
2019). Dismissing victims’ challenges to oppression sion, or statements/behavior that denigrate or blame
because of their communication style and emotionality people and cultures for disparities (Mekawi & Todd,
has colloquially been referred to as tone policing—and 2018). For example, victim-blaming microaggressions
can lead to hypervigilance and self-policing in targets may include statements implying that Black people
(Davis & Ernst, 2019). Thus, Black women in academia use slavery as an excuse for “their problems,” Latinx
report filtering their communication or self-silencing to Americans would have an easier time finding jobs if
avoid the social cost of being perceived as angry and they learned to speak English, or trans people would
evade being revictimized through victim blaming not face violence if they decided to remain in their
(Corbin et al., 2018; Dotson, 2011). “real” bodies. Although explicit literature on victim
Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions 1029
blaming and microaggressions is scarce, victim blaming as “aggressive” instead of White people being viewed
is an implicit part of existing microaggressions theory. as fragile ( Jones & Norwood, 2016).
For example, the myth-of-meritocracy microaggression
suggests that racism is not a factor in determining socio-
Gaslighting
economic life-course outcomes despite ample evidence
suggesting otherwise (Shapiro et al., 2013). Myth-of- As a secondary microaggression, gaslighting is a par-
meritocracy microaggressions (e.g., “Everyone can suc- ticularly common and harmful type of victim blaming.
ceed in this society if they work hard enough”) implicitly The term gaslighting comes from the 1944 movie Gas-
blame economic racial disparities on individuals as light, in which a husband systematically lies and
opposed to systemic racism, which is consistent with deceives his wife to manipulate her into believing she
Ryan’s findings (1976, p. 276). is going insane and to cover up his misdeeds. Gaslight-
As a secondary microaggression, perpetrators may ing is commonly discussed in popular and social media,
engage in victim blaming in response to being “called and scholarship, in the context of heterosexual roman-
out” for committing a microaggression or in response tic relationships in which women are the victims of the
to a collective uprising challenging broader systemic gaslighting tactics of their male partners. For example,
violence. On an individual level, a microaggression per- Huffington Post published an article entitled “Gaslight-
petrator may respond by blaming the victim after being ing: It’s Really A Thing,” providing a definition and
made aware of the transgression. Given the frequent examples of gaslighting specifically in romantic rela-
unintentional nature of microaggressions, the victim tionships (Rodman, 2017). In academic literature, there
may be painted as overly sensitive or aggressive (e.g., also appears to be a focus on female victims of gaslight-
“You are too sensitive; you don’t have to get that angry ing in various aspects of their personal and professional
about it”). The perpetrator may also double down on lives (Stern, 2007).
a previous microaggression (e.g., “Black people always Scholars in both psychology and sociology have
make everything about race”). Victim blaming has his- argued that the definition of gaslighting can be extended
torically been used as a common tactic to discredit to include a single act or series of acts perpetrated by
oppressed groups and justify violence, oppression, and any person in a position of power designed to manipu-
disparities (Schoellkopf, 2012). For example, the upris- late less powerful others to doubt themselves or ques-
ings following the police killings of Michael Brown in tion their own sanity or memory (Davis & Ernst, 2019;
2014 and George Floyd and Breonna Taylor in 2020 Tobias & Joseph, 2020). Sweet (2019) noted that gas-
triggered widespread national victim blaming against a lighting is embedded in a larger system of social
number of protestors who engaged in property damage inequality and can take place in relationships that are
and looting. These incidents—most accurately described power laden. Gaslighting is used not only to maintain
as secondary macroaggressions—were used to justify or gain power in intimate relationships but also to
escalating police violence against protesters and to uphold power structures of White supremacy, patriar-
question the overall legitimacy of the protests (“After chy, heteronormativity, and transphobia. Therefore,
Curfew,” 2020; Sharma, 2020) while ignoring how sys- gaslighting applies to interactions between cis- and
temic oppression, an overtly racist administration, a transgender people, heterosexual people and LGBTQIA+
serious economic crisis, and a pandemic may have people, and Whites and people of color.
fueled nonpeaceful aspects of the protests. Scholars have discussed how stereotypes can be
Anecdotally, victim blaming has affected all four used to make gaslighting even more effective on mem-
authors in our everyday lives. For instance, authors bers of marginalized groups. Although all gaslighting
D. R. G. Sissoko and R. King, both of whom are Black has the potential to make the target question their
female graduate students, recall incidents in which they reality, Sweet (2019) discussed how gender stereotypes
were challenged or discredited after acknowledging can be wielded to make gaslighting tactics against
racial microaggressions, particularly in classroom set- women particularly harmful. For example, in the 1944
tings. Whenever they pointed out racially biased com- film, the wife is made to believe she is losing her mind.
ments made by their White peers, they were deemed This concept of “losing one’s mind” or “going crazy” is
“bullies,” particularly if and when their White class- built into a larger system of patriarchy in which women
mates became defensive and/or emotional. Although are frequently labeled “crazy” and “hysterical” (Sweet,
they were the targets of the hurtful comments, they 2019), all while also promoting ableist terminology. So
ended up taking blame for their actions. Such dynamics when gaslighting tactics are combined with these ste-
mirror previous scholarship in which White women’s reotypes (e.g., “That’s not what I meant! You’re being
tears are used to oppress Black women (Accapadi, irrational!”) they have the potential to make the target
2007) or how Black people are wrongfully stereotyped internalize societal assumptions about all women.
1030 Johnson et al.
Davis and Ernst (2019) defined racial gaslighting as dominant group speaks for or provides rationale to
“the political, social, economic and cultural process that people of historically marginalized groups (e.g., people
perpetuates and normalizes a white supremacist reality of color, women, LGBTQIA+ people) about topics
through pathologizing those who resist” (p. 763). In related to oppression or inequity. Although these terms
this instance, stereotypes about particular racial and have been commonly used among historically marginal-
ethnic groups are used to make the target and/or others ized communities and social-justice organizations, they
(e.g., bystanders) believe that the target’s reality cannot have also been used in social and popular media. For
be trusted. For example, one may argue that the target example, Achola (2015) described an instance of
is always making things about race, being oversensitive Whitesplaining in The Telegraph, in which actor Matt
or paranoid, or overly focused on the negatives. These Damon attempted to rationalize the lack of diversity in
responses are rooted in larger societal stereotypes Hollywood to Effie Brown, a successful Black woman
about people of color, and specifically Black Americans. producer. Gupta (2018) defined Whitesplaining in The
In a particularly painful experience during graduate Wellesley News as “when white people feel the need to
training, author V. E. Johnson was yelled at on a col- explain problems that are faced by people of color to
laborative library floor for talking while discussing a people of color themselves” (para. 3). Solnit (2012)
group project with a White female peer. The perpetrator described how mansplaining existed at “the intersection
loudly yelled at the first author (but not her White between overconfidence and cluelessness,” whereas
peer), “Some of us are students here trying to study!” Lewis (2014) wrote in New Republic how mansplaining
The implications of this statement were clear to her. transpires when women “have their expertise instantly
Despite being located in a space accessible only to dismissed because of the lady-shaped package it came
students at the college, the perpetrator believed or— in” (para. 3).
wanted to insinuate—that V. E. Johnson could not have Despite the usage of the terms mansplaining and
possibly been a student. The comment likely revealed Whitesplaining in everyday vernacular, there is a dearth
the perpetrator’s own biases about Black people, in that in the academic literature that describes the phenom-
they were unintelligent, loud, and unruly. She con- ena. A search of PsychInfo in June 2020 found that
fronted the perpetrator, “So I’m not a student? Why are there is only one hit that mentions “Whitesplaining”
you singling me out? This is a collaborative floor where and one hit that mentions “mansplaining”; in both
everyone is free to talk.” In response, the perpetrator sources, neither term is the main focus of the publica-
exclaimed, “Oh my God, you’re ridiculous! This is not tion. However, outside of psychology, there has been
about race. You should have more respect for people some academic literature in which scholars have
who are studying!” attempted to provide definitions and conceptualizations
In this example, gaslighting constitutes a form of for both terms. For instance, in examining mansplain-
epistemic injustice and microaggressive behavior. The ing, Deo (2014) shared:
perpetrator’s comment is best classified as a microinsult.
Although the comment was overtly aggressive, the Both inside and outside the workplace, a woman’s
racial undertones (i.e., “You do not belong here”) are ideas, suggestions, or observations may be ignored
subtle in nature. The perpetrator denies that their state- until a man explains (or more frequently, simply
ment was race-based and asserts their own perspective repeats) her thoughts; sometimes the man honestly
as the “right” one. V. E. Johnson, then, not only was a believes himself to be the one full of knowledge
target of microaggressive behavior but also, after con- and ideas, virtually unaware of the woman’s
fronting the perpetrator, was subjected to racial gas- comments before voicing them as his own. (pp.
lighting. The perpetrator uses a racial stereotype of 976–977)
Black people being overly sensitive about race to gas-
light her It is clear that the perpetrator’s intent was to Likewise, Whitesplaining may occur when “White
harm, but the racial undertone of the statement was validation [is given] more weight” than perspectives of
subtle and perhaps unknown to the perpetrator. people of color (Deo, 2014, p. 978) and may be even
Although gaslighting is often discussed as intentional, more complex and detrimental when people hold mul-
we contend that gaslighting as a microaggressive expe- tiple marginalized identities (e.g., women of color,
rience can also be unintentional. LGBTQIA+ people of color). Goldberg (2014) described
‘splaining as “a general process by which a privileged
figure who is nevertheless an outsider ‘splains’ to a
‘Splaining
marginalized insider the nature of the latter’s own expe-
‘Splaining (derived from mansplaining or Whitesplain- rience” (p. 117). In this way, other terms that have been
ing) is an act in which a person of a historically used for this phenomenon include straightsplaining,
Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions 1031
heterosplaining, cissplaining, thinsplaining, and many microinvalidation in that he negates her reality as Black
others. The common thread is that the person in privi- woman producer in Hollywood. The White student
lege (e.g., straight/heterosexual person, cisgender per- in the classroom example is Whitesplaining to the
son, or thin person) asserts their opinion about the Black student, who was not given the opportunity to
marginalized group (e.g, queer person, transgender speak for herself or share her own reality or lived
or genderqueer person, or fat person) as factual or experience.
absolute. When a person with power and privilege ‘splains and
‘Splaining is related to epistemic injustice because takes credit for something that a person of a historically
perpetrators are unaware of the ways in which they marginalized group has said or written before or
enact their power and privilege over persons with mar- silences the input of marginalized individuals or groups,
ginalized identities. To lack the knowledge or under- their actions and statements may potentially be viewed
standing of one’s own identities is, in itself, a privilege. as microassaults or a microinsults. One example may
For example, when a White man Whitesplains or mans- be a case in which a White person in an academic set-
plains, he is oblivious of his identities and the impact ting or workplace interrupts, speaks over, or speaks for
of his words, likely because of a lack of consequences people of color in discussions of racial discrimination.
in the past or present. Meanwhile, when a woman of This behavior might serve to distance the perpetrator
color speaks on any topic, she may be hyperconscious from the perspectives and contributions of people of
of her word choice, her tone, her volume, and the man- color (i.e., avoidant behavior as a feature of some
ner in which she communicates her message because microassaults). In this same example, the ‘splaining may
she has suffered direct or indirect consequences of serve to establish the perpetrator as the authority in
having her opinions misinterpreted or pathologized. the subject matter and diminish the validity of the
Thus, women of color (and people of other marginal- contributions of people of color in the discussion
ized groups) navigate multiple oppressive dynamics (i.e., microinsult).
and environments, which may result in disparate psy- In some instances of ‘splaining, the perpetrator’s
chological and emotional labor that is not encountered actions demonstrate a belief in the superiority (i.e.,
by people with privileged identities. more important or valid, logical, well articulated) of
Although ‘splaining has not been explicitly tied to their opinions or perspectives are than the person or
microaggressions, the concept has existed in previous people of the historically marginalized group(s). In
microaggression literature. Sue and colleagues (2009) other words, they believe (on a conscious or subcon-
discussed an incident which a Black woman was asked scious level) that what they are sharing is more impor-
a question in a classroom: tant, more valid, more logical, or more well-articulated
than what the original speaker said. To this point, previ-
I started to explain, and the White girl said, “well, ous research has found that White people and men tend
what she means is”—and she tried to talk for me. to speak more in groups, even on topics in which they
That I don’t know what I’m talking about. I can’t may not be experts (Sue, 2004). Such behavior is often
even articulate my own, my own idea. And I had learned through their socialization from being members
to tell her, I can speak for myself, I can articulate of privileged groups; some studies have found that boys
my idea better than you can, you know? And learn this behavior, in part, because of teacher bias in
only—I could not believe that she tried to speak the classroom (Beaman et al., 2006). Further, because
for me. (p. 186) White people are taught implicitly and explicitly to
never think about their Whiteness (Sue, 2004), they may
Further, utilizing Sue and colleagues’ (2007) original continue to speak their opinions without understanding
taxonomy on racial microaggressions, it is evident that racial dynamics or the damaging consequences of their
‘splaining could be considered a form of microinvalida- actions. Regardless of perpetrator awareness, ‘splaining
tion. The individual with power or privilege is negating can be insulting and harmful to historically marginal-
the perspective, reality, and lived experience of a per- ized people (e.g., your opinion or voice is not valu-
son of a historically marginalized group. By asserting able)—which may then be internalized by the target
their opinion—which may or may not be accurate— and result in an array of negative psychological out-
they fail to allow the historically marginalized person comes, such as depression, anger, anxiety, or trauma.
to speak for themselves. They also use their privileged Author K. L. Nadal cited how he regularly encounters
voice to silence or drown out the perspectives of the ‘splaining in his career. Although he is recognized as
historically marginalized person. Matt Damon’s afore- one of the leading researchers in microaggression the-
mentioned behavior toward Effie Brown could be ory and has published extensively on the topic, he is
described as both a Whitesplaining or mansplaining frequently met with strangers (mostly older White men)
1032 Johnson et al.
who challenge his work and offer alternate explanations because they have the potential to disrupt experiences
to the theory. When he cites dozens of empirical studies of bias, reduce their escalation, and mitigate the harm
(which cumulatively comprise thousands of research that can be incurred by these experiences to the target
participants who have acknowledged the existence and other bystanders (Nelson et al., 2011). Czopp and
and harmful impact of microaggressions), his chal- Monteith (2003) found that bystander action with
lengers remain unmoved and insist their perspectives regard to racism was particularly powerful when the
are correct, without ever having conducted any research bystander was White as opposed to a person of color.
on the topic themselves. In such experiences, it is evi- Researchers found that White bystanders were more
dent that the challengers are unable to acknowledge successful than bystanders of the target’s same racial
the validity of microaggressions because of a lack of group in taking antiracist action because racial/ethnic
lived experience with racial ine quity and a lack of minority bystanders were more likely to be seen
cultural humility for people who navigate racism in as overreacting (i.e., secondary microaggression)
their everyday lives. The inability to acknowledge or and thus were less effective in inducing guilt or self-
understand racial microaggressions is particularly an criticism in perpetrators.
issue for White Americans, who have difficulty in Bystanders encounter a number of barriers to
acknowledging the salience of race in society and action, including the bystander’s own prejudicial
who often refuse to believe or accept the privilege thinking, need and/or desire to maintain relationships
that their race affords them (Sue et al., 2007). with perpetrators, and perceived risk of personal
It is important to make the distinction between using harm by the perpetrator (Stewart et al., 2011). There-
one’s privileged voice and crossing over into overt rac- fore, bystanders often miss or take no issue with the
ism, transphobia, sexism, and so forth. When Jennifer behavior of the perpetrator, and when they do, they
Schulte (known as “Barbecue Becky”) called the police still do not act (Nelson et al., 2011). Targets are then
when a Black family was barbecuing at a public park left without support. No more recognizable quote can
in Oakland in 2017 (Henderson & Jefferson-Jones, be used to describe this experience for targets than
2019) or when Amy Cooper called the police on Chris this one from Martin Luther King, Jr.: “In the end, we
Cooper (a Black man) in Central Park in 2020, falsely will remember not the words of our enemies, but the
accusing the Black man of assault, both perpetrators silence of our friends” (1967/2011). Targets of micro-
used their racial privilege to weaponize racial stereo- aggressions not only have to contend with the harm
types of the dangerousness and criminality of Black done to them by perpetrators but also are often left
people (via psychological and physical harm to Black to wonder others noticed the microaggression as well.
people by members of law enforcement). Such behavior If the bystander fails to notice the microaggression,
would not be viewed as microaggressive but rather as targets may ask themselves, “Why not?” If the bystander
an overt act of racism. did notice the microaggression, “Why did they not
speak up?” Perhaps adding insult to injury, a bystander
may offer support to the target in private, admitting
Abandonment and neglect
that they noticed the microaggression but subtly sug-
Sue et al. (2019) defined allies as “individuals who gesting the risk for them was too great to offer public
belong to dominant social groups (e.g., Whites, males, support.
heterosexuals) but actively work toward the eradication Imagine a scenario in which two friends, one trans-
of prejudicial practices they witness in both their woman and one cisgender female, are on a crowded
personal and professional lives” (p. 132). However, train. The transwoman accidentally bumps into a cis-
research suggests targets often receive no support from gender woman, who in retaliation calls her a “tranny.”
bystanders—whether they have claimed to be or have The trans slur is delivered by the stranger; however,
been previously regarded as allies or not (Nelson et al., the target finds herself more preoccupied with the inac-
2011). In the context of microaggression theory, we tion of her friend than the slur itself. The inaction of
define abandonment as the bystander failure to act on the cisgender female friend can be described as aban-
behalf of a target of microaggressions despite having donment, whereas neglect refers to the failure to act
noticed the transgression. Microaggressive neglect refers on behalf of a target because there was a failure to
to the failure to act on behalf of a target because of a recognize that a microassault took place. Consider a
failure to recognize that a microaggression took place. less overt experience in which the same pair attend a
The concepts of abandonment and neglect have not party together. The transwoman notices that many of
been explicitly explored in the larger taxonomy of the partygoers do not make eye contact with her, have
microaggressions. their bodies turned away from her, and do not directly
Researchers on antibias bystander behavior have respond to any of her input during group conversations.
argued that these actions are incredibly important At the end of the evening, after the transwoman attempts
Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions 1033
to bring these incidents to their friend’s awareness, the health, trauma, self-efficacy, and other variables. Fur-
transwoman is left to question how her friend could ther research can also examine the process in which
have missed these events that she saw as clear instances people confront or address secondary microaggres-
of social exclusion. sions, particularly understanding how power and inter-
sectional identities may influence decisions and actions.
Future Directions in Microaggression For instance, Brondolo et al. (2009) concluded that
many people face discrimination but may not actively
Research and Training confront perpetrators (even when they want to or
The expansion of microaggression theory has enhanced intend to). Both qualitative and experimental studies
people’s ability to identify microaggressive experiences can be used to understand the decision to confront
in their everyday lives. Along with growth in under- versus not, as well as the impact of that decision.
standing comes room to confront these experiences. At Training and awareness efficacy about microaggres-
the same time, further harm can come to individuals sions can be increased by (a) expanding microaggression
who attempt to confront perpetrators of microaggres- research and awareness to include secondary microag-
sions. Victim blaming, gaslighting, ‘splaining, abandon- gressions, including gaslighting, victim blaming, ‘splain-
ment, and neglect are all secondary microaggressions ing, and microaggressive abandonment and neglect;
that can be additionally harmful or revictimizing to (b) educating all people as potential perpetrators of
targets of microaggressions. Just as Sue and colleagues microaggressions that a failure to respond proactively
(2019) suggested that there is room for intervention, (i.e., not catching and addressing one’s own microag-
we suggest there is also room for additional injury. gressive behavior or relying on the target to bring up the
Table 1 includes definitions and examples of victim microaggression) and inappropriately responding (e.g.,
blaming, gaslighting, ‘splaining, and abandonment and anger, retaliation) to confrontation from targets after per-
neglect. This list is designed as a starting point, not an petrating a microaggression often leaves targets silenced,
exhaustive list, of the reactions that can occur when inflicts additional harm, and further perpetuates systems
confronting microaggressions. of oppression; and (c) emphasizing the responsibility of
To fully understand secondary microaggressions, those who hold privileged identities to reduce, take
researchers should focus on understanding the fre- responsibility for, and mitigate harm done by microag-
quency of these incidents and their impact on targets, gressions, including bystander action and deemphasizing
perpetrators, and bystanders. In this way, quantitative the responsibility of those who hold marginalized identi-
research could be used to develop measures of the ties to bear these burdens.
secondary microaggressions proposed in this article— To increase hermeneutical and testimonial justice,
which could help measure the impact of such experi- targets cannot be solely responsible for confronting
ences on a spectrum of outcomes, including mental microaggressive behavior and coping with its impact.
