Introduction: the main pillars of US foreign policy

Bibliography:

- Ambrose Rise to Globalism

- Cohen The New Cambridge history of American foreign policies

!! —> lire les articles sur Ametice au fur et à mesure + lire un des livres

The main pillars of US foreign policies: a few basic principles

The US constitution has not changed since independence. It is roughly the

same guidelines today as at the time of independence.

Quote 1: Foreign policy isn’t distant and should concern every American
citizen

Even a president who seems very different borrows from other elements
from the bucket of American foreign policies

Need to have more trade and more land

The first e the US developed some kind of ideology was with the myth of
the manifest destiny.

Isolationism: started with President Washington when the US was still

young. No American president is doing thing completely new: they are
only okay with temporary alliances and ONLY in extreme emergencies

They needed to have money and the only way to do so was to trade

Even when NATO was created, there was a debate (1940s) about the fact
that it was against the tradition.

Very strong in the 19th century and unwoven in the fabric of American

« America First » goes back to

Protectionism: they defend their country’s interests (security, freedom of
US citizens not to be colonized, the pursuit of happiness).

Sometimes, it is not only defensive but with the view of getting more
territory.

The city upon a hill (puritans)

Jefferson: the empire of liberties

Congress is still reluctant to commit the US into a war. In fact, the US

haven’t declared many wars bc it is a decision made by congress.

1823: Monroe Doctrine

William

From the Cold War to 'America First': The United

States and the World

Session 1: Introduction: The main pillars of US foreign policy

Since the beginning of US history a few basic principles have
emerged as guidelines to US foreign policy in remarkable continuity
(cf continuity of US Constitution), even though methods and ways do
vary along with circumstances (quote Dean Rusk). "Our policies have
changed over the decades and centuries to reflect changing
circumstances; our basic strategic posture has not changed since
1823" (Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence, 2001). In other
words, George W. Bush or Barack Obama, or even Donald Trump, are
not isolated, unique phenomena but rather derive from strongly
entrenched movements whose ancestry can be found in the late
18th, 19th and early 20th centuries. During the nation’s first
century, ideology exercised a limited influence over decision
making, since the government was rendered cautious by its
relatively limited resources and sharp political disagreements.
Things started changing with the Manifest Destiny concept (War on
Mexico) and the real turning point came with the Spanish American
War in 1898 when the US embarked upon a truly international war
(not defensive).
 Isolationism
The very first principle of isolationism was announced as early as
1796 by President George Washington in his Farewell Address, when
he recommended that his fellow citizens did not meddle with
European affairs, to avoid conflicts, in other words to maintain a
certain form of political isolationism. At the time, the U.S. was still a
young and rather weak nation and had everything to lose in being
entangled in the quarrels of Europe. This is why President
Washington advised to take advantage of our detached and distant
situation and to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion
of the foreign world while resorting to temporary alliances for
extraordinary emergencies. For Washington and many other
presidents after him, the U.S. was to protect U.S. interests, that is:
its security, the freedom of US citizens, and the pursuit of happiness.
If the U.S. was to intervene in a conflict, it would be only for
defensive purposes or because it served its own interests. Jefferson
was very much on the same line and thought the U.S. should be a
model for the world (cf the city upon a hill concept) but without
trying to export this model forcibly, in order to prevent military
commitment (no strong military force at the time but the reluctance
to commit troops abroad is still a strong current of US policy.)
Isolationism or what has come to be called America first has
remained a permanent, underlying feature of America. It was
particularly strong in the 19th century, after WWI, in the 1920s and
1930s, but became increasingly difficult to enforce after Pearl Harbor
(1941) when it became impossible for the U.S. to remain isolated.
Although a minority trend, it occasionally reemerged (Senator Taft
repeatedly opposed international economic agreements after WWII;
George McGovern’s 1972 presidential theme "Come Home America")
and became more consistent after the end of the Cold War, in the
decade 1991-2001, when many Americans felt that there was no
longer any foreign threat forcing the US to get involved overseas.
Three examples of this mild version of isolationism or America first
were, ironic as it may sound:
• the Gulf War (1991), initially opposed by a large part of the U.S.
population that refused, after the trauma of the Vietnam War, to be
entangled again in a foreign war. Congress only reluctantly declared
war.
• in November 1997 when Congress refused to grant President
Clinton fast track authority to expand free trade agreements with
the whole of Latin America, agreements which were seen as
detrimental to U.S. jobs and wages.
• widespread isolationist sentiment as a result of the War on terror
during the GW Bush Administration, with the fiasco of the
Afghanistan and Iraq wars, leading to the complete withdrawal from
Afghanistan in 2021.
• Trump's policies

