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Touro Law Review

Volume 38 Number 2 Article 5

2022

Denial of Housing to African Americans: Post-Slavery Reflections


from a Civil Rights Advocate
Elaine Gross

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview

Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Courts Commons, Fourteenth Amendment
Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Law and Race Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
Gross, Elaine (2022) "Denial of Housing to African Americans: Post-Slavery Reflections from a Civil Rights
Advocate," Touro Law Review: Vol. 38: No. 2, Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss2/5

This Symposium: The FHA and ADAAA is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro
Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @
Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.
Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans

DENIAL OF HOUSING TO AFRICAN AMERICANS: POST-SLAVERY


REFLECTIONS FROM A CIVIL RIGHTS ADVOCATE
Elaine Gross, MSW*

ABSTRACT

In this article, I draw on two decades of experience as a civil


rights advocate to reflect on the denial of housing to African
Americans in post-slavery America. I do so as Founder and President
of the civil rights organization, ERASE Racism.
I undertake historical research and share insights from my own
experience to create and reflect upon six lessons related to
understanding the systematic discrimination and segregation of
African Americans. The lessons encompass: (1) the role of the federal
government, (2) the role of municipal governments, (3) White
supremacy ideation and actions, (4) legislative advocacy and legal
actions, (5) modern ideological and political forces, and (6) indelible
impressions. These lessons are offered in hopes that they will inform
the work of other social justice advocates, including attorneys, to
finally end structural racism in America.

*
Elaine Gross, MSW draws on her experience as the Founder and President of
ERASE Racism in writing this article. ERASE Racism is a regional civil rights
organization that leads public policy advocacy campaigns and related initiatives to
promote racial equity in areas such as housing, public school education, and
community development. I would like to thank Olivia Ildefonso, Ph.D. and Folasade
Famakinwa, J.D., M.S. for their research assistance.

589

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Touro Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 2 [2022], Art. 5

590 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 38

I. INTRODUCTION

As founder and president of ERASE Racism, I have spent the


past 20 years working to end racial discrimination in housing and
education in Long Island, one of the nation’s 10 most racially
segregated metropolitan regions in the nation. We have had notable
successes during those two decades. I have learned valuable lessons
that I believe can inform the work of social justice advocates, including
attorneys. However, structural racism, which underpins the
fundamental problems of housing and school inequity, has remained
intact.
Needless to say, I have no illusion that I and my staff alone
could successfully unravel structural racism in a mere two decades.
However, I thought it would be instructive to explore the post-slavery
history of our nation when, supposedly, those who were formerly
enslaved were now free; even citizens of the United States. This
contradiction of free yet not free, and citizen but not a citizen will be
explored in this Article.

II. THE PECULIAR DISCRIMINATION AND SEGREGATION


AGAINST AFRICAN AMERICANS

After the end of the Civil War in April 1865 (June was the
surrender of the last sizable confederate armies), the United States
government, seemingly, laid the foundation for the formerly enslaved
Africans to be full citizens of the United States, with equal access to
housing under the law of the land.
In December 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment 1 to the United
States Constitution sought to outlaw slavery throughout the United
States. Congress passed the amendment, and the former confederate
states revised their state constitutions to include abolition of slavery
and ratified the amendment. This amendment covered the United
States as well as “any place subject to their jurisdiction.”2
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, which included multiple
provisions, established that all persons born in the United States,
regardless of race, color, or “previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude,” were entitled to basic rights of citizenship “in

1
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
2
Id. § 1.

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every State and Territory in the United States.”3 The law further
declared that all such individuals were entitled to the following specific
rights:
[1.] [T]o make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
and give evidence [in court] . . . [2. to] give evidence,
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real
and personal property . . . and [3.] to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding .
..4
The law also provided for the conviction and punishment of
individuals who violated the law under what was codified as 18 U.S.C.
§ 242.5 This amendment was vetoed by then President Andrew
Johnson. After an override of the veto by the United States Congress,
it became law in April 1866.
The Fourteenth Amendment, which had been proposed at that
time, provided that all those “born or naturalized in the United States,”
which included former enslaved persons, were “citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside.” 6 It also stated that no
State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty or property . . . nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 7
It was ratified in July 1868.
Yet, the evidence in the following six “Lessons Learned”
sections of this Article demonstrate the failures of federal, state, and
local governments to acknowledge and act on the humanity and
citizenship of African Americans. We see time and again the
undermining of basic rights, including, but not limited to
nondiscriminatory housing for African Americans. We now examine
the impact with regard to the housing issue.

3
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by the Enforcement
Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870)) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983).
4
Id.
5
See 18 U.S.C. § 242.
6
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7
Id.

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592 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 38

For 100 years, between the 1865 ratification of the Thirteenth


Amendment8 and the 1968 Fair Housing Act,9 there were numerous
opportunities for the federal government to put a stop to the
institutionalization of explicit race-based discrimination against
African Americans. Further, this race-based discrimination to deny
African Americans equal access to housing was enshrined in
government policies and actions, the courts, and businesses acting
under the requirements of government agencies or under the
acquiescence, willful support, or willful ignorance of government
regulators. Congress, with power to enforce the United States
Constitution and its own laws, could have and should have put a stop
to the plight of African Americans. Likewise, United States presidents
should have and could have forcefully demanded rigorous enforcement
of the laws designed to protect African Americans. They clearly did
not do enough, and some worked actively to undermine the rights of
African Americans.
For the last 54 years since the passage of the Fair Housing
Act,10 all governments and all businesses in private sectors related to
the development, purchase, or lease of property and housing could
have and should have reversed the buildup of structural impediments
to housing equity. They did not. In fact, as discussed below, those
structural impediments grew in form and number.
Finally, the fellow Americans of good will who were not
African American could have and should have stopped their complicit
actions and silence in the face of persistent acts of discrimination and
segregation, but they did not and have not.
I have reached these conclusions based on the facts that follow,
which are organized under six lessons learned.

8
U.S. CONST. amend XIII.
9
The Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81, 81-92 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631).
10
Id.

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III. LESSONS LEARNED FROM A CIVIL RIGHTS ADVOCATE

A. Lesson One: The Federal Government—Executive,


Legislative, and Judicial Branches—Have Been a
Large Part of the Problem of Housing
Discrimination and Segregation Against African
Americans and Must, Therefore, Be a Large Part
of Any Solution11

In his book, The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How


our Government Segregated America, Richard Rothstein uses
meticulous research to demonstrate how, throughout modern history,
racial segregation in housing has been perpetuated through law and
government policies and intentionally not remediated. He posits that:
[U]ntil the last quarter of the twentieth century, racially
explicit policies of federal, state, and local governments
defined where whites and African Americans should
live. Today’s residential segregation in the North,
South, Midwest, and West is not the unintended
consequence of individual choices and of otherwise
well-meaning law or regulation but of unhidden public
policy that explicitly segregated every metropolitan
area in the United States.12
Rothstein refers to modern history beginning in the twentieth century
when the federal government instituted an official system of
segregation through racially explicit laws, regulations, and
government practices. 13 In 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
administration took office in the midst of a housing crisis that was
made worse because of the Great Depression. 14 The Home Owners
Loan Corporation (“HOLC”) was created by the administration to
refinance mortgages in danger of default. 15 It bought up existing
mortgages and then issued new mortgages to homeowners, providing

11
The term “Government” is used throughout this Article, broadly referring to such
elements as the executive and legislative branches, the judicial branch, and the
enforcement authorities at federal, state and local levels.
12
RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA, at vii-viii (2018).
13
Id.
14
Id. at 63.
15
Id.

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594 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 38

very low interest rates and longer repayment periods—15 and then 25
years.16
HOLC created color-coded maps of neighborhoods for every
major metropolitan region. Areas with African American residents
were colored red and white neighborhoods were colored green. 17 Real
estate agents who knew the racial composition of the local
neighborhoods were important partners for this process. At the time,
the ethics code of the National Association of Real Estate Boards—the
governing body for the real estate agents—stated that the agents should
maintain racially segregated neighborhoods.18
The purpose of the maps was to gauge risk for issuing the new
loans in order to prevent a massive number of foreclosures, and risk
was determined by race. 19 A middle-class African American
community with single family homes would be colored red just like
any other neighborhood with African American residents. When
reviewing the information from the completed forms that were used
to create the maps, you can see in the section entitled “Detrimental
Influences,” there is “Colored infiltration” and “infiltration of
negros.”20 In accordance with HOLC policy, the race of the resident
was used to determine risk and thus the color of red on the map. 21 The
presence of African American residents was used as a signal for high
risk, and the presence of white residents signaled that the new loans
could be used there to forestall foreclosures.
In 1934, the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) was
created to help first-time homebuyers. Again, this program was
designed to benefit white people only. 22 These government-backed
mortgages included a whites-only requirement, and the FHA
Underwriting Manual stated its preference for physical barriers
separating whites from African Americans such as highways or

16
Id.
17
Mapping Inequality: Redlining in New Deal America, UNIV. OF RICHMOND: DIGIT.
SCHOLARSHIP LAB, https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/#loc=5/39.1/-
94.58 (last visited Mar. 7, 2022).
18
NAT’L ASS’N REAL ESTATE BDS., CODE OF ETHICS 7 (1924).
19
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 64.
20
Mapping Inequality, supra note 17.
21
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 64.
22
Id. at 64-65.

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artificial barriers. 23 It also required that loans not be made if schools


might become integrated as a result. 24
After World War II, both the FHA and the Veterans
Administration (“VA”) were using the FHA policy of discrimination
to issue loans.25 Banks required VA or FHA approval before they
would issue mortgages to prospective homebuyers.26 Later, the FHA
and VA expanded their racial segregation policy by guaranteeing loans
for builders in thousands of locales for the creation of new suburban
subdivisions.27 With Congressional authority, the FHA and VA
guaranteed bank loans for mass-produced builders, for almost the
entire cost of the subdivision if the builder committed to not sell to
African Americans. 28 In addition, the mortgages for homebuyers in
these whites-only-developments were automatically approved for
white borrowers.29 All of this minimized the risk for builders—using
the government’s money rather than their own (if they had it) to build
the developments—and eased the process of home ownership for white
buyers.
Racial restrictions or covenants were another tool used to
sustain racial segregation in white communities. 30 These were clauses
in the deeds of homes that explicitly prohibited people who were not
white from buying or leasing a home. 31 It also specified that the only
circumstance permitting a non-white person to be in the community
was if they were a servant living in the home of a white person. 32 For
example, some racial covenants on Long Island included the clause,
“This covenant shall not prohibit the engagement or maintenance of
colored servants or domestics in the family household.”33
In Levittown, these covenants were required to obtain project
financing.34 Levitt and Sons, who served as builders, and Abraham
23
Id. at 65.
24
FED. HOUS. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL: UNDERWRITING & VALUATION
PROC. UNDER TITLE II NAT’L HOUS. ACT 113 (1938).
25
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 64-65.
26
Id. at 66.
27
Id. at 70-73.
28
Id. at 71.
29
Id. at 63-75.
30
Id. at 78-79.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
John P. Dean, Only Caucasian: A Study of Race Covenants, J. LAND & PUB. UTIL.
ECON. 428, 432 (1947).
34
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 85.

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Levitt, who led that business, created a whole community called


Levittown.35 Levittown was built on Long Island in the late 1940s and
early 1950s and is renowned for being one of the nation’s first
suburbs—birthed with tens of thousands of newly built federally
financed homes affordable enough for white GIs returning from World
War II.36 These federally financed homes were systematically denied
to Black GIs.37
African Americans were denied an opportunity to acquire
wealth, as was the case with their white counterparts, because they
were systematically denied an opportunity to purchase housing. A
Levitt house in the 1940s and 1950s could be purchased for as little as
$8,000 (or about $86,000 in 2019 once adjusted for inflation38) with
no money down.39 To draw a comparison, as of 2020, the median price
of a home in the same area is $430,900.40 Only white families were
permitted to buy homes in Levittown and benefit from this
investment.41 In the 1960s, the population of Levittown was 0 percent
Black, and the 2010 United States Census revealed that by then, the
suburb’s population was just 1 percent Black.42
This wealth-building machine was explicitly for white people
only, embracing the federal government segregation policies.
Veterans who were African American were summarily blocked from
living in these new homes, just because of their race. 43 The racism was
structural, brought about by both government and businesses including
banks, real estate brokers and housing developers. 44 With restrictive
racial covenants in the deeds, which stated that houses could not be
sold to anyone who was not “Caucasian”45 the impact and intention

35
Id.
36
Id. at 70.
37
Id. at 71.
38
CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STATS.,
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2022).
39
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 70.
40
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2020, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=Housing%20Value%20and%20Purchase%2
0Price&g=1600000US3642081 (last visited May 26, 2022).
41
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 68-69.
42
Id.; Rachelle Blidner, Long Island Divided: Part 8—Favored for Whites:
Levittown, NEWSDAY (Nov. 12, 2019), https://projects.newsday.com/long-
island/levittown-demographics-real-estate.
43
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 70-71.
44
Id. at VII, XV, 178-79.
45
Id. at 71.

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were clear. As long as the discriminatory laws and practices remained,


African Americans would be legally excluded from residing in
Levittown as homeowners.
The FHA did not stop financing developers who explicitly
refused to sell to Black buyers until the 1962 Executive Order issued
by President John F. Kennedy prohibiting the use of federal funds to
support racial discrimination.46 However, the segregation was already
firmly in place. Between 1932 and 1968, the government gave $120
billion to future homeowners, 98 percent of whom were white. 47
This is Long Island’s legacy. Today, housing is still
segregated. Using Levittown as an example, in 1960, not one of the
82,000 residents of Levittown’s 17,400 houses was African
American.48 In 2020, Blacks comprised about 1 percent of
Levittown’s population, even though they comprised about 10 percent
of Long Island’s population.49 Redlining and racially discriminatory
housing were national policies, which Long Island’s residents and
leadership embraced.
Using 2020 census data, the widely used dissimilarity index
measured racial residential segregation, and Long Island is ranked as
among the 10 most racially segregated metropolitan regions in the
United States.50 White-to-Black segregation levels remain severe at
65.5. Segregation between whites and Hispanics is moderate at 46.1.
Finally, segregation between whites and Asians, while not yet severe,
has risen from 38.4 in 2010 to 43.4 in 2020. 51 Mr. Rothstein
summarizes the federal government’s segregation polices as follows:

46
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 88; see also Equal Opportunity in Housing, 27 Fed.
Reg. 11527 (1962).
47
Go Deeper: Where Race Lives, PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/race/000_About/002_06_a-godeeper.htm (last visited June 6,
2022).
48
Olivia Winslow, Long Island Divided: Part 10—Dividing Lines, Visible and
Invisible, NEWSDAY (Nov. 17, 2019), https://projects.newsday.com/long-
island/segregation-real-estate-history.
49
2020 DEC Redistricting Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?t=Black%20or%20African%20American&g=1
600000US3642081&tid=DECENNIALPL2020.P1 (last visited May 26, 2022).
50
John R. Logan & Brian Stults, The Persistence of Segregation in the Metropolis:
New Findings from the 2020 Census, U.S. 2010 PROJECT (2021),
https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity.
51
Id. at 18.

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598 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 38

The policy was so systemic and forceful that its effects


endure to the present time. Without our government’s
purposeful imposition of racial segregation, the other
causes—private prejudice, white flight, real estate
steering, bank redlining, income differences, and self-
segregation—still would have existed but with far less
opportunity for expression. Segregation by intentional
government action is not de facto. Rather, it is what
courts call de jure: segregation by law and public
policy.52
The level and persistence of segregation of African Americans in
housing is unique. As an example, historically, there were
government-organized residency restrictions or covenants in deeds
used to exclude African Americans and some other groups (e.g.,
Hispanics, Chinese and Japanese). However, as the twentieth century
progressed, the courts no longer upheld the restrictions on the other
groups. “Only African Americans have been systematically and
unconstitutionally segregated for such a long period,” says Mr.
Rothstein, “and with such thorough repression, that their condition
requires an aggressive constitutional remedy.”53 Government policies
designed to isolate African Americans and the other groups identified
above are different from the discrimination that was historically
experienced by white immigrant groups (e.g., Irish, Jewish, Italian,
Polish, Greek and others), which was absent sustained federal
government instigation. Mr. Rothstein explains the differences
between government-organized discrimination and segregation of
other racial/ethnic groups that is of the more distant past, of being
related to economic inequality, or of being related to the normal cycle
of immigration.54
Convincingly, Mr. Rothstein has made the case that “[w]e have
created a caste system in this country, with African Americans kept
exploited and geographically separate by racially explicit government
policies. Although most of these policies are now off the books, they
have never been remedied and their effects endure.” 55

52
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at viii.
53
Id. at 235.
54
Id.
55
Id. at xvii.

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While I will not offer a full assessment of how the judicial


branch of government was implicated in this government system of
segregation, here are a couple of insights included in the Color of Law.
“Throughout the nation,” says Mr. Rothstein, “courts ordered African
Americans evicted from homes they had purchased. State supreme
courts upheld the practice when it was challenged,” including the New
York Supreme Court.56
In 1926, the United States Supreme Court in Corrigan v.
Buckley upheld racial covenants in deeds, including such court actions
as evictions to enforce the covenants.57 In 1948, the United States
Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer reversed the 1926 ruling and
deemed the enforcement by state courts as unconstitutional. 58 This
ruling forbade the practice of court-ordered evictions of African
Americans because of the restrictive covenants. 59 However, “parties
to restrictive covenants continued for another five years to bring suits
for damages against fellow signatories who violated their pacts,” says
Mr. Rothstein, “and two state supreme courts upheld the propriety of
such damage awards.”60 Missouri and Oklahoma continued the
practice.
Mr. Rothstein reports successful and persistent efforts to
undermine the Shelley decision. For example, “[t]wo weeks after the
Court announced its decision, FHA commissioner Franklin D.
Richards stated that the Shelley decision would ‘in no way affect the
programs of this agency,’ which would make ‘no change in our basic
concepts or procedures.’”61
“Six months later,” Mr. Rothstein reported, “when Thurgood
Marshall, then the NAACP legal counsel (and later a [United States]
Supreme Court Justice), challenged the FHA policy of restrictive
covenants in deeds of the massive Levittown development, Richards
responded, ‘I find nothing in the [Shelley decision] to indicate that in
the absence of statutory authority the government, or any agency
thereof, is authorized to withdraw its normal protection and benefits

56
Id. at 81.
57
Id. at 82, 268; Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
58
Id. at 85.
59
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
60
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 89.
61
Id. at 86.

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from persons who have executed but do not seek judicial enforcement
of such covenants.’”62
Shelley ruled that courts could not order eviction of African
Americans.63 In 1953, the United States Supreme Court in Barrows v.
Jackson64 ruled that “the Fourteenth Amendment precluded state
courts not only from evicting African Americans from homes
purchased in defiance of a restrictive covenant but also from
adjudicating suits to recover damages from property owners who made
such sales.”65
The FHA continued to finance developments with restrictive
covenants, including Levittown. 66 Restrictive covenants, and housing
discrimination more broadly, were not explicitly banned until the 1968
Fair Housing Act,67 which will be discussed later in this Article.
Before there was an FHA, community residents and realtors
were freely segregating neighborhoods.68 Racial covenants in deeds
were used.69 In fact, the FHA adopted the racial covenant practice used
in local communities.70 Local residents and municipalities continued
to try a variety of strategies to ensure racial restrictions. 71 They
couldn’t count on the original developer to care about what happens
with resale.72 Increasingly, to avoid using the courts, residents created
contracts amongst themselves agreeing that neighbors could sue
directly if someone broke the contract. 73 That required recruiting
everyone in the neighborhood to voluntarily agree, which did not
always happen.74 For further protections, they created neighborhood
associations for the same purpose. 75 Bylaws for the association would
contain racial restrictions.76 To mandate participation in the
associations, subdivision developers would include a requirement that,

62
Id.
63
Id. at 85.
64
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1952).
65
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 90.
66
Id. at 86.
67
Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619.
68
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 12-14, 77.
69
Id. at 78-81.
70
Id. at 82-83.
71
Id. at 122-37.
72
Id. at 79-82.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 79.
75
Id. at 80-82.
76
Id. at 79.

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as a condition of sale, the purchaser had to agree to join the


association.77 Again, racial restrictions were included in the
association documents. 78 The Fair Housing Act also covered these
arrangements.79
By refusing to lend to African Americans, banks were central
partners in implementing the government’s intentional policies to
discriminate against this racial group. Mr. Rothstein states that: “The
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, for example, chartered, insured, and
regulated savings and loan associations from the early years of the New
Deal but did not oppose the denial of mortgages to African Americans
until 1961.”80 As a result, the only “contracts” to which African
Americans often had access were incredibly exploitative and now
illegal.81 As NPR reported on these “contracts”:
A buyer put down a large down payment for a home
and made monthly installments at high interest rates.
But the buyer never gained ownership until the contract
was paid in full and all conditions were met.
Meanwhile, the contract seller held the deed and could
evict the buyer. Contract buyers also accumulated no
equity in their homes. No laws or regulations protected
them.82
The inability to accrue equity in their homes along the way made it a
lot more likely for Black families to default on their mortgages as well
as impossible for them to sell at any point. One estimate found that
“85 percent of homes bought by Blacks in Chicago were bought on
contract.”83
More recently, the exploitative “contracts” took on another
incarnation as a discriminatory scheme carried out by banks called
“reverse-redlining.”84 This is the practice of lending subprime
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 97-99.
82
Natalie Moore, Contract Buying Robbed Black Families in Chicago of Billions,
NPR, https://www.npr.org/local/309/2019/05/30/728122642/contract-buying-
robbed-black-families-in-chicago-of-billions (May 30, 2019).
83
Emily Badger, Why a Housing Scheme Founded in Racism is Making a Resurgence
Today, CHI. TRIB., https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-contract-selling-
resurgence-20160513-story.html (May 16, 2016).
84
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 109-13.

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mortgages disproportionately to homebuyers of color or targeting


homes in non-white neighborhoods for terms that are less favorable
than those provided to homes in white neighborhoods.85 It functions
as one important reason why the 2008 financial crisis significantly
affected Black families. 86
In 1973, the United States Commission on Civil Rights
concluded that the “housing industry, aided and abetted by
Government, must bear the primary responsibility for the legacy of
segregated housing . . . . Government and private industry came
together to create a system of residential segregation.”87
The Commission’s statement does not go far enough. The facts
presented in this article provide a modest number of compelling
examples of the significant body of research and source documents that
implicate the federal government (aided by business sectors such as
banks, real estate brokerages and developers) as instigating and
sanctioning this racist system to explicitly discriminate against African
Americans. The facts clearly evidence the systemic efforts by the
government to subjugate African Americans. 88

B. Lesson Two: Local Governments Also Play an


Essential Role in the Problem of Housing
Discrimination and Segregation Against African
Americans and Must Be a Part of the Solution

In 1917, in Buchanan v. Warley,89 the Supreme Court struck


down a racial zoning ordinance because of the “Freedom of Contract”
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not to protect African
Americans.90 The Court felt that people should be able to sell to

85
Id.
86
See generally Linda Fisher, Target Marketing of Subprime Loans: Racialized
Consumer Fraud & Reverse Redlining, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 121, 121-55 (2009).
87
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 75.
88
For documented examples of how the United States government and local
governments have systematically subjugated African Americans, see Kenneth
Jackson, Race, Ethnicity, and Real Estate Appraisal: The Home Owners Loan
Corporation and the Federal Housing Association, 6 J. URB. HIST. 419, 419-52
(1980). See generally THOMAS SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE
AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (2005); ALLAN SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO :
THE MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETTO, 1890-1920 (1967); DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID (1993).
89
245 U.S. 60 (1917).
90
Id. at 82.

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whomever they want. 91 Once again, continuing in the twenty-first


century, there were a number of successful schemes to outright oppose
and skirt Buchanan, which will not be explored here. However, it is
instructive to note that one of those schemes, “local control,” is alive
and well today, including on Long Island. 92
New York State is a home rule state, which means that New
York has delegated specific powers held by the State to local
municipalities enumerated in Article IX of the State Constitution, 93 the
Municipal Home Rule Law, 94 and local legislation which includes
decisions related to land use (as well as public services and community
benefits) and zoning, which determines what can and cannot be built
within a given jurisdiction.
First, let us review some basic information about Long Island.
In 2019, it had about 2.8 million people, consisting of 9 percent Black,
18 percent non-White Hispanic, 7 percent Asian, 64 percent non-
Hispanic White, and 1 percent other racial groups.95 Long Island is
becoming more racially diverse in the aggregate. For example, in 2010
it had about 800,000 people of color, representing 30 percent of the
population and in 2019, the number of people of color increased to
about 1,000,000—representing 36 percent of the population. 96 In the
same time period, the number of Black residents increased from
240,000 to 260,000, continuing to make up about 9 percent of the
population.97 This population is divided between two counties, “13

91
See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 45.
92
Elaine Gross, Housing Discrimination and Local Control, NYU FURMAN CTR.
(Mar. 19, 2019), https://furmancenter.org/research/iri/essay/housing-discrimination-
and-local-control.
93
See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
94
See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 2021).
95
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?t=Race%20and%20Ethnicity&g=0500000US3
6059,36103&tid=ACSDT5Y2020.B03002 (last visited May 25, 2022) (providing
these statistics which were derived from the Census Bureau’s ACS interactive data
tool).
96
ERASE Racism, Unequal Resources for Long Island Students Based on Race 8,
(May 2022)
https://www.eraseracismny.org/storage/documents/Unequal_Resources_for_Long_
Island_Students_Based_on_Race_ERASE_Racism_2022_Report.pdf.
97
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2010 and 2019, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=Suffolk&t=-00%20-
%20All%20available%20races&y=2019 (last visited Mar. 7, 2022) (providing
statistics which were derived from the Census Bureau’s ACS interactive data tool).

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towns, 2 cities and 97 villages.” 98 In addition to other taxing


jurisdictions, there are 125 public school districts that mirror the
residential segregation.99 Government is very fragmented with
numerous zoning authorities. As discussed, Long Island is the 10th
most racially segregated region in the nation, due in large part to the
systematic government discrimination and segregation during its
birth.100 Long Island, like communities nationwide, needs a wide
variety of housing types and prices to meet the needs of residents with
different family sizes and various income levels.
In the past ten years, Long Island’s housing production has not
kept up with its population increase. For instance, between 2001 and
2018, Long Island granted building permits to only 56,000 housing
units.101 This comes out to an annual rate of just over 3,000 homes per
year in a region with a population of 2.8 million. Meanwhile, between
2000 and 2016 the region’s population increased by about 100,000. 102
In both Nassau and Suffolk, more than a third of the homeowners pay
more than 30 percent of their income in mortgage costs.103
Since 2000, Long Island’s median income has slightly
decreased, while housing costs have increased by 24%. In addition,
350,000 Long Island households are housing cost-burdened.104 The
highest percentage of these households falls within the lowest-income
category.105 Yes, Long Island needs more affordable housing.
Local control has been an effective mechanism for limiting
types of housing typically more affordable and associated with lower

98
Long Island Housing Data Profiles, REG’L PLAN. ASS’N (Oct. 2020),
https://rpa.org/work/reports/long-island-housing-data-profiles.
99
Counties, N.Y.S. EDUC. DEP’T., https://data.nysed.gov/lists.php?type=county (last
visited Mar. 7, 2022).
100
John R. Logan & Brian J. Stults. Metropolitan Segregation: No Breakthrough in
Sight, BROWN UNIV. (Aug. 12, 2021),
https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity/Data/Report/report08122021.pdf.
101
Noah Kazis, Ending Exclusionary Zoning in New York City’s Suburbs, N.Y.U.
FURMAN CTR. 1, 9 (Nov. 9, 2020),
https://furmancenter.org/files/Ending_Exclusionary_Zoning_in_New_York_Citys_
Suburbs.pdf.
102
2018 Indicators Report, LONG ISLAND INDEX, at 9,
http://www.longislandindex.org/data_posts/long-island-index-2018-report (last
visited June 6, 2022).
103
REGIONAL PLAN. ASS’N., BE MY NEIGHBOR: UNTAPPED HOUSING SOLUTIONS:
ADUS AND CONVERSIONS (July 2020), https://rpa.org/work/reports/be-my-neighbor.
104
Long Island Housing Data Profiles, supra note 98.
105
Id.

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income residents like African Americans in particular, such as multi-


family, mixed-income and affordable for sale and rental properties. 106
In effect, municipalities have successfully kept out African Americans.
The reason this home rule scheme can work on Long Island is
that overwhelmingly, the housing that can be built as-of-right is single
family housing. All other housing proposals must be approved on a
case-by-case basis.107
Local control legitimizes the power arrangements already in
place, allowing white people in charge of local government to
perpetuate structural racism in housing—discriminating against and
segregating African Americans. This power to exclude creates and
perpetuates residential segregation. Local control does not even
require overt racial hatred. That is what is so insidious about it. It will
automatically perpetuate racial segregation due to the history we have
discussed.
Following are some examples of the impact of local control on
Long Island. A famous housing discrimination case in Huntington,
Long Island, previously went all the way to the United States Supreme
Court.108 In 1988, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
Huntington violated the federal Fair Housing Act because its zoning
confined the construction of apartments only to a predominantly Black
neighborhood, thus creating a discriminatory result. 109 In 2021—43
years later—the affordable apartment project in a predominantly white
neighborhood at issue in that case was finally approved by the town
board! This means that the project might be able to break ground
within the year.110 That is the impact of local control.
In addition to discrimination and segregation resulting from
zoning policies, local government housing policies have also
contributed to housing discrimination and segregation. In 2014—26
years after the Huntington Supreme Court decision—the federal
government sued the Town of Oyster Bay on Long Island for violating

106
Kazis, supra note 101, at 12-15.
107
Binyamin Appelbaum, Long Island, We Need to Talk (About Housing), N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 24, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/opinion/long-island-
housing.html.
108
Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 15 (1988).
109
Id.
110
Randi F. Marshall, Opinion, The Point: 43 Years Later, A Huntington Affordable
Housing Project Looks Ready, NEWSDAY (Dec. 15, 2021),
newsday.com/opinion/matinecock-court-o18319.

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the Fair Housing Act.111 The United States alleged that two housing
programs to develop below-market rate housing for first-time
homeowners and senior citizens discriminated against African
Americans, because the programs gave a preference to residents of the
predominantly white Town.112 The Government asserted that this
preference produced a discriminatory result, because very few African
Americans (3 percent of residents) live in the Town and less than one
percent of the Black families living there were eligible for the
program.113 Income-eligible Black residents nearby were blocked
from participating. Town officials tried to avoid depositions, but a
federal judge ruled in February 2022 that the officials could not do
so.114
In MHANY Management Inc. and New York Communities for
Change, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Garden City and Garden City
Board of Trustees,115 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed a lower court’s decision that the Village of
Garden City intentionally discriminated against people of color and
thus violated the federal Fair Housing Act116 in its zoning decision to
abandon a multi-family residential district in favor of a residential
townhouse district.117 At the time, Garden City was largely white and
2.6% minority (defined as Hispanic/Latino or as both non-Hispanic
and Black).118
ERASE Racism submitted its original administrative
complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”) on April 28, 2014, alleging that Nassau County violated the

111
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619.
112
United States v. Town of Oyster Bay, No. CV-14-2317, 2022 WL 1458176 at *1
(E.D.N.Y. 2014); see also Press Release, United States Sues Town of Oyster Bay for
Housing Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: U.S. ATT’YS OFF. E.D.N.Y. (Apr. 10,
2014), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/united-states-sues-town-oyster-bay-
housing-discrimination.
113
Id.
114
Ted Philips, Federal Judge Denies Bid by Oyster Bay Officials to Avoid
Depositions, NEWSDAY (Feb. 8, 2022), newsday.com/long-
island/Nassau/depositions-lawsuit-housing-discrimination-town-board-n34587.
115
4 F. Supp. 3d 549 (2014).
116
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619.
117
Mhany Mgmt. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 2016).
118
Decl. of Nancy McArdle at 3, ACORN v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. 05CV2301, 2009
WL 2923435 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2009).

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Fair Housing Act119 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964120 by
discriminating against African Americans and perpetuating racial
segregation in the administration of its housing and community
development programs.121 The Complaint identifies violations
committed by the County itself, as well as the County’s failure to
enforce federal civil rights requirements on members of the Nassau
Urban County Consortium. 122 The Complaint was amended on May
28, 2014 to include additional facts. HUD accepted the Complaint on
July 18, 2014.123 As of the writing of this Article, this Complaint
remains unresolved.
The Complaint’s central allegation is that the County
discriminates on the basis of race and color, and perpetuates racial
segregation by its actions or omissions with respect to: (a) its own
funding of housing and community development activities in
jurisdictions that are members of the Nassau Urban County
Consortium—a collective of Nassau County municipalities that are
given access to competitive grant funds from HUD’s Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program; (b) its own decisions
with respect to dedicating County-owned land for the development of
affordable housing; and (c) failing or refusing to withhold funding or
other County benefits from members of the Nassau Urban County
Consortium that maintain zoning and land use laws, policies and
practices with a discriminatory effect. 124
With policies like local control, it is fair to say that residential
segregation is firmly and stunningly in place. Local control has no
doubt been carried to extremes on Long Island; 125 however, the
dynamic is not unique to this region.
In another suburban region just to the north of Long Island, the
Anti-Discrimination Center’s False Claims Act lawsuit126 targeting

119
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619.
120
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
121
Housing Discrimination Complaint against Nassau Cnty., filed by ERASE
Racism (Apr. 28, 2014),
https://www.eraseracismny.org/storage/documents/HUD_Administrative_Complai
nt.pdf.
122
Id.
123
Case Nos. 02-14-0400-8 and 02-14-0029-6.
124
Id.
125
Kazis, supra note 101.
126
United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
Cty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).

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exclusionary zoning in Westchester County, New York resulted in


Westchester settling the case and entering into a 2009 consent decree.
As the Center describes the outcome, “Westchester was prohibited
from ignoring either the residential racial segregation that continues to
plague it, or the municipal resistance to affordable housing
development that stymies the possibility of changing those
patterns.”127
At its core, local control is a system of perpetuating advantage
for white Americans and disadvantaging African Americans. Housing
discrimination will never be successfully combated—including
construction of the affordable housing that people with lower incomes,
particularly some African Americans, so desperately need—until we
recognize and address the extraordinary role that local control has
played, and still plays, in creating and perpetuating discrimination and
segregation, with its predictable inequities.
In many places, local control is accompanied by intense
government fragmentation. As a result of hyper-fragmentation, Long
Islanders (e.g., government, real estate, and homeowners) can easily,
and often do, act in ways that “protect” local neighborhoods from
change. White homogeneity is rewarded with higher property values,
incentivizing, and perpetuating racial segregation at the regional level.
As a result, Long Island remains one of the 10 most racially segregated
metropolitan regions in the United States.128
Residential segregation has likewise perpetuated segregation in
Long Island’s 125 public schools, and school segregation is still
growing. The school districts boundaries mirror the residential
segregation and consequently we have schools that are highly
segregated with very different resources and outcomes.129 According
to research conducted by ERASE Racism, between 2004 and 2016, the
number of intensely segregated school districts (90 to 100 percent non-
white) more than doubled. Students attending those segregated
districts more than tripled.130 Unfortunately, with data we collected

127
Anti-Discrimination Center, Westchester Case,
http://www.antibiaslaw.com/westchester-case.
128
Logan & Stults, supra note 100.
129
ERASE RACISM, UNEQUAL RESOURCES FOR LONG ISLAND STUDENTS BASED ON
RACE 8-24, (May 2022)
https://www.eraseracismny.org/storage/documents/Unequal_Resources_for_Long_
Island_Students_Based_on_Race_ERASE_Racism_2022_Report.pdf.
130
ERASE RACISM, 2017 INFOGRAPHIC: SCHOOL SEGREGATION ON LONG ISLAND
(2017), https://www.eraseracismny.org/component/content/article/1/498.

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and analyzed from New York State Education Department (NYSED)


for 2019-2020 school year, the number of intensely segregated school
districts remains the same, and the number of students attending those
districts further increased.
Local control is denying African Americans access to housing
in high opportunity areas with high performing schools. For example,
Jericho High School, which is placed 147th on United States News
Report’s list of best high schools in the country is only 2 percent Black
and 4 percent Hispanic. 131 It is simultaneously normalizing severe
discrimination and segregation for the next generation of African
American Long Islanders.

C. Lesson Three: White Supremacy Ideation Shapes


Government Policy and Legal Actions, Which
Animate and Sustain Structural Racism

Structural racism marginalizes, discriminates, and segregates


African Americans, producing advantages for whites and
disadvantages and oppression for African Americans. Citizen
compliance and ignorance underpin structural racism.
Mr. Rothstein’s arguments tying the systematic segregation of
African Americans to the law, narrowly defined, are persuasive.
However, even if you don’t ascribe to his analysis in its entirety, there
can be no doubt, based on the evidence presented in this article thus
far, that government and institutional remedies are necessary to
dismantle Long Island’s ongoing housing discrimination and
segregation and ensure it does not continue in the future.
At ERASE Racism, when we refer to the instigating and
sanctioning of the racist system to explicitly discriminate against
African Americans, we use the term structural racism. We define the
term in this way: Structural racism is the historical and ongoing racial
marginalization, discrimination, and segregation of Black people—
African Americans in particular—which is typically instigated or
sanctioned by government through its direct actions or its inaction in
the face of illegal or immoral policies and behaviors. Structural racism

131
See Joie Tyrell, Long Island Places 20 High Schools on United States News &
World Report's Annual List, NEWSDAY (Apr. 27, 2021),
https://www.newsday.com/long-island/education/u-s-news-world-report-long-
island-schools-1.50227626; see also New York State Education at a Glance, N.Y.S.
EDUC. DEP’T (Mar. 24, 2022), https://data.nysed.gov.

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creates inequity in every aspect of life. I am referring to systemic


oppression perpetrated by all arms of government and most every
private institution.
As previously discussed, anti-Black racism is central to
structural racism in the United States. This does not mean that the
descendants of the enslaved Africans in United States, North America
are the only people who have been historically impacted by structural
racism. However, the peculiar discrimination and segregation against
African Americans warrants our special attention. The evidence of
structural racism in housing has been presented.
Structural racism did not appear out of thin air. The racist
policies, practices, and legal actions we have discussed related to
housing were created by government and business leaders who
embraced white supremacy in their life as a whole.
For several centuries, the concept of race was constructed by
prominent individuals that held power. 132 They were landowners and
owners of enslaved Africans, government officials, religious leaders,
judges, and the like—all white Europeans. In the 1800s, so-called
“scientific” investigations were confirming the common
understanding of race: that enslaved Africans were inherently inferior
to white people.133
Yes, we now know that what we refer to as “race” is not based
on blood, skull sizes, or other so-called biological factors that manifest
outwardly in skin color. Scientists from various fields have agreed that
there is no “race gene,”134 and people within the same race have been
found to have more genetic differences than people from different
racial groups.134 But race is real in its consequences. The hierarchy

132
Race–The Power of an Illusion, Episode Two: The Story We Tell, PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/race/000_About/002_04-about-02-01.htm (last visited Mar. 9,
2022).
133
Inventing Black and White: Holocaust and Human Behavior, FACING HIST. &
OURSELVES, https://www.facinghistory.org/holocaust-and-human-behavior/chapter-
2/inventing-black-and-white (last visited March 9, 2022).
134
Race, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST., https://www.genome.gov/genetics-
glossary/Race (last visited Mar. 9, 2022).
134
Megan Gannon, Race Is a Social Construct, Scientists Argue, SCI. AM. (Feb. 5,
2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/race-is-a-social-construct-
scientists-argue; see generally SUNG-MIN AHN ET AL., THE FIRST KOREAN GENOME
SEQUENCE AND ANALYSIS: FULL GENOME SEQUENCING FOR A SOCIO-ETHNIC GROUP
1622-29 (2009). We note here that the study found that there were significant genetic
variations between individuals from the same racial group as well as genetic
similarities between individuals from different racial groups.

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that arises from this pseudo-scientific and common understanding of


race allowed people to justify chattel slavery. While inaccurate,
Africans were “meant” to be slaves because they were fundamentally
inferior to white people. In contrast, the controlling thought process
was that white people were destined to be at the top of the hierarchy.
The foundation and the source of structural racism is white supremacy:
the ideation and the actions that uphold the social construction of
whiteness as a superior race, and blackness as an inferior race; some
people have even believed that Black people are not fully human. 135
White people can uphold white supremacy individually or when
banded together in groups.
The white people upholding white supremacy can be members
of white nationalist groups, but also elected officials, school board and
PTA members, or just random people walking dogs in parks.136 They
may not foment violence, but they may take actions to block African
American families from gaining access to white residential
neighborhoods, and block their children from white schools, which is
a different form of violence. They may believe that Black people are
inherently not as smart or that there are positions that “just don’t suit”
African Americans. Perhaps they believe that Black people should
“just get over it.” After all, they say, my white ancestors came here
with nothing, and with our hard work, look what we have achieved.
Listen closely. The subtext of that statement is: white people
are superior because they are successful—all on their own. Black
people are inferior because they have not been able to do what white
people have done. However, the facts do not support this
misconception. White people have had plenty of help, and they have
used their power to make certain that African Americans do not have
non-discriminatory access to housing. Most white people are unable
to see and/or acknowledge the massive societal benefits and privileges
systematically bestowed upon them. However, every time African
Americans were systematically denied housing, white people received
massive societal, financial and housing benefits. This has been going
on for over 400 years in the United States.

135
See generally EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY AND RACISM IN THE
POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2001).
136
See Jan Ransom, Amy Cooper Faces Charges After Calling Police on Black Bird-
Watcher, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/06/nyregion/amy-cooper-false-report-
charge.html.

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In her published writings, contemporary writer Peggy


McIntosh of the Center for Research on Women at Wellesley College,
describes these advantages, which are inherently bestowed upon white
people because they are white, even without their realizing it, as a
reflection of “white privilege.”137 She had been taught that racism put
others at a disadvantage, “but had been taught not to see one of its
corollary aspects, white privilege, which puts me at an advantage.” 138
McIntosh goes on to say, “I have come to see white privilege as an
invisible package of unearned assets that I can count on cashing in each
day, but about which I was ‘meant’ to remain oblivious.”139 Her list
of twenty-six unearned assets includes the ability to rent or purchase
housing in any area that she can afford, going shopping without fear of
being followed by employees of the store, and purchasing items with
cash or credit, knowing that her skin color will not work against the
appearance of financial reliability.
So, when we talk about structural racism, we begin with how
race was conveniently constructed to justify the power arrangement of
whites on top and Blacks on the bottom and to cement in place that
racial hierarchy and power distribution. The ideation of white
supremacy is broadly normalized, and all decisions being examined in
this paper are made from that perspective. Over time the government
policies, practices, and laws provide the scaffolding of structural
racism in housing. Overt racism is intentional and is sometimes easily
recognized and understood, whether it involves individual acts of
malice or institutional policies and practices that isolate Blacks or
discriminate against Blacks.
It is enlightening, therefore, to examine how white privilege
works. White privilege denies the implications of our history of
structural racism, instigated and sanctioned by governments. It
supports the rationalization that Blacks and whites really have a level
playing field and that differences between Blacks and whites are not
due to racism, but are because of Black inferiority, failures of the
individual Black person, or due to happenstance.
White privilege hampers the “undoing” of structural racism
because it fosters the illusion that the privileges that whites enjoy are
entitlements based on merit and should therefore be fiercely guarded.

137
Ms. McIntosh is a white woman born in Brooklyn and raised in New Jersey.
138
Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, PEACE &
FREEDOM, July/Aug. 1989, at 10.
139
Id.

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Some of the following statements by white people I have encountered


on numerous occasions demonstrate this line of thinking: 1) I want
improved schools for Blacks, but that must not have any impact on my
school district or the students attending; 2) I think Blacks should have
better housing options, but that doesn't mean they should live in my
community; and 3) better economic opportunities for Blacks seems
fair, but I should still be able to hire my staff through a word-of-mouth
system among a circle of my (white) colleagues.
Some whites don't want to acknowledge white privilege, or at
least they don’t want to talk about it. But unraveling structural racism
requires us to examine all systems that disadvantage African
Americans and make necessary changes, even if it means changes for
whites. Fighting against the perpetuation of white supremacy and
structural racism should be a common discussion amongst all
government leaders, and the general public if we are serious about
addressing the systemic housing discrimination and segregation of
African Americans. In other words, structural racism is inescapable,
unless and until it is dismantled and unless and until the fallacy of
white supremacy ceases to be normalized. Silence or willful ignorance
is a recipe for maintaining the status quo.

D. Title Lesson Four: Passing and Enacting Laws Is


Necessary but Not Enough

Ending housing discrimination and affirmatively furthering


fair housing are the cornerstones of both federal and state fair housing
statutes. However, implementation of these laws requires embracing
these cornerstones by government leaders and the general public and a
willingness to act. There are two components comprising one’s ability
to gain housing: there must be housing that one can afford and that
housing must be made available in a non-discriminatory manner. We
have addressed the first component, access to housing one can afford,
under Lesson two, Local Control. Concerning access to housing in a
non-discriminatory manner, we will look at the fair housing laws.
In 1968, the United States Congress passed the Fair Housing
Act and President Lyndon B. Johnson signed it into law.141 This law
140

140
42 U.S.C. §3601.
141
History of Fair Housing, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV. (Mar. 25, 2022, 2:00
PM),
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/aboutfheo/history.

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provides enforcement mechanisms to punish people who discriminate


in the rental and sale of housing and offer redress for those who have
been discriminated against. Congress realized that simply prohibiting
discrimination and redressing the injuries that occur when
discrimination happens is not enough. The duty to affirmatively
further fair housing is a critical component of the Fair Housing Act.142
It seeks to prevent discrimination and dismantle existing segregation.
Specifically, affirmatively furthering fair housing means taking
meaningful actions that, taken together: (1) address significant
disparities in housing needs and in access to opportunity; (2) replace
segregated living patterns with truly integrated and balanced living
patterns; (3) transform racially or ethnically concentrated areas of
poverty into areas of opportunity; and (4) foster and maintain
compliance with civil rights and fair housing laws. HUD was tasked
with enforcing the law. HUD states that the duty to affirmatively
further fair housing extends to all of a program participant’s activities
and programs relating to housing and urban development. 143 The 2021
New York State legislature passed a law articulating the same duty to
AFFH.144
Our federal, state, and local governments are failing to abide
by the Fair Housing Act145 and, most especially the mandate to
AFFH.146 New York State Human Rights law and county laws offer
additional protections against housing discrimination. 147 That does not
142
42 U.S.C. § 3601.
143
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH), U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & DEV.
(March 25, 2022, 2:03 PM),
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/affh#_Who_must_c
omply. The guidelines specifically state the following: “In general, the AFFH
mandate applies to HUD and its grantees, as well as all executive agencies and
departments of the federal government and relates to the administration of any
program or activity relating to housing and urban development.” Id.
144
See Governor Hochul Signs Legislative Package to Combat Housing
Discrimination, N.Y.S. (Dec. 21, 2021),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-signs-legislative-package-
combat-housing-discrimination.
145
The Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §3601.
146
Id.
147
See generally Unlawful Discriminatory Practices, 15 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296
(2015) (prohibiting discrimination in advertising, buying, renting, and selling of
housing); N.Y. Unlawful Discriminatory Acts, SUFFOLK CNTY. EXEC. LAW § 528
(2020); LOCAL LAW NO. 9-2006, A Local Law to Amend Chapter 272 of the Laws
of 1939, Constituting the Nassau County Administrative Code, In Relation to the
Nassau County Commission on Human Rights (Jan. 1, 2007).

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negate the positive steps that have been taken by the Obama and now
the Biden administrations. Nor am I ignoring the positive steps taken
by the New York State Assembly, Senate, and the New York State
Governor in December 2021 when nine bills were signed into law,
which would increase accountability and enforcement of fair housing
laws.148 Even in the face of these gains, when we add in the actions of
non-government entities such as banks and the real estate agencies, we
are failing to protect African Americans.
The United Nations (“UN”) Fact Sheet 21 entitled The Right to
Adequate Housing can be used as a framework to examine more deeply
the state of Long Island housing.149 This UN document provides that
adequate housing was recognized as part of the right to an adequate
standard of living in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights.150
When Fact Sheet 21 talks about “[k]ey aspects of the right to
adequate housing” in the section called entitlements, it includes
“[e]qual and non-discriminatory access to adequate housing.”151 It
further describes what is meant by discrimination:
Discrimination means any distinction, exclusion or
restriction made on the basis of the specific
characteristics of an individual such as race, religion,
age or sex, which has the effect or purpose of impairing
or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of
human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is linked to
the marginalization of specific population groups and is
generally at the root of structural inequalities within
societies . . . . In housing, discrimination can take the
form of discriminatory laws, policies or measures;
zoning regulations; exclusionary policy development;
exclusion from housing benefits; denial of security of
tenure; lack of access to credit; limited participation in

148
Governor Hochul Signs Legislative Package to Combat Housing Discrimination,
supra note 144.
149
See generally OFF. U.N. HIGH COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE
HOUSING: FACT SHEET NO. 21 (2009),
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/FS21_rev_1_Ho
using_en.pdf.
150
Id. at 3.
151
Id.

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decision-making; or lack of protection against


discriminatory practices carried out by private actors.
Non-discrimination and equality are fundamental
human rights principles and critical components of the
right to adequate housing.152
Our laws and the UN document are quite similar; however, this
document offers an important ingredient, a blueprint for action.
Furthermore, ordinary citizens and civic and government leaders must
take seriously the obligation to fight housing discrimination with
concrete actions. Individuals, businesses, and governments must not
be allowed to violate laws and carry out acts and plans of housing
discrimination against people because of characteristics they possess,
which are named in our fair housing laws, and which have been upheld
in case law as unlawful for decades. Those “protected characteristics”
include race and ethnicity, among others. If violators do discriminate,
the punishment must be severe and specific enough that it keeps them
from being repeat discriminators. This is the blueprint that should be
followed for New York State and Long Island.
How do we know that the housing segregation on Long Island
is bad enough that we need to actually implement AFFH? Analysis
from Brown University with data from the 2020 census uses a
Dissimilarity Index to measure segregation, which accounts for the
percentage of a group's population that would have to change residence
for each neighborhood to have the same percentage of that group as
the metropolitan area overall. The report reveals that, on Long Island,
the Black-White segregation is 65.5, meaning that 65.5% of Black
people would need to move to another neighborhood to achieve racial
integration in the region.153 A score that is greater than 60 connotes
severe segregation.154 The score for Hispanic-White segregation is
46.1 and Asian-White is 43.4.155 When looking at Black-White
segregation of 50 metro areas with the largest Black population: Long
Island maintains its position as the 10th most racially segregated metro
region in the nation. 156 Long Island’s Hispanic-White ranking is
nineteenth and Asian-White is fourteenth.157

152
Id. at 10.
153
Logan & Stults, supra note 100, at 17.
154
Id. at 16.
155
Id. at 20.
156
Id. at 6.
157
Id. at 21, 25.

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Furthermore, the results from a random telephone research


study conducted in 2012 for ERASE Racism found that, contrary to
popular opinion, only one percent of the Black respondents said they
only wanted to live in neighborhoods that were 100 percent Black. 158
The remaining Black respondents preferred racially diverse
communities. Most Long Island Blacks live in racially segregated
communities not because of a preference for self-segregation. This
mirrors research studies that have been conducted on other areas.159
While ERASE Racism and other nonprofits have had
successful settlements in housing discrimination lawsuits, there is no
indication that the problem has lessened. The findings from the
groundbreaking three–year investigation issued by Newsday in 2019,
showed that Black testers received disparate treatment forty-nine
percent of the time (thirty-nine percent for Hispanics and nineteen
percent for Asians) when telling real estate agents that they wanted to
purchase a home. 160 We see clearly that the segregation of African

158
ERASE RACISM, 2012 SURVEY RESEARCH REPORT: HOUSING AND
NEIGHBORHOOD PREFERENCES OF AFRICAN AMERICANS ON LONG ISLAND (2012),
https://www.eraseracismny.org/storage/documents/FINAL_ERASE_Racism_2012
_Housing_Survey_Report_web_version.pdf.
159
Maria Krysan & Reynolds Farley, The Residential Preferences of Blacks: Do They
Explain Persistent Segregation?, 80 SOC. FORCES 937 (2002). “African Americans
overwhelmingly prefer 50–50 areas, a density far too high for most whites . . . [w]hite
preferences also play a key role, since whites are reluctant to move into
neighborhoods with more than a few African Americans.” Id. at 937; Reynolds
Farley et al., The Residential Preferences of Blacks and Whites: A Four‐Metropolis
Analysis, 8 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE, 763-800 (1997). “Whites’ willingness to move
into a neighborhood is inversely related to the density of blacks living there. Blacks
prefer integrated neighborhoods, but ones with a substantial representation of
blacks.” Id. at 763; Maria Krysan, Community Undesirability in Black and White:
Examining Racial Residential Preferences through Community Perceptions, 49 SOC.
PROBS. 521, 521-43 (2002). “[B]lacks rate most communities as more desirable than
whites, and African Americans find desirable many of the communities in which they
are the numerical minority. Whites rate mixed race communities as undesirable, in
part because of a desire to avoid black neighbors, but also because of what may be
an over-inflated perception of crime in those communities.” Id. at 521; Maria Krysan
et al., Does Race Matter in Neighborhood Preferences? Results from a Video
Experiment, 115 AM. J. SOCIO. 527, 527-59 (2009). “Whites said the all‐white
neighborhoods were most desirable. The independent effect of racial composition
was smaller among blacks and blacks identified the racially mixed neighborhood as
most desirable.” Id. at 527.
160
Ann Choi et al., Long Island Divided, NEWSDAY (Nov. 17, 2019),
https://projects.newsday.com/long-island/real-estate-agents-investigation/.

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Americans on Long Island is not self-imposed by themselves or


happenstance.
Finally, the UN document talks about the obligation of states,
(in the United States we would use the word countries or national
governments), to prohibit and eliminate discrimination on all
grounds.161 The governments of these countries have an “immediate
obligation to take steps, which should be concrete, deliberate and
targeted, to fulfill the right to adequate housing.” 162 It further identifies
that “[t]he obligation to protect requires States to prevent third parties
from interfering with the right to adequate housing.” 163 This document
was printed in 2009 and reprinted in 2014. 164 Again, Fact Sheet 21 is
the blueprint for how to dramatically alter systematic housing
discrimination and segregation on Long Island.

1. ERASE Racism as a Case Study of Potential


Solutions

For twenty years, ERASE Racism has researched various


aspects of housing discrimination and segregation. It uses that
knowledge to expose and challenge racial segregation and
discrimination in housing, educate the public and then engage them to
promote enhanced fair housing laws, nondiscriminatory affordable
housing policies, and vigilant fair housing enforcement, including
affirmatively furthering fair housing. We’ve engaged hundreds of
individuals directly in this work and amplify our efforts with an
aggressive communications strategy, which includes broadcast and
print media outreach, as well as a robust social media presence
spreading our message to tens of thousands more. I will share two
examples.

2. Fair Housing Legislation and Enforcement

We began fair housing-related work almost immediately when


we launched in 2001. We researched fair housing complaints from
Long Island, processed by the New York State Division of Human
Rights. We didn’t like what we saw; too many cases were dismissed

161
OFF. U.N. HIGH COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 149.
162
Id. at 31 (emphasis in original).
163
Id. at 33.
164
Id.