1034 Johnson et al.
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The Black seventies (pp. 265–282). Porter Sargent. & Mendez, N. (2019). Disarming racial microaggressions:
Pitcan, M., Park-Taylor, J., & Hayslett, J. (2018). Black men Microintervention strategies for targets, White allies,
and racial microaggressions at work. The Career Develop and bystanders. American Psychologist, 74(1), 128–142.
ment Quarterly, 66(4), 300–314. https://doi.org/10.1002/ https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000296
cdq.12152 Sue, D. W., Capodilupo, C. M., & Holder, A. M. B. (2008).
Rodman, A. (2017, November 4). Gaslighting: It’s really a Racial microaggressions in the life experience of Black
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(2010). Effects of racism on perceptions and punish- Racial microaggressions in everyday life: Implications for
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Schoellkopf, J. C. (2012). Victim-blaming: A new term for Rivera, D. P. (2009). Racial microaggressions and difficult
an old trend. Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Queer dialogues on race in the classroom. Cultural Diversity and
Center. http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/glbtc/33 Ethnic Minority Psychology, 15(2), 183–190. https://doi
Shapiro, T., Meschede, T., & Osoro, S. (2013). The roots of .org/10.1037/a0014191
the widening racial wealth gap: Explaining the Black- Sweet, P. (2019). The sociology of gaslighting. American
White economic divide. Minority Health and Health Equity Sociological Review, 84(5), 851–875. https://doi.org/
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Sharma, P. (2020, June 4). Vandalism dents credibility of Tobias, H., & Joseph, A. (2020). Sustaining systemic racism
Black Lives Matter movement in US. Wio News. https:// through psychological gaslighting: Denials of racial profil-
www.wionews.com/world/vandalism-dents-credibility- ing and justifications of carding by police utilizing local
of-black-lives-matter-movement-in-us-303388 news media. Race and Justice, 10(4), 424–455. https://
Shelton, K., & Delgado-Romero, E. A. (2013). Sexual orienta- doi.org/10.1177/2153368718760969
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bisexual, and queer clients in psychotherapy. Psychology & Sue, D. W. (2018). Microaggression theory: Influence
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a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history: Although the relationship between an individual’s racist attitudes and discriminatory
Received 20 May 2013 behaviours has been widely studied, the association between racist attitudes among perpe-
Revised 11 February 2014 trators and experiences of racism among targets has been under-examined. Based on data
Accepted 1 May 2014
from the 2001–8 Australian Challenging Racism Project survey, this paper details a novel
Available online 9 May 2014
method to investigate the link between racist attitudes and experiences of discrimination
utilising two separate models linked by nomination of cultural or ethnic groups who do not
Keywords:
fit into Australian society (i.e., out-groups). Those identified as out-groups were more likely
Racist attitudes
Prejudice
to report experiences of discrimination than those who were not nominated as out-groups.
Discrimination Overall, out-group nomination by those with racist attitudes strongly predict experiences
Self-report of discrimination among these same target out-groups, OR = 2.2, F(6, 12,348) = 78.61,
Methods p < .001. Racist attitudes are related to racist behaviours among perpetrators that are, in
Australia turn, related to experiences of racial discrimination among targets. This study demon-
strates that attitudes not only affect majority group behaviour but also drive the resulting
experiences of discrimination for minority group members.
! 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Racism can be defined as the underlying beliefs, ideologies, behaviours and practices that result in inequalities between
racial, ethnic and cultural groups, while racial discrimination refers specifically to the behaviours and practices resulting in
unfair inequalities (Paradies et al., 2009). The beliefs that underlie racist attitudes are constituted from group-focused antip-
athies (e.g., so-called Islamophobia), preferences for cultural homogeneity, false beliefs and stereotypes as well as convic-
tions regarding racial or cultural hierarchies. The latter would include racial supremacism, which has a hold on a
decreasing proportion of the population in countries like Australia (Dunn et al., 2004), but which may be associated with
more overt behaviours – i.e. with more racist acts and experiences. It may also be the case that this belief would result in
a higher level of racism against some groups compared to others. For example, racism would be more prevalent against those
who are more visibly distinct from culturally privileged groups. A more popular attitude in Australia is insecurity with
cultural diversity (Dunn et al., 2004) but it may be less likely to impact target groups. However, this and other forms of
⇑ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: yin.paradies@deakin.edu.au (Y.C. Paradies).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2014.05.002
0049-089X/! 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191 179
Table 1
Attitudes towards other racial/ethnic groups among Australians based on the 2001–8 CRP survey.
Response categories recoded as: Disagree = Strongly disagree + Disagree/Agree = Strongly agree + Agree/and Indifferent = Neither agree nor disagree. The
sample size range is 12,054–12,413.
‘new racism’ attitudes could have a particular impact upon members of groups seen as not fitting into majority group
cultures. The beliefs underlying racist attitudes may therefore convert unevenly into racist behaviours and the resulting
experiences of racial discrimination (EOD).1
To date, numerous studies have examined either perpetrators or targets of racism in isolation, while relatively few have
investigated both in conjunction (McConahay, 1983; Dovidio et al., 1996; Dovidio et al., 2002; Flynn, 2005; Gaertner et al.,
2005). In fact, to our knowledge, no attempt to quantify the association between attitudes and target reported experiences
has been published in the literature. There is, however, an extensive body of evidence investigating the association between
the racist attitudes of majority group members and their racist behaviours. For example, in two European studies, Pereira
et al. (2010) found that prejudice is positively related to discriminatory behaviours while Kauff and Wagner (2012) showed
that pro-diversity beliefs are negatively related to discriminatory behaviours.
Talaska et al. (2008) analysed 57 studies to find ‘a moderate relationship between overall attitudes and discrimination,’
further observing the presence of heterogeneity between attitudes and behaviour. We, therefore, might similarly expect the
relationship between attitudes/behaviours and target EOD to vary across specific beliefs about ethnic relations, race and
diversity.
In this paper, we detail a novel examination of the association between perpetrator attitudes (as a proxy of perpetrator
behaviour) and target EOD. We also report on the influence of various racist beliefs on the propensity of specific groups to
experience racism. Section 2 below presents the study methods while Section 3 details the results and Section 4 concludes
with implications and future directions.
2. Methods
2.1. Data
We analyse the relation between self-reported racist attitudes and EOD drawing from the Australian 2001–8 Challenging
Racism Project (CRP) survey data. This project was initiated by Professors Kevin Dunn and Jim Forest to understand the
extent and nature of race-related attitudes in Australia. The project received funding from multiple sources including Aus-
tralian Research Council, Victorian Health Promotion Foundation and Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC). It has
been successful in disseminating information about the prevalence of racism and intolerance in Australia and has had a sig-
nificant influence on policy and practice to combat racism through engagement with local communities and various levels of
government.
The collection of the CRP survey data began in 2001 in the states of New South Wales and Queensland where 5056
respondents completed a questionnaire (Dunn and Nelson, 2011; Challenging Racism Project, 2012). This survey was
repeated in Victoria in 2006 with 4016 respondents. Other states which participated in the CRP in subsequent years included
South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory in 2007 (n = 1484 and n = 454, respectively), as well as the Northern
Territory, Tasmania and the city of Perth in 2008 (n = 300, n = 351 and n = 851, respectively). All of these surveys included
questions about attitudes towards cultural diversity and racism, utilising probability-based random telephone sampling
techniques that allowed a representative sample of each relevant state or territory. These findings were then consolidated
into a single dataset (n = 12,512).
The CRP questionnaires asked the Australian respondents about their attitudes toward: cultural diversity, assimilation,
Anglo-privilege, racial equality, racial hierarchy, acknowledgement of racism, self-declared prejudice and nomination of
1
Throughout the paper we use the abbreviation EOD to refer to experiences of racial discrimination.
180 A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191
Table 2
Self-Reported experiences of discrimination among Australians based on the 2001–8 Challenging Racism
Project survey.
Stem question: ‘How often have YOU experienced discrimination because of your OWN ETHNIC ORIGIN in
the following situations?’ Response categories recoded as: No = Never + Hardly ever and Yes = Some-
times + Often + Very often. The sample size range is (12,160, 12,486).
cultural or ethnic groups that do not fit into Australian society (i.e., out-groups). In this paper, we focus on nine attitude vari-
ables available across these datasets, each question has a 5-item Likert scale response set (see Table 1).2
Table 1 shows the attitudes of Australians towards diversity. Although only 6.1% disagree that multiculturalism is good
compared to 88% who agree, 42.2% believe peoples’ maintenance of racial/ethnic distinctiveness weakens Australia com-
pared to 43.1% who do not.
In addition, these datasets have another six questions, each with 5-item ordinal scale measuring EOD. These questions
involve EOD in the workplace, schools, housing markets, shops and restaurants, policing, and sporting events (see Table 2).
Reported experiences vary from as low as 3.5% (in renting/buying house) to as high as 10.1% (in schools). Discrimination
tends to be more pronounced in educational settings, at sporting events, in the labour market and in shopping and restau-
rants. Out of the total sample (n = 12,512), 54.8% of those born overseas (n = 1757) reported EOD compared to 21.9% of those
born in Australia (n = 2036). Other studies utilising the CRP data have found similar results, although at the state level (Dunn
et al., 2005, 2010).
In addition to the variables in Tables 1 and 2, the CRP data also includes demographic characteristics such as age, sex,
educational attainment and geographic location that are utilised as controls in analyses detailed below. For simplicity, we
treat response items indicating the respondent does not know, ‘is not sure’ or ‘refuses to give an answer’ as missing values
(0–4% across all variables). Instead of the dichotomous dummy variables mentioned earlier, we construct another dependent
variable – EOD – with a 5-item ordinal scale response. We aggregate the responses from the five ‘frequency of discrimination’
variables to create this variable (a = 0.79, mean = 1.22 and SD = 0.67) by selecting the highest discrimination experience
reported across the five questions. For instance, assume one of the CRP participants gave the following responses to each
EOD item (with responses coded between 0 and 4):
Frequency experienced discrimination because of race/ethnicity:
Then this person has experienced the highest level of discrimination in school relative to the other settings. Thus, the
value assigned to this respondent is ‘4’ (high level of discrimination). Applying the same procedure for the whole sample
with available data (n = 12,505), the distribution of the aggregate EOD is never (65.1%), hardly ever (12.6%), sometimes
(14.3%), often (4.6%) and very often (3.4%).
Our method could be biased upward if the frequency of responses were high (e.g. a score of 3 or 4) in only one setting
while zero in all other settings. As sensitivity checks, we examined two alternative methods. First, we added up responses
in each setting to generate an aggregate value ranging 0–24. Then we re-assigned the scale as 0 ‘never’, 1–6 ‘hardly ever’, 7–
12 ‘sometimes’, 13–18 ‘often’, and 19–24 ‘very often’. The result is significantly different with only 5.7% of the whole sample
self-reporting EOD at a more often than ‘hardly ever’ rather than 22.3% using the method above. In addition, 10.8% of the
minority sample self-reported EOD instead of 35.8% using the highest level of discrimination method. Second, we re-esti-
mated our models using domain counts for the six discrimination variables instead of the aggregate values. This method,
with values ranging between 0 and 6, generated frequencies of EOD between the highest prevalence method and aggregate
method, i.e. 15.1% reported EOD in at least one domain.
2
The response categories for the Likert-type responses are coded on a scale of 1–5 ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree.
A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191 181
Although, the reported frequencies varied depending on which method is used to construct the EOD variable, this had
little impact on multivariate associations. For example, the effect of re-scaling on the results is minimal with a difference
in the correlation coefficient (see Sections 3 and 4 below) of just 0.04. Similarly, using the domain count approach, we
obtained (ordered logit/Poisson) regression outcomes that are comparable to those reported in this paper. In fact, as we trea-
ted missing values in these alternative estimations as zeroes, our estimation is conservative with lower bound coefficient
estimates. In general, these findings suggest that the discrimination variable is robust to alternative scaling.3
As an initial step in the analysis, we calculated correlations between racist attitudes and EOD. We first computed the
average racist attitudes among Australian-born respondents who nominate a specific out-group for each of the nine racist
attitude variables. For instance, the percentage of anti-diversity attitudes (one of the nine attitude variables) among those
who nominate Middle Easterners as an out-group is 16.5%. In general, the average nomination rate of Middle Easterners
as out-group is 36.2%, indicating that Australian-born respondents who nominate Middle Easterners as an out-group hold,
on average, more racist attitudes than other respondents. Following a similar procedure, corresponding values are then
assigned to each member of the nominated out-group. For example, we assign each respondent identifying as Middle Eastern
a value of 0.362. Thus, the average value for racist attitudes is serving as a weight variable assigned to target group mem-
bership. In this way we can create a categorical variable ‘anti-out-group specific racist attitudes’. Since members of the same
group are assigned the same value, they can be considered as one category. There are thirteen minority groups we assess in
this analysis, each assigned unique value as described above, after excluding some groups due to sample size and geographic
contiguity.4 The result is a racist attitude variable with thirteen categories indicating out-group specific racist attitudes. We
assess the strength of the relationship between these attitudes and self-reported EOD in the multivariate analyses.
We have already derived the self-reported EOD variable, reflecting the prevalence of the highest EOD as reported by CRP
respondents (see Section 2.1). Since we now have one individual level variable (i.e., self-reported EOD) along with another
variable assigned to each minority respondent based on group membership (i.e., members of minority groups nominated as
out-groups), we can estimate the correlation between self-reported EOD and anti-out-group racist attitudes as shown in
Section 3.2.
We developed several multivariate models to understand what factors influence the relationship between racist attitude
and EOD. As the variables were generally ordinal, most of the analysis involved ordered logistic regression. However, we also
utilised binary logistic regression when the dependent variables were dichotomous.
where yj is the outcome measure, and i is the category which yj can take (for EOD i takes ‘never’, ‘hardly ever’, ‘sometimes’,
‘often’ and ‘very often’). There are k amounts of the explanatory variables xj; and ki is the cut-point indexed in the range (1, i).
The model estimated using the ordered logistic regression gives a linear relationship such as:
y&j ¼ bxj þ uj ð2Þ
where the measured yj estimates the unobserved latent variable (y&j ) which is continuous and can take values between ($1,
+1). Since the distance between the ordinal values (e.g. between EOD values ‘sometimes’ and ‘often’) cannot be determined
in the datasets, the cut-points estimated with maximum likelihood estimation (ML) are utilised as thresholds in predicting
the probabilistic weights. This is due to the presence of the unobserved error term that is assumed to be randomly and logis-
tically distributed.5 Given this assumption is satisfied, the probability that the outcome variable takes a certain category can be
calculated from the ordinal regression estimated with ML procedure. Coefficients are interpreted as logit estimates. If the esti-
mate is positive, then increasing the value of the predictor increases the likelihood of the outcome variable taking the highest
category while decreasing the likelihood of it taking the lowest category. The reverse is the case with regard to negative
estimates. In our case, self-reported EOD was the response variable with possible outcomes (i) of ‘never’ to ‘very often’. Then
the probability that the person responds with outcome i is given by:
3
The results of the alternative estimations can be provided upon request from the Authors.
4
Two group categories ‘Muslims’ and ‘Balkans’ are excluded from further analyses because the former are not geographically limited to a certain region
category and the later are part of South Europeans in the U.N. regional classification. Jews, East Africans and Rest of Africans are excluded in the final analysis
because their sample size is far smaller than other groups.
5
The logistic distribution evaluated at the z value is given by the cumulative frequency distribution F(z) = ez/(1 + ez).
182 A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191
PrðDiscrimj ¼ iÞ ¼ Prðki$1 < b1 Racist$ attitudej þ b2 Agej þ b3 Genderj þ b3 Educationj þ b3 Birth$ country$ groupj
þ b3 Aus$ Fatherj þ b3 Aus$ Motherj þ b3 Regionj þ b3 Statej þ u 6 ki :Þ ð3Þ
The independent variable of interest in this multivariate ordered logit model is the prevalence of racist attitudes composite
variable represented by the nine attitude variables that are each included in separate regression models along with co-vari-
ates and the dependent variable. Each attitude variable was recoded dichotomously taking a value of ‘0’ if the respondent
agreed/strongly agreed with items listed in Table 1 and ‘1’ if they disagreed/strongly disagreed with these items. The prob-
ability outcomes can be predicted from the model using the logit estimates and the cut-points as follows:
Prðki < Discrimj þ uj < kiþ1 Þ ¼ 1=ð1 þ eDiscrimj $kiþ1 Þ $ 1=ð1 þ eDiscrimj $ki Þ 8i ¼ ½1 $ 4( ð6Þ
Eqs. (4) and (5) are used to calculate the probability that the response variable takes the lowest and highest level categories
respectively, while Eq. (6) is used to calculate the remaining categories.
2.3.2. Two-stage estimation strategy for the association between racist attitudes and self-reported EOD
The main challenge in measuring the association between racist attitudes and self-reported EOD is attributing the atti-
tudes to perpetrators and the experiences to targets. Such attribution is confounded by individual level data. It is method-
ologically inaccurate to measure the two variables (i.e., attitudes and experiences) in a single model because these two
variables are not mutually exclusive. This is the case because one cannot attribute the racist attitudes in the CRP data solely
to perpetrators and experiences solely to targets. Anyone can potentially be a perpetrator or target of racist behaviour,
regardless of their racial or ethnic background (Sawrikar and Katz, 2010). Thus, we effectively have two different samples
to construct: the first sample consisting only of perpetrators and the second sample consisting only of targets.
We conjecture that the confounding in the attitude and experiences variables can be corrected by introducing an estima-
tion strategy that first examines perpetrators in relation to their targets, with these results then used to estimate another
model involving only targets. Since we are analysing perpetrators of racist attitudes in the first stage, we restrict the sample
to Anglo-Australians. Clearly, non-Anglo-Australians can also perpetrate racism, but in this study we are primarily interested
in the attitudes of the majority group. Furthermore, we are not suggesting that all Anglo-Australians perpetrate racism but
simply that majority groups are usually in a better position (i.e., generally have more social power) to do so (Manglitz, 2003;
Hill, 2011). Since there is no comprehensive ancestry variable in the CRP data, we restricted our sample to the closest proxy
for ethnicity available (i.e., country/region of birth), including respondents born in Australia (n = 9311) as a surrogate for
Anglo-Australians. Clearly, this group includes many non-Anglo Australians, but arguably, nativity is another form of major-
ity group membership which, to some extent, allows members more opportunity to perpetrate racism.
The estimation strategy we followed is illustrated in Fig. 1. As can be seen in the diagram, the first stage is to measure the
association between respondents nominating specific out-groups6 and their race-related attitudes (denoted by Model A). In
the next stage, we create a proxy categorical variable for those nominated as out-groups by mapping them against their respec-
tive ‘region of birth’. At this stage we can use the ‘nominated out-groups’ categorical variable as regressor in the discrimination
model. With exposure to racial discrimination as the dependent variable, we estimate the marginal effect of being nominated as
out-group on self-reported EOD in this model, denoted by Model B. Whereas ‘A’ measures the racist attitudes expressed against
specific target groups, ‘B’ measures the EOD reported by these target groups. If both set of models, ‘A’ and ‘B’, are statistically
significant with the expected signs of coefficients, then this establishes evidence of the relationship between the racist attitudes
of perpetrators and self-reported EOD by targets. Significance in the first set of models (model A) suggests that the racist atti-
tudes relate to specific groups. Similarly, significance in the second model (model B) shows that groups who are the focus of
racist attitudes report more EOD. These two models are linked by the nominated out-groups which are used to denote the tar-
gets of discrimination.
3. Results
Descriptive statistics of the variables utilised in the model for the CRP data are reported in Table 3. In terms of gender, the
data are slightly skewed with females accounting for more than half (59%) of the respondents. The average age is 48.9 years,
varying between 18 and 97 years. Almost 27% have a university degree or more, but more than 50% have at most a high
school certificate. More than 61% of the respondents are from Australian capitals with more than 58% of them residing in
New South Wales or Victoria. Almost 40% have a father or mother born overseas, or both.