The famous historian Walter LaFeber equates isolationism with

unilateralism, which is debatable, but this convergence is more
readily apparent with George W. Bush’s doctrine of preemptive war.
(The American Age: US Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad) and with
Trump. Although isolationism still prevails in public opinion, it is not
a valid option for policymakers in our interdependent world, until
Donald Trump revived the isolationist instincts of Americans.
According to historian Andrew Preston, "Trump has built his political
success by tapping into some of the deepest traditions of American
political culture, one of which is exemplified by America First."
(Passport, September 2018, p.35). And according to historian
Christopher Nichols, "the combination of wars abroad, demographic
change, cultural instability, intensifying receptiveness to populist,
nationalist, and xenophobic appeals, along with rising economic
inequality, rapid globalization, and cyclic recessions over the past
two decades, has helped to drive the rise of America First
sensibilities." (ibid. p. 36)

 Interventionism (or threat of) as defense of US security

Keep Europe out of the Americas could summarize the principles
President Monroe announced in 1823, derided as "the revelation of
the Holy Truth" by William A. Williams. This “doctrine” is also
interpreted as an example of unilateralism. Any attack or influence
by European powers (Spain) on any nation of America would be felt
as an aggression on the U.S. itself and so might entail retaliation
from Washington. (cf Quotation) The self-proclaimed Doctrine also
prohibited the establishment of new European colonies in the
Americas with the principle of non colonization and non-intervention.
It made Latin America the backyard of the U.S.. But since, at the
time, the U.S. did not have the means, the power to enforce it, it
stayed a dead letter until the end of the 19 th century. Then, when the
U.S. became stronger, richer, more powerful and a military power, it
viewed and denounced any foreign influence as dangerous and tried
to eradicate it in the name of the Monroe Doctrine. It was the case
of:
• European powers (England, Spain, Germany) in the late19th and
early 20th centuries, which tried to impose their presence in Central
America, Venezuela, the Caribbean.
• European ideology: Fascism in the 1930’s; communism from
1946/7 to 1990
• And, to a lesser extent, just when one thought that the Monroe
Doctrine had no more raison d’être, it was reappearing in the late
1990’s when the European Union signed free trade agreements with
Latin American countries, thus endangering U.S. economic
hegemony in the region (Washington counterattacked with the
proposed but still born Free Trade Agreement of the Americas), or
again with Islamist terrorism since 2001.
+ domino theory (Eisenhower, 1954): leading to intervention in one
country for fear that its threatening model might spread to a whole
region (Vietnam, Cuba, Chile…).
"You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one,
and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go
over very quickly."
• Manifest Destiny
A third basic tenet of US foreign policy is that of Manifest Destiny
and its corollaries, messianic globalism, and universalism. Let us
recall that this concept was created in 1845 by a Democratic
journalist, O’Sullivan (the U.S. has "the manifest destiny to
overspread the continent allotted by Providence to the free
development of our yearly multiplying millions.") It originally meant
republicanism, religious freedom, states rights, free trade, cheap
land. It echoed a feeling that is as old as the Puritan settlers, ie the
belief that Americans were chosen by God (cf the elect) to erect a
city upon a hill and to civilize wild territories next to theirs and why
not other continents as well. This belief rests on two fundamentals
that are still valid today:
- American civilization, institutions and culture are superior to
the others and more efficient (cf formidable success of the
young American nation.
- Americans have a mandate, a mission, to endow other peoples
with what has worked so well for them, with the idea that their
ideologies, their values, and their institutions can be
transposed anywhere for the own good of other populations.
(messianic globalism and universalism of American values).
These beliefs gave them the moral authority to massacre Indian
tribes (inferior races), to annex Mexican populations and to expand
economically, as is exemplified by Ashbel Smith or Senator Albert
Beveridge (cf quotes). In practice, those sentiments reflected less an
American desire to acquire others’ territory and resources than an
underlying attitude about the country’s unique place in the world
and an ethnocentric view of the world.
In the 20th century these beliefs gave Americans the urge to protect
or export democracy in/ to the rest of the world and to expand the
American way of life. They gave birth to internationalism entailing
interference with the political affairs of other countries, the
economic penetration of foreign markets through investment and
trade, maintenance of a high diplomatic profile, the quest for
preponderant military and diplomatic status, sensitivity to threats to
the nation’s honor, active promotion of American values abroad and
a corresponding effort to transplant American institutions. At the
extreme, the globalist tradition places the U.S. in the category of an
imperial republic (late 19th and early 20 th centuries), but there was
no real desire to occupy a territory and establish a US administration
(unlike British or French colonies). The few “colonial” cases, after the
Spanish-American War were the Philippines and Cuba and were
short-lived. Puerto Rico was rapidly related to the United States as
an “associated state.”
 Multilateralism, unilateralism
• Unilateralists seek to dominate the international system and
impose the U.S. view (defense of U.S. national interest, U.S.