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without cause. Too many cases took undue time to complete


investigations and reach a determination. Local agencies that assist
residents with landlord-tenant issues—and take housing
discrimination complaints—told us about poor service from the state
and the county enforcement agencies as well. Further, these county
laws needed to be strengthened. Plus, residents frequently had to travel
long distances to get to the state offices to which their cases had been
transferred.
A fair housing working group, which consisted of housing
advocates, civil rights attorneys, and interested others, convened in
2005. We decided that we would seek amendments to Nassau and
Suffolk Counties’ human rights laws and work to make the county
enforcement agencies more effective. Both changes would be more
convenient for local residents. We also gained agreement, initially, to
do this in collaboration with the two counties so that both laws would
match. After all, we reasoned that we are one region on an island
where residents move easily between the two counties. There simply
was no reason to offer different protections in the laws within Long
Island.
Nassau was willing to work with this arrangement, but Suffolk
went its own way. In the end, we succeeded in garnering willing
support for both bills that were quite similar. The next step was to get
our new and improved laws, featuring more robust protections than the
amended 1968 Fair Housing Act, recognized by the federal
government.165 Little did we know, the HUD process for seeking
substantial equivalency 166 for our county law was only on paper.
Nassau County staff told us that, based on the repeated replies to
questions asked by HUD, they believed HUD had no intention of
granting substantial equivalency of the Nassau Human Rights Law.167
It would seem that HUD did not want to expand its accountability to
match a new local law.

165
The Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
166
See Fair Housing Assistance Program (FHAP), U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/partners/FHAP
(“HUD provides FHAP funding annually on a noncompetitive basis to state and local
agencies that administer fair housing laws that provide rights and remedies that are
substantially equivalent to those provided by the Fair Housing Act.”).
167
Nassau County, N.Y. LOCAL LAW NO. 9-2006 (2012). This is a local law to
amend chapter 272 of the Laws of 1939, constituting the Nassau County
Administrative Code, in relation to the Nassau County Commission on Human
Rights.

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I won’t recite all the details, but the short story is that even
though we got the amended laws passed, we had limited success in
implementing the full impact and intent of the laws. One County
Executive was fully supportive. He had already begun to revamp the
Human Rights Commission governing board and was looking to beef
up the staff. But after he lost his bid for re-election, our conversations
with the new County Executive made it clear that they had no interest
in supporting fair housing.
What the Nassau law included that the New York State law did
not have at the time was source of income protection (SOI) which
prohibits discrimination against renters and homebuyers based on such
legal sources of their income other than a paycheck, including social
security payments, any form of government assistance, or child
support. At a later date, SOI protection was included in the Suffolk
law as well, under a new, more supportive County Executive.
Fair housing laws offer protections to groups of people with
certain characteristics or protected classes, such as race and religion.
Our new law protected people from being discriminated against based
on legal SOI. This phenomenon involved building managers refusing
housing to tenants who were using some forms of legal non-wage
income—private or public assistance such as housing vouchers,
alimony payments, and disability payments or government subsidies.
If the county was not going to be a refuge, we needed to change the
state statute. In 2016, we organized a statewide coalition to push for
an SOI amendment to the New York State Human Rights Law. In
2019, that amendment passed and was signed by Governor Cuomo. 168
There’s a lot more to tell about this story, including lobby days
in Albany and supportive op-eds, but I’ll just say that I was very
grateful to our partners in this journey, especially the New York Office
of Enterprise Community Partners, a national nonprofit that exists to
increase the supply of affordable homes and to advance racial equity
in housing, which assumed key coordination responsibilities in
collaboration with our leadership team of four nonprofits.

168
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2015); see also for an announcement:
Governor Cuomo and Legislative Leaders Announce FY 2020 Enacted Budget
Includes Measure Prohibiting Discrimination Against Tenants Based on Source of
Income, N.Y.S. DIV. HUM. RTS. (Apr. 26, 2019), https://dhr.ny.gov/source-of-
income-press-release.

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3. Legal Action

In addition to working on the laws and enforcement, ERASE


Racism took legal action against owners and management companies
that denied rental housing to Black testers while encouraging White
testers to apply.169 Two legal actions utilized undercover paired testing
to document disparate treatment between African American/Black
testers and White testers seeking rental housing. In both Nassau and
Suffolk Counties, our lawsuits resulted in successful court
settlements.170
Following our own experience with fair housing enforcement
utilizing paired testing, I recommended to Newsday that they utilize
paired testing to undertake a broad fair housing investigation on Long
Island. Newsday credits this recommendation as the impetus for its
landmark three-year investigation, “Long Island Divided.”171 That
investigation exposed widespread evidence of housing discrimination:
with 40 percent of the Black testers, 39 percent of the Hispanic testers,
and 19 percent of the Asian testers being discriminated against when
seeking to purchase homes.172 Following Newsday’s publication of
“Long Island Divided,” ERASE Racism played a leadership role in
educating the public and advancing statewide action to redress the
exposed discrimination, with town halls, op-eds, and various forums.

169
A fair housing tester is an individual who is trained by a fair housing
organization(s) and acts as a prospective renter or homebuyer. Individuals are
usually paired in a way that allows the fair housing organization to uncover possible
discrimination based on a protected characteristic, such as Black-White pairings to
investigate racial discrimination or woman-man pairings to investigate gender
discrimination. At the same time, paired testers are provided profiles that show them
to be the same in characteristics that might influence their rental or home buying
prospects or process, such as same income, the number of bedrooms they seek, etc.
For example, a Black tester and a White tester might both attempt to rent from the
same landlord. They are given profiles that are similar in terms of their income,
occupation, preferences for number of bedrooms, gender, etc. The testers record
their interactions with the landlord, allowing the fair housing organization to evaluate
whether the landlord treats the White tester more positively than the Black tester
and/or rents the apartment to the White tester over the Black tester.
170
See generally ERASE Racism Inc. v. LLR Realty LLC, No. CV 13-4821, 2013
WL 11089020 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013); ERASE Racism Inc. v. Empire
Management American Corporation, No. CV 15-03376, (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
171
Choi et al., supra note 160.
172
Id.

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4. Local Action Leads to State Action

On December 12, 2019, I was invited to offer extensive


testimony, at a joint hearing on Long Island before three New York
State Senate Committees: The Committee on Housing, Construction
and Community Development; the Committee on Investigations and
Government Operations; and the Committee on Consumer
Protection.173 I called on government and the real estate industry to
address housing discrimination on Long Island. 174 Realtors were
invited but did not attend this hearing. I was then asked to testify at a
second hearing in September 2020. The realtors identified in the
Newsday investigation who were captured on video engaging in
discriminatory behaviors against testers of color were subpoenaed and
compelled to attend.
On January 27, 2021, the same three Senate committees
released a ninety-seven page investigative report on housing
discrimination on Long Island. 175 The report, which responds to
testimony that I and others presented at the Committees’ hearings,
includes key recommendations to develop a New York State fair
housing strategy, provide more proactive enforcement of fair housing
laws and increased penalties for violators, and ensure that government
at all levels is part of the solution by taking concrete steps to address
discrimination and segregation. That last recommendation pointedly
underscores the need for local governments to be “part of the
solution.”176
Many times, the question we ask ourselves is, “so, what can be
done?” Sometimes, with perseverance, we get closer to unraveling
structural racism. In December 2021, the New York State Governor
signed nine bills into law that are designed to increase fair housing
enforcement.177

173
Elaine Gross, ERASE Racism Testimony on Governor Hochul's ADU Proposed
Legislation, ERASE RACISM (Jan. 27, 2022),
https://www.eraseracismny.org/component/content/article/28/968.
174
Id.
175
FINAL INVESTIGATIVE REPORT FAIR HOUSING & DISCRIMINATION ON LONG
ISLAND, REPORT FROM THE NEW YORK STATE SENATE STANDING COMMITTEES ON
INVESTIGATIONS & GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; HOUSING, CONSTRUCTION &
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT; & CONSUMER PROTECTION 58-59 (Jan. 27, 2021).
176
Id.
177
Governor Hochul Signs Legislative Package to Combat Housing Discrimination,
supra note 144.

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We have also learned about addressing fair housing at the


national level: First, research is crucial. A great example is our
national report issued in October 2019 titled “Civil Rights Rollback:
United States Government Actions to Reduce Civil Rights in Housing
and Public Education,” which was created by ERASE Racism, with
essential research by the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law.178 It provides an analysis of the US government’s efforts to roll
back civil rights in housing and education under the Trump
administration.179 The report spotlights implications for Long Island
and calls for a new level of monitoring, vigilance, and activism. It is
the basis for ERASE Racism’s ongoing efforts to draw attention to
federal actions and their ramifications for Long Island and similar
locales.180
Second, commenting on proposed federal action is vital.
ERASE Racism strongly opposed and worked to generate broad
opposition to two proposed HUD Rules that would undermine civil
rights in housing: a proposed rule on “Disparate Impact” that would
make it dramatically more difficult to fight housing discrimination in
court; and a proposed rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing
that would allow federal and local governments to relinquish
responsibilities for addressing existing racial segregation in
housing.181 We have since publicly applauded President Biden’s
Executive Order to begin undoing the Trump administration rollbacks.
In an article published in USA Today, we make five suggestions for the
Biden administration to keep the momentum moving towards
equity.182

178
ERASE Racism, Civil Rights Rollback: United States Government Actions to
Reduce Civil Rights in Housing and Public Education (Oct. 2019),
http://www.eraseracismny.org/storage/documents/Reports/rollback_report_FINAL
_REPORT.pdf.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
See generally Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 11459 (Feb. 15, 2013).
182
Elaine Gross, Erase Structural Racism: 5 Steps Joe Biden Can Take to Make U.S.
Laws, Policies More Just, USA TODAY (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/02/04/5-steps-joe-bide-can-take-
erase-structural-racism-american-law-column/4369978001. The five steps are as
follows:
First, treat violent white nationalists as domestic
terrorists…Second, employ a racial equity lens as a decision-
making tool to ensure that the federal government no longer

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Third, research should be the basis for shaping programmatic


initiatives and advocacy campaigns, both of which address structural
impediments to equity. It is crucial to base tactics on facts that can be
proven and demonstrated. Research can bring to light what might
otherwise be invisible.
Fourth, it’s important to connect national urgency to regional
knowledge and vice versa. That enables one to be recognized
regionally and nationally as a structural racism expert grounded by
theory and practice, and recognized in academia, in the media, by civic
and political leaders, and by the general populace.
Fifth, it is vital to have a range of tools at your disposal, so that
you can effectively choose between an array of intervention strategies,
differentiating between educating and organizing the public for
change, taking legal action, and collaborating with private and public
institutions.
Being a community resource helps to make the change. Some
of ERASE Racism’s work is available in the form of research reports,
infographics, a documentary, and formal comments to federal agencies
about changes to federal policies which are available on our website.
In addition to being available to the greater public, the ERASE Racism
research is cited in academic publications and the media and utilized
in secondary schools, colleges, and universities. 183

institutes or leaves unchanged policies and practices that promote


structural racism. . . . Third, focus on justice and hold law
enforcement accountable. . . . Fourth, address housing
discrimination. . . . Fifth, tackle school segregation.
Id.
183
See, e.g., Corianne Payton Scally, The Nuances of NIMBY: Context and
Perceptions of Affordable Rental Housing Development, 49 URBAN AFFS REV., 718-
47 (2013); Jeanette Rebecchi, Building Established Suburbs Upwards: Case Studies
of New Development Projects in Long Island, NY, (Nov. 2011) (unpublished M.A.
thesis, Tufts University) (on file with Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Scholarship, Tufts University); Eric Kay, Population Change in the United States:
Response to Demographic Change by One Suburban Community's School Districts,
1997 to 2017, (May 16, 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Hofstra University).

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E. Lesson Five: Ideological and Political Forces


Actively Fight to Keep White Supremacy and
Structural Racism in Place

Since the end of the civil rights movement, social scientists


have extensively documented and illustrated the emergence of
colorblind racism—a racist ideology that has so far operated in a more
subtle way and focused on “cultural” or “character” differences among
racial groups.184 Instead of highlighting genetic or biological
inferiority/superiority, colorblind racism functions to “explain away”
differences in life outcomes between whites and people of color —
especially between whites and African Americans as well as between
non-Black minorities and African Americans—as differences in
upbringings, characters, education backgrounds, or feelings of self-
confidence. Further, it functions to downplay the persistence or even
the existence of contemporary discrimination and the importance of
historical discrimination; it is a belief system that is adopted by both
politically conservative and liberal individuals. 185 As a result,
colorblind racism is most prominent in conversations around
affirmative action or any race-targeted and race-conscious policies that
aim to remedy racial gaps and historic inequities. 186 At the same time,
since the election of Barack Obama, social scientists have also found
evidence of a return to what they coin “old-fashioned” racism,
especially the effect that this type of racism has on political behaviors
(such as partisan identification and voting preferences).187
We can see both old-fashioned racism and colorblind racism
playing a prominent role in debates around critical race theory
(“CRT”) within the last two years.188 State lawmakers rushed to ban

184
See generally EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-
BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED
STATES (2d ed. 2016).
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Michael Tesler, The Return of Old-Fashioned Racism to White Americans’
Partisan Preferences in the Early Obama Era, 75 J. POL. 110, 115-16 (2013).
188
Critical race theory is an academic legal concept which argues that structural
racism is a significant factor in the legal system, including how laws are written,
passed, enacted, and implemented. Further, its tenets argue that race is a social
construct and racism is not simply a product of individual bias or interpersonal
prejudice; instead, they argue that racism is deeply entrenched in legal systems and
policies. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 21 (3d ed. 2017).

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discussions of racism and its impact and acknowledgements of a racial


system at all. These legislative efforts began by focusing exclusively
on critical race theory, and quickly extended to include banning books
on the Holocaust.189 They sought to restrict curricula, how teachers
might implement their lessons, and the scope and content of class
discussions.190 Their implicit strategy and desired end result is clear:
we cannot begin to solve racism if we cannot even talk about it, and so
white supremacy continues to live on in our culture unchallenged.
Both the political anti-CRT movement and the ideological
color-blind racism analysis contribute to the lack of movement to
eradicate and address structural racism in housing. If white supremacy
and structural racism have been explained away, there is really no
reason to consider the plight of African Americans who are denied
non-discriminatory housing.

F. Lesson Six: Indelible Impressions of Racial


Injustice are Extremely Helpful But Not Sufficient
to Create the Impetus For Structural Changes

The television images during the 1960s of peaceful Black


southerners, adults, and especially children, fighting to stand upright
against the water from powerful fire hoses, left an indelible impression
on viewers across the nation and the world. Those images could not
be easily ignored or erased from memory.
Indelible images leave a mark and generate a human response.
I believe the violence of the incidents produced unforgettable
impressions, but, most importantly, the viewing public could not easily
escape the images. I remember that every news program had pictures
of the flying bodies being thrown by the force of the water. Every
promo for the upcoming news program had images, along with
magazines and newspapers. Over time, the sustained images, along
with stories of murders and the everyday oppression under Jim Crow,
touched the conscience of many in the general public, religious leaders,
civic and cultural leaders, as well as some elected officials. Requiring
people to experience the human suffering experienced by others made
it difficult for those seeing it to ignore and/or deny it.
At the height of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s,
Blacks and whites, Jews and Christians, and, in fact, a large number of

189
See Educational Gag Orders, PEN AM., 2016, at 1.
190
Id. at 8.

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US citizens, eventually embraced the formal dismantling of Jim Crow


segregation in the southern states. For many, it was a moral cause that
had an impact not only on the rights of African Americans; changing
the course of segregation was viewed as a requirement in order for the
nation to live up to its self-perception of “one nation, under God, with
liberty and justice for all.”191 Plus, as Americans, we are
uncomfortable under the international spotlight, calling into question
our self-perception of superiority and being the beacon of justice and
freedom.
Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and other civil rights leaders
during that period could make a direct connection between the
oppression of slavery and Jim Crow segregation—a vestige of slavery
that embraced the pseudo-science of racial hierarchy with its “God-
given” right to oppress Negroes and keep them in their proper place. 192
Nightly television images reinforced the narrative of church-going
Blacks not asking for much, just to be treated like the human beings
that they were, yet suffering under the cruelty of police and other
establishment figures operating within a legal structure that was
blatantly bigoted and immoral. The shift toward a change in national
opinion did not happen overnight. Readers are reminded that there was
no universal outcry to the rampant lynching of African Americans,
with lynching still being recorded as late as 1964.193 Between 1882
and 1964, 3,445 African Americans were lynched, mostly in the South;
whites were occasionally lynched, too, although less frequently once
Jim Crow took hold.194
Even though northern liberal whites clearly recognized Blacks
as being different from themselves, the southern segregationists were
so egregious in their behavior that many people of goodwill finally
sympathized with the “Negroes” and wanted to support their cause.
The “Negroes” were “deserving” of their care and support. They did
nothing to deserve the treatment they were receiving; disparities, such
as in public school education and achievement, could readily be traced

191
The Pledge of Allegiance, USHISTORY.ORG,
http://www.ushistory.org/documents/pledge.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2022).
192
See generally ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC
STORY OF AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION (2010).
193
Lynchings by Year and Race, UNIV. MO., KANSAS CITY,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/lynchingyear.html (last visited
Mar. 7, 2022). University of Missouri, Kansas City has compiled lynching figures
by state, race, and year.
194
Id.

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to racial segregation, which intentionally maintained separate and


unequal school curricula, facilities, staffing and resources. They were
urged to be sympathetic to the plight of Blacks by white religious
leaders from Christian and Jewish denominations who saw continued
segregation as a moral issue. It should be noted, however, that the lack
of racial integration and the existence of racial disparities in the North
would more likely elicit a charitable response of helping those less
fortunate but not a demand for structural changes to structural
problems.195 Television, too, helped make the case that the brutality
of southern racial politics was indeed shameful. 196 Jim Crow laws
were legal, structural impediments that intentionally denied southern
Blacks access to numerous opportunities which therefore demanded
legal, structural, intentional solutions. The northern version of racial
discrimination received short shrift in the media and in the minds of
northern whites.197 The indelible images were necessary, but not
sufficient for structural change. In modern history, at the turn of the
twentieth century, the creation of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), comprised of African
Americans and some white allies, had a vision, strategically planned,
and took actions to advance equality for African Americans. So, there
was an infrastructure in place of trained leaders, attorneys, and citizen
activists who were mapping out how to dismantle the carefully
constructed, systematic subjugation of African Americans.

195
When the first school cases were brought challenging northern segregation, the
United States Supreme Court curtailed remedies by creating the distinction between
de jure, or intentional, legally sanctioned segregation which warranted judicial
intervention, and de facto, or unintentional social segregation that occurred
“naturally” through alleged choice rather than government action. De facto
segregation does not trigger judicial remedies. Thus, there could be no inter-district
busing between urban and suburban schools to integrate rather than desegregate
northern schools without a showing of intentional illegal government action
intending to keep the races apart. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 756-57
(1974); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 1049, 1098, 1100-02 (1978) (highlighting the courts’ flawed distinction of de
jure segregation in the early school cases as a justification for separation).
196
See Alexis C. Madrigal, When the Revolution was Televised, ATLANTIC (Apr. 1,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/04/televisions-civil-
rights-revolution/554639/.
197
See WILKERSON, supra note 192.

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The journey to the United States Supreme Court decision of


Brown v. Board of Education 198 in 1954 and the landmark civil rights
legislation in the 1960s would not have happened if not for all the work
that had been accomplished in the previous decades.199 This is a
success-filled story which has not been repeated. However, even this
story is incomplete. I believe that the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr.’s untimely murder, at least partly, explains why a campaign for the
wholesale rejection of white supremacy and dismantling of structural
racism has not been accomplished. He was the ostensible head of the
movement and with his passing, momentum was lost. Do we need an
indelible image of the housing injustice of discrimination and
segregation of African Americans? Is there some other way to
generate the widespread agreement amongst the citizenry that
structural racism in housing must be dismantled? And how do we do
that in a way that clearly connects and stops the normalization of white
supremacy, especially given the ideological and political forces
previously discussed? I do not have a simple answer to that question.
I do, however, address some aspects of a way forward in the
conclusion.

IV. CONCLUSION

Why is it so hard to make change and what are the signs of a


way forward? The ongoing segregation and discrimination in housing
create indefensible advantages for white Long Islanders and deprive
Long Island of the talent and skills of African American Long Islanders
that the region needs to compete successfully in a twenty-first century
economy. Structural racism is a self-inflicted drag on Long Island’s
economic prosperity.200 We must remember that structural change is
needed, not just charity. We must look at the racial impact, disparities,
and outcomes from policies, practices, and behaviors, not just whether
someone intends to discriminate or whether some policy, practice or
behavior is intended to produce disparities or disproportionalities or
block access to housing and segregate African Americans in separate
communities.

198
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
199
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17; The Fair Housing Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
200
POLICY LINK & USC PROGRAM ENV’T & REG’L EQUITY: AN EQUITY PROFILE OF
LONG ISLAND 15-16, 100-04 (2017).

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How can the current trajectory be reversed? A sizable


proportion of the current silent bystanders on Long Island will need to
become champions for change in their own communities and with local
and state governments. They will need to support laws, policies, and
practices that dismantle segregation. Structural problems require
structural solutions. Yet too often the instinct is to leave structural
racism in place and then wonder why efforts around the edges don’t
make a lasting difference.
Regional cohesion and empathy across racial groups is far less
likely on Long Island because people from different racial groups do
not know each other, do not live together or go to school together, and,
as a result, inhabit very different realities. Solving structural racism
will require a shared understanding of history, objective facts about
current challenges and how to address them, and familiarity with and
empathy for people who are not like oneself. The familiarity and
empathy gaps on Long Island will not lessen if segregation remains so
widespread and unchallenged. Central to the prosperity and
sustainability of Long Island is the extent to which Long Islanders
tackle white supremacy, discrimination, and segregation against
African Americans in housing head-on. Why is it so hard to make
change?
Point One: On the whole, the general public and civic and
political leaders reject the argument that the disparities between whites
and Blacks have anything to do with structural impediments. Even a
plurality of justices (according to 2013 publications and it is probably
worse now) on the United States Supreme Court refuse to acknowledge
that anything other than intentional discrimination can be legally
addressed through government action. 201 “Why can’t they pull
themselves up by their bootstraps?” is the familiar refrain.
Point Two: Nightly TV news reinforces the idea that Blacks are
responsible for the socio-economic challenges they disproportionately
face by overrepresenting Black criminality. Even though most people
who commit crimes are white, Blacks are more likely to appear as
criminally threatening on local television news.202 Missing, almost
completely, are news stories that provide an historical context and a

201
See generally MICHAEL AVERY & DANIELLE MCLAUGHLIN, THE FEDERALIST
SOCIETY: HOW CONSERVATIVES TOOK THE LAW BACK FROM THE LIBERALS (2013).
202
Kelly Welch, Black Criminal Stereotypes and Racial Profiling, J. CONTEMP.
CRIM. JUST. 276, 281-84 (2007).

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structural analysis to the problems facing Blacks, which brings me to


Point 3.
Point Three: Another common refrain is that the “problem” is
economic, not racial. Many people cite the wealthy Black high
achievers in entertainment, sports, even some corporate leaders, and,
of course, the former President of the United States, Barack Obama, in
order to substantiate their claims to a post-racial society.203
Most recently, an article from The New York Times reported
that income inequality can adversely affect any economic recovery. 204
One percent of earners accumulated ninety-three percent of income
gains made during the first full year of the economic upswing after the
2008 economic crisis.205 However, in reporting on income disparities,
there was not a single mention of race or the intersectionality of race
and poverty. Similarly, a report by The Century Foundation noted the
following: “Aggregate net worth among [the richest 7 percent of
households] rose 28 percent during the first two years of the recovery,
from $19.8 trillion to $25.4 trillion. The bottom 93 percent,
meanwhile, saw their aggregate net worth fall 4 percent, from $15.4
trillion to $14.8 trillion.”206 It, too, did not discuss the intersectionality
of race and poverty. Looking back at the November 2012 election, we
can unfortunately say that neither candidate discussed poverty and race
nor the increasing relationship between poverty and race in any of the
three Presidential debates, and consequently ignored the impact of the
2008 economic meltdown.207 Nor was there any discussion from either

203
John R. Logan, The Persistence of Segregation in the 21st Century Metropolis,
CITY CMTY., June 1, 2013, at 1, 4-5.
204
Annie Lowry, Income Inequality Might Take Toll on Growth, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/business/economy/income-
inequality-may-take-toll-on-growth.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
205
Id.
206
Benjamin Landy, A Tale of Two Recoveries: Wealth Inequality After the Great
Recession, CENTURY FOUND. (Aug. 28, 2013), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/a-
tale-of-two-recoveries-wealth-inequality-after-the-great-recession.
207
PBS NewsHour, Obama v. Romney: The First 2012 Presidential Debate,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 3, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfaBRyCKRhk; PBS
NewsHour, Obama v. Romney: The Second 2012 Presidential Debate, YOUTUBE
(Oct. 16, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jhXgbrkFJ_s; PBS NewsHour,
Obama v. Romney: The Third 2012 Presidential Debate, YOUTUBE (Oct. 22, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jhXgbrkFJ_s.

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candidate about the increasing racial isolation found in American


metropolitan areas, including the suburbs.208
As our news gets broken into sound bites, the media avoids
complicated issues like disparate impact, 209 the need to intentionally
plan and implement fair housing policies, and post-Brown v. Board of
Education,210 inter-district school segregation. We know that,
especially here on Long Island, the 125 school districts, which mirror
the racially segregated communities they serve, produce separate and
unequal public-school education for Blacks and Latinos as compared
to whites.211 It’s easier on Long Island to talk about economic
segregation rather than racial segregation; however, in reality we
remain much more segregated by race than by income, with
segregation between Blacks and whites being the most severe. 212
The standard narrative explains the cause for
underachievement academically among these racial groups as the
students themselves and their parents. The parents do not value
education and their kids do not apply themselves. This is a much more
comprehensible sound bite than describing a complex cause and effect
relationship between segregation and underachievement for media,
government officials, and the general voting public. Furthermore, a
new narrative explains that public school education is itself the
problem. The story goes: Unionized teachers are overpaid and deliver
poor instruction. This narrative is particularly helpful for those who

208
Richard Fry & Paul Taylor, The Rise of Racial Segregation by Income, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Mar. 26, 2022, 2:29 PM), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/08/01/the-
rise-of-residential-segregation-by-income/1/. Here on Long Island, despite
increased diversity, racial isolation, especially among Hispanics, is rising.
209
Disparate impact is a focus on “discriminatory effects” as a way to provide
evidence for discrimination. As noted in a brief by the Federal Register,
“discrimination under the [Fair Housing] Act may be established through evidence
of discriminatory effects, i.e., facially neutral practices with an unjustified
discriminatory effect.” Reinstatement of HUD’s Discriminatory Effects Standard,
86 Fed. Reg. 33590 (proposed June 25, 2021) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
This means that a fair housing organization can demonstrate fair housing violations
without needing to demonstrate an intent to discriminate.
210
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
211
ERASE Racism, Unequal Resources for Long Island Students Based on Race
(May 2022),
https://www.eraseracismny.org/storage/documents/Unequal_Resources_for_Long_
Island_Students_Based_on_Race_ERASE_Racism_2022_Report.pdf.
212
John R. Logan. The Persistence of Segregation in the 21st Century Metropolis,
12 CITY & COMMUNITY 4, 5 (2013): 10.1111/cico.12021. doi:10.1111/cico.12021.

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wish to dismantle public school education and replace it with profit-


making charter schools or voucher programs. 213
Questions of access to opportunity, self-determination, and the
right not to be discriminated against for Blacks remain a heavy lift in
today’s climate. Fundamentally, they are portrayed as and considered
“undeserving” by elected officials, civic leaders and the average white
citizen. Addressing racial inequities through affirmative action and
voluntary accommodations has been redefined in the twenty-first
century as offering special treatment to those who do not deserve it at
the expense of innocent whites. This is the underlying ideology of
reverse discrimination cases which has found its way into dominant
culture and perceptions.214 A recent survey found that far fewer whites
and Hispanics strongly disagree that “racism is by and large a thing of

213
See, e.g., Republican National Party, The 2012 Republican National Convention
Platform 35, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2012). The Platform states:
School choice–whether through charter schools, open enrollment
requests, college lab schools, virtual schools, career and technical
education programs, vouchers, or tax credits–is important for all
children, especially for families with children trapped in failing
schools. Getting those youngsters into decent learning
environments and helping them to realize their full potential is the
greatest civil rights challenge of our time.
Id. at 36.
214
The first reverse discrimination cases were brought on behalf of men, represented
by the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project headed by then Associate Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg. The strategy was to do away with gender classifications that had
previously been labeled “benign” or protective of women. Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion). On the same day as Kahn
was argued before the United States Supreme Court, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
312 (1974) was also heard. DeFunis was the first reverse race discrimination case
to arrive at the Court, but was dismissed as moot because the plaintiff had been
admitted to University of Washington School of Law and was about to finish law
school. Id. at 317-18; see Rosalie Berger Levinson, Gender-Based Affirmative
Action and Reverse Gender Bias: Beyond Gratz, Parents Involved, and Ricci, 34
HARV. J. L. & GENDER 1, 5-9 (2011). For the reverse race discrimination cases that
began reaching the Supreme Court in the late 1970s, see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (discussing employment); Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (discussing medical school
admissions); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (discussing
a minority set-aside program); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (discussing
law school admissions); and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (discussing
college admissions).

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the past”—34% and 32%—whereas African Americans strongly


believe that racism is here and as virulent as ever—58%.215
Given this reality, how does one enact civil rights public
policies in the twenty-first century that advance equal opportunity and
equal access to such unequivocal basic rights as quality public school
education and decent, safe housing for Blacks in a neighborhood of
their choosing?
First, one cannot minimize the pervasive success of the leaders
of the Republican Party nationally and certain conservative religious
leaders and their organizations in creating a new narrative about the
United States heading in the wrong direction. 216 There is an urgent call
to reverse at any cost everything that liberals or progressives have
stood for, including dismantling the gains of the Civil Rights
Movement, like the bold-faced efforts to disenfranchise Black
voters.217
The traditional approach to developing public policy is to
identify problems and then develop the policy solutions to those
identified problems. Some policy experts have gone about their work
by first establishing a paradigm or broad vision of what society should
look like for all its inhabitants and then think about the specific policies
that will produce the end goal. Others are less focused on a world view
and instead, perhaps more pragmatically, target their efforts narrowly,
looking to solve one specific problem at a time without seeing the
interconnectedness among problems.
However, if we don’t know where we are going and why, we
will likely never get there. So, we do need a vision of where we want
to go. I want our society to embrace the dignity and diversity of this

215
Harper’s Index, HARPER’S MAG., Apr. 2013, at 15.
216
Kevin Phillips, the architect of the Republican Party’s “southern strategy”
admitted that the very basis of the strategy was to optimize racial hostility among
working class white ethnic voters and African Americans who now saw hope in the
1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act. James Boyd, Nixon’s Southern
Strategy: It’s All in the Charts, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 1970),
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/books/phillips-southern.pdf. The red state-
blue state maps tracking the 2012 Presidential election demonstrated how effective
the strategy has been in luring white southern Democrats to the Republican rolls.
217
Voting Laws Roundup: February 2022, BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (Feb. 9, 2022),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-
february-
2022?ms=gad_voting%20laws_587514441261_8626214133_130570618446&gcli
d=CjwKCAjwxZqSBhAHEiwASr9n9CG_riMTKfLpn0y6facg1EHNjXW4SqSwS
3UWVMy5Ee5GogzHQayeNhoCXBgQAvD_BwE.

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nation. The elected and civic leadership should reflect that diversity
and power should be shared. That is my vision: where race and
ethnicity will not be determinative of one’s ability to access
nondiscriminatory housing, and more broadly one’s place in the
economic, social, or political order. How we get there requires a
structural analysis, because any attempt to stop re-segregation and to
promote an integrated public life requires structural change.
Furthermore, where we want to go needs to reflect structural
alternatives to seemingly intractable problems like housing
discrimination and racially segregated schools, as is the case for Long
Island. Blacks and Latinos in the region do not have access to highly
resourced school districts, especially when compared to districts that
are predominantly white. 218 Despite the fact that student enrollment
for all districts on Long Island is 16 percent Black, 28 percent
Hispanic, 10 percent Asian, and 41 percent white, the number of school
districts with over 90% Black and Latino is increasing.219 And it’s
these hyper-segregated districts that have the least access to resources,
such as overall per pupil funding, AP courses, and guidance
counselors.220
If our vision only addresses how individuals treat other
individuals and does not recognize the power of institutions to
maintain the status quo, our efforts will fall far short.
As an example, under No Child Left Behind 221 and now Race
to the Top,222 the prescription for addressing the achievement gap in
Long Island schools includes a multitude of strategies but does not
challenge the existence of racially segregated schools which have
unequal resources for their Black and Hispanic students.223 But don’t,

218
ERASE Racism, supra note 211.
219
Id. at 11.
220
Id. at 16-24.
221
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered section of 20 U.S.C.) (repealed by Every Student
Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.)).
222
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 14005-
6, 123 Stat. 115, 282-84 (2009). U.S. Dep't Of Educ., Race To The Top Program
Executive Summary (Nov. 2009) https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED557422.pdf. In
2007, the United States Congress passed, and President Barack Obama signed it into
law.
223
Unequal Resources for Long Island Students Based on Race, ERASE RACISM
(May 2022),

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under any circumstances, utilize a proven strategy to increase the


academic achievement of Blacks in the United States, school and
classroom integration, which gives Blacks and Latinos access to the
same high performing educational environment and rigorous
curriculum as whites by allowing access to the same schools and
classrooms as the white students.224
I also believe that while we work on the longer-term structural
changes, we need to identify opportunities where an immediate
strategy can both make a difference and move us toward our longer-
term structural alternative. The United States narrative about our
success, even as a young nation, was that we caught up with older
European counterparts and surpassed them in economic development
in large part because of the system of public education, which was
largely for whites. Now the population of our public schools
increasingly includes more Blacks and Latinos, mirroring global
demographic changes. As such, this is not the time to dismantle our
public school system. This is not the time to replace public education
with a fragmented patchwork of private schools with little government
oversight and even less community investment and control. These
highly visible, yet unsuccessful interim strategies that help dismantle
the public schools, such as the promotion of charter schools, will not
help us to reach our long-term vision or ensure that children of color
can be productive in our future economy. 225
Institutions are needed to help guide this work. Institutions that
both nurture our preferred values, collect the evidence that proves the
discrimination and disparate impact, and institutions that analyze
specific power relationships, government and social structures that
warrant changes. Alternative structures (laws, policies, frameworks,
and institutions) are needed that support greater racial equity, and an
external narrative is needed that can change the hearts and minds of
decision-makers and the general public.

https://www.eraseracismny.org/storage/documents/Unequal_Resources_for_Long_
Island_Students_Based_on_Race_ERASE_Racism_2022_Report.pdf.
224
See generally Dennis J. Condron et al., Racial Segregation and the Black/White
Achievement Gap, 1992-2009, 54 SOCIO. Q. 130 (2013).
225
See CTR. FOR RSCH. EDUC. OUTCOMES, Multiple Choice: Charter School
Performance in 16 States, STAN. UNIV., June 2009, at 1. A longitudinal study
showed that 17 percent of charter schools outperformed public schools; however,
nearly half showed no difference, and 37 percent performed considerably below
public schools. Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss2/5 48
Gross: Denial of Housing to African Americans

2022 DENIAL OF HOUSING TO AFRICAN AMERICANS 637

Too often, there are those who think we just need a different
discourse based on the facts and those who think, “Enough talking,
let’s just push through policy changes that we need using direct
action.” Both groups would probably agree that they also need to map
out a strategy for change that takes into account political realities.
Even if they are both interested in structural changes, which some
social justice activists may not be, they may skip two additional
important components of the policy change strategy: 1) figuring out
exactly how existing institutions can support the values underpinning
the change we want, i.e., systematically considering power dynamics
in our democracy; and 2) creating a narrative that is easy to understand,
that ties into familiar values and constructs that ordinary people,
thought-leaders, and decision-makers can embrace.
The narrative will need to re-legitimize the role of government,
re-affirm the call for well-meaning people of all races to take a stand
for racial equity, and reconstruct who we are as “Americans.” We
would need to dismantle the normalized white supremacy ideology.
Despite the abolition of slavery and legalized Jim Crow, the white
supremacy ideology is not dead. As discussed in this Article, white
supremacy is inscribed in our society’s geography, government, laws,
and private and public institutions. We need to replace it with a
narrative of racial equity and inclusion, which would be embraced by
a large segment of our political leaders, civic leaders, and the general
populace.
Lawyers played a pivotal role throughout the Civil Rights
Movement of the 1950s and 1960s, which pushed through sweeping,
societal changes to enfranchise disenfranchised Blacks. 226 There are
many lessons to learn from the successes during that period. Clearly,
the ability of lawyers to use the rule of law in support of greater equity
is priceless. Unfortunately, the rule of law is now, once again, being
used to protect racial inequity and cement in place structural
impediments that deny racial groups, which are perceived as
undeserving, access to opportunity. 227 I would suggest that civil rights
attorneys revisit the demand for equal rights and the principle that
separate is not equal, neither for housing nor public-school

226
See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS (Basic Books 1994).
227
Wendy Leo Moore, Maintaining Supremacy By Blocking Affirmative Action, 17
CONTEXTS 54-59 (2018).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2022 49


Touro Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 2 [2022], Art. 5

638 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 38

education.228 My observation is that protest alone is not sufficient and


no legal or policy strategy is sufficient without engagement of the
general citizenry. Bayard Rustin was one civil rights leader who talked
about transitioning from protests to political power. He cautioned that
by destroying Jim Crow we would not in fact gain equality. 229 He
suggested that the post-Jim Crow era would be even more challenging
than the legal battles under Jim Crow.230 That was a profound analysis,
especially given that even today, structural racism is not seen by many
otherwise intelligent individuals.
There were strong, organized, trained voices of dissent during
the 1950s and 1960s, but our voices are more muted today. There were
clear, often coherent visions of freedom and equality then, but our
visions, when we have them, are frequently fragmented and blurrier
today. There was thoughtful, strategic leadership then, which
sometimes made mistakes, but, on the whole, was effective and
fearless. Today, there are more demagogues than leaders, and we have
clearly not coalesced into a fearsome force for change.
I close with an optimistic hope, however, that as individuals
increasingly understand the sheer power of the white supremacy
ideology, there will be a collective movement to unravel it and create
a new narrative for Long Island and the nation that is rooted in a vision
of racial equity and inclusion. We will create the laws, policies and
culture that will underpin that narrative. Ultimately, that is what we,
as a nation, need to do to radically alter the continuation of race-based
discrimination and segregation of African Americans.

228
Gary Orfield et al., E Pluribus...Separation: Deepening Double Segregation for
More Students, CIVIL RTS. PROJECT (Sept. 19, 2012),
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-
diversity/mlk-national/e-pluribus...separation-deepening-double-segregation-for-
more-students.
229
Bayard Rustin, ‘Negro Revolution in 1965’ Speech at the Center for Democratic
Institutions, AM. RADIOWORKS,
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/blackspeech/brustin.html.
230
Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss2/5 50
Human Rights

The ‘Not Here’ Syndrome


Racism denial, workplace inequity, and the futility of speaking out.

By Charlice Hurst May 3, 2021

One day not long after the 2016 US presidential


election, a white senior colleague asked me—the only
Black tenure-line faculty in my college at that time—
how Black people felt realizing that racism still exists
in America. I was annoyed by his question. This
colleague never spoke to me; yet he felt at ease asking
me to speak on behalf of all Black people in the United
States. Why did he expect me to have a pat answer?
(Illustration by Nyanza D)
Did he think I had taken a scientific poll of Black
people’s reactions to the election?

I had not. Nevertheless, the imbalance of power between my colleague and myself made it
imprudent to show my annoyance, so I answered that Black people never thought racism had ended.
Not only do we know it still exists, I told him, but we also continue to experience it, often in our own
workplaces.

He was shocked.

He had what I have come to call the “not here” syndrome—denying that racism is a problem in your
own organization, even when you are willing to acknowledge it as prevalent in society, outside your
own organization or home. The “not here” syndrome is at work when someone bemoans Trump’s
election but confidently declares, as this colleague did, “There’s no racism here; at least none that
I’ve seen.” Racism was only “out there, not here.” Ironically, while my colleague trusted me to
represent Black people’s views on the racism that Trump and his supporters so boldly expressed, he
did not trust me to speak about what I have personally experienced as the only Black faculty member
This Is What Racism Looks Like
This series aims to explain how racism operates within organizations and create
conversation about racial justice, dignity, and belonging.
FOLLOW THIS SERIES

at our school. His epiphany that racism persists in the United States left him unconvinced that it is a
problem at our own university. And there was nothing I could say to convince him otherwise.

Regardless of Black people’s dignity, expertise, or professional achievements, employers treat Black
employees as unfit to interpret our own experiences. Even Black scholars with deep knowledge of the
vast and damning literature on racism find that our expertise is unwelcome within our colleges and
universities. We can talk about it at conferences but not in our organizations’ conference rooms.
White colleagues who have never given serious thought to racism believe themselves more fit to
identify it; more capable of being “objective” or “reasonable.” They almost seem to pity us for our
sensitivity to signals of racism. They believe that what they cannot see must not exist, overlooking
the possibility that they do not see racism because it does not happen to them.
For instance, when I confided in a colleague one day that a student in my class had declared support
for white nationalism—a student whose evaluation of my teaching would one day be treated as a data
point in deciding whether or not I could keep my job—the colleague simply replied, “I’m sure you’ll
figure out how to handle it.” Although I cannot be sure that he was in complete denial, his casual
response conveyed that, at best, he saw this student as a “bad apple” rather than as a symptom of a
rotten tree—of the culture and systems. In his mind, there might be a few racist students at our
university, but there was not enough racism to justify my alarm. Yet, he showed sensitivity and
concern in discussions we had about racial inequity outside of our university. He, too, had the “not
here” syndrome.

When Racism Is Always Somewhere Else


Many people have hoped that George Floyd’s death at the hands of Minneapolis police officers in the
spring of 2020 would spark a surge in white people’s awareness of racism, a surge that would carry
us, finally, to racial justice in the United States. I have had white friends chastise me for not
embracing this optimism. Yet recent surveys by the Pew Research Center have found racial attitudes
in the United States have remained largely unchanged since 2019. White and Black Americans’
attitudes about policing have converged on only one issue: The majority of people in both groups
believe that the criminal justice system is less fair to Black people. Otherwise, there are large
differences between Black and white Americans in their beliefs about the urgency of racial inequality
and the need for policies to redress it. Far fewer shares of white people, for instance, believe that the
country needs to do more toward the goal of racial equality, that they need to educate themselves on
racial inequality, or that racially disparate treatment is alive in mortgage lending, health care, and
voting. There has certainly not been a great awakening to systemic racism in the workplace. In fall
2020, only 43 percent of white people agreed that employers discriminate against Black people.
Based on my experiences and those of other Black people I know, I suspect that even fewer white
people believe that their own employer discriminates.

I have often wondered how white people can be blind to racial inequity in their workplace—the place
where they spent most of their time. Research suggests that one reason is a greater tendency among
white Americans to overestimate how much the United States has progressed toward racial
economic parity. They do so even after reading about the persistence of racism. Rather than
attending to facts, white people often base their estimates on examples of high-status Black people,
taking the success of a few as evidence of mass progress.

Turning away from evidence of racism also serves as psychological self-protection. Denying or
downplaying racism helps white people maintain the view that they, personally, hold no racial
prejudice and, more critically, are disconnected from (and therefore not responsible for) the history
of racism within the United States that has served to benefit them politically, socially, and
economically. Nobody wants to dwell on painful truths that reflect poorly upon them and their
friends, family, and beloved institutions.

Research has shown that people often identify strongly with the organization that employs them. Not
only are they part of the organization, but the organization is a part of them. Organizational identity
is a source of self-esteem and satisfies that most fundamental of human needs to belong to a valued
collective. Although identifying with one’s employer can support well-being and performance, it can
also reduce employees’ willingness to recognize the organization’s pitfalls. Research by business
management scholars Elizabeth E. Umphress, John B. Bingham, and Marie S. Mitchell has found
that people who are highly identified with their employer are more likely to engage in unethical
actions that benefit the organization. In addition to self-protection, people with strong organizational
identity may be motivated to deny racism in their organization if they think acknowledgment is a
slippery slope toward discrimination claims that are costly to the organization’s reputation and
bottom line.

Despite such paranoia about lawsuits, research suggests that employees are less likely to lodge
formal discrimination complaints if they feel that their organization shows true concern about their
experiences of racism. Based on my experience, few Black people are interested in the potential
monetary costs, mental health, and career costs that can result from claiming discrimination. We
simply want our organizations to listen and act.

The Paradox of Diversity Efforts and Racism Denial


Many companies now claim to be listening and acting. Estee Lauder, Facebook, and PepsiCo are
among the dozens of firms that have announced pledges over the past year to pour resources into
advancing racial justice. Many of the pledges include goals to increase representation of Black
employees in these companies. However, a closer look at these goals gives room for pause. For
instance, the investment firm Blackrock plans a 30-percent increase in the proportion of Black
employees and a doubling of Black senior leaders in its workforce of 7,500 over the next three years.
The targets seem impressive until a look at the numbers reveals that success will result in only 113
more Black employees. The doubling of Black people in senior leadership will result in an increase
from one Black person to two on the board of directors and the executive committee.

Black people hired under these initiatives could encounter a culture that is as dismissive of their
experiences and insights as ever. Indeed, anemic as Blackrock’s hiring goals may seem to be,
organizations that signal commitment to racial diversity often encounter a countervailing wave of
heightened racism denial among white employees. The very programs we count on to remedy
racism in employment can actually strengthen the tendency to deny that racism is, in fact, “here, not
there.” Numerous studies, for example, have found that people are less likely to see a company as
discriminatory if it has a diversity program, even in the face of objective evidence of discrimination.
A 2018 study by Columbia Business School’s Seval Gündemir & Adam Galinsky found that when a
company either claims a commitment to multiculturalism or wins a diversity award, observers are
more likely to see Black employees’ claims of racial discrimination as illegitimate. Furthermore,
there is evidence that when organizations prioritize the hiring of Black employees and strive to
remove discriminatory barriers to employment, white employees may not only deny anti-Black
racism but also allege that white people are the real victims of discrimination.

Although diversity training might seem to be the obvious tool for managing such reactions, it also
heightens denial. Implicit bias training, the approach that has become standard for companies
ranging from Google to McDonald's, has shown little evidence of effecting lasting change in
individual racial attitudes. The main message of such training is that all of us carry unconscious
biases against other social groups. However, simply making people aware that they have unconscious
biases does not necessarily motivate them to address or remedy those biases. In fact, diversity
training participants with the lowest initial cultural competence and knowledge are the least likely to
show interest in further training. One large study published at the Harvard Business Review in 2019
showed that employees who took part in a diversity training intervention were more likely to
recognize their bias, but the training only increased inclusive behaviors among female and racial
minority employees. Another study by Cornell University’s associate professor of management and
organizations at the Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management Michelle M. Duguid
and Airbnb’s Global Head of Diversity Melissa C. Thomas-Hunt found that white people expressed
more racially biased attitudes and behaviors after learning in diversity training that racial
stereotyping is highly prevalent.

Given the ineffectiveness of implicit bias training at the individual level, it is not surprising that
there is no evidence that it catalyzes organizational change. By locating racism in the individual
rather than the system, it obviates the need to consider bias in the organization’s policies. It fails to
communicate that the survival of systemic racism does not depend only on individual attitudes.
People with the best of intentions may perpetuate systemic racism simply by implementing policies
conceived of during a time when the exclusion of racial minorities was not only considered normal,
but also necessary. For example, the use of student evaluations to judge faculty performance came
into being before most institutions were hiring Black faculty. Yet there is substantial evidence that
gender and racial bias influence these measures. Though a department chair may sincerely wish to
see a Black faculty member succeed, they perpetuate institutional racism with their failure to accept
evidence of the harm caused by student evaluations.

The consequences of racism denial in workplaces reach well beyond those in my admittedly
privileged position as a highly educated and well-compensated college professor. Gaps in pay,
benefits, and access to jobs perpetuate less wealth and poorer health among Black people. Low-wage
Black workers have played an outsized role in keeping the United States operating through the
COVID-19 pandemic, delivering groceries, washing bedpans, and even cleaning up after white
supremacist rioters. But companies have not been generous in return. Business groups continue to
lobby against minimum wage increases, benefits for gig workers, and safe working conditions—the
very changes Black workers need to recover from the significant toll the pandemic has taken on their
communities.

Even the Business Roundtable’s announcement of support for federal paid leave legislation defies
optimism. This league of companies that collectively employs 19 million people is advocating
limiting federal paid leave only to employees currently covered by the Family Medical Leave Act,
excluding 62 percent of low-wage workers (who are disproportionately people of color and women).
The Roundtable’s position does not inspire confidence that US corporations have realized racial
inequity is both “out there” and “in here.” No amount of diversity training or pledges can compensate
for this denial.

Sorry, I Can’t Talk Right Now


Whose burden is it to speak up? When leaders announce that it is time for a reckoning with racism
in their organizations, initiatives often include requests to Black employees to participate in “candid
conversations” and “listening circles.” In Zoom meetings, white colleagues look on earnestly as Black
employees pour out their pain and plead for change. In these discussions, I see at play the uneven
power dynamic that, as journalist Reni Eddo-Lodge has pointed out, often accompanies white
people’s invitations to Black people to talk about race. Now, white people are giving me the okay to
say that racism is here, not just out there. Only now that millions of white people have been shocked
into grief and outrage by the video of George Floyd’s death. It was not okay when I was grieving the
massacre of nine Black people at Bible study in Charleston or the shooting of 12-year old Tamir Rice
while he played with a toy gun. It was not okay when I talked about the white nationalist student in
my class or the times I called on administrators to take a serious look at the data on bias in teaching
evaluations.

I can speak now. But I do not want to. Like so many other Black people, I am tired. I am also angry. I
am angry that people did not have enough respect to listen to me before. I am angry that it took
George Floyd for people to want to listen. I am angry that none of this newfound sympathy will undo
the emotional strain and career damage I have sustained over years of fighting alone. A few years
ago, in 2017, the weight of the anxiety and rage that I felt from that fight led me to decide to let it go.
My health was suffering. I chose to save myself by accepting that the institution is what it is and that
I have no power to change it. I stopped risking further alienation from my colleagues by talking
about race at work. As a Black woman, I made the same choice then about which the poet Paul
Laurence Dunbar wrote in 1895—to don “the mask that grins and lies.” As with all masks, mine is
silent. I still carry the knowledge and pain of the reality that racism is pervasive, but I, to borrow
again from Dunbar, “let the world dream otherwise.”

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Read more stories by Charlice Hurst.

Charlice Hurst is an assistant professor in the University of Notre Dame’s Mendoza College of
Business. Her teaching and research are centered around social innovation, systems thinking, and
racial economic justice.

DOI: 10.48558/djgd-9p08

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Editorial

Discourse & Society

Accusations and denials 21(3) 251–256


© The Author(s) 2010

of racism: Managing Reprints and permission: sagepub.


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DOI: 10.1177/0957926509360650
moral accountability in http://das.sagepub.com

public discourse

Martha Augoustinos
University of Adelaide, Australia

Danielle Every
University of South Australia

As Van Dijk (1992) has documented, one of the pervasive features of contemporary race
discourse is the denial of prejudice. During the last 50 years, social norms against openly
expressing racist sentiments has led to the development of ways of talking that present
negative views of out-groups as reasonable and justified, while at the same time protect-
ing speakers from charges of racism and prejudice. It goes without saying that a ‘preju-
diced’ or ‘racist’ identity is no longer a valued identity. Negative representations and
evaluations of minorities are commonly preceded by ubiquitous disclaimers such as ‘I’m
not racist but . . . ’ or ‘I have nothing against migrants but ... ’. Contemporary race talk,
therefore, is strategically organized to deny racism.
A closely related but largely ignored phenomenon associated with the denial of prej-
udice is a political climate that creates what is tantamount to a social taboo against mak-
ing accusations of racism in the first place (Augoustinos and Every, 2007). Such charges
and accusations are invariably met with not only strong denials, but also moral outrage
and are often treated as more extreme than racism itself. This Special Edition publishes
new discursive work on the delicate discursive and argumentative management of
accusations of racism and their accompanying denials.

New racism
There is now a large body of research analysing the discursive and rhetorical properties of
the new racism (Barker, 1981). Studies in Western liberal democracies including Australia

Corresponding author:
Martha Augoustinos, School of Psychology, Level 4, Hughes Building, University of Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia.
Email: martha.augoustinos@adelaide.edu.au
252 Discourse & Society 21(3)

(Augoustinos et al., 2005; Rapley, 1998), Belgium (Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998),
Britain (Condor et al., 2006; Jones, 2000; Lynn and Lea, 2003), New Zealand (Nairn and
McCreanor, 1991; Wetherell and Potter, 1992), The Netherlands (Van Dijk, 1991, 1993,
1997; Verkuyten, 1998) and the USA (Goldberg, 1996; Santa Ana, 1999) have identified
pervasive discursive repertoires and rhetorical devices that are combined flexibly by
majority group members to justify negative evaluations of minority out-groups. Those
who wish to express negative views against out-groups in the contemporary historical
climate take care to construct these views as justified, warranted and rational (Billig,
1988), denying, mitigating, justifying and excusing negative acts and views towards
minorities in order to position themselves as decent, moral, reasonable citizens (Condor
et al., 2006). Such denials not only attend to the positive self-presentation of the speaker,
but also allow what otherwise would be ‘unsayable’ to be said.
Given the flexible and ambivalent nature of contemporary race discourse, critical
voices, that identify and attempt to make accountable racist practices in Western societ-
ies, are easily silenced and dismissed by such denials. As Van Dijk (1992: 90) argues,
‘Accusations of racism . . . tend to be seen as more serious social infractions than racist
attitudes or actions themselves’. This, of course, raises special challenges for the devel-
opment of effective anti-racist practices and for naming racism when it takes place. How
can racist or discriminatory practices be challenged, when there are increasing social
taboos around identifying, naming and categorizing persons, groups, events and
practices as ‘racist’?
Critical voices are also effectively silenced by the widespread marginalization and
denigration of those who ‘speak up’ and challenge racism. Van Dijk (1992: 90) writes:

the person who accuses the other as racist is in turn accused of inverted racism against whites,
as oversensitive and exaggerating, as intolerant and generally as ‘seeing racism where there is
none’ … Moreover, such accusations are seen to impose taboos, prevent free speech and a ‘true’
or ‘honest’ assessment of the ethnic situation. In other words, denials of racism often turn into
counter-accusations of intolerant and intolerable anti-racism.