6
As determined by answers to the question: ‘which cultural or ethnic groups do you believe do NOT fit into Australian society?’
A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191 183
By Perpetrators By Targets
DV IV DV
Model A Model B
Nominated Self-Reported
Racist Attitudes Out-Groups EOD
Perpetrators Targets
Fig. 1. A two-stage estimation strategy for the association between racist attitudes and self-reported EOD (DV: dependent variable; IV: independent
variable; Model A: X; Model B: Y.).
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of the respondents in 2001–8 CRP datasets.
Variable Percent
a
Age in years (mean, n = 10,880) 50.3
Gender (female) 59.0
Highest education (n = 12,435)
University degree or higher 27.6
Other tertiary qualifications 8.6
Trade or TAFE qualifications 12.0
Higher school certificate or equivalent 20.4
School certificate or equivalent 23.6
No formal qualifications 7.8
Region (Capital city residency) 61.4
State
Australian capital territory 3.1
New South Wales 26.3
Queensland 14.7
Northern territory 2.4
Perth 6.8
South Australia 11.9
Victoria 32.1
Tasmania 2.8
Father’s Ancestry not Australianb 42.3
Mother’s Ancestry not Australianb 40.4
Observations(n) 12,512
a
Age details for 1516 respondents not given, the rest are missing values. Mean value is
weighted.
b
Ancestry questions were not asked to NSW and OLD respondents.
Table 4 below reports the degree of association between out-group identification and self-reported EOD based on estima-
tion strategy explained in Section 2.2. The setting-specific correlation between exposure and racist attitudes (out-group
specific racist attitudes) ranges between 0.13 and 0.20 (p < 0.05). The strength of the correlation is higher for the aggregate
EOD variable, r = 0.19 (p < 0.05). This indicates that there is some association between the membership of a person in an
‘out-group’ (as nominated by racist respondents) and the self-reporting of EOD. However, this is a crude estimate because
the method used involved several steps in deriving the individual level variable of the anti-out-group attitude. As such,
we explore a more sophisticated approach using our two-stage in the next sub-section (Section 3.3).
Table 4
Correlation between Racist Attitudes and Self-reported EOD.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Out-group specific racist attitudes 1
EOD (Aggregate) 0.19* 1
EOD (Workplace) 0.14* 0.69* 1
EOD (education) 0.13* 0.66* 0.38* 1
EOD (real estate) 0.17* 0.47* 0.40* 0.38* 1
EOD (policing) 0.14* 0.46* 0.38* 0.37* 0.46* 1
EOD (shops/restaurant) 0.20* 0.60* 0.41* 0.40* 0.46* 0.41* 1
EOD (sporting events) 0.16* 0.61* 0.46* 0.39* 0.44* 0.44* 0.47* 1
covariates to capture the association between self-reported EOD and racist attitudes. Our first model begins with just one
attitude variable. In the second and third models, demographic characteristics (age, gender and educational attainment)
and region/state dummy variables (to control for geographic variation in the sample) are included. Finally, the fourth model
is estimated by including ancestry variables (respondent birth country/region as well as father’s and mother’s ancestry). We
follow this procedure for each of the nine attitude variables, amassing a total of 36 regression models. The results are
reported in Table 5 which presents odds ratios comparing the likelihood of observing each category of the response variable
(EOD) given different explanatory variables in each model. For simplicity, we have collapsed the 5-item Likert scale response
options of the racist attitudes (i.e., the independent variable) into two where ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘disagree’ are coded as
‘disagree’, while ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ are coded as ‘agree’. We have excluded ‘neither agree nor disagree’ responses,
ranging between 4% and 15% across the nine variables. In only one variable (‘sense of insecurity when among ethnic others’)
do these ‘neutral’ responses (10.5%) exceed the ‘racist’ responses (9.2%).
The results in Table 5 indicate that nearly all the models we estimated are statistically significant. Only four regression
models generate non-significant results. However, once we include more control variables, even these become statistically
significant. The last two columns (column ‘3’ and ‘4’) suggest that including the geographic and ancestry controls improves
the estimation significantly as can be seen from the large increase in F-statistics, in moving from model ‘2’ to model ‘3’. The
‘state’ dummy variable is statistically insignificant and is therefore dropped in the fourth model.
The odds ratios7 indicate mixed evidence in predicting the effect of racist attitudes on self-reported EOD. There is significant
variation in the responses to different questions. This can be due to the wording of the survey questions where some of the
questions are more direct (e.g. ‘you are prejudiced’) while others are not (e.g. ‘Australia is weakened by ethnic diversity’). Thus,
those holding racist views may respond differently when exposed to direct questions than when asked more subtle questions.
Five out of the nine attitude variables strongly predict self-reported EOD. We found mixed evidence for ‘anti-cross-marriage’
attitudes and ‘non-acknowledgement of racism in Australia’ with the multivariate models (models 3 and 4) showing statistically
significant results while the simple model has non-significant results. ‘Non-acknowledgement of racism’ is also non-significant
in model 2. The results for ‘denial of Anglo-privilege’ and ‘belief in racial categories’ indicate that these variables are unrelated to
EOD.
From Table 1, we see that 12.2% and 11.2% of the respondents acknowledge their opposition to inter-racial marriage and
self-declare racial prejudice, respectively. These attitudes are positively associated with self-reported EOD (Table 5). The
odds ratios for the variable ‘prejudiced against other cultures’ range between 1.80 (95% CI: 1.55, 2.11) and 1.84 (95% CI:
1.60, 2.12), and for ‘anti-cross-marriage’ sentiments from 1.09 (95% CI: 0.92, 1.29) to 1.25 (95% CI: 1.05, 1.49), indicating
positive relationships. Racial supremacism, the other ‘old racism’ attitude (against racial equality), tested in the survey is
positively and significantly associated with self-reported EOD in all four models, 1.45 (95% CI: 1.26, 1.67) to 1.54 (95% CI:
1.33, 1.76). Among the CRP respondents, more prejudice against minorities and old racism attitudes are associated with
an increased self-reported EOD (and vice versa).
The new racism attitudes against diversity are positively associated with EOD. The estimated odds ratios for model 1
ranges between 1.42 for ‘anti-diversity attitudes’ (95% CI: 1.14–1.77) and 1.98 for ‘sense of insecurity when among other
ethnic groups’ (95% CI: 1.66–2.35). The assimilationist belief that Australia is weakened by ethnic diversity is positively asso-
ciated with self-reported EOD. This indicates that poor dispositions towards ‘diversity’ and towards ‘living among diverse
culture with fairness’ are associated with worse cross-cultural relations (in the form of EOD on the basis of ethnic
background).
The covariate ‘non-acknowledgement of racism in Australia’ is statistically significant for models 3 and 4, with the
expected negative sign. The trend indicates that reduced acknowledgement of racism in Australia is associated with
increased self-reporting of racial discrimination. Non-acknowledgment of racism has been described elsewhere as denial
of racism, and it makes sense that non-acknowledgment could be associated with higher prevalence of racism. If acceptance
7
The standard interpretation of odds ratios is that values above ‘1’ indicate positive association, while values below ‘1’ show negative association between
the dependent and independent variables. A value equal to ‘1’ indicates no negative or positive association between the variables.
A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191 185
Table 5
Odds ratio from ordered logistic regression models: Association between self-reported EOD and racist attitudes in the 2001–8 CRP datasets (Dependent
variable: self-reported EOD).
Notes: This Table reports odds ratio from 36 ordered logistic regressions with each cell reporting the results of a separately estimated model given the
independent variable of interest indicated. Across the board, the dependent variable is the response variable self-reported EOD which has ordinal outcomes
ranging from ‘Never’ to ‘Very often’. Based on this, Model 1 is estimated with a single independent variable (reported in the first column of the first nine
rows). Model 2 includes as control variables ‘Age’, ‘Gender’ and ‘Education’. Model 3 adds additional residential controls: ‘Region’ and ‘State’. Finally, Model
4 further adds ancestral origin variables: ‘region of birth’, ‘Father’s ancestry’ and ‘Mother’s ancestry’. Estimations are adjusted for population weights. The
first number in each cell is odds ratio and numbers in round brackets are 95% Confidence Intervals. F-statistics are reported in squared brackets and are
statistically significant at the conventional levels unless indicated otherwise.
Significance levels: * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.
a
Model 1 is not statistically significant at the conventional levels when estimated with ‘Denial of Racism in Australia’, ‘Anti-cross-marriage Sentiments’
or ‘’Denial of Anglo Privilege’ as the only independent variable.
is a first step towards addressing the issue, then denial fundamentally undermines remediation of racism and allows it to
flourish without check. Dunn and Nelson (2011) also found that Australians with a langauge background other than English,
and those who were born overseas, are less likely to acknowledge racism as a problem in Australia, even though they are the
groups more likely to report experiences of racism. This trend would align with the negative association outlined above,
though not always significant. Finally, odds ratios for the ‘denial of Anglo-privilege’ covariate are non-significant suggesting
no association with self-reported EOD.
Anti-diversity dispositions are clearly linked within this sample to EOD, as is the belief in racial supremacy (i.e., against
racial equality and self-declared prejudice). These analyses, therefore, indicate that both old and new racist beliefs can influ-
ence the reported EOD. The same is true to some extent for anti-cross-racial marriage and non-acknowledgement of racism.
However, the effects of belief in racial categories and denial of Anglo privilege did not have clear trends.
So far our interpretation has been based on models directly estimated from the CRP data. All estimations involved the
whole sample excluding missing values (the sample sizes vary between n = 12,088 and n = 12,505). But due to the nature
of the individual level data, we did not clearly separate the perpetrators and targets of discrimination. Thus, the findings
are showing crude association in that the racist attitudes in these models do not necessarily reflect only those of perpetra-
tors. Similarly, as mentioned in Section 2 above, the EOD does not necessarily show only those of groups we normally con-
sider targets (i.e., minorities). In the former case, minority groups can have racist attitudes (Sawrikar and Katz, 2010) while in
the latter case, the majority group can, in limited contexts, be targets of racism as well as more generally feel disenfranchised
and claim ‘reverse discrimination’ (Norton, 2011).
186 A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191
3.3.1.1. Stage 1 results. The results for the first stage of our estimation are reported in Table 6. As stated in Section 2, we
restricted the sample to respondents born in Australia to proxy for perpetration of racist attitudes by the majority group.
All of the nine models include six demographic and human capital control variables (age, gender, education, region, state
and region of birth) as well as the out-group variables of interest together with the nine racist attitudes as dependent vari-
ables. Estimates for the demographic and human capital variables have mixed results in terms of statistical significance, but
for brevity, we only report estimates for the nominated out-group. Each column reports one of the nine attitude items in the
CRP dataset as a dependent variable. In these results, Asians (in general), North East Asians, South East Asians, Middle
Easterners and Muslims are consistently nominated as out-groups by Australian-born respondents who have old-fashioned
racism expressed in ‘anti-cross-racial marriage’ and ‘anti-racial equality’ attitudes, and ‘self-declared prejudice towards
other cultures’ (columns 1, 2 and 4 respectively) as well as by those respondents with new racism beliefs such as ‘anti-
diversity attitudes’ and ‘sense of insecurity among other ethnic groups’ (columns 5 and 6 respectively). Odds ratios for these
results range between 1.24 (95% CI: 0.97, 1.58) and 2.90 (95% CI: 1.44, 3.82). South East Asians, however, are not nominated
by those with self-declared prejudice and anti-racial equality attitudes. Three groups, South East Asians, South Asians and
Muslims are nominated by those who are against inter-racial marriage (odds ratio between 1.42, 95% CI: 0.99, 2.04 and
1.67, 95% CI: 1.15, 2.43 for the Asian groups). Asians and Africans in general are also nominated by those with the old
racist belief in ‘racial categories’, with odds ratios of 2.29 (95% CI: 1.43, 3.66) and 1.53 (95% CI: 1.21, 1.94), respectively. South
Asians as a nominated out-group in this model are associated with sentiments against racial equality (OR: 1.50, 95% CI: 0.95,
2.38) and against inter-racial marriage (OR: 1.67, 95% CI: 1.15, 2.43). The racist attitude variable that has the strongest
association with the out-group nomination variable is ‘anti-racial equality’ with statistically significant estimates for six
groups (North East Asians, South Asians, Asians, Balkans, Indigenous Australians and Muslims). Those who are more
consistently nominated as an out group are Muslims, nominated by those who hold seven out of the nine measured racist
attitudes.
The results in column 8 suggest that the ‘non-acknowledgement (denial) of racism’ variable in the CRP data fails to predict
the association between racist attitude and nomination of minorities as out-groups. This finding for the denial of racism is
inconsistent with that of Table 5. From Table 1, we see that only 7.7% deny that there is racism in Australia with denial pre-
dicting decreased self-reported EOD in Table 5. This result is partly explained by the relevant sample size of the out-group
nominating respondents (fewer respondents who nominate out-groups deny the existence of racism in Australia compared
to the other attitude variables).8 Acknowledgment of racism is very prevalent (86%, see Table 1), and the reasons for denial are
multiple. Therefore, denial does not seem to be a consistent predictor of antagonism towards specific out-groups.
In columns 1 and 9 we observe another important finding. The nomination of Muslims, South East Asians and South
Asians as out-groups is strongly associated with having anti-cross-marriage sentiments as column 1 shows, odds ratios rang-
ing between 1.42 (95% CI: 0.99, 2.04) and 1.67 (95% CI: 1.15, 2.43). However, the nomination of South Europeans is negatively
associated with opposition to inter-racial marriage (OR: 0.35, 95% CI: 0.16, 0.81). According to column 9, nominating people
from the Balkans, the Rest of Africa (non-East Africans) and Muslims as out-groups is strongly related to denial of Anglo-priv-
ilege (odds ratios between 1.16, 95% CI: 0.98, 1.38 and 2.42, 95% CI: 1.06, 5.55). It seems likely that antipathy towards people
with ancestry from the Balkans would principally be a disposition of Australians with a European heritage, and so it makes
sense that they (Europeans) would be less likely to acknowledge cultural privilege in Australia. Anti-Muslim prejudice would
be expected as part of post-9-11 Isalmophobia. However, Anglo Australians would be less likely to acknowledge it as having
association with their privilege. Similarly, while antipathy towards the other Rest of Africa category would be expected with
race more salient among Africans than the other minority groups, Anglo-Australians with racial disposition against Africans
would be less likely to acknowledge their cultural privilege. Another important observation is that those who believe that
Australia is weakened by diversity are more likely to nominate Asians, Middle Easterners and Muslims as out-groups. Finally,
while nominating Indigenous Australians as out-groups is associated with ‘self-declared prejudice’ (OR: 2.03, 95% CI: 1.25,
3.30) and having ‘anti-racial equality attitudes’ (OR: 1.57, 95% CI: 0.98, 2.51), nominating Africans as out-groups is strongly
associated with ‘believing in racial categories’ (OR: 1.53, 95% CI: 1.21, 1.94).
We re-calculated the racist attitudes analysis by including the neutral response categories from each attitude variable.
The results for most of the variables are similar to the findings above. For some nominated out-group categories, scores
are lower than the corresponding values reported in Table 6 (e.g. estimates for those with ‘anti-diversity attitudes’ and nom-
inating South and North East Asians, Asians and Muslims). This indicates that the effect of racist attitudes is more evident
when racial neutrality is excluded from the overall sample. Only in a few cases are the results divergent (e.g. for Balkans
and the Rest of Africans the scores become higher than in Table 6).
Our results indicate that anti-Asian sentiment is associated with new racism (i.e. beliefs against diversity) although the
denial discourses conceptually attached to new racism are not associated with anti-Asian views. Old racist beliefs in racial
categories and against racial equality are also associated with anti-Asian attitudes. Asian-Australians is a set of groups for
whom there has been extreme racialisation in Australia since the 19th Century (Kamp, 2010), and this was notably enlivened
during the so-called race debates following the election wins of the One Nation Party from the mid to late 1990s (Davis and
8
Percentage of the relevant sample (out-group nominating respondents with racist attitudes) for each attitude variable is: ‘denial of racism’ = 8.6%, ‘anti-
diversity attitude’ = 15.9%, ‘sense of insecurity’ = 12.5%, ‘self-declared prejudice’ = 20.6, ‘anti-cross-marriage’ = 17.1%, ‘British privileges’ = 43.1%, ‘Australia
weakened by diversity’ = 24.5%, ‘anti-equality sentiment’ = 17.6%, ‘belief in racial categories’ = 10.2%. This indicates that ‘denial of racism’ is not as strongly
associated with out-group nomination as it is for other attitudes.
Table 6
Odds ratio from logistic regression models: Association between out-group nomination and expressions of racist attitudes in the 2001–8 CRP datasets.
Note: This table reports the nomination of minorities as out-groups by Australian-born respondents who have racist attitudes. Targets are nominated as out-groups if the respondent answers ‘yes’ to the question
asking: ‘Do you believe that there are any cultural or ethnic groups that do NOT fit into Australian society.’ Column headings are the dependent variables in the respective model. For brevity only values that are
statistically significant are reported. For each cultural groups nominated as out-groups odds ratios are reported and numbers in parenthesis are 95% confidence intervals. All models were estimated by including
age, gender, education, region and state as control variables. Three groups in the models, namely, ‘Jews’, ‘East Africans’ and ‘Extremists’ are not shown because they have statistically non-significant results. The
sample size is restricted to Australian-born respondents and results are corrected for population weights.
Significance levels: * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.
187
188 A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191
Stimson, 1998). Antipathy towards European groups is only focused against those with Balkan heritage and the only statis-
tical trend is that it is associated with denial of Anglo-privilege and anti-racial equality attitudes. Middle-Easterner ‘out-
status’ is associated with new racism and this accords with research that links anti-Middle Easterner attitudes with narrow
constructions of national identity and citizenship (Dunn et al., 2007; Morgan and Poynting, 2012). Negative views on the
extent to which Muslims fit-in in Australia, as the most prevalent of the out-group dispositions (Dunn et al., 2004), is asso-
ciated with all racist attitudes with the exception of ‘denial of racism’ and ‘belief in racial categories’. Antipathy towards
Indigenous Australians is associated with old racist attitudes such as a belief in racial supremacy (against racial equality).
Anti-Indigenous sentiment is also associated with self-declared prejudice. In a separate analysis, not reported in this paper,
we tracked the relation between self-declared prejudice and antipathy towards racialised groups (Asian-, African-, Indige-
nous- and Jewish-Australian).9 Antipathy towards Jewish-, Indigenous-, and Asian-Australians is associated with this
self-declarative judgment of prejudice. The results for the Jewish, East African, Rest of African and Latin American categories,
however, are not conclusive due to small sample sizes.
3.3.1.2. Stage 2 results. At this stage we utilise the results in Table 6 as a basis for creating a categorical variable representing
the out-groups nominated by those CRP survey participants reporting racist attitudes. The groups thus nominated according
to Table 6 are Muslims, Middle Easterners, South East Asians, North East Asians, and Asians in general. These are groups for
which there is strong association between their nomination as out-groups and the expressions of racist attitudes. Other
groups with significant results are people from the Balkans, South Asians and Indigenous Australians each of which is nom-
inated as an out-group by those with racist attitudes expressed in responses to exactly two items (these items vary for each
group). East Africans and the Rest of Africa are nominated by those who believe in racial categories and by those who deny
Anglo-privilege, respectively. We proxy these targets by their region of birth, thereby, creating dummy variables to identify
them as targets of racial discrimination in the regression models. Although Muslims are one of the most likely groups to be
targets of racist attitudes (see Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC), 2004), we could not analyse their
self-reported EOD because the CRP data does not have the participant’s ‘religion’ as a variable. We also regroup the Balkans
category into South Europeans (based on United Nations, 2012). The results are reported in Tables 7 and 8.
The results in Table 7 are in line with our expectation. Overall, the model is statistically significant: F(17, 12,051) = 30.19,
p < .001. All coefficient estimates for the categorical variable ‘nominated out-groups’ are statistically significant, except
North Americans.10 For the Eastern European category the estimates are marginally significant at the 10% level. Generally,
our hypothesis that there is an association between self-reported EOD by targets and the racist attitudes of perpetrators is sup-
ported. Those targets nominated by CRP participants as out-groups are more likely to report EOD. The reference group for racist
attitudes in this analysis are Australian-born respondents.
