TEAM CODE: 4

MOCK TRAIL

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF ZINDIA

IN THE MATTERS OF S.L.P. NO. 123/2024

THE STATE OF BHARAT PRADESH

…APPELLANT

V.

THE REPUBLIC OF ZINDIA

…RESPONDENT

ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF ZINDIA UNDER

ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Index of Authorities ...................................................................................

2. List of Abbreviations ................................................................................

3. Statement of Jurisdiction ..........................................................................
4. Statement of Facts .....................................................................................
5. Issues Raised .............................................................................................
6. Summary of Arguments ............................................................................
7. Arguments Advanced ................................................................................
- 7.1 Issue 1: Jurisdiction over ForgeAI Pvt. Ltd. ....................................
- 7.2 Issue 2: Liability of ForgeAI Pvt. Ltd. ..............................................
- 7.3 Issue 3: Conviction of Priya Mehta ...................................................
- 7.4 Issue 4: Admissibility of Digital Evidence ........................................
- 7.5 Issue 5: Expert Opinions on Deepfake Video ...................................
8. Prayer………………………………………………………………………
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES

1. Bharatiya nyaya Sanhita

2. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
3. THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000

TABLE OF CASES
S.No Case Name Citation

1 B.S.N.L vs Reliance Communication Ltd 6706 of (2011) 1 SCC 394

2010

2 Union Of India vs Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar & Ors [2008] 7 S.C.R. 673

3 Avnish Bajaj v State the CEO of Bazee.com 2004 (2005) 3 CompLJ 364
Del,

4 Google India Pvt. Ltd. v. Visaka Industries Ltd AIR 2020 SUPREME
COURT 350

5 Sanjay Kumar Kedia v. Narcotics Control Bureau Appeal (crl.) 1659 of 2007

6 Ramesh v. Union ofIndia, (1988) 1 SCC 668,

7 In Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996) 2 SCC 648,

8 Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC 955

9 Bilkis Bano v. State of Gujarat (2007) 6 SCC 171

10 Mohd. Faizan v. State, (2021) 04 AHC CK 0062

11 Selvi v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2010 SUPREME
COURT 1974

12 State of Maharashtra v. Damu, (2000) 6 SCC 269

13 State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600.

14 Samant N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandes (1969) 3 SCC 238

15 Laxmi Raj Shetty v. State of T.N (1988) 3 SCC 319

16 Qamarul Islam v. S.K. Kanta, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 5

17 Ghanshyam Upadhyay v. State of U.P., (2020) 16 SCC 811

18 Kushum Lata v. Union of India, (2006) 6 SCC 180

19 Rohit Pandey v. Union of India, (2005) 13 SCC 702

20 Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2018) 5 SCC 311

21 Wilayat Khan v. State, MANU/SC/0068/1951.

22 Murari Lal v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1980 SC 531

23 Bal Krishna Das Agarwal vs. Radha Devi,. AIR1989ALL133.

24 Murari Lal S/O Ram Singh vs State Of Madhya 1980 AIR 531
Pradesh
25 Yahoo! Inc. v. LICRA US 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181
 (2001)
26 Vodafone International Holdings v. Union of India CIVIL APPEAL NO.733 OF
2012
27 Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of AIR 2006 SUPREME
Enforcement COURT 1301,
_______________________________________________________________________________

LIST OF ABBREVATION
___________________________________________________________________________

BSA Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam

BNSS Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita

BNS Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita

AIR All India Report

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SC Supreme Court

HC High Court

& And

V. Versus

Sec Section

Jr Journal

Art Article
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

THE RESPONDENT HAVE THE HONOUR TO SUBMIT BEFORE THE HON’BLE

SUPREME COURT OF ZENDIA, THE MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT IN
AN APPEAL FILED BY APPELLANT UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA, 1950.

“Article 136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court (1) Notwithstanding anything in
this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any
judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by
any court or tribunal in the territory of India.1”

1
 STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Bharat Pradesh, a politically volatile Indian state, witnessed large-scale communal
violence ahead of its 2024 Assembly elections after a deepfake video surfaced showing Chief
Minister Rajesh Sharma making inflammatory remarks against minorities. The video, created
using FaceForge AI tools, went viral on October 10, 2024, sparking riots and curfews.

2. Investigations revealed Rajiv Kumar, a political activist linked to the opposition, used
FaceForge to create the video. He later confessed, admitting his intent to damage Sharma’s
reputation before elections. Journalist Priya Mehta shared the unverified video, while
ForgeAI—the app’s developer headquartered in Zendia but with a Bharat Pradesh subsidiary
—faced scrutiny for lacking safeguards.

3. The trial court convicted Kumar under Sections 196 (promoting enmity) and 353
(public mischief) of the Zindian Nyaya Sanhita. ForgeAI was held liable for negligence in
failing to prevent misuse of its AI tool, and Mehta was convicted for disseminating the video
without verification, exacerbating unrest.