Examples of this negative characterization of anti-racists and accusations of racism have


been documented in studies across several Western countries. In the USA, for example,
supporters of an anti-discrimination bill were categorized as the ‘human rights industry’,
‘demagogic’, and as incompatible with the American values of democracy and freedom
of speech (Van Dijk, 1997). In the UK, refugee sympathizers were derisively tagged as
‘white liberals’: wealthy elites who espoused humanitarianism but, duplicitously, did not
disadvantage themselves by providing for asylum seekers but forced this burden on to
others (Lynn and Lea, 2003).
The theme of anti-racists as out of touch with the mainstream was also found in The
Netherlands. Participants in Verkuyten’s (1998) focus groups positioned anti-racists as
ignorant of the reality of living in a multi-ethnic community and therefore without legit-
imate right to speak of the ‘facts’. These participants also presented anti-racists as dis-
criminating against the majority white population. In Australia too, anti-racist critics
have often been depicted as politically correct ideologues who undermine the liberal
principles of free speech (McIntyre and Clark, 2003). For example, political journalist
Augoustinos and Every 253

Paul Sheehan (1998) alleged that ‘racist’ was a loaded term employed by the ‘Thought
Police’ (post-modern academics, Labor politicians and members of the ‘elite multicultur-
alism industry’) to silence their opponents. As in Belgium and the UK, ‘the elites’ has
become a powerful derogatory categorization applied to those who oppose conservative
and reactionary policies on immigration, refugees and indigenous peoples. As such, anti-
racists are constructed as an out of touch, privileged minority. As part of the maintenance
of social inequity, the construction of anti-racists as pernicious, oppressive, discrimina-
tory or just plain crazy (the ‘loony left’) is a potent way of silencing prejudice claims.
This research on the negative construction of anti-racists suggests that such critics
must attend to pervasive concerns that accusations of racism may be perceived to be
unreasonable and extreme. Indeed, Jones’ (2000) analysis of political discourse in the
UK on new asylum laws found that politicians opposing such laws rarely explicitly
invoked the category of racism when justifying their condemnation. Similarly, Every and
Augoustinos (2007) found that in the Australian parliament, refugee advocates opposing
restrictive laws also avoided making direct allegations of racism against such laws. Both
studies found that, instead, critics deployed euphemisms for racism such as describing
the government as ‘playing the race card’ or appealing to the ‘Conservative-minded’
vote. These ‘softened’ euphemisms for racism functioned to criticize such policies whilst
maintaining a reasonable and rational subject position.
In this Special Issue, we present analyses which examine the fine detail of how speak-
ers make and manage accusations of racism and in turn how they are responded to by
interlocutors through the use of ubiquitous disclaimers and denials. At the same time, the
articles in this Issue provide naturalistic data in which claims of racism are produced by
social participants themselves (rather than analysts) and examine how these claims are
managed and attended to in social interaction in a variety of social and institutional set-
tings (Edwards, 2003). In this way, the articles also attend to the indexicality and contin-
gency of contested meanings of ‘racism’ in social interaction. Thus, rather than
attempting to define what ‘really’ constitutes ‘racism’, these articles also examine the
production of racism as an everyday contested phenomenon (Van den Berg et al., 2003).

In this Special Issue


The four articles in this issue provide naturalistic data in which accusations of racism are
made either directly or indirectly. The first three articles are based on publicly available
data in a range of media settings including a reality television programme, radio and
doorstop interviews with a politician, and a confrontational televised debate on immigra-
tion. The last article is drawn from focus group discussions on asylum seeking in the UK.
In the first article, Riggs and Due present a fascinating analysis of exit interviews in
the 2007 UK series of Celebrity Big Brother, which received international media atten-
tion for allegations of ‘racist bullying’ towards Bollywood film star Shilpa Shetty by the
British housemates. As the analysis makes clear, at stake during this public controversy
was not only the potentially prejudiced identities of the celebrities themselves, but the
collective ‘identity of Britain as a socially inclusive and “tolerant” society’. The analysis
of the interviews demonstrates how the host of the reality television programme man-
aged these accusations indirectly during the exit interviews by: avoiding labelling and
254 Discourse & Society 21(3)

naming the behaviour of the housemates as ‘racist’ but instead employing euphemisms
such as ‘bullying’, ‘mocking’, ‘cruel’ and ‘offensive’ behaviour; and using a distanced
footing by attributing the allegations of racism to third parties (the audience, media and
the British nation). These discursive practices serve to demonstrate the increasing social
delicacy that interactants orient to when racism becomes a publicly accountable matter.
Indeed, the analysis also suggests that by avoiding explicitly naming racism in such
highly visible public settings, racism is represented as a highly unusual and exceptional
occurrence rather than as a routine and normative feature of everyday life.
The second article in this issue by Chiang examines the discursive and rhetorical
management of a highly charged televised debate in February 2008 between CNN anchor
Lou Dobbs, and the President of La Raza (a Hispanic civil rights group) Janet Murguia,
about the defeat of the immigration amnesty legislation in the USA. The analysis dem-
onstrates the dramatic escalation of the debate between the two protagonists which cul-
minates in direct accusations by Murguia that Dobbs was guilty of propagating hate
speech against Hispanic immigrants on his programme. Within the cut and thrust of this
heated argumentative exchange, we see how Dobbs defends against this explicit charge
in the face of evidence and ‘facts’ that Murguia cites to support her claims. In contrast to
the previous article which demonstrated the interactional delicacy of making accusations
of racism, this article provides a dramatic instance in which one interactant holds another
– specifically in this case, an individual who has widespread media influence – person-
ally accountable for propagating racism. Finally, we see how Dobbs shuts down the
debate by invoking the First Amendment and the sanctity of free speech in America. This
argumentative resource functions as a rhetorically self-sufficient or bottom-line argu-
ment that needs no further warrant or elaboration.
Hanson-Easey and Augoustinos shift focus to analyse the discourse of political elites
in articulating and defending contentious government policy to reduce the Sudanese
humanitarian refugee quota in Australia. Again, the data are media interviews, this time
between the Immigration Minister and journalists who questioned the government’s
motives for introducing the legislation: suggestions by the media that the government
was once again playing the ‘race card’ on the eve of a Federal election. We see in this
analysis several examples of how the Minister’s factual claims about the unique ‘integra-
tion’ problems of this particular group of refugees were challenged by interviewers, and
in turn how the Minister fends off attributions of racism by deploying a range of discur-
sive resources such as the use of specific membership category devices, empiricist war-
ranting, appeals to consensus, stake inoculation and the deployment of causal and
historical narratives that construct the Sudanese as a uniquely problematic group.
Moreover, the analysis also suggests that while political elites have become particularly
adept at avoiding the use of the category ‘race’, supplanting it with de-racialized terms
such as ‘culture’, there are nonetheless occasions when ‘race’ ‘is worth the risk in allow-
ing a political speaker to conjure fear inducing imagery and causal inferences in ways
that advance a political project’.
As the number of displaced persons from underdeveloped nations seeking refuge in
Western liberal democracies continues to increase, many of these countries have wit-
nessed polarized public debates on the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers. The
final article by Goodman and Burke examines how British university students in focus
Augoustinos and Every 255

groups discuss whether or not it is racist to oppose asylum seekers. Goodman and Burke
demonstrate the dilemmatic way in which this issue is discursively managed in the talk
of students: although participants acknowledge and recognize that opposition to asylum
seeking can be and is often perceived to be racist, at the same time most participants
argued that this characterization was unfair. Rather, the rejection of and opposition to
asylum is more likely to be based on what were constructed as reasonable, practical and
economic concerns. The analysis examines how the word ‘just’ is used structurally to
‘both align with the taboo against prejudice’ and with the increasing sensitivities associ-
ated with making racist accusations. Racist accusations were constructed by participants
as ‘over-simplistic’ explanations for opposing asylum, which functioned to gloss over
reasonable and practical (non-racist) reasons and which also served to stifle free speech
in the community. As in Chiang’s analysis, free speech is appealed to as a rhetorically
self-sufficient argument that does not require further warrant.
Together, these articles offer new insights into the increasing delicacy of making
accusations of racism and how speakers manage their moral accountability (both in
accusing of and denying racism) in public discourse. Indeed, given the increasing
salience of contentious debates in the media around issues pertaining to race, immigra-
tion and ethnicity, as discourse analysts we have a wealth of publicly available data from
which we can draw to analyse the finer details of how speakers orient and attend to these
issues in everyday informal and formal talk. We hope that, taken together, the articles
in this Special Issue make a significant contribution to our growing understanding of
contemporary race discourse.

Acknowledgements
We are very grateful to Teun van Dijk and the anonymous reviewers for their comments and advice
on the manuscripts comprising this Special Issue.

References
Augoustinos, M. and Every, D. (2007) ‘Contemporary Racist Discourse: Taboos Against Racism
and Making Racist Accusations’, in A. Weatherall, B. Watson and C. Gallois (eds) Language,
Discourse and Social Psychology, pp. 233–54. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Augoustinos, M., Tuffin, K. and Every, D. (2005) ‘New Racism, Meritocracy and Individualism:
Constraining Affirmative Action in Education’, Discourse & Society 16: 315–39.
Barker, M. (1981) The New Racism. London: Junction Books.
Billig, M. (1988) ‘The Notion of “Prejudice”: Some Rhetorical and Ideological Aspects’, Text 8:
91–110.
Blommaert, J. and Verschueren, J. (1998) Debating Diversity: Analysing the Discourse of
Tolerance. London: Routledge.
Condor, S., Abell, J., Figgou, L., Gibson, S. and Stevenson, C. (2006) ‘“They’re not Racist . . . ”:
Prejudice Denial, Mitigation and Suppression in Dialogue’, British Journal of Social
Psychology 45: 441–62.
Edwards, D. (2003) ‘Analyzing Racial Discourse: The Discursive Psychology of Mind-world
Relationships’, in H. van den Berg, H. Houtcoup-Steenstra and M. Wetherell (eds) Analyzing
Race Talk: Multidisciplinary Approaches to the Interview. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
256 Discourse & Society 21(3)

Every, D. and Augoustinos, M. (2007) ‘Constructions of Racism in the Australian Parliamentary


Debates on Asylum Seekers’, Discourse & Society 18(4): 411–36.
Goldberg, D.T. (1996) ‘Racial Formation in Contemporary American National Identity’, Social
Identities 2: 169–91.
Jones, L. (2000) ‘Immigration and Parliamentary Discourse in Great Britain: An Analysis of the
Debates Related to the 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act’, in R. Wodak and T.A. van Dijk
(eds) Racism at the Top, pp. 283–310. Klagenfurt, Austria: Drava Verlag.
Lynn, N. and Lea, S. (2003) ‘“A Phantom Menace and the New Apartheid”: The Social Construction
of Asylum-seekers in the United Kingdom’, Discourse & Society 14: 425–52.
McIntyre, S. and Clark, A. (2003) The History Wars. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
Nairn, R.G. and McCreanor, T.N. (1991) ‘Race Talk and Common Sense: Patterns in Pakeha
Discourse on Maori/Pakeha Relations in New Zealand’, Journal of Language and Social
Psychology 10: 245–61.
Rapley, M. (1998) ‘“Just an Ordinary Australian”: Self-categorisation and the Discursive
Construction of Facticity in “New Racist” Political Rhetoric’, British Journal of Social
Psychology 37: 325–44.
Santa Ana, O. (1999) ‘“Like an Animal I was Treated”: Anti-immigrant Metaphor in US Public
Discourse’, Discourse & Society 10: 191–224.
Sheehan, P. (1998) Among the Barbarians: The Dividing of Australia. Sydney: Random House.
Van den Berg, H., Houtcoup-Steenstra, H. and Wetherell, M. (eds) (2003) Analyzing Race Talk:
Multidisciplinary Approaches to the Interview. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Van Dijk, T.A. (1991) Racism and the Press. London: Routledge.
Van Dijk, T.A. (1992) ‘Discourse and the Denial of Racism’, Discourse & Society 3: 87–118.
Van Dijk, T.A. (1993) Elite Discourses and Racism. London: Sage.
Van Dijk, T.A. (1997) ‘Political Discourse and Racism: Describing Others in Western Parliaments’,
in S.H. Riggins (ed.) The Language and Politics of Exclusion: Others in Discourse, pp. 31–64.
London: Sage.
Verkuyten, M. (1998) ‘Personhood and Accounting for Racism in Conversation’, Journal for the
Theory of Social Behaviour 28: 147–68.
Wetherell, M. and Potter, J. (1992) Mapping the Language of Racism. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Martha Augoustinos is Professor and Co-Director of the Discourse and Social Psychology
Group (DASP) in the School of Psychology, University of Adelaide. Martha has pub-
lished widely on ‘race’ and prejudice in Australia and in the field of discursive psychol-
ogy. She is co-editor with Kate Reynolds of Understanding Prejudice, Racism and Social
Conflict (Sage, 2001) and co-author of Social Cognition: An Integrated Introduction
(2nd edition, Sage, 2006) with Iain Walker and Ngaire Donaghue.

Danielle Every is a Research Fellow in the School of Communication, International


Studies and Languages at the University of South Australia. Her work explores the
language of anti-racism and refugee advocacy as a way of identifying and supporting
solidarity and resistance work in these areas. Her research has been published in
Discourse & Society, the Journal of Refugee Studies and the Journal of Sociolinguistics
among others, as well as in edited collections.
Whiteness and Education

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/rree20

Racism plays a disappearing act: discourses of denial in


one anti-discrimination campaign in higher education

Amanda Gebhard, Gabriela Novotna, Heather Carter & Funke Oba

To cite this article: Amanda Gebhard, Gabriela Novotna, Heather Carter & Funke
Oba (2023) Racism plays a disappearing act: discourses of denial in one anti-
discrimination campaign in higher education, Whiteness and Education, 8:2, 229-247, DOI:
10.1080/23793406.2022.2072760

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WHITENESS AND EDUCATION
2023, VOL. 8, NO. 2, 229–247
https://doi.org/10.1080/23793406.2022.2072760

Racism plays a disappearing act: discourses of denial in one


anti-discrimination campaign in higher education
a
Amanda Gebhard , Gabriela Novotnaa, Heather Carterb and Funke Obac
a
Faculty of Social Work, University of Regina, Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada; bFaculty of Education,
University of Regina, Canada; cSchool of Social Work, Ryerson University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY


This article responds to a university’s anti-discrimination campaign, Received 12 May 2021
ostensibly launched to combat racism. Taking up poststructural Revised 23 December 2021
principles and anchored in anti-racism literature, we employ Accepted 27 March 2022
a discourse analysis to examine the truth productions about racism KEYWORDS
circulated by the campaign, and the subject positions to which they Anti-racism campaign;
give rise. We analyse the consequences and possibilities for anti- belonging; discourse
racist action in the light of our argument that the campaign pro­ analysis; higher education;
duced the university as an always already anti-racist space, becom­ whiteness
ing a means to an end to meaningful action. Through themes of
belonging, denial, innocence, colour-blindness, and erasure, we
demonstrate that the messaging of the campaign aligns with
national narratives about Canadian society as free of racial inequity.
We bring readers to consider how an anti-discrimination campaign
effectively delegitimised the need for anti-racist action, imploring
future initiatives to guard against re-inscribing the very forms of
inequality they purport to disrupt.

This article analyses the public discourses circulated by one university campaign
ostensibly developed to raise awareness about and counter racism. At the time of the
campaign’s launch, we, the authors, were collaborating on a research project exam­
ining the experiences of racialised students1 in the helping professions – in the
Faculties of Social Work, Education, and Nursing – at the university delivering the
campaign. Our emerging research findings, based on qualitative data from semi-
structured interviews with students who self-identified as racialised, were painting
a picture of the university space as lonely and isolating; participants recounted
experiences of racism on campus and practicum settings in a multitude of forms
(e.g., McNeil, Oba and Kalu 2020; Novotna et al. 2020; Reid et al. 2020). During
research meetings, which were taking place against the backdrop of the campaign,
the focus of this article and thus an interrelated research project began to take
shape, as we considered the campaign’s messaging through anti-racist lenses.
Because those in a position of authority at universities can profoundly shape how
racism is presented and addressed (Iverson 2012), we felt compelled to analyse on
a deeper level our concerns that a campaign that professed to be combatting racism

CONTACT Amanda Gebhard amanda.gebhard@uregina.ca


This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any med­
ium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
230 A. GEBHARD ET AL.

was working to silence counter-narratives about racism on campus, reproducing


white innocence, and ignoring power relations. Counter-narratives are stories that
‘challenge the perceived wisdom of those at society’s centre, and provide a context
to understand and transform established belief systems’ (Kaomea 2012, 4). They are
also an important tool in research on racism in education for debunking harmful
myths in master narratives (Ladson-Billings and Tate 1995). Our sentiments of
unease about the campaign were amplified by our awareness of how an increase
in discourses of ‘diversity, equity and inclusion’ in predominantly white institutions
is currently taking place alongside rising neoliberalism.
In our research team meetings, we began to question the discourses that were
regulating the statements made in the campaign and considered how the dis­
courses contradicted foundational tenets of anti-racism and anti-racist education
that we would hope to see in such an initiative. For the purpose of this article, we
approached the examination of the campaign as a discourse analysis of the public
messaging, circulated through print and online articles and other forms of texts
generated by the university about the campaign, to answer the following research
questions: How does the campaign both disrupt and reinscribe mainstream dis­
courses about racism? How do the discourses both open up and foreclose the
possibilities for anti-racist action and meaningful changes in the university? By
understanding the messaging as discourses, bodies of knowledge that are taken as
‘truth’ (Youdell 2006), we do not claim to uncover a singular truth about the
campaign through our analysis. Instead, we aim to examine whose interests and
ideologies are served by the particular constructs of racism circulated in this
campaign.
We begin this article by locating ourselves and by providing a description of the
background of the university campaign and the context of this research. We then
present literature on racism in higher education, and the tenets of the theoretical
frameworks that guided our analysis. What follows is a description of the meth­
odology of discourse analysis and the methods we undertook to collect and analyse
the data. Finally, we put these concepts and areas of scholarship into conversation,
applying the insights of discourse analysis, poststructuralism, and anti-racist stu­
dies to the You Belong Here campaign. We present a series of discursive threads
across the campaign messaging to demonstrate how the campaign became a means
to an end and served up as evidence that racism on campus is a non-issue. We
examine the discourse of denial as the university was produced as a racism-free
space, giving rise to innocent subject positions for white people through celebra­
tory activities and language, and silencing counterstories about the realities of
racism. We reveal the discourses of colour-blindness and equal opportunity pro­
mulgated through suggesting ‘kindness and respect’ as solutions for systemic
oppression. Furthermore, we discuss how the concept of ‘belonging’ re-affirms
the dominant discourse on who has the power to recognise, validate and include.
In conclusion, we argue a campaign meant to combat discrimination effectively
worked to de-legitimise the need for anti-racist action at all, and we call for future
initiatives to draw from anti-racist literature to guard against reinscribing the very
forms of inequity they purportedly aim to disrupt.
WHITENESS AND EDUCATION 231

Locating ourselves
Our social locations are inseparable from this research and the analysis. While we share
an interest in anti-racism, our lived experiences within this system of oppression we
study as academics are mediated by our own intersecting identity markers and how we
are perceived. As a white settler woman of Eastern European ancestry, I (Gebhard) have
navigated a system of education structured to ensure my academic success and ‘belonged’
by virtue of my white skin. Throughout my early schooling and my trajectory into
academia, the explicit and hidden curriculum of whiteness propelled me forward while
ensuring my successes would be individualised. I, (Novotna), identify as a white woman,
who moved to Canada for my postsecondary studies and later decided to pursue an
academic career. While my whiteness grants me membership into the dominant group in
Canada, my Eastern European origins and English being my additional language simul­
taneously position me as the ‘Other’. I (Carter) identify as a Métis woman, but my light
skin and red hair grant me membership to the dominant white culture of the province.
My ‘White-seeming privilege’ (Downey 2018) and Indigeneity coalesce in a personal
identity of amalgamated ‘imposterhood’ (Mercier 2010), advantaging and disadvantaging
me within academia and society at large. I, (Oba) identify as an Indigenous African Black
woman. As a settler in Turtle land, I share a history of colonisation with Indigenous
people. We experience the academy as a site of colonialism that perpetuates insidious
anti-black racism that juxtaposes Black bodies with whiteness-defined as pure, pristine
and moral, while Black people (pupils, students, faculty) are relics of Tarzan, dangerous
and deviant (Kumsa, Mfoafo-M’Carthy, and Sadia 2014).

Context
‘We are, I believe, a very open and friendly city. I know we are.’
(Michael Fougere cited in Canadian Press 2019, emphasis added)
On the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
21 March 2019, the University of Regina launched a campaign entitled ‘You Belong
Here.’ The stated purpose of the campaign was to ‘ . . . reinforce the institution’s
commitment to be a welcoming place, where behaviours such as bullying, abuse, harass­
ment and discrimination are not tolerated or accepted’ (Shepherd 2019). While this
statement did not specifically reference racism, a second rationale provided for the
campaign was that ‘The recent attacks in New Zealand highlight that racism is
a serious and widespread problem’ (Shepherd 2019), and the official campaign slogan
was announced as You Belong Here. Racism Doesn’t. A similar version of this statement,
and the peculiar use of racism as a reason for self-adulation, was cited by the city’s mayor
in a media statements unrelated to the campaign about incidents involving white young
men who threw coffee at black students while laughing and filming the act, cited in the
opening to this section.
The campaign took off with a flurry of promotional events, including the distribution
of t-shirts, stickers, and posters emblazoned with the logo; a multicultural food festival
hosted by the student union; the circulation of videos via Facebook; and announcements
about an upcoming speaker series. Contrary to the campaign’s slogan, racist belief
systems have long belonged to the settler population of the province of Saskatchewan
232 A. GEBHARD ET AL.

(Green 2011; Lavasseur 2014; Starblanket and Hunt 2020). As asserted by Foucault,
‘knowledge linked to power, not only assumes the authority of “the truth” but has the
power to make itself true’ (Foucault 1979, 27). The mayor’s disbelief at racism in the city
is an example of how the province’s historical and contemporary white settler colonial
domination has become largely understood through a lens of meritocracy (Schick and
St. Denis 2003). ‘Settler colonialism is a territorial project that is centred on the accu­
mulation and control of dispossessed land’ (Nunn 2018, 8) and has been legitimised in
the Canadian Prairies by racist ideologies that simultaneously construct white people as
superior and BIPOC as inferior (Gebhard, McLean and St. Denis 2022; Starblanket and
Hunt 2020).
Situated on Treaty 4 Territory and the homeland of the Métis Nation2 in the province
of Saskatchewan, the University of Regina serves over 15,000 students. Approximately
16% of the student body are international students, 13% self-declare as Indigenous and
32% self-identify as a visible minority (University of Regina 2020). The student demo­
graphics mirror the province of Saskatchewan (Statistics Canada 2017), one of three of
Canada’s western prairie provinces. The colonial history of Saskatchewan and current
attitudes of racism that racialise Indigenous people, as well as non-white Canadians and
newcomers, have created an ideological landscape where white skin signifies entitlement
to the resources of the province and the nation state, including the resource of education
(Thobani 2007). Like their Indigenous counterparts, Black and people of colour experi­
ence racism in Canada daily (Este, Lorenzetti and Sato 2018; Oba 2018; Salloum and
Polischuk 2020), including within post-secondary institutions, in spite of mission state­
ments claiming to recognise and support diversity (e.g., University of Regina 2020a).
Although racism in the province continues to be brought to the foreground of public
consciousness through events highlighting the prevalence of racial inequities, hegemonic
discourses are often deployed as rhetoric of platitudes that can serve to further heighten
racial tensions. Racialised groups often carry the responsibility of naming, confronting
and addressing the racism they are faced with in their daily lives, at the risk of social
penalty (Kumsa, Mfoafo-M’Carthy, and Sadia 2014).

Frameworks of race and racism


We analyse the You Belong Here campaign through an anti-racist theoretical lens
(Bonilla-Silva 2018; Ladhani and Sitter 2020; Lentin 2005; Mills 2007; Schick and St.
Denis 2003; Schmidt 2005), to unpack the discourses circulated by the campaign that
allow racism to remain un-scrutinised while (re)inscribing the post-racial discourses of
equality in higher education. Anti-racism aims to ‘expose and confront the multitude of
ways that racism may be embodied or embedded within relations, institutions, systems,
and structures’ (Ladhani and Sitter 2020). Schmidt (2005) outlines seven shared assump­
tions of anti-racist scholarship: race is a social construct, racism exists at interconnected
levels, society is divided into dominant and subordinate groups based on race, oppression
leads to internalised racism and internalised dominance, white privilege is normative and
pervasive, people are members of multiple social groups, and there is historical inequality
in the accumulation of wealth and quality of education between socially constructed races
in Canada and the United States. Critical race theory (CRT) tenets are widely used in
anti-racist scholarship and movements in education. The conception and analysis of this
WHITENESS AND EDUCATION 233

research is informed by CRT’s aims of critiquing colour-blindness, exposing the differ­


ential racialisation for different groups at different time periods, and exposing how white
people are motivated to eradicate racism when it serves their interests (Delgado and
Stefancic 2012).
According to Ladson-Billings (1998), it is because of the superior value ascribed to
whiteness, and its positioning as normative, that CRT is an important tool for, among
other purposes, to accomplish ‘deconstruction of oppressive structures and discourses’
(9). Unlike overt racist practices, contemporary racism is often couched within racist
discourses so ubiquitous they go unquestioned (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2011). Indeed,
CRT has informed critiques of the popular myth that North America has entered a ‘post-
racial era,’ a myth reinforced through ideologies of meritocracy, colour-blindness, and
multiculturalism, which are often presented as evidence that racism no longer exists
(Bonilla-Silva 2012; Lentin 2005). Central frames of colour-blind racism, whereby people
claim not see or notice race, are explained by Bonilla-Silva 2018) as abstract liberalism:
the tendency of whites to employ liberal language when opposing practical approaches to
combating structural racial inequality so as not to appear unreasonable or immoral in
that opposition; naturalisation: the claim that racial phenomena are natural rather than
the result of subjugation; minimisation of racism: the claim that racism is an ‘excuse’ used
by racialised people to blame others for their personal shortcomings; and cultural racism:
the justification of discrimination due to cultural differences or behaviours supposedly
held by minority groups, and the ‘biologizing’ of stereotypical cultural practices.
Deploying the latter frames allow white people to remain innocent and unaccountable
for change. Conversely, anti-racism asks white people to ‘be vulnerable, examine power
relations, confront privilege, and implicate themselves within the process’ (Ladhani and
Sitter 2020, 59) thus forsaking the notion that ‘good intentions secure innocence as well
as superiority’ (Schick and St. Denis 2003, 55).

Racism in higher education


The history of white dominance and racism against Indigenous people and non-white,
non-Christians has left its ‘indelible stamp that is evident in Canadian institutions and
society’ (Hiranandani 2011, 93), including higher education (Henry and Tator 2009).
While the student population in universities is increasingly diverse3 as Indigenous people
and racialised Canadians gain access to higher education and globalisation gives rise to
increasing numbers of international students, Canadian postsecondary education pre­
serves its Eurocentric origins and imperialistic worldviews (Dua and Banji 2012; Henry
and Tator 2009; Oba 2018). In addition to reflecting cultural and paradigmatic domina­
tion of white males of Anglo-Saxon origins, Canadian universities are strongholds of
liberal democracy, at the exclusion of Indigenous and racialised people (Ward 2012).
Decreasing funding of postsecondary education, the rise of corporate culture in uni­
versities and the emphasis on individual rationality and responsibility to invest in one’s
future (Henry et al. 2017; Henry and Tator 2009) are key neoliberal ideas reflected in
Canadian university policies, values, and norms (Bozheva 2019; Davies and Bansel 2007).
Among the challenges to tackle racism in the academy is the focus on its overt forms
and seemingly isolated incidents, as well as commonly used public relations messaging to
present celebrations of diversity as evidence of forward-thinking in increasingly
234 A. GEBHARD ET AL.

competitive neoliberal times (e.g., Henry et al. 2017; Olssen 2016). The diversity and
inclusion rhetoric perpetuates insider/outsider dichotomy, suggesting non-white indivi­
duals need to be granted access by dominant group members (Iverson 2012). BIPOC do
not report the sense of belonging frequently promoted as hallmarks of the university
(Oba 2018; Solórzano, Ceja, and Yosso 2000). Educational exclusions are manifested in
BIPOC’s disappointment with a lack of non-dominant content in the university curri­
cula, objectification, isolation and alienation (Henry and Tator 2009). Racialised students
are often a tokenised presence in universities perceived as likely to under-perform or in
need of additional support due to ‘cultural differences’ (Henry and Tator 2009), and find
the university space reflective of monocultural views and ideologies (Battiste 2013).

Discourse analysis: a methodology and a method


This research builds on traditions of critical and poststructural theories of race and
racism to demonstrate how initiatives to further equity and diversity are producers of and
are produced by colourblind discourses of racism (Bonilla-Silva 2018; Daniels and
Varghese 2020). Our discourse analysis is guided by Foucauldian understandings of
discourse and power, a theoretical framework providing a set of tools that shape our
discourse analysis (Cheng 2018). Discourses are bodies of knowledge that regulate
behaviour and reinscribe power relations within institutions; it is circular in that ‘dis­
cursive practices constitute discourse at the same time as being constituted by discourse’
(Youdell 2006, 35). Discourse is not the equivalent of language, but ‘a system which
structures the way we perceive reality’ (Mills 2003, 55). Widely circulated documents are
mechanisms of power that keep counter discourses – that is, other versions of truth – out
of circulation (Mills 2003). To examine the discourses circulated about the You Belong
Here campaign, we collected all widely circulated documents publicising the campaign.
Data collection started after the launch of the campaign in March 2019. Since the
beginning of the campaign, the data was available in physical spaces at the university
(images, t-shirts with the campaign logo, a wall #YQRBelong backdrop), and dissemi­
nated to students and faculty via different media communication channels: both intern­
ally (postings on the University Facebook page and home page, excerpts from campaign
speakers, tweets from the Student Union Twitter account, and videos about the cam­
paign), and externally (articles from local and provincial news outlets written as
responses to the texts initially circulated by the university). Additionally, some of the
research team members (Novotna) attended at least one of the publicly lectures of invited
speakers. Gebhard, Novotna and Carter conducted Internet searches to find all publicly-
available documents about the campaign, adding them to a shared cloud folder. The
search terms used were: You Belong Here campaign, anti-racist campaign, anti-racism
and University of Regina. We added 18 sources of data in total to a shared chart: these
included university website stories on the campaign; video files promoting the speaker
series; the content of the speakers series attended in person and in public media coverage
of the campaign; and University, Student association Facebook and twitter feeds).
We read and re-read the documents collected, individually and collaboratively chart­
ing and noting what the texts produced as ‘truth.’ We met bi-weekly to discuss our
individual interpretations and meaning-making, taking notes on our team conversations,
which often led to new insights, and broadened and deepened our analyses. After
WHITENESS AND EDUCATION 235

establishing recurring discourses in the documents, Gebhard synthesised and wrote the
analysis; Novotna, Carter and Oba provided regular feedback on the draft, which was
stored in a cloud document accessible to all authors at all times. In our final stages, we
returned to the original data, engaging in an iterative process that led to a deepened
examination of the consequences of the identified discourses.
Discourse analysis is not about following a particular set of steps, but requires
confidence in one’s analytic prowess (Cheng 2018). We were interested in dominant
narratives about race and racism circulated through the documents; that is, what about
these topics was maintained as true, natural and good, as well as the counter-narratives
they served to exclude (Weedon 1987/1997). Viewing the documents as layered with
discourses that maintain a particular version of truth about diversity, equity, and racism
in higher education, we asked questions of the data to unpack these particular versions of
truth as well as the versions that were excluded. Key questions that guided our discourse
analysis were the following: What does this text take for granted about race and racism at
the University? How are these assumptions reflective of anti-racist scholarship? What
subjectivities (who people ‘get to be’) are made possible by the truth patterns, and how do
these open up or forestall possibilities for transformation? Asking questions that reveal
the data’s unstated assumptions and the larger consequences of these assumptions is the
starting point of producing findings distinguishable from what one would find in
a thematic analysis. In the latter, the researcher typically aims to describe and summarise
a data set, which is often taken at face value. In discourse analysis, the aim is to go beyond
a description of textual data, and to examine its underlying and (un)stated assumptions.
Importantly, while we understand the discourses as circulated by individuals, they do
not originate from individuals; therefore, we endeavoured to ‘keep the focus on the . . .
discourse, not the person who produces it’ (Wood and Kroger 2000, 78). Wetherell and
Potter (1992) also underline the interest in discourse analysis is in language and not in
language users. Similarly, we do not analyse the intention of the speakers or producers of
the messages; not only do discourses have consequences beyond intentions, speculation
about intentions merely obscures analysis of consequence and effect.
Following poststructuralist tradition, we reject the notion of one true interpretation of
the data (Wood and Kroger 2000). The knowledge we produce in this research emerged
because we ‘asked certain questions and used certain frameworks to produce the answers’
(Kumashiro 2015, 8), and we underline this to signal the postructural paradigm that
views all data analysis as partial and incomplete (Jackson and Mazzei 2012). We did not
set out to unveil a singular truth, but to examine whose interests and ideologies are served
by the particular constructs of race, racism, and whiteness circulated by the campaign.

You belong here: racism doesn’t – a means to an end?


We open our analysis with a series of statements circulated at the start of the campaign:
The University of Regina admits it has a racism problem on campus and it’s doing
something to fix it (Shepherd 2019).
It’s subtle, it’s insidious, it is everywhere on our campus (Shepherd 2019).
Racism is alive and well and we need to name it and we need to work together to make
sure that it doesn’t flourish in our society (Shepherd 2019).
236 A. GEBHARD ET AL.

According to the above statements, racism is a pervasive problem on campus; it is


‘everywhere’ and the university is committed to addressing the problem. Producing as
truth that racism exists and needs to be named, these statements belie dominant refrains
of the non-existence of racism in the Canadian prairies. Despite these initial disruptive
discourses of the campaign that suggest an anti-racist aim of exposing and confronting
the myriad of ways racism is embedded in the institution, the subsequent messaging put
forth by the campaign contradicts this initial accountability taken by the university. The
slogan of the campaign, ‘You Belong Here. Racism Doesn’t.’ quickly became an end in
itself. Ensuring racism ‘doesn’t flourish’ was transformed into a publicised stance that
racism does not exist on campus and that the university has already achieved equality as
starting points, thus supporting the discourse that any instances of racism are aberrant
examples. The language of race and racism appeared almost exclusively in the slogan and
was largely absent from other components of the campaign, or only mentioned, instead
of explained with a scholarly definition.
The repetition of the slogan in the absence of a deeper education about racism worked
to deny instead of recognise racism. The slogan began appearing across physical and
online university spaces, including a high-traffic area of the university where it was set up
as a photo backdrop against which people could stop and take photos for posting to social
media. The slogan is consistent with a popular stance perceived as more progressive that
still equates to denial, which is that racism does exist, but it is ‘out there and not here’; in
this case, racism became something that does not belong to this particular university,
which positioned itself as different through the launch of the campaign and the repetition
of the slogan. This positioning as different from other universities was later echoed in
statements made by senior university administration: ‘other universities are working
hard to become what we are today’ (Martin 2017). Through the reliance on the slogan
alone, the complexities of anti-racist education and the multidimensional ways in which
it operates were minimised. This thin approach contradicts scholarship that posits
addressing racism is complex and, for the individuals involved, lifelong (Kendi 2019).

Niceties are (not) enough


A turn to positivity and the erasure of the topic of racism in the campaign events that
followed its launch – with the exception of the slogan – was a move consistent with
Nelson’s (2015) research demonstrating programmes are often initiated to disrupt
experiences of racism, and then focus on celebratory discourses, avoiding the language
of racism and anti-racism. The following statement made at the outset of the campaign,
‘Treating each other with kindness and respect has a world changing impact,’ (Campbell
2019) appeals to the notion that niceties are solutions to widespread racial inequity and
discrimination. When racism is transformed into a lack of ‘kindness and respect,’ the
comforting discourse of colour-blindness is left intact. Sweeping statements about the
importance of being kind to everyone ignore the fact that identity markers influence and
shape the treatment of individuals on a personal level, in day-to-day interactions, and on
the institutional level, through rules and policies. Individuals who perceive themselves
and are perceived by others as being ‘nice’ can nevertheless harbour deep disdain and
disrespect for people of colour (Nieto 2008). Reducing the countering of racism to being
kind is actually harmful to students of colour, because this fails to counter a social
WHITENESS AND EDUCATION 237

structure wherein racialised students are treated unequally (Nieto 2008, 28). Bonilla-Silva
2018) explains contemporary racism sounds and appears very ‘nice’ on a surface level;
importantly, the promulgation of kindness and respect re-inscribes the knowledge that to
be racist, one must participate in outright acts of hatred (Leonardo 2013). When racism is
understood as an individual affliction ‘located within a small, aberrant pocket of the
population’ (Nelson 2015, 345), there is no credible basis for action.

Appeals to sameness
The next excerpts originate from the publicity surrounding the first event in the speakers’
series of You Belong Here, a key component of the campaign which featured public
lectures.
In his upcoming presentation, Anthony Mclean will challenge audience members to
think critically about unconscious biases and deliver a powerful message about creating
an inclusive environment. He’ll argue that regardless of our race, religion, socio-
economic background, or sexual orientation, we all want to feel a sense of belonging
(Waldrop 2019).
Uncovering discriminatory unconscious biases can be an eye-opening and unsettling
experience, but it is one that helps create a University community where everybody feels
valued and knows they belong (Waldrop 2019).
We all have unconscious biases. They are learned stereotypes that are automatic,
unintentional, deeply ingrained within our beliefs, universal, and have the ability to
affect our behaviour (Waldrop 2019).
These excerpts suggest the speaker would unsettle the audience members through
a focus on unpacking discriminatory, unconscious biases. However, the speech itself met
expectations of the dominant group in terms of overall lightness of subject matter that
did not name racism until the discussion period. Recognising people are really not that
different from each other as a solution to inequity emerged as the lecture’s key message.
The speaker encouraged a racially diverse audience of faculty, staff and students to seek
out each other’s commonalities, to demonstrate ‘You have much more in common than
you realise’ (McLean 2019). The speaker encouraged the audience to raise their hand if
they could relate to a series of statements, including: ‘ . . . if you cry at car commercials,’
‘ . . . if you love dogs,’ and ‘ . . . if you love popping the bubbles in bubble wrap.’ The
audience was also encouraged, ‘when they see someone different from themselves,’ to be
curious instead of judgemental, not to focus on their perceived religion or race, and to
instead wonder about, for example, ‘what movie made them cry.’
Through this well-intended activity promoting sameness, whiteness operates as an
invisible norm; the real difference that difference makes in the lives of individuals
whose ways of being do not conform to white mainstream expectations can be
diminished or ignored. According to Schick (2010), ‘a type of easy universalism
suggests that people “are just people” in contrast to the reality that social hierarchies
have widely different consequences that advantage some to the detriment of others’
(54). Further, the speaker’s examples reference a particular cultural framework that is
not shared by everyone, which is a cultural framework reflective of mainstream,
Eurocentric, consumerist culture, to ‘function in ways that privilege whiteness, so
that whiteness persists as an identification that is worth knowing and as an
238 A. GEBHARD ET AL.

identification worth performing’ (Schick 2002, 101). Emotions are not universal or
naturally occurring, but shaped ‘by our biases and beliefs, our cultural frameworks’
(DiAngelo 2018, 132). Whiteness is held as the invisible norm when the values and
characteristics of the dominant group are espoused as the unspoken, neutral standard
against which all ‘others’ are evaluated, and must conform to in order to ‘belong.’ The
appeal to a universalised humanity as a remedy for inequality not only ignores that
humans are different from each other, but produces whiteness as humanity itself. The
third speaker in the speaker series made statements that bumped up against the
messages of sameness promoted by the first speaker. While speaker one urged their
audience to recognise ‘we are all the same,’ the third speaker discussed the impacts of
‘having to pretend and present yourself in a way to make [white] people feel like you
were like them’ (Sciarpelletti 2020).
Producing everyone as equally responsible for inequity was also reinscribed through
an emphasis on unconscious biases in the first speaker’s lecture, a message consistent
with unconscious bias training that encourages everyone to accept they are
a ‘suppressed racist (or at least [exhibit] a strong racial preference)’ (Noon 2018).
Framing the problem of racism as ‘unconscious biases’ equally belonging to everyone
shifts the lens away from the devastating impacts of racism on BIPOC, and leaves white
people unaccountable for examining internalised racist beliefs about the inferiority of
BIPOC and white supremacy. Perpetuating the knowledge that everyone holds uncon­
scious biases without a discussion of power relations also serves to safeguard the
dominant belief held by white people about the existence of ‘reverse racism’ and
oppression – the idea that allows whites to claim ‘People of colour are just as racist
as whites’ or ‘It goes both ways’ – ubiquitous claims in the context of this study.
According to Bourne (2019), concepts such as individual or unconscious ‘bias’ obscure
structural analyses of racism as institutionalised, ignores historical injustices, reduces
racist acts to individual ‘flaws’ and provides simplistic solutions to a complex social
problem.

Diversity as ‘valuable’
Producing the university as an always already progressive space, appreciative of diver­
sity, was presented in the University’s promotion of the second speaker in the cam­
paign speaker series. The advertisements called for acknowledging the ‘power of
a diverse and inclusive workplace, and the need to convey the message of diversity as
beneficial for all of us’ (University of Regina 2020b). The poster text quoted the speaker
stating, ‘Extensive research has confirmed how important it is to build teams whose
members don’t all look or think the same way. Diversity and inclusion are valuable to
any team, in any setting, and lead to more creativity and innovation. And yet, there’s
still a lot of work to do. While most business leaders now understand why having
a diverse and inclusive culture is critical to performance, they don’t necessarily know
how to achieve that goal’ (University of Regina 2020b). Ascribing a social and eco­
nomic value to the Other constitutes a type of commodification that has become
integral to neoliberal postsecondary education (Evans 2020; Leong 2013). The presence
of non-white individuals is justified and ironically measured by the majority (Leong
2013).
WHITENESS AND EDUCATION 239

Furthermore, the last excerpt reiterates a discourse that depicts the ‘Other’ as
requiring permission to participate in white institutions (Iverson 2012), and unwit­
tingly acknowledges white dominance by granting the dominant group the power to
include and exclude ‘the Other’. Another example of this occurs in a video advertise­
ment (University of Regina 2019) posted on social media. The video opens with people
appearing to represent faculty of colour, stating ‘You belong here.’ This is followed by
eight separate statements of ‘I belong here’ spoken by racialised students in various
languages. A white student subsequently takes the screen and the script changes from
‘I belong here’ to ‘You belong here, racism doesn’t.’ The white student is thus posi­
tioned as not only belonging automatically, but holding the authority to affirm the
belonging of their peers of colour, sending a message about who belongs unequivocally
and whose membership depends on the approval of the dominant group. This approval
is often contingent upon racialized university members' willingness to uphold the
institution as an equal playing field.

Silencing Counternarratives
The production of the campaign as evidence that equity has been achieved on campus
was bolstered by highlighting interviews with faculty and students of colour who spoke
positively about the campaign and their experiences at university in media coverage. The
notion of exclusion is very important in discourse analysis and we must consider how
some discourses are kept in existence in ways that keep other statements out of circula­
tion (Mills 2003). Storytelling from the perspective of critical race scholars is ‘not valued
so much for its truth content as its truth effects; its ability to affect our actions and our
orientation to the Other’ (Leonardo 2013, 20). In keeping with this framework for
examining publicised positive stories, we are not claiming the untruthfulness of indivi­
duals’ accounts but are instead interested in how stories have the ability to uphold
discourses of denial and silence counternarratives that would be an ‘antidote to the
majority’s line of thinking’ through ‘recountings of how race affects minority lives’
(Leonardo 2013, 20).
In one newspaper story released one year after the campaign started, one Black faculty
member describes being handed a ‘You Belong Here’ t-shirt upon their return to the
university after a leave of absence. The professor is quoted as explaining they had
originally left because they ‘didn’t feel that I belonged here. Nobody told me
I belonged here at that time and everything I saw on the job, the way people sometimes
asked me where I came from “originally” and when I intended to return there, and many
other indicators gave me the impression that I didn’t really belong here’ (University of
Regina 2020a). The story goes on to tell of the faculty member’s return to work at the
university: ‘In late 2019, my supervisor welcomed me and gave me a grey shirt with a bold
message on the front: “You Belong Here: Racism Doesn’t.” That almost melted my heart.
It was a powerful message that left a powerful impression . . . I am impressed with the
change I am seeing. We know there is a lot of work to be done as the University
transforms itself into a more welcoming community where everyone can have a full
sense of belonging, but we must recognise the work that is being done, especially the
genuine and honest openness to engage in public discussions of these issues’ (University
of Regina 2020a).
240 A. GEBHARD ET AL.

We read the above interview responses as informed by a discursive backdrop that


rewards iterations of gratitude and responds negatively to counternarratives disruptive to
mainstream Canadians’ self-adulatory stance on multiculturalism (Hiranandani 2011;
Maiter and Joseph 2017). Speaking within the limits of what mainstream discourses have
authorised as ‘true’ lessens the risk of outrage and backlash or being positioned as
irrational and dangerous (Schmidt 2005). Social penalties of disrupting white innocence
are documented by DiAngelo and Sensoy, who trace how white students frame anti-racist
education as a violent attack, describing themselves as being ‘victimised, slammed,
blamed . . . [and ‘used as a punching bag]’ (2014, 125). BIPOC who allege racism are
often positioned as ‘hypersensitive’ or presented with the ubiquitous claim they are
‘playing the race card’ (Bonilla-Silva 2018; Thobani 2007). Drawing from methodological
analyses of interviews with racialised participants, scholars demonstrate racialised parti­
cipants rarely employ structural analysis in discussions about racism and tend to con­
form to, and produce, colourblind and liberal discourses, pointing to the importance of
foregrounding what is left unsaid rather than what is (Maiter and Joseph 2017; Pollack
2003). Multicultural discourses that emphasise good-will and benevolence towards
racialised newcomers keep stories about inequity, especially racism, out of circulation.
Oba (2018) underlines celebratory discourses, require internalised oppression, a process
whereby ‘the Other’ must participate in their own oppression by remaining grateful and
subservient or be deemed resistant or maladaptive. The exclusion of examples of how
racism continues to operate on campus is made possible through language that suggests
an equitable present and the dream of an equitable future while glossing over or ignoring
the inequitable present (Turner 2019).

Always already
The below publicised statements about the campaign underline how the messaging of
You Belong Here became regulated by the discourses of a post-racial society, depicting
the university as a space that was always already a space where racism does not exist, or as
a space that has already achieved equality for everyone, even before the campaign.
The campaign reinforces the message that the University is a welcoming institution
that is open to all. It also raises awareness of the behaviours and attitudes – such as
bullying, abuse, harassment, and discrimination – that are not acceptable on the
University’s campuses (Campbell 2019).
‘In a world that continues to be plagued by racial intolerance, discrimination, and
violence, it is important for our University to set a positive example.’ (Campbell 2019)
‘The University has a long history of being a welcoming Institution’ (Campbell 2019)
The University has been forward thinking and progressive since 1978, when it was
already ahead of its times in its creation of a sexual orientation clause. The university
today is at the forefront of diversity and inclusion movements today (Campbell 2019).
Where racism was originally proclaimed to be ‘everywhere’ at the outset of the
campaign, it was suddenly nowhere soon after the campaign was launched. This is
a narrative consistent with general white Canadian beliefs that racism in Canada is non-
existent (Hiranandani 2011). Scholars contend that racism requires denial in order to
flourish (e.g., Kendi 2019; Nelson 2015), and by reiterating this discourse, the campaign
forestalled anti-racist actions that require acknowledging that racism operates on campus
WHITENESS AND EDUCATION 241

in order to be justified. The campaign was quickly transformed into a celebratory story
about the accomplishments of the university. If there was ever a problem of racism on
campus, reminders of the university’s past initiatives to promote inclusivity were high­
lighted as evidence that equality has been achieved, giving rise to celebration instead of
transformative education and actions. Ladhani and Sitter (2020) might describe this
posturing as ‘competency language’ and ‘diversity management’ which guards the insti­
tutional and national image of Canada as a fair nation that celebrates diversity, a message
echoed in the following Twitter feed: ‘You belong here, racism doesn’t! Racism has no
place at the University of Regina or at your Student Union. We pride ourselves in offering
jobs, food, and cultural connections to our students from 48 countries around the globe
and those from right here in Canada. #yqrbelong #sask’ (Wiskar 2019). Celebratory anti-
racist messaging, embedded in institutional practices that make space for diversity,
becomes an efficient way to perpetuate stereotypes about the Other and commodify its
presence on campus (Evans, J 2020; Nelson 2015). The messaging surrounding the
campaign depicts the university as an exemplar of progress and imbued with good-will
towards minoritised groups – versions of nationalist narratives that portray Canada as
a model multicultural society (Thobani 2007). The self-adulatory nature of the campaign
is consistent with Canada’s multicultural discourses that produce the country as welcom­
ing to all, and different from the United States, characterisations that make anti-racist
education difficult.

Conclusion
How does a university-wide awareness campaign both disrupt and re-inscribe main­
stream discourses about racism? How do the discourses open up and foreclose the
possibilities for anti-racist action and meaningful changes for racialised members of
the university? This discourse analysis reveals the discourses of the campaign and
subjectivities to which they give rise are consistent with those that anti-racist scholars
have long contended forestall meaningful anti-racist action and change. We do not
question the sincerity of the campaign leaders for the university to be a space where all
students, regardless of identity and backgrounds, are welcomed. However, we suggest
hegemonic discourses circulated by the campaign largely centred around the denial of
racism, erasing the possibility of an understanding that racism and other forms of
oppression are ongoing, have grave impacts on racialised faculty and students, and
forestall anti-racist actions. This study illuminates how well-intentioned campaigns can
easily succumb to the forces of privilege and oppression they were ostensibly seeking to
dismantle.
A simple Google search for the You Belong Here slogan reveals how ubiquitous the
discourses of diversity and inclusion in postsecondary education have become across
North American campuses (e.g. Mount Royal University, 2020; Southern Methodist
University, 2020; UBC Okanagan, 2020; University of South Florida, 2020). The cam­
paigns’ messaging – You Belong Here – became the linchpin of communication strategies
touting the solutions to structural racism by the promising to racialised people that all are
welcome and accepted. Rankine (2014) suggests that positive effects of anti-racism
242 A. GEBHARD ET AL.

campaigns are only assumed, as many only vaguely identify audiences and goals, with
education about diversity remaining the sole strategy and without any specific beha­
vioural or institutional changes.
What changes then are required from the dominant group, from the knowledge
produced by the campaign? Very few, we contend. Instead, the messaging of the
campaign encourages dominant group members to continue displaying the qualities
and ideals they have supposedly always upheld. In keeping with national narratives,
these are goodwill and benevolence towards all. The campaign missed an opportunity to
have any profound educational value; while it presented an opportunity to engage in
discussions about racism, the discourses employed in the campaign failed to provide
a nuanced and scholarly-based analysis of racism in academia. It therefore fell into the
pitfall of a premature and false sense of accomplishment through employment of
a narrowly defined terrain of racism as individual transgressions. While messaging at
the outset of the campaign defined racism as a reality on campus, the reality quickly
became redefined as one of equality already achieved. The implication of the discourse of
denial is that there becomes no legitimate basis for opposition to racism or structural
anti-racist action by the university and gives rise to familiar white subjectivities who see
themselves outside the system of racism, exemplifying Bonilla-Silva’s 2018 ‘racism with­
out racists.’
Taking place against a backdrop of rising neoliberalism, the superficial treatment of
diversity as a means for achieving competitive status renders racialised students and
faculty as objects and commodities. Research on the denial of racism in the context of
neo-liberalism is important for future studies – a conversation already started by
scholars abroad (see Dunn et al. 2011). Similarly, diversification of students and faculty
alone does not signal fundamental change if not accompanied by the interrogation of
the normative centre of whiteness and colonialism. In the absence of an acknowl­
edgement of the colonial origins of higher education, universities’ inclusivity efforts
risk reinforcing instead of shifting unequal power relations. Anti-racism requires long-
term commitment to fundamental change, and an engagement with scholarship that
has long criticised continued recycling of discourses of denial over radical action and
education that would transform the academy. Campaigns professing to combat racism
or any form of oppression must refrain from applying yet another shiny veneer to
detract from more difficult and sustained commitments that hold potential for more
equitable outcomes.

Notes
1. The term ‘racialised’ is employed in this paper to refer to individuals who identify as Black,
Indigenous and People of Colour (BIPOC), and we also use the term BIPOC. While not
a homogenous group, BIPOC – albeit always in differential and shifting ways – have been
racialised; that is, systems of white dominance have attempted to categorise and define who
they are (Gonzalez-Sobrino and Goss 2019; Ladson-Billings 1998; St Denis 2010). While we
recognise white people are also racialised in that white is a socially constructed category, our
usage of the term implies to be racialised is to be othered, and we follow scholars who
emphasise the unequal power relations involved in racialising processes (e.g., Ladson-
Billings 1998; Razack 1998). The term person of colour is used to acknowledge the work
WHITENESS AND EDUCATION 243

of scholars that recognise experiences of racialised people in Canada without referring to


Indigenous People, who are considered distinct societies under the Canadian Constitution
(Canadian Race Relation Foundation, n.d.).
2. Saskatchewan, Canada is situated on lands that are composed of territories covered in 5
major historical numbered treaties: Treaty 4 (1874), Treaty 5 (1875–76), Treaty 6 (1876),
Treaty 8 (1899–1900), and Treaty 10 (1906–07) and, to a lesser extent, Treaty 2 (1871) and
Treaty 7 (1877), as well as the traditional Homeland of the Métis Nation (Government of
Saskatchewan 2019).
3. When using the terms diversity and inclusion, we refer to the diversity initiatives in
Canadian or US universities commonly deployed to ostensibly increase racial diversity on
campus. We note these have largely served to increase the diversity amongst white people on
campuses, rather than increase presence of non-white students and/or enhance their reten­
tion. Thus diversity and inclusion initiatives often mask or avoid addressing race and racism
(Henry and Tator 2009; Iverson 2012; Moreno et al. 2006).

Acknowledgments
Kathy Hogarth, Barbara McNeil, Florence Luhanga, Latoya Reid, Uwakwe Kalu.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding
This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada [430-
2018-01135].

ORCID
Amanda Gebhard http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6046-3838

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“It’s Not in Your Head”: Gaslighting, ‘Splaining, Victim Blaming, and Other
Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions

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Veronica E. Johnson, Kevin L. Nadal, D. R. Gina Sissoko, and


Rukiya King
Department of Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, and the
Graduate Center, City University of New York

Abstract
Secondary microaggressions refer to the ways in which people of historically dominant groups negate the realities
of people of marginalized groups. Gaslighting describes the act of manipulating others to doubt themselves or
question their own sanity; people confronted for committing microaggressions deny the existence of their biases, often
convincing the targets of microaggressions to question their own perceptions. ‘Splaining (derived from mansplaining/
Whitesplaining) is an act in which a person of a dominant group speaks for or provides rationale to people of
marginalized groups about topics related to oppression or inequity. Victim blaming refers to assigning fault to people
who experience violence or wrongdoing and is used as a tool to discredit people of marginalized groups who speak
out against microaggressions or any injustices. Finally, abandonment and neglect refer to a bystander’s failure to address
or acknowledge microaggressions. Although these terms are commonly known among marginalized communities (and
frequently used in popular media), there is a dearth in academic literature that substantiates these phenomena and
relates them to microaggressions. The purpose of this article is to review these concepts in the psychological literature
and to demonstrate the psychological harm caused by these behaviors on interpersonal and systemic levels.