Our estimation involved grouping the targets into 15 categories and mapping the racist expressions observed in Table 6,
with three groups excluded from this analysis due to small sample size. Out of the 12 minority groups, ‘Indigenous Austra-
lians’ scored the highest probability of reporting EOD (OR: 3.95, 95% CI: 2.82–5.53) followed by South East Asians (OR: 3.17,
95% CI: 2.38–4.23) and South Asians (OR: 2.8, 95% CI: 1.93–4.07). The next groups with more likelihood of reporting EOD are
North East Asians (OR: 2.87 95% CI: 1.98–4.15). These results suggest that self-reported EOD is more prevalent among Indig-
enous Australians and Asians in general than among other minority groups. Middle Easterners (OR: 2.59, 95% CI: 1.42–4.51)
and Pacific Islanders (OR: 1.95, 95% CI: 1.39–2.75) are also more likely to report discrimination than Australian-born respon-
dents. Although slightly less likely than these groups Western Europeans and Africans are also more likely to report EOD
than Australian-born respondents (odds ratio between 1.82 and 1.91). The rest of the minority groups are considerably less
likely to report discrimination than the above groups, although more likely than Australian-born respondents.
Another observation from Table 7 is that non-English language spoken at home is associated with increased reporting of
EOD (OR: 2.1, 95% CI: 1.71–2.59). In addition, gender (being male) and age are negatively associated with reported EOD
although the magnitude of this association with age is small (OR: 0.99). There is a growing body of evidence supporting some
form of association between socio-demographics and self-reported EOD (Kessler et al., 1999; Paradies, 2006; Perez et al.,
2008; Lewis et al., 2012). Males are more likely to self-report EOD than females (Sellers and Shelton, 2003; Broman et al.,
2000), however, this association is not supported by our findings from the CRP datasets. On the other hand, we find that
higher level of education is significantly associated with fewer self-reported EOD although the magnitude of the association
is negligible (OR: 0.99, 95% CI: 0.99–1.00). Region of residence is another covariate with no association in the EOD model.
Table 8 combines the targets and reports a single coefficient by creating a dummy variable which takes a value of ‘1’ if the
group is nominated as an out-group by those with racist attitudes and ‘0’ otherwise. The result is similar to Table 7, with this
variable predicting the likelihood of self-reported EOD with an odds ratio of 2.18 (95% CI: 1.85–2.57). However, in Table 8, we
report that the negative effect of gender on self-reported EOD is statistically significant with OR: 0.68 (95% CI: 0.58–0.79). Sim-
ilarly, the data confirm that non-English spoken at home is strongly associated with increased self-reported EOD. Although the
coefficient for age is statistically significant, both age and education are negligible in terms of coefficient magnitude.
Generally, Tables 6–8 support our hypothesis. There are strong positive associations between the expressions of racist
attitudes, in the form of nominating out-groups, and self-reported EOD. Our results go one further step than the experimen-
tal research on the relationship between attitudes and behaviours (Dovidio et al., 1996, 2002; Gaertner et al., 2005;
9
All alternative estimations and findings not reported in this paper can be made available upon request from the authors.
10
Nominated out-groups: refers to ‘groups nominated by those expressing racist attitudes as out-groups.’
A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191 189
Table 7
Odds ratio from ordered logistic regression models: self-reported EOD by targets nominated as out-groups in the 2001–8 CRP data.
Note: The dependent variable is self-reported EOD. Cut-points are not shown. Coefficients are logit estimates (exp(b)/1 + exp(b)) and they are exponentiated
by exp(b) to give their corresponding odds ratios (Column 4). In addition to variables included in previous Tables, ‘Non-English’ language spoken at home is
included to control for its impact on the dependent variable.
Significance levels: * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.
Table 8
Odds ratio from ordered logistic regression models: self-reported EOD by targets nominated as out-groups in the 2001–8 CRP data (all targets combined
together).
Note: This Table is estimated by grouping the targets, creating a dummy variable which takes ‘1’ if the group is identified as out-group and targeted by racist
attitudes and ‘0’ otherwise. The dependent variable is self-reported EOD.
Significance levels: * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.
McConahay, 1983). We have demonstrated a within sample relationship between racist attitudes towards out-groups and
reported EOD among these groups. Racist attitudes are linked with EOD by those nominated as out-groups. Our findings also
suggest that negative attitudes towards certain groups are associated with particular racist beliefs. For example, antipathy
towards Asians is linked with both new racist dispositions against diversity and with old racist notions of racial supremacy
(Table 6). Those who see Asians as not fitting in in Australia are more likely to self-declare as racists, aligning with old racist
beliefs. There is a strong within-sample correspondence between a stance against racial equality among majority group
members and reports of discrimination by minority group members (Table 5). This is also the case for majority group mem-
bers who are against or are insecure about ethnic diversity. Not surprisingly, antipathy towards Asians is strongly associated
with higher reported EOD by Australians born in Asia (Table 7).
4. Conclusion
Racist attitudes are related to racist behaviours among perpetrators that are, in turn, related to experiences of racial dis-
crimination among targets. In this study, we were able to measure the association between racist attitudes and self-reported
EOD utilising data from the Australian Challenging Racism Project survey. As an initial step, we averaged racist attitudes
against nominated out-groups and found a modest overall correlation with reported EOD (r = 0.19, p < 0.05). This relatively
190 A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191
small correlation represents an initial crude estimate which does not differentiate between perpetrators and targets of
racism. In order to isolate perpetrator racist attitudes and target experiences, we constructed two sets of variables from nine
attitude and five experience questions. In the first stage of our estimation, we estimated regression models focused on
nominated out-groups, and then we estimated reported discrimination experiences in the second stage for each of these
out-groups.
Our results show that those targets identified as out-groups in the first stage of our estimation were more likely to report
having experienced discrimination. Thus we conclude that nomination of out-groups by those with racist attitudes is
strongly associated with self-reported EOD, OR = 2.2 (p < 0.01). To our knowledge, this is the first published within-sample
test that examines perpetrators of racism and targets of self-reported discrimination in predicting the link between racist
attitudes and EOD.
Our analysis did not include socio-economic variables, although region of residence (capital city vs. rest of region) and
education may proxy socio-economic status to some degree. We are aware that there is strong evidence of the influence
of socio-economic status on attitude toward out-groups (see Pedersen et al., 2000, 2004) although some studies suggest
no association between these variables (Bobo and Zubrinsky, 1996; Branton and Jones, 2005; Karlsen and Nazroo, 2002;
Romero and Roberts, 1998). In analysing self-reported EOD, our analysis did not account for the effect of social desirability
bias, or strength of social identity. There is currently mixed findings in relation to the direction of bias associated with such
potential unmeasured confounding (Gilens et al., 1998; Janus, 2010; Stocke, 2007; Tsuchiya and Hirai, 2010). More research
is needed to investigate how social desirability influences the association between perpetrator racist attitudes and target
EOD. Moreover, an ideal data to further explore this association would be one that includes more detailed categories of target
specific racial attitudes (e.g. based on national origin, ethnicity etc.).
Despite these limitations, our study contributes to the literature on racial discrimination by quantifying the association
between discrimination experiences of minorities and racist attitudes of majority groups. Our results suggest that majority
group racist attitudes, manifest as behaviours, are experienced as discriminatory acts by minority group members. Attitudes
do matter, and the variation in racist attitudes towards different out-groups has a marked effect on the prevalence of their
racist experiences. We also found that the attitudinal disposition towards groups is underpinned by varied racist beliefs. Old
racisms are a stronger factor in the antipathy towards Indigenous Australians, Asians and Africans whereas new racist beliefs
were more strongly tied to negative views about those from the Middle East as well as Muslims and Asians. This provides
some insight into how best to target anti-racism efforts in order to address the discrimination faced by specific minority
groups.
Acknowledgments
The first author is supported by an Australian Postgraduate Awards (Industry) as part of linkage Project LP100200057
funded by the Australian Research Council, Victorian Health Promotion Foundation and the Australian Human Rights
Commission.
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BRIEF REPORTS
We examined the factor structure of the Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites Scale (PCRW;
Spanierman & Heppner, 2004) on 766 White American university students from the southeastern
United States. Results from confirmatory factor analyses supported the 3-factor model proposed by
Spanierman and Heppner (2004). The construct validity of the PCRW was further strengthened by
its convergent validity demonstrated by the associations among its subscales and White racial
identity attitudes and White privilege attitude. Our findings support the continued exploration of the
validity and reliability of the PCRW as well as its utility as a measure of White individuals’ affective
responses to racism.
585
586 BRIEF REPORTS
Evidence of construct validity of the measure was demonstrated to further examine the measure’s convergent validity by investi-
by confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and correlations with other gating its relationship with White privilege. We expected to find
measures of related constructs. CFA on another sample of college significant associations between the PCRW factors and White
students indicated support for the three-factor structure of the privilege.
measure (Spanierman & Heppner, 2004). The subscales were
found to have expected pattern of correlations with the Color-
Method
Blind Racial Attitudes Scale (Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, &
Browne, 2000), the Scale of Ethnocultural Empathy (Wang et al., Procedure and Participants
2003), the Quick Discrimination Index (Ponterotto, Potere, &
Johansen, 2002), and the Oklahoma Racial Attitudes Scale We developed an online survey for this validation study. An
(LaFleur, Leach, & Rowe, 2002). Additionally, the measure was invitation to participate in the survey was sent electronically to
found to not be associated with socially desirable responding and students currently enrolled in a university in the southeastern
not be related to the general negative affectivity of the participants United States with a student body of about 20,000 at the time of the
(Spanierman & Heppner, 2004). survey. No incentives were offered for participation. We received
Participants in the initial studies (Spanierman & Heppner, 2004) 1,144 completed surveys. In addition to the survey items, the
were White undergraduate psychology and education majors from participants also completed demographic items. Participants who
a midsized midwestern university. Women scored higher on all self-identified as White (n ⫽ 788) were directed to complete the
PCRW factors than did men, and their White Empathy scores were PCRW, the WRIAS, and the White Privilege Scale (WPS; Swim &
statistically significantly higher than were those of the men. Par- Miller, 1999). Participants who identified as non-White were di-
ticipants with higher levels of exposure scored significantly lower rected to complete a measure of ethnic identity development and
on White Fear than did those reporting moderate or low levels of the WPS. The present study focused on White participants’ re-
exposure to other races. Participants reporting that 75%–100% of sponses.
their friends were White had higher White Fear scores than did We omitted data from 22 participants because of excessive
those reporting lower percentages. Participants with high and missing data, resulting in a usable sample of 766 (328 men, 435
moderate amounts of multicultural education had significantly women, and 1 participant who did not report gender). For the
lower scores on White Fear than did those with no or very little purposes of CFA, we randomly selected approximately 50% (n ⫽
multicultural education. 395) of the participants and reserved the remaining participant data
The utility of the PCRW was demonstrated in a recent study by (n ⫽ 371) for a cross-validation analysis. Chi-square tests did not
Spanierman, Poteat, Wang, and Oh (2008) indicating that, as a show any statistically significant differences between the two
measure of affective responses to racism, the PCRW subscales samples with regard to participants’ gender, 2(1) ⫽ 3.13; age,
predicted White applied psychology trainees’ multicultural coun- 2(2) ⫽ 2.15; grade level, 2(2) ⫽ 1.25; and political affiliation,
seling competencies (MCC). Specifically, Spanierman et al. found 2(1) ⫽ 4.49. Detailed demographic characteristics of the sample
that White Empathy, White Guilt, and White Fear predicted the are presented as an online supplement.
knowledge component of self-reported MCC, White Guilt pre-
dicted demonstrated MCC, and White Empathy predicted observed
Materials
MCC.
PCRW. The PCRW is a 16-item self-report measure that as-
The Present Study sesses individuals’ affective responses to racism. It allows for
responses to range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
We designed the present study to examine the factorial and The scale consists of three subscales: White Empathy, White Guilt,
convergent validity of the PCRW on a sample different from the and White Fear. Details of the scale were discussed earlier. The
original college sample used for scale development. On the basis alphas for the three PCRW subscales in the present study were .84
of existing findings (Spanierman & Heppner, 2004; Poteat & (White Empathy), .75 (White Guilt), and .79 (White Fear), indi-
Spanierman, 2008), we expected to replicate the scale’s three- cating satisfactory levels of internal consistency.
factor structure in the study sample. If the factor structure were WRIAS. Helms (1984, 1995) developed a White racial identity
replicated, we would proceed to examine its convergent validity development model that posits that White individuals respond to
with conceptually related constructs. racial issues through one of six statuses. The model theorizes that
Following Spanierman and Heppner’s (2004) recommendation White individuals who experience emotions such as shame and
to research the scale’s convergent validity with conceptually re- guilt when confronted with racism are moving forward to the next
lated constructs like White racial identity, we selected the White status of racial development. The first three statuses (contact,
Racial Identity Attitude Scale (WRIAS; Helms, 1995; Helms & disintegration, and reintegration) describe the progression away
Carter, 1990), a commonly used measure in the literature, to assess from a racist frame of reference before entering the next three
the PCRW’s convergent validity. Because the WRIAS examines statuses (pseudoindependence, immersion– emersion, and auton-
the relationships between racism and privilege and affective re- omy) where progression toward a nondefensive and nonracist
sponses such as guilt and fear that mitigate racial identity devel- White identity occurs.
opment (Helms, 1995), we expected to find significant associa- Based on the model, the WRIAS, a six-factor 60-item inventory,
tions among the PCRW factors and the WRIAS subscales. was developed (Helms, 1995). Initial studies (e.g., Helms &
White privilege attitude has been shown to be associated with Carter, 1990) utilizing the WRIAS reported alphas of .55 for the
racism (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Schiffhauer, 2007). We decided contact status, .77 for the disintegration status, .80 for the reinte-
BRIEF REPORTS 587
gration status, .71 for the pseudoindependence status, .82 for the Table 1
immersion– emersion status, and .70 for the autonomy status. Al- Factor Analysis: Goodness-of-Fit Summary
phas for the present study were .65 for contact, .66 for disintegra-
tion, .87 for reintegration, .58 for pseudoindependence, .81 for Study sample Cross-validation sample
Index (n ⫽ 395) (n ⫽ 371)
immersion– emersion, and .51 for autonomy.
The reliability coefficients for four of the WRIAS statuses were CFI .96 .95
unacceptably low in the study sample (i.e., ⬍.70). Other studies NNFI .95 .95
had also reported similar low reliability coefficients for these NFI .94 .93
SRMR .07 .07
statuses (Behren, 1997; Ottavi, Pope-Davis, & Dings, 1994). Con-
RMSEA .07 .07
sequently, we used only the reintegration status and the 90% confidence interval
immersion– emersion status to access the convergent validity of of RMSEA [.06, .08] [.06, .08]
the PCRW in this study. 2 299.09 273.81
WPS. White privilege is defined as a system of an identifiable df 101 101
2/df 2.96 2.71
racial hierarchy that creates a system of advantages for White
individuals that is based on race, not merit (McIntosh, 1989; Note. CFI ⫽ comparative fit index; NNFI ⫽ nonnormed fit index; NFI ⫽
Neville, Worthington, & Spanierman, 2001). White privilege, of- normed fit index; SRMR ⫽ standardized root-mean-square residual;
ten invisible and taken for granted, is rooted in social and eco- RMSEA ⫽ root-mean-square error of approximation.
nomic privilege, and its meaning and significance are highly
situational (McDermott & Samson, 2005). Swim and Miller (1999)
developed the WPS, a five-item single-factor structure (␣ ⫽ .72) (Model 3). Because of the sensitivity of the chi-square to sample
self-report measure from McIntosh’s (1989) chapter, “White Priv- size, this study, however, placed more emphasis on a change in
ilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack.” The WPS items (e.g., CFI values of .01 or below (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002) to flag
“Status as a White person grants me unearned privileges in today’s significant differences when testing the models: Model 1,
society”) allow for responses to range from 1 (strongly disagree) 2(221) ⫽ 766.23, CFI ⫽ .95; Model 2, 2(224) ⫽ 769.18, CFI ⫽
to 5 (strongly agree). The alpha for the WPS in this study was .90.
.95; Model 3, 2(237) ⫽ 792.11, CFI ⫽ .94. The changes of
chi-square values were insignificant in comparison to the changes
Results of degree freedom, and the changes of CFI values were not more
than .01 for the three cumulative models. As a result, we concluded
CFA that factorial structure was invariant between the two samples
randomly split from the whole study sample.
To test the three-factor structure of the PCRW, a CFA was
conducted using LISREL (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). A
maximum-likelihood method was used to estimate goodness of fit Convergent Validity
of the three-factor model because this estimation method is robust We examined the PCRW’s convergent validity by correlating its
to nonnormality in CFA when sample size is large (Anderson & subscales with the WRIAS reintegration and immersion– emersion
Gerbing, 1984; Benson & Fleishman, 1994; Browne, 1984). Fol- statuses and the WPS. The pattern of the correlation coefficients
lowing recommendations in the literature (Browne & Cudeck, supports our expectations for conceptually meaningful associa-
1993; Hu & Bentler, 1999), we used five indices to assess good- tions between the PCRW and the White racial identity and White
ness of fit of the model: comparative fit index (CFI), nonnormed privilege attitude.
fit index, normed fit index (values greater than .90 indicate rea- White Empathy was negatively correlated with reintegration
sonable good fit), standardized root-mean-square residual, and (r ⫽ –.70, p ⬍ .01) and positively correlated with immersion–
root-mean-square error of approximation (values of .05 or less emersion (r ⫽ .35, p ⬍ .01). White Guilt was significantly posi-
indicate close approximate fit of the model, and values between tively correlated with immersion– emersion (r ⫽ .31, p ⬍ .01) and
.05 and .08 suggest reasonable error of approximation). had a nonsignificant relationship with reintegration (r ⫽ –.01, p ⬎
Table 1 presents the results of the CFA. All fit indices in the .05). White Fear was positively correlated with reintegration (r ⫽
study sample model and the cross validation model fell within .65, p ⬍ .01) and had a nonsignificant relationship with
acceptable values, supporting the three-factor structure reported by immersion– emersion. White privilege was significantly correlated
Spanierman and Heppner (2004). with all three PCRW subscales: White Empathy (r ⫽ .30, p ⬍ .01),
We conducted a multiple group analysis to examine whether the White Guilt (r ⫽ .26, p ⬍ .01), and White Fear (r ⫽ .10, p ⬍ .01).
factor loadings for affective responses to racism items on their
respective latent variables (i.e., White Empathy, White Guilt, and Analysis of the PCRW Factors and Demographic
White Fear) were invariant across the two samples. Different
Variables
levels of factorial invariance between the two samples were tested
through the following three steps: First, all parameters were freely The associations between the PCRW factor scores and demo-
estimated (Model 1, baseline model); second, the factor loadings graphic variables (gender, grade level, age, religious affiliation,
were constrained to be equal for each pair of the three factors multicultural education, political affiliation, and levels of mother
between the two samples (Model 2); and the last step involved and father’s education) were examined. For a report of a series of
constraining factor loadings and error variances to be equal for multivariate analysis of variance that indicated significant demo-
each pair of the three latent variables between the two groups graphic differences for gender, grade level, age, religious affilia-
588 BRIEF REPORTS
tion, multicultural education, and political affiliation, please see White privilege would empathize more with other racial minority
the online supplement. groups who do not enjoy similar privileges and concomitantly
experience greater guilt being White.
Discussion The range of emotions captured by the PCRW factors is ex-
pected as White individuals struggle to conceptualize White priv-
The present study provides support for the psychometric prop- ilege and examine the reality that White individuals, while be it
erties of the PCRW, a recently developed measure that examines unknowingly, perpetuate the oppression of minority groups (Hays,
the affective responses of White individuals regarding racial is- Chang, & Dean, 2004). Many have difficulty accepting the exis-
sues. Findings were as expected. CFA results in this study support tence of White privilege (Ancis & Szymanski, 2001) due to the
the measure’s factorial invariance across samples. The findings of invisibility of White privilege and the differential ways some
conceptually meaningful associations among the PCRW factors White individuals (i.e., women, sexual minorities, people who are
and the WRIAS reintegration and immersion– emersion statuses disabled, and individuals with a low socioeconomic status) expe-
and the WPS further strengthen the measure’s construct validity. rience its benefits (Neville et al., 2001).
Findings in this study provide evidence supporting the utility of the
measure.