4. The prosecution relied on digital evidence, including Kumar’s confession and

FaceForge logs, though metadata gaps and chain-of-custody lapses raised doubts. A court-
appointed expert initially deemed the video manipulated but later called his findings
inconclusive. The defense cited an independent media report disputing tampering, admitted
despite hearsay objections.

5. On November 15, 2024, the trial court ruled that ForgeAI’s lack of content
moderation (e.g., watermarking) enabled harm, while Mehta’s journalistic duty required
verification before sharing. The court admitted imperfect digital evidence, prioritizing public
interest over procedural flaws.

6. Both parties appealed. ForgeAI challenges territorial jurisdiction, arguing its Zendia-
based operations fall outside Bharat Pradesh’s purview. Mehta contends her conviction stifles
press freedom, while prosecutors maintain her recklessness worsened violence.

7. The appellate court must now decide: (1) whether Bharat Pradesh had jurisdiction
over ForgeAI; (2) if Mehta’s conviction unjustly penalizes journalists; (3) whether AI
developers can be liable for third-party misuse; (4) if mishandled digital evidence was rightly
admitted; and (5) how conflicting expert testimonies affect the video’s authenticity.
8. The case remains pending appeal, with outcomes poised to shape India’s legal
approach to AI accountability, digital evidence standards, and journalistic responsibilities in
an era of rampant misinformation. The judgment could set precedents for balancing free
speech, technological regulation, and public order during elections.
 ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the court of first instance was correct in asserting the territorial and subject-
matter jurisdiction of Bharat Pradesh to prosecute ForgeAI Pvt. Ltd., despite its global
headquarters being based in the Republic of Zendia?
2. Whether the court of first instance was justified in holding ForgeAI Pvt. Ltd. not
liable under Section 147 and 196 of the Zindian Nyaya Sanhita and Section 66F of the
IT Act, for the creation and dissemination of the deepfake video?
3. Whether the court of first instance was correct in convicting Priya Mehta for aiding or
abetting the commission of the criminal offenses charged, given the resulting harm to
public order from her circulation of the potentially doctored video?
4. Whether the court of first instance was justified in admitting the video and other digital
evidence under the Zindia Sakshya Adhiniyam, considering the alleged mishandling of
the digital evidence?
5. Whether the court of first instance was correct in allowing expert opinions on the
authenticity of the deepfake video, despite conflicting expert testimonies?
1.
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1:

Whether the court of first instance was correct in asserting the territorial and subject-
matter jurisdiction of Bharat Pradesh to prosecute ForgeAI Pvt. Ltd., despite its global
headquarters being based in the Republic of Zendia?

The counsel argues that Bharat Pradesh’s courts rightly exercised jurisdiction over ForgeAI,
despite its foreign headquarters, as the deepfake’s harmful effects occurred there, in India,
Sections 179 and 180 of CRPC. International law’s "effects doctrine" supports this, given the
local impact. ForgeAI’s subsidiary in Zenith City establishes a legal connection, and the IT
Act (Section 75) covers extraterritorial cyber offenses involving Indian networks. The video
disrupted public order, justifying state intervention, while corporate liability laws hold
ForgeAI accountable for failing to prevent misuse. Thus, jurisdiction is valid based on local
consequences, statutory provisions, and ForgeAI’s operational ties to Bharat Pradesh.

ISSUE 2:

Whether the court of first instance was justified in holding ForgeAI Pvt. Ltd. not liable
under Section 147 and 196 of the Zindian Nyaya Sanhita and Section 66F of the IT Act,
for the creation and dissemination of the deepfake video?

The counsel argues that ForgeAI was wrongly acquitted for the deepfake video’s harms
under Section 66F IT Act (promoting communal disharmony) and tortious
liabilityprinciples. Strict liability applies (per Rylands v. Fletcher and BSNL v. Reliance) as
ForgeAI’s AI tool, like a hazardous activity, caused foreseeable damage (riots) without
needing proof of negligence. Vicarious liability attaches since ForgeAI enabled third-party
misuse by lacking controls. Constructive knowledge (Google India v. Visaka) imputes
liability—ForgeAI ignored risks despite awareness of volatile content. Courts must hold
intermediaries accountable for unchecked platform misuse causing public harm.

ISSUE 3:
Whether the court of first instance was correct in convicting Priya Mehta for aiding or
abetting the commission of the criminal offenses charged, given the resulting harm to
public order from her circulation of the potentially doctored video?

The counsel contends the court rightly convicted Ms. Mehta for sharing unverified deepfake
content that incited riots, violating Section 66F IT Act and constitutional limits on free speech
Article 19(2). As a journalist, she breached her heightened duty of care, especially during
elections. Her reckless dissemination—despite foreseeable harm—established causal
liability and negligence. Even without intent, the direct consequences (communal violence)
justify conviction, as speech enabling public disorder isn’t protected. By amplifying
inflammatory material, she facilitated abetment, making her liable for the ensuing chaos.