Keywords
microaggressions, discrimination, racism, mansplaining, Whitesplaining, gaslighting, victim blaming, transphobia

Microaggressions are subtle, nuanced forms of discrimi- focus on concepts such as gaslighting, ‘splaining, victim
nation that are experienced by racial and ethnic minori- blaming, and abandonment and neglect as terms that
ties, women, LGBTQIA+ people, religious minorities, warrant greater attention in academic discourse.
individuals with mental illnesses, and people of other
historically marginalized groups (Torino et al., 2018);
A Brief Overview of Microaggression
the term itself has been used so much that it has been
integrated into our country’s everyday lexicon, even Theory and Research
entering the Merriam Webster dictionary in 2017 (Nadal, Sue et al. (2007) defined microaggressions as “brief and
2018). The commonplace use of the term—fueled by commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, and environ-
the vast amount of research produced on the topic—has mental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional,
increased our understanding of microaggressions and that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial
ability to recognize them. As this awareness grows, so slights and insults to the target person or group”
does the opportunity to confront and disrupt microag- (p. 273). Originally used to describe experiences Black
gressive behavior. However, attempts at exposing
microaggressions can leave targets vulnerable to further
Corresponding Author:
harm. In this article, we explore harmful responses to Veronica E. Johnson, Department of Psychology, John Jay College of
calling attention to microaggressive behavior, which we Criminal Justice, City University of New York
deem secondary microaggressions. We specifically Email: vjohnson@jjay.cuny.edu
Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions 1025

people commonly had when interacting with Whites microaggression resulted from race, gender, both, or
(Pierce, 1970), microaggressions have been linked to some other combination of one’s identity groups).
the experiences of people from various marginalized Despite the cognitive and emotional energy expended
identities such as religious minorities (Nadal et al., by targets in identifying microaggressions (Pitcan et al.,
2010), women (Lewis et al., 2016), queer and trans 2018), studies suggest that marginalized individuals
people (Nadal, 2013; Nadal et al., 2012), and other regularly experience and identify microaggressions;
people of color, including those with intersecting mar- more than 90% of most study samples report having
ginalized identities, such as Black women (Williams & experienced microaggressions on a regular basis
Lewis, 2019). (Barber et al., 2020; Woodford et al., 2014). Therefore,
Microassaults refer to verbal and nonverbal attacks if targets can overcome this ambiguity and identify the
intended to hurt a target through name-calling, avoidant microaggression, they are left to either sit and ruminate
behavior, or purposeful discriminatory actions; micro- on the matter or confront the person. As Sue et al.
insults refer to subtle verbal or nonverbal behavior that (2007) noted, both options can leave targets vulnerable
conveys rudeness, insensitivity, and insulting messages to further harm.
about one’s identity; and microinvalidations include Targets of microaggressions show a pattern of quietly
communications that exclude, negate, or nullify the shouldering the impact of microaggressive behavior out
psychological thoughts, feelings, or experiences of of fear of retaliation from the perpetrator or others
members of marginalized groups (Sue et al., 2007). involved and/or reinforcing negative stereotypes about
Microaggressions are theorized to exist on a continuum their group if they choose to confront the perpetrator
ranging from overt, intentional, and explicit to subtle, (Sue et al., 2008). However, this latter choice comes at
unintentional, and implicit. Unintentional and/or subtle the expense of their own well-being. Targets report
microaggressions are often outside of the awareness of feelings of guilt, embarrassment, shame, regret, and
the perpetrator and/or target. Even when perpetrators remorse after unconfronted microaggressive behavior.
are aware of their intention, they may deny malicious Furthermore, the internalization of these feelings has
intent when confronted. Therefore, all forms of micro- long-lasting effects on the target’s self-confidence, work
aggressions have some degree of invisibility but are far performance, and mental and physical health (Holder
from innocuous. et al., 2015; Lewis et al., 2013).
The extant literature shows that the impact of these If targets choose confrontation, they externalize
microaggressions is anything but micro—as some critics blame for the incident onto the perpetrator, potentially
have misunderstood—and is associated with a number mitigating their own feelings of shame, blame, and guilt.
of adverse physical and psychological consequences. However, they do so at varying levels of risk to them-
Racial and ethnic microaggressions have been associ- selves in other ways. Targets frequently have to circum-
ated with declining physical health, depression, exces- vent fears of being further invalidated or reinforcing
sive substance use, lowered self-esteem, suicide negative stereotypes about their own group (e.g., being
ideation, and somatic complaints (for a review, see seen as an angry Black woman) when confronting
Nadal, 2018). Researchers have also linked microag- microaggressions. Empirical evidence supports this
gressions to trauma-related symptoms in people of notion; targets report that using confrontation opened
color (Moody & Lewis, 2019; Nadal et al., 2020; Torres them up to further microaggressive experiences (e.g.,
& Taknint, 2015). Queer populations appear to suffer being further invalidated, being called “oversensitive”
increased anxiety and stress, decreased self-esteem, and and “paranoid”; Nadal et al., 2013; Sue et al., 2009). As
detrimental therapeutic outcomes as a result of micro- Minikel-Lacocque (2013) noted, it is the aftermath of the
aggressive experiences ( Johnson, 2014; Shelton & original microaggressive act, as opposed to the initial
Delgado-Romero, 2013; Torres & Taknint, 2015). Some microaggression itself, that carries most of the weight.
researchers have also demonstrated that microaggres-
sions targeting trans people are associated with nega- Epistemic injustice and
tive affect, emotional withdrawal, and suicide-related
behaviors (Howe, 2019).
microaggressions
Some scholars have suggested that targets should give
the offender “the benefit of the doubt” in the face of
Responding to microaggressions microaggressive behavior (Haidt, 2017). However, this
As Sue et al. (2007) discussed in their foundational suggestion ignores the harm that often befalls targets
article, recognizing and responding to microaggressions after microaggressive experiences go unadressed (e.g.,
puts the target in a catch-22. The target is first presented internalizing negative emotions such as anger, guilt,
with attributional ambiguity (e.g., questioning if the and shame; Sue et al., 2019; Williams, 2020). On the
1026 Johnson et al.

other hand, active forms of coping (e.g., confrontation) dominant groups (e.g., White people, men, cisgender
may raise levels of anxiety for targets who may fear people) often discount the account of people of mar-
retaliation or backlash in particular settings (e.g., work ginalized groups because they do not experience the
or school; Sue et al., 2019). Still, challenging microag- world in the same way and thereby may not even real-
gressive behavior (e.g., confrontation) may disrupt the ize that discrimination is a typical and salient everyday
internalization of anger and other negative emotions experience for people without power or privilege. In
and increase self-efficacy in the aftermath of microag- this way, people with privilege are like fish in water,
gressive experiences for targets (Brondolo et al., 2009; in that they do not recognize the water until (or unless)
Sue et al., 2019). Further, confronting microaggressions they are removed from it (Brown et al., 2003).
serves as an important intervention in raising awareness On individual levels, testimonial injustice—instances
of microaggressions and reducing perpetration on a in which a person’s credibility is diminished as a result
societal level. However, there are a number of barriers of prejudice, often unknown and unrecognized by the
to disrupting microaggressions. perpetrator—leads to further invalidation and harm of
Epistemic injustice provides a useful framework for targets in the aftermath of microaggressive experiences.
understanding how and why microaggressions are Virtually all qualitative examinations of microaggres-
resistant to disruption both interpersonally and on sys- sions reveal people of color, queer and trans people,
temic levels. Epistemic injustice refers to the tendency and women’s fears of being further invalidated if they
in society to not believe speakers as a result of implic- were to contest microaggressions (Nadal et al., 2013;
itly or explicitly prejudicial thinking (Fricker, 2007). Pitcan et al., 2018; Sue et al., 2009). Further, denial from
Specifically, hermeneutical injustice refers to instances perpetrators is thought to come in various forms, rang-
in which someone’s experiences are not well under- ing from simple denial of intentionality (“I didn’t mean
stood by themselves and/or by others because these it like that!”) to shifting responsibility for the target’s
experiences do not fit any concepts known to them or harm back onto the target (“You’re so sensitive!” or
others. This lack of knowledge is due largely to historic “You’re paranoid”). These reactions become particularly
exclusion of some groups of people from societal activi- dangerous when perpetrators weaponize already widely
ties (e.g., scholarship, journalism) that shape which held negative stereotypes about marginalized groups
concepts become well known. Microaggressions, we against targets (e.g., Black women are angry).
argue, are particularly susceptible to hermeneutical The main purpose of this article is to focus on sec-
injustice because of their subtlety and invisibility to the ondary microaggressions, or harmful reactions to micro-
perpetrator. aggressions that then become microaggressions
On a systemic level, there is perhaps no clearer themselves. We focus specifically on four main con-
example of hermeneutical injustice with regard to cepts: victim blaming, gaslighting, ‘splaining, and aban-
microaggressions than the critiques of the microaggres- donment and neglect. Although these secondary
sions research program (MRP). Critics undermine the microaggressions have been introduced to the Ameri-
MRP by emphasizing the common lack of intentionality can lexicon via mainstream and social media, they have
of the perpetrator, as well as a perceived oversensitivity received minimal attention in academic discourse. Fur-
of the target and subjectivity of the assessment of ther, we situate these terms in our understanding of
microaggressions (for a review, see Torino et al., 2018). hermeneutical and testimonial injustice and provide
“Pure nonsense,” “ridiculous,” and “irrational” have all recommendations for future directions for researchers
described critics’ reactions to microaggression research who hope to further investigate these experiences.
(Sue et al., 2008). In addition, critics routinely attempt
to challenge the legitimacy of microaggression research Statement of Reflexivity and
by offering alternative explanations for microaggressive
experiences ranging from miscommunication to psy-
Theoretical Underpinnings
chopathology of the target. Further, they suggest micro- Before we delve into our proposed model of secondary
aggressions do not occur more often, or amount to microaggressions, it is crucial that we examine how our
more harm, than the everyday hassles or indignities identities and experiences may influence our under-
people of any race, gender, sexual orientation, or reli- standings and personal connections to the topics we
gious affiliation might face (Lukianoff & Haidt, 2015). discuss (Fine, 2013). Authors V. E. Johnson, D. R. G.
However, these criticisms prove to be microaggressions Sissoko, and R. King identity as Black women, and
themselves in that they invalidate and deny the lived author K. L. Nadal identifies as a Brown Asian man;
experiences of marginalized peoples, who are more accordingly, our experiences as people of color inform
likely to recognize microaggressions because they are the ways we understand these concepts both academi-
targets of such experiences. On the contrary, people of cally and personally. In fact, throughout this article we
Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions 1027

offer both empirical evidence and anecdotal examples Blaming the Victim critically analyzed how the dismissal
of how secondary microaggressions may be manifested of racism and the social environment as determinants
to demonstrate what we know from academic literature of racial disparities results in the faulty logic of victim
as well as what we know from our lived experiences. blaming. Since then, the term has been applied to a
Further, we understand that we each have other unique variety of areas and gained particular traction in the
identities that influence our lens. Collectively, we iden- areas of gendered violence and racism (Dressel, 1994;
tify as academics, New Yorkers, able-bodied, and Dukes & Gaither, 2017; Eigenberg & Policastro, 2017;
people with access to education and other economic George & Martínez, 2002; Saucier et al., 2010).
resources; individually, some of us identify as American- In psychological literature, victim blaming is usually
born, immigrants, queer, working class, upwardly mobile, defined as fully or partially blaming people for their
and so forth. Thus, we acknowledge how our multiple misfortunes (Harber et al., 2015). However, victim blam-
identities, individually and collectively, influence our ing can occur on an individual level (e.g., blaming a
framework. woman for getting sexually assaulted) and collective
Relatedly, we center our models through the lens of social identity level (e.g., blaming African American
intersectionality theory, which Crenshaw (1989) initially culture for economic disparities; Mekawi & Todd, 2018;
proposed as a way of understanding how Black women Ryan, 1976). Victim blaming can be conceptualized as
navigate multiple forms of systemic oppression. We a form of testimonial injustice in which the victim’s
understand that, in the context of intersectionality the- credibility may be undermined by preconceived notions
ory, whereas people of one marginalized group are based on negative stereotypes. This process results in
harmed by secondary microaggressions, people of mul- the placement of responsibility about an objectively
tiple marginalized groups (e.g., Black women, LGBTQ negative outcome onto the victim. In the context of
people of color) may encounter secondary microag- hermeneutical injustice, victim blaming may occur
gressions in even more deleterious ways. Further, we when a victim is unable to coherently label or identify
also recognize that people of multiple privileged identi- their experience and the listener is unfamiliar with the
ties (i.e., White cisgender heterosexual men) may com- subject matter (e.g., subtle racism, systemic oppres-
mit microaggressions that could result in increased sion), which may result in blaming victims for their
harm or impact given their compounded privileged interpretation of the interaction.
identities (Collins, 1990; Crenshaw, 1989; Wang, 2012). Victim blaming not only affects individuals but also
has the potential to undermine the credibility of a col-
lective as a whole (e.g., racial minority groups, women,
Forms of Secondary Microaggressions
LGBTQIA+ communities). Popular stereotypes that
When people who commit microaggressions respond result in victim blaming include gender-based violence
in ways that further invalidate or deny the target’s expe- myths (e.g., “If she had not had too much to drink, she
rience of the microaggression, they exacerbate the would not have been raped”; Sleath & Bull, 2012) and
given situation and inflict even more harm on the target. generalizations of behavior based on race (e.g., “Black
In agreement with Sue and colleagues’ (2007) defini- people are more likely to engage in criminal activity”;
tions of microinvalidations, or “communications that Dukes & Gaither, 2017). These stereotypes lead to the
exclude, negate, or nullify the psychological thoughts, diminished credibility of victims, and the overassign-
feelings, or experiential reality” (p. 274), we focus on ment of responsibility for negative outcomes (e.g.,
three types of secondary microaggressions that can be sexual assault, racial disparities) is placed on the victim.
expressed verbally (i.e., victim blaming, gaslighting, People with intersecting marginalized identities are par-
and ‘splaining) and one type of secondary microaggres- ticularly vulnerable to victim blaming (Dotson, 2011;
sion that can be expressed behaviorally (i.e., abandon- Stewart, 2019). For example, stereotypes have rendered
ment and neglect). See Fig. 1 for an example of primary Black women’s social identity as “epistemologically dis-
and secondary microaggressions. advantaged” (p. 245), whereby the audience does not
recognize the victim as a credible source of knowledge
(Dotson, 2011).
Victim blaming
Stewart (2019) argued that affective responses to
The phrase “blaming the victim” was coined by sociolo- victim blaming can lead to a feedback loop, whereby
gist William Ryan in response to the Moynihan report the victim’s display of emotions is used to justify the
(Moynihan, 1965), which posited that racial econo­ undermining of the victim’s credibility—which may lead
mic disparities—and poverty in Black communities to further victim blaming by reinforcing that the victim
specifically—resulted from the of rise of single-parent is “too emotional” or “too angry.” Furthermore, emo-
households in Black families. Ryan’s (1976) book tions are used to create new stereotypes that affect
1028 Johnson et al.

Primary Microaggression
“Wow, You Are So Well
Spoken!”

Confrontation: “You Are Assuming Clarification: “Can You Explain


That It’s Unusual for People of My What You Mean by That
Race to Be Well-Spoken.” Victim Reaction Statement?”

Inaction: Ignoring
the Comment Protection: “Thank You.” Avoidance: Leaving the Situation

Secondary Microaggression
Primary/Secondary Perpetrator Bystander Response

“Wow, You People “Oh, I Did Not


Always Make Realize That
Everything About Race!” What They Said
Was Offensive to You.”

Neglect
Victim Blaming

Abandonment
‘Splaining Gaslighting

“Yes, This Was


“Please Calm Down. Offensive, But I
“Basically, What She
This Was Not About Did Not Want to
Is Saying and Why
Race. You Are Overreacting. Get Involved.”
She Is Upset Is Because…”

Fig. 1. Conceptual map of primary and secondary microaggressions.

credibility and result in repeated testimonial injustice In the context of microaggressions, victim blaming
(e.g., the trope of the angry Black woman; Stewart, has already been understood as a primary microaggres-
2019). Dismissing victims’ challenges to oppression sion, or statements/behavior that denigrate or blame
because of their communication style and emotionality people and cultures for disparities (Mekawi & Todd,
has colloquially been referred to as tone policing—and 2018). For example, victim-blaming microaggressions
can lead to hypervigilance and self-policing in targets may include statements implying that Black people
(Davis & Ernst, 2019). Thus, Black women in academia use slavery as an excuse for “their problems,” Latinx
report filtering their communication or self-silencing to Americans would have an easier time finding jobs if
avoid the social cost of being perceived as angry and they learned to speak English, or trans people would
evade being revictimized through victim blaming not face violence if they decided to remain in their
(Corbin et al., 2018; Dotson, 2011). “real” bodies. Although explicit literature on victim
Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions 1029

blaming and microaggressions is scarce, victim blaming as “aggressive” instead of White people being viewed
is an implicit part of existing microaggressions theory. as fragile ( Jones & Norwood, 2016).
For example, the myth-of-meritocracy microaggression
suggests that racism is not a factor in determining socio-
Gaslighting
economic life-course outcomes despite ample evidence
suggesting otherwise (Shapiro et al., 2013). Myth-of- As a secondary microaggression, gaslighting is a par-
meritocracy microaggressions (e.g., “Everyone can suc- ticularly common and harmful type of victim blaming.
ceed in this society if they work hard enough”) implicitly The term gaslighting comes from the 1944 movie Gas-
blame economic racial disparities on individuals as light, in which a husband systematically lies and
opposed to systemic racism, which is consistent with deceives his wife to manipulate her into believing she
Ryan’s findings (1976, p. 276). is going insane and to cover up his misdeeds. Gaslight-
As a secondary microaggression, perpetrators may ing is commonly discussed in popular and social media,
engage in victim blaming in response to being “called and scholarship, in the context of heterosexual roman-
out” for committing a microaggression or in response tic relationships in which women are the victims of the
to a collective uprising challenging broader systemic gaslighting tactics of their male partners. For example,
violence. On an individual level, a microaggression per- Huffington Post published an article entitled “Gaslight-
petrator may respond by blaming the victim after being ing: It’s Really A Thing,” providing a definition and
made aware of the transgression. Given the frequent examples of gaslighting specifically in romantic rela-
unintentional nature of microaggressions, the victim tionships (Rodman, 2017). In academic literature, there
may be painted as overly sensitive or aggressive (e.g., also appears to be a focus on female victims of gaslight-
“You are too sensitive; you don’t have to get that angry ing in various aspects of their personal and professional
about it”). The perpetrator may also double down on lives (Stern, 2007).
a previous microaggression (e.g., “Black people always Scholars in both psychology and sociology have
make everything about race”). Victim blaming has his- argued that the definition of gaslighting can be extended
torically been used as a common tactic to discredit to include a single act or series of acts perpetrated by
oppressed groups and justify violence, oppression, and any person in a position of power designed to manipu-
disparities (Schoellkopf, 2012). For example, the upris- late less powerful others to doubt themselves or ques-
ings following the police killings of Michael Brown in tion their own sanity or memory (Davis & Ernst, 2019;
2014 and George Floyd and Breonna Taylor in 2020 Tobias & Joseph, 2020). Sweet (2019) noted that gas-
triggered widespread national victim blaming against a lighting is embedded in a larger system of social
number of protestors who engaged in property damage inequality and can take place in relationships that are
and looting. These incidents—most accurately described power laden. Gaslighting is used not only to maintain
as secondary macroaggressions—were used to justify or gain power in intimate relationships but also to
escalating police violence against protesters and to uphold power structures of White supremacy, patriar-
question the overall legitimacy of the protests (“After chy, heteronormativity, and transphobia. Therefore,
Curfew,” 2020; Sharma, 2020) while ignoring how sys- gaslighting applies to interactions between cis- and
temic oppression, an overtly racist administration, a transgender people, heterosexual people and LGBTQIA+
serious economic crisis, and a pandemic may have people, and Whites and people of color.
fueled nonpeaceful aspects of the protests. Scholars have discussed how stereotypes can be
Anecdotally, victim blaming has affected all four used to make gaslighting even more effective on mem-
authors in our everyday lives. For instance, authors bers of marginalized groups. Although all gaslighting
D. R. G. Sissoko and R. King, both of whom are Black has the potential to make the target question their
female graduate students, recall incidents in which they reality, Sweet (2019) discussed how gender stereotypes
were challenged or discredited after acknowledging can be wielded to make gaslighting tactics against
racial microaggressions, particularly in classroom set- women particularly harmful. For example, in the 1944
tings. Whenever they pointed out racially biased com- film, the wife is made to believe she is losing her mind.
ments made by their White peers, they were deemed This concept of “losing one’s mind” or “going crazy” is
“bullies,” particularly if and when their White class- built into a larger system of patriarchy in which women
mates became defensive and/or emotional. Although are frequently labeled “crazy” and “hysterical” (Sweet,
they were the targets of the hurtful comments, they 2019), all while also promoting ableist terminology. So
ended up taking blame for their actions. Such dynamics when gaslighting tactics are combined with these ste-
mirror previous scholarship in which White women’s reotypes (e.g., “That’s not what I meant! You’re being
tears are used to oppress Black women (Accapadi, irrational!”) they have the potential to make the target
2007) or how Black people are wrongfully stereotyped internalize societal assumptions about all women.
1030 Johnson et al.

Davis and Ernst (2019) defined racial gaslighting as dominant group speaks for or provides rationale to
“the political, social, economic and cultural process that people of historically marginalized groups (e.g., people
perpetuates and normalizes a white supremacist reality of color, women, LGBTQIA+ people) about topics
through pathologizing those who resist” (p. 763). In related to oppression or inequity. Although these terms
this instance, stereotypes about particular racial and have been commonly used among historically marginal-
ethnic groups are used to make the target and/or others ized communities and social-justice organizations, they
(e.g., bystanders) believe that the target’s reality cannot have also been used in social and popular media. For
be trusted. For example, one may argue that the target example, Achola (2015) described an instance of
is always making things about race, being oversensitive Whitesplaining in The Telegraph, in which actor Matt
or paranoid, or overly focused on the negatives. These Damon attempted to rationalize the lack of diversity in
responses are rooted in larger societal stereotypes Hollywood to Effie Brown, a successful Black woman
about people of color, and specifically Black Americans. producer. Gupta (2018) defined Whitesplaining in The
In a particularly painful experience during graduate Wellesley News as “when white people feel the need to
training, author V. E. Johnson was yelled at on a col- explain problems that are faced by people of color to
laborative library floor for talking while discussing a people of color themselves” (para. 3). Solnit (2012)
group project with a White female peer. The perpetrator described how mansplaining existed at “the intersection
loudly yelled at the first author (but not her White between overconfidence and cluelessness,” whereas
peer), “Some of us are students here trying to study!” Lewis (2014) wrote in New Republic how mansplaining
The implications of this statement were clear to her. transpires when women “have their expertise instantly
Despite being located in a space accessible only to dismissed because of the lady-shaped package it came
students at the college, the perpetrator believed or— in” (para. 3).
wanted to insinuate—that V. E. Johnson could not have Despite the usage of the terms mansplaining and
possibly been a student. The comment likely revealed Whitesplaining in everyday vernacular, there is a dearth
the perpetrator’s own biases about Black people, in that in the academic literature that describes the phenom-
they were unintelligent, loud, and unruly. She con- ena. A search of PsychInfo in June 2020 found that
fronted the perpetrator, “So I’m not a student? Why are there is only one hit that mentions “Whitesplaining”
you singling me out? This is a collaborative floor where and one hit that mentions “mansplaining”; in both
everyone is free to talk.” In response, the perpetrator sources, neither term is the main focus of the publica-
exclaimed, “Oh my God, you’re ridiculous! This is not tion. However, outside of psychology, there has been
about race. You should have more respect for people some academic literature in which scholars have
who are studying!” attempted to provide definitions and conceptualizations
In this example, gaslighting constitutes a form of for both terms. For instance, in examining mansplain-
epistemic injustice and microaggressive behavior. The ing, Deo (2014) shared:
perpetrator’s comment is best classified as a microinsult.
Although the comment was overtly aggressive, the Both inside and outside the workplace, a woman’s
racial undertones (i.e., “You do not belong here”) are ideas, suggestions, or observations may be ignored
subtle in nature. The perpetrator denies that their state- until a man explains (or more frequently, simply
ment was race-based and asserts their own perspective repeats) her thoughts; sometimes the man honestly
as the “right” one. V. E. Johnson, then, not only was a believes himself to be the one full of knowledge
target of microaggressive behavior but also, after con- and ideas, virtually unaware of the woman’s
fronting the perpetrator, was subjected to racial gas- comments before voicing them as his own. (pp.
lighting. The perpetrator uses a racial stereotype of 976–977)
Black people being overly sensitive about race to gas-
light her It is clear that the perpetrator’s intent was to Likewise, Whitesplaining may occur when “White
harm, but the racial undertone of the statement was validation [is given] more weight” than perspectives of
subtle and perhaps unknown to the perpetrator. people of color (Deo, 2014, p. 978) and may be even
Although gaslighting is often discussed as intentional, more complex and detrimental when people hold mul-
we contend that gaslighting as a microaggressive expe- tiple marginalized identities (e.g., women of color,
rience can also be unintentional. LGBTQIA+ people of color). Goldberg (2014) described
‘splaining as “a general process by which a privileged
figure who is nevertheless an outsider ‘splains’ to a
‘Splaining
marginalized insider the nature of the latter’s own expe-
‘Splaining (derived from mansplaining or Whitesplain- rience” (p. 117). In this way, other terms that have been
ing) is an act in which a person of a historically used for this phenomenon include straightsplaining,
Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions 1031

heterosplaining, cissplaining, thinsplaining, and many microinvalidation in that he negates her reality as Black
others. The common thread is that the person in privi- woman producer in Hollywood. The White student
lege (e.g., straight/heterosexual person, cisgender per- in the classroom example is Whitesplaining to the
son, or thin person) asserts their opinion about the Black student, who was not given the opportunity to
marginalized group (e.g, queer person, transgender speak for herself or share her own reality or lived
or genderqueer person, or fat person) as factual or experience.
absolute. When a person with power and privilege ‘splains and
‘Splaining is related to epistemic injustice because takes credit for something that a person of a historically
perpetrators are unaware of the ways in which they marginalized group has said or written before or
enact their power and privilege over persons with mar- silences the input of marginalized individuals or groups,
ginalized identities. To lack the knowledge or under- their actions and statements may potentially be viewed
standing of one’s own identities is, in itself, a privilege. as microassaults or a microinsults. One example may
For example, when a White man Whitesplains or mans- be a case in which a White person in an academic set-
plains, he is oblivious of his identities and the impact ting or workplace interrupts, speaks over, or speaks for
of his words, likely because of a lack of consequences people of color in discussions of racial discrimination.
in the past or present. Meanwhile, when a woman of This behavior might serve to distance the perpetrator
color speaks on any topic, she may be hyperconscious from the perspectives and contributions of people of
of her word choice, her tone, her volume, and the man- color (i.e., avoidant behavior as a feature of some
ner in which she communicates her message because microassaults). In this same example, the ‘splaining may
she has suffered direct or indirect consequences of serve to establish the perpetrator as the authority in
having her opinions misinterpreted or pathologized. the subject matter and diminish the validity of the
Thus, women of color (and people of other marginal- contributions of people of color in the discussion
ized groups) navigate multiple oppressive dynamics (i.e., microinsult).
and environments, which may result in disparate psy- In some instances of ‘splaining, the perpetrator’s
chological and emotional labor that is not encountered actions demonstrate a belief in the superiority (i.e.,
by people with privileged identities. more important or valid, logical, well articulated) of
Although ‘splaining has not been explicitly tied to their opinions or perspectives are than the person or
microaggressions, the concept has existed in previous people of the historically marginalized group(s). In
microaggression literature. Sue and colleagues (2009) other words, they believe (on a conscious or subcon-
discussed an incident which a Black woman was asked scious level) that what they are sharing is more impor-
a question in a classroom: tant, more valid, more logical, or more well-articulated
than what the original speaker said. To this point, previ-
I started to explain, and the White girl said, “well, ous research has found that White people and men tend
what she means is”—and she tried to talk for me. to speak more in groups, even on topics in which they
That I don’t know what I’m talking about. I can’t may not be experts (Sue, 2004). Such behavior is often
even articulate my own, my own idea. And I had learned through their socialization from being members
to tell her, I can speak for myself, I can articulate of privileged groups; some studies have found that boys
my idea better than you can, you know? And learn this behavior, in part, because of teacher bias in
only—I could not believe that she tried to speak the classroom (Beaman et al., 2006). Further, because
for me. (p. 186) White people are taught implicitly and explicitly to
never think about their Whiteness (Sue, 2004), they may
Further, utilizing Sue and colleagues’ (2007) original continue to speak their opinions without understanding
taxonomy on racial microaggressions, it is evident that racial dynamics or the damaging consequences of their
‘splaining could be considered a form of microinvalida- actions. Regardless of perpetrator awareness, ‘splaining
tion. The individual with power or privilege is negating can be insulting and harmful to historically marginal-
the perspective, reality, and lived experience of a per- ized people (e.g., your opinion or voice is not valu-
son of a historically marginalized group. By asserting able)—which may then be internalized by the target
their opinion—which may or may not be accurate— and result in an array of negative psychological out-
they fail to allow the historically marginalized person comes, such as depression, anger, anxiety, or trauma.
to speak for themselves. They also use their privileged Author K. L. Nadal cited how he regularly encounters
voice to silence or drown out the perspectives of the ‘splaining in his career. Although he is recognized as
historically marginalized person. Matt Damon’s afore- one of the leading researchers in microaggression the-
mentioned behavior toward Effie Brown could be ory and has published extensively on the topic, he is
described as both a Whitesplaining or mansplaining frequently met with strangers (mostly older White men)
1032 Johnson et al.

who challenge his work and offer alternate explanations because they have the potential to disrupt experiences
to the theory. When he cites dozens of empirical studies of bias, reduce their escalation, and mitigate the harm
(which cumulatively comprise thousands of research that can be incurred by these experiences to the target
participants who have acknowledged the existence and other bystanders (Nelson et al., 2011). Czopp and
and harmful impact of microaggressions), his chal- Monteith (2003) found that bystander action with
lengers remain unmoved and insist their perspectives regard to racism was particularly powerful when the
are correct, without ever having conducted any research bystander was White as opposed to a person of color.
on the topic themselves. In such experiences, it is evi- Researchers found that White bystanders were more
dent that the challengers are unable to acknowledge successful than bystanders of the target’s same racial
the validity of microaggressions because of a lack of group in taking antiracist action because racial/ethnic
lived experience with racial in­e quity and a lack of minority bystanders were more likely to be seen
cultural humility for people who navigate racism in as overreacting (i.e., secondary microaggression)
their everyday lives. The inability to acknowledge or and thus were less effective in inducing guilt or self-
understand racial microaggressions is particularly an criticism in perpetrators.
issue for White Americans, who have difficulty in Bystanders encounter a number of barriers to
acknowledging the salience of race in society and action, including the bystander’s own prejudicial
who often refuse to believe or accept the privilege thinking, need and/or desire to maintain relationships
that their race affords them (Sue et al., 2007). with perpetrators, and perceived risk of personal
It is important to make the distinction between using harm by the perpetrator (Stewart et al., 2011). There-
one’s privileged voice and crossing over into overt rac- fore, bystanders often miss or take no issue with the
ism, transphobia, sexism, and so forth. When Jennifer behavior of the perpetrator, and when they do, they
Schulte (known as “Barbecue Becky”) called the police still do not act (Nelson et al., 2011). Targets are then
when a Black family was barbecuing at a public park left without support. No more recognizable quote can
in Oakland in 2017 (Henderson & Jefferson-Jones, be used to describe this experience for targets than
2019) or when Amy Cooper called the police on Chris this one from Martin Luther King, Jr.: “In the end, we
Cooper (a Black man) in Central Park in 2020, falsely will remember not the words of our enemies, but the
accusing the Black man of assault, both perpetrators silence of our friends” (1967/2011). Targets of micro-
used their racial privilege to weaponize racial stereo- aggressions not only have to contend with the harm
types of the dangerousness and criminality of Black done to them by perpetrators but also are often left
people (via psychological and physical harm to Black to wonder others noticed the microaggression as well.
people by members of law enforcement). Such behavior If the bystander fails to notice the microaggression,
would not be viewed as microaggressive but rather as targets may ask themselves, “Why not?” If the bystander
an overt act of racism. did notice the microaggression, “Why did they not
speak up?” Perhaps adding insult to injury, a bystander
may offer support to the target in private, admitting
Abandonment and neglect
that they noticed the microaggression but subtly sug-
Sue et al. (2019) defined allies as “individuals who gesting the risk for them was too great to offer public
belong to dominant social groups (e.g., Whites, males, support.
heterosexuals) but actively work toward the eradication Imagine a scenario in which two friends, one trans-
of prejudicial practices they witness in both their woman and one cisgender female, are on a crowded
personal and professional lives” (p. 132). However, train. The transwoman accidentally bumps into a cis-
research suggests targets often receive no support from gender woman, who in retaliation calls her a “tranny.”
bystanders—whether they have claimed to be or have The trans slur is delivered by the stranger; however,
been previously regarded as allies or not (Nelson et al., the target finds herself more preoccupied with the inac-
2011). In the context of microaggression theory, we tion of her friend than the slur itself. The inaction of
define abandonment as the bystander failure to act on the cisgender female friend can be described as aban-
behalf of a target of microaggressions despite having donment, whereas neglect refers to the failure to act
noticed the transgression. Microaggressive neglect refers on behalf of a target because there was a failure to
to the failure to act on behalf of a target because of a recognize that a microassault took place. Consider a
failure to recognize that a microaggression took place. less overt experience in which the same pair attend a
The concepts of abandonment and neglect have not party together. The transwoman notices that many of
been explicitly explored in the larger taxonomy of the partygoers do not make eye contact with her, have
microaggressions. their bodies turned away from her, and do not directly
Researchers on antibias bystander behavior have respond to any of her input during group conversations.
argued that these actions are incredibly important At the end of the evening, after the transwoman attempts
Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions 1033

Table 1. Examples of Secondary Microaggressions

Terms Definition Example


Victim blaming Blaming marginalized groups for microaggressive Blaming someone for being the target of a
incident or the response to the incident microaggression (e.g., “I only assumed that you
were mad because Black women easily get
agitated”)
Gaslighting Manipulation with the goal of making victims Accusing someone of overreacting to a
doubt their perception microaggression (e.g., “It wasn’t such a big deal—
please calm down”)
Denying the implicit message of a microaggressive
act (e.g., “This was not about race”)
‘Splaining An outsider speaking for or providing rationale to Talking over a marginalized person to clarify a
marginalized groups point to the broader audience (e.g., “Well, what
[marginalized person] means is that. . .”)
Explaining a person’s lived reality to that person (e.g.,
telling a Black person how anti-Black racism is
manifested)
Abandonment Failure of a knowledgeable bystander to confront Failure to intervene when a perpetrator tells an
microaggressions immigrant to “go back to their country”
Neglect Failure of a bystander to recognize Failure to recognize that someone calling a Latina
microaggressions “exotic and fiery” is a microaggression

to bring these incidents to their friend’s awareness, the health, trauma, self-efficacy, and other variables. Fur-
transwoman is left to question how her friend could ther research can also examine the process in which
have missed these events that she saw as clear instances people confront or address secondary microaggres-
of social exclusion. sions, particularly understanding how power and inter-
sectional identities may influence decisions and actions.
Future Directions in Microaggression For instance, Brondolo et al. (2009) concluded that
many people face discrimination but may not actively
Research and Training confront perpetrators (even when they want to or
The expansion of microaggression theory has enhanced intend to). Both qualitative and experimental studies
people’s ability to identify microaggressive experiences can be used to understand the decision to confront
in their everyday lives. Along with growth in under- versus not, as well as the impact of that decision.
standing comes room to confront these experiences. At Training and awareness efficacy about microaggres-
the same time, further harm can come to individuals sions can be increased by (a) expanding microaggression
who attempt to confront perpetrators of microaggres- research and awareness to include secondary microag-
sions. Victim blaming, gaslighting, ‘splaining, abandon- gressions, including gaslighting, victim blaming, ‘splain-
ment, and neglect are all secondary microaggressions ing, and microaggressive abandonment and neglect;
that can be additionally harmful or revictimizing to (b) educating all people as potential perpetrators of
targets of microaggressions. Just as Sue and colleagues microaggressions that a failure to respond proactively
(2019) suggested that there is room for intervention, (i.e., not catching and addressing one’s own microag-
we suggest there is also room for additional injury. gressive behavior or relying on the target to bring up the
Table 1 includes definitions and examples of victim microaggression) and inappropriately responding (e.g.,
blaming, gaslighting, ‘splaining, and abandonment and anger, retaliation) to confrontation from targets after per-
neglect. This list is designed as a starting point, not an petrating a microaggression often leaves targets silenced,
exhaustive list, of the reactions that can occur when inflicts additional harm, and further perpetuates systems
confronting microaggressions. of oppression; and (c) emphasizing the responsibility of
To fully understand secondary microaggressions, those who hold privileged identities to reduce, take
researchers should focus on understanding the fre- responsibility for, and mitigate harm done by microag-
quency of these incidents and their impact on targets, gressions, including bystander action and deemphasizing
perpetrators, and bystanders. In this way, quantitative the responsibility of those who hold marginalized identi-
research could be used to develop measures of the ties to bear these burdens.
secondary microaggressions proposed in this article— To increase hermeneutical and testimonial justice,
which could help measure the impact of such experi- targets cannot be solely responsible for confronting
ences on a spectrum of outcomes, including mental microaggressive behavior and coping with its impact.
1034 Johnson et al.

In fact, encouraging targets to “simply speak up” or ens-life/11890566/Whitesplaining-not-just-Matt-Damon-


“give the benefit of the doubt” is shortsighted and Why-I-set-up-a-black-womens-blog.html
ignores the potential for secondary microaggressive After curfew, protesters are again met with strong police
experiences. Others have also recognized how contex- response in New York City. (2020, June 4). The New York
Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/nyregion/
tual factors (e.g., identity of perpetrator, access to
nyc-protests-george-floyd.html
resources and social support) are important consider-
Barber, S., Gronholm, P. C., Ahuja, S., Rüsch, N., & Thornicroft,
ations in training around confronting microaggressions G. (2020). Microaggressions towards people affected by
(Brondolo et al., 2009; Houshmand et al., 2019; Sue mental health problems: A scoping review. Epidemiology
et al., 2019). For instance, people who facilitate con- and Psychiatric Sciences, 29, Article e82. https://doi
versations about microaggressions must make con- .org/10.1017/S2045796019000763
scious decisions to create spaces in which people of Beaman, R., Wheldall, K., & Kemp, C. (2006). Differential
historically marginalized groups do not experience sec- teacher attention to boys and girls in the classroom.
ondary microaggressions in trainings that are meant to Educational Review, 58(3), 339–366. https://doi.org/
be safe or validating spaces. Thus, efforts to further 10.1080/00131910600748406
understand secondary microaggressions reflect our col- Brondolo, E., Brady Ver Halen, N., Pencille, M., Beatty, D.,
& Contrada, R. J. (2009). Coping with racism: A selective
lective, ethical responsibilities to diligently and obses-
review of the literature and a theoretical and method-
sively disrupt manifestations of racism, heteronormativity,
ological critique. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 32(1),
patriarchy, and so on because these systems are stub- 64–88. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10865-008-9193-0
born and permeate much of everyday life. Brown, M. K., Carnoy, M., Currie, E., Duster, T., Oppenheimer,
D. B., Shultz, M. M., & Wellman, D. (2003). Whitewashing
Conclusion race: The myth of a color-blind society. University of
California Press.
The harmful impact of microaggressions on targets has Collins, P. H. (1990). Black feminist thought in the matrix
been well documented. It is our hope that researchers of domination. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge,
use their scholarly and psychological interest in micro- Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, 138,
aggressions to critically examine and understand the 221–238.
impact of secondary microaggressions. This work con- Corbin, N. A., Smith, W. A., & Garcia, J. R. (2018). Trapped
tinues the microaggressions tradition of “making the between justified anger and being the strong Black
woman: Black college women coping with racial battle
invisible visible” and providing epistemic justice for
fatigue at historically and predominantly White insti-
those historically and unjustly silenced, blamed, and
tutions. International Journal of Qualitative Studies in
pathologized for the impact of oppressive forces out- Education, 31(7), 626–643. https://doi.org/10.1080/095
side of their control. Readers may experience resistance 18398.2018.1468045
to this concept and question the existence/impact of Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the intersection of
such incidents or fear backlash if they pursued this line race and sex: A Black feminist critique of antidiscrimi-
of research. These individuals may consider how epis- nation doctrine, feminist theory, and antiracist politics.
temic injustice has privileged their own or others’ ability University of Chicago Legal Forum.
to question, minimize, and deny the experiences of Czopp, A. M., & Monteith, M. J. (2003). Confronting prejudice
others. (literally): Reactions to confrontations of racial and gender
bias. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(4),
Transparency 532–544. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167202250923
Davis, A. M., & Ernst, R. (2019). Racial gaslighting. Politics,
Action Editor: Monnica T. Williams Groups, and Identities, 7(4), 761–774. https://doi.org/10
Editor: Laura A. King .1080/21565503.2017.1403934
Declaration of Conflicting Interests Deo, M. E. (2014). The ugly truth about legal academia.
The author(s) declared that there were no conflicts of Brooklyn Law Review, 80, 943–1014.
interest with respect to the authorship or the publication Dotson, K. (2011). Tracking epistemic violence, tracking prac-
of this article. tices of silencing. Hypatia, 26(2), 236–257. https://doi
.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01177.x
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Are racist attitudes related to experiences of racial discrimination? Within


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Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Social Science Research


journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ssresearch

Are racist attitudes related to experiences of racial


discrimination? Within sample testing utilising nationally
representative survey data
Amanuel E. Habtegiorgis a, Yin C. Paradies a,⇑, Kevin M. Dunn b
a
Centre for Citizenship & Globalisation, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University, 221 Burwood HWY, Melbourne, VIC 3125, Australia
b
Geography and Urban Studies, School of Social Sciences & Psychology, University of Western Sydney, Penrith Campus (Kingswood), Locked Bag 1797, Penrith,
NSW 2751, Australia

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Although the relationship between an individual’s racist attitudes and discriminatory
Received 20 May 2013 behaviours has been widely studied, the association between racist attitudes among perpe-
Revised 11 February 2014 trators and experiences of racism among targets has been under-examined. Based on data
Accepted 1 May 2014
from the 2001–8 Australian Challenging Racism Project survey, this paper details a novel
Available online 9 May 2014
method to investigate the link between racist attitudes and experiences of discrimination
utilising two separate models linked by nomination of cultural or ethnic groups who do not
Keywords:
fit into Australian society (i.e., out-groups). Those identified as out-groups were more likely
Racist attitudes
Prejudice
to report experiences of discrimination than those who were not nominated as out-groups.
Discrimination Overall, out-group nomination by those with racist attitudes strongly predict experiences
Self-report of discrimination among these same target out-groups, OR = 2.2, F(6, 12,348) = 78.61,
Methods p < .001. Racist attitudes are related to racist behaviours among perpetrators that are, in
Australia turn, related to experiences of racial discrimination among targets. This study demon-
strates that attitudes not only affect majority group behaviour but also drive the resulting
experiences of discrimination for minority group members.
! 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Racism can be defined as the underlying beliefs, ideologies, behaviours and practices that result in inequalities between
racial, ethnic and cultural groups, while racial discrimination refers specifically to the behaviours and practices resulting in
unfair inequalities (Paradies et al., 2009). The beliefs that underlie racist attitudes are constituted from group-focused antip-
athies (e.g., so-called Islamophobia), preferences for cultural homogeneity, false beliefs and stereotypes as well as convic-
tions regarding racial or cultural hierarchies. The latter would include racial supremacism, which has a hold on a
decreasing proportion of the population in countries like Australia (Dunn et al., 2004), but which may be associated with
more overt behaviours – i.e. with more racist acts and experiences. It may also be the case that this belief would result in
a higher level of racism against some groups compared to others. For example, racism would be more prevalent against those
who are more visibly distinct from culturally privileged groups. A more popular attitude in Australia is insecurity with
cultural diversity (Dunn et al., 2004) but it may be less likely to impact target groups. However, this and other forms of

⇑ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: yin.paradies@deakin.edu.au (Y.C. Paradies).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2014.05.002
0049-089X/! 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191 179

Table 1
Attitudes towards other racial/ethnic groups among Australians based on the 2001–8 CRP survey.

Attitudes to other racial/ethnic groups Disagree Agree Indifferent


Old Racism
All races of people are equal 10.9 85.1 4.0
NOT prejudiced toward other cultures 12.2 81.3 6.6
Humankind is NOT made up of separate races 79.6 14.9 5.6
Support racial cross-marriage 11.2 79.9 8.9
New Racism: pro-assimilation
Multiculturalism is good for Australia 6.1 88.0 5.8
Feel secure with other ethnic groups 9.2 80.3 10.5
Other ethnic groups DO NOT weaken Australia 42.2 43.1 14.7
New racism: denial
There is racial prejudice in Australia 7.7 85.9 6.5
British descent Australians are privileged 41.4 43.2 15.4

Response categories recoded as: Disagree = Strongly disagree + Disagree/Agree = Strongly agree + Agree/and Indifferent = Neither agree nor disagree. The
sample size range is 12,054–12,413.

‘new racism’ attitudes could have a particular impact upon members of groups seen as not fitting into majority group
cultures. The beliefs underlying racist attitudes may therefore convert unevenly into racist behaviours and the resulting
experiences of racial discrimination (EOD).1
To date, numerous studies have examined either perpetrators or targets of racism in isolation, while relatively few have
investigated both in conjunction (McConahay, 1983; Dovidio et al., 1996; Dovidio et al., 2002; Flynn, 2005; Gaertner et al.,
2005). In fact, to our knowledge, no attempt to quantify the association between attitudes and target reported experiences
has been published in the literature. There is, however, an extensive body of evidence investigating the association between
the racist attitudes of majority group members and their racist behaviours. For example, in two European studies, Pereira
et al. (2010) found that prejudice is positively related to discriminatory behaviours while Kauff and Wagner (2012) showed
that pro-diversity beliefs are negatively related to discriminatory behaviours.
Talaska et al. (2008) analysed 57 studies to find ‘a moderate relationship between overall attitudes and discrimination,’
further observing the presence of heterogeneity between attitudes and behaviour. We, therefore, might similarly expect the
relationship between attitudes/behaviours and target EOD to vary across specific beliefs about ethnic relations, race and
diversity.
In this paper, we detail a novel examination of the association between perpetrator attitudes (as a proxy of perpetrator
behaviour) and target EOD. We also report on the influence of various racist beliefs on the propensity of specific groups to
experience racism. Section 2 below presents the study methods while Section 3 details the results and Section 4 concludes
with implications and future directions.

2. Methods

2.1. Data

We analyse the relation between self-reported racist attitudes and EOD drawing from the Australian 2001–8 Challenging
Racism Project (CRP) survey data. This project was initiated by Professors Kevin Dunn and Jim Forest to understand the
extent and nature of race-related attitudes in Australia. The project received funding from multiple sources including Aus-
tralian Research Council, Victorian Health Promotion Foundation and Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC). It has
been successful in disseminating information about the prevalence of racism and intolerance in Australia and has had a sig-
nificant influence on policy and practice to combat racism through engagement with local communities and various levels of
government.
The collection of the CRP survey data began in 2001 in the states of New South Wales and Queensland where 5056
respondents completed a questionnaire (Dunn and Nelson, 2011; Challenging Racism Project, 2012). This survey was
repeated in Victoria in 2006 with 4016 respondents. Other states which participated in the CRP in subsequent years included
South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory in 2007 (n = 1484 and n = 454, respectively), as well as the Northern
Territory, Tasmania and the city of Perth in 2008 (n = 300, n = 351 and n = 851, respectively). All of these surveys included
questions about attitudes towards cultural diversity and racism, utilising probability-based random telephone sampling
techniques that allowed a representative sample of each relevant state or territory. These findings were then consolidated
into a single dataset (n = 12,512).
The CRP questionnaires asked the Australian respondents about their attitudes toward: cultural diversity, assimilation,
Anglo-privilege, racial equality, racial hierarchy, acknowledgement of racism, self-declared prejudice and nomination of

1
Throughout the paper we use the abbreviation EOD to refer to experiences of racial discrimination.
180 A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191

Table 2
Self-Reported experiences of discrimination among Australians based on the 2001–8 Challenging Racism
Project survey.

Experienced racial discrimination Yes No


Workplace 9.8 90.3
Education 10.1 90.0
Renting/Buying house 3.5 96.5
Dealings with police 3.8 96.2
Shops/Restaurants 8.6 91.4
Sports event 8.4 91.6
Average 7.4 92.7

Stem question: ‘How often have YOU experienced discrimination because of your OWN ETHNIC ORIGIN in
the following situations?’ Response categories recoded as: No = Never + Hardly ever and Yes = Some-
times + Often + Very often. The sample size range is (12,160, 12,486).

cultural or ethnic groups that do not fit into Australian society (i.e., out-groups). In this paper, we focus on nine attitude vari-
ables available across these datasets, each question has a 5-item Likert scale response set (see Table 1).2
Table 1 shows the attitudes of Australians towards diversity. Although only 6.1% disagree that multiculturalism is good
compared to 88% who agree, 42.2% believe peoples’ maintenance of racial/ethnic distinctiveness weakens Australia com-
pared to 43.1% who do not.
In addition, these datasets have another six questions, each with 5-item ordinal scale measuring EOD. These questions
involve EOD in the workplace, schools, housing markets, shops and restaurants, policing, and sporting events (see Table 2).
Reported experiences vary from as low as 3.5% (in renting/buying house) to as high as 10.1% (in schools). Discrimination
tends to be more pronounced in educational settings, at sporting events, in the labour market and in shopping and restau-
rants. Out of the total sample (n = 12,512), 54.8% of those born overseas (n = 1757) reported EOD compared to 21.9% of those
born in Australia (n = 2036). Other studies utilising the CRP data have found similar results, although at the state level (Dunn
et al., 2005, 2010).
In addition to the variables in Tables 1 and 2, the CRP data also includes demographic characteristics such as age, sex,
educational attainment and geographic location that are utilised as controls in analyses detailed below. For simplicity, we
treat response items indicating the respondent does not know, ‘is not sure’ or ‘refuses to give an answer’ as missing values
(0–4% across all variables). Instead of the dichotomous dummy variables mentioned earlier, we construct another dependent
variable – EOD – with a 5-item ordinal scale response. We aggregate the responses from the five ‘frequency of discrimination’
variables to create this variable (a = 0.79, mean = 1.22 and SD = 0.67) by selecting the highest discrimination experience
reported across the five questions. For instance, assume one of the CRP participants gave the following responses to each
EOD item (with responses coded between 0 and 4):
Frequency experienced discrimination because of race/ethnicity:

At workplace sometimes (code ‘2’)


In schools very often (code ‘4’)
In housing market never (code ‘0’)
In shopping/restaurant hardly ever (code ‘1’)
In sporting event often (code ‘3’)

Then this person has experienced the highest level of discrimination in school relative to the other settings. Thus, the
value assigned to this respondent is ‘4’ (high level of discrimination). Applying the same procedure for the whole sample
with available data (n = 12,505), the distribution of the aggregate EOD is never (65.1%), hardly ever (12.6%), sometimes
(14.3%), often (4.6%) and very often (3.4%).
Our method could be biased upward if the frequency of responses were high (e.g. a score of 3 or 4) in only one setting
while zero in all other settings. As sensitivity checks, we examined two alternative methods. First, we added up responses
in each setting to generate an aggregate value ranging 0–24. Then we re-assigned the scale as 0 ‘never’, 1–6 ‘hardly ever’, 7–
12 ‘sometimes’, 13–18 ‘often’, and 19–24 ‘very often’. The result is significantly different with only 5.7% of the whole sample
self-reporting EOD at a more often than ‘hardly ever’ rather than 22.3% using the method above. In addition, 10.8% of the
minority sample self-reported EOD instead of 35.8% using the highest level of discrimination method. Second, we re-esti-
mated our models using domain counts for the six discrimination variables instead of the aggregate values. This method,
with values ranging between 0 and 6, generated frequencies of EOD between the highest prevalence method and aggregate
method, i.e. 15.1% reported EOD in at least one domain.

2
The response categories for the Likert-type responses are coded on a scale of 1–5 ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree.
A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191 181

Although, the reported frequencies varied depending on which method is used to construct the EOD variable, this had
little impact on multivariate associations. For example, the effect of re-scaling on the results is minimal with a difference
in the correlation coefficient (see Sections 3 and 4 below) of just 0.04. Similarly, using the domain count approach, we
obtained (ordered logit/Poisson) regression outcomes that are comparable to those reported in this paper. In fact, as we trea-
ted missing values in these alternative estimations as zeroes, our estimation is conservative with lower bound coefficient
estimates. In general, these findings suggest that the discrimination variable is robust to alternative scaling.3

2.2. Correlation between racist attitudes and self-reported EOD

As an initial step in the analysis, we calculated correlations between racist attitudes and EOD. We first computed the
average racist attitudes among Australian-born respondents who nominate a specific out-group for each of the nine racist
attitude variables. For instance, the percentage of anti-diversity attitudes (one of the nine attitude variables) among those
who nominate Middle Easterners as an out-group is 16.5%. In general, the average nomination rate of Middle Easterners
as out-group is 36.2%, indicating that Australian-born respondents who nominate Middle Easterners as an out-group hold,
on average, more racist attitudes than other respondents. Following a similar procedure, corresponding values are then
assigned to each member of the nominated out-group. For example, we assign each respondent identifying as Middle Eastern
a value of 0.362. Thus, the average value for racist attitudes is serving as a weight variable assigned to target group mem-
bership. In this way we can create a categorical variable ‘anti-out-group specific racist attitudes’. Since members of the same
group are assigned the same value, they can be considered as one category. There are thirteen minority groups we assess in
this analysis, each assigned unique value as described above, after excluding some groups due to sample size and geographic
contiguity.4 The result is a racist attitude variable with thirteen categories indicating out-group specific racist attitudes. We
assess the strength of the relationship between these attitudes and self-reported EOD in the multivariate analyses.
We have already derived the self-reported EOD variable, reflecting the prevalence of the highest EOD as reported by CRP
respondents (see Section 2.1). Since we now have one individual level variable (i.e., self-reported EOD) along with another
variable assigned to each minority respondent based on group membership (i.e., members of minority groups nominated as
out-groups), we can estimate the correlation between self-reported EOD and anti-out-group racist attitudes as shown in
Section 3.2.

2.3. Multivariate models

We developed several multivariate models to understand what factors influence the relationship between racist attitude
and EOD. As the variables were generally ordinal, most of the analysis involved ordered logistic regression. However, we also
utilised binary logistic regression when the dependent variables were dichotomous.