hegemony) in a « benevolent empire » even if it means intervention
even before a crisis breaks out (cf interventionism). They belong to
the conservative group and are realists (cf below). The main
spokesmen for this intellectual current are Robert Kagan, William
Kristol, Charles Krauthammer.
• Multilateralists seek to protect U.S. leadership in the international
system by sharing world rule with other nations. They insist on the
importance of international institutions and on taking other
nations/regions into account. They also think that belonging to an
alliance or an international institution allows to share the financial
and ideological burdens of military interventions. The main
spokespeople, though belonging to various groups, are John
Ikenberry, Joseph Nye, Charles Kupchan…
 Idealism, Realism
The history of American diplomacy may be written in terms of the
influence of two divergent schools of thought, idealism (or liberalism
or liberal idealism in the case of Democrats) and realism. (cf
quotation Kissinger)
• The Idealists — often but not always liberals in domestic politics —
view human nature as essentially "good" and posit that human
progress is possible; wicked behavior is the product not of bad
people, but of bad institutions that breed such behavior (Wittkopf &
Kegley, American Foreign Policy: Patterns and Process, 67). They
believe proper reforms of domestic and international institutions can
eliminate negative political behavior, such as dictatorship or war.
The internationalists, who can be liberals or realists, believe that the
U.S. is part of the world and so depends upon others and others’
interests (à droit d’ingérence/interference).
To universalize those humanitarian ideals and moral principles to
which the country has traditionally aspired, idealists have prescribed
American support for international organizations, international law
(internationalism), arms control and disarmament, free trade to
produce goodwill among nations as well as prosperity within them,
respect for human rights, and above all democratic governance (cf
criticism by Kennan.) Moral idealism may prescribe either
isolationism or internationalism, for such thinking invites either a
withdrawal from an immoral world or a quest to reform it.
Consequently, idealism may contribute to the cyclical swings
between disengagement and globalism clear in U.S. diplomatic
history.
The best representative of moral idealism in the 20th century is
certainly Woodrow Wilson who pleaded in favor of a League of
Nations, ie the beginning of multilateralism and international
organizations (cf Fourteen Points) but who also wanted to "teach the
Latin Americans to elect good men" and didn’t hesitate to invade
Mexico for so doing (1914). Human rights and democratic values are
at the core of U.S. foreign policy and the U.S. has a moral obligation
de promote American values abroad. Jimmy Carter, the highly
religious Southerner, is another idealist President, with his constant
emphasis on religion, moralism, and human rights ("human rights is
the soul of our foreign policy", 1977). Most American Presidents are
wholly or partly moral idealists. Reagan and G. Bush wanted to
promote democracy and consolidate it where it had just been
established; Clinton is a good recent example too, with his emphasis
on talks and multilateralism; as for G.W. Bush, he based all his post
9/11 foreign policy on moralism and the gospel of American
values.... In other words, idealism with the best intentions in the
world often turns into messianic idealism, a potentially dangerous
behavior for the independence of other nations (quotes Schlesinger,
Carter).
• In fundamental contradiction with moral idealism, but all too often
concomitant with it, is political realism or realpolitik. The realists —
often domestic conservatives— have little faith in human betterment
and they argue that it is safer to expect the worst and prepare to
deal with it. The primary obligation of every state in such negative
environment is to promote the national self-interest. According to
realists, this is best achieved by not relying on international
organizations or international law for protection and by acquiring
sufficient military capabilities for self-defense. The acquisition of
allies is to be considered provided they do not demand systematic
protection. "Realists say that states have little choice in defining
their national interest because of the international system. They
must define their interest in terms of balance of power or they will
not survive." (Nye, 50, Understanding International Conflicts).
Realists also try to maximize the power of the US and to minimize
the ability of other states to jeopardize US security. Realism is best
exemplified by President Nixon and Secretary of State H. Kissinger.
Realism and idealism are obviously both continuous traditions in
American diplomatic history. They compete as conceptions of how
the U.S. ought to define its foreign policy goals, yet they coexist with
one another in sometimes uncomfortable ways. Thus, the American
foreign policy tradition encompasses both moral idealism and raw
self-interest as well as all the variations we have seen. The duality
they engender accounts for the willingness of the U.S. at times to
sacrifice its cherished ideals for an expedient action, even while
reaffirming its ideals and promoting their maintenance, with the
sincere belief that the U.S. has a mission to help the rest of the
world (G.W. Bush and his Great Middle East project) (Kegley, op. cit.
69-70.) "Practitioners, " decision makers generally borrow elements
from the various types of thinking we have seen when them
formulate American foreign policy à "schizophrenia" (Nye, op. cit). It
is necessary to wait until the end of an Administration to determine
whether it is leaning towards realism or idealism (ex: Carter who
started as an idealist and became a realist under the pressure of
events at the end of this term).