Limitations
The PCRW and the WRIAS There are several limitations to this study. First, the PCRW,
WRIAS, and WPS are self-report measures so participants may
The associations among the PCRW subscales and the two have selected socially desirable responses. Second, the survey was
WRIAS statuses make conceptual sense. The PCRW construct not run from a secure online server; therefore, the possibility of a
helps to illuminate the affective experiences of White individuals participant completing the instruments more than once exists.
as they relate to racial identity development. The reintegration However, we did not expect anyone would spend his or her time
status of the WRIAS is characterized by a retreat into Whiteness, completing the survey more than once. Third, the results from this
actively and passively endorsing White superiority and Black sample of university students may not generalize to the nonstudent
inferiority. Individuals in this status may become hostile to racial population of this area or to other areas in the United States.
minorities, become defensive, and deny their role in the perpetu- Finally, the suboptimal reliability coefficients on most of the
ation of racism in society. Some may overidealize the White WRIAS statuses in this study limit its adequacy as an instrument
culture as superior, and their perceptions of racial minorities may to examine the convergent validity of the PCRW. Future research-
become negative and distorted (Helms, 1995). This factor of the ers should consider using another White racial identity develop-
WRIAS was significantly negatively correlated with White Em- ment measure that has better psychometric properties to further
pathy and positively correlated with White Fear. Individuals with examine the association between the PCRW and White racial
higher scores in this status tend to empathize less with other racial identity.
groups and have greater fear regarding the diminishment of their Along with Spanierman and Heppner’s (2004) and Poteat and
racial status. The nonsignificant relationship between reintegration Spanierman’s (2008) psychometric findings on the PCRW, the
and White Guilt makes conceptual sense because individuals in the present study provides additional evidence in support of the
reintegration status endorse White superiority and do not feel PCRW as a psychometrically sound instrument for identifying and
ashamed about being White (Spanierman & Heppner, 2004). examining emotional reactions that facilitate or impede White
The immersion– emersion status of the WRIAS is characterized individuals’ awareness of racial issues and racial identity devel-
by an acknowledgment of racial inequalities, a willingness to forgo opment. The PCRW offers promise as an instrument useful in
privileges associated with Whiteness, and a commitment to devel- elucidating the complexity of White individuals’ defensive or
oping a positive White identity through self-exploration and mean- progressive attitudes about racial issues. Future psychometric re-
ingful contact with members of other racial groups (Helms, 1995). search on the PCRW should include other forms of reliability (e.g.,
This status was found significantly positively correlated with test–retest reliability) and validity (e.g., criterion validity).
White Empathy and White Guilt. The more individuals in this
status are exposed to members of other racial groups, the more
they become aware of racial inequalities and experience guilt or
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Kivel, P. (1996). Uprooting racism: How White people can work for racial validation, and reliability. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 50, 221–
justice. Philadelphia, PA: New Society. 234.
LaFleur, N. K., Leach, M. M., & Rowe, W. (2002). Manual: Oklahoma
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Participants (230 White college students) completed the Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites
(PCRW) Scale. Using cluster analysis, we identified 5 distinct cluster groups on the basis of PCRW
subscale scores: the unempathic and unaware cluster contained the lowest empathy scores; the insensitive
and afraid cluster consisted of low empathy and guilt scores, with the highest score on fear; the fearful
guilt cluster exhibited elevations on guilt and fear; the empathic but unaccountable cluster reflected high
empathy with low guilt and fear; and the informed empathy and guilt cluster represented those high on
empathy and guilt in conjunction with low levels of fear. Groups were validated on an additional sample
(n ⫽ 366) and were found to differ significantly on theoretically related measures.
Keywords: costs of racism to Whites, White racial attitudes, White guilt, cluster analysis
As the study of racism and its impact on individuals and society noteworthy that racism affects all individuals in negative ways
continues to evolve, researchers have begun to explore the ways in (Kivel, 1996; Tatum, 1992).
which White individuals, as members of the dominant racial Conceptual writings have often situated the costs of racism to
group, are affected by this system. Conceptual writings (e.g., Whites in a broad range of personal and social domains. For
Goodman, 2001; Kivel, 1996; McIntosh, 1998; Neville, Worthing- example, with regard to dominant group members in a variety of
ton, & Spanierman, 2001) and empirical research (e.g., Iyer, oppressive systems (e.g., racism, sexism), Goodman (2001) cate-
Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Spanierman & Heppner, 2004; Swim & gorized costs according to psychological, social, spiritual, physi-
Miller, 1999) have suggested that Whites experience both positive cal, and intellectual characteristics. Using a tripartite model,
(i.e., privileges) and negative (i.e., costs) consequences as a result Spanierman and Heppner (2004) classified costs according to
of racism. White privilege refers to unearned benefits and oppor- affective (i.e., emotional), cognitive (i.e., distorted beliefs), and
tunities to which White individuals have access as a result of their behavioral (i.e., limited or restricted actions) dimensions. Through
race and that remain inaccessible to racial minorities (McIntosh, personal reflection, other theorists have delineated specific costs
1998; Sue, 2003). Examples of privilege include easier access to that they, as White individuals, have experienced, which include
health care, advanced educational opportunities, and the ability to guilt, shame, and helplessness in ending racism; lack of developed
set social norms (McIntosh, 1998; Neville et al., 2001; Wildman & racial identity; and lack of understanding about people of other
Davis, 1996). The phrase costs of racism to Whites is defined as races (Croteau, 2002; Grover, 1997; Kivel, 1996).
negative psychosocial consequences that Whites experience as a Researchers have conducted qualitative analyses examining the
result of the existence of racism (Kivel, 1996; Spanierman & costs of racism to Whites, and interviews and responses to open-
Heppner, 2004). Examples of these costs include guilt and shame,
ended questions have provided researchers with a rich resource for
irrational fear of people of other races, distorted beliefs regarding
further identifying negative consequences of racism to White
race and racism, and limited exposure to people of different races
individuals. Interviewees often express varying degrees of ac-
and cultures (Spanierman & Heppner, 2004; Spanierman et al., in
knowledgment of White privilege, which is associated with vary-
press; Swim & Miller, 1999). As such, these costs are in no way
ing degrees of guilt and shame (Ancis & Szymanski, 2001;
comparable to the substantial economic, political, and social costs
Arminio, 2001; Spanierman et al., in press). Respondents have also
of racism that racial and ethnic minorities face. Nevertheless, it is
expressed empathic reactions, including anger, sadness, frustra-
tion, and disgust about the existence of racism (Spanierman et al.,
in press). Among White counselor trainees, Utsey, Gernat, and
Lisa B. Spanierman, V. Paul Poteat, and Amanda M. Beer, Department Hammer (2005) found that some focus group participants experi-
of Educational Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign; enced a distorted sense of identity, denying themselves as racial
Patrick Ian Armstrong, Department of Psychology, Iowa State University. beings.
Preliminary results were presented at the annual meeting of the Amer- In addition to conducting qualitative examinations, researchers
ican Psychological Association in August 2005. We would like to thank
have quantitatively investigated a number of consequences of
Dorothy Espelage for her contributions to the development of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Lisa B. racism to Whites. Several researchers focused on the role of White
Spanierman, Department of Educational Psychology, University of Illinois guilt in relation to White individuals’ attitudes and behaviors
at Urbana–Champaign, 226 Education Building MC-708, Champaign, IL regarding racism. For example, Swim and Miller (1999) developed
61820. E-mail: lbspan@uiuc.edu a five-item scale measuring White guilt toward racism and found
434
PCRW CLUSTER PATTERNS 435
that many participants experienced varying degrees of guilt. Fur- Thus, our primary purpose in conducting the present investiga-
thermore, they found that degree of guilt was positively associated tion was to use cluster analysis to explore Whites’ experiences of
with the extent to which participants acknowledged White privi- costs of racism (i.e., empathic reactions, guilt, and fear of people
lege. Harvey and Oswald (2000) further distinguished guilt from of other races) simultaneously. Cluster analysis has been identified
shame and found that individuals who experienced shame (which as an effective and useful analytic technique in counseling psy-
is more self-condemning) were less likely to support Black campus chology research, one that helps researchers identify groups of
programs than were those experiencing guilt (which is more re- similar individuals when those researchers are examining multiple
morseful). Similarly, Iyer et al. (2003) reported the need to distin- constructs of interest (Borgen & Barnett, 1987). These patterns of
guish guilt from sympathy in how each construct influences sup- subscale scores on the PCRW Scale not only will increase our
port for affirmative action. Because guilt emerges as a critical understanding of the complicated and nuanced picture of Whites’
component of Whites’ responses to racism and is associated with experiences but will also inform our understanding of how partic-
a number of responses to racism, a next step might be examination ular groups of Whites might react differently to racial issues in our
of guilt in the context of the complex constellation of costs rather society on the basis of the degree to which they experience several
than in isolation. types of costs. In other words, researchers can use cluster group
Spanierman and Heppner (2004) recently developed the Psy- membership to predict important constructs of interest such as
chosocial Costs of Racism to Whites (PCRW) scale, which com- cultural sensitivity. Therefore, another purpose of this study was to
prises three distinct subscales measuring (a) White Empathic Re- examine the different PCRW cluster groups in the contexts of
actions Toward Racism (e.g., sadness and anger; also known as theoretically and empirically related constructs, such as color-blind
White Empathic Reactions); (b) White Guilt; and (c) White Fear of racial attitudes (Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, & Browne, 2000) and
People of Other Races (also known as White Fear of Others). The cultural sensitivity (i.e., as measured by the Quick Discrimination
scale has demonstrated convergent validity with theoretically re- Index; Ponterotto et al., 1995), as well as with relevant demo-
lated constructs such as cultural sensitivity, color-blind racial graphic characteristics (e.g., exposure to people of other races,
attitudes, and ethnocultural empathy (Spanierman & Heppner, political affiliation, etc.). While identifying potential patterns of
2004). Specifically, individuals reporting higher White empathic costs of racism to Whites, such typologies have the potential to
reactions also reported higher levels of racial awareness, cognitive inform interventions that are specific to particular cluster groups,
attitudes toward racial diversity, and ethnocultural empathy. such as informing pedagogy for teaching Whites about societal
Higher levels of White Guilt were associated with more positive racism.
attitudes toward minorities. White Fear of Others was related to
lower levels of White empathic reactions, racial awareness, and
ethnocultural empathy. Poteat and Spanierman (2006) recently Method
validated the scale with a community sample of White, employed
adults. Participants
Although researchers have found previous theoretical writings Participants were 230 self-identified White undergraduate students
and empirical investigations to be useful in understanding the (36% men, 64% women) aged 18 – 44 years (M ⫽ 29.42, SD ⫽ 2.15)
varied ways in which White individuals experience the negative attending a large Midwestern university. Participants were predomi-
consequences of racism, knowledge in this area remains limited. nantly Christian (71%) and of middle-class (43%) or upper-middle-
Qualitative findings consistently have pointed to the complexity class (46%) social status. Approximately one third (34%) of the par-
involved when discerning White individuals’ experiences of the ticipants identified their affiliation as Democrat; the remainder
costs of racism (Arminio, 2001; Spanierman et al., in press), but identified their affiliation as Republican (26%), Independent (9%), or
instruments thus far tend to measure only single constructs in “none” or “other” (30% total). Each participant was free to use his or
isolation (e.g., White Guilt). In recent years, certain counseling her own interpretation of the scale anchors for the following demo-
graphic items. Multicultural education was assessed with one item that
psychology researchers have illustrated the usefulness of consid-
used the following frequency response format: 1 (none), 2 (very little),
ering subscale scores simultaneously to identify and examine
3 (some), 4 (quite a bit), and 5 (extensive multicultural education). The
complex racial experiences (e.g., Carter, Helms, & Juby, 2004; majority of participants (71%) indicated that they had very little to
Neville & Lilly, 2000). Accordingly, because knowledge about the some multicultural education. Exposure to people of other races also
complex and varied ways in which White individuals experience was assessed with one item that used the following frequency response
costs of racism is limited, patterns of White individuals’ experi- format: 1 (no exposure), 2 (small amount), 3 (moderate amount), and 4
ences of such costs might better capture the nuances and complex- (a high amount of exposure). The majority of participants indicated that
ity inherent in this phenomenon than would the study of costs in they had a moderate level of exposure to people of other races (59%);
isolation. More specifically, examining a high score on one sub- 23% reported a high amount of exposure, and 18% indicated a small
scale, such as White Guilt, is less informative than examining this amount of exposure. We also assessed participants’ percentage of White
friends through one item that used the following frequency response
score in the context of its association with the additional scores of
format: 1 (0%–25%), 2 (26%–50%), 3 (51%–75%), 4 (76%–99%), and
White Empathic Reactions and White Fear of Others. Examination
5 (100%). The majority (54%) of participants expressed that their
of patterns of scores reflects a more nuanced picture of Whites’ friendship group was more than 75% White. Last, we assessed partic-
perceptions, experiences, and responses to societal racism and is ipants’ support of affirmative action through one item that used a
of critical importance for counseling psychologists with regard Likert-type response format ranging from 1 (low) to 6 (high). The
to teaching and training White students and mental health majority of participants (63%) reported their level of support at 3 or
professionals. below.
436 SPANIERMAN, POTEAT, BEER, AND ARMSTRONG
Measures relevant to the purpose of the current investigation. In the current study,
coefficient alphas were .82 for the Cognitive Racial Attitudes subscale
PCRW Scale. We used the PCRW Scale (Spanierman & Heppner, and .81 for the Affective Racial Attitudes subscale.
2004) to assess the various negative consequences of racism as experienced
by White individuals, including empathic reactions toward racism (i.e.,
anger and sadness); guilt; and fear. The 16-item self-report measure uses a Procedure
Likert-type response format ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 Prior to data collection, approval was obtained from the Institutional
(strongly agree). Higher scores reflect higher experiences of psychosocial Review Board at the home institution (the University of Illinois at Urbana–
costs. The measure includes the three subscales of White Empathic Reac- Champaign). Participants were recruited from undergraduate courses in
tions Toward Racism (also known as White Empathic Reactions; 6 items; psychology and education during two consecutive semesters and received
“I am angry that racism exists”); White Guilt (5 items; “Sometimes I feel research credit for their participation. Participants were allowed to com-
guilty about being White”); and White Fear of People of Other Races (also plete and return the packet at the end of their class or take the packets and
known as White Fear of Others; 5 items; “I am distrustful of people of return them to the investigator at a later date. All students who chose
other races”). Internal consistency estimates for each subscale ranged as in-class participation completed the survey packet. In the few cases in
follows: White Empathic Reactions, ␣ ⫽ .70 –.85; White Guilt, ␣ ⫽ .73–.81; which students chose at-home participation, all students returned com-
and White Fear of Others, ␣ ⫽ .63–.78 (Spanierman & Heppner, 2004). pleted packets. Thus, we obtained a 100% response rate. Names of the
Temporal stability estimates for each subscale during a 2-week period ranged individual measures were not listed on the survey packets, but, rather,
from .69 for White Guilt to .95 for White Fear of Others (Spanierman & participants were given a survey packet titled “Racial Attitudes Survey.”
Heppner, 2004). Convergent validity has been established with a number of Each packet contained consent forms, the PCRW Scale, the CoBRAS, the
related scales, including the Color-Blind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS; QDI, and a demographic questionnaire. The participants received verbal
Neville et al., 2000), the Scale of Ethnocultural Empathy (Wang et al., 2003), and written instructions stating that there were no right or wrong answers
the QDI (Ponterotto et al., 1995), and the Oklahoma Racial Attitudes Scale and that we wanted them to respond honestly to the items. We emphasized
(LaFleur, Rowe, & Leach, 2002). Additionally, through use of the Marlowe- that their responses would remain anonymous and confidential. Partici-
Crowne Social Desirability Scale–Form C (Reynolds, 1982), previous findings pants who did not self-identify as White were directed to omit the PCRW
indicate that the PCRW is not associated with socially desirable responding. In items and to complete the remainder of the packet. This directive allowed
the current investigation, coefficient alphas for the three PCRW subscales of participants an equal opportunity to earn research credit; however, their
White Empathic Reactions, White Guilt, and White Fear of Others were .77, data were not included in the analysis.
.79, and .63, respectively.
CoBRAS. The CoBRAS (Neville et al., 2000) measures color-blind
racial attitudes, which are characterized as cognitive distortions that min- Results
imize the existence and effects of race and racism and have been identified
Cluster Analysis
as a more subtle, covert form of modern racism. On the 20-item self-report
scale, researchers use a Likert-type response format ranging from 1 We used cluster analysis to explore the different patterns of
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Higher scores reflect a stronger Whites’ experiences of psychosocial costs of racism measured by
endorsement of color-blind racial attitudes. A three-factor structure has the PCRW subscales. We selected this analysis to enable the
been established, with subscales labeled as follows: (a) Racial Privilege (7
identification and further validation of meaningful typologies or
items; “White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the
subgroups of White individuals. The three subscale measures (i.e.,
color of their skin [reverse]”; ␣ ⫽ .71–.83); (b) Institutional Discrimination
(7 items; “Social policies, such as affirmative action, discriminate unfairly White Empathic Reactions, White Guilt, and White Fear of Oth-
against White people”; ␣ ⫽ .73–.76); and (c) Blatant Racial Issues (6 ers) were used as grouping variables. To control for scaling dif-
items; “Racism may have been a problem in the past, but it is not an ferences resulting from the different number of items in each scale,
important problem today”; ␣ ⫽ .70 –.76). Coefficient alphas for the total we used raw score means (i.e., scale score divided by number of
scale have ranged from .84 to .91 (Neville et al., 2000). Convergent validity items in scale) for each subscale. As recommended by Gordon
has been examined with several scales, including the Modern Racism Scale (1999), we followed a two-step procedure in identifying cluster
(McConahay, 1986), the Global Belief in a Just World Scale (Lipkus, groups. First, we used SYSTAT software to conduct hierarchical
1991), and the Multi-Dimensional Just World Belief Scale (Furnham & cluster analysis with Ward’s clustering method (Ward, 1963),
Procter, 1988). Coefficient alphas for the current investigation were .80 for
which seeks to minimize within-group variability while maximiz-
Racial Privilege, .74 for Institutional Discrimination, .73 for Blatant Racial
ing between-groups variability in Euclidean distance. This method
Issues, and .86 for the CoBRAS total.
QDI. The QDI (Ponterotto et al., 1995) measures prejudicial atti- suggested that a five-cluster solution minimized within-groups
tudes toward racial minorities and women. In this 30-item self-report sum of squares and was most appropriate for the data. Second,
scale, researchers use a Likert-type response format ranging from 1 we conducted a nonhierarchical k-means cluster analysis using
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Higher scores reflect greater SYSTAT, specifying a five-cluster solution. Cluster groups ranged
awareness of and sensitivity to racial diversity and gender equality. The in size from 32 to 61 participants.
scale comprises the following three subscales: (a) Cognitive Racial To facilitate the interpretation of the PCRW patterns of the five
Attitudes (9 items; “I believe that reading The Autobiography of Mal- cluster groups, in the following paragraphs we describe scores on
colm X would be of value”; ␣ ⫽ .85–.91); (b) Affective Racial Attitudes each PCRW subscale for each group with reference to the overall
(7 items; “I feel I could develop an intimate relationship with someone
mean and standard deviation of the subscale. Interpretive criteria
from a different race;” ␣ ⫽ .70 –.79); and (c) Attitudes Toward Wom-
are based on dividing the total sample distribution on each sub-
en’s Equity (7 items; “I look forward to the day when a woman is
president of the United States”; ␣ ⫽ .70 –.77). Previous studies have scale into thirds. A cluster group’s score on a subscale is consid-
provided support for the convergent and discriminant validity of the ered to be “high” if the group’s average score falls within the upper
scale (see Ponterotto, Potere, & Johansen, 2002). As recommended by third of the overall distribution of scores (i.e., at least 0.43 SD
Ponterotto et al. (2002), we administered the entire QDI, although we above the total sample’s subscale mean score). “Moderate” refers
chose to examine only the two race-based subscales, which were most to group scores that fall within the middle third of the overall
PCRW CLUSTER PATTERNS 437
Figure 1. K-means cluster group Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites (PCRW) patterns.
distribution of scores (i.e., within ⫾ 0.43 SD of the total sample’s sis using an independent data set from a published study (see
subscale mean score). “Low” refers to group scores that are in the Spanierman & Heppner, 2004). The participants in this validation
lower third of the overall distribution of scores (i.e., at least – 0.43 sample included 366 White undergraduate students enrolled in a
SD below the total sample’s subscale mean score). See Figure 1 for mid-sized Midwestern university (see Spanierman & Heppner,
the five cluster groups’ mean subscale score patterns. The number 2004, for a detailed description of the participants and methodol-
of participants in each cluster group is presented in the following ogy). Cluster groups from this sample ranged in size from 28 to
paragraphs along with a brief description of the cluster group’s 117 participants. Overall, the PCRW patterns for the cluster groups
PCRW pattern. across the two samples demonstrated strong consistency on each of
Cluster A—Unempathic and unaware. Cluster A (n ⫽ 41) was the five groups identified in the k-means clustering solution. The
characterized by low levels of White Empathic Reactions, low numbers of individuals within each of the clusters for this sample
White Guilt, and moderate White Fear of Others. are Cluster A (n ⫽ 69), Cluster B (n ⫽ 117), Cluster C (n ⫽ 83),
Cluster B—Empathic but unaccountable. This was the largest Cluster D (n ⫽ 69), and Cluster E (n ⫽ 28). The validation sample
cluster group (n ⫽ 61). Participants exhibited high scores on White cluster groups for informed empathy and guilt reported moderate
Empathic Reactions as well as low scores on White Guilt and levels of White Fear of Others, and the unempathic and unaware
White Fear of Others. group reported moderate levels of both White Guilt and White
Cluster C—Informed empathy and guilt. This cluster group Fear of Others, compared with the low scores on these measures in
(n ⫽ 32) exemplified high White Empathic Reactions and the the initial cluster sample. Additionally, the fearful guilt validation
highest White Guilt scores of all the cluster groups. Additionally, cluster reported a moderate level of White Guilt, compared with
this cluster group scored low on White Fear of Others.
the high level reported by the initial cluster sample.