2.3.1. Ordered Logistic Regression Model


Using aggregate self-reported EOD as the dependent variable and other covariates including prevalence of racism, age,
gender, education, region of birth, region and state as explanatory variables, we estimated ordered logistic regression to
detect any association between racist attitudes and EOD. The ordered logistic regression for ordinal data is:
Prðyj ¼ iÞ ¼ Prðki$1 < b1 x1j þ b2 x2j þ b3 x3j þ . . . þ bk xkj þ ui 6 ki Þ ð1Þ

where yj is the outcome measure, and i is the category which yj can take (for EOD i takes ‘never’, ‘hardly ever’, ‘sometimes’,
‘often’ and ‘very often’). There are k amounts of the explanatory variables xj; and ki is the cut-point indexed in the range (1, i).
The model estimated using the ordered logistic regression gives a linear relationship such as:
y&j ¼ bxj þ uj ð2Þ

where the measured yj estimates the unobserved latent variable (y&j ) which is continuous and can take values between ($1,
+1). Since the distance between the ordinal values (e.g. between EOD values ‘sometimes’ and ‘often’) cannot be determined
in the datasets, the cut-points estimated with maximum likelihood estimation (ML) are utilised as thresholds in predicting
the probabilistic weights. This is due to the presence of the unobserved error term that is assumed to be randomly and logis-
tically distributed.5 Given this assumption is satisfied, the probability that the outcome variable takes a certain category can be
calculated from the ordinal regression estimated with ML procedure. Coefficients are interpreted as logit estimates. If the esti-
mate is positive, then increasing the value of the predictor increases the likelihood of the outcome variable taking the highest
category while decreasing the likelihood of it taking the lowest category. The reverse is the case with regard to negative
estimates. In our case, self-reported EOD was the response variable with possible outcomes (i) of ‘never’ to ‘very often’. Then
the probability that the person responds with outcome i is given by:

3
The results of the alternative estimations can be provided upon request from the Authors.
4
Two group categories ‘Muslims’ and ‘Balkans’ are excluded from further analyses because the former are not geographically limited to a certain region
category and the later are part of South Europeans in the U.N. regional classification. Jews, East Africans and Rest of Africans are excluded in the final analysis
because their sample size is far smaller than other groups.
5
The logistic distribution evaluated at the z value is given by the cumulative frequency distribution F(z) = ez/(1 + ez).
182 A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191

PrðDiscrimj ¼ iÞ ¼ Prðki$1 < b1 Racist$ attitudej þ b2 Agej þ b3 Genderj þ b3 Educationj þ b3 Birth$ country$ groupj
þ b3 Aus$ Fatherj þ b3 Aus$ Motherj þ b3 Regionj þ b3 Statej þ u 6 ki :Þ ð3Þ

The independent variable of interest in this multivariate ordered logit model is the prevalence of racist attitudes composite
variable represented by the nine attitude variables that are each included in separate regression models along with co-vari-
ates and the dependent variable. Each attitude variable was recoded dichotomously taking a value of ‘0’ if the respondent
agreed/strongly agreed with items listed in Table 1 and ‘1’ if they disagreed/strongly disagreed with these items. The prob-
ability outcomes can be predicted from the model using the logit estimates and the cut-points as follows:

PrðDiscrimj þ uj < kÞ ¼ 1=ð1 þ eDiscrimj $k Þ ð4Þ

PrðDiscrimj þ uj > kÞ ¼ 1 $ 1=ð1 þ eDiscrimj $k Þ ð5Þ

Prðki < Discrimj þ uj < kiþ1 Þ ¼ 1=ð1 þ eDiscrimj $kiþ1 Þ $ 1=ð1 þ eDiscrimj $ki Þ 8i ¼ ½1 $ 4( ð6Þ

Eqs. (4) and (5) are used to calculate the probability that the response variable takes the lowest and highest level categories
respectively, while Eq. (6) is used to calculate the remaining categories.

2.3.2. Two-stage estimation strategy for the association between racist attitudes and self-reported EOD
The main challenge in measuring the association between racist attitudes and self-reported EOD is attributing the atti-
tudes to perpetrators and the experiences to targets. Such attribution is confounded by individual level data. It is method-
ologically inaccurate to measure the two variables (i.e., attitudes and experiences) in a single model because these two
variables are not mutually exclusive. This is the case because one cannot attribute the racist attitudes in the CRP data solely
to perpetrators and experiences solely to targets. Anyone can potentially be a perpetrator or target of racist behaviour,
regardless of their racial or ethnic background (Sawrikar and Katz, 2010). Thus, we effectively have two different samples
to construct: the first sample consisting only of perpetrators and the second sample consisting only of targets.
We conjecture that the confounding in the attitude and experiences variables can be corrected by introducing an estima-
tion strategy that first examines perpetrators in relation to their targets, with these results then used to estimate another
model involving only targets. Since we are analysing perpetrators of racist attitudes in the first stage, we restrict the sample
to Anglo-Australians. Clearly, non-Anglo-Australians can also perpetrate racism, but in this study we are primarily interested
in the attitudes of the majority group. Furthermore, we are not suggesting that all Anglo-Australians perpetrate racism but
simply that majority groups are usually in a better position (i.e., generally have more social power) to do so (Manglitz, 2003;
Hill, 2011). Since there is no comprehensive ancestry variable in the CRP data, we restricted our sample to the closest proxy
for ethnicity available (i.e., country/region of birth), including respondents born in Australia (n = 9311) as a surrogate for
Anglo-Australians. Clearly, this group includes many non-Anglo Australians, but arguably, nativity is another form of major-
ity group membership which, to some extent, allows members more opportunity to perpetrate racism.
The estimation strategy we followed is illustrated in Fig. 1. As can be seen in the diagram, the first stage is to measure the
association between respondents nominating specific out-groups6 and their race-related attitudes (denoted by Model A). In
the next stage, we create a proxy categorical variable for those nominated as out-groups by mapping them against their respec-
tive ‘region of birth’. At this stage we can use the ‘nominated out-groups’ categorical variable as regressor in the discrimination
model. With exposure to racial discrimination as the dependent variable, we estimate the marginal effect of being nominated as
out-group on self-reported EOD in this model, denoted by Model B. Whereas ‘A’ measures the racist attitudes expressed against
specific target groups, ‘B’ measures the EOD reported by these target groups. If both set of models, ‘A’ and ‘B’, are statistically
significant with the expected signs of coefficients, then this establishes evidence of the relationship between the racist attitudes
of perpetrators and self-reported EOD by targets. Significance in the first set of models (model A) suggests that the racist atti-
tudes relate to specific groups. Similarly, significance in the second model (model B) shows that groups who are the focus of
racist attitudes report more EOD. These two models are linked by the nominated out-groups which are used to denote the tar-
gets of discrimination.

3. Results

3.1. Descriptive statistics

Descriptive statistics of the variables utilised in the model for the CRP data are reported in Table 3. In terms of gender, the
data are slightly skewed with females accounting for more than half (59%) of the respondents. The average age is 48.9 years,
varying between 18 and 97 years. Almost 27% have a university degree or more, but more than 50% have at most a high
school certificate. More than 61% of the respondents are from Australian capitals with more than 58% of them residing in
New South Wales or Victoria. Almost 40% have a father or mother born overseas, or both.

6
As determined by answers to the question: ‘which cultural or ethnic groups do you believe do NOT fit into Australian society?’
A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191 183

By Perpetrators By Targets

DV IV DV
Model A Model B

Nominated Self-Reported
Racist Attitudes Out-Groups EOD

Perpetrators Targets

Fig. 1. A two-stage estimation strategy for the association between racist attitudes and self-reported EOD (DV: dependent variable; IV: independent
variable; Model A: X; Model B: Y.).

Table 3
Descriptive statistics of the respondents in 2001–8 CRP datasets.

Variable Percent
a
Age in years (mean, n = 10,880) 50.3
Gender (female) 59.0
Highest education (n = 12,435)
University degree or higher 27.6
Other tertiary qualifications 8.6
Trade or TAFE qualifications 12.0
Higher school certificate or equivalent 20.4
School certificate or equivalent 23.6
No formal qualifications 7.8
Region (Capital city residency) 61.4
State
Australian capital territory 3.1
New South Wales 26.3
Queensland 14.7
Northern territory 2.4
Perth 6.8
South Australia 11.9
Victoria 32.1
Tasmania 2.8
Father’s Ancestry not Australianb 42.3
Mother’s Ancestry not Australianb 40.4
Observations(n) 12,512
a
Age details for 1516 respondents not given, the rest are missing values. Mean value is
weighted.
b
Ancestry questions were not asked to NSW and OLD respondents.

3.2. Correlation results

Table 4 below reports the degree of association between out-group identification and self-reported EOD based on estima-
tion strategy explained in Section 2.2. The setting-specific correlation between exposure and racist attitudes (out-group
specific racist attitudes) ranges between 0.13 and 0.20 (p < 0.05). The strength of the correlation is higher for the aggregate
EOD variable, r = 0.19 (p < 0.05). This indicates that there is some association between the membership of a person in an
‘out-group’ (as nominated by racist respondents) and the self-reporting of EOD. However, this is a crude estimate because
the method used involved several steps in deriving the individual level variable of the anti-out-group attitude. As such,
we explore a more sophisticated approach using our two-stage in the next sub-section (Section 3.3).

3.3. Multivariate analysis

3.3.1. Ordered logistic regression results


Multivariate analyses of the relationship between self-reported EOD and racist attitudes, controlling for other character-
istics are shown in Table 5. First, we specified a set of ordered logistic models by successively increasing the number of
184 A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191

Table 4
Correlation between Racist Attitudes and Self-reported EOD.

Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Out-group specific racist attitudes 1
EOD (Aggregate) 0.19* 1
EOD (Workplace) 0.14* 0.69* 1
EOD (education) 0.13* 0.66* 0.38* 1
EOD (real estate) 0.17* 0.47* 0.40* 0.38* 1
EOD (policing) 0.14* 0.46* 0.38* 0.37* 0.46* 1
EOD (shops/restaurant) 0.20* 0.60* 0.41* 0.40* 0.46* 0.41* 1
EOD (sporting events) 0.16* 0.61* 0.46* 0.39* 0.44* 0.44* 0.47* 1

Note: the coefficients are computed for a sample size of n = 2627.


*
Significance level: <.05.

covariates to capture the association between self-reported EOD and racist attitudes. Our first model begins with just one
attitude variable. In the second and third models, demographic characteristics (age, gender and educational attainment)
and region/state dummy variables (to control for geographic variation in the sample) are included. Finally, the fourth model
is estimated by including ancestry variables (respondent birth country/region as well as father’s and mother’s ancestry). We
follow this procedure for each of the nine attitude variables, amassing a total of 36 regression models. The results are
reported in Table 5 which presents odds ratios comparing the likelihood of observing each category of the response variable
(EOD) given different explanatory variables in each model. For simplicity, we have collapsed the 5-item Likert scale response
options of the racist attitudes (i.e., the independent variable) into two where ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘disagree’ are coded as
‘disagree’, while ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ are coded as ‘agree’. We have excluded ‘neither agree nor disagree’ responses,
ranging between 4% and 15% across the nine variables. In only one variable (‘sense of insecurity when among ethnic others’)
do these ‘neutral’ responses (10.5%) exceed the ‘racist’ responses (9.2%).
The results in Table 5 indicate that nearly all the models we estimated are statistically significant. Only four regression
models generate non-significant results. However, once we include more control variables, even these become statistically
significant. The last two columns (column ‘3’ and ‘4’) suggest that including the geographic and ancestry controls improves
the estimation significantly as can be seen from the large increase in F-statistics, in moving from model ‘2’ to model ‘3’. The
‘state’ dummy variable is statistically insignificant and is therefore dropped in the fourth model.
The odds ratios7 indicate mixed evidence in predicting the effect of racist attitudes on self-reported EOD. There is significant
variation in the responses to different questions. This can be due to the wording of the survey questions where some of the
questions are more direct (e.g. ‘you are prejudiced’) while others are not (e.g. ‘Australia is weakened by ethnic diversity’). Thus,
those holding racist views may respond differently when exposed to direct questions than when asked more subtle questions.
Five out of the nine attitude variables strongly predict self-reported EOD. We found mixed evidence for ‘anti-cross-marriage’
attitudes and ‘non-acknowledgement of racism in Australia’ with the multivariate models (models 3 and 4) showing statistically
significant results while the simple model has non-significant results. ‘Non-acknowledgement of racism’ is also non-significant
in model 2. The results for ‘denial of Anglo-privilege’ and ‘belief in racial categories’ indicate that these variables are unrelated to
EOD.
From Table 1, we see that 12.2% and 11.2% of the respondents acknowledge their opposition to inter-racial marriage and
self-declare racial prejudice, respectively. These attitudes are positively associated with self-reported EOD (Table 5). The
odds ratios for the variable ‘prejudiced against other cultures’ range between 1.80 (95% CI: 1.55, 2.11) and 1.84 (95% CI:
1.60, 2.12), and for ‘anti-cross-marriage’ sentiments from 1.09 (95% CI: 0.92, 1.29) to 1.25 (95% CI: 1.05, 1.49), indicating
positive relationships. Racial supremacism, the other ‘old racism’ attitude (against racial equality), tested in the survey is
positively and significantly associated with self-reported EOD in all four models, 1.45 (95% CI: 1.26, 1.67) to 1.54 (95% CI:
1.33, 1.76). Among the CRP respondents, more prejudice against minorities and old racism attitudes are associated with
an increased self-reported EOD (and vice versa).
The new racism attitudes against diversity are positively associated with EOD. The estimated odds ratios for model 1
ranges between 1.42 for ‘anti-diversity attitudes’ (95% CI: 1.14–1.77) and 1.98 for ‘sense of insecurity when among other
ethnic groups’ (95% CI: 1.66–2.35). The assimilationist belief that Australia is weakened by ethnic diversity is positively asso-
ciated with self-reported EOD. This indicates that poor dispositions towards ‘diversity’ and towards ‘living among diverse
culture with fairness’ are associated with worse cross-cultural relations (in the form of EOD on the basis of ethnic
background).
The covariate ‘non-acknowledgement of racism in Australia’ is statistically significant for models 3 and 4, with the
expected negative sign. The trend indicates that reduced acknowledgement of racism in Australia is associated with
increased self-reporting of racial discrimination. Non-acknowledgment of racism has been described elsewhere as denial
of racism, and it makes sense that non-acknowledgment could be associated with higher prevalence of racism. If acceptance

7
The standard interpretation of odds ratios is that values above ‘1’ indicate positive association, while values below ‘1’ show negative association between
the dependent and independent variables. A value equal to ‘1’ indicates no negative or positive association between the variables.
A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191 185

Table 5
Odds ratio from ordered logistic regression models: Association between self-reported EOD and racist attitudes in the 2001–8 CRP datasets (Dependent
variable: self-reported EOD).

Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4


(df = 1) (df = 11) (df = 35) (df = 28)
Old racism
Anti-cross-marriage 1.085 (0.92, 1.29) 1.231*** (1.05, 1.44) 1.249** (1.05, 1.49) 1.167* (0.99, 1.38)
[0.94]a [7.17] [13.05] [11.63]
Against racial equality 1.451*** (1.26, 1.67) 1.494*** (1.30, 1.72) 1.549*** (1.34, 1.79) 1.542*** (1.33, 1.76)
[28.62] [9.75] [18.19] [13.57]
Belief in racial categories 0.892 (0.77, 1.03) 0.894 (0.77, 1.03) 0.977 (0.85, 1.13) 0.949 (0.83, 1.09)
[2.5]a [8.57] [12.73] [12.07]
Prejudiced against other cultures 1.822*** (1.57, 2.11) 1.801*** (1.55, 2.09) 1.827*** (1.58, 2.11) 1.843*** (1.60, 2.12)
[66.52] [12.59] [18.54] [15.47]
New racism: pro-assimilation
Anti-diversity attitudes 1.423*** (1.14, 1.77) 1.529*** (1.22, 1.92) 1.712*** (1.36, 2.15) 1.632*** (1.30, 2.05)
[10.25] [7.547] [16.97] [13.60]
Sense of insecurity among other ethnic groups 1.973*** (1.66, 2.35) 2.100*** (1.75, 2.52) 2.032*** (1.71, 2.42) 2.063*** (1.73, 2.46)
[60.44] [12.49] [15.25] [14.95]
Australia weakened by ethnic diversity 1.197*** (1.07, 1.34) 1.285*** (1.14, 1.45) 1.364*** (1.21, 1.53) 1.318*** (1.17, 1.48)
[10.08] [7.60] [12.91] [11.81]
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Independent variables (df = 1) (df = 11) (df = 35) (df = 28)
New racism: denial
Non-acknowledgement of racism in Australia 0.868 (0.72, 1.04) 0.922 (0.77, 1.11) 0.722*** (0.60, 0.88) 0.707*** (0.58, 0.86)
[2.36]a [7.21] [12.56] [11.73]
Denial of Anglo-privilege 1.006 (0.92, 1.10) 1.003 (0.92, 1.10) 1.027 (0.94, 1.13) 1.027 (0.94, 1.13)
[0.02]a [7.13] [12.78] [11.64]
Observations 12,505 12,389 12,088 12,088
Control variables
Age in years No Yes Yes Yes
Gender (Ref: Male) No Yes Yes Yes
Highest education attained No Yes Yes Yes
Region (Capital city/Rest of Australia) No No Yes Yes
State No No Yes No
Region of birth No No No Yes
Father’s ancestry not Australian No No No Yes
Mother’s ancestry not Australian No No No Yes

Notes: This Table reports odds ratio from 36 ordered logistic regressions with each cell reporting the results of a separately estimated model given the
independent variable of interest indicated. Across the board, the dependent variable is the response variable self-reported EOD which has ordinal outcomes
ranging from ‘Never’ to ‘Very often’. Based on this, Model 1 is estimated with a single independent variable (reported in the first column of the first nine
rows). Model 2 includes as control variables ‘Age’, ‘Gender’ and ‘Education’. Model 3 adds additional residential controls: ‘Region’ and ‘State’. Finally, Model
4 further adds ancestral origin variables: ‘region of birth’, ‘Father’s ancestry’ and ‘Mother’s ancestry’. Estimations are adjusted for population weights. The
first number in each cell is odds ratio and numbers in round brackets are 95% Confidence Intervals. F-statistics are reported in squared brackets and are
statistically significant at the conventional levels unless indicated otherwise.
Significance levels: * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.
a
Model 1 is not statistically significant at the conventional levels when estimated with ‘Denial of Racism in Australia’, ‘Anti-cross-marriage Sentiments’
or ‘’Denial of Anglo Privilege’ as the only independent variable.

is a first step towards addressing the issue, then denial fundamentally undermines remediation of racism and allows it to
flourish without check. Dunn and Nelson (2011) also found that Australians with a langauge background other than English,
and those who were born overseas, are less likely to acknowledge racism as a problem in Australia, even though they are the
groups more likely to report experiences of racism. This trend would align with the negative association outlined above,
though not always significant. Finally, odds ratios for the ‘denial of Anglo-privilege’ covariate are non-significant suggesting
no association with self-reported EOD.
Anti-diversity dispositions are clearly linked within this sample to EOD, as is the belief in racial supremacy (i.e., against
racial equality and self-declared prejudice). These analyses, therefore, indicate that both old and new racist beliefs can influ-
ence the reported EOD. The same is true to some extent for anti-cross-racial marriage and non-acknowledgement of racism.
However, the effects of belief in racial categories and denial of Anglo privilege did not have clear trends.
So far our interpretation has been based on models directly estimated from the CRP data. All estimations involved the
whole sample excluding missing values (the sample sizes vary between n = 12,088 and n = 12,505). But due to the nature
of the individual level data, we did not clearly separate the perpetrators and targets of discrimination. Thus, the findings
are showing crude association in that the racist attitudes in these models do not necessarily reflect only those of perpetra-
tors. Similarly, as mentioned in Section 2 above, the EOD does not necessarily show only those of groups we normally con-
sider targets (i.e., minorities). In the former case, minority groups can have racist attitudes (Sawrikar and Katz, 2010) while in
the latter case, the majority group can, in limited contexts, be targets of racism as well as more generally feel disenfranchised
and claim ‘reverse discrimination’ (Norton, 2011).
186 A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191

3.3.1.1. Stage 1 results. The results for the first stage of our estimation are reported in Table 6. As stated in Section 2, we
restricted the sample to respondents born in Australia to proxy for perpetration of racist attitudes by the majority group.
All of the nine models include six demographic and human capital control variables (age, gender, education, region, state
and region of birth) as well as the out-group variables of interest together with the nine racist attitudes as dependent vari-
ables. Estimates for the demographic and human capital variables have mixed results in terms of statistical significance, but
for brevity, we only report estimates for the nominated out-group. Each column reports one of the nine attitude items in the
CRP dataset as a dependent variable. In these results, Asians (in general), North East Asians, South East Asians, Middle
Easterners and Muslims are consistently nominated as out-groups by Australian-born respondents who have old-fashioned
racism expressed in ‘anti-cross-racial marriage’ and ‘anti-racial equality’ attitudes, and ‘self-declared prejudice towards
other cultures’ (columns 1, 2 and 4 respectively) as well as by those respondents with new racism beliefs such as ‘anti-
diversity attitudes’ and ‘sense of insecurity among other ethnic groups’ (columns 5 and 6 respectively). Odds ratios for these
results range between 1.24 (95% CI: 0.97, 1.58) and 2.90 (95% CI: 1.44, 3.82). South East Asians, however, are not nominated
by those with self-declared prejudice and anti-racial equality attitudes. Three groups, South East Asians, South Asians and
Muslims are nominated by those who are against inter-racial marriage (odds ratio between 1.42, 95% CI: 0.99, 2.04 and
1.67, 95% CI: 1.15, 2.43 for the Asian groups). Asians and Africans in general are also nominated by those with the old
racist belief in ‘racial categories’, with odds ratios of 2.29 (95% CI: 1.43, 3.66) and 1.53 (95% CI: 1.21, 1.94), respectively. South
Asians as a nominated out-group in this model are associated with sentiments against racial equality (OR: 1.50, 95% CI: 0.95,
2.38) and against inter-racial marriage (OR: 1.67, 95% CI: 1.15, 2.43). The racist attitude variable that has the strongest
association with the out-group nomination variable is ‘anti-racial equality’ with statistically significant estimates for six
groups (North East Asians, South Asians, Asians, Balkans, Indigenous Australians and Muslims). Those who are more
consistently nominated as an out group are Muslims, nominated by those who hold seven out of the nine measured racist
attitudes.
The results in column 8 suggest that the ‘non-acknowledgement (denial) of racism’ variable in the CRP data fails to predict
the association between racist attitude and nomination of minorities as out-groups. This finding for the denial of racism is
inconsistent with that of Table 5. From Table 1, we see that only 7.7% deny that there is racism in Australia with denial pre-
dicting decreased self-reported EOD in Table 5. This result is partly explained by the relevant sample size of the out-group
nominating respondents (fewer respondents who nominate out-groups deny the existence of racism in Australia compared
to the other attitude variables).8 Acknowledgment of racism is very prevalent (86%, see Table 1), and the reasons for denial are
multiple. Therefore, denial does not seem to be a consistent predictor of antagonism towards specific out-groups.
In columns 1 and 9 we observe another important finding. The nomination of Muslims, South East Asians and South
Asians as out-groups is strongly associated with having anti-cross-marriage sentiments as column 1 shows, odds ratios rang-
ing between 1.42 (95% CI: 0.99, 2.04) and 1.67 (95% CI: 1.15, 2.43). However, the nomination of South Europeans is negatively
associated with opposition to inter-racial marriage (OR: 0.35, 95% CI: 0.16, 0.81). According to column 9, nominating people
from the Balkans, the Rest of Africa (non-East Africans) and Muslims as out-groups is strongly related to denial of Anglo-priv-
ilege (odds ratios between 1.16, 95% CI: 0.98, 1.38 and 2.42, 95% CI: 1.06, 5.55). It seems likely that antipathy towards people
with ancestry from the Balkans would principally be a disposition of Australians with a European heritage, and so it makes
sense that they (Europeans) would be less likely to acknowledge cultural privilege in Australia. Anti-Muslim prejudice would
be expected as part of post-9-11 Isalmophobia. However, Anglo Australians would be less likely to acknowledge it as having
association with their privilege. Similarly, while antipathy towards the other Rest of Africa category would be expected with
race more salient among Africans than the other minority groups, Anglo-Australians with racial disposition against Africans
would be less likely to acknowledge their cultural privilege. Another important observation is that those who believe that
Australia is weakened by diversity are more likely to nominate Asians, Middle Easterners and Muslims as out-groups. Finally,
while nominating Indigenous Australians as out-groups is associated with ‘self-declared prejudice’ (OR: 2.03, 95% CI: 1.25,
3.30) and having ‘anti-racial equality attitudes’ (OR: 1.57, 95% CI: 0.98, 2.51), nominating Africans as out-groups is strongly
associated with ‘believing in racial categories’ (OR: 1.53, 95% CI: 1.21, 1.94).
We re-calculated the racist attitudes analysis by including the neutral response categories from each attitude variable.
The results for most of the variables are similar to the findings above. For some nominated out-group categories, scores
are lower than the corresponding values reported in Table 6 (e.g. estimates for those with ‘anti-diversity attitudes’ and nom-
inating South and North East Asians, Asians and Muslims). This indicates that the effect of racist attitudes is more evident
when racial neutrality is excluded from the overall sample. Only in a few cases are the results divergent (e.g. for Balkans
and the Rest of Africans the scores become higher than in Table 6).
Our results indicate that anti-Asian sentiment is associated with new racism (i.e. beliefs against diversity) although the
denial discourses conceptually attached to new racism are not associated with anti-Asian views. Old racist beliefs in racial
categories and against racial equality are also associated with anti-Asian attitudes. Asian-Australians is a set of groups for
whom there has been extreme racialisation in Australia since the 19th Century (Kamp, 2010), and this was notably enlivened
during the so-called race debates following the election wins of the One Nation Party from the mid to late 1990s (Davis and

8
Percentage of the relevant sample (out-group nominating respondents with racist attitudes) for each attitude variable is: ‘denial of racism’ = 8.6%, ‘anti-
diversity attitude’ = 15.9%, ‘sense of insecurity’ = 12.5%, ‘self-declared prejudice’ = 20.6, ‘anti-cross-marriage’ = 17.1%, ‘British privileges’ = 43.1%, ‘Australia
weakened by diversity’ = 24.5%, ‘anti-equality sentiment’ = 17.6%, ‘belief in racial categories’ = 10.2%. This indicates that ‘denial of racism’ is not as strongly
associated with out-group nomination as it is for other attitudes.
Table 6
Odds ratio from logistic regression models: Association between out-group nomination and expressions of racist attitudes in the 2001–8 CRP datasets.

Variables Old racism New racism: pro-assimilation New racism: denial


(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Anti-cross- Against racial Belief in racial Prejudiced against other cultures Anti-diversity Sense of insecurity among Diversity Non-acknowledgement Denial of
marriage equality categories attitudes other ethnic groups weakens of racism in Australia Anglo Privilege
Australia
South East Asians 1.422* 1.746** 1.447* 1.443**
(0.99–2.04) (1.14–2.67) (0.97–2.17) (1.05–1.98)
North East Asians 1.832*** 2.104*** 2.148*** 1.904***
(1.17–2.88) (1.31–3.37) (1.29–3.57) (1.26–2.89)
South Asians 1.670*** 1.502*
(1.15–2.43) (0.95–2.38)

A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191


Asians 1.608** 2.286*** 2.454*** 1.893*** 1.973*** 1.666***
(1.09–2.37) (1.43–3.66) (1.78–3.38) (1.27–2.8) (1.36–2.86) (1.25–2.22)
North Europeans 0.354*
(0.11–1.18)
South Europeans 0.354**
(0.16–0.81)
Balkans 2.897*** 1.940*
(1.44–5.82) (0.987–3.81)
Middle Easterners 1.286* 1.431** 1.442*** 1.366***
(0.99–1.67) (1.09–1.88) (1.13–1.85) (1.12–1.67)
Africans 1.530***
(1.21–1.94)
Pacific Islanders
Indigenous Australians 1.572* 2.031*** 0.615**
(0.983–2.51) (1.25–3.30) (0.398–0.95)
Muslims 1.642*** 1.300*** 1.459*** 1.599*** 1.236* 1.819*** 1.159*
(1.29–2.09) (1.07–1.57) (1.16–1.83) (1.20–2.13) (0.97–1.58) (1.56–2.13) (0.98–1.38)
Foreigners 0.553* 0.587** 0.810*
(0.28–1.09) (0.38–0.92) (0.63–1.04)
East Africans 0.418**
(0.18–0.96)
Rest of Africans 2.419**
(1.06–5.55)
Observations 9057 9057 9057 9057 9057 9057 9057 9057 9,057
F-Statistics 12.75 8.687 4.687 10.86 21.66 17.44 29.41 6.132 3.206
Degrees of Freedom 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 18
P-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001

Note: This table reports the nomination of minorities as out-groups by Australian-born respondents who have racist attitudes. Targets are nominated as out-groups if the respondent answers ‘yes’ to the question
asking: ‘Do you believe that there are any cultural or ethnic groups that do NOT fit into Australian society.’ Column headings are the dependent variables in the respective model. For brevity only values that are
statistically significant are reported. For each cultural groups nominated as out-groups odds ratios are reported and numbers in parenthesis are 95% confidence intervals. All models were estimated by including
age, gender, education, region and state as control variables. Three groups in the models, namely, ‘Jews’, ‘East Africans’ and ‘Extremists’ are not shown because they have statistically non-significant results. The
sample size is restricted to Australian-born respondents and results are corrected for population weights.
Significance levels: * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.

187
188 A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191

Stimson, 1998). Antipathy towards European groups is only focused against those with Balkan heritage and the only statis-
tical trend is that it is associated with denial of Anglo-privilege and anti-racial equality attitudes. Middle-Easterner ‘out-
status’ is associated with new racism and this accords with research that links anti-Middle Easterner attitudes with narrow
constructions of national identity and citizenship (Dunn et al., 2007; Morgan and Poynting, 2012). Negative views on the
extent to which Muslims fit-in in Australia, as the most prevalent of the out-group dispositions (Dunn et al., 2004), is asso-
ciated with all racist attitudes with the exception of ‘denial of racism’ and ‘belief in racial categories’. Antipathy towards
Indigenous Australians is associated with old racist attitudes such as a belief in racial supremacy (against racial equality).
Anti-Indigenous sentiment is also associated with self-declared prejudice. In a separate analysis, not reported in this paper,
we tracked the relation between self-declared prejudice and antipathy towards racialised groups (Asian-, African-, Indige-
nous- and Jewish-Australian).9 Antipathy towards Jewish-, Indigenous-, and Asian-Australians is associated with this
self-declarative judgment of prejudice. The results for the Jewish, East African, Rest of African and Latin American categories,
however, are not conclusive due to small sample sizes.

3.3.1.2. Stage 2 results. At this stage we utilise the results in Table 6 as a basis for creating a categorical variable representing
the out-groups nominated by those CRP survey participants reporting racist attitudes. The groups thus nominated according
to Table 6 are Muslims, Middle Easterners, South East Asians, North East Asians, and Asians in general. These are groups for
which there is strong association between their nomination as out-groups and the expressions of racist attitudes. Other
groups with significant results are people from the Balkans, South Asians and Indigenous Australians each of which is nom-
inated as an out-group by those with racist attitudes expressed in responses to exactly two items (these items vary for each
group). East Africans and the Rest of Africa are nominated by those who believe in racial categories and by those who deny
Anglo-privilege, respectively. We proxy these targets by their region of birth, thereby, creating dummy variables to identify
them as targets of racial discrimination in the regression models. Although Muslims are one of the most likely groups to be
targets of racist attitudes (see Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC), 2004), we could not analyse their
self-reported EOD because the CRP data does not have the participant’s ‘religion’ as a variable. We also regroup the Balkans
category into South Europeans (based on United Nations, 2012). The results are reported in Tables 7 and 8.
The results in Table 7 are in line with our expectation. Overall, the model is statistically significant: F(17, 12,051) = 30.19,
p < .001. All coefficient estimates for the categorical variable ‘nominated out-groups’ are statistically significant, except
North Americans.10 For the Eastern European category the estimates are marginally significant at the 10% level. Generally,
our hypothesis that there is an association between self-reported EOD by targets and the racist attitudes of perpetrators is sup-
ported. Those targets nominated by CRP participants as out-groups are more likely to report EOD. The reference group for racist
attitudes in this analysis are Australian-born respondents.
Our estimation involved grouping the targets into 15 categories and mapping the racist expressions observed in Table 6,
with three groups excluded from this analysis due to small sample size. Out of the 12 minority groups, ‘Indigenous Austra-
lians’ scored the highest probability of reporting EOD (OR: 3.95, 95% CI: 2.82–5.53) followed by South East Asians (OR: 3.17,
95% CI: 2.38–4.23) and South Asians (OR: 2.8, 95% CI: 1.93–4.07). The next groups with more likelihood of reporting EOD are
North East Asians (OR: 2.87 95% CI: 1.98–4.15). These results suggest that self-reported EOD is more prevalent among Indig-
enous Australians and Asians in general than among other minority groups. Middle Easterners (OR: 2.59, 95% CI: 1.42–4.51)
and Pacific Islanders (OR: 1.95, 95% CI: 1.39–2.75) are also more likely to report discrimination than Australian-born respon-
dents. Although slightly less likely than these groups Western Europeans and Africans are also more likely to report EOD
than Australian-born respondents (odds ratio between 1.82 and 1.91). The rest of the minority groups are considerably less
likely to report discrimination than the above groups, although more likely than Australian-born respondents.
Another observation from Table 7 is that non-English language spoken at home is associated with increased reporting of
EOD (OR: 2.1, 95% CI: 1.71–2.59). In addition, gender (being male) and age are negatively associated with reported EOD
although the magnitude of this association with age is small (OR: 0.99). There is a growing body of evidence supporting some
form of association between socio-demographics and self-reported EOD (Kessler et al., 1999; Paradies, 2006; Perez et al.,
2008; Lewis et al., 2012). Males are more likely to self-report EOD than females (Sellers and Shelton, 2003; Broman et al.,
2000), however, this association is not supported by our findings from the CRP datasets. On the other hand, we find that
higher level of education is significantly associated with fewer self-reported EOD although the magnitude of the association
is negligible (OR: 0.99, 95% CI: 0.99–1.00). Region of residence is another covariate with no association in the EOD model.
Table 8 combines the targets and reports a single coefficient by creating a dummy variable which takes a value of ‘1’ if the
group is nominated as an out-group by those with racist attitudes and ‘0’ otherwise. The result is similar to Table 7, with this
variable predicting the likelihood of self-reported EOD with an odds ratio of 2.18 (95% CI: 1.85–2.57). However, in Table 8, we
report that the negative effect of gender on self-reported EOD is statistically significant with OR: 0.68 (95% CI: 0.58–0.79). Sim-
ilarly, the data confirm that non-English spoken at home is strongly associated with increased self-reported EOD. Although the
coefficient for age is statistically significant, both age and education are negligible in terms of coefficient magnitude.
Generally, Tables 6–8 support our hypothesis. There are strong positive associations between the expressions of racist
attitudes, in the form of nominating out-groups, and self-reported EOD. Our results go one further step than the experimen-
tal research on the relationship between attitudes and behaviours (Dovidio et al., 1996, 2002; Gaertner et al., 2005;

9
All alternative estimations and findings not reported in this paper can be made available upon request from the authors.
10
Nominated out-groups: refers to ‘groups nominated by those expressing racist attitudes as out-groups.’
A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191 189

Table 7
Odds ratio from ordered logistic regression models: self-reported EOD by targets nominated as out-groups in the 2001–8 CRP data.

Variables Coefficients Standard Errors Odds Ratios 95% Confidence Interval


Targets of racist attitudes
(Ref: non-Indigenous Australians)
Indigenous Australians 1.374*** (0.169) 3.950 (2.819–5.534)
North Europeans 0.304*** (0.0879) 1.356 (1.137–1.616)
Western Europeans 0.649*** (0.155) 1.913 (1.402–2.610)
Eastern Europeans 0.491* (0.288) 1.634 (0.919–2.907)
South Europeans 0.553*** (0.168) 1.738 (1.241–2.435)
Middle Easterners 0.928*** (0.289) 2.529 (1.419–4.505)
North Americans 0.281 (0.246) 1.324 (0.809–2.165)
Pacific Islanders 0.670*** (0.171) 1.953 (1.389–2.748)
Africans 0.600** (0.247) 1.822 (1.111–2.989)
South Asians 1.030*** (0.187) 2.801 (1.926–4.072)
North East Asians 1.053*** (0.185) 2.866 (1.981–4.146)
South East Asians 1.155*** (0.144) 3.173 (2.379–4.232)
Control variables
Age in years $0.008*** (0.00183) 0.992 (0.989–0.996)
Gender (Ref: Male) $0.397*** (0.0784) 0.673 (0.575–0.787)
Highest education attained $0.013** (0.00603) 0.988 (0.976–1.000)
Region (Capital City/Rest of Australia) 0.059 (0.0691) 1.061 (0.924–1.219)
Non English Spoken at Home 0.745*** (0.103) 2.106 (1.713–2.589)
Observations 12,051
F-statistic 30.19
Degrees of Freedom 17
p-Value 0

Note: The dependent variable is self-reported EOD. Cut-points are not shown. Coefficients are logit estimates (exp(b)/1 + exp(b)) and they are exponentiated
by exp(b) to give their corresponding odds ratios (Column 4). In addition to variables included in previous Tables, ‘Non-English’ language spoken at home is
included to control for its impact on the dependent variable.
Significance levels: * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.

Table 8
Odds ratio from ordered logistic regression models: self-reported EOD by targets nominated as out-groups in the 2001–8 CRP data (all targets combined
together).

Variables Coefficients Standard Errors Odds Ratios 95% Confidence Interval


Targets of racist attitudes 0.779 ***
(0.083) 2.179 (0.846–2.573)
Age in years $0.008*** (0.002) 0.992 (0.988–0.996)
Gender (Ref: Male) $0.394*** (0.080) 0.675 (0.575–0.791)
Highest education attained $0.011* (0.006) 0.989 (0.977–1.000)
Region (Capital City/Rest of Australia) 0.0389 (0.072) 1.040 (0.900–1.201)
Non english spoken at home 0.899*** (0.082) 2.458 (2.085–2.898)
Observations 12,348
F-statistic 78.61
Degrees of Freedom 6
p-Value 0

Note: This Table is estimated by grouping the targets, creating a dummy variable which takes ‘1’ if the group is identified as out-group and targeted by racist
attitudes and ‘0’ otherwise. The dependent variable is self-reported EOD.
Significance levels: * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.

McConahay, 1983). We have demonstrated a within sample relationship between racist attitudes towards out-groups and
reported EOD among these groups. Racist attitudes are linked with EOD by those nominated as out-groups. Our findings also
suggest that negative attitudes towards certain groups are associated with particular racist beliefs. For example, antipathy
towards Asians is linked with both new racist dispositions against diversity and with old racist notions of racial supremacy
(Table 6). Those who see Asians as not fitting in in Australia are more likely to self-declare as racists, aligning with old racist
beliefs. There is a strong within-sample correspondence between a stance against racial equality among majority group
members and reports of discrimination by minority group members (Table 5). This is also the case for majority group mem-
bers who are against or are insecure about ethnic diversity. Not surprisingly, antipathy towards Asians is strongly associated
with higher reported EOD by Australians born in Asia (Table 7).

4. Conclusion

Racist attitudes are related to racist behaviours among perpetrators that are, in turn, related to experiences of racial dis-
crimination among targets. In this study, we were able to measure the association between racist attitudes and self-reported
EOD utilising data from the Australian Challenging Racism Project survey. As an initial step, we averaged racist attitudes
against nominated out-groups and found a modest overall correlation with reported EOD (r = 0.19, p < 0.05). This relatively
190 A.E. Habtegiorgis et al. / Social Science Research 47 (2014) 178–191

small correlation represents an initial crude estimate which does not differentiate between perpetrators and targets of
racism. In order to isolate perpetrator racist attitudes and target experiences, we constructed two sets of variables from nine
attitude and five experience questions. In the first stage of our estimation, we estimated regression models focused on
nominated out-groups, and then we estimated reported discrimination experiences in the second stage for each of these
out-groups.
Our results show that those targets identified as out-groups in the first stage of our estimation were more likely to report
having experienced discrimination. Thus we conclude that nomination of out-groups by those with racist attitudes is
strongly associated with self-reported EOD, OR = 2.2 (p < 0.01). To our knowledge, this is the first published within-sample
test that examines perpetrators of racism and targets of self-reported discrimination in predicting the link between racist
attitudes and EOD.
Our analysis did not include socio-economic variables, although region of residence (capital city vs. rest of region) and
education may proxy socio-economic status to some degree. We are aware that there is strong evidence of the influence
of socio-economic status on attitude toward out-groups (see Pedersen et al., 2000, 2004) although some studies suggest
no association between these variables (Bobo and Zubrinsky, 1996; Branton and Jones, 2005; Karlsen and Nazroo, 2002;
Romero and Roberts, 1998). In analysing self-reported EOD, our analysis did not account for the effect of social desirability
bias, or strength of social identity. There is currently mixed findings in relation to the direction of bias associated with such
potential unmeasured confounding (Gilens et al., 1998; Janus, 2010; Stocke, 2007; Tsuchiya and Hirai, 2010). More research
is needed to investigate how social desirability influences the association between perpetrator racist attitudes and target
EOD. Moreover, an ideal data to further explore this association would be one that includes more detailed categories of target
specific racial attitudes (e.g. based on national origin, ethnicity etc.).
Despite these limitations, our study contributes to the literature on racial discrimination by quantifying the association
between discrimination experiences of minorities and racist attitudes of majority groups. Our results suggest that majority
group racist attitudes, manifest as behaviours, are experienced as discriminatory acts by minority group members. Attitudes
do matter, and the variation in racist attitudes towards different out-groups has a marked effect on the prevalence of their
racist experiences. We also found that the attitudinal disposition towards groups is underpinned by varied racist beliefs. Old
racisms are a stronger factor in the antipathy towards Indigenous Australians, Asians and Africans whereas new racist beliefs
were more strongly tied to negative views about those from the Middle East as well as Muslims and Asians. This provides
some insight into how best to target anti-racism efforts in order to address the discrimination faced by specific minority
groups.

Acknowledgments

The first author is supported by an Australian Postgraduate Awards (Industry) as part of linkage Project LP100200057
funded by the Australian Research Council, Victorian Health Promotion Foundation and the Australian Human Rights
Commission.

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Journal of Counseling Psychology © 2009 American Psychological Association
2009, Vol. 56, No. 4, 585–589 0022-0167/09/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0017278

BRIEF REPORTS

Further Validation of the Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites Scale


on a Sample of University Students in the Southeastern United States

Amy Sifford, Kok-Mun Ng, and Chuang Wang


University of North Carolina at Charlotte

We examined the factor structure of the Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites Scale (PCRW;
Spanierman & Heppner, 2004) on 766 White American university students from the southeastern
United States. Results from confirmatory factor analyses supported the 3-factor model proposed by
Spanierman and Heppner (2004). The construct validity of the PCRW was further strengthened by
its convergent validity demonstrated by the associations among its subscales and White racial
identity attitudes and White privilege attitude. Our findings support the continued exploration of the
validity and reliability of the PCRW as well as its utility as a measure of White individuals’ affective
responses to racism.

Keywords: racism, privilege, scale validation, Whites

Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0017278.supp

Recent researchers have begun to discuss and investigate the PCRW


costs of racism to the White majority in the United States, though
these costs are not the same costs people of color have to deal with Based on their review of the literature regarding the psychoso-
on a daily basis (Goodman, 2001; Kivel, 1996; Spanierman & cial costs of racism to White people, Spanierman and Heppner
Heppner, 2004). On the basis of the premise that racism affects the (2004) developed the PCRW, a 16-item self-report measure, to
victims, the blatant perpetrators of racism, as well as the “silent” assess negative consequences of racism experienced by White
and “blind” White majority, Spanierman and Heppner (2004) persons. The developers used the maximum-likelihood extraction
developed the Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites Scale with an oblique rotation method to ascertain the factor structure of
(PCRW) to facilitate the investigation of the negative effects of the 36 original items. The items retained had factor loadings of .35
racism to Whites. Though a validation study of the PCRW con- or greater with no cross loadings or redundancy of items within the
ducted by Poteat and Spanierman (2008) on a sample of employed factors. The resulting 16 items accounted for approximately 49%
adults indicated support for the scale’s factor structure, items on of the variance and were primarily affective versus cognitive or
the White Guilt subscale had low reliability and indicated a need behavioral. The results indicated a three-factor structure was the
for refinement. Further studies with additional samples are needed best fit for the data.
to verify the scale’s validity and extend its utility (Poteat &
The three factors constituting the three PCRW subscales are
Spanierman, 2008; Spanierman & Heppner, 2004).
White Empathic Reactions Toward Racism (hereafter referred to
Professional standards for psychological testing further neces-
as White Empathy), White Guilt, and White Fear of Others (here-
sitate that the validation process of a measure be ongoing, with
after referred to as White Fear). They were named based on
continuing efforts to establish its usefulness for specific popula-
tions and purposes (American Educational Research Association, emotional themes of the participants’ responses to racism. The
1999). We designed the present study to further investigate the White Empathy subscale comprises six items, such as “I become
psychometric properties of the PCRW by focusing on its factorial sad when I think about acts of racial injustice.” The White Guilt
and convergent validity on a sample of White graduate and un- subscale comprises five items, such as “I never feel ashamed about
dergraduate students in the southeastern United States. being White.” The White Fear subscale comprises five items, such
as “I feel safe in most neighborhoods, regardless of the racial
composition.” In the initial exploratory and confirmatory studies,
Cronbach’s alphas for White Empathy were .78, .84, and .85.
Amy Sifford and Kok-Mun Ng, Department of Counseling, University Alphas for White Guilt were .73, .69, and .78; and those for White
of North Carolina at Charlotte; Chuang Wang, Department of Educational
Fear were .63, .95, and .81. Test–retest reliabilities for subscales
Leadership, University of North Carolina at Charlotte.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Amy
during a 2-week period ranged from .69 for White Guilt to .95 for
Sifford, Department of Counseling, University of North Carolina at Char- White Fear (Spanierman & Heppner, 2004). The three-factor struc-
lotte, 9201 University City Boulevard, Charlotte, NC 28223. E-mail: ture was recently replicated in a geographically dispersed sample
amsiffor@uncc.edu of employed White adults (Poteat & Spanierman, 2008).

585
586 BRIEF REPORTS

Evidence of construct validity of the measure was demonstrated to further examine the measure’s convergent validity by investi-
by confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and correlations with other gating its relationship with White privilege. We expected to find
measures of related constructs. CFA on another sample of college significant associations between the PCRW factors and White
students indicated support for the three-factor structure of the privilege.
measure (Spanierman & Heppner, 2004). The subscales were
found to have expected pattern of correlations with the Color-
Method
Blind Racial Attitudes Scale (Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, &
Browne, 2000), the Scale of Ethnocultural Empathy (Wang et al., Procedure and Participants
2003), the Quick Discrimination Index (Ponterotto, Potere, &
Johansen, 2002), and the Oklahoma Racial Attitudes Scale We developed an online survey for this validation study. An
(LaFleur, Leach, & Rowe, 2002). Additionally, the measure was invitation to participate in the survey was sent electronically to
found to not be associated with socially desirable responding and students currently enrolled in a university in the southeastern
not be related to the general negative affectivity of the participants United States with a student body of about 20,000 at the time of the
(Spanierman & Heppner, 2004). survey. No incentives were offered for participation. We received
Participants in the initial studies (Spanierman & Heppner, 2004) 1,144 completed surveys. In addition to the survey items, the
were White undergraduate psychology and education majors from participants also completed demographic items. Participants who
a midsized midwestern university. Women scored higher on all self-identified as White (n ⫽ 788) were directed to complete the
PCRW factors than did men, and their White Empathy scores were PCRW, the WRIAS, and the White Privilege Scale (WPS; Swim &
statistically significantly higher than were those of the men. Par- Miller, 1999). Participants who identified as non-White were di-
ticipants with higher levels of exposure scored significantly lower rected to complete a measure of ethnic identity development and
on White Fear than did those reporting moderate or low levels of the WPS. The present study focused on White participants’ re-
exposure to other races. Participants reporting that 75%–100% of sponses.
their friends were White had higher White Fear scores than did We omitted data from 22 participants because of excessive
those reporting lower percentages. Participants with high and missing data, resulting in a usable sample of 766 (328 men, 435
moderate amounts of multicultural education had significantly women, and 1 participant who did not report gender). For the
lower scores on White Fear than did those with no or very little purposes of CFA, we randomly selected approximately 50% (n ⫽
multicultural education. 395) of the participants and reserved the remaining participant data
The utility of the PCRW was demonstrated in a recent study by (n ⫽ 371) for a cross-validation analysis. Chi-square tests did not
Spanierman, Poteat, Wang, and Oh (2008) indicating that, as a show any statistically significant differences between the two
measure of affective responses to racism, the PCRW subscales samples with regard to participants’ gender, ␹2(1) ⫽ 3.13; age,
predicted White applied psychology trainees’ multicultural coun- ␹2(2) ⫽ 2.15; grade level, ␹2(2) ⫽ 1.25; and political affiliation,
seling competencies (MCC). Specifically, Spanierman et al. found ␹2(1) ⫽ 4.49. Detailed demographic characteristics of the sample
that White Empathy, White Guilt, and White Fear predicted the are presented as an online supplement.
knowledge component of self-reported MCC, White Guilt pre-
dicted demonstrated MCC, and White Empathy predicted observed
Materials
MCC.
PCRW. The PCRW is a 16-item self-report measure that as-
The Present Study sesses individuals’ affective responses to racism. It allows for
responses to range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
We designed the present study to examine the factorial and The scale consists of three subscales: White Empathy, White Guilt,
convergent validity of the PCRW on a sample different from the and White Fear. Details of the scale were discussed earlier. The
original college sample used for scale development. On the basis alphas for the three PCRW subscales in the present study were .84
of existing findings (Spanierman & Heppner, 2004; Poteat & (White Empathy), .75 (White Guilt), and .79 (White Fear), indi-
Spanierman, 2008), we expected to replicate the scale’s three- cating satisfactory levels of internal consistency.
factor structure in the study sample. If the factor structure were WRIAS. Helms (1984, 1995) developed a White racial identity
replicated, we would proceed to examine its convergent validity development model that posits that White individuals respond to
with conceptually related constructs. racial issues through one of six statuses. The model theorizes that
Following Spanierman and Heppner’s (2004) recommendation White individuals who experience emotions such as shame and
to research the scale’s convergent validity with conceptually re- guilt when confronted with racism are moving forward to the next
lated constructs like White racial identity, we selected the White status of racial development. The first three statuses (contact,
Racial Identity Attitude Scale (WRIAS; Helms, 1995; Helms & disintegration, and reintegration) describe the progression away
Carter, 1990), a commonly used measure in the literature, to assess from a racist frame of reference before entering the next three
the PCRW’s convergent validity. Because the WRIAS examines statuses (pseudoindependence, immersion– emersion, and auton-
the relationships between racism and privilege and affective re- omy) where progression toward a nondefensive and nonracist
sponses such as guilt and fear that mitigate racial identity devel- White identity occurs.
opment (Helms, 1995), we expected to find significant associa- Based on the model, the WRIAS, a six-factor 60-item inventory,
tions among the PCRW factors and the WRIAS subscales. was developed (Helms, 1995). Initial studies (e.g., Helms &
White privilege attitude has been shown to be associated with Carter, 1990) utilizing the WRIAS reported alphas of .55 for the
racism (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Schiffhauer, 2007). We decided contact status, .77 for the disintegration status, .80 for the reinte-
BRIEF REPORTS 587

gration status, .71 for the pseudoindependence status, .82 for the Table 1
immersion– emersion status, and .70 for the autonomy status. Al- Factor Analysis: Goodness-of-Fit Summary
phas for the present study were .65 for contact, .66 for disintegra-
tion, .87 for reintegration, .58 for pseudoindependence, .81 for Study sample Cross-validation sample
Index (n ⫽ 395) (n ⫽ 371)
immersion– emersion, and .51 for autonomy.
The reliability coefficients for four of the WRIAS statuses were CFI .96 .95
unacceptably low in the study sample (i.e., ⬍.70). Other studies NNFI .95 .95
had also reported similar low reliability coefficients for these NFI .94 .93
SRMR .07 .07
statuses (Behren, 1997; Ottavi, Pope-Davis, & Dings, 1994). Con-
RMSEA .07 .07
sequently, we used only the reintegration status and the 90% confidence interval
immersion– emersion status to access the convergent validity of of RMSEA [.06, .08] [.06, .08]
the PCRW in this study. ␹2 299.09 273.81
WPS. White privilege is defined as a system of an identifiable df 101 101
␹2/df 2.96 2.71
racial hierarchy that creates a system of advantages for White
individuals that is based on race, not merit (McIntosh, 1989; Note. CFI ⫽ comparative fit index; NNFI ⫽ nonnormed fit index; NFI ⫽
Neville, Worthington, & Spanierman, 2001). White privilege, of- normed fit index; SRMR ⫽ standardized root-mean-square residual;
ten invisible and taken for granted, is rooted in social and eco- RMSEA ⫽ root-mean-square error of approximation.
nomic privilege, and its meaning and significance are highly
situational (McDermott & Samson, 2005). Swim and Miller (1999)
developed the WPS, a five-item single-factor structure (␣ ⫽ .72) (Model 3). Because of the sensitivity of the chi-square to sample
self-report measure from McIntosh’s (1989) chapter, “White Priv- size, this study, however, placed more emphasis on a change in
ilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack.” The WPS items (e.g., CFI values of .01 or below (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002) to flag
“Status as a White person grants me unearned privileges in today’s significant differences when testing the models: Model 1,
society”) allow for responses to range from 1 (strongly disagree) ␹2(221) ⫽ 766.23, CFI ⫽ .95; Model 2, ␹2(224) ⫽ 769.18, CFI ⫽
to 5 (strongly agree). The alpha for the WPS in this study was .90.
.95; Model 3, ␹2(237) ⫽ 792.11, CFI ⫽ .94. The changes of
chi-square values were insignificant in comparison to the changes
Results of degree freedom, and the changes of CFI values were not more
than .01 for the three cumulative models. As a result, we concluded
CFA that factorial structure was invariant between the two samples
randomly split from the whole study sample.
To test the three-factor structure of the PCRW, a CFA was
conducted using LISREL (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). A
maximum-likelihood method was used to estimate goodness of fit Convergent Validity
of the three-factor model because this estimation method is robust We examined the PCRW’s convergent validity by correlating its
to nonnormality in CFA when sample size is large (Anderson & subscales with the WRIAS reintegration and immersion– emersion
Gerbing, 1984; Benson & Fleishman, 1994; Browne, 1984). Fol- statuses and the WPS. The pattern of the correlation coefficients
lowing recommendations in the literature (Browne & Cudeck, supports our expectations for conceptually meaningful associa-
1993; Hu & Bentler, 1999), we used five indices to assess good- tions between the PCRW and the White racial identity and White
ness of fit of the model: comparative fit index (CFI), nonnormed privilege attitude.
fit index, normed fit index (values greater than .90 indicate rea- White Empathy was negatively correlated with reintegration
sonable good fit), standardized root-mean-square residual, and (r ⫽ –.70, p ⬍ .01) and positively correlated with immersion–
root-mean-square error of approximation (values of .05 or less emersion (r ⫽ .35, p ⬍ .01). White Guilt was significantly posi-
indicate close approximate fit of the model, and values between tively correlated with immersion– emersion (r ⫽ .31, p ⬍ .01) and
.05 and .08 suggest reasonable error of approximation). had a nonsignificant relationship with reintegration (r ⫽ –.01, p ⬎
Table 1 presents the results of the CFA. All fit indices in the .05). White Fear was positively correlated with reintegration (r ⫽
study sample model and the cross validation model fell within .65, p ⬍ .01) and had a nonsignificant relationship with
acceptable values, supporting the three-factor structure reported by immersion– emersion. White privilege was significantly correlated
Spanierman and Heppner (2004). with all three PCRW subscales: White Empathy (r ⫽ .30, p ⬍ .01),
We conducted a multiple group analysis to examine whether the White Guilt (r ⫽ .26, p ⬍ .01), and White Fear (r ⫽ .10, p ⬍ .01).
factor loadings for affective responses to racism items on their
respective latent variables (i.e., White Empathy, White Guilt, and Analysis of the PCRW Factors and Demographic
White Fear) were invariant across the two samples. Different
Variables
levels of factorial invariance between the two samples were tested
through the following three steps: First, all parameters were freely The associations between the PCRW factor scores and demo-
estimated (Model 1, baseline model); second, the factor loadings graphic variables (gender, grade level, age, religious affiliation,
were constrained to be equal for each pair of the three factors multicultural education, political affiliation, and levels of mother
between the two samples (Model 2); and the last step involved and father’s education) were examined. For a report of a series of
constraining factor loadings and error variances to be equal for multivariate analysis of variance that indicated significant demo-
each pair of the three latent variables between the two groups graphic differences for gender, grade level, age, religious affilia-
588 BRIEF REPORTS

tion, multicultural education, and political affiliation, please see White privilege would empathize more with other racial minority
the online supplement. groups who do not enjoy similar privileges and concomitantly
experience greater guilt being White.
Discussion The range of emotions captured by the PCRW factors is ex-
pected as White individuals struggle to conceptualize White priv-
The present study provides support for the psychometric prop- ilege and examine the reality that White individuals, while be it
erties of the PCRW, a recently developed measure that examines unknowingly, perpetuate the oppression of minority groups (Hays,
the affective responses of White individuals regarding racial is- Chang, & Dean, 2004). Many have difficulty accepting the exis-
sues. Findings were as expected. CFA results in this study support tence of White privilege (Ancis & Szymanski, 2001) due to the
the measure’s factorial invariance across samples. The findings of invisibility of White privilege and the differential ways some
conceptually meaningful associations among the PCRW factors White individuals (i.e., women, sexual minorities, people who are
and the WRIAS reintegration and immersion– emersion statuses disabled, and individuals with a low socioeconomic status) expe-
and the WPS further strengthen the measure’s construct validity. rience its benefits (Neville et al., 2001).
Findings in this study provide evidence supporting the utility of the
measure.
Limitations

The PCRW and the WRIAS There are several limitations to this study. First, the PCRW,
WRIAS, and WPS are self-report measures so participants may
The associations among the PCRW subscales and the two have selected socially desirable responses. Second, the survey was
WRIAS statuses make conceptual sense. The PCRW construct not run from a secure online server; therefore, the possibility of a
helps to illuminate the affective experiences of White individuals participant completing the instruments more than once exists.
as they relate to racial identity development. The reintegration However, we did not expect anyone would spend his or her time
status of the WRIAS is characterized by a retreat into Whiteness, completing the survey more than once. Third, the results from this
actively and passively endorsing White superiority and Black sample of university students may not generalize to the nonstudent
inferiority. Individuals in this status may become hostile to racial population of this area or to other areas in the United States.
minorities, become defensive, and deny their role in the perpetu- Finally, the suboptimal reliability coefficients on most of the
ation of racism in society. Some may overidealize the White WRIAS statuses in this study limit its adequacy as an instrument
culture as superior, and their perceptions of racial minorities may to examine the convergent validity of the PCRW. Future research-
become negative and distorted (Helms, 1995). This factor of the ers should consider using another White racial identity develop-
WRIAS was significantly negatively correlated with White Em- ment measure that has better psychometric properties to further
pathy and positively correlated with White Fear. Individuals with examine the association between the PCRW and White racial
higher scores in this status tend to empathize less with other racial identity.
groups and have greater fear regarding the diminishment of their Along with Spanierman and Heppner’s (2004) and Poteat and
racial status. The nonsignificant relationship between reintegration Spanierman’s (2008) psychometric findings on the PCRW, the
and White Guilt makes conceptual sense because individuals in the present study provides additional evidence in support of the
reintegration status endorse White superiority and do not feel PCRW as a psychometrically sound instrument for identifying and
ashamed about being White (Spanierman & Heppner, 2004). examining emotional reactions that facilitate or impede White
The immersion– emersion status of the WRIAS is characterized individuals’ awareness of racial issues and racial identity devel-
by an acknowledgment of racial inequalities, a willingness to forgo opment. The PCRW offers promise as an instrument useful in
privileges associated with Whiteness, and a commitment to devel- elucidating the complexity of White individuals’ defensive or
oping a positive White identity through self-exploration and mean- progressive attitudes about racial issues. Future psychometric re-
ingful contact with members of other racial groups (Helms, 1995). search on the PCRW should include other forms of reliability (e.g.,
This status was found significantly positively correlated with test–retest reliability) and validity (e.g., criterion validity).
White Empathy and White Guilt. The more individuals in this
status are exposed to members of other racial groups, the more
they become aware of racial inequalities and experience guilt or
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See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232531231

Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites: Exploring Patterns Through Cluster


Analysis

Article in Journal of Counseling Psychology · October 2006


DOI: 10.1037/0022-0167.53.4.434

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Journal of Counseling Psychology Copyright 2006 by the American Psychological Association
2006, Vol. 53, No. 4, 434 – 441 0022-0167/06/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-0167.53.4.434

Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites:


Exploring Patterns Through Cluster Analysis

Lisa B. Spanierman, Patrick Ian Armstrong


V. Paul Poteat, and Amanda M. Beer Iowa State University
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign

Participants (230 White college students) completed the Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites
(PCRW) Scale. Using cluster analysis, we identified 5 distinct cluster groups on the basis of PCRW
subscale scores: the unempathic and unaware cluster contained the lowest empathy scores; the insensitive
and afraid cluster consisted of low empathy and guilt scores, with the highest score on fear; the fearful
guilt cluster exhibited elevations on guilt and fear; the empathic but unaccountable cluster reflected high
empathy with low guilt and fear; and the informed empathy and guilt cluster represented those high on
empathy and guilt in conjunction with low levels of fear. Groups were validated on an additional sample
(n ⫽ 366) and were found to differ significantly on theoretically related measures.

Keywords: costs of racism to Whites, White racial attitudes, White guilt, cluster analysis

As the study of racism and its impact on individuals and society noteworthy that racism affects all individuals in negative ways
continues to evolve, researchers have begun to explore the ways in (Kivel, 1996; Tatum, 1992).
which White individuals, as members of the dominant racial Conceptual writings have often situated the costs of racism to
group, are affected by this system. Conceptual writings (e.g., Whites in a broad range of personal and social domains. For
Goodman, 2001; Kivel, 1996; McIntosh, 1998; Neville, Worthing- example, with regard to dominant group members in a variety of
ton, & Spanierman, 2001) and empirical research (e.g., Iyer, oppressive systems (e.g., racism, sexism), Goodman (2001) cate-
Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Spanierman & Heppner, 2004; Swim & gorized costs according to psychological, social, spiritual, physi-
Miller, 1999) have suggested that Whites experience both positive cal, and intellectual characteristics. Using a tripartite model,
(i.e., privileges) and negative (i.e., costs) consequences as a result Spanierman and Heppner (2004) classified costs according to
of racism. White privilege refers to unearned benefits and oppor- affective (i.e., emotional), cognitive (i.e., distorted beliefs), and
tunities to which White individuals have access as a result of their behavioral (i.e., limited or restricted actions) dimensions. Through
race and that remain inaccessible to racial minorities (McIntosh, personal reflection, other theorists have delineated specific costs
1998; Sue, 2003). Examples of privilege include easier access to that they, as White individuals, have experienced, which include
health care, advanced educational opportunities, and the ability to guilt, shame, and helplessness in ending racism; lack of developed
set social norms (McIntosh, 1998; Neville et al., 2001; Wildman & racial identity; and lack of understanding about people of other
Davis, 1996). The phrase costs of racism to Whites is defined as races (Croteau, 2002; Grover, 1997; Kivel, 1996).
negative psychosocial consequences that Whites experience as a Researchers have conducted qualitative analyses examining the
result of the existence of racism (Kivel, 1996; Spanierman & costs of racism to Whites, and interviews and responses to open-
Heppner, 2004). Examples of these costs include guilt and shame,
ended questions have provided researchers with a rich resource for
irrational fear of people of other races, distorted beliefs regarding
further identifying negative consequences of racism to White
race and racism, and limited exposure to people of different races
individuals. Interviewees often express varying degrees of ac-
and cultures (Spanierman & Heppner, 2004; Spanierman et al., in
knowledgment of White privilege, which is associated with vary-
press; Swim & Miller, 1999). As such, these costs are in no way
ing degrees of guilt and shame (Ancis & Szymanski, 2001;
comparable to the substantial economic, political, and social costs
Arminio, 2001; Spanierman et al., in press). Respondents have also
of racism that racial and ethnic minorities face. Nevertheless, it is
expressed empathic reactions, including anger, sadness, frustra-
tion, and disgust about the existence of racism (Spanierman et al.,
in press). Among White counselor trainees, Utsey, Gernat, and
Lisa B. Spanierman, V. Paul Poteat, and Amanda M. Beer, Department Hammer (2005) found that some focus group participants experi-
of Educational Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign; enced a distorted sense of identity, denying themselves as racial
Patrick Ian Armstrong, Department of Psychology, Iowa State University. beings.
Preliminary results were presented at the annual meeting of the Amer- In addition to conducting qualitative examinations, researchers
ican Psychological Association in August 2005. We would like to thank
have quantitatively investigated a number of consequences of
Dorothy Espelage for her contributions to the development of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Lisa B. racism to Whites. Several researchers focused on the role of White
Spanierman, Department of Educational Psychology, University of Illinois guilt in relation to White individuals’ attitudes and behaviors
at Urbana–Champaign, 226 Education Building MC-708, Champaign, IL regarding racism. For example, Swim and Miller (1999) developed
61820. E-mail: lbspan@uiuc.edu a five-item scale measuring White guilt toward racism and found
434
PCRW CLUSTER PATTERNS 435

that many participants experienced varying degrees of guilt. Fur- Thus, our primary purpose in conducting the present investiga-
thermore, they found that degree of guilt was positively associated tion was to use cluster analysis to explore Whites’ experiences of
with the extent to which participants acknowledged White privi- costs of racism (i.e., empathic reactions, guilt, and fear of people
lege. Harvey and Oswald (2000) further distinguished guilt from of other races) simultaneously. Cluster analysis has been identified
shame and found that individuals who experienced shame (which as an effective and useful analytic technique in counseling psy-
is more self-condemning) were less likely to support Black campus chology research, one that helps researchers identify groups of
programs than were those experiencing guilt (which is more re- similar individuals when those researchers are examining multiple
morseful). Similarly, Iyer et al. (2003) reported the need to distin- constructs of interest (Borgen & Barnett, 1987). These patterns of
guish guilt from sympathy in how each construct influences sup- subscale scores on the PCRW Scale not only will increase our
port for affirmative action. Because guilt emerges as a critical understanding of the complicated and nuanced picture of Whites’
component of Whites’ responses to racism and is associated with experiences but will also inform our understanding of how partic-
a number of responses to racism, a next step might be examination ular groups of Whites might react differently to racial issues in our
of guilt in the context of the complex constellation of costs rather society on the basis of the degree to which they experience several
than in isolation. types of costs. In other words, researchers can use cluster group
Spanierman and Heppner (2004) recently developed the Psy- membership to predict important constructs of interest such as
chosocial Costs of Racism to Whites (PCRW) scale, which com- cultural sensitivity. Therefore, another purpose of this study was to
prises three distinct subscales measuring (a) White Empathic Re- examine the different PCRW cluster groups in the contexts of
actions Toward Racism (e.g., sadness and anger; also known as theoretically and empirically related constructs, such as color-blind
White Empathic Reactions); (b) White Guilt; and (c) White Fear of racial attitudes (Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, & Browne, 2000) and
People of Other Races (also known as White Fear of Others). The cultural sensitivity (i.e., as measured by the Quick Discrimination
scale has demonstrated convergent validity with theoretically re- Index; Ponterotto et al., 1995), as well as with relevant demo-
lated constructs such as cultural sensitivity, color-blind racial graphic characteristics (e.g., exposure to people of other races,
attitudes, and ethnocultural empathy (Spanierman & Heppner, political affiliation, etc.). While identifying potential patterns of
2004). Specifically, individuals reporting higher White empathic costs of racism to Whites, such typologies have the potential to
reactions also reported higher levels of racial awareness, cognitive inform interventions that are specific to particular cluster groups,
attitudes toward racial diversity, and ethnocultural empathy. such as informing pedagogy for teaching Whites about societal
Higher levels of White Guilt were associated with more positive racism.
attitudes toward minorities. White Fear of Others was related to
lower levels of White empathic reactions, racial awareness, and
ethnocultural empathy. Poteat and Spanierman (2006) recently Method
validated the scale with a community sample of White, employed
adults. Participants
Although researchers have found previous theoretical writings Participants were 230 self-identified White undergraduate students
and empirical investigations to be useful in understanding the (36% men, 64% women) aged 18 – 44 years (M ⫽ 29.42, SD ⫽ 2.15)
varied ways in which White individuals experience the negative attending a large Midwestern university. Participants were predomi-
consequences of racism, knowledge in this area remains limited. nantly Christian (71%) and of middle-class (43%) or upper-middle-
Qualitative findings consistently have pointed to the complexity class (46%) social status. Approximately one third (34%) of the par-
involved when discerning White individuals’ experiences of the ticipants identified their affiliation as Democrat; the remainder
costs of racism (Arminio, 2001; Spanierman et al., in press), but identified their affiliation as Republican (26%), Independent (9%), or
instruments thus far tend to measure only single constructs in “none” or “other” (30% total). Each participant was free to use his or
isolation (e.g., White Guilt). In recent years, certain counseling her own interpretation of the scale anchors for the following demo-
graphic items. Multicultural education was assessed with one item that
psychology researchers have illustrated the usefulness of consid-
used the following frequency response format: 1 (none), 2 (very little),
ering subscale scores simultaneously to identify and examine
3 (some), 4 (quite a bit), and 5 (extensive multicultural education). The
complex racial experiences (e.g., Carter, Helms, & Juby, 2004; majority of participants (71%) indicated that they had very little to
Neville & Lilly, 2000). Accordingly, because knowledge about the some multicultural education. Exposure to people of other races also
complex and varied ways in which White individuals experience was assessed with one item that used the following frequency response
costs of racism is limited, patterns of White individuals’ experi- format: 1 (no exposure), 2 (small amount), 3 (moderate amount), and 4
ences of such costs might better capture the nuances and complex- (a high amount of exposure). The majority of participants indicated that
ity inherent in this phenomenon than would the study of costs in they had a moderate level of exposure to people of other races (59%);
isolation. More specifically, examining a high score on one sub- 23% reported a high amount of exposure, and 18% indicated a small
scale, such as White Guilt, is less informative than examining this amount of exposure. We also assessed participants’ percentage of White
friends through one item that used the following frequency response
score in the context of its association with the additional scores of
format: 1 (0%–25%), 2 (26%–50%), 3 (51%–75%), 4 (76%–99%), and
White Empathic Reactions and White Fear of Others. Examination
5 (100%). The majority (54%) of participants expressed that their
of patterns of scores reflects a more nuanced picture of Whites’ friendship group was more than 75% White. Last, we assessed partic-
perceptions, experiences, and responses to societal racism and is ipants’ support of affirmative action through one item that used a
of critical importance for counseling psychologists with regard Likert-type response format ranging from 1 (low) to 6 (high). The
to teaching and training White students and mental health majority of participants (63%) reported their level of support at 3 or
professionals. below.
436 SPANIERMAN, POTEAT, BEER, AND ARMSTRONG

Measures relevant to the purpose of the current investigation. In the current study,
coefficient alphas were .82 for the Cognitive Racial Attitudes subscale
PCRW Scale. We used the PCRW Scale (Spanierman & Heppner, and .81 for the Affective Racial Attitudes subscale.
2004) to assess the various negative consequences of racism as experienced
by White individuals, including empathic reactions toward racism (i.e.,
anger and sadness); guilt; and fear. The 16-item self-report measure uses a Procedure
Likert-type response format ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 Prior to data collection, approval was obtained from the Institutional
(strongly agree). Higher scores reflect higher experiences of psychosocial Review Board at the home institution (the University of Illinois at Urbana–
costs. The measure includes the three subscales of White Empathic Reac- Champaign). Participants were recruited from undergraduate courses in
tions Toward Racism (also known as White Empathic Reactions; 6 items; psychology and education during two consecutive semesters and received
“I am angry that racism exists”); White Guilt (5 items; “Sometimes I feel research credit for their participation. Participants were allowed to com-
guilty about being White”); and White Fear of People of Other Races (also plete and return the packet at the end of their class or take the packets and
known as White Fear of Others; 5 items; “I am distrustful of people of return them to the investigator at a later date. All students who chose
other races”). Internal consistency estimates for each subscale ranged as in-class participation completed the survey packet. In the few cases in
follows: White Empathic Reactions, ␣ ⫽ .70 –.85; White Guilt, ␣ ⫽ .73–.81; which students chose at-home participation, all students returned com-
and White Fear of Others, ␣ ⫽ .63–.78 (Spanierman & Heppner, 2004). pleted packets. Thus, we obtained a 100% response rate. Names of the
Temporal stability estimates for each subscale during a 2-week period ranged individual measures were not listed on the survey packets, but, rather,
from .69 for White Guilt to .95 for White Fear of Others (Spanierman & participants were given a survey packet titled “Racial Attitudes Survey.”
Heppner, 2004). Convergent validity has been established with a number of Each packet contained consent forms, the PCRW Scale, the CoBRAS, the
related scales, including the Color-Blind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS; QDI, and a demographic questionnaire. The participants received verbal
Neville et al., 2000), the Scale of Ethnocultural Empathy (Wang et al., 2003), and written instructions stating that there were no right or wrong answers
the QDI (Ponterotto et al., 1995), and the Oklahoma Racial Attitudes Scale and that we wanted them to respond honestly to the items. We emphasized
(LaFleur, Rowe, & Leach, 2002). Additionally, through use of the Marlowe- that their responses would remain anonymous and confidential. Partici-
Crowne Social Desirability Scale–Form C (Reynolds, 1982), previous findings pants who did not self-identify as White were directed to omit the PCRW
indicate that the PCRW is not associated with socially desirable responding. In items and to complete the remainder of the packet. This directive allowed
the current investigation, coefficient alphas for the three PCRW subscales of participants an equal opportunity to earn research credit; however, their
White Empathic Reactions, White Guilt, and White Fear of Others were .77, data were not included in the analysis.
.79, and .63, respectively.
CoBRAS. The CoBRAS (Neville et al., 2000) measures color-blind
racial attitudes, which are characterized as cognitive distortions that min- Results
imize the existence and effects of race and racism and have been identified
Cluster Analysis
as a more subtle, covert form of modern racism. On the 20-item self-report
scale, researchers use a Likert-type response format ranging from 1 We used cluster analysis to explore the different patterns of
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Higher scores reflect a stronger Whites’ experiences of psychosocial costs of racism measured by
endorsement of color-blind racial attitudes. A three-factor structure has the PCRW subscales. We selected this analysis to enable the
been established, with subscales labeled as follows: (a) Racial Privilege (7
identification and further validation of meaningful typologies or
items; “White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the
subgroups of White individuals. The three subscale measures (i.e.,
color of their skin [reverse]”; ␣ ⫽ .71–.83); (b) Institutional Discrimination
(7 items; “Social policies, such as affirmative action, discriminate unfairly White Empathic Reactions, White Guilt, and White Fear of Oth-
against White people”; ␣ ⫽ .73–.76); and (c) Blatant Racial Issues (6 ers) were used as grouping variables. To control for scaling dif-
items; “Racism may have been a problem in the past, but it is not an ferences resulting from the different number of items in each scale,
important problem today”; ␣ ⫽ .70 –.76). Coefficient alphas for the total we used raw score means (i.e., scale score divided by number of
scale have ranged from .84 to .91 (Neville et al., 2000). Convergent validity items in scale) for each subscale. As recommended by Gordon
has been examined with several scales, including the Modern Racism Scale (1999), we followed a two-step procedure in identifying cluster
(McConahay, 1986), the Global Belief in a Just World Scale (Lipkus, groups. First, we used SYSTAT software to conduct hierarchical
1991), and the Multi-Dimensional Just World Belief Scale (Furnham & cluster analysis with Ward’s clustering method (Ward, 1963),
Procter, 1988). Coefficient alphas for the current investigation were .80 for
which seeks to minimize within-group variability while maximiz-
Racial Privilege, .74 for Institutional Discrimination, .73 for Blatant Racial
ing between-groups variability in Euclidean distance. This method
Issues, and .86 for the CoBRAS total.
QDI. The QDI (Ponterotto et al., 1995) measures prejudicial atti- suggested that a five-cluster solution minimized within-groups
tudes toward racial minorities and women. In this 30-item self-report sum of squares and was most appropriate for the data. Second,
scale, researchers use a Likert-type response format ranging from 1 we conducted a nonhierarchical k-means cluster analysis using
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Higher scores reflect greater SYSTAT, specifying a five-cluster solution. Cluster groups ranged
awareness of and sensitivity to racial diversity and gender equality. The in size from 32 to 61 participants.
scale comprises the following three subscales: (a) Cognitive Racial To facilitate the interpretation of the PCRW patterns of the five
Attitudes (9 items; “I believe that reading The Autobiography of Mal- cluster groups, in the following paragraphs we describe scores on
colm X would be of value”; ␣ ⫽ .85–.91); (b) Affective Racial Attitudes each PCRW subscale for each group with reference to the overall
(7 items; “I feel I could develop an intimate relationship with someone
mean and standard deviation of the subscale. Interpretive criteria
from a different race;” ␣ ⫽ .70 –.79); and (c) Attitudes Toward Wom-
are based on dividing the total sample distribution on each sub-
en’s Equity (7 items; “I look forward to the day when a woman is
president of the United States”; ␣ ⫽ .70 –.77). Previous studies have scale into thirds. A cluster group’s score on a subscale is consid-
provided support for the convergent and discriminant validity of the ered to be “high” if the group’s average score falls within the upper
scale (see Ponterotto, Potere, & Johansen, 2002). As recommended by third of the overall distribution of scores (i.e., at least 0.43 SD
Ponterotto et al. (2002), we administered the entire QDI, although we above the total sample’s subscale mean score). “Moderate” refers
chose to examine only the two race-based subscales, which were most to group scores that fall within the middle third of the overall
PCRW CLUSTER PATTERNS 437

Figure 1. K-means cluster group Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites (PCRW) patterns.

distribution of scores (i.e., within ⫾ 0.43 SD of the total sample’s sis using an independent data set from a published study (see
subscale mean score). “Low” refers to group scores that are in the Spanierman & Heppner, 2004). The participants in this validation
lower third of the overall distribution of scores (i.e., at least – 0.43 sample included 366 White undergraduate students enrolled in a
SD below the total sample’s subscale mean score). See Figure 1 for mid-sized Midwestern university (see Spanierman & Heppner,
the five cluster groups’ mean subscale score patterns. The number 2004, for a detailed description of the participants and methodol-
of participants in each cluster group is presented in the following ogy). Cluster groups from this sample ranged in size from 28 to
paragraphs along with a brief description of the cluster group’s 117 participants. Overall, the PCRW patterns for the cluster groups
PCRW pattern. across the two samples demonstrated strong consistency on each of
Cluster A—Unempathic and unaware. Cluster A (n ⫽ 41) was the five groups identified in the k-means clustering solution. The
characterized by low levels of White Empathic Reactions, low numbers of individuals within each of the clusters for this sample
White Guilt, and moderate White Fear of Others. are Cluster A (n ⫽ 69), Cluster B (n ⫽ 117), Cluster C (n ⫽ 83),
Cluster B—Empathic but unaccountable. This was the largest Cluster D (n ⫽ 69), and Cluster E (n ⫽ 28). The validation sample
cluster group (n ⫽ 61). Participants exhibited high scores on White cluster groups for informed empathy and guilt reported moderate
Empathic Reactions as well as low scores on White Guilt and levels of White Fear of Others, and the unempathic and unaware
White Fear of Others. group reported moderate levels of both White Guilt and White
Cluster C—Informed empathy and guilt. This cluster group Fear of Others, compared with the low scores on these measures in
(n ⫽ 32) exemplified high White Empathic Reactions and the the initial cluster sample. Additionally, the fearful guilt validation
highest White Guilt scores of all the cluster groups. Additionally, cluster reported a moderate level of White Guilt, compared with
this cluster group scored low on White Fear of Others.
the high level reported by the initial cluster sample.
Cluster D—Fearful guilt. The fearful guilt cluster group (n ⫽
A chi-square analysis, which we conducted to test for differ-
56) demonstrated high scores on White Guilt and White Fear of
ences in the proportion of individuals grouped into each cluster for
Others, along with moderate scores on White Empathic Reactions.
both samples, was significant, ␹2(4, N ⫽ 596) ⫽ 20.89, p ⬍ .001,
Only Cluster C had a higher score on White Guilt, with the
which may reflect differences between the two samples in political
remaining cluster groups demonstrating distinctly lower levels of
affiliation and other demographic characteristics. As suggested by
White Guilt.
Henry, Tolan, and Gorman-Smith (2005), we conducted a 2 (sam-
Cluster E—Insensitive and afraid. This cluster group (n ⫽ 40)
ple) ⫻ 5 (cluster group) multivariate analysis of variance
was characterized by the highest score on White Fear of Others
and a low score on White Guilt. Additionally, the cluster group (MANOVA) to further test for cluster stability (i.e., if the cluster
exhibited low scores on White Empathic Reactions. groups are an exact replication in each sample, no interaction
effect will be present). Our data exhibited main effects for sample,
⌳ ⫽ .92, F(3, 584) ⫽ 16.13, p ⬍ .001, ␩2 ⫽ .08, and for cluster
Validation of PCRW Clusters
groups, ⌳ ⫽ .10, F(12, 1545) ⫽ 173.96, p ⬍ .001, ␩2 ⫽ .53. A
To validate the identified five-cluster solution obtained from the significant interaction effect, ⌳ ⫽ .58, F(12, 1545) ⫽ 29.67, p ⬍
present sample, we performed an identical k-means cluster analy- .001, ␩2 ⫽ .17, indicated that cluster groups in the validation
438 SPANIERMAN, POTEAT, BEER, AND ARMSTRONG

sample were not an exact replication of the groups in the initial reported support on a Likert-type scale. Cluster D’s participants
sample. Specifically, we noted differences in two cluster groups: were concentrated in the moderate levels, and Clusters A and B
Cluster E and Cluster D. Upon further inspection, the differences included approximately equivalent percentages of participants re-
in Cluster E offer stronger support for our interpretation, namely, porting support at each of the six levels (1 ⫽ low; 6 ⫽ high).
that the validation sample expressed even lower scores on White Finally, cluster groups significantly differed in political affilia-
Empathic Reactions and higher scores on White Fear of Others. tion, ␹2(20, N ⫽ 227) ⫽ 36.61, p ⬍ .01. Specifically, 47.5% of
Additionally, the overall pattern of the cluster group (i.e., low individuals in Cluster E identified their affiliation as Republican,
empathy, low guilt, high fear) was the same. Cluster D, however, followed by individuals reporting none or other (27.5% total),
does not appear as stable, as the level of guilt in the validation Democrat (20.0%), Libertarian (2.5%), and Independent (2.5%). In
sample cluster is not as high as that in the initial sample. contrast, 51.6% of individuals in Cluster C identified their affili-
ation as Democrat, followed by individuals reporting Republican
(19.4%), none or other (16.2% total), or Independent (12.9%). It is
Comparison of PCRW Cluster Patterns
noteworthy that approximately 50% of Democrats, as opposed to
Demographic variables. We compared the cluster groups of 30% of Republicans, were found in cluster groups containing
individuals from the present sample on relevant demographic higher levels of White Guilt (i.e., Clusters C and D).
variables and found several significant differences. We noted Racial awareness and cultural sensitivity. Using MANOVA,
significant differences in the cluster groups by gender, ␹2(4, N ⫽ we evaluated color-blind racial attitudes (as measured by CoBRAS
230) ⫽ 20.24, p ⬍ .001. Specifically, Clusters A, B, and E scores) and cultural sensitivity (as measured by QDI scores) to
contained a balanced representation of men and women. A greater assess for potential cluster group differences (see Table 1 for
representation of female participants was present in Clusters C and means and standard deviations). We found an overall significant
D, each of which consisted of more than 75% women. Addition- cluster group effect, ⌳ ⫽ .46, F(20, 707.29) ⫽ 9.40, p ⬍ .001,
ally, the highest proportion of men was concentrated in Cluster A ␩2 ⫽ .18. Follow-up univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs)
(29%) and Cluster B (28%). Significant differences also appeared indicated that the clusters differed significantly on each CoBRAS
regarding level of multicultural education, ␹2(16, N ⫽ 230) ⫽ subscale: Racial Privilege, F(4, 217) ⫽ 9.10, p ⬍ .001, ␩2 ⫽ .14;
29.35, p ⬍ .05. For Clusters B, C, and D, the majority (42.6%– Institutional Discrimination, F(4, 217) ⫽ 9.67, p ⬍ .001, ␩2 ⫽ .15;
50.0%) of participants reported some multicultural education, and and Blatant Racial Issues, F(4, 217) ⫽ 13.35, p ⬍ .001, ␩2 ⫽ .20.
the informed empathy and guilt cluster included the highest per- Least squares difference (LSD) post hoc comparisons revealed that
centage of participants reporting quite a bit to extensive multicul- Clusters C and D did not significantly differ from one another on
tural education (34.4%). Furthermore, compared with other Racial Privilege but were significantly different from all other
groups, Clusters E and A were represented by the highest percent- cluster groups on this subscale. With regard to Institutional Rac-
age of those reporting “none” with regard to multicultural educa- ism, Cluster C differed significantly from all other cluster groups
tion (16.0% and 9.8%, respectively). and demonstrated the lowest score on this subscale. Cluster E
We also compared the cluster groups on percentage of close differed significantly from all other cluster groups and demon-
friends who were White. Results indicated that significant differ- strated the highest score on this subscale. LSD post hoc compar-
ences did exist, ␹2(16, N ⫽ 230) ⫽ 62.39, p ⬍ .001. Specifically, isons also revealed significant differences in the following cluster
Clusters B and C were the only groups in which the majority of group with regard to Blatant Racial Issues: Cluster E differed
members reported that less than 75% of their friends were White, significantly from all other cluster groups, demonstrating the high-
compared with Clusters A, D, and E, which were composed est score on this subscale; no significant differences emerged
primarily of members reporting that 75% or more of their friends among Clusters B, C, or D.
were White. Furthermore, Cluster E had the highest percentage of Follow-up ANOVAs revealed that the clusters also differed
members reporting 75% or more White friends (87.5%), and significantly on the QDI subscales of interest: Cognitive Racial
Cluster C had the lowest percentage of such members (25.0%). Attitudes, F(4, 217) ⫽ 22.15, p ⬍ .001, ␩2 ⫽ .29; Affective Racial
Similarly, we evaluated cluster groups on exposure to people of Attitudes, F(4, 217) ⫽ 36.67, p ⬍ .001, ␩2 ⫽ .40. LSD post hoc
other races and found significant differences, ␹2(12, N ⫽ 230) ⫽ comparisons revealed that Clusters C and E significantly differed
54.31, p ⬍ .001. Cluster E contained the highest percentage from all cluster groups on both subscales, with Cluster C demon-
(42.5%) of members reporting “none” to a “small” amount of strating the highest scores on both subscales and Cluster E dem-
exposure to people of other races and contained 5% of members onstrating the lowest scores on both subscales. Furthermore, with
reporting a “high” amount of exposure. Clusters C and D were regard to Cognitive Racial Attitudes, all cluster groups differed
primarily composed of participants reporting a “moderate” amount significantly from one another with the exception of Clusters B
of exposure to people of other races (71.9% and 78.6%, respec- and D. With regard to Affective Racial Attitudes, all cluster groups
tively), whereas Clusters A and B included relatively equivalent differed significantly from one another with the exception of
percentages of participants reporting none, small, moderate, and Clusters A and D.
high exposure to people of other races.
We also noted significant differences in the cluster groups by Discussion
affirmative action attitudes, ␹2(20, N ⫽ 228) ⫽ 44.22, p ⬍ .01. In
particular, in Cluster E, none of the participants reported high To address the complexities of White individuals’ experiences
support of affirmative action, and in Cluster C, none of the par- of the psychosocial costs of racism, we used cluster analysis to
ticipants reported low support of affirmative action. Additionally, consider the three PCRW subscales simultaneously and to identify
participants in Cluster C were concentrated at higher levels of patterns of such experiences. The present investigation is an ex-
PCRW CLUSTER PATTERNS 439

Table 1
Cluster Group Means and Standard Deviations on the Color-Blind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS) and the Quick Discrimination
Index (QDI)

PCRW
PCRW PCRW Cluster C: PCRW PCRW
Cluster A: Cluster B: Informed Cluster D: Cluster E:
Unempathic Empathic but empathy Fearful Insensitive
and unaware unaccountable and guilt guilt and afraid
(n ⫽ 41) (n ⫽ 61) (n ⫽ 32) (n ⫽ 56) (n ⫽ 40)
LSD post hoc tests
Subscale M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD F ␩2 ( p ⬍ .001)

CoBRAS

Racial Privilege 26.90 6.55 26.02 5.38 21.81 5.90 22.31 6.36 28.28 5.72 9.38* .15 C, D ⬍ A, B, E
Institutional Racism 26.98 5.76 24.54 5.02 21.72 6.80 24.91 5.85 29.69 5.90 9.73* .15 C ⬍ A, B, D ⬍ E
Blatant Racial Issues 15.05 4.20 12.20 3.78 11.44 3.42 13.00 3.88 17.15 4.55 13.61* .20 B, C, D ⬍ A ⬍ E

QDI

Cognitive 27.59 4.58 31.07 4.57 34.41 5.45 30.62 5.45 24.20 4.88 22.79* .29 E ⬍ A ⬍ B, D ⬍ C
Affective 24.20 4.99 26.08 4.25 28.69 3.16 24.00 3.35 17.88 3.92 38.36* .41 E ⬍ A, D ⬍ B ⬍ C

Note. PCRW ⫽ Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites Scale.


* p ⬍ .001.

tension of earlier quantitative studies in which researchers exam- participants seemed qualitatively different than that of the previous
ined single subscale scores on the PCRW Scale (Poteat & Spa- group. For example, those in the Cluster C were likely experienc-
nierman, 2006; Spanierman & Heppner, 2004) and provides a ing guilt on the basis of awareness of White privilege and institu-
more advanced quantitative modeling of the complex experiences tional racism, as found in previous studies (Arminio, 2001). Par-
of costs identified in existing qualitative research (Spanierman et ticipants in the Cluster D did have a moderate awareness of White
al., in press; Utsey et al., 2005). The results revealed five distinct privilege, but this was concomitant with low scores on the Affec-
cluster groups, which represent a more integrative and nuanced tive Racial Attitudes subscale (i.e., personal contact with people of
portrayal of relative differences in White individuals’ perceptions other races) of the QDI and high levels of White Fear of Others
of the experiences of the costs of racism, thus contributing to subscale of the PCRW. Additionally, participants reported only
further refinement of the theory of the psychosocial costs of racism moderate empathic reactions toward racism and had mostly White
to Whites to include such patterns. friends.
In addition to high levels of empathy and guilt, and in conjunc- The uniqueness of this combination of high guilt and moderate
tion with low levels of fear, Cluster C consisted of participants empathy in Cluster D may be particularly important as empathy
with the greatest levels of racial awareness (i.e., lowest scores on has been identified as a crucial characteristic of White antiracism
the CoBRAS) and cultural sensitivity (i.e., highest scores on the (Goodman, 2001). We speculate that at least two distinct types of
QDI). This group was predominantly female and contained the White guilt exist, namely accountable (i.e., informed empathy)
smallest number of male participants of all the cluster groups guilt and fearful guilt. Empathy felt toward those targeted by
(8.4% of the men were in this group, n ⫽ 7). This result is racism was found to significantly predict support for equal oppor-
consistent with previous findings that women are more likely than tunity policy, whereas guilt was found not to predict such support
men to experience affective, ethnocultural empathy (Wang et al., (Iyer et al., 2003). Furthermore, accountable guilt is more likely to
2003). Because of the participants’ low CoBRAS scores, we exist in conjunction with empathy and, ultimately, might predict
consider the empathic reactions to be informed on the basis of an antiracist activism. Because the effect of guilt on individuals’
understanding of institutional racism. Among all the cluster racial attitudes and behaviors could be moderated by the extent to
groups, this group reported high levels of prior multicultural edu- which they experience other additional costs, coordinators of pro-
cation and racial diversity among friendship groups. We deem this gramming efforts should take into consideration the specific type
cluster as the most desirable typology, and it is our hope that of guilt that individuals are experiencing (i.e., cluster group mem-
interventions derived from our work will facilitate more White bership) to be maximally effective and appropriate. With regard to
individuals exhibiting this pattern. theory refinement, guilt is not necessarily undesirable, as has been
We note that Cluster D, one of the larger groups, scored simi- indicated in some anecdotal literature. Rather, it could depend on
larly to the previously described Cluster C on the White Guilt whether it is experienced concomitantly with particular additional
subscale. Had we examined the subscales only in isolation, we costs and the degree to which these additional costs are experi-
might assume that participants in these two groups have had enced. The interpretation of Cluster D is somewhat tentative at this
similar experiences of White Guilt. However, when observing the point because the corresponding validation sample cluster did not
scores in the context of the patterns of costs, we named this group report the same degree of guilt. Future researchers need to conduct
fearful guilt to highlight that the type of guilt exhibited by these additional research to explore the role of guilt in White individu-
440 SPANIERMAN, POTEAT, BEER, AND ARMSTRONG

als’ perceptions of the cost of racism and to evaluate the stability distress may be more likely to fall into Cluster D or Cluster E than
of Cluster D. individuals who report low levels of emotional distress. Further-
Cluster B exhibited similar high levels of White Empathic more, researchers could use cluster group membership to predict
Reactions and low levels of White Fear of Others, as did those in actual race-related behaviors, such as willingness to endorse an
Cluster C. Therefore, if we examined these two subscale scores in affirmative action program or demonstration of multicultural coun-
isolation, these participants would appear identical. However, seling competence, which would enrich the research in this area
Cluster B expressed low levels of White Guilt, thus portraying a beyond self-report accounts.
rather different experience than did the other group. This lack of In addition, qualitative investigation, perhaps in the form of
guilt may be related to participants’ lower levels of awareness of focus groups organized by cluster membership, could address
racial privilege than those of Cluster C. However, because Cluster current speculations about various differences between groups
B’s awareness of racial privilege was moderate rather than low, we (e.g., level of education or awareness, experiences of guilt, level of
speculate that this pattern might be similar to responses revealed multicultural social desirability) and would add meaning to under-
by White students in previous qualitative research. Specifically, in standing Whites’ experiences of costs. This type of work is nec-
a study conducted by Ancis and Szymanski (2001) students por- essary for researchers to identify critical variables in forming
trayed an awareness of White privilege, disgust, and sadness about education and training interventions toward increasing White sup-
such privilege yet indicated no action to relinquish such privilege. port and White involvement in combating racism.
Future researchers need to address this speculation. Implications for practice evolving from current and future pro-
Participants in Cluster A appeared similar to those in Cluster E posed research lie primarily in the education and training of White
except that those in the latter group experienced higher levels of students and community members on topics of race and racism. As
White Fear of Others, which is associated with their significantly universities and counseling centers increase their focus on multi-
lower scores on racial sensitivity. These patterns reflect the com- cultural education for students (Hytten & Adkins, 2001), the
mon assumption in the racism and critical Whiteness studies importance of understanding the experiences of all students with
literature regarding the ease with which White Americans can regard to racism is highlighted. Investigation of the experiences of
construct a reality that denies the existence of racism (Wildman & the costs of racism to Whites, although a relatively new area of
Davis, 1996). With regard to multicultural training, knowledge of research, is of great importance considering Whites’ dominant
these nuances would inform the facilitation of an experiential, safe, (i.e., privileged) roles in society. Multicultural programming,
interactive component for persons in these groups (especially those workshops, and other intervention efforts likely will be more
who demonstrate White fear). effective when they are specifically tailored to and take into
Interpretation of the current results requires consideration of consideration the patterns of costs experienced by Whites. Because
inherent limitations. Because we found a significant Sample ⫻ we have demonstrated that the cluster groups identified in this
Cluster interaction effect, ␩2 ⫽ .17, which is considered a large investigation differ significantly on several racial attitudes and
effect (Cohen, 1988), our interpretation of the cluster groups is beliefs, assessing patterns of costs would also provide a sense of
somewhat tentative. As described earlier, this effect can be attrib- attitudes and beliefs of participating individuals related to race and
uted to two of the cluster groups and, in particular, centers on our racism, thereby providing a practical and efficient way for facili-
interpretation of Cluster D. The reliability of the five-cluster so- tators to tailor their programming efforts. Furthermore, educators
lution across additional, diverse samples is not yet known. In the may be able to use information regarding the costs of racism to
present study, we assessed only college students in the Midwest; Whites to engage White students in learning about a system that
thus, researchers would need to replicate our study with geograph- might otherwise seem insignificant to their own being.
ically dispersed samples of students and community members to
support clear conclusions and implications. In addition, the inter- References
nal consistency of the White Fear of Others subscale of the PCRW
is slightly lower than the recommended .70 with the present Ancis, J. R., & Szymanski, D. M. (2001). Awareness of White privilege
sample. Researchers would have to conduct further examination of among White counseling trainees. The Counseling Psychologist, 29,
548 –569.
this subscale to support reliability of the initial subscale as well as
Arminio, J. (2001). Exploring the nature of race-related guilt. Journal of
that of the cluster groups. Multicultural Counseling and Development, 29, 239 –252.
In addition to assessing the reliability of the cluster groups Borgen, F. H., & Barnett, D. C. (1987). Applying cluster analysis in
revealed in the present analysis, researchers in future studies counseling psychology research. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 34,
addressing differences between cluster groups and other related 456 – 468.
constructs might help to further validate and describe distinct Carter, R. T., Helms, J. E., & Juby, H. L. (2004). The relationship between
patterns of costs among White students with regard to their expe- racism and racial identity for White Americans: A profile analysis.
riences of racism. Moreover, cluster group membership can be Journal of Multicultural Counseling and Development, 32, 2–17.
used for concurrent or prospective predictions of additional vari- Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences
ables pertinent to racism (e.g., social dominance orientation, social (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Croteau, J. (2002). One struggle through individualism: Toward an anti-
distance, modern racism), which could be considered in under-
racist White racial identity. Journal of Counseling and Development, 77,
standing the aforementioned cluster groups. In the present study, 30 –32.
we focused on understanding racial attitudes; future researchers Furnham, A., & Procter, E. (1988). The Multi-Dimensional Just World
might want to examine participants’ affective responses, which are Belief Scale. [Mimeograph] London: London University.
often associated with such attitudes. For example, future research Goodman, D. J. (2001). Promoting diversity and social justice: Educating
might address how individuals who report high levels of emotional people from privileged groups. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
PCRW CLUSTER PATTERNS 441

Gordon, A. D. (1999). Classification. Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall. Dubuisson, A., et al. (1995). Development and initial validation of the
Grover, B. K. (1997). Growing up White in America? In R. Delgado & J. Quick Discrimination Index (QDI). Educational and Psychological
Stephanie (Eds.), Critical White studies: Looking behind the mirror (pp. Measurement, 55, 1026 –1031.
34 –35). Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Ponterotto, J. G., Potere, J. C., & Johansen, S. A. (2002). The Quick
Harvey, R. D., & Oswald, D. L. (2000). Collective guilt and shame as Discrimination Index: Normative data and user guidelines for counseling
motivation for White support of Black programs. Journal of Applied researchers. Journal of Multicultural Counseling and Development, 30,
Social Psychology, 30, 1790 –1811. 192–207.
Henry, D. B., Tolan, P. H., & Gorman-Smith, D. (2005). Cluster analysis Poteat, V. P., & Spanierman, L. B. (2006). Validation of the Psychosocial
in family psychology research. Journal of Family Psychology, 19, 121– Costs of Racism to Whites Scale among adults in the community.
131. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Hytten, K., & Adkins, A. (2001). Thinking through a pedagogy of White- Reynolds, W. M. (1982). Development of reliable and valid short forms of
ness. Educational Theory, 51, 433– 450. the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. Journal of Clinical
Iyer, A., Leach, C. W., & Crosby, F. J. (2003). White guilt and racial Psychology, 38, 119 –125.
compensation: The benefits and limits of self-focus. Personality & Spanierman, L. B., & Heppner, M. J. (2004). Psychosocial Costs of Racism
Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 117–129. to Whites Scale (PCRW): Construction and initial validation. Journal of
Kivel, P. (1996). Uprooting racism: How White people can work for racial Counseling Psychology, 51, 249 –262.
justice. Philadelphia: New Society. Spanierman, L. B., Oh, E., Poteat, V. P., Hund, A., McClair, V., Beer,
LaFleur, N. K., Rowe, W., & Leach, M. M. (2002). Reconceptualizing A. M., & Clarke, A. (in press). White students’ responses to societal
White racial consciousness. Journal of Multicultural Counseling and racism: A qualitative examination. The Counseling Psychologist.
Development, 30, 148 –152. Sue, D. W. (2003). What is White privilege? In Overcoming our racism:
Lipkus, I. (1991). The construction and preliminary validation of a Global The journey to liberation (pp. 137–159). San Francisco: Wiley.
Belief in a Just World Scale and the exploratory analysis of the Multi- Swim, J. K., & Miller, D. L. (1999). White guilt: Its antecedents and
dimensional Belief in a Just World Scale. Personality and Individual consequences for attitudes toward affirmative action. Personality and
Difference, 12, 1171–1178. Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 500 –514.
McConahay, J. B. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the Modern Tatum, B. D. (1992). Talking about race, learning about racism: The
Racism scale. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, application of racial identity development theory in the classroom.
discrimination, and racism (pp. 91–125). New York: Academic Press Harvard Educational Review, 62, 1–24.
McIntosh, P. (1998). White privilege and male privilege: A personal Utsey, S. O., Gernat, C. A., & Hammer, L. (2005). Examining White
account of coming to see correspondence through work in women’s counselor trainees’ reactions to racial issues in counseling and supervi-
studies. In M. Andersen & P. Collins (Eds.), Race, class, and gender: An sion dyads. The Counseling Psychologist, 33, 449 – 478.
anthology (2nd ed.; pp. 76 – 87). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Wang, Y., Davidson, M. M., Yakushko, O. F., Savoy, H. B., Tan, J. A., &
Neville, H. A., & Lilly, R. L. (2000). The relationship between racial Bleier, J. K. (2003). The Scale of Ethnocultural Empathy: Development,
identity cluster profiles and psychological distress among African Amer- validation, and reliability. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 50, 221–
ican college students. Journal of Multicultural Counseling and Devel- 234.
opment, 28, 194 –207. Ward, J. H. (1963). Hierarchical grouping to optimize an objective func-
Neville, H. A., Lilly, R. L., Duran, G., Lee, R. M., & Browne, L. (2000). tion. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 58, 236 –244.
Construction and initial validation of the Color-Blind Racial Attitudes Wildman, S. M., & Davis, A. D. (1996). Making systems of privilege
Scale (CoBRAS). Journal of Counseling Psychology, 47, 59 –70. visible: How language veils the existence of systems of privilege. In R.
Neville, H. A., Worthington, R. L., & Spanierman, L. B. (2001). Race, Delgado & J. Stefancic (Eds.), Critical White studies: Looking behind
power, and multicultural counseling psychology: Understanding White the mirror (pp. 314 –319). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
privilege and color-blind racial attitudes. In J. G. Ponterotto, J. M. Casas,
L. A. Suzuki, & C. M. Alexander (Eds.), Handbook of multicultural Received August 24, 2005
counseling (2nd ed.; pp. 257–288). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Revision received June 13, 2006
Ponterotto, J. G., Burkard, A., Rieger, B., Grieger, I., D’Onofrio, A., Accepted June 15, 2006 䡲

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Why Does Racial Inequality Persist?


Culture, Causation, and Responsibility

Racial Inequality: A Conceptual Framework


Over the last 40 years, I’ve explored why, notwithstanding the success of the civil
rights movement, the subordinate status of African-Americans persists. Key to my
thinking about this intractable problem has been the need to distinguish the role
played by discrimination against black people from that played by counterproductive
behavioral patterns among blacks.

This puts what is a very sensitive issue rather starkly. Many vocal advocates for racial
equality have been loath to consider the possibility that problematic patterns of be-
havior could be an important factor contributing to our persisting disadvantaged
status. Some observers on the right of American politics, meanwhile, take the po-
GLENN C. LOURY sition that discrimination against blacks is no longer an important determinant of
Merton P. Stoltz unequal social outcomes. I have long tried to chart a middle course—acknowledging
Professor of the antiblack biases that should be remedied while insisting on addressing and reversing
Social Sciences the patterns of behavior that impede black people from seizing newly opened oppor-
Department of tunities to prosper. I still see this as the most sensible position.
Economics
Brown University These two positions can be recast as causal narratives. One is what I call the “bias
narrative”: racism and white supremacy have done us wrong; we can’t get ahead until
they relent; so we must continue urging the reform of white American society toward
that end.

The other is what I call the “development narrative,” according to which it is essen-
tial to consider how a person comes to acquire those skills, traits, habits, and orien-
tations that foster successful participation in American society. To the extent that
African-American youngsters do not have the expe- rigorously defined. In a 2002 book, The Anatomy of
riences, are not exposed to the influences, and do Racial Inequality, I sketched a theory of race ap-
not benefit from the resources that foster and facil- plicable to the social and historical circumstances
itate their human development, they fail to achieve of the U.S., speculated about why racial inequali-
their full human potential. This lack of development ties persist, and advanced a conceptual framework
is what ultimately causes the persistent, stark racial for thinking about social justice in matters of race.1
disparities in income, wealth, education, family Because there remains so much confusion in today’s
structure, and much else. (The charts and tables on public discussions about race and racial inequality,
this and the next several pages offer a glimpse of the I need to revisit that framework. Bear with me. The
magnitude of these disparities.) relevance of this conceptual excursion will be clear
soon enough.
In terms of prescribing intervention and remedy,
these causal narratives point in very different direc-
tions. The bias narrative says that we need to have
a “conversation” about race: white America must Categorization Versus
reform itself; racism must end; we need more of this
or that, whatever the “this” or “that” is on the agenda Signification
of today’s race reformers. One hears this kind of talk,
one reads these exhortations, in newspapers and For me, the term “race” refers to indelible and her-
other media every day. itable marks on human bodies—skin color, hair
texture, bone structure—that are of no intrinsic sig-
The development narrative puts more onus on the nificance but that nevertheless have, through time,
responsibilities of African-Americans to develop come to be invested with social expectations that are
our human potential. It is not satisfied with wishful more or less reasonable and social meanings that
thinking like: “If we could only double the budget are more or less durable. When we talk about race
for some social program, the homicide rate among in America or anywhere else, we are actually dealing
young African-American men would be less atro- with two distinct processes: categorization and sig-
cious.” Or, “If we can just get this police department nification. Categorization entails sorting people into
investigated by the Department of Justice, then.…” a small number of subsets based on bodily marks
The development narrative asks, Then what? Then and differentiating one’s dealings with such persons
it will be safe to walk on the south side of Chicago accordingly. It is a cognitive act—an effort to com-
after midnight? prehend the social world around us.