Cluster D—Fearful guilt. The fearful guilt cluster group (n ⫽
A chi-square analysis, which we conducted to test for differ-
56) demonstrated high scores on White Guilt and White Fear of
ences in the proportion of individuals grouped into each cluster for
Others, along with moderate scores on White Empathic Reactions.
both samples, was significant, 2(4, N ⫽ 596) ⫽ 20.89, p ⬍ .001,
Only Cluster C had a higher score on White Guilt, with the
which may reflect differences between the two samples in political
remaining cluster groups demonstrating distinctly lower levels of
affiliation and other demographic characteristics. As suggested by
White Guilt.
Henry, Tolan, and Gorman-Smith (2005), we conducted a 2 (sam-
Cluster E—Insensitive and afraid. This cluster group (n ⫽ 40)
ple) ⫻ 5 (cluster group) multivariate analysis of variance
was characterized by the highest score on White Fear of Others
and a low score on White Guilt. Additionally, the cluster group (MANOVA) to further test for cluster stability (i.e., if the cluster
exhibited low scores on White Empathic Reactions. groups are an exact replication in each sample, no interaction
effect will be present). Our data exhibited main effects for sample,
⌳ ⫽ .92, F(3, 584) ⫽ 16.13, p ⬍ .001, 2 ⫽ .08, and for cluster
Validation of PCRW Clusters
groups, ⌳ ⫽ .10, F(12, 1545) ⫽ 173.96, p ⬍ .001, 2 ⫽ .53. A
To validate the identified five-cluster solution obtained from the significant interaction effect, ⌳ ⫽ .58, F(12, 1545) ⫽ 29.67, p ⬍
present sample, we performed an identical k-means cluster analy- .001, 2 ⫽ .17, indicated that cluster groups in the validation
438 SPANIERMAN, POTEAT, BEER, AND ARMSTRONG
sample were not an exact replication of the groups in the initial reported support on a Likert-type scale. Cluster D’s participants
sample. Specifically, we noted differences in two cluster groups: were concentrated in the moderate levels, and Clusters A and B
Cluster E and Cluster D. Upon further inspection, the differences included approximately equivalent percentages of participants re-
in Cluster E offer stronger support for our interpretation, namely, porting support at each of the six levels (1 ⫽ low; 6 ⫽ high).
that the validation sample expressed even lower scores on White Finally, cluster groups significantly differed in political affilia-
Empathic Reactions and higher scores on White Fear of Others. tion, 2(20, N ⫽ 227) ⫽ 36.61, p ⬍ .01. Specifically, 47.5% of
Additionally, the overall pattern of the cluster group (i.e., low individuals in Cluster E identified their affiliation as Republican,
empathy, low guilt, high fear) was the same. Cluster D, however, followed by individuals reporting none or other (27.5% total),
does not appear as stable, as the level of guilt in the validation Democrat (20.0%), Libertarian (2.5%), and Independent (2.5%). In
sample cluster is not as high as that in the initial sample. contrast, 51.6% of individuals in Cluster C identified their affili-
ation as Democrat, followed by individuals reporting Republican
(19.4%), none or other (16.2% total), or Independent (12.9%). It is
Comparison of PCRW Cluster Patterns
noteworthy that approximately 50% of Democrats, as opposed to
Demographic variables. We compared the cluster groups of 30% of Republicans, were found in cluster groups containing
individuals from the present sample on relevant demographic higher levels of White Guilt (i.e., Clusters C and D).
variables and found several significant differences. We noted Racial awareness and cultural sensitivity. Using MANOVA,
significant differences in the cluster groups by gender, 2(4, N ⫽ we evaluated color-blind racial attitudes (as measured by CoBRAS
230) ⫽ 20.24, p ⬍ .001. Specifically, Clusters A, B, and E scores) and cultural sensitivity (as measured by QDI scores) to
contained a balanced representation of men and women. A greater assess for potential cluster group differences (see Table 1 for
representation of female participants was present in Clusters C and means and standard deviations). We found an overall significant
D, each of which consisted of more than 75% women. Addition- cluster group effect, ⌳ ⫽ .46, F(20, 707.29) ⫽ 9.40, p ⬍ .001,
ally, the highest proportion of men was concentrated in Cluster A 2 ⫽ .18. Follow-up univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs)
(29%) and Cluster B (28%). Significant differences also appeared indicated that the clusters differed significantly on each CoBRAS
regarding level of multicultural education, 2(16, N ⫽ 230) ⫽ subscale: Racial Privilege, F(4, 217) ⫽ 9.10, p ⬍ .001, 2 ⫽ .14;
29.35, p ⬍ .05. For Clusters B, C, and D, the majority (42.6%– Institutional Discrimination, F(4, 217) ⫽ 9.67, p ⬍ .001, 2 ⫽ .15;
50.0%) of participants reported some multicultural education, and and Blatant Racial Issues, F(4, 217) ⫽ 13.35, p ⬍ .001, 2 ⫽ .20.
the informed empathy and guilt cluster included the highest per- Least squares difference (LSD) post hoc comparisons revealed that
centage of participants reporting quite a bit to extensive multicul- Clusters C and D did not significantly differ from one another on
tural education (34.4%). Furthermore, compared with other Racial Privilege but were significantly different from all other
groups, Clusters E and A were represented by the highest percent- cluster groups on this subscale. With regard to Institutional Rac-
age of those reporting “none” with regard to multicultural educa- ism, Cluster C differed significantly from all other cluster groups
tion (16.0% and 9.8%, respectively). and demonstrated the lowest score on this subscale. Cluster E
We also compared the cluster groups on percentage of close differed significantly from all other cluster groups and demon-
friends who were White. Results indicated that significant differ- strated the highest score on this subscale. LSD post hoc compar-
ences did exist, 2(16, N ⫽ 230) ⫽ 62.39, p ⬍ .001. Specifically, isons also revealed significant differences in the following cluster
Clusters B and C were the only groups in which the majority of group with regard to Blatant Racial Issues: Cluster E differed
members reported that less than 75% of their friends were White, significantly from all other cluster groups, demonstrating the high-
compared with Clusters A, D, and E, which were composed est score on this subscale; no significant differences emerged
primarily of members reporting that 75% or more of their friends among Clusters B, C, or D.
were White. Furthermore, Cluster E had the highest percentage of Follow-up ANOVAs revealed that the clusters also differed
members reporting 75% or more White friends (87.5%), and significantly on the QDI subscales of interest: Cognitive Racial
Cluster C had the lowest percentage of such members (25.0%). Attitudes, F(4, 217) ⫽ 22.15, p ⬍ .001, 2 ⫽ .29; Affective Racial
Similarly, we evaluated cluster groups on exposure to people of Attitudes, F(4, 217) ⫽ 36.67, p ⬍ .001, 2 ⫽ .40. LSD post hoc
other races and found significant differences, 2(12, N ⫽ 230) ⫽ comparisons revealed that Clusters C and E significantly differed
54.31, p ⬍ .001. Cluster E contained the highest percentage from all cluster groups on both subscales, with Cluster C demon-
(42.5%) of members reporting “none” to a “small” amount of strating the highest scores on both subscales and Cluster E dem-
exposure to people of other races and contained 5% of members onstrating the lowest scores on both subscales. Furthermore, with
reporting a “high” amount of exposure. Clusters C and D were regard to Cognitive Racial Attitudes, all cluster groups differed
primarily composed of participants reporting a “moderate” amount significantly from one another with the exception of Clusters B
of exposure to people of other races (71.9% and 78.6%, respec- and D. With regard to Affective Racial Attitudes, all cluster groups
tively), whereas Clusters A and B included relatively equivalent differed significantly from one another with the exception of
percentages of participants reporting none, small, moderate, and Clusters A and D.
high exposure to people of other races.
We also noted significant differences in the cluster groups by Discussion
affirmative action attitudes, 2(20, N ⫽ 228) ⫽ 44.22, p ⬍ .01. In
particular, in Cluster E, none of the participants reported high To address the complexities of White individuals’ experiences
support of affirmative action, and in Cluster C, none of the par- of the psychosocial costs of racism, we used cluster analysis to
ticipants reported low support of affirmative action. Additionally, consider the three PCRW subscales simultaneously and to identify
participants in Cluster C were concentrated at higher levels of patterns of such experiences. The present investigation is an ex-
PCRW CLUSTER PATTERNS 439
Table 1
Cluster Group Means and Standard Deviations on the Color-Blind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS) and the Quick Discrimination
Index (QDI)
PCRW
PCRW PCRW Cluster C: PCRW PCRW
Cluster A: Cluster B: Informed Cluster D: Cluster E:
Unempathic Empathic but empathy Fearful Insensitive
and unaware unaccountable and guilt guilt and afraid
(n ⫽ 41) (n ⫽ 61) (n ⫽ 32) (n ⫽ 56) (n ⫽ 40)
LSD post hoc tests
Subscale M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD F 2 ( p ⬍ .001)
CoBRAS
Racial Privilege 26.90 6.55 26.02 5.38 21.81 5.90 22.31 6.36 28.28 5.72 9.38* .15 C, D ⬍ A, B, E
Institutional Racism 26.98 5.76 24.54 5.02 21.72 6.80 24.91 5.85 29.69 5.90 9.73* .15 C ⬍ A, B, D ⬍ E
Blatant Racial Issues 15.05 4.20 12.20 3.78 11.44 3.42 13.00 3.88 17.15 4.55 13.61* .20 B, C, D ⬍ A ⬍ E
QDI
Cognitive 27.59 4.58 31.07 4.57 34.41 5.45 30.62 5.45 24.20 4.88 22.79* .29 E ⬍ A ⬍ B, D ⬍ C
Affective 24.20 4.99 26.08 4.25 28.69 3.16 24.00 3.35 17.88 3.92 38.36* .41 E ⬍ A, D ⬍ B ⬍ C
tension of earlier quantitative studies in which researchers exam- participants seemed qualitatively different than that of the previous
ined single subscale scores on the PCRW Scale (Poteat & Spa- group. For example, those in the Cluster C were likely experienc-
nierman, 2006; Spanierman & Heppner, 2004) and provides a ing guilt on the basis of awareness of White privilege and institu-
more advanced quantitative modeling of the complex experiences tional racism, as found in previous studies (Arminio, 2001). Par-
of costs identified in existing qualitative research (Spanierman et ticipants in the Cluster D did have a moderate awareness of White
al., in press; Utsey et al., 2005). The results revealed five distinct privilege, but this was concomitant with low scores on the Affec-
cluster groups, which represent a more integrative and nuanced tive Racial Attitudes subscale (i.e., personal contact with people of
portrayal of relative differences in White individuals’ perceptions other races) of the QDI and high levels of White Fear of Others
of the experiences of the costs of racism, thus contributing to subscale of the PCRW. Additionally, participants reported only
further refinement of the theory of the psychosocial costs of racism moderate empathic reactions toward racism and had mostly White
to Whites to include such patterns. friends.
In addition to high levels of empathy and guilt, and in conjunc- The uniqueness of this combination of high guilt and moderate
tion with low levels of fear, Cluster C consisted of participants empathy in Cluster D may be particularly important as empathy
with the greatest levels of racial awareness (i.e., lowest scores on has been identified as a crucial characteristic of White antiracism
the CoBRAS) and cultural sensitivity (i.e., highest scores on the (Goodman, 2001). We speculate that at least two distinct types of
QDI). This group was predominantly female and contained the White guilt exist, namely accountable (i.e., informed empathy)
smallest number of male participants of all the cluster groups guilt and fearful guilt. Empathy felt toward those targeted by
(8.4% of the men were in this group, n ⫽ 7). This result is racism was found to significantly predict support for equal oppor-
consistent with previous findings that women are more likely than tunity policy, whereas guilt was found not to predict such support
men to experience affective, ethnocultural empathy (Wang et al., (Iyer et al., 2003). Furthermore, accountable guilt is more likely to
2003). Because of the participants’ low CoBRAS scores, we exist in conjunction with empathy and, ultimately, might predict
consider the empathic reactions to be informed on the basis of an antiracist activism. Because the effect of guilt on individuals’
understanding of institutional racism. Among all the cluster racial attitudes and behaviors could be moderated by the extent to
groups, this group reported high levels of prior multicultural edu- which they experience other additional costs, coordinators of pro-
cation and racial diversity among friendship groups. We deem this gramming efforts should take into consideration the specific type
cluster as the most desirable typology, and it is our hope that of guilt that individuals are experiencing (i.e., cluster group mem-
interventions derived from our work will facilitate more White bership) to be maximally effective and appropriate. With regard to
individuals exhibiting this pattern. theory refinement, guilt is not necessarily undesirable, as has been
We note that Cluster D, one of the larger groups, scored simi- indicated in some anecdotal literature. Rather, it could depend on
larly to the previously described Cluster C on the White Guilt whether it is experienced concomitantly with particular additional
subscale. Had we examined the subscales only in isolation, we costs and the degree to which these additional costs are experi-
might assume that participants in these two groups have had enced. The interpretation of Cluster D is somewhat tentative at this
similar experiences of White Guilt. However, when observing the point because the corresponding validation sample cluster did not
scores in the context of the patterns of costs, we named this group report the same degree of guilt. Future researchers need to conduct
fearful guilt to highlight that the type of guilt exhibited by these additional research to explore the role of guilt in White individu-
440 SPANIERMAN, POTEAT, BEER, AND ARMSTRONG
als’ perceptions of the cost of racism and to evaluate the stability distress may be more likely to fall into Cluster D or Cluster E than
of Cluster D. individuals who report low levels of emotional distress. Further-
Cluster B exhibited similar high levels of White Empathic more, researchers could use cluster group membership to predict
Reactions and low levels of White Fear of Others, as did those in actual race-related behaviors, such as willingness to endorse an
Cluster C. Therefore, if we examined these two subscale scores in affirmative action program or demonstration of multicultural coun-
isolation, these participants would appear identical. However, seling competence, which would enrich the research in this area
Cluster B expressed low levels of White Guilt, thus portraying a beyond self-report accounts.
rather different experience than did the other group. This lack of In addition, qualitative investigation, perhaps in the form of
guilt may be related to participants’ lower levels of awareness of focus groups organized by cluster membership, could address
racial privilege than those of Cluster C. However, because Cluster current speculations about various differences between groups
B’s awareness of racial privilege was moderate rather than low, we (e.g., level of education or awareness, experiences of guilt, level of
speculate that this pattern might be similar to responses revealed multicultural social desirability) and would add meaning to under-
by White students in previous qualitative research. Specifically, in standing Whites’ experiences of costs. This type of work is nec-
a study conducted by Ancis and Szymanski (2001) students por- essary for researchers to identify critical variables in forming
trayed an awareness of White privilege, disgust, and sadness about education and training interventions toward increasing White sup-
such privilege yet indicated no action to relinquish such privilege. port and White involvement in combating racism.
Future researchers need to address this speculation. Implications for practice evolving from current and future pro-
Participants in Cluster A appeared similar to those in Cluster E posed research lie primarily in the education and training of White
except that those in the latter group experienced higher levels of students and community members on topics of race and racism. As
White Fear of Others, which is associated with their significantly universities and counseling centers increase their focus on multi-
lower scores on racial sensitivity. These patterns reflect the com- cultural education for students (Hytten & Adkins, 2001), the
mon assumption in the racism and critical Whiteness studies importance of understanding the experiences of all students with
literature regarding the ease with which White Americans can regard to racism is highlighted. Investigation of the experiences of
construct a reality that denies the existence of racism (Wildman & the costs of racism to Whites, although a relatively new area of
Davis, 1996). With regard to multicultural training, knowledge of research, is of great importance considering Whites’ dominant
these nuances would inform the facilitation of an experiential, safe, (i.e., privileged) roles in society. Multicultural programming,
interactive component for persons in these groups (especially those workshops, and other intervention efforts likely will be more
who demonstrate White fear). effective when they are specifically tailored to and take into
Interpretation of the current results requires consideration of consideration the patterns of costs experienced by Whites. Because
inherent limitations. Because we found a significant Sample ⫻ we have demonstrated that the cluster groups identified in this
Cluster interaction effect, 2 ⫽ .17, which is considered a large investigation differ significantly on several racial attitudes and
effect (Cohen, 1988), our interpretation of the cluster groups is beliefs, assessing patterns of costs would also provide a sense of
somewhat tentative. As described earlier, this effect can be attrib- attitudes and beliefs of participating individuals related to race and
uted to two of the cluster groups and, in particular, centers on our racism, thereby providing a practical and efficient way for facili-
interpretation of Cluster D. The reliability of the five-cluster so- tators to tailor their programming efforts. Furthermore, educators
lution across additional, diverse samples is not yet known. In the may be able to use information regarding the costs of racism to
present study, we assessed only college students in the Midwest; Whites to engage White students in learning about a system that
thus, researchers would need to replicate our study with geograph- might otherwise seem insignificant to their own being.
ically dispersed samples of students and community members to
support clear conclusions and implications. In addition, the inter- References
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E
S
S
A
Y
This puts what is a very sensitive issue rather starkly. Many vocal advocates for racial
equality have been loath to consider the possibility that problematic patterns of be-
havior could be an important factor contributing to our persisting disadvantaged
status. Some observers on the right of American politics, meanwhile, take the po-
GLENN C. LOURY sition that discrimination against blacks is no longer an important determinant of
Merton P. Stoltz unequal social outcomes. I have long tried to chart a middle course—acknowledging
Professor of the antiblack biases that should be remedied while insisting on addressing and reversing
Social Sciences the patterns of behavior that impede black people from seizing newly opened oppor-
Department of tunities to prosper. I still see this as the most sensible position.
Economics
Brown University These two positions can be recast as causal narratives. One is what I call the “bias
narrative”: racism and white supremacy have done us wrong; we can’t get ahead until
they relent; so we must continue urging the reform of white American society toward
that end.
The other is what I call the “development narrative,” according to which it is essen-
tial to consider how a person comes to acquire those skills, traits, habits, and orien-
tations that foster successful participation in American society. To the extent that
African-American youngsters do not have the expe- rigorously defined. In a 2002 book, The Anatomy of
riences, are not exposed to the influences, and do Racial Inequality, I sketched a theory of race ap-
not benefit from the resources that foster and facil- plicable to the social and historical circumstances
itate their human development, they fail to achieve of the U.S., speculated about why racial inequali-
their full human potential. This lack of development ties persist, and advanced a conceptual framework
is what ultimately causes the persistent, stark racial for thinking about social justice in matters of race.1
disparities in income, wealth, education, family Because there remains so much confusion in today’s
structure, and much else. (The charts and tables on public discussions about race and racial inequality,
this and the next several pages offer a glimpse of the I need to revisit that framework. Bear with me. The
magnitude of these disparities.) relevance of this conceptual excursion will be clear
soon enough.
In terms of prescribing intervention and remedy,
these causal narratives point in very different direc-
tions. The bias narrative says that we need to have
a “conversation” about race: white America must Categorization Versus
reform itself; racism must end; we need more of this
or that, whatever the “this” or “that” is on the agenda Signification
of today’s race reformers. One hears this kind of talk,
one reads these exhortations, in newspapers and For me, the term “race” refers to indelible and her-
other media every day. itable marks on human bodies—skin color, hair
texture, bone structure—that are of no intrinsic sig-
The development narrative puts more onus on the nificance but that nevertheless have, through time,
responsibilities of African-Americans to develop come to be invested with social expectations that are
our human potential. It is not satisfied with wishful more or less reasonable and social meanings that
thinking like: “If we could only double the budget are more or less durable. When we talk about race
for some social program, the homicide rate among in America or anywhere else, we are actually dealing
young African-American men would be less atro- with two distinct processes: categorization and sig-
cious.” Or, “If we can just get this police department nification. Categorization entails sorting people into
investigated by the Department of Justice, then.…” a small number of subsets based on bodily marks
The development narrative asks, Then what? Then and differentiating one’s dealings with such persons
it will be safe to walk on the south side of Chicago accordingly. It is a cognitive act—an effort to com-
after midnight? prehend the social world around us.
Meanwhile, the terms themselves—race and dis- Signification is an interpretative act—one that as-
crimination—are often bandied about without being sociates certain connotations or “social meanings”
40% 43 43
Black
Black
$10,000 30%
$12,200 $11,200
20%
10%
$1,000
0%
'83 '86 '89 '92 '95 '98 '01 '04 '07 '10 '13 '76 '82 '88 '94 '00 '06 '15
Source: Pew Research Center, Social & Demographic Trends, “Demographic Trends and Source: Pew Research Center, “Demographic Trends and Economic Well-Being”
Economic Well-Being,” June 27, 2016
60%
35% 42.3
Asians
53
40% 38.3
30% Blacks 36.8 50%
30 26
30.4 Whites
25% 30% 40% 36
24 39
23
Hispanics 23.9
20%
20.2 30% Blacks
Asians 20% 23
15% 16
12
14.3
20%
10% 9.9
10.7
10 10% 10 15
8 Whites 10% Hispanics
5% 4
5
0% 0% 0%
'74 '84 '94 '04 '14 Age Under Under '64 '72 '80 '88 '96 '04 '15
18–64 age 18 age 6
Source: Pew Research Center, “Demographic Trends Source: Economic Policy Institute, The State Source: Pew Research Center, “Demographic Trends and
and Economic Well-Being” of Working America Economic Well-Being”
200
40 40
18-24
150 10
30 30
18-24
100
20 18-24 25+
18-24 20
5
25+
25+
10 50 10
25+
14-17 14-17 14-17
0 14-17 0 0 0
'75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05
Source: James Alan Fox and Marianne W. Zawitz, “Homicide Trends in the United States,” Bureau of Justice Statistics
400
40 40
18-24 300 10
30 30
18-24
18-24
200
20 20
14-17 5
25+ 25+
100 18-24
10 10
25+ 25+
14-17 14-17
14-17
0 0 0 0
'75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05
200
Hispanic
40% 40
Black
35 150 non-Hispanic
Hispanics
29 27.1
Source: Pew Research Center, “Demographic Trends Source: “U.S. Rates of Pregnancy, Birth and Abortion Source: “Abortion Rates by Race and Ethnicity,”
and Economic Well-Being” Among Adolescents and Young Adults Continue to Guttmacher Institute, Oct. 19, 2017
Decline,” Guttmacher Institute, Sept. 17, 2017
Race/ethnicity
White 16 43 36 4
Black 45 42 12 #
Hispanic 42 43 15 1
Asian/ 20 39 36 5
Pacific Islander
American Indian/
44 38 16 2
Alaska Native
70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent below Basic Percent at or above Basic
# Rounds to zero
Source: “Status and Trends in the Education of Racial and Ethnic Groups,” NCES, July 2010
Race/ethnicity
White 21 36 37 6
Black 46 38 15 1
Hispanic 40 40 18 2
Asian/ 26 38 31 5
Pacific Islander
American Indian/
33 41 24 ‡
Alaska Native
70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent below Basic Percent at or above Basic
Race/ethnicity
White 17 40 33 11
Black 50 37 11 1
Hispanic 43 40 15 2
Asian/ 15 31 34 20
Pacific Islander
American Indian/
44 38 15 3
Alaska Native
70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent below Basic Percent at or above Basic
Source: “Status and Trends in the Education of Racial and Ethnic Groups,” NCES, 2010
Race/ethnicity
White 30 41 26 3
Black 70 25 5 #
Hispanic 60 32 8 #
Asian/ 27 37 30 6
Pacific Islander
American Indian/
58 36 5 1
Alaska Native
70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent below Basic Percent at or above Basic
# Rounds to zero
Source: “Status and Trends in the Education of Racial and Ethnic Groups,” 2010
50%
40%
30%
20%
19.6
15.4
10%
11.1 10.5
8.7 8.2 7.8 8.8
6.4 6.2 2.3 1.5 2.3 2.2 6.4
4.0 5.9 3.6 0.7 3.8 5.2 5.1 3.9
0% 4.3
Total White Black Hispanic Asian Pacific American Indian/ Two or
Islander Alaska Native more races
Race/ethnicity
Source: “Status and Trends in the Education of Racial and Ethnic Groups 2017,” NCES, July 2017
dnapier@coe.uga.edu
In "I'm Not a Racist, but . . .": The Moral Quandary of Race, Blum scrutinizes the
moral and ethical dimensions of the debate on the topic of race. His principal
argument is that the debate has become polarized, that everything that happens in the
racial arena is labeled as "racism," and that this reduces the term's power to evoke
proper moral outrage. Blum sets out to clarify definitions and types of racism, the
varieties of "racial ills" or symptoms of racism, the distinction between racial
discrimination and color blindness, and the evolution of racial ideology in American
society. He begins with a brief historical sketch of the origins of the term racism (pp.
3-8), then tackles the core meanings of racism under the categories of personal-,
social-, and institutional types of racism. He postulates that all forms of racism can be
related to one of two general paradigms, namely "inferiorization" and
"antipathy/prejudice" (pp. 10-13), both illustrated in the opening chapters. Blum
argues that the terms racism and racist have been "conceptually inflated and morally
overloaded" (p.18), that racial acts are prompted by unadulterated racism in some
cases, but in other cases by motives that are not necessarily racist-hence the title of the
book. He dares to ask questions such as: "Why is racism a moral evil?" "Can blacks
be racist?" and "Do races exist?"
Blum restricts his focus to American society for the most part, and this narrows the
potential value of the argument and of the book as a whole. International origins and
elements of racism are given only brief treatment in the opening chapter. Blum also
focuses largely on the black/white dimensions of racism, making rather sparse
reference to other groups in American society. The historical overview (largely in
chapters 6 and 7) interrupted the flow of Blum's argument across chapters, and would
have been more useful as an introduction. His concluding thoughts on the ideal of
superceding race would have been better served if juxtaposed with the obvious
counterargument that we might never be able to move beyond race, that re-
racialization is perhaps as likely as de-racialization.
The book is likely to interest anyone interested in the history of race and racism in the
United States. It would be useful for researchers as they examine their own data and
experiences that pertain to the question of race in fields such as anthropology,
education, sociocultural studies, multiculturalism, and American sociocultural and
political history. It has modest value as a bibliographic resource but the detailed
endnotes are worth attention. Because of its predominantly American focus its
usefulness to international scholars would be limited to insight into the American
context. For teaching, this could be a valuable supplementary text in graduate courses
in anthropology, postcolonial studies, African American studies, race and race
relations, and cross cultural or multicultural studies, sociology, and political
philosophy. I have used the book provocatively in a doctoral level educational
foundations course on postcolonialism and cultural politics: Blum's arguments evoked
vehement reactions in my students (from agreement, to outrage and indignation).
Overall, any researcher, teacher, or student concerned with matters of race will find
Blum a valuable read, an exhortation to reflect on one's inner feelings about race and
racism as well as on one's position on the issues in society at large.
(c)2003 American Anthropological Association. This review is cited in the December
2003 issue (34:4) of Anthropology & Education Quarterly. It is indexed in the
December 2003 issue (34:4).
The Nonperformativity of Antiracism
Author(s): Sara Ahmed
Source: Meridians , 2006, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2006), pp. 104-126
Published by: Duke University Press
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Meridians
The Nonperformativity of
Antiracism
In this paper, I reflect on institutional speech acts: those that make claims
"about" or "on behalf of an institution. Such speech acts involve acts of nam-
ing: the institution is named, and in being "given" a name, the institution is
also "given" attributes, qualities, and even a character. By "speech acts" I in-
clude not just spoken words but writing and visual images - all the materials
that give an institution interiority, as if it has a face, as well as feelings,
thoughts, orjudgments. They might say, forexample, "the university regrets,"
or just simply, "we regret." More specifically, in this paper, I examine docu-
ments that are authorized by institutions (such as race-equality policies,
which are often signed by, say, the vice-chancellor on behalf of an institution),
make claims about the institution (for instance, by describing the institution
as having certain qualities, such as being diverse), or point toward future ac-
tion (by committing an institution to a course of action, such as diversity or
equality, which in turn might involve the commitment of resources).
Such speech acts do not do what they say: they do not, as it were, commit a
person, organization, or state to an action. Instead, they are nonperformatives.
They are speech acts that read as if they are performatives, and this "reading"
generates its own effects. For John Langshaw Austin a performative refers to
a particular class of speech. An utterance is performative when it does what it
says: "the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action" (1975, 6).
For Austin, conditions have to be in place to allow such words to act, or in his
104
speech act: rather, it "works" because it fails to bring about what it names. My
paper will be structured by taking up four specific forms of institutional
speech acts: admissions, commitments, performances, and descriptions.
Second, in this paper, I want to suggest that the nonperformativity of anti-
racist speech acts requires a new approach to the relation between texts and
social action, which I will be calling "an ethnography of texts." Such an ap-
proach still considers texts as actions, which "do things," but it also suggests
that "texts" are not "finished" as forms of action, as what they "do" depends
on how they are "taken up." To track what texts do, we need to follow them
around. If texts circulate as documents or objects within public culture, then
our task is to follow them, to see how they move as well as how they get stuck.
So rather than just looking at university documentation on diversity for what
it says, although I do this, as close readings are important and necessary, I
also ask what they do, in part by talking to practitioners who use these docu-
ments to support their actions. This paper hence draws on interviews with
diversity and equal opportunities officers or staff from personnel units with
responsibility for diversity at ten universities in the United Kingdom, an anal-
ysis of policy documents and my own participation in discussions within
universities and policy conferences.
The academic and political background to this research is provided by
Admissions
It is worth noting that psychological language that creeps into the defini-
tion: "processes, attitudes, and behaviour which amount to discrimination
through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness, and racist stereo-
typing" (Macpherson Report 1999, 1). In a way, the institution becomes rec-
ognized as racist only through being posited as an individual, as someone
who suffers from prejudice but who could be treated so that they would act
better toward racialized others. To say "we are racist" is here translated into
the statement it seeks to replace, "I am racist," where "our racism" is de-
scribed as a bad practice that can be changed through learning more tolerant
attitudes and behavior. Indeed, if the institution becomes like the individual,
then one suspects that the institution also takes the place of individuals: it is
the institution that is the bad person rather than this person or that person.
In other words, the transformation of the collective into an individual (a col-
lective without individuals) might allow individual actors to deny or refuse
responsibility for collective forms of racism.
But there is more to understanding how institutional racism becomes an
institutional admission. What does it mean for a subject or institution to
posit itself as being racist? If racism is shaped by actions that do not get seen
by those who are its beneficiaries, what does it mean for those beneficiaries
to see it? I would suggest that such admissions might work both by claiming
to see racism (in what the institution fails to do) and by maintaining the defi-
nition of racism as unseeing. If racism is defined as unwitting and collective
prejudice, then the claim to be racist by being able to see racism in this or that
form of practice is also a claim not to be racist in the same way.
The paradoxes of admitting to one's own racism are clear: saying "we are
racist" becomes a claim to have overcome the conditions (unseen racism)
that require the speech act in the first place. The logic is, first, we say, "we are
racist," and insofar as we can admit to being racist (and racists are unwit-
ting) , then we show that "we are not racist, " or at least that we are not racist
I was taught a good lesson, which of course means a hard lesson: the lan-
guage we think of as critical can easily lend itself to the very techniques of
governance we critique. So we wrote the document, and the university was
praised for its policy by the Equality Challenge Unit (ECU), and the vice chan-
cellor was able to congratulate the university on its performance: we did well.
At a meeting with staff, the vice chancellor praised staff for their excellent
work, referring to the letter from the ECU. It was a feel good moment, but
those of us who wrote the document did not feel so good. A document that
documented the racism of the university became usable as a measure of good
performance. Here, having a good race-equality policy quickly got translated
Commitments
The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 (RRAA 2000) places a require-
ment on a wide range of public authorities, including all Further and
Higher Education institutions, to promote race equality in a proactive way
through all their functions and to publish a Race Equality Policy. This
Race Equality Policy has been published to inform all [xxx] staff and stu-
dents and all other partners of our institutional commitment under the re-
quirements of the RRAA 2000. [xxx] recognises that by embracing
diversity it can achieve its ultimate goal to become a 'world class Univer-
sity' and pursue excellence in research, teaching and clinical service.
[xxx] values its diverse community and is opposed to racism in all its
forms. The [xxx] is committed to the fair and equal treatment of all indi-
viduals and aims to ensure that no-one in the [xxx] community is disad-
vantaged on the grounds of race, cultural background, ethnic or national
origin or religious belief.
These documents show the different ways in which the university is imag-
ined as a subject with a commitment to race equality. In the first one, the pol-
icy begins with law: it frames the institutional commitment in terms of
The second quote seems to take us further, insofar as it names racism and
declares the organization as being opposed to racism. At the same time, the
statement also functions to bring the organization into the policy as being
antiracist, a self-declaration that ironically can participate in the concealment
of racism within the university. Declaring a commitment to opposing racism
might function as a form of organizational pride: antiracism as a speech act
might then accumulate value for the organization, as a sign of its own commit-
ment. A university that commits to antiracism might also be one that does not
recognize racism as an ongoing reality, or if it did recognize such racism, then
it would be more likely to see that racism as coming from "strangers" outside
of the institution rather than "natives" inside it. It is as if the university now
says, if we are committed to antiracism (and we have said we are), then how
can we be racists? Declarations of commitment can block recognition of
racism. Paradoxically, the recognition of racism can be taken up as a sign of
commitment, which in turn blocks the recognition of racism. The work of
such speech acts seems to be precisely how they function to hinder rather than
enable action. In other words, the failure, or the nonperformativity, of anti-
racist speech acts is a mechanism for the reproduction of institutional author-
ity, which conceals the ongoing reality of racism.
In one 2005 newspaper article about racism experienced by international
students at Royal Holloway, we can see exactly this mechanism at work. Stu-
dents from Korea complained about racism experienced on campus and
about the failure of the college to respond adequately: "Students, particularly
east Asian students, feel fearful of these attacks and are deeply concerned
that something should be done. But, they have no proper channels of com-
plaint and are worried that too much noise would have a negative effect on
their status at college" (Pai 2005, 3). The article highlights the multiples
ways that racism can affect the experiences of black and Asian students: it
can involve direct violence, and it also affects how students respond to such
violence, fearing that reporting racism would lead to further marginaliza-
tion. But the response of the college to this report was to deny the students'
Responses:
I would say yes but don't say why.
Yes it does, but my angle, I suppose, is that you have to
examples, arguments all the time.
And I think it's a good working document that people
them.
ment" is usually described in opposition to the "tick box"; a tick box approach
to diversity would be where institutions go along with the process, but are not
"behind" the action. For commitment to become a tick in the box is to suggest
that "being behind" can itself be a matter of institutional performance. We
create the illusion of being behind an action, even at the moment the action is
not performed.
The final utterance describes the statement of commitment as a "reference
document" that people can use. This document then exists insofar as people
refer back to it, as something that can help them to do things. Such documents
by implication can only work if they are not obligatory: if people do not have to
use them, then they might work. What this sequences of utterance shows is
Oh that's hard. I think you cannot not have them, if you don't have them,
well to me as a practitioner it's a starting point, again it's whether that
gets fitted into practice. Commitments can't come without other actions.
So the commitment to me is about what the institution believes in and
what it intends to do- it can't stand alone, it has to come with how you're
actually going to do it. I think if they weren't there then, well I refer to
them quite a lot as you well know, if you're trying to, let's say there's an
issue that's come up and somebody is not, maybe there's an issue and per-
haps they're racist in what they bring up in their practice or something
like that, and it's good to refer back to these documents, but actually
you're an employee of the university and the university has made a state-
ment about this. So in terms of watching the other members of staffand
in my own experience, I've used it for that.
tive because it suggests that commitment is an action, but it is one that does
not act on its own. Instead, it depends on other actions, or on what is done
with it. Commitment might be, in other words, a technology that can be used
or deployed within specific settings. The work of commitment is how you act
on the action: it is about what the action allows the practitioner to do. The
statement of commitment is also described as a reference point, something
you can use, when challenging how people act within the institution. In other
words, the statement of commitment does not commit the institution to any-
thing, but it allows the practitioner to support their claims for or against spe-
cific action. The statement functions as a supporting device.
So although a statement of commitment can block action by constructing
the university or organization as already committed to race equality, these
statements also can support other actions precisely by giving this illusion of
Performing Equality
So what work are these documents doing in their failure to bring about the
effects that they name? Such documents arguably are forms of institutional
performance. They are ways in which universities perform an image of them-
selves, to be sure, but they are also ways in which universities perform in the
sense of "doing well." To return to my own experience of writing a diversity
document: the document that documents racism becomes usable as a mea-
sure of good performance. What does it mean for "equality" and "diversity"
to be seen as measurable in the first place? Are they becoming boxes to be
ticked? Or a "paper trail" that goes nowhere?
Diversity and equality are increasingly discussed in the United Kingdom
through an emphasis on good practice. Although good practice is often seen
as "beyond the tick box" (or rather, the tick box approach is seen as bad prac-
tice), I would suggest that "the tick box" and the "good practice" are part of
the same vocabulary. The tick box shows we have done it (whatever we do)
while the good practice shows we have done it (whatever we do), where the
"it" is taken as a sign of good performance. Good practice guides and tool-
kits are produced based on the principle that the best way of improving insti-
tutional performance is to share good practice. These documents too move
around. An example can be taken from the ECU toolkit on communications,
"Good Talking: The HE Communicators Equality and Diversity Toolkit,"
I was very aware that it wasn't very difficult for me and some of the other
people to write a wonderful aspirational document. I think we all have
OK yes. It was about uncovering perceptions, um, about the [xxx] as an em-
ployer
and white male dominated, and they didn't have the right per
[xxx] in terms of what it offers and what it brings to the aca
most of the external people had the wrong perceptions about
Describing Diversity
This Race Equality Policy has been published to inform all [xxx] staff and
students and all other partners of our institutional commitment under the
requirements of the RRAA 2000. [xxx] recognises that by embracing di-
versity it can achieve its ultimate goal to become a 'world class University'
and pursue excellence in research, teaching and clinical service.
[xxx] values its diverse community and is opposed to racism in all its
forms. The [xxx] is committed to the fair and equal treatment of all indi-
viduals and aims to ensure that no one in the [xxx] community is disad-
vantaged on the grounds of race, cultural background, ethnic or national
origin or religious belief.
So now we'll talk about diversity, and that means everybody's different but
equal and its all nice and cuddly and we can feel good about it and feel like
we've solved it, when actually we're nowhere near solving it, and we need
to, I think, have that, well, diversity as a concept fits in much better with
the university's idea of what it's doing about being the great benefactor.