Meanwhile, the terms themselves—race and dis- Signification is an interpretative act—one that as-
crimination—are often bandied about without being sociates certain connotations or “social meanings”

Median Net Worth of U.S. Households Percentage of Householders


in 2014 Dollars Owning a Home
80% White
$1,000,000 White net worth 72
13x greater
70%
69 Asian
$144,200 57
$98,700 60%
$100,000 49 Hispanic
White 50% 44 45

40% 43 43
Black
Black
$10,000 30%
$12,200 $11,200
20%
10%
$1,000
0%
'83 '86 '89 '92 '95 '98 '01 '04 '07 '10 '13 '76 '82 '88 '94 '00 '06 '15
Source: Pew Research Center, Social & Demographic Trends, “Demographic Trends and Source: Pew Research Center, “Demographic Trends and Economic Well-Being”
Economic Well-Being,” June 27, 2016

E S S AY Why Does Racial Inequality Persist? | Culture, Causation, and Responsibility 2


with those categories. Informational and symbolic phasis on the negative interpretative/symbolic con-
issues are both at play. Or, as I like to put it, when we notations attached to “blackness” in the U.S.5
speak about race, we are really talking about “em-
bodied social signification.”2

It is instructive to contrast a social-cognitive con- Reward Bias Versus


ception of race with acts of biological taxonomy—
sorting humans based on presumed variations of Development Bias
genetic endowments across what had for eons been
geographically isolated subpopulations. Such isola- Given this theoretical understanding of race, what
tion was, until recently, the human condition, and might one say about the causes of persistent racial
it may be thought to have led to the emergence of inequality? Fundamental is the elemental distinc-
distinct races. Nevertheless, using the term “race” in tion I first drew in 2002 between racial discrimina-
this way is controversial, particularly if the aim is to tion and racial stigma. Discrimination is about how
explain social inequalities between groups. blacks are treated; stigma is about how blacks are
perceived.
Thus, scientists, such as the population geneticist
Luigi Cavalli-Sforza,3 and social critics, such as the What I call “reward bias” (conventional racial dis-
philosopher Anthony Appiah,4 deny that “race” crimination) is now a less significant barrier to
refers to anything real. What they have in mind is the full participation of African-Americans in U.S.
the biological-taxonomic notion, and what they deny society than what I call “development bias.” Reward
is that meaningful distinctions among human sub- bias focuses on the disadvantageous treatment of
groups pertinent to accounting for racial inequality black people in formal transactions that limits their
can be derived from this notion. I am not arguing rewards for skills and talents presented to the market.
this point—though it would appear to be eminently Development bias refers to impediments that block
arguable. What I am emphasizing is that to establish access for black people to those resources necessary
the scientific invalidity of race demonstrates neither to develop and refine their talents but that are con-
the irrationality nor the immorality of invoking veyed via informal social relations. This is where the
racial classification as acts of social cognition. So I consideration of culture enters the picture.
shall employ the concept of race here, with an em-

Poverty Rates, Poverty Rates, by Race, Adults Aged 25 and Older


1974–2014 Ethnicity, and Age, 2013 Who Have at Least a
Bachelor’s Degree
40% 50%
White Black Hispanic
Share of the population below the poverty line

60%
35% 42.3
Asians
53
40% 38.3
30% Blacks 36.8 50%
30 26
30.4 Whites
25% 30% 40% 36
24 39
23
Hispanics 23.9
20%
20.2 30% Blacks
Asians 20% 23
15% 16
12
14.3
20%
10% 9.9
10.7
10 10% 10 15
8 Whites 10% Hispanics
5% 4
5
0% 0% 0%
'74 '84 '94 '04 '14 Age Under Under '64 '72 '80 '88 '96 '04 '15
18–64 age 18 age 6
Source: Pew Research Center, “Demographic Trends Source: Economic Policy Institute, The State Source: Pew Research Center, “Demographic Trends and
and Economic Well-Being” of Working America Economic Well-Being”

E S S AY Why Does Racial Inequality Persist? | Culture, Causation, and Responsibility 3


Reward bias is grounded in racially discriminatory poor social performance, an observer may be unable
transactions, but development bias is ultimately to distinguish between blocked developmental
rooted in racially stigmatized social relations. Many opportunities and limited capacities or distorted
resources that foster human development only values. In ethical terms, citizens who find the “trans-
become available to persons as the by-product of in- actional discrimination” associated with reward bias
formal, race-influenced social interactions. Another to be noxious may be less offended by the covert,
way to put this expanded view of discrimination: subconscious “relational discrimination” that un-
reward bias reflects discrimination in contract while derlies development bias.7
development bias reflects discrimination in contact.
Regarding the distinction between reward bias and
Obviously, these two forms of bias are not mutual- development bias: to understand persistent racial
ly exclusive. The acquisition of skills can be blocked inequality in America, it is crucial to put relations
by overt discriminatory treatment, and a regime before transactions. The focus on discriminatory
of market discrimination under pressure from the economic transactions may not be sufficient; one
forces of economic competition may require infor- will need also to consider the consequences of racial-
mal instruments of social control to maintain that ly stigmatized social relations. Stigma—the distorted
discriminatory regime.6 Though both kinds of bias social meanings attaching to “blackness”—inhibits
promote racial inequality, the distinction is useful. the access that some black people have to those net-
works of social affiliation where developmental re-
The moral problem presented by reward bias is sources are most readily appropriated. This might
straightforward and calls for an uncontroversial happen because black people are socially excluded;
remedy: laws against overt racial discrimination. it might also happen because we choose to be social-
Development bias presents a subtler and more in- ly withdrawn.
sidious ethical challenge that may be difficult to
remedy via public policies in any way that garners On this view, persistent inequality may no longer be
majoritarian support. Ultimately, development bias due mainly to a racially discriminatory marketplace,
deals with some cultural patterns that are character- or an administrative state that refuses to reward
istic of both a racial minority group and the society black talent equally, as was the case in decades past.
at large, while reward bias deals with overt antiblack Rather, today’s problem may be due, in large part,
discriminatory treatment that, even though it has to a race-tinged psychology of perception and val-
not been fully eliminated, is nevertheless nearly uni- uation—a way of seeing black people, and a way of
versally condemned. black people seeing themselves, that impedes the ac-
quisition of traits that are valued in the marketplace
The difficulties for remedying development bias and are essential for human development.
have a cognitive and an ethical dimension. In terms
of cognition, when confronted with a racial group’s This can lead to a vicious circle. The status of a racial

Homicide Victimization by Age, Gender, and Race, 1976–2005


WHITE MALES BLACK MALES WHITE FEMALES BLACK FEMALES
Rate per 100,000 population Rate per 100,000 population Rate per 100,000 population Rate per 100,000 population

200
40 40
18-24
150 10
30 30
18-24
100
20 18-24 25+
18-24 20
5
25+
25+
10 50 10
25+
14-17 14-17 14-17
0 14-17 0 0 0
'75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05

Source: James Alan Fox and Marianne W. Zawitz, “Homicide Trends in the United States,” Bureau of Justice Statistics

E S S AY Why Does Racial Inequality Persist? | Culture, Causation, and Responsibility 4


group as stigmatized in the social imagination—and inequality an intellectual framework that had been
crucially, in its own self-understanding—can be ra- well developed in economics to explain the invest-
tionalized and socially reproduced because of that ment decisions of firms—a framework that focuses
group’s subordinate position in the economic order. on the analysis of formal economic transactions.
Moreover, this way of thinking implies that the explan-
atory categories of “racial discrimination” and “racial- I argued that associating business with human in-
ly distinct behaviors” are not mutually exclusive. vestments is merely an analogy, not an identity—
particularly if one seeks to explain persistent racial
disparities. Human capital, as an economic concept,
overlooks two important facts having to do with in-
Social Capital Versus formal social relations.
Human Capital First, all human development is socially situated and
mediated. Human development takes place between
A quarter-century before the publication of The people, by way of human interactions, within social
Anatomy of Racial Inequality, I coined the term institutions—the family, the community, the school,
“social capital” to help account for persistent racial the peer group. Many resources essential to human
inequality in the U.S.8 The concept behind social development, such as the attention that parents give
capital illuminates the difference between informal to their children, are not alienable. These resources,
social relations and formal economic transactions— for the most part, are not commodities and are not
between reward and development bias—as mecha- up for sale. Instead, structured connections between
nisms perpetuating the subordinate position of Af- individuals create the context within which develop-
rican-Americans. mental resources come to be allocated to individual
persons. Opportunity travels along the synapses of
As an economist, I sought to differentiate social these social networks.
capital with the more familiar term in my own field:
“human capital.” Human-capital theory attempts The resulting allocation of developmental resourc-
to account for variation in people’s earnings ca- es need not be responsive to prices or be economi-
pacities by analogy with well-developed theories of cally efficient. The development of human beings is
investment. These theories begin with the assump- not the same as corporate investment, and it is not
tion of competitive markets and rational choice a good metaphor, or a good analogy, to reason as
by forward-looking individuals, and then analyze though this were so.
investment decisions in light of individuals’ time
preferences, their anticipated rates of return, and Human development begins before birth. The deci-
the available alternatives for uses of their time. Hu- sions a mother makes—about how closely to attend
man-capital theory imports into the study of human to her health and nutrition during pregnancy, for

Homicide Offending by Age, Gender, and Race, 1976–2005


WHITE MALES BLACK MALES WHITE FEMALES BLACK FEMALES
Rate per 100,000 population Rate per 100,000 population Rate per 100,000 population Rate per 100,000 population

400
40 40
18-24 300 10
30 30
18-24
18-24
200
20 20
14-17 5
25+ 25+
100 18-24
10 10
25+ 25+
14-17 14-17
14-17
0 0 0 0
'75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05

Source: Fox and Zawitz, “Homicide Trends in the United States”

E S S AY Why Does Racial Inequality Persist? | Culture, Causation, and Responsibility 5


instance—will alter the neurological development of so as biologically to reproduce the variety of pheno-
her fetus. This, and a myriad of other decisions and typic expression that constitutes the substance of
actions, all come together to shape the experience racial distinction.
of the infant, who will mature one day to become a
human being, and about whom it will be said that he If the goal is to understand durable racial inequal-
or she has this or that much productivity, as reflect- ity in a society, one needs to attend in detail to the
ed in his or her wages or academic test scores. processes that cause race to persist as a fact of life,
because such processes will be related to the allocation
This productivity, the behavioral and cognitive ca- of human developmental resources in that society.
pacities bearing on a person’s social and economic
functioning, are not merely the result of a mechan- Race, as a feature of a society, rests upon the cultur-
ical infusion of material resources. Rather, these al conceptions about identity held by the people—
are by-products of social processes mediated by in America, principally blacks and whites alike—in
networks of human affiliation, and these processes that society. These are the beliefs that people hold
are fundamentally important for understanding per- about who they are and about the legitimacy of
sistent racial disparities. conducting intimate relations (and not only sexual
relations) with racially distinct others. Beliefs
Second, what we call “race” is mainly a social, and of this kind affect the access that people enjoy to
only indirectly a biological, phenomenon. The per- those informal resources that individuals require
sistence across generations of racial differentiation to develop their human potential. Social capital is
between large groups of people, in an open society a critical prerequisite for creating what economists
where individuals live in proximity to one another, refer to as human capital.
provides irrefutable indirect evidence of a profound
separation between the racially defined networks of Any conceptual framework for the study of persistent
social affiliation within that society. There would be racial inequality is incomplete if it fails to consider
no races in the steady state of any dynamic social the interactions between those social processes
system unless, on a daily basis and with regard to ensuring the reproduction of racial difference, on
their most intimate affairs, people paid assiduous one hand, and those processes facilitating human
attention to the boundaries separating themselves development, on the other hand. If we consider
from racially distinct others. Over time, race would these interactions, it becomes easier to see the
cease to exist unless people chose to act in a manner many intimate connections between the antiblack

Men’s Percentage Risk of Imprisonment, Ages Household Living Arrangements of


30–34, by Race and Educational Attainment* Children by Race
100%
High High 8 2 7 2 8 2 2 5 1 8 3 4 8 2
10
All School School/ College 12 14
80% 18
Dropouts GED 27 25
32 34
1945–1949 cohort 39
60% 57
White 1.4 3.8 1.5 0.4
Black 10.4 14.7 11.0 5.3 40% 82
73
63 65
Latino 2.8 4.1 2.9 1.1 56 56
20% 43
1975–1979 cohort 33

White 5.4 28.0 6.2 1.2 0%


Total White Black Hispanic Asian Pacific American/ Two or
Black 26.8 68.0 21.4 6.6 Islander Indian more
Alaska races
Race/ethnicity Native
Latino 12.2 19.6 9.2 3.4
Married F emale parent,  ale parent,
M All other children*
no spouse present no spouse present
*C umulative risk of imprisonment, ages 30–34, men born 1945–49 and 1975–79, by
educational attainment and race/ethnicity Source: Lauren Musu-Gillette et al., “Status and Trends in the Education of Racial and Ethnic Groups
2017,” U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), July 2017
Source: Bruce Western and Becky Pettit, “Incarceration and Social Inequality,” Daedalus:
Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 139, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 8–19 *Includes foster children, children in unrelated subfamilies, children living in group quarters, and
children who were reported as the house holder or spouse of the householder.

E S S AY Why Does Racial Inequality Persist? | Culture, Causation, and Responsibility 6


“racial bias” that liberals emphasize and the portunities as had come to exist. I stressed to other
“behavioral pathology” of (some) blacks that (some) blacks that if we were ever to achieve equality within
conservatives are so keen to focus on. American society, we could not simply rely on the
antidiscrimination laws and affirmative action; we
would also have to address some of these internal
behavioral patterns. I still believe this to be the case.
Nobody Is Coming to Save Us
By pointing to the “enemy within,” I did not deny
I know how difficult it can be to see those connec- that the ultimate source of such adverse internal
tions—it has taken me many years to recognize patterns might be historical discrimination. (Al-
them. My doctoral dissertation included an essay though as a social scientist, I recognized that this
that was very close to the liberal, “racial bias” narra- kind of causal inference question is nearly impossi-
tive. History, I wrote, casts a long shadow. Contem- ble to resolve convincingly by looking at data.) But
porary racial inequality in America reflects a history it did not matter so much what the ultimate sources
of deprivation, discrimination, and dispossession of of internal behavioral patterns were; what mattered
black people. We can’t expect this problem to cure was how they were to be reversed.
itself. Thus, social justice rightly understood would
involve some kind of reparation. I didn’t use that The majority of African-American children are born
word, but I did advocate for some intervention by to a woman without a husband. It is extremely im-
the state on behalf of the explicit goal of racial equal- plausible to imagine how this would be reversed by
ity. Otherwise, I reasoned, we would be stuck indefi- government policies such as the redistribution of re-
nitely with the consequences of an unjust past.9 sources. (I am aware of no evidence to this effect.)
If this trend is to be reversed at all, it would require
That was Glenn Loury circa 1976. By 1985, I had a determined effort by African-Americans to think
become a Reagan Republican, emphasizing the differently about our responsibilities to our children
problems of single-parent families, out-of-wedlock and to one another.
births among blacks, low labor-force participation
and educational performance, and high criminal and And so I would say to fellow African-Americans:
victimization rates. My favored formulation: there No one is coming to save us! The situation in
is an enemy without—namely, racism; but there is which we find ourselves is unfair, but this is not a
also an enemy within—namely, behavior patterns question of justice. Nobody is coming, and, more
inhibiting African-Americans from seizing such op- fundamentally, no one can come into the most

Percentage of Births to Pregnancies per 1,000 Abortions per 1,000


Unmarried Women Women Aged 15–19 Women Aged 15–44

60% Blacks 250 60


54 Black

200
Hispanic
40% 40
Black
35 150 non-Hispanic
Hispanics
29 27.1

Whites 100 Hispanic


19 18.1
20% White 20
18
Other non-Hispanic
10% 50 16.3
13
Asians White non-Hispanic
10
0% 0 0
'70 '80 '90 '00 '14 '91 '93 '95 '97 '99 '01 '03 '05 '07 '09 '11 '13 '00 '08 '14

Source: Pew Research Center, “Demographic Trends Source: “U.S. Rates of Pregnancy, Birth and Abortion Source: “Abortion Rates by Race and Ethnicity,”
and Economic Well-Being” Among Adolescents and Young Adults Continue to Guttmacher Institute, Oct. 19, 2017
Decline,” Guttmacher Institute, Sept. 17, 2017

E S S AY Why Does Racial Inequality Persist? | Culture, Causation, and Responsibility 7


intimate relations between our women and men, “Bias Narratives” Can Take
into the families and neighborhoods where our
children are being raised, so as to reorder those on (Viral) Lives of Their Own
cultural institutions in a manner that would be more
developmentally constructive. Today, as social-justice warriors take to the streets
to protest against racism, it is important to recognize
These matters are ultimately and necessarily in the the role played by Facebook, Twitter, Instagram,
hands of African-Americans alone. They require and other social media. Many people get news from
facing up to such questions as: Who are we as a online sources that play to the narrative that Amer-
people? How should we live with one another? What ican society is overwhelmingly populated by white
will we do to honor the sacrifices that our ancestors bigots; so incidents that are not at all representa-
made to leave us the opportunities we now enjoy? tive nevertheless become iconic because they go
What do we owe our children? viral. A student finds something resembling a noose
near his dorm-room door; a security guard says to
Think about black-on-black crime. Unemployment someone, “I am unsure whether you belong here.
rates, wealth holdings, residential segregation, and Let me see your ID”; customers are asked to leave
biased policing all may be playing some role in a food-service establishment when the manager
this problem. But young black men are killing one thinks that their behavior is inconsistent with the
another at extraordinary rates. Notwithstanding establishment’s rules. These incidents become na-
the potential beneficial effects of various social pol- tional events. It is not simply that something has
icies, no one is coming to save black people from happened, or that a lot of people know about some-
that pathology. If we are not prepared to condemn thing having happened. Rather, what matters is that
this contemptible behavior and to cooperate with a lot of people know that many people know of the
institutions of civil authority that are legitimate- incidents in question.
ly addressing it—if we are unable to recognize that
this is a tragic failure with the way that black people Idiosyncratic occurrences then become “driving
are living—we will likely be facing exactly the same while black,” “barbecuing while black,” “swimming
issues for many years to come. while black,” “shopping while black,” “walking while
black,” and so forth. The narrative of pervasive an-
tiblack racism becomes a trope. When millions of
people focus on the same events and reinforce one

Reading Achievement at the Eighth Grade


Below Basic At Basic At Proficient At Advanced

Race/ethnicity

White 16 43 36 4

Black 45 42 12 #

Hispanic 42 43 15 1

Asian/ 20 39 36 5
Pacific Islander

American Indian/
44 38 16 2
Alaska Native

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent below Basic Percent at or above Basic

# Rounds to zero
Source: “Status and Trends in the Education of Racial and Ethnic Groups,” NCES, July 2010

E S S AY Why Does Racial Inequality Persist? | Culture, Causation, and Responsibility 8


another in their comments, declaring one’s outrage outrage of the day and are thought to be racists—
at such incidents becomes a substitute for reason- risks devaluing one’s reputation among “progres-
ing about what larger meaning, if any, should be at- sives.”
tached to these events.
My theory of political correctness: a cognitive and
I often ask people who tell me about these inci- intellectual dead end where too many people are
dents: Why do we care? Why should I care whether motivated to remain silent on critical questions, to
a woman was asked to put out her cigarette when a voice empty platitudes, or even to say things that
police officer stopped her for a broken taillight on a they don’t believe, all by their need to avoid appear-
dusty road in Texas? Is that supposed to be emblem- ing as though they’re on the wrong side of history.10
atic of the treatment of black people in this country?

As a social scientist, I am loath to operate based on


a few anecdotes. For many who embrace the bias Those Who Downplay
narrative, however, that’s what is happening. Inci-
dents that are not representative but that are salient Behavioral Disparities
within a bias narrative go viral and shape the con-
sciousness of many. The viral social construction
Are Bluffing
of episodes that are not the substance of our lives
comes to shape our politics via exaggerated projec- People on the left of American politics who claim that
tions onto the surface of our lives. This is not “pol- “white supremacy,” “implicit bias,” and old-fash-
itics”—if, by that term, we understand mechanisms ioned discrimination account for black disadvantage
of give-and-take and persuasion by means of which are daring you to disagree. Their implicit rebuke is
we govern ourselves. It is, rather, a certain kind of that, if you do not agree, you are saying that there’s
mass delusion. something intrinsically wrong with black people, or
with black culture; you must be a racist who thinks
A big part of the problem is virtue signaling. Only that blacks are inferior. Otherwise, they say, how
certain kinds of (immoral) people would refuse to go else could one explain the disparities? Behavior?
along with these delusions, and too many of us wish That leads to the accusation that you are “blaming
not to be thought of as being one of those people, so the victim.”
we avoid expressing skepticism publicly. To do so—
to repeat things being said by those who scoff at the But this is a bluff. It is a rhetorical sleight-of-hand,

Reading Achievement at the 12th Grade


Below Basic At Basic At Proficient At Advanced

Race/ethnicity

White 21 36 37 6

Black 46 38 15 1

Hispanic 40 40 18 2

Asian/ 26 38 31 5
Pacific Islander

American Indian/
33 41 24 ‡
Alaska Native

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent below Basic Percent at or above Basic

‡ Reporting standards not met


Source: “Status and Trends in the Education of Racial and Ethnic Groups,” NCES, 2010

E S S AY Why Does Racial Inequality Persist? | Culture, Causation, and Responsibility 9


a debater’s trick. Why? Consider a statement that One is not born with the knowledge, skills, and ac-
“mass incarceration,” the high number of blacks in ademic ability to gain admission into elite colleges.
jails and prisons, is self-evidently a sign of American The people who acquire these skills do so through
racism. If you respond that it’s mainly a sign of the effort. Why do some youngsters acquire the skills
pathological behavior of criminals who happen to while others do not? That is a deep question requir-
be black, you risk being called a racist. Yet common ing a serious answer. The simple answer—that this
sense, not to mention the evidence, suggests that disparity is due to racism, and anyone who says oth-
people are not being arrested, tried, convicted, and erwise is a racist—is not serious. Do such disparate
sentenced because they are black. Rather, prisons outcomes have nothing to do with behavior, with
are full of people who have broken the law, who have cultural patterns, with what peer groups value, with
hurt other people, who have violated the basic rules how people spend their time, with what they identify
of civility. Prison is not a conspiracy to confine black as being critical to their self-respect? Anyone who
people. I maintain that no serious person believes believes that is, at best, a fool.
that it is. Not really.
Asians are said, sardonically, to be a “model minori-
The young black men taking one another’s lives on ty.” As a matter of fact, quite a compelling case can
the streets of St. Louis, Baltimore, and Chicago are be made that “culture” is critical to their success.
exhibiting behavioral pathology, plain and simple. Jennifer Lee and Min Zhou interviewed Asian fami-
The people they kill are mainly black, and the fam- lies in Southern California, trying to learn how their
ilies who live with the misery are mainly black. As- kids get into Dartmouth, Columbia, and Cornell at
cribing that to white racism is laughable. Nobody such high rates.12 They found that these families
believes it. Not really. do exhibit cultural patterns, embrace values, adopt
practices, engage in behavior, and follow disciplines
Consider educational test-score data. Antiracism that orient them so as to facilitate the achievements
advocates are, in effect, daring you to say that some of their children. It defies common sense, as well as
groups send their children to the elite universities the evidence, to assert that they do not, or, converse-
in outsize numbers compared with other groups ly, to assert that the paucity of African-Americans
because their academic preparation is magnitudes performing at the very top of the intellectual spec-
higher and better. Such excellence is an achieve- trum—I am talking about academic excellence and
ment.11 about the low relative numbers of blacks who exhibit
it—has nothing to do with behavior, that it is due en-

Mathematics Achievement at the Eighth Grade


Below Basic At Basic At Proficient At Advanced

Race/ethnicity
White 17 40 33 11

Black 50 37 11 1

Hispanic 43 40 15 2

Asian/ 15 31 34 20
Pacific Islander

American Indian/
44 38 15 3
Alaska Native

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent below Basic Percent at or above Basic

Source: “Status and Trends in the Education of Racial and Ethnic Groups,” NCES, 2010

E S S AY Why Does Racial Inequality Persist? | Culture, Causation, and Responsibility 10


tirely to institutional forces. That is an absurdity. Thus, the Obama administration’s Department of
Education issued a “Dear Colleague Letter”13 that
Some 70% of African-American babies are born to a sought to cajole local school districts around the
woman without a husband. Is this a good thing? Is country to narrow the racial disparity in the suspen-
it due to the ongoing practice of antiblack racism? sion rates of students for disruptive behavior. The
Some people say these things. Do they really believe letter was supposedly advice—but failure to narrow
these things, or are they daring you to deny them? the disparity meant that the district could be found
guilty of a civil rights violation and potentially lose
The 21st-century failures of too many African-Amer- federal funding. Trump’s secretary of education,
icans to take advantage of the opportunities created Betsy DeVos, rescinded that letter—resulting in a
by the civil rights revolution are palpable, yet they great deal of consternation.
are denied at every turn. This position is untenable.
The end of Jim Crow segregation and the advent Of course, if teachers, principals, guidance counsel-
of equal rights for blacks were game changers. A ors, and school-based police officers are discrimi-
half-century later, the deep disparities that remain nating by race when they discipline students, the
are shameful and are due in large part to the behav- Department of Education and the Department of
iors of black people. Justice should get involved. But based on all that
we know—for instance, about crime and incarcer-
People tout the racial wealth gap as, ipso facto, an ation rates—it is at least plausible that there is an
indictment of the system—even while black Caribbe- objective racial disparity in the frequency of disrup-
an and African immigrants are starting businesses, tive behavior that occasions a difference in the sus-
penetrating the professions, and presenting them- pension statistics. If behavior, not racism, is at the
selves at Ivy League institutions in outsize numbers. bottom of racially disparate suspension rates, think
They are behaving, although black, like other immi- of the disservice being done—to the schoolchildren
grant groups in our nation’s past. True, they are im- who act out (by failing to teach the lesson that bad
migrants, not natives, and immigration can be posi- behavior has consequences), to classmates (includ-
tively selectived. But something is dreadfully wrong ing, of course, minority students) who are hindered
when adverse patterns of behavior readily visible from getting an education by disruptive classroom
in the black American population go without being behavior, and to teachers, who are trying to main-
adequately discussed—to the point that anybody tain a safe environment for learning.
daring to mention them is labeled a racist.

Mathematics Achievement at the 12th Grade


Below Basic At Basic At Proficient At Advanced

Race/ethnicity
White 30 41 26 3

Black 70 25 5 #

Hispanic 60 32 8 #

Asian/ 27 37 30 6
Pacific Islander

American Indian/
58 36 5 1
Alaska Native

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent below Basic Percent at or above Basic

# Rounds to zero
Source: “Status and Trends in the Education of Racial and Ethnic Groups,” 2010

E S S AY Why Does Racial Inequality Persist? | Culture, Causation, and Responsibility 11


One more example of how this bluffing can do harm: victim, to filter experience constantly and at every
the affirmative-action debate. We are now on the instance through a sieve that catches everything that
verge of permanently including African-Americans one has control over while leaving the outcome to
in elite and selective academic institutions through invisible, implacable historical forces: something is
an openly acknowledged use of different standards. pathetic about that posture.
That is horrible—and not because of the Fourteenth
Amendment, though the Supreme Court may yet The struggle for equal rights for black people, from
find it so. It’s horrible because this is not equality. abolition through the civil rights movement, has
It is patronizing. It is horrible for black Americans always been thought of as a “freedom struggle.” But
to embrace, and the establishment to adopt, a set with freedom, rightly understood, comes responsi-
of practices rooted in the soft bigotry of low expec- bility. It is past time for all of us to start perform-
tations. Yet other than Clarence Thomas, Thomas ing without a net. Rather than lamenting the lack
Sowell, and a few others, there is not even a debate of black billionaires, an outcome ascribed to some
among African-Americans about what should be a invisible force called “racism,” one can admit that
first-order question, if the goal is to attain genuine you will never become a billionaire unless you build
racial equality. a billion-dollar business—which begins by starting a
business. One will never win a Nobel Prize in physics
unless one learns calculus at the age of 12. What
black parents are insisting that their 12-year-old
No Responsibility kids learn calculus—those few kids capable of doing
so? White people are not responsible for the fact that
Means No Glory black people are, or are not, doing this.

If the negative cultural patterns in some Afri-


can-American communities are said to be a neces-
sary consequence of oppression, what is one to make Not All Black People
of positive cultural patterns of behavior? Are they,
too, a necessary consequence of oppression? If an Are the Same
individual or a community refuses to take respon-
sibility for failure, how can they claim any glory for All this having been said about the behavioral roots
success? No blame? No skin in the game? Then no of racial inequality, it is dangerous to talk about
credit. “black culture” as if it were only one thing—with
pathological behavior (such as high levels of urban
You cannot help the hand you are dealt; but you can violence) becoming a stereotype about all black
decide how to play it. To cast oneself as a helpless people. Here an insight by UCLA sociologist Rogers

Out-of-School Suspension Rates, by Race/Ethnicity and Sex


Total Male Female

50%

40%

30%

20%
19.6
15.4
10%
11.1 10.5
8.7 8.2 7.8 8.8
6.4 6.2 2.3 1.5 2.3 2.2 6.4
4.0 5.9 3.6 0.7 3.8 5.2 5.1 3.9
0% 4.3
Total White Black Hispanic Asian Pacific American Indian/ Two or
Islander Alaska Native more races
Race/ethnicity
Source: “Status and Trends in the Education of Racial and Ethnic Groups 2017,” NCES, July 2017

E S S AY Why Does Racial Inequality Persist? | Culture, Causation, and Responsibility 12


Brubaker is crucial for understanding race and in- Another example involves the drug trade, which in
equality: one should never invoke racial aggregates the U.S. is worth billions of dollars annually and
as the subjects of social analysis unreflectively.14 includes marijuana, heroin, cocaine, ecstasy, and
crystal meth. It involves people of every race in
This is a major concern among African-Americans every geographic location and every walk of life.
about “culture talk.” Culture talk overly focuses on But the street trafficking in drugs in large urban
pathology; but many positive things could be men- areas is largely in the hands of black and Latino
tioned that will not typically appear in an op-ed. youth—in substantial part because the only people
Black people are not a this or a that. They are a pop- who would do such dangerous, low-paying work are
ulation in excess of 30 million, with cultural patterns those whose alternative employment opportunities
as variegated as one would expect in such a large ag- are scant. It is no surprise that those incarcerated
gregation. for street-level trafficking are disproportionately
blacks. Their arrests and imprisonment are not in
Moreover, American society is a polyglot mixture themselves evidence of racism—or evidence of black
where cultural dynamics influence one another. culture. But given the bare facts of racial stigma in
For example, some middle-class, suburban white American society, many observers will be inclined to
kids download rap music produced by black artists think so.
from the inner city. These musicians come to have a
market substantially influenced by the preferences
of their middle-class white customers. To a certain
degree, they play to that audience, including that We’re All in This Together—at
audience’s stereotypes about thuggish behavior.
Along comes a schoolteacher who announces: “Rap Least We’re Supposed to Be
music is bad, and it’s pathological. Can’t you see just
how troubled black people are?” This is ludicrous— This point about racial stigma is fundamental.
how is it that a few hundred musicians and artists Without understanding it, one might say (as many
responding to a national market consisting mostly conservative commentators do), “Look at recent im-
of white customers suddenly become emblematic of migrants from Asia and even from Latin America.
black culture or black people? They, too, have been victims in various ways. Yet they
have advanced in our society even as the blacks of in-

Some Data from Harvard’s Affirmative-Action Case


Applications by Academic Index Decile and Race Admission Rates by Academic Index Decile and Race

Share of Applicants in Each Decile


Academic Academic
African- Asian African- Asian
Index White Hispanic TOTAL Index White Hispanic TOTAL
American American American American
Decile Decile
1 4.98 38.85 20.47 3.92 10.55 1 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
2 7.58 22.76 20.52 5.11 10.23 2 0.30% 0.80% 0.18% 0.21% 0.39%
3 11.01 15.2 17.15 7.14 11.12 3 0.48% 4.51% 1.83% 0.53% 1.45%
4 10.32 7.52 11.29 7.16 9.12 4 1.66% 10.60% 4.76% 0.84% 2.83%
5 12.11 5.46 9.29 8.97 10.03 5 2.25% 19.62% 7.80% 1.49% 3.91%
6 12.6 3.84 7.12 10.8 10.31 6 3.54% 26.28% 11.19% 2.42% 4.79%
7 12.19 2.68 5.09 11.23 9.85 7 3.91% 37.60% 15.76% 3.35% 5.62%
8 11.14 1.89 4.37 13.08 9.85 8 6.42% 41.48% 20.30% 4.00% 6.85%
9 9.75 1.17 2.76 15.85 9.76 9 9.32% 50.90% 22.27% 6.26% 8.77%
10 8.31 0.64 1.94 16.73 9.18 10 13.59% 49.45% 28.04% 9.36% 11.70%
Source: Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Harvard, no. 14-cv-14176-ADB (D. Mass), Expert Report of Peter S. Arcidiacono, doc. 415-1, Tables 5.1 and 5.2 June 15, 2018
Note: See endnote 11 of this essay for explanantion.
Source: Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Harvard, no. 14-cv-14176-ADB (D. Mass), Expert Report of Peter S. Arcidiacono, doc. 415-1, June 15, 2018

E S S AY Why Does Racial Inequality Persist? | Culture, Causation, and Responsibility 13


ner-city Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, Baltimore, for socioeconomic racial disparities. But that is not
New Orleans, Los Angeles, and Oakland continue the whole story.
to lag. Whatever is wrong with those people?” In
effect: “It must be something about ‘those people,’ Racial intermarriage rates in the U.S. remain quite
not about us, that causes them to be so backward.” low (though they have risen in recent decades).15
The reasons for this low rate are unclear. Are black
By looking at America this way, one eschews social, women, perhaps, receiving marriage proposals from
political, and moral responsibility for the plight white men and turning them down? I don’t know. But
of those people. One will conclude that blacks’ I strongly suspect that a low rate of cross-boundary
failure to develop their human potential reflects mating between these two groups has implications
the absence of such potential (and there are books for human development, for resources available to
making that argument), or it reflects a backward children, and for the generation and transmission of
culture that, sadly but inevitably (“What more can wealth.
we do?”) causes them to lag behind. Yet blacks are
not the authors of the stigma that engenders de- Moreover, the low rate of intermarriage has impli-
velopmental bias against them. When we under- cations for the dating and mating market among
stand that the way people come to value things or blacks because they are a small minority of the pop-
make decisions is partly created via interactions in ulation—roughly one in eight Americans. If white
society, their flourishing, or lack thereof, reflects on men and black women were marrying at a higher
society as a whole, as well as on themselves. It re- rate, black men and black women would be inter-
flects on an “us,” not merely on “them.” acting in a different way. To observe a social equi-
librium in which blacks and whites exhibit different
The mistake is to ignore the extent to which racial out-of-wedlock birthrates and, on the basis of that
inequality reflects not only cultural patterns among observation, to impute the difference to something
insular groups of people but also the interactions called black culture, reflects one’s failure to see how
that run through society. To impute a causal role the intra-racial marriage market is nested within a
to what one takes to be intrinsic cultural traits of larger context, where a higher rate of cross-bound-
a subordinate racial group, while failing to see the ary mating could substantially alter intra-boundary
systemwide context out of which dysfunctional cul- behavior.
tural patterns emerged, is to commit a significant
error of social cognition. That members of a partic- What may be perceived as a characteristic of “those
ular group seem to perform less well routinely on people” (Why don’t they marry? Why do they bear
a set of transactions of interest is a matter not of a their children in such a disorderly manner?) might
cultural essence but of the network of social rela- be seen instead as a question about society as a
tions that has (or has not) prepared the members whole. From the perspective of the white popula-
of that group for those transactions. tion, perhaps the real question about out-of-wedlock
births is: “Why do we avoid intimacy with them?” I
In the U.S. context, “blackness” is associated with use “us,” “we,” “them” to emphasize how stigma op-
stigmatizing meanings. This stigma leads nonblack erates. It operates in the very definition of who one
people to be reluctant to enter into intimate social understands to be the social “we.”
or individual relations with them, which in turn
affects the social allocation of developmental re- How a society answers the question, “Who are we?”
sources. has far-reaching implications. When Americans
talk about crime, violence, school failure, and urban
People don’t make social judgments based on decay, do we understand these matters as “us versus
straightforward benefit-cost calculations. Rather, them”? If so, it becomes possible to say, regarding
they often act on identity considerations. They ask people languishing in the ghettos of our great cities:
such questions as: Who am I? How should I live? “That’s not my country. That’s some third-world
With whom should I associate? When should I thing.”
extend to this “other” a benefit of the doubt? Racial
inequality is, in substantial part, the outcome of This was actually said during the flood of New
a system of nonmarket social interactions such as Orleans that followed Hurricane Katrina. But black
these that entangle us together. people have been in New Orleans for 250 years.
They’re not aliens. They’re as American as anybody
Consider the high out-of-wedlock birthrates among can be. That was us crawling up on the rooftops.
blacks. This pattern of behavior has consequences That was us huddled in the Superdome. The abject

E S S AY Why Does Racial Inequality Persist? | Culture, Causation, and Responsibility 14


poverty that was exposed to a national audience after Conclusion: Who Are We?
the flood was a quintessentially American affair, not
simply a measure of the inadequacy of black culture. How should we think about the persistence of racial
It reflected as well upon our social inadequacy. inequality in America? To deny the relevance of be-
havioral patterns among some black families and
The perspective I am promoting about social capital communities is folly. To wash one’s hands of their
does not require special, race-targeted social policy. problems because of such cultural and behavior-
Most policy initiatives aimed at improving the lives al impediments is profoundly unjust. There are no
of our most disadvantaged citizens should not, and easy answers, but I suggest that the view here is
need not, be formulated in explicitly racial terms worth considering as a way to account for, and then
or understood as a remedy for racial injuries. We respond to, an enduring dilemma that confronts and
have to find what works for disadvantaged people frustrates us still.
in America, period. If we get that right—if we can
fashion an American welfare state consistent with Take the poor central-city dwellers who make up
our demographic realities, our own values, and our perhaps a quarter of the African-American popu-
fiscal capacities—we will go a very long way toward lation. The dysfunctional behavior of many in this
assisting African-Americans to develop their full population does account for much of their failure
human potential. to progress—and conservatives’ demand for greater
personal responsibility is necessary and proper. Yet,
Finding what works is especially pertinent for ed- confronted with the despair, violence, and self-de-
ucation policy. Disadvantaged youngsters who structive behavior of so many people, it seems
live in large cities are poorly served by the major- morally superficial in the extreme to argue, as many
ity–minority school districts on which they and conservatives do, that “those people should just
their parents must rely. This is a huge area for get their acts together; if they did, like many of the
policy innovation, with respect to charter schools poor immigrants, we would not have such a horrific
and increased options for parents. Yet black politi- problem in our cities.” To the contrary, any morally
cians who speak publicly on the issue are virtually astute response to the social pathology of American
unanimous in adopting the hostility toward charter history’s losers would have to conclude that, while
schools that animates the country’s largest teachers’ we cannot change our ignoble past, we must not be
union, the National Education Association. Thus, at indifferent to contemporary suffering issuing direct-
the NAACP’s annual board meeting in Cincinnati in ly from that past. Their culture may be implicated
2016, delegates were overwhelmed by black Ameri- in their difficulties, but so is our culture complicit in
can parents who had stormed the meeting to protest their troubles; we bear collective responsibility for
that the organization’s board was about to endorse the form and texture of our social relations.
a resolution that opposed more funding for charter
schools in various states.16 While we cannot ignore the behavioral problems of
the so-called black underclass, we should discuss
Are police good or bad for the security and safety of and react to those problems as if we were talking
black lives in U.S. cities? It is hard to imagine a more about our own children, neighbors, and friends.
important question. Yet one is hard-pressed to find It will require adjusting ways of thinking on both
any effective political debate among African-Amer- sides of the racial divide. Achieving a well-ordered
icans. Instead, we get the shopworn and ineffective society, where all members are embraced as being
stances that people on the left are taking. among us, should be the goal. Our failure to do so is
an American tragedy. It is a national, not merely
Social-justice warriors are supposed to care about a communal, disgrace. Changing the definition of
black lives. But if they did, they’d seriously care the American “we” is a first step toward rectifying
about securing the safety and property of Afri- the relational discrimination that afflicts our
can-Americans in the South Bronx, the west side society, and it is the best path forward in reducing
of Chicago, and other cities. A real argument is to racial inequality.
be had over public safety and the role of the police,
and the answers are far from self-evident. Yet I’m
not sure that social-justice warriors care about black
lives. They seem to care more about remaining in
lockstep with fashionable liberal opinion.

E S S AY Why Does Racial Inequality Persist? | Culture, Causation, and Responsibility 15


Endnotes
1 Glenn C. Loury, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002). See also my collection of critical essays,
One by One from the Inside Out: Race and Responsibility in America (New York: Free Press, 1995).
2 A self-conscious awareness that the marks on one’s body may convey profound significations to others in society may be an impediment to one’s
psychological health—particularly in the U.S., where, because of the need to justify chattel slavery in a nation self-consciously defining itself as
“the land of liberty,” the mark of blackness has, over the last two centuries, come to be infused with long-enduring, derogatory significations.
3 See, e.g., Luigi Cavalli-Sforza, Paolo Menozzi, and Alberto Piazza, The History and Geography of Human Genes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1996).
4 See, e.g., Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
5 The powerful and derogatory social meanings associated with the bodily marks that define race in American society may even be internalized
by persons identifying with a stigmatized racial group—even people like me, who might hope to study such matters scientifically. How does one
achieve the objective observer’s stance while enmeshed in the tangled web of identities, fealties, and conflicting narratives that surrounds racial
discourse in America?
6 For example, norms against trading with stigmatized “others” may be established and enforced via threats of social ostracism.
7 For example, the same citizens who object if a white police officer treats black youths unfairly might say nothing when white families flee an
integrating residential community because of an exaggerated fear of what they perceive to be “black crime.”
8 Glenn C. Loury, “Essays in the Theory of the Distribution of Income” (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1976). The sociologist
James S. Coleman, in his Foundations of Social Theory (1990), credits me, along with Jane Jacobs (The Economy of Cities, 1970), as having been
an originator of this concept. Political scientist Robert Putnam also cites my dissertation to this same effect in Making Democracy Work (1993).
9 Glenn C. Loury, “A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences,” in Women, Minorities and Employment Discrimination, ed. P. A. Wallace
and A. LaMond (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977).
10 See Glenn C. Loury, “Self-Censorship in Public Discourse: A Theory of ‘Political Correctness’ and Related Phenomena,” Rationality and Society 6,
no. 4 (November 1994): 426–61.
11 See, e.g., the two tables in this paper on p.12 taken from the affirmative-action lawsuit against Harvard University. For recent African-American
applicants, more than 60% presented academic credentials falling in the bottom two deciles of the applicant pool (meaning that 80% of all
applicants presented better credentials) while fewer than 2% of African-American applicants placed in the top two deciles (those for whom 80%
had worse credentials). By contrast, nearly one-third of all Asian-American applicants ranked in the top two deciles, and fewer than 10% were
among those in the bottom two deciles. Yet, as the second table makes clear, when comparing African-American and Asian-American applicants
with academic credentials in the same decile, one finds blacks being admitted to Harvard at rates five to 10 times higher than the admission rates
for Asian applicants.
12 Jennifer Lee and Min Zhou, The Asian American Achievement Paradox (New York: Russell Sage Foundation Press, 2015).
13 See U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, and U.S. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights (OCR), “Joint ‘Dear Colleague’
Letter,” Jan. 8, 2014. See also Arne Duncan, “Rethinking School Discipline,” speech delivered at the Academies at Frederick Douglass High
School, Baltimore, Jan. 8, 2014.
14 Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006).
15 See, e.g., Renee C. Romano, Race Mixing: Black-White Marriage in Postwar America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).
16 Mark Curnutte, “Protesters Interrupt NAACP Board Meeting Here,” Cincinnati Enquirer, Oct. 15, 2016. The NAACP adopted the
anti-charter resolution.

E S S AY Why Does Racial Inequality Persist? | Culture, Causation, and Responsibility 16


E S S AY Why Does Racial Inequality Persist? | Culture, Causation, and Responsibility 17
 
"I'm Not a Racist, but . . ." The Moral Quandary of Race. Lawrence Blum. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2002. 259 pp.

DIANE BROOK NAPIER, University of Georgia

dnapier@coe.uga.edu

In "I'm Not a Racist, but . . .": The Moral Quandary of Race, Blum scrutinizes the
moral and ethical dimensions of the debate on the topic of race. His principal
argument is that the debate has become polarized, that everything that happens in the
racial arena is labeled as "racism," and that this reduces the term's power to evoke
proper moral outrage. Blum sets out to clarify definitions and types of racism, the
varieties of "racial ills" or symptoms of racism, the distinction between racial
discrimination and color blindness, and the evolution of racial ideology in American
society. He begins with a brief historical sketch of the origins of the term racism (pp.
3-8), then tackles the core meanings of racism under the categories of personal-,
social-, and institutional types of racism. He postulates that all forms of racism can be
related to one of two general paradigms, namely "inferiorization" and
"antipathy/prejudice" (pp. 10-13), both illustrated in the opening chapters. Blum
argues that the terms racism and racist have been "conceptually inflated and morally
overloaded" (p.18), that racial acts are prompted by unadulterated racism in some
cases, but in other cases by motives that are not necessarily racist-hence the title of the
book. He dares to ask questions such as: "Why is racism a moral evil?" "Can blacks
be racist?" and "Do races exist?"

Blum's success in answering these questions is arguable, but he attempts to explain


how prejudice and power operate as racism, how reactive racism occurs in response to
racism, and how scientific research has been misused to demonstrate the existence of
races. As Blum attempts to dissect the concept of racism by enumerating "symptoms"
of racism or racial ills, he experiences some conceptual difficulties (chapter 3), and he
sounds apologetic in some examples when he explains that bigoted actions (such as
using racial epithets, or committing a racist act) do not necessarily make a person a
racist. Here, Blum's words might enflame emotions in readers, in either direction. In
the concluding chapters, Blum turns his attention to broad social processes at work in
the production of racialized groups and social constructions. He suggests that
racialization as a process is best understood in the context of "panethnicity," grouping
disparate ethnocultural groups under an umbrella identity such as "Hispanic/Latino,"
"Native American," and "Asian American." He argues that we would benefit from
viewing ourselves and society in terms of panethnicity and collective identity, rather
than in terms of racial identity. Blum concludes with the nagging question of whether
 
we should "give up on race" (p. 169), closing with the argument that "although
achieving racial justice is an urgent goal, ridding ourselves of false and divisive racial
thinking-abandoning race-is a worthy aim in its own right" (p. 177).

Blum restricts his focus to American society for the most part, and this narrows the
potential value of the argument and of the book as a whole. International origins and
elements of racism are given only brief treatment in the opening chapter. Blum also
focuses largely on the black/white dimensions of racism, making rather sparse
reference to other groups in American society. The historical overview (largely in
chapters 6 and 7) interrupted the flow of Blum's argument across chapters, and would
have been more useful as an introduction. His concluding thoughts on the ideal of
superceding race would have been better served if juxtaposed with the obvious
counterargument that we might never be able to move beyond race, that re-
racialization is perhaps as likely as de-racialization.

Despite these weaknesses, Blum's overall contribution is to illustrate the complexity


of defining and conceptualizing "race" and "racism." Blum addresses a familiar range
of questions in the racism debate as he attempts to deconstruct "race" and "racism," to
scrutinize the moral and ethical threads that demand careful thought rather than mere
attention to slogans. Blum successfully demonstrates that in confronting the "moral
quandary of race" there are no easy or simple answers. Consequently, the book's chief
value might be as a springboard for confronting the thorny questions associated with
race.

The book is likely to interest anyone interested in the history of race and racism in the
United States. It would be useful for researchers as they examine their own data and
experiences that pertain to the question of race in fields such as anthropology,
education, sociocultural studies, multiculturalism, and American sociocultural and
political history. It has modest value as a bibliographic resource but the detailed
endnotes are worth attention. Because of its predominantly American focus its
usefulness to international scholars would be limited to insight into the American
context. For teaching, this could be a valuable supplementary text in graduate courses
in anthropology, postcolonial studies, African American studies, race and race
relations, and cross cultural or multicultural studies, sociology, and political
philosophy. I have used the book provocatively in a doctoral level educational
foundations course on postcolonialism and cultural politics: Blum's arguments evoked
vehement reactions in my students (from agreement, to outrage and indignation).
Overall, any researcher, teacher, or student concerned with matters of race will find
Blum a valuable read, an exhortation to reflect on one's inner feelings about race and
racism as well as on one's position on the issues in society at large.
 
(c)2003 American Anthropological Association. This review is cited in the December
2003 issue (34:4) of Anthropology & Education Quarterly. It is indexed in the
December 2003 issue (34:4).
The Nonperformativity of Antiracism
Author(s): Sara Ahmed
Source: Meridians , 2006, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2006), pp. 104-126
Published by: Duke University Press

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SARA AHMED

The Nonperformativity of
Antiracism

In this paper, I reflect on institutional speech acts: those that make claims
"about" or "on behalf of an institution. Such speech acts involve acts of nam-
ing: the institution is named, and in being "given" a name, the institution is
also "given" attributes, qualities, and even a character. By "speech acts" I in-
clude not just spoken words but writing and visual images - all the materials
that give an institution interiority, as if it has a face, as well as feelings,
thoughts, orjudgments. They might say, forexample, "the university regrets,"
or just simply, "we regret." More specifically, in this paper, I examine docu-
ments that are authorized by institutions (such as race-equality policies,
which are often signed by, say, the vice-chancellor on behalf of an institution),
make claims about the institution (for instance, by describing the institution
as having certain qualities, such as being diverse), or point toward future ac-
tion (by committing an institution to a course of action, such as diversity or
equality, which in turn might involve the commitment of resources).
Such speech acts do not do what they say: they do not, as it were, commit a
person, organization, or state to an action. Instead, they are nonperformatives.
They are speech acts that read as if they are performatives, and this "reading"
generates its own effects. For John Langshaw Austin a performative refers to
a particular class of speech. An utterance is performative when it does what it
says: "the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action" (1975, 6).
For Austin, conditions have to be in place to allow such words to act, or in his

[Meridians: Jeminism, race, transnationalism 2006, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 104-126]


©2006 by Smith College. All rights reserved.

104

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terms, to allow performatives to be "happy." The "action" of the performa-
tive is not in the "words," or if it is "in" the words, it is "in" them only in so
far as the words are "in the right place" to secure the effect that they name.
Performatives succeed when they are uttered by the right person, to the right
people, and in a way that takes the right form. As Judith Butler argues, "per-
formativity must be understood not as a singular or deliberate 'act', but,
rather as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the
effects that it names" (1993, 2, emphasis added).
The speech acts that commit the university to equality, I suggest, are non-
performatives.1 They "work" precisely by not bringing about the effects that
they name. For Austin, failed performatives are "unhappy": they do not act
because the conditions are not in place that are required for the action to suc-
ceed (for example, if the person who apologizes is insincere then the apology
would be unhappy). In my model of the "nonperformative", the failure of the
speech act to do what it says is not a failure of intent or even circumstance,
but it is actually what the speech act is doing. In other words, the nonperfor-
mative does not "fail to act" because of conditions that are external to the

speech act: rather, it "works" because it fails to bring about what it names. My
paper will be structured by taking up four specific forms of institutional
speech acts: admissions, commitments, performances, and descriptions.
Second, in this paper, I want to suggest that the nonperformativity of anti-
racist speech acts requires a new approach to the relation between texts and
social action, which I will be calling "an ethnography of texts." Such an ap-
proach still considers texts as actions, which "do things," but it also suggests
that "texts" are not "finished" as forms of action, as what they "do" depends
on how they are "taken up." To track what texts do, we need to follow them
around. If texts circulate as documents or objects within public culture, then
our task is to follow them, to see how they move as well as how they get stuck.
So rather than just looking at university documentation on diversity for what
it says, although I do this, as close readings are important and necessary, I
also ask what they do, in part by talking to practitioners who use these docu-
ments to support their actions. This paper hence draws on interviews with
diversity and equal opportunities officers or staff from personnel units with
responsibility for diversity at ten universities in the United Kingdom, an anal-
ysis of policy documents and my own participation in discussions within
universities and policy conferences.
The academic and political background to this research is provided by

THE NONPERFORMATIVITY OF ANTIRACISM 105

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scholarship in critical race studies that has analyzed institutional racism in
higher education in the United Kingdom, in all of its complexity (Modood and
Acland 1998; Shiner and Madood 2002; Law, Phillips, and Turney 2004). My
argument extends this work by pointing to a relationship between the new dis-
courses of racial equality and the extension of institutional racism. In other
words, rather than considering the turn to promoting racial equality as a sign
of overcoming institutional racism, my argument will explore the "terms" on
which this promotion is happening within higher education.

Admissions

In order to reflect on the politics of institutional speech acts, I want to think


first about a politics of admission. I begin by analyzing the concept of institu-
tional racism and the paradoxes that follow when institutional racism be-
comes part of institutional language. This has happened in the United
Kingdom, where institutions (in particular, the police) have either recognized
themselves as being institutionally racist or have adopted a definition of insti-
tutional racism within their race-equality policies. The Macpherson Report
(1999) on the police handling of the murder of a young black man, Stephen
Lawrence, has been the key in this public turn. The Macpherson Report is an
important document insofar as it recognizes the police force as "institution-
ally racist." According to the report, institutional racism amounts to "the col-
lective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional
service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be
seen or detected in processes, attitudes, and behaviour which amount to dis-
crimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness, and
racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people" (1).
The language of institutional racism was not, of course, invented by the re-
port, but it draws on a long history of black activism and scholarship. How is
this language used here? Defining an institution as racist involves recogni-
tion of the collective rather than individual nature of racism. Moreover, it
forecloses what is meant by collective and institutional by seeing evidence of
that collectivity only in what institutions fail to do. In other words, the report
defines institutional racism in such a way that racism is not seen as an ongo-
ing series of actions that shape institutions or the norms that get reproduced
or posited over time. We might wish to see racism as a form of doing or even
a field of positive action, rather than as a form of inaction. For instance, we

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might wish to examine how institutions become white through the positing
of some bodies rather than others as the subjects of the institution (querying,
for example, who the institution is shaped for and who it is shaped by). Rac-
ism would not be evident in what we fail to do, but what we have already
done, whereby the "we" is an effect of the doing. The recognition of institu-
tional racism within the Macpherson Report reproduces the whiteness of in-
stitutions by seeing racism simply as the failure to provide for nonwhite
others because of a difference that is somehow theirs.

It is worth noting that psychological language that creeps into the defini-
tion: "processes, attitudes, and behaviour which amount to discrimination
through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness, and racist stereo-
typing" (Macpherson Report 1999, 1). In a way, the institution becomes rec-
ognized as racist only through being posited as an individual, as someone
who suffers from prejudice but who could be treated so that they would act
better toward racialized others. To say "we are racist" is here translated into
the statement it seeks to replace, "I am racist," where "our racism" is de-
scribed as a bad practice that can be changed through learning more tolerant
attitudes and behavior. Indeed, if the institution becomes like the individual,
then one suspects that the institution also takes the place of individuals: it is
the institution that is the bad person rather than this person or that person.
In other words, the transformation of the collective into an individual (a col-
lective without individuals) might allow individual actors to deny or refuse
responsibility for collective forms of racism.
But there is more to understanding how institutional racism becomes an
institutional admission. What does it mean for a subject or institution to
posit itself as being racist? If racism is shaped by actions that do not get seen
by those who are its beneficiaries, what does it mean for those beneficiaries
to see it? I would suggest that such admissions might work both by claiming
to see racism (in what the institution fails to do) and by maintaining the defi-
nition of racism as unseeing. If racism is defined as unwitting and collective
prejudice, then the claim to be racist by being able to see racism in this or that
form of practice is also a claim not to be racist in the same way.
The paradoxes of admitting to one's own racism are clear: saying "we are
racist" becomes a claim to have overcome the conditions (unseen racism)
that require the speech act in the first place. The logic is, first, we say, "we are
racist," and insofar as we can admit to being racist (and racists are unwit-
ting) , then we show that "we are not racist, " or at least that we are not racist

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in the same way. What is important here is that the admission converts
swiftly into a declarative mode: the speech act, in its performance, is taken up
as having shown that the institution has overcome what it is that the speech
act admits to. Simply put, admissions of racism become readable as declara-
tions of commitment to antiracism. What does this conversion of admis-
sions into commitments do?

In the United Kingdom, there has been a proliferation of documents on


race equality; we might even say that race equality is increasingly being docu-
mented or turned into documents. The circulation of race-equality docu-
ments in the public sector is a direct result of the 2000 Race Relations
Amendment Act, which requires all public bodies to have and enforce a race-
equality and action plan. This is an important piece of legislation insofar as
race equality now becomes a positive duty; something that organizations
must do. The first specific duty under the act for higher and further educa-
tion organizations is that they must write a race-equality policy. The RRAA
has fascinated me partly as it has generated a huge amount of documenta-
tion: the documentation is, as it were, one of the objects of the act, what it
points toward.
My own experience of writing such a document as part of a race-equality
team was instructive. We adopted the Macpherson definition of "institu-
tional racism" in the document, although we fell short of naming our institu-
tion itself as "being institutionally racist." In working on this policy, we tried
to bring a critical language of antiracism into the wording of the document.
This meant that in the document we identified inequalities and racism as the
history behind the document: in other words, we took up "diversity" and
"equality" as terms within the document given that they do not describe the
institution.

I was taught a good lesson, which of course means a hard lesson: the lan-
guage we think of as critical can easily lend itself to the very techniques of
governance we critique. So we wrote the document, and the university was
praised for its policy by the Equality Challenge Unit (ECU), and the vice chan-
cellor was able to congratulate the university on its performance: we did well.
At a meeting with staff, the vice chancellor praised staff for their excellent
work, referring to the letter from the ECU. It was a feel good moment, but
those of us who wrote the document did not feel so good. A document that
documented the racism of the university became usable as a measure of good
performance. Here, having a good race-equality policy quickly got translated

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into being good at race equality. Such a translation works to conceal the very
inequalities that the documents were written to reveal. The document be-
comes a fetishized object, something that has value by being cut offfrom the
process of documentation. In other words, its very existence is taken as evi-
dence that the institutional environment documented by the document
(racism, inequality, injustice) has been overcome; as if by saying that we "do
it" means that's no longer what we do.

Commitments

Such documents function as statements of commitment to race equality: in-


deed, such commitments are often made in the first sentences of the policies.
Having a race-equality policy, especially having a "good race-equality policy,"
is about making an institutional commitment public. The documents are read
as signs of commitment and in turn seem to commit the institution to doing
something. Or do they?
Let me quote from the opening paragraphs of two race-equality policies:

The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 (RRAA 2000) places a require-
ment on a wide range of public authorities, including all Further and
Higher Education institutions, to promote race equality in a proactive way
through all their functions and to publish a Race Equality Policy. This
Race Equality Policy has been published to inform all [xxx] staff and stu-
dents and all other partners of our institutional commitment under the re-
quirements of the RRAA 2000. [xxx] recognises that by embracing
diversity it can achieve its ultimate goal to become a 'world class Univer-
sity' and pursue excellence in research, teaching and clinical service.

[xxx] values its diverse community and is opposed to racism in all its
forms. The [xxx] is committed to the fair and equal treatment of all indi-
viduals and aims to ensure that no-one in the [xxx] community is disad-
vantaged on the grounds of race, cultural background, ethnic or national
origin or religious belief.

These documents show the different ways in which the university is imag-
ined as a subject with a commitment to race equality. In the first one, the pol-
icy begins with law: it frames the institutional commitment in terms of

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compliance with law. In a way, then, the document names its commitment
by framing that commitment as a requirement: we commit insofar as we are
required to do so. Commitment here is literally under the law. We might note
that while this institutional commitment is named, it is not named as a com-
mitment to something; we are simply committed to whatever the law com-
mits us to do.

The second quote seems to take us further, insofar as it names racism and
declares the organization as being opposed to racism. At the same time, the
statement also functions to bring the organization into the policy as being
antiracist, a self-declaration that ironically can participate in the concealment
of racism within the university. Declaring a commitment to opposing racism
might function as a form of organizational pride: antiracism as a speech act
might then accumulate value for the organization, as a sign of its own commit-
ment. A university that commits to antiracism might also be one that does not
recognize racism as an ongoing reality, or if it did recognize such racism, then
it would be more likely to see that racism as coming from "strangers" outside
of the institution rather than "natives" inside it. It is as if the university now
says, if we are committed to antiracism (and we have said we are), then how
can we be racists? Declarations of commitment can block recognition of
racism. Paradoxically, the recognition of racism can be taken up as a sign of
commitment, which in turn blocks the recognition of racism. The work of
such speech acts seems to be precisely how they function to hinder rather than
enable action. In other words, the failure, or the nonperformativity, of anti-
racist speech acts is a mechanism for the reproduction of institutional author-
ity, which conceals the ongoing reality of racism.
In one 2005 newspaper article about racism experienced by international
students at Royal Holloway, we can see exactly this mechanism at work. Stu-
dents from Korea complained about racism experienced on campus and
about the failure of the college to respond adequately: "Students, particularly
east Asian students, feel fearful of these attacks and are deeply concerned
that something should be done. But, they have no proper channels of com-
plaint and are worried that too much noise would have a negative effect on
their status at college" (Pai 2005, 3). The article highlights the multiples
ways that racism can affect the experiences of black and Asian students: it
can involve direct violence, and it also affects how students respond to such
violence, fearing that reporting racism would lead to further marginaliza-
tion. But the response of the college to this report was to deny the students'

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charges: "Royal Holloway's spokeswoman said: 'This could not be further
from the truth. The college prides itself on its levels of pastoral carey" (Pai 2005, 3,

emphasis added). In other words, organizational pride and the self-perception


of being good block the recognition of racism. Organizational pride in being
good at hearing messages prevents the message getting through. Such a
speech act does exactly what it says that it does not do: it refuses to hear com-
plaint in the very moment it says that it does hear complaint. If colleges have
pride in their policies of pastoral care and antiracism, then they also fail to
hear about racism. Being committed to antiracism can function as a perverse
performance of racism: "you" are wrong to describe us as uncaring and racist
because "we" are committed to being antiracist. Antiracism functions here
as a discourse of organizational pride.
As I have suggested, many of the race-equality documents function as state-
ments of commitment and take a simple form: "we are committed to

Such statements of commitment might work to limit rath


tion, insofar as they block recognition of the ongoing natu
organization is committed to opposing. However, we can
tion, what do statements of commitment commit institutio
When asking practitioners about this process of writing
icies, I ask specifically about statements of commitment.
they?) commit the university to do? In the following exc
and three interviewees from the personnel department of a
see the hesitation that follows such a question.

Question: It's a statement of commitment clearly as man


you feel that the statement itself commits the university

Responses:
I would say yes but don't say why.
Yes it does, but my angle, I suppose, is that you have to
examples, arguments all the time.
And I think it's a good working document that people
them.

But people don't like being told to read it.


Yes they don't like it.
We don't like being told we have to tick these boxes.

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It is true, but it exists, and I think it's a reference document and people
will go back and read it if they wanted to find out something. But people
don't want to be told to read it.

If we took statements of commitment as performatives, we would say that


they commit a person to something. But such performativity is not assumed by
practitioners. The first response is that the statement of commitment does
"commit", but for unknown reasons. This uncertainty is itself telling, for it
suggests that commitment is in some way mysterious and would need to be
explained. In other words, the commitment does not simply follow the letter
of the document. The word "commitment" does not do what it says. The sec-
ond response also is a "yes" but a qualified one: the statement of commitment
does commit, but it has to be supplemented by other forms of institutional
pressure (reminders, examples, and so on). In other words, the commitment
is not given by the document but depends on the work generated around the
document. It is interesting that the next intervention begins with further qual-
ification: "but people don't like to be told to read it." If the statement of com-
mitment does not necessarily commit the university to doing anything, then
practitioners have to keep up the pressure; it is this pressure that can mean
that documents do not work. This is a telling pressure for diversity workers:
we have to put pressure on the document because it does not work, and the
pressure on documents is what makes them not work. The compulsion to read
the document means that it loses rather than gains currency. If people are re-
quired to read it, then they "don't like it." Indeed, the following utterance
moves from "they don't like it" to "we don't like being told to tick these
boxes." The commitment itself becomes a "tick" in the box. Now "commit-

ment" is usually described in opposition to the "tick box"; a tick box approach
to diversity would be where institutions go along with the process, but are not
"behind" the action. For commitment to become a tick in the box is to suggest
that "being behind" can itself be a matter of institutional performance. We
create the illusion of being behind an action, even at the moment the action is
not performed.
The final utterance describes the statement of commitment as a "reference

document" that people can use. This document then exists insofar as people
refer back to it, as something that can help them to do things. Such documents
by implication can only work if they are not obligatory: if people do not have to
use them, then they might work. What this sequences of utterance shows is

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not only how documents of commitment are perceived as non-commitments
in and of themselves but also how this lack of commitment in the document-

which implies that we have to be committed to them to make them work- is


what makes them less likely to generate commitment in others.
The question then becomes where commitment is located, if it is not in the
statements of commitment or in the people who generate such statements.
Why does commitment matter so much to diversity and equality work, if it
seems always not to be where it should be? I asked why statements of com-
mitment matter to another practitioner:

Oh that's hard. I think you cannot not have them, if you don't have them,
well to me as a practitioner it's a starting point, again it's whether that
gets fitted into practice. Commitments can't come without other actions.
So the commitment to me is about what the institution believes in and

what it intends to do- it can't stand alone, it has to come with how you're
actually going to do it. I think if they weren't there then, well I refer to
them quite a lot as you well know, if you're trying to, let's say there's an
issue that's come up and somebody is not, maybe there's an issue and per-
haps they're racist in what they bring up in their practice or something
like that, and it's good to refer back to these documents, but actually
you're an employee of the university and the university has made a state-
ment about this. So in terms of watching the other members of staffand
in my own experience, I've used it for that.

The sentence "commitments can't come without other actions" is instruc-

tive because it suggests that commitment is an action, but it is one that does
not act on its own. Instead, it depends on other actions, or on what is done
with it. Commitment might be, in other words, a technology that can be used
or deployed within specific settings. The work of commitment is how you act
on the action: it is about what the action allows the practitioner to do. The
statement of commitment is also described as a reference point, something
you can use, when challenging how people act within the institution. In other
words, the statement of commitment does not commit the institution to any-
thing, but it allows the practitioner to support their claims for or against spe-
cific action. The statement functions as a supporting device.
So although a statement of commitment can block action by constructing
the university or organization as already committed to race equality, these
statements also can support other actions precisely by giving this illusion of

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being behind. Practitioners use such statements to challenge people within the
organization, by showing they are "out of line" with the direction of the orga-
nization, even if this line is itself imaginary and does not direct institutional
action. Documents do not simply have a referential or descriptive function: it
is not simply that they describe principles that a university already has. Indeed,
in a way, the documents might even perform a lie insofar as they represent the
university as if it has principles that it does not have. But this can be a useful lie:
by producing the university as if it was a subject with such principles, the doc-
uments then become usable as they allow practitioners to make members of
the university as well as the university itself as an imagined entity subject to
those principles. Statements of commitment then might do something, not in
and of themselves, but because they enable the exposure of a gap between
what organizations say they do, and what they actually do: indeed, they might
"do something" insofar as they fail to describe what organizations do.

Performing Equality

So what work are these documents doing in their failure to bring about the
effects that they name? Such documents arguably are forms of institutional
performance. They are ways in which universities perform an image of them-
selves, to be sure, but they are also ways in which universities perform in the
sense of "doing well." To return to my own experience of writing a diversity
document: the document that documents racism becomes usable as a mea-

sure of good performance. What does it mean for "equality" and "diversity"
to be seen as measurable in the first place? Are they becoming boxes to be
ticked? Or a "paper trail" that goes nowhere?
Diversity and equality are increasingly discussed in the United Kingdom
through an emphasis on good practice. Although good practice is often seen
as "beyond the tick box" (or rather, the tick box approach is seen as bad prac-
tice), I would suggest that "the tick box" and the "good practice" are part of
the same vocabulary. The tick box shows we have done it (whatever we do)
while the good practice shows we have done it (whatever we do), where the
"it" is taken as a sign of good performance. Good practice guides and tool-
kits are produced based on the principle that the best way of improving insti-
tutional performance is to share good practice. These documents too move
around. An example can be taken from the ECU toolkit on communications,
"Good Talking: The HE Communicators Equality and Diversity Toolkit,"

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which includes the following as an example of "general good practice":
"University of Southampton has produced institutional equality and diversity
gifts and novelties that are in great demand." For diversity novelties to be-
come a sign of good practice is clear evidence of how diversity is being re-
packaged, as if it was a property of objects that can be passed around. So an
organization even gets a "tick" for its novelties.
The RRAA signals a shift within the public sectors toward seeing equality
and diversity as performance indicators, as things that can be measured.
Heidi Mirza (2005) has described this as the "bureaucratisation of diversity."
Indeed, the RRAA has encouraged the shift toward seeing diversity and
equality work as auditable. Audit culture not only measures performance but
it depends on the reliability of such measurements. It also associates good
performance with accountability, efficiency, and quality, assumed goals for
organizations (Powers 1994, 1). Race equality would be something that could
be measured, such that doing well would become an indicator of institu-
tional good performance. In other words, race equality would be a sign of ac-
countability, efficiency, and quality.
Practitioners expressed mixed feelings about equality and diversity be-
coming auditable. Some suggested that to audit equality and diversity would
be a good thing, as universities only take seriously the activities that are au-
dited and attached to financial returns or penalties. As one interviewee de-
scribes, "I think it would be useful in the HE sector because it wouldn't have
been done, just thinking about how they could operate and how they've been
lagging behind, it was the push, you know you had to do it." Audit becomes
here a "stick" that would compel action, as a compulsion that energizes or
creates an institutional drive. Others suggested that audit would not neces-
sarily work, given how audit culture works as a kind of awareness of itself. As
one director of personnel elaborates:

An audit can establish if we have gone through processes, it can't really


determine whether we are altering culture here. It can perhaps show
whether we are reaching various targets, say you know, the same teacher
of leadership staff who come from various backgrounds over time. But the
trouble is when dealing with audit you tend always to respond in terms of
process you know, we've done this report, we've got a plan out and all that
sort of stuff. And I could see that you could get a rough idea if universities
were putting effort into diversity by doing that, but the trouble is that in

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universities we've got an audit-aware culture in administrations. And so
people are practiced at how to show auditors that processes are being
gone through.

So if diversity and equality were audited, then universities would be able to


show they have gone through the right processes, however they define those
processes. In other words, personnel can become good at audit by producing
auditable documents, which would mean the universities that did well on race
equality would be simply the ones that were good at creating auditable systems.
What it is important to note here is that audit culture too is very much
about the politics of documentation. One does not audit something that is al-
ready in place. The audit generates a system by generating documents that
are auditable. As Michael Powers argues, audit culture is what "makes things
auditable" (1994, 33). Or, as Chris Shore and Susan Wright describe in their
excellent account of audit in higher education: "The result has been the in-
vention of a host of 'auditable structures' and paper trails to demonstrate 'ev-
idence of system' to visiting inspectors" (2000, 72). The document is the
paper in such a trail. The auditable document would be the document that
"refers back" to the terms set up an in auditing system. Benchmarking works
by generating documents that refer back to the benchmarks, produces a fam-
ily of documents around the terms. It is not then that "diversity" and "equal-
ity" are simply in the documents: instead, they are terms used by documents,
in reference to terms that have already been made. When we measure such
documents, we might then be measuring how their terms correspond with
other terms, such as those set up by the Race Relations Amendment Act it-
self. What does it mean for the correspondence of terms to be a measure of
good performance? What is being measured when diversity becomes a mea-
sure of institutional performance?
I asked this question to one diversity practitioner whose university re-
ceived an excellent rank for their race-equality policy, and she suggested that:
"We are good at writing documents." I replied, without thinking, "Well yes,
one wonders," and we both laughed. Our wonder is skeptical: we wonder
whether what is being measured are levels of institutional competence in
producing documents rather than what the university is doing in terms of
race equality. As this practitioner further describes:

I was very aware that it wasn't very difficult for me and some of the other
people to write a wonderful aspirational document. I think we all have

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great writing skills, and we can just do that, because we are good at it,
that's what we are expert at. And there comes with that awareness a real
anxiety that the writing becomes an end in itself, the reality is being born
out by, say, for example, we were commended on our policies, and when
the ECU reviewed our Implementation Plans last year there were a number
of quite serious criticisms about time slippages, about the fact that we
weren't reaching out into the mainstream and the issues hadn't really per-
meated the institution and the money implemented in certain specific ar-
eas. And it wasn't that there was hostility, it was much more of this kind of
marshmallow feeling.

In this fascinating statement about the politics of diversity as an institutional


performance, the practitioner describes her skill and expertise in terms of
writing a "wonderful aspirational document." Being good at writing docu-
ments becomes a competency that is also an obstacle for diversity work, as it
means that the university gets judged as good because of the document. It is
this very judgment about the document that blocks action, producing a kind
of "marshmallow feeling," a feeling that we are doing enough, or doing well
enough, or even that there is nothing left to do.
Many practitioners and academics have expressed concerns that writing
documents or having good policies becomes a substitute for action: as this
practitioner goes on to say, "you end up doing the document rather than doing
the doing." The work that goes into writing the document ends up blocking
other kinds of action. Or, to make an even stronger argument: the orientation
toward writing good documents can block action, insofar as the document
then gets taken up as evidence that we have done the work. As another practi-
tioner describes, "Well I think in terms of the policies, people's views are 'well
we've got them now so that's done, it's finished.' I think actually, I'm not sure if
that's even worse than having nothing, that idea in people's heads that we've done
race, when we very clearly haven't done race." The idea that the document is it-
self an action is what could allow the institution to block recognition of the
work that there is to do. The system of rewarding organizations for their per-
formance on diversity and equality not only risks concealing forms of inequal-
ity and racism but also supports forms of organizational pride, which reorient
the politics of diversity work away from challenging how institutions consti-
tute their identity and toward a promotion of that identity.
As one of my interviewees suggests, diversity work has become promo-

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tionalwork, or what she calls a form of "R and R," thatis, about risk and rep-
utation. Diversity involves promoting organizations through remaking their
image. In one of my interviews, we discussed a research project that had been
funded as part of the university's commitment to race equality, which is de-
scribed as "perception data" (data that gathers how people perceive an orga-
nization). This research project was a target met by the university under its
action plan, so of course it is already a tick. What did the research reveal?

OK yes. It was about uncovering perceptions, um, about the [xxx] as an em-
ployer

and white male dominated, and they didn't have the right per
[xxx] in terms of what it offers and what it brings to the aca
most of the external people had the wrong perceptions about

And I mean, quotes, there were such funny quotes, like l


were sitting there with their cardigans, you know. Um, an
that, they were shocking reports to read, really, about how
nal people, perceive the [xxx] so we have to try to achieve,
have to try to make the [xxx] an attractive employer.

The politics of diversity and equality has become about im


ment: diversity and equality work is about generating the ri
correcting the wrong one. According to this logic, people ha
perception when they see the organization as white, elite, m
fashioned. In other words, what is behind the shock is a belief
ness is in the image rather than in the organization. Diversit
work hence becomes about changing perceptions of whitene
changing the whiteness of organizations. A good performan
be about being perceived as a diverse and equal organization
ted to diversity and equality. The perception itself would be
and would be taken as a sign of good performance. The perc
comes taken up as description: as if being perceived as diver
the organization such qualities.

Describing Diversity

Race-equality documents work as if they are descriptions: th


university not only as having certain principles, but also as

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qualities, characteristics, and styles. They are often accompanied by images
that give the university a face by adopting the diverse faces of its inhabitants.
Through such images and documents, universities are constituted as if they
have these qualities. One of the most obvious features of this descriptive pur-
chase in the context of the RRAA is the use of the word "diversity." Diversity
enters such documents not only as something the university is committed to
but as a quality the university already has, by virtue of the kinds of staff and
students that already exist within the organization. We can turn again to
some opening sentences of race-equality policies.

This Race Equality Policy has been published to inform all [xxx] staff and
students and all other partners of our institutional commitment under the
requirements of the RRAA 2000. [xxx] recognises that by embracing di-
versity it can achieve its ultimate goal to become a 'world class University'
and pursue excellence in research, teaching and clinical service.

[xxx] values its diverse community and is opposed to racism in all its
forms. The [xxx] is committed to the fair and equal treatment of all indi-
viduals and aims to ensure that no one in the [xxx] community is disad-
vantaged on the grounds of race, cultural background, ethnic or national
origin or religious belief.

These are interesting documents to read in terms of showing the different


ways that the university is imagined as a subject with commitments as well as
characteristics. In the first sentence of the first quote, the word "equality" is
associated with law and seems to point not to the university's commitment
but to the force of law. The document then moves from equality to diversity.
Diversity seems more readily embraced, as something that is both taken on
and taken in within the constitution of the university as a subject community.
We might note, then, that diversity is taken in precisely as it is associated
with being a "world class university"; it functions in a way as a term that al-
lows the university to measure up to its ego ideal or its ideal image. Diversity
is taken in as an orientation toward the market, a way of being "world class."
One way to rearticulate this statement might be, "We are committed to diver-
sity insofar as we are committed to being world class." Diversity might even
work through its proximity to the self-image of organizations.
The second quote begins with diversity as a property, as something the or-
ganization has. The discourse of valuing diversity is, of course, mainstream,

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and it lingers between discourses of economic value (the business case for
diversity) and moral value (the social justice case). This model of diversity si-
multaneously reifies difference as something that already exists in the bodies
of others ("we" are diverse because "they" are here). It also transforms differ-
ence into a property: if difference is something they are, then it is something
we can have. It is this model of diversity as something others bring to the or-
ganization that we can see at work in the use of visual images of diverse orga-
nizations: images of colorful, happy faces, which show the diversity of the
university as something it has embraced.
It is worth noting here the powerful critiques of the turn to diversity within
higher education offered by feminist and critical management scholars.
Such critiques have suggested that diversity enters higher education through
"marketization": the term is seen as coming from management and from the
imperative to manage diversity or to value diversity as if it were a human re-
source. Such a managerial focus on diversity, it has been argued, works to in-
dividuate difference and to conceal the continuation of systematic
inequalities within organizations such as universities (Kandola and Fullerton
1994; Lorbiecki 2001; Kirton and Greene 2000). These important critiques
attend to the word "diversity" itself, which has been attributed with a prob-
lematic genealogy, having not only dubious origins but also uncertain and
potentially damaging effects. Deem and Ozga (1997) suggest that "the con-
cepts of equity and equal opportunities imply an underlying concept of social
justice for all," while "the notion of diversity invokes the existence of differ-
ence and variety without any necessary commitment to action or redistribu-
tive justice" (33). Similarly, Benschop (2001) suggests that "'diversity' does
not so powerfully appeal to our sense of social justice" (1166). For Deem and
Ozga, the word "diversity" invokes difference but does not necessarily evoke
commitment to action or redistributive justice. What is problematic about di-
versity, by implication, is that it can be cut off from the programs that seek to
challenge inequalities within organizations, and it might even take the place
of such programs in defining the social mission of universities. We can cer-
tainly see this cut-off point. For these scholars, among others, the institu-
tional preference for the term "diversity" is a sign of the lack of commitment
to change and might even allow universities to conceal the operation of sys-
tematic inequalities under the face of diversity.
In light of these critiques, what does the word "diversity" do? It is because
diversity does not seem to evoke such histories of struggle that many practi-

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tioners are critical of the institutional desire for this term. As one practitioner
put it, "I think the concept of diversity, in the way that it is now used in equal-
ity, rather than 'diversity' as a word, which I don't really think it has much re-
lationship to, I think it's used as a complete and utter cop-out. I think it's a
dreadful concept." Indeed, this practitioner felt so strongly about the "cop-
out" of diversity that she refuses to describe herself as an equality and diver-
sity practitioner even though her job title involves both terms. She goes on to
describe "diversity" as a "cuddly" concept that extends the university's self-
image as being good:

So now we'll talk about diversity, and that means everybody's different but
equal and its all nice and cuddly and we can feel good about it and feel like
we've solved it, when actually we're nowhere near solving it, and we need
to, I think, have that, well, diversity as a concept fits in much better with
the university's idea of what it's doing about being the great benefactor.

We could describe diversity as a politics of feeling good, which allows people


to relax and feel less threatened, as if we have already "solved it" and there is
nothing else to do. I asked another practitioner why she thinks that the word
"diversity" is appealing. She argued that diversity appeals because "it ob-
scures the issues

all looks wonderful. This is an example actually a member


with in my focus group about gender issues, she says, but
into that apple there's a rotten core in there, and you know
all rotting away and it's not actually being addressed. It al
but the inequalities aren't being addressed."
Again, the suggestion here is that the appeal of diversity
and feeling good, as an orientation that obscures inequalit
ing of a rotten core behind a shiny surface. Diversity as a t
ing appeal: it allows the university to sell itself by presentin
place, a place where differences are celebrated, welcomed
versity becomes a form of organizational pride. Not only
ing of the university as being diverse work to conceal racism
to reimagine the university as being antiracist, even beyon
colors of different races have integrated to create a new hy
bronzed face.

And yet, this practitioner also acknowledges that there a


to diversity in the sense it can "start to engage people." It i

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versity might make people feel good, that it can be a useful term, as it allows
people in: once they are in, we can then do different things or even use a dif-
ferent set of terms. In other words, the word "equality," which is associated
with the law, might be less useful as people turn away from it and/or are
threatened by the work that it asks them to do. If we use the word "diversity,"
we might have a better chance of getting through. So it is precisely how diver-
sity might work to conceal racism that might make it a term that can do
things. In other words, what makes diversity useful is how it is appealing. If
words do things, what they do depends on how they are being used and how
they can hook people or bring them in. Indeed, most practitioners describe
their work as a question of "what works," of using whatever language works
for the different audiences to whom they speak. Diversity work is strategic,
even if it has certain political principles behind it. So diversity is used by
some precisely because it is a comfortable term that allows people to engage
more easily with this kind of work. As a result, practitioners are positive
about the term "diversity" for the very reasons some are critical of the term.
As one interviewee describes:

I think for me with equality, as I said, there is some legal framework, and
I think sometimes overemphasised. There's a tension, really, because you
need to make people aware of the legality, but you want to go beyond that
don't you? You don't want it to be about compliance, so for me, I actually
think "diversity" is actually a far more positive word than "equality" so for me
it's about celebration. Whereas equality feels a bit more about, oh, you know,
meetings, legal requirements almost, I don't know, that's just personal.

Here, diversity is something positive: it is about celebration or can be cele-


brated. This is why it is a useful term. "Equality" evokes compliance and
meeting legal requirements. It is no accident that diversity is described as
having an energizing effect. For many practitioners the question becomes
then not so much whether to use the term "diversity" but how to use it. If the
success of the term is that it can be detached from the history of struggle for
equalities, then its success might paradoxically depend on being reattached
to those very histories. Practitioners hence use the word "diversity" as a way
of getting institutional attention, but then they use the word alongside other
more worrisome words, or what I call elsewhere, "sticky signs," such as
"equality and justice" (Ahmed 2004b, 89-92). As one practitioner suggests:

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I have gone for both equality and diversity, so as an institution we do not
use the term "diversity" in isolation, nor do we use equality in isolation.
Equality is to do with compliance, diversity is more qualitative and can be
internally driven and that premise suits us. There are pockets of the insti-
tution where diversity is more proactive than other areas and compliance
is more of priority in some areas as well. And the both have to work to-
gether, they have to be married together, because if you just go down to
the compliance level there's no reward in it for the institution and because
of the positive images around equality and diversity that we project, it is
important for us that both work together. And I think we have gone for
that rather than just diversity. But I know some universities have just gone
diversity and it depends how you package it.

So what the word "diversity" does might depend on the words it is placed
alongside: using diversity with equality associates the political and legal
challenge to inequalities with the qualities of feeling attached to the celebra-
tion of difference. The aim of such work would be to restick these words to-

gether so that when people hear the word "diversity," they hear a challenge to
inequality.
At the same time, in order to be heard, practitioners also work by attaching
the word "diversity" to the other words that are taken as key to the organiza-
tion's strategic mission, whether it be excellence, internationalism, or wid-
ening participation. In other words, it is the proximity of the term "diversity"
to the self-image of organizations that allows the term to accrue value. Take
the following quotation:

For me, I think that the, well certainly, our aim in the diversity project is to
help the organisation to see how diversity will help meet the strategic
plans. So how can diversity help make us top ten in 2010? What will think-
ing about diversity enable a head of a school that is already very successful
to be more successful? That would be my real aim and to live our vision for
race, which is excellence through diversity.

Organizational pride gets translated into diversity pride by attaching diver-


sity to the pursuit of excellence. As this practitioner goes on to describe,
" [xxx] is very much, well, you know, it really does want to build a reputation
and to be seen to be at the front, even if that's a bit risky." Doing diversity is
not so much about putting diversity in front but about putting the organiza-

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tion in front and making diversity what follows. Indeed, another practitioner
suggests that diversity is simply about getting the best people for the job,
which for her is about the organizational mission of excellence: "People
really care about excellence, they really get hacked off when somebody sec-
ond rate is appointed to anything and they don't care what they look like."
Interestingly, this practitioner works at an elite and white organization,
which is perhaps so secure in its privilege that it does not have to defend itself
against those who look different. Diversity can be taken in precisely insofar
as it becomes a sign of indifference to difference: "They don't care what they
look like."

In following the word "diversity" around, we can see that it gets embraced
by organizations insofar as it is proximate to the ideal images organizations
already have of themselves. To add "diversity" to a mission statement hence
does not necessarily add anything, but, rather, it puts an educational mission
in different terms. And yet this word still has baggage and still gets associated
with people who look different. As Nirmal Puwar points out, "In policy terms,
diversity has overwhelmingly come to mean the inclusion of people who look
different" (2004, 1). Ironically, the hope of putting diversity into university
documentation is that this word will keep these associations, however prob-
lematic they may be. The point would not be to constitute racial others as the
origin of diversity, as what adds color to the white face of the university.
Rather, insofar as diversity signifies the presence of racial others, then it might
also point to how organizations are orientated around whiteness, around
those who are already in place. The happy smiling face of diversity would not
then simply rebrand the university but point instead to what gets concealed by
this very image: the inequalities that are behind it and give it a surface appeal.
In other words, the strategy of associating diversity with the organizational
pride is that the word might yet work to challenge the ideal image of the orga-
nization. It is pride, after all, which is the condition of the possibility for being
shamed for exposing gaps between ideals and actions.
If we consider the politics of describing diversity, we can see that such de-
scriptions create fantasy images of the organizations they apparently repre-
sent. The document says we are diverse, as if saying it makes it so. In a way,
our task must be to refuse to read such documents as performatives, as if they
bring into effect what they name. That is not to say that such documents do
not matter, or that they do not do any work. They do. Indeed, this non-
performativity is what makes them tools that can be used by practitioners as

124 SARA AHMED

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128.59.222.107 on Wed, 18 Nov 2020 04:32:22 UTC
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things that work insofar as they fail to describe or produce what is ongoing
or going on within organizations. In other words, by putting commitments
in writing -as commitments that are not followed by other actions- such
documents can be used as supportive devices, by exposing gaps between
words and deeds. This is not to say we should not be critical in the hope in-
vested in such documents. We must be critical. At the same time, we must
also consider how such documents circulate, how they move around, and
how they get stuck. Following documents around begins with an uncertainty
about what these documents will do. They might, at certain points, even
cause trouble.

NOTE

I. This paper develops the thesis on the nonperformativity of antiracism orig


made in Ahmed (2004a).

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Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna
Archivio istituzionale della ricerca

The indifference that makes a difference: Why unconcern for minorities disguises prejudicial attitudes

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Passini S. (2019). The indifference that makes a difference: Why unconcern for minorities disguises
prejudicial attitudes. JOURNAL OF MORAL EDUCATION, 48(2), 263-274
[10.1080/03057240.2018.1509064].

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(Article begins on next page)

01 May 2025
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 1

This is an Accepted Manuscript version of the following article, accepted

for publication in JOURNAL OF MORAL EDUCATION.

Stefano Passini (2019) The indifference that makes a difference: Why


unconcern for minorities disguises prejudicial attitudes, Journal of
Moral Education, 48:2, 263-274, DOI:
10.1080/03057240.2018.1509064

It is deposited under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-

NonCommercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-

nc/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and

reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

1
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 2

The Indifference that Makes a Difference: Why Unconcern for Minorities Disguises

Prejudicial Attitudes

Stefano Passini

University of Bologna

Author Note

Stefano Passini, Department of Education Studies, University of Bologna.

Declaration of Conflict of Interest: The authors declared no potential conflicts of

interests with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Stefano Passini,

Department of Education Studies, University of Bologna, Via Filippo Re 6, 40126,

Bologna (Italy). E-mail: s.passini@unibo.it

2
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 3

Abstract

Studies on historical episodes of intergroup violence and conflicts have underlined the

complicit role of bystanders in extreme intergroup dynamics. In regard to contemporary

multicultural societies, the concept of intergroup indifference has recently been

introduced, defined as being uncaring vis-à-vis arbitrary policies affecting other social

groups. In the present manuscript, the reasons why an indifferent position towards

minorities may imply some prejudicial attitudes towards them will be analyzed. In

particular, moral disengagement and lack of social responsibility are considered to be

variables that could explain why indifference might mask prejudicial attitudes and a

lack of altruism for out-groups. The results show that moral disengagement and social

responsibility are indeed significant mediators of the prediction of intergroup

indifference to racism and altruism. In particular, the mediation model shows that moral

disengagement partially mediates the path from indifference to racism, while social

responsibility partially mediates that from indifference and altruism.

Keywords: intergroup indifference; prejudice; altruism; moral disengagement; social

responsibility

3
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 4

The Indifference that Makes a Difference: Why Unconcern for Minorities

Disguises Prejudicial Attitudes

Although mostly independent of each other, the coincidental overlapping of two

worldwide circumstances such as the 2008 financial crisis and the exponential

increment in immigration towards Western countries has had some serious

consequences as concerns intergroup relations (Becker, Wagner, & Christ, 2011; Butz

& Yogeeswaran, 2011; Passini, 2015), especially in terms of attitudes towards social

minorities. As some scholars (e.g. Author, 2018; Becker et al., 2011; Bukowski, de

Lemus, Rodriguez-Bailón, & Willis, 2016; Valentova & Callens, 2017; Werts,

Scheepers, & Lubbers, 2013) have pointed out, the use of immigration as a scapegoat

for the economic crisis promoted by some political parties and movements to gain votes

has indeed fueled prejudicial and exclusionary attitudes towards certain out-groups.

Alongside the increase in such open and direct manifestations of hostility, the

present age is also marked by the increasing attitudes of indifference towards the

situation of social minorities. As Passini (2017b, 2017a) has recently pointed out, both

uncertainties deriving from the financial crisis and fears triggered by immigration have

indeed led many people to focus on their own group difficulties and to look away from

and feel indifferent to the restriction of the rights to other social groups. Such feelings

of unconcern towards members of the out-groups lead them to be invisible for the in-

group and support a lowering of the sense of moral salience towards them, that is the

feeling that others are suffering and an action to help them is necessary (Monroe, 2008).

Various studies on past episodes of intergroup violence (see Bauman, 1989; Monroe,

2008; Staub, 2013b) have underlined the complicit role of passive bystanders in not

obstructing or even justifying perpetrators, allowing for the advancement of intergroup

4
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 5

conflicts. These studies have suggested that the gradual restriction of minorities’ rights

is not only fostered by being compliant with the majority in power, but it is supported

by individual attitudes of indifference towards them. As Monroe (2008) has pointed out

in her analysis of the Holocaust, by avoiding moral implications and dodging their

responsibility towards the out-groups, bystanders enhance in-group/out-group

distinctions and certify the legitimacy of the restriction of their rights.

In the present manuscript, the relationship between attitudes of indifference

towards the derogation of minorities’ rights and racism and altruism will be analyzed. In

particular, moral disengagement and deresponsibilization will be considered as two

mechanisms that could explain why indifference might mask prejudicial attitudes and a

lack of altruism for out-groups. In the following paragraph, the notion of intergroup

indifference will be outlined. Lastly, moral disengagement and social responsibility will

be briefly presented.

Indifference as a Prejudice

Various studies on the racial policy of Nazi Germany and on other historical

periods marked by intergroup violence and repression (see Monroe, 2008; Staub, 2014)

have underlined that, rather than being passive, bystanders often had an active and

complicit role in non-obstructing or even supporting these extreme measures. As Staub

(2014) has pointed out, bystanders are indeed in a position to know what is happening

and to take action as a consequence. That is, they may decide to pretend nothing is

happening (indirectly encouraging the perpetrators) or they may define that situation as

a restriction of rights and intervene, refusing to cooperate.

Starting from these studies and in reference to the contemporary multicultural

societies in which we live nowadays, Passini (2017b) has introduced the concept of

5
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 6

intergroup indifference, defined as being uncaring in regard to arbitrary policies

affecting other social groups. Such indifference may be revealed by attitudes of explicit

total unconcern for such rights restrictions or by more implicit positions such as those in

which in-group needs are prioritized over those of out-groups to the point that the latter

are not considered. As Dovidio and Gaertner (2004) have pointed out, a certain

invisibility of immigrants and minorities has indeed been strengthened by masking the

denial of minorities’ rights underlying declarations such as “there are other priorities for

this country” or “we can do nothing to resolve these problems.”

In line with the literature on bystanders and their complicit role in evildoing,

Passini (2017b) has analyzed intergroup indifference and its connection with prejudicial

attitudes. These were measured in their negative specification as unfavorable

evaluations of social groups or individuals because of their group membership in the

context of in-group vs. out-group categorization (Brown, 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Considering those people who declared themselves “indifferent” concerning some

Parliamentary bills related to derogatory policies towards out-groups, results have

shown that indifferent citizens had similar scores on scales of prejudicial attitudes to

those people who openly support such policies. These results were confirmed by Author

(2017b): higher levels of intergroup indifference (measured on a four-item scale) were

associated with higher levels of prejudice, even after controlling for agreement to such

rights restrictions.

Moral Disengagement and Social Responsibility

In the classic experiment by Latané and Darley (1970), the authors mainly

identified three psychological processes to explain the bystander effect. First, people do

not intervene because of social influence: that is, the inactive behavior of the other

6
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 7

bystanders was interpreted as an indication that no help was required. Second, a certain

diffusion of responsibility took over, by which people felt less personally responsible as

they ascribe the responsibility to intervene and the blame for inaction to the other

bystanders. Third, there is a transformation in morality (Staub, 2014), by which

bystanders suspend their moral principles by dehumanizing and morally excluding the

victims. As already pointed out by studies on historical events, in those circumstances in

which an event should be unequivocally interpreted as a restriction of rights (as in the

case of intergroup violence), diffusion of responsibility and moral transformation are

the two main psychological processes for explaining the bystander effect. Indeed,

delegitimization (Oren, Nets-Zehngut, & Bar-Tal, 2015) and moral exclusion of the out-

groups (Opotow, 2011) by the incumbent political system and people’s disengagement

from moral beliefs (Bandura, 1999, 2016) are fundamental psychological processes for

both perpetrators and bystanders to sustain violent events (see Monroe, 2008; Staub,

2014). “Many passive bystanders, in order to reduce their own empathic distress, may

over time further distance themselves from victims” (Staub, 2013b, p. 578). As Basaran

(2015) has pointed out discussing the deaths of migrants in the Mediterranean,

indifference and collective disengagement from particular populations are produced in

liberal societies by the use and the increase in intergroup social distance and by the

progressive invisibility of minorities.

In line with the studies by Latané and Darley (1970), in the present research

moral disengagement and social responsibility are analyzed as two mediators between

intergroup indifference, and prejudicial and altruistic attitudes towards minorities.

Moral disengagement is defined as a psychosocial process by which individuals

mitigate the moral consequences of harmful behaviors (Bandura, 1999). In particular,

7
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 8

moral self-sanctions can be disengaged from violations by eight mechanisms operating

on four levels (see Caprara, Fida, Vecchione, Tramontano, & Barbaranelli, 2009). At

the behavioral level, people depict immoral conducts in moral terms by means of moral

justification, euphemistic language, or advantageous comparison. At the agency level,

people may attenuate the link between their actions and their consequences by a

displacement or diffusion of responsibility. At the outcome level, people may avoid the

blameful effects of their actions by distorting their consequences. Finally, at the

recipient level people may remove empathetic feelings for the victims by attribution of

blame or dehumanization. Previous research has found that moral disengagement is

positively related to racism (Faulkner & Bliuc, 2016) and aggression (Gini, Pozzoli, &

Hymel, 2014) and negatively to altruism (Paciello, Fida, Cerniglia, Tramontano, &

Cole, 2013).

As concerns social responsibility, as Milgram (1974) had already pointed out in

his famous experiment on destructive obedience, the shift of responsibility outside one’s

own accountability is a powerful way to act immorally without feeling guilt.

Contrariwise, the assumption of social responsibility leads people to help others and not

to act against their wellbeing. Social responsibility is defined as the propensity to show

concern for the welfare of others, the perception that other people depend on us and an

attitude that results in behaviors that support the common good (Berkowitz &

Lutterman, 1968; see also Trnka & Trundle, 2017). As various studies (e.g., Ruci, van

Allen, & Zelenski, 2018) have pointed out, people who score high on social

responsibility are more likely to engage in pro-social behaviors and to feel a certain

altruism towards strangers.

Hypotheses

8
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 9

The aim of the present research was to analyze the relationship of intergroup

indifference with racism and altruism, and the mediation effects of moral

disengagement and social responsibility on these relationships. Specifically, it was

hypothesized that intergroup indifference will be positively correlated with moral

disengagement and modern racism, while negatively correlated with social

responsibility and altruism (Hypothesis 1). Second, it was hypothesized that moral

disengagement and social responsibility will mediate the relationship between

indifference on the one side, and racism and altruism on the other (Hypothesis 2).

Methods

Participants

Participants were contacted online, using an internet questionnaire constructed

using Limesurvey, a survey-generating tool (http://www.limesurvey.org). The

questionnaire was publicly accessible and an invitation with the link to the

questionnaire was emailed to the potential participants by various methods (e.g.,

mailing lists, newsgroups, social networking services). In particular, a university

mailing list was used. Respondents were advised that their participation was voluntary

and that their responses would remain anonymous and confidential. No fee was offered.

The questionnaire was drafted in Italian. In order to check and prevent a person from re-

entering the survey site, the subject’s IP address was monitored. The data were collected

in 2017.

A total of 335 Italian citizens (68.1% women) responded by accessing the website

and filling out the questionnaire. Participant ages ranged from 18 to 73 years (M =

27.63, SD = 11.82). They were mainly born in the north of Italy (81%), while 11.5%

and 6% came from the center and the south, respectively, and 1.5% were born abroad.

9
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 10

As regards their level of education, 6.6% declared they had finished middle school,

65.2% declared they had completed a high school diploma, 25.5% had a university

degree and 2.7% a masters or Ph.D. qualification. Job-wise, 59.5% stated they were

university students, 14.7% white collar workers, 4.9% factory workers/craftsmen, 4.5%

self-employed, 3.3% teachers, 4.6% unemployed, 2.3% retired, and 6.3% chose other.

Measures

Intergroup indifference. Participants were asked to answer to items concerning

indifference towards social groups and minorities. The scale was developed by Author

(2017b) and was composed of four items on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly

disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): “I am quite indifferent to the news about the Navy’s

actions to send back migrants’ boats from our country,” “The fact that doctors have an

obligation to report illegal (i.e., without a permit) immigrant patients leaves me quite

indifferent,” “I think that Parliament has other priorities than dealing with the rights of

certain minorities” and “I am not very interested in news about civil rights denied to

homosexuals”. Cronbach’s α was .62.

Civic moral disengagement. The scale validated by Caprara, Fida, Vecchione,

Tramontano, & Barbaranelli (2009) was used. Participants responded to 32 items on a

7-point scale (from 1 = strongly disagree, to 5 = strongly agree) that identify eight

mechanisms of moral disengagement with four items for each mechanism. As suggested

by the author, an overall moral disengagement score was calculated by averaging all the

items (α = .89). Moreover, each mechanism was measured as a separate dimension as

well: moral justification (“In order to keep family cohesion, its members should always

be defended, even when they are guilty of serious crimes,” α = .56), advantageous

comparison (“Given the widespread corruption in society, one cannot disapprove of

10
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 11

those who pay for favors,” α = .77), displacement of responsibility (“It is not the fault of

drivers if they exceed the speed limit since cars are made to go at high speeds,” α = .61),

diffusion of responsibility (“There is no sense in blaming individuals who evade a rule

when everybody else does the same thing,” α = .61), attribution of blame (“Victims

generally have trouble staying out of harm’s way,” α = .60), distorting consequences

(“Thefts in large department stores are irrelevant compared to the stores’ earnings,” α =

.67), dehumanization (“In order to force some people to work, they have to be treated

like beasts of burden,” α = .63)1.

Social responsibility. Four items on a 7-point scale (from 1 = strongly disagree,

to 5 = strongly agree) from the Social Responsibility Scale (Berkowitz & Lutterman,

1968) were used to measure individual likelihood of contributing to the greater good of

one’s own society. A sample item is “I think we should all try to enhance the welfare of

others through our actions.” Cronbach’s α was .71.

Modern racism. To measure modern racism, four items on a 7-point scale (from

1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree) from the modern sexism scale were adapted

to fit racism toward immigrants (see Wohl & Branscombe, 2009). A sample item is

“Discrimination against immigrants is no longer a problem in Italy.” An overall anti-

immigrant racism score was calculated by averaging the four items (α = .83).

Altruism. To measure altruism, the Santa Clara Brief Compassion Scale (Hwang,

Plante, & Lackey, 2008) was used. The scale is composed of five items (e.g., “I tend to

feel compassion for people, even if I do not know them” on a 7-point scale (from 1 =

strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). Cronbach’s α was .83.

1
The mechanism “euphemistic language” was removed due to a low Cronbach’s α.

11
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 12

Demographics and politics. Participants stated their age, gender, level of

education, job, and ideological affiliation (from 1 = extreme left to 10 = extreme right).

Results

As can be seen in Table 1 (left part), the means showed that in general participants

gave low scores to intergroup indifference, moral disengagement, while they gave high

scores to social responsibility. They gave low-medium scores on attitudes of modern

racism and medium high scores on the altruism scale. Finally, they tended to be

politically situated in the moderate area.

Bivariate correlations (see Table 1, right part) showed that intergroup

indifference, as hypothesized, was positively correlated with moral disengagement and

with modern racism, while negatively correlated with social responsibility and altruism.

Moreover, the more people were politically situated on the right-wing, the more they

tended to be indifferent towards minorities. As concerns the other variables, moral

disengagement was positively correlated with modern racism and negatively correlated

with social responsibility and altruism. Social responsibility was correlated with all the

same variables in the opposite direction.

-------------------------------INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE------------------------

The mediation of moral disengagement and social responsibility on the path from

indifference to modern racism and altruism was carried out using Mplus 7.4 (Muthen &

Muthen, 2012). A latent variable of moral disengagement was created using the seven

mechanisms scores. As suggested by Hu and Bentler (1999), model fit was assessed

using the Comparative Fit Index (CFI, cutoff value close to .95), the Tucker-Lewis

Index (TLI, cutoff value close to .95), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation

12
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 13

(RMSEA, cutoff value close to .06), and Standardized Root Mean Squared Residual

(SRMR, cutoff value close to .08).

The mediation model fit the data well: χ2(2) = 77.46, CFI = .97, TLI = .96,

RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .04. As can be seen in Figure 1, intergroup indifference

positively predicted moral disengagement, modern racism, and negatively predicted

social responsibility and altruism. The effect of intergroup indifference on racism (R2 =

.45) was partially mediated by moral disengagement (indirect effect: B = .20, t = 5.16, p

< .001), while the one on altruism (R2 = .44) was partially mediated by social

responsibility (indirect effect: B = -.20, t = -6.10, p < .001).

-------------------------------INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE------------------------

Discussion

Starting from the literature on the bystander effect, the aim of the present research

was to deepen the concept of intergroup indifference. In particular, the effects of this

variable on racism and altruism was analyzed, considering two psychosocial

mechanisms as intervening variables: i.e., moral disengagement and the lack of social

responsibility.

Firstly, participants in the present research generally have low scores on both

intergroup indifference and moral disengagement and high scores on social

responsibility. These results underline that the majority of participants do not feel

indifferent to minorities and feel morally engaged and responsible for the consequences

of their conduct. However, it is worth noting that scores on modern racism are not so

correspondingly low. In line with recent studies on intergroup relationships (Dovidio,

Gaertner, Ufkes, Saguy, & Pearson, 2016), these results are not self-contradictory, given

that people often openly express prejudicial attitudes against some groups of minorities,

13
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 14

especially immigrants, without feeling any sense of guilt for such positions. Moreover,

as shown by the literature on moral exclusion, people may feel morally engaged and

responsible towards certain social groups but not others, depending on their inclusion or

exclusion from the moral community within which moral values and rules of justice

apply (Passini & Morselli, 2016).

Secondly, notwithstanding the fact that participants are generally not unconcerned

about the restriction of minorities rights, intergroup indifference is correlated to all the

variables considered and moral disengagement and social responsibility are significant

mediators of the prediction of indifference to racism and altruism. In particular, the

mediation model shows that moral disengagement partially mediates the path from

indifference to racism, while social responsibility partially mediates the path from

indifference and altruism. Therefore, as hypothesized, the results show the effect of

intergroup indifference on both racism and altruism, in terms of which most people

declare they are indifferent as concerns institutional policies curbing minority rights,

while the more they share biased attitudes, the less they are liable to be altruistic

towards strangers. These effects are differently mediated by the two variables

considered. In this sense, we can assume that indifferent people are biased because they

morally disengage from the consequence of their actions, while they are not altruistic

because of a lack of social responsibility. Thus, by way of confirmation of bystander

literature, the results of the mediation suggest the involvement of distinct – albeit

interrelated – psycho-social mechanisms in explaining the relationship between

indifference on the one side, and racism and altruism on the other. A lack of moral

engagement explains an indifference connected to prejudicial attitudes and it lies behind

the transition from uncaring to derogatory and aversive attitudes towards other social

14
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 15

groups. Instead, a lack of social responsibility describes an indifference marked more by

selfishness and unhelpfulness, and it underlies the shift from uncaring to indifference in

helping others. It should be noted, however, that indirect effects are only partial,

suggesting a role of other intervening variables.

These results have some implications for the analysis of intergroup relationships

and for understanding and reducing those dynamics that lead to prejudice and

discrimination of minorities or the lack of altruism towards them. First of all, in

agreement with bystander studies (see Staub, 2014) and with those focusing on passive

obedience or active implication in evildoing (see Haslam & Reicher, 2007),

disengagement from moral norms and self-sanctions might be used as a conscious or

unconscious strategy for participating or simply observing a restriction of rights without

feeling guilt or remorse. “The struggle over moral issues never takes place, as the moral

aspects of actions are not immediately obvious or are deliberately prevented from

discovery and discussion. In other words, the moral character of action is either

invisible or purposefully concealed” (Bauman, 1989, p. 24). If these strategies were

mainly studied in regard to their frequent use during dictatorial regimes, they are often

being applied to so-called democracies. As both moral disengagement (see Bandura,

1999) and moral exclusion (see Passini, 2010) literatures have pointed out, moral

disengagement operates through various strategies that are frequently used nowadays

also in the political, economic and broadcasting domains to disguise some facts and

events under a different light (see Lazar & Lazar, 2004; Passini, Palareti, & Battistelli,

2010). The use of euphemistic language, advantageous comparison or distortion of the

consequences of one’s own actions, are all strategies used by political systems to justify

the restriction of rights of minorities and out-groups (e.g., Oren et al., 2015). Moreover,

15
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 16

people often use strategies that shift one’s own responsibility outside or that remove any

empathetic feelings for the victims by attributing blame or dehumanizing them. In this

sense, dehumanization of people is associated with less support for their rights (Drolet,

Hafer, & Heuer, 2016; Staerklé & Clémence, 2004) and the moral exclusion of social

groups (see Passini, 2014, 2016) fosters their invisibility, promoting a certain

indifference to the undermining of their rights (Passini, 2017a).

Second, the negative effect of indifference on altruism is instead mediated by

social responsibility. As the analysis of the holocaust by Monroe (2008) has shown,

bystanders frequently feign ignorance to dodge responsibility while rescuers name

social responsibility as one of their core values. There is “a critical difference between

rescuers and bystanders. It is not enough merely to do no wrong. You have to do what is

right.” (p. 720). Oliner and Oliner (1992) describes the “altruistic personality” as

effectively characterized by higher levels of morality and inclusivity, as well as higher

standards of social responsibility. In this sense, moral inclusion, as opposed to moral

disengagement and exclusion, and social responsibility are interconnected and mutually

reinforce each other (see Morselli & Passini, 2010), as the concept of “vertical

responsibility” (Jonas, 1984) already has suggested.

All these considerations have a practical implication as well. Indeed, in order to

reduce the negative impact of prejudice on the integration of cultures in contemporary

societies, it is relevant to break the chain of indifference and turn indifference into

attention to the other (Short, 1999). Some scholars talk about moral courage (Staub,

2013a) and moral inclusion (Passini, 2011) as qualities to be developed in children and

youngsters by encouraging them, for instance, to express what they think and actively

participate in decision-making both at home and in schools (e.g., Applebaum, 2005). In

16
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 17

this sense, it may be relevant to implement interventions related to the development of

civic engagement and critical consciousness in society (see Freire, 1970), focusing on

the notion of social responsibility and moral engagement. As Lynch, Swartz, and Isaacs

(2017) have pointed out, moral education can help people to no longer be just passive

bystanders of racial injustice, and to recognize it and dismantle those structures,

inequalities and institutions that keep it in place. “A focus on anti-racist education as a

clear goal of moral education helps to relocate moral education in a progressive

framework concerned with achieving social justice” (Lynch et al., 2017, p. 130). As

anti-racist education considers racism as operating not only just by way of personal

bias, but in its connection with a system that marginalizes and excludes some groups

while privileging others (Hassouneh, 2006), a reflection on the topic of indifference

towards the restriction of minority rights should be part of the basis of such a moral

education.

This research has some limitations which should be borne in mind for future

research. First of all, the mediation of both moral disengagement and responsibility is

just partial. Other variables should be considered in the future. As Staub (2013a) has

pointed out, moral disengagement is just the first step towards that moral transformation

that allows indifference to support wrongdoings. Secondly, future studies may use an

indifference scenario to deepen what people might really do in an everyday situation of

a restriction of out-group rights. Similarly, it may be interesting to include some

behavioral measures of intergroup indifference to evaluate the unwillingness to

intervene in a situation.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the results presented in this article are

promising. In particular, they underline how relevant it is to consider the role of

17
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 18

indifferent people, and not just perpetrators or victims of such dynamics, for

understanding intergroup conflicts. This is particularly applicable to the analysis of the

recent opposition to immigration, which is a “hot topic” on the agenda of political

parties and where the enforcement of security often requires collective indifference

toward securitized populations. “By limiting third-party assistance to undesired

populations, to the extent that humanitarian acts and even rescue are questioned,

penalized, and criminalized, public compassion is discouraged, while collective

disengagement and even indifference are encouraged” (Basaran, 2015, p. 215).

18
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 19

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Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 26

Table 1.

Means, Standard Deviations and Pearson Correlation Coefficients among all the

Variables.

Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5
1. Intergroup indifference 2.57 1.25 –
2. Moral disengagement 2.19 0.82 .51*** –
3. Social responsibility 5.27 1.15 -.35*** -.33*** –
4. Modern racism 2.91 1.58 .61*** .53*** -.34*** –
5. Altruism 4.76 1.24 -.35*** -.29*** .65*** -.30*** –
6. Ideological affiliation 4.96 1.98 .35*** .21*** -.26*** .50*** -.10
Note. All the variables extended from 1 to 7, except for ideological affiliation from 1 to
10.
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.

26
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 27

Figure Caption

Figure 1. Mediation model of intergroup indifference on racism and altruism, mediated

by moral disengagement and social responsibility. Note. Advantag. = Advantageous

comparison. Conseq. = Consequences. Dehuman. = Dehumanization. * p < .05. ** p <

.01. *** p < .001.

27
Running Head: THE INDIFFERENCE THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE 28

28
Racism Scale: Where do you fall?
<-------------------- Feelings of ‘White Guilt’ can lead to

Terrorism Overt racism Subconscious racism Indifference Defensive Justification Denial

I would/ Violent Whites “I’m not How I just If he/ Racism


Blacks
have Black are the racist am I don’t they no
are
killed a Face superior but...” privileged like had longer
naturally
black (Depict race if I am “ghetto” just... exists
more
person Hangings, poor?
violent/
simply for etc)
less
being inteligent
black “Funny”
I inflict Blacks The way That has It’s just What I have I don’t
Black about black
fear upon should be things are nothing a joke see color
Face reverse friends
black sent back is god’s will to do
people to Africa with me racism?
on purpose

I inflict Whites are Thugs That is But black Calling the We had a Slavery ended
fear upon under attack/ their on police because black president 200 years ago
black people will be minorities problem, black crime! black folk makes therefore
“as a joke” soon not mine you uncomfortable black people
are not oppressed

and compound many of these behaviors ------------------------------>

White Savior “Woke” justification Performative Ally Awareness Allyship Abolitionist

Whites There is only I will Being Systemic


were 1 Race, help you, involved racism is
slaves too the human but only in this very real
race. if I lead will help and needs to
my be ended
reputation

There are There is no Love If they want I expect Yes, I will


plenty of need for conquers our help praise my life as a poor make space
succesful POC to have all. they and/or white person has for POC
POC; their own should be publicity been hard but it
they just safe spaces; nicer/more isn’t as hard
need to we are all respectful as if I were poor
work one AND a POC
harder
If we can’t My experience I will put my
use the “N” as a white person safety,
word, they is drastically health
shouldn’t either different than & freedom
that of a POC. on the line to
fight for POC.
I will let them
lead and not
try to be at
the center.

© 2019 *Note: It is common for many people to move back & forth along the scale regularly, especially the middle parts
@CristiInMD ** The term “blacks” is used to be more familiar to anyone of those mentalities
V4.0 ***”Blacks” can be substituted with people of any nationality/ethnicity other than European white since it’s
RacismScale.weebly.com people of European descent who have held institutional power in America since its inception.

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