I think for me with equality, as I said, there is some legal framework, and
I think sometimes overemphasised. There's a tension, really, because you
need to make people aware of the legality, but you want to go beyond that
don't you? You don't want it to be about compliance, so for me, I actually
think "diversity" is actually a far more positive word than "equality" so for me
it's about celebration. Whereas equality feels a bit more about, oh, you know,
meetings, legal requirements almost, I don't know, that's just personal.
So what the word "diversity" does might depend on the words it is placed
alongside: using diversity with equality associates the political and legal
challenge to inequalities with the qualities of feeling attached to the celebra-
tion of difference. The aim of such work would be to restick these words to-
gether so that when people hear the word "diversity," they hear a challenge to
inequality.
At the same time, in order to be heard, practitioners also work by attaching
the word "diversity" to the other words that are taken as key to the organiza-
tion's strategic mission, whether it be excellence, internationalism, or wid-
ening participation. In other words, it is the proximity of the term "diversity"
to the self-image of organizations that allows the term to accrue value. Take
the following quotation:
For me, I think that the, well certainly, our aim in the diversity project is to
help the organisation to see how diversity will help meet the strategic
plans. So how can diversity help make us top ten in 2010? What will think-
ing about diversity enable a head of a school that is already very successful
to be more successful? That would be my real aim and to live our vision for
race, which is excellence through diversity.
In following the word "diversity" around, we can see that it gets embraced
by organizations insofar as it is proximate to the ideal images organizations
already have of themselves. To add "diversity" to a mission statement hence
does not necessarily add anything, but, rather, it puts an educational mission
in different terms. And yet this word still has baggage and still gets associated
with people who look different. As Nirmal Puwar points out, "In policy terms,
diversity has overwhelmingly come to mean the inclusion of people who look
different" (2004, 1). Ironically, the hope of putting diversity into university
documentation is that this word will keep these associations, however prob-
lematic they may be. The point would not be to constitute racial others as the
origin of diversity, as what adds color to the white face of the university.
Rather, insofar as diversity signifies the presence of racial others, then it might
also point to how organizations are orientated around whiteness, around
those who are already in place. The happy smiling face of diversity would not
then simply rebrand the university but point instead to what gets concealed by
this very image: the inequalities that are behind it and give it a surface appeal.
In other words, the strategy of associating diversity with the organizational
pride is that the word might yet work to challenge the ideal image of the orga-
nization. It is pride, after all, which is the condition of the possibility for being
shamed for exposing gaps between ideals and actions.
If we consider the politics of describing diversity, we can see that such de-
scriptions create fantasy images of the organizations they apparently repre-
sent. The document says we are diverse, as if saying it makes it so. In a way,
our task must be to refuse to read such documents as performatives, as if they
bring into effect what they name. That is not to say that such documents do
not matter, or that they do not do any work. They do. Indeed, this non-
performativity is what makes them tools that can be used by practitioners as
NOTE
WORKS CITED
The indifference that makes a difference: Why unconcern for minorities disguises prejudicial attitudes
This is the final peer-reviewed author’s accepted manuscript (postprint) of the following publication:
Published Version:
Passini S. (2019). The indifference that makes a difference: Why unconcern for minorities disguises
prejudicial attitudes. JOURNAL OF MORAL EDUCATION, 48(2), 263-274
[10.1080/03057240.2018.1509064].
Availability:
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01 May 2025
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 1
1
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 2
The Indifference that Makes a Difference: Why Unconcern for Minorities Disguises
Prejudicial Attitudes
Stefano Passini
University of Bologna
Author Note
2
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 3
Abstract
Studies on historical episodes of intergroup violence and conflicts have underlined the
introduced, defined as being uncaring vis-à-vis arbitrary policies affecting other social
groups. In the present manuscript, the reasons why an indifferent position towards
minorities may imply some prejudicial attitudes towards them will be analyzed. In
variables that could explain why indifference might mask prejudicial attitudes and a
lack of altruism for out-groups. The results show that moral disengagement and social
indifference to racism and altruism. In particular, the mediation model shows that moral
disengagement partially mediates the path from indifference to racism, while social
responsibility
3
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 4
worldwide circumstances such as the 2008 financial crisis and the exponential
consequences as concerns intergroup relations (Becker, Wagner, & Christ, 2011; Butz
& Yogeeswaran, 2011; Passini, 2015), especially in terms of attitudes towards social
minorities. As some scholars (e.g. Author, 2018; Becker et al., 2011; Bukowski, de
Lemus, Rodriguez-Bailón, & Willis, 2016; Valentova & Callens, 2017; Werts,
Scheepers, & Lubbers, 2013) have pointed out, the use of immigration as a scapegoat
for the economic crisis promoted by some political parties and movements to gain votes
has indeed fueled prejudicial and exclusionary attitudes towards certain out-groups.
Alongside the increase in such open and direct manifestations of hostility, the
present age is also marked by the increasing attitudes of indifference towards the
situation of social minorities. As Passini (2017b, 2017a) has recently pointed out, both
uncertainties deriving from the financial crisis and fears triggered by immigration have
indeed led many people to focus on their own group difficulties and to look away from
and feel indifferent to the restriction of the rights to other social groups. Such feelings
of unconcern towards members of the out-groups lead them to be invisible for the in-
group and support a lowering of the sense of moral salience towards them, that is the
feeling that others are suffering and an action to help them is necessary (Monroe, 2008).
Various studies on past episodes of intergroup violence (see Bauman, 1989; Monroe,
2008; Staub, 2013b) have underlined the complicit role of passive bystanders in not
4
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 5
conflicts. These studies have suggested that the gradual restriction of minorities’ rights
is not only fostered by being compliant with the majority in power, but it is supported
by individual attitudes of indifference towards them. As Monroe (2008) has pointed out
in her analysis of the Holocaust, by avoiding moral implications and dodging their
towards the derogation of minorities’ rights and racism and altruism will be analyzed. In
mechanisms that could explain why indifference might mask prejudicial attitudes and a
lack of altruism for out-groups. In the following paragraph, the notion of intergroup
indifference will be outlined. Lastly, moral disengagement and social responsibility will
be briefly presented.
Indifference as a Prejudice
Various studies on the racial policy of Nazi Germany and on other historical
periods marked by intergroup violence and repression (see Monroe, 2008; Staub, 2014)
have underlined that, rather than being passive, bystanders often had an active and
(2014) has pointed out, bystanders are indeed in a position to know what is happening
and to take action as a consequence. That is, they may decide to pretend nothing is
happening (indirectly encouraging the perpetrators) or they may define that situation as
societies in which we live nowadays, Passini (2017b) has introduced the concept of
5
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 6
affecting other social groups. Such indifference may be revealed by attitudes of explicit
total unconcern for such rights restrictions or by more implicit positions such as those in
which in-group needs are prioritized over those of out-groups to the point that the latter
are not considered. As Dovidio and Gaertner (2004) have pointed out, a certain
invisibility of immigrants and minorities has indeed been strengthened by masking the
denial of minorities’ rights underlying declarations such as “there are other priorities for
In line with the literature on bystanders and their complicit role in evildoing,
Passini (2017b) has analyzed intergroup indifference and its connection with prejudicial
context of in-group vs. out-group categorization (Brown, 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
shown that indifferent citizens had similar scores on scales of prejudicial attitudes to
those people who openly support such policies. These results were confirmed by Author
associated with higher levels of prejudice, even after controlling for agreement to such
rights restrictions.
In the classic experiment by Latané and Darley (1970), the authors mainly
identified three psychological processes to explain the bystander effect. First, people do
not intervene because of social influence: that is, the inactive behavior of the other
6
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 7
bystanders was interpreted as an indication that no help was required. Second, a certain
diffusion of responsibility took over, by which people felt less personally responsible as
they ascribe the responsibility to intervene and the blame for inaction to the other
bystanders suspend their moral principles by dehumanizing and morally excluding the
the two main psychological processes for explaining the bystander effect. Indeed,
delegitimization (Oren, Nets-Zehngut, & Bar-Tal, 2015) and moral exclusion of the out-
groups (Opotow, 2011) by the incumbent political system and people’s disengagement
from moral beliefs (Bandura, 1999, 2016) are fundamental psychological processes for
both perpetrators and bystanders to sustain violent events (see Monroe, 2008; Staub,
2014). “Many passive bystanders, in order to reduce their own empathic distress, may
over time further distance themselves from victims” (Staub, 2013b, p. 578). As Basaran
(2015) has pointed out discussing the deaths of migrants in the Mediterranean,
liberal societies by the use and the increase in intergroup social distance and by the
In line with the studies by Latané and Darley (1970), in the present research
moral disengagement and social responsibility are analyzed as two mediators between
7
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 8
on four levels (see Caprara, Fida, Vecchione, Tramontano, & Barbaranelli, 2009). At
the behavioral level, people depict immoral conducts in moral terms by means of moral
people may attenuate the link between their actions and their consequences by a
displacement or diffusion of responsibility. At the outcome level, people may avoid the
recipient level people may remove empathetic feelings for the victims by attribution of
positively related to racism (Faulkner & Bliuc, 2016) and aggression (Gini, Pozzoli, &
Hymel, 2014) and negatively to altruism (Paciello, Fida, Cerniglia, Tramontano, &
Cole, 2013).
his famous experiment on destructive obedience, the shift of responsibility outside one’s
Contrariwise, the assumption of social responsibility leads people to help others and not
to act against their wellbeing. Social responsibility is defined as the propensity to show
concern for the welfare of others, the perception that other people depend on us and an
attitude that results in behaviors that support the common good (Berkowitz &
Lutterman, 1968; see also Trnka & Trundle, 2017). As various studies (e.g., Ruci, van
Allen, & Zelenski, 2018) have pointed out, people who score high on social
responsibility are more likely to engage in pro-social behaviors and to feel a certain
Hypotheses
8
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 9
The aim of the present research was to analyze the relationship of intergroup
indifference with racism and altruism, and the mediation effects of moral
responsibility and altruism (Hypothesis 1). Second, it was hypothesized that moral
indifference on the one side, and racism and altruism on the other (Hypothesis 2).
Methods
Participants
questionnaire was publicly accessible and an invitation with the link to the
mailing list was used. Respondents were advised that their participation was voluntary
and that their responses would remain anonymous and confidential. No fee was offered.
The questionnaire was drafted in Italian. In order to check and prevent a person from re-
entering the survey site, the subject’s IP address was monitored. The data were collected
in 2017.
A total of 335 Italian citizens (68.1% women) responded by accessing the website
and filling out the questionnaire. Participant ages ranged from 18 to 73 years (M =
27.63, SD = 11.82). They were mainly born in the north of Italy (81%), while 11.5%
and 6% came from the center and the south, respectively, and 1.5% were born abroad.
9
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 10
As regards their level of education, 6.6% declared they had finished middle school,
65.2% declared they had completed a high school diploma, 25.5% had a university
degree and 2.7% a masters or Ph.D. qualification. Job-wise, 59.5% stated they were
university students, 14.7% white collar workers, 4.9% factory workers/craftsmen, 4.5%
self-employed, 3.3% teachers, 4.6% unemployed, 2.3% retired, and 6.3% chose other.
Measures
indifference towards social groups and minorities. The scale was developed by Author
(2017b) and was composed of four items on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): “I am quite indifferent to the news about the Navy’s
actions to send back migrants’ boats from our country,” “The fact that doctors have an
obligation to report illegal (i.e., without a permit) immigrant patients leaves me quite
indifferent,” “I think that Parliament has other priorities than dealing with the rights of
certain minorities” and “I am not very interested in news about civil rights denied to
7-point scale (from 1 = strongly disagree, to 5 = strongly agree) that identify eight
mechanisms of moral disengagement with four items for each mechanism. As suggested
by the author, an overall moral disengagement score was calculated by averaging all the
well: moral justification (“In order to keep family cohesion, its members should always
be defended, even when they are guilty of serious crimes,” α = .56), advantageous
10
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 11
those who pay for favors,” α = .77), displacement of responsibility (“It is not the fault of
drivers if they exceed the speed limit since cars are made to go at high speeds,” α = .61),
when everybody else does the same thing,” α = .61), attribution of blame (“Victims
generally have trouble staying out of harm’s way,” α = .60), distorting consequences
(“Thefts in large department stores are irrelevant compared to the stores’ earnings,” α =
.67), dehumanization (“In order to force some people to work, they have to be treated
to 5 = strongly agree) from the Social Responsibility Scale (Berkowitz & Lutterman,
1968) were used to measure individual likelihood of contributing to the greater good of
one’s own society. A sample item is “I think we should all try to enhance the welfare of
Modern racism. To measure modern racism, four items on a 7-point scale (from
1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree) from the modern sexism scale were adapted
to fit racism toward immigrants (see Wohl & Branscombe, 2009). A sample item is
immigrant racism score was calculated by averaging the four items (α = .83).
Altruism. To measure altruism, the Santa Clara Brief Compassion Scale (Hwang,
Plante, & Lackey, 2008) was used. The scale is composed of five items (e.g., “I tend to
feel compassion for people, even if I do not know them” on a 7-point scale (from 1 =
1
The mechanism “euphemistic language” was removed due to a low Cronbach’s α.
11
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 12
education, job, and ideological affiliation (from 1 = extreme left to 10 = extreme right).
Results
As can be seen in Table 1 (left part), the means showed that in general participants
gave low scores to intergroup indifference, moral disengagement, while they gave high
racism and medium high scores on the altruism scale. Finally, they tended to be
with modern racism, while negatively correlated with social responsibility and altruism.
Moreover, the more people were politically situated on the right-wing, the more they
disengagement was positively correlated with modern racism and negatively correlated
with social responsibility and altruism. Social responsibility was correlated with all the
The mediation of moral disengagement and social responsibility on the path from
indifference to modern racism and altruism was carried out using Mplus 7.4 (Muthen &
Muthen, 2012). A latent variable of moral disengagement was created using the seven
mechanisms scores. As suggested by Hu and Bentler (1999), model fit was assessed
using the Comparative Fit Index (CFI, cutoff value close to .95), the Tucker-Lewis
Index (TLI, cutoff value close to .95), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
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Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 13
(RMSEA, cutoff value close to .06), and Standardized Root Mean Squared Residual
The mediation model fit the data well: χ2(2) = 77.46, CFI = .97, TLI = .96,
social responsibility and altruism. The effect of intergroup indifference on racism (R2 =
.45) was partially mediated by moral disengagement (indirect effect: B = .20, t = 5.16, p
< .001), while the one on altruism (R2 = .44) was partially mediated by social
Discussion
Starting from the literature on the bystander effect, the aim of the present research
was to deepen the concept of intergroup indifference. In particular, the effects of this
mechanisms as intervening variables: i.e., moral disengagement and the lack of social
responsibility.
Firstly, participants in the present research generally have low scores on both
responsibility. These results underline that the majority of participants do not feel
indifferent to minorities and feel morally engaged and responsible for the consequences
of their conduct. However, it is worth noting that scores on modern racism are not so
Gaertner, Ufkes, Saguy, & Pearson, 2016), these results are not self-contradictory, given
that people often openly express prejudicial attitudes against some groups of minorities,
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Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 14
especially immigrants, without feeling any sense of guilt for such positions. Moreover,
as shown by the literature on moral exclusion, people may feel morally engaged and
responsible towards certain social groups but not others, depending on their inclusion or
exclusion from the moral community within which moral values and rules of justice
Secondly, notwithstanding the fact that participants are generally not unconcerned
about the restriction of minorities rights, intergroup indifference is correlated to all the
variables considered and moral disengagement and social responsibility are significant
mediation model shows that moral disengagement partially mediates the path from
indifference to racism, while social responsibility partially mediates the path from
indifference and altruism. Therefore, as hypothesized, the results show the effect of
intergroup indifference on both racism and altruism, in terms of which most people
declare they are indifferent as concerns institutional policies curbing minority rights,
while the more they share biased attitudes, the less they are liable to be altruistic
towards strangers. These effects are differently mediated by the two variables
considered. In this sense, we can assume that indifferent people are biased because they
morally disengage from the consequence of their actions, while they are not altruistic
literature, the results of the mediation suggest the involvement of distinct – albeit
indifference on the one side, and racism and altruism on the other. A lack of moral
the transition from uncaring to derogatory and aversive attitudes towards other social
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Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 15
selfishness and unhelpfulness, and it underlies the shift from uncaring to indifference in
helping others. It should be noted, however, that indirect effects are only partial,
These results have some implications for the analysis of intergroup relationships
and for understanding and reducing those dynamics that lead to prejudice and
agreement with bystander studies (see Staub, 2014) and with those focusing on passive
feeling guilt or remorse. “The struggle over moral issues never takes place, as the moral
aspects of actions are not immediately obvious or are deliberately prevented from
discovery and discussion. In other words, the moral character of action is either
mainly studied in regard to their frequent use during dictatorial regimes, they are often
1999) and moral exclusion (see Passini, 2010) literatures have pointed out, moral
disengagement operates through various strategies that are frequently used nowadays
also in the political, economic and broadcasting domains to disguise some facts and
events under a different light (see Lazar & Lazar, 2004; Passini, Palareti, & Battistelli,
consequences of one’s own actions, are all strategies used by political systems to justify
the restriction of rights of minorities and out-groups (e.g., Oren et al., 2015). Moreover,
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Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 16
people often use strategies that shift one’s own responsibility outside or that remove any
empathetic feelings for the victims by attributing blame or dehumanizing them. In this
sense, dehumanization of people is associated with less support for their rights (Drolet,
Hafer, & Heuer, 2016; Staerklé & Clémence, 2004) and the moral exclusion of social
groups (see Passini, 2014, 2016) fosters their invisibility, promoting a certain
social responsibility. As the analysis of the holocaust by Monroe (2008) has shown,
social responsibility as one of their core values. There is “a critical difference between
rescuers and bystanders. It is not enough merely to do no wrong. You have to do what is
right.” (p. 720). Oliner and Oliner (1992) describes the “altruistic personality” as
disengagement and exclusion, and social responsibility are interconnected and mutually
reinforce each other (see Morselli & Passini, 2010), as the concept of “vertical
societies, it is relevant to break the chain of indifference and turn indifference into
attention to the other (Short, 1999). Some scholars talk about moral courage (Staub,
2013a) and moral inclusion (Passini, 2011) as qualities to be developed in children and
youngsters by encouraging them, for instance, to express what they think and actively
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Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 17
civic engagement and critical consciousness in society (see Freire, 1970), focusing on
the notion of social responsibility and moral engagement. As Lynch, Swartz, and Isaacs
(2017) have pointed out, moral education can help people to no longer be just passive
framework concerned with achieving social justice” (Lynch et al., 2017, p. 130). As
anti-racist education considers racism as operating not only just by way of personal
bias, but in its connection with a system that marginalizes and excludes some groups
towards the restriction of minority rights should be part of the basis of such a moral
education.
This research has some limitations which should be borne in mind for future
research. First of all, the mediation of both moral disengagement and responsibility is
just partial. Other variables should be considered in the future. As Staub (2013a) has
pointed out, moral disengagement is just the first step towards that moral transformation
that allows indifference to support wrongdoings. Secondly, future studies may use an
intervene in a situation.
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Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 18
indifferent people, and not just perpetrators or victims of such dynamics, for
parties and where the enforcement of security often requires collective indifference
populations, to the extent that humanitarian acts and even rescue are questioned,
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Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 19
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Table 1.
Means, Standard Deviations and Pearson Correlation Coefficients among all the
Variables.
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5
1. Intergroup indifference 2.57 1.25 –
2. Moral disengagement 2.19 0.82 .51*** –
3. Social responsibility 5.27 1.15 -.35*** -.33*** –
4. Modern racism 2.91 1.58 .61*** .53*** -.34*** –
5. Altruism 4.76 1.24 -.35*** -.29*** .65*** -.30*** –
6. Ideological affiliation 4.96 1.98 .35*** .21*** -.26*** .50*** -.10
Note. All the variables extended from 1 to 7, except for ideological affiliation from 1 to
10.
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
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Figure Caption
27
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 28
28
Racism Scale: Where do you fall?
<-------------------- Feelings of ‘White Guilt’ can lead to
I inflict Whites are Thugs That is But black Calling the We had a Slavery ended
fear upon under attack/ their on police because black president 200 years ago
black people will be minorities problem, black crime! black folk makes therefore
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@CristiInMD ** The term “blacks” is used to be more familiar to anyone of those mentalities
V4.0 ***”Blacks” can be substituted with people of any nationality/ethnicity other than European white since it’s
RacismScale.weebly.com people of European descent who have held institutional power in America since its inception.