ISSUE 4:

Whether the court of first instance was justified in admitting the video and other digital
evidence under the Zindia Sakshya Adhiniyam, considering the alleged mishandling of
the digital evidence?

The counsel argues the court correctly admitted the digital evidence despite minor technical
gaps. Substantial compliance with certification requirements was met through forensic
reports and corroborative evidence like confessions and usage logs. Chain-of-custody lapses
only affect evidentiary weight, not admissibility, as no tampering was proven. The
confession, witness testimony, and digital trails provided independent verification beyond the
expert’s inconclusive opinion. Legal presumptions of integrity applied since the system logs
were secure and consistent. Given the video’s role in inciting large-scale unrest, public
interest justified prioritizing substantive reliability over procedural imperfections. The totality
of evidence—not just technical compliance—validated its admission.

ISSUE 5:

Whether the court of first instance was correct in allowing expert opinions on the
authenticity of the deepfake video, despite conflicting expert testimonies?
The counsel argues media reports constitute inadmissible hearsay under the Bhartiya Sakshya
Adhiniyam, 2023, lacking certification or testimony from authors/editors. Conversely, the
forensic expert's analysis of the deepfake video—detecting FaceForge AI manipulation—was
properly admitted, as it aligned with Rajiv Kumar's voluntary confession. While the defense
highlights procedural gaps (e.g., unexamined expert reports), the court rightly prioritized
corroborated technical evidence over uncertified media claims. Expert opinions, though
conflicting, gained credibility through Kumar's admission and detailed forensic methodology.
Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed unreliable media reports and upheld the video's
authenticity based on substantive, corroborated evidence.
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1: Whether the court of first instance was correct in asserting the
territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction of Bharat Pradesh to prosecute
ForgeAI Pvt. Ltd., despite its global headquarters being based in the
Republic of Zendia?
The counsel humbly submits that the court of first instance in Bharat Pradesh correctly
exercisedterritorial and subject-matter jurisdiction over ForgeAI Pvt. Ltd., notwithstanding its
globalheadquarters being located in the Republic of Zendia. This argument is anchored in the
principles ofinternational criminal law, Indian statutory provisions, and the jurisprudence
concerning cybercrimesand intermediary liability.

1.1 Territorial Jurisdiction under Indian Law

Under Section 179 and 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), when an act is
committed partly in one place and partly in another, or where the consequence of an act
occurs in a differentjurisdiction from where it was initiated, courts in both jurisdictions have
authority. The deepfakevideo, allegedly created using ForgeAI's FaceForge platform, had its
consequence - communal violence, destruction of property, and public unrest - in Bharat
Pradesh. This consequence issufficient to invoke jurisdiction of Bharat Pradesh courts.

1.2 Effects Doctrine in International Law

The "effects doctrine" is a recognized principle in international law which permits a state to
assert jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct that has or is intended to have substantial
effects within itsterritory. In Yahoo! Inc. v. LICRA (US) 2, the court acknowledged that where
the effects of an internet-based action are felt in another state, jurisdiction is justified.
ForgeAI's tool, thoughdeveloped outside Bharat Pradesh, was used within and had grave
consequences in the state, thusmeeting the threshold of the doctrine.

2
1.3 Role of the Subsidiary in Bharat Pradesh

ForgeAI Pvt. Ltd. maintains a marketing and promotional subsidiary in Zenith City, Bharat
Pradesh.This presence creates a nexus between the company and the territory. Indian courts
havepreviously pierced the corporate veil to evaluate whether a foreign company has
sufficientoperational control or presence in India to attract liability (e.g., Vodafone
International Holdings v. Union of India3). The subsidiary's promotion of FaceForge within
Bharat Pradesh supports theargument that ForgeAI availed itself of the Indian market and
cannot now shield itself behindterritorial borders.

1.4 The Information Technology Act, 2000 - Extra-Territorial Reach

Section 75 of the IT Act grants Indian authorities jurisdiction over offences committed
outside Indiaby any person if the act involves a computer, computer system, or network
located in India. Giventhat the FaceForge platform was accessed and used within Bharat
Pradesh to generate the video,the use of ForgeAI's infrastructure in this territory further
anchors jurisdiction. Additionally, Section66F, pertaining to cyber terrorism, can be invoked
if the offence intends to threaten the unity orsovereignty of India, or to strike terror among
sections of the people.

1.5 Public Order and Political Integrity

The prosecution contends that the creation and dissemination of the deepfake video had the
specificintent of disrupting public order and influencing electoral outcomes. The Supreme
Court in RomeshThappar v. State of Madras highlighted that "public order" is a legitimate
ground for stateintervention. Since the unrest erupted in Bharat Pradesh, it is only proper that
its courts hear thematter.

1.6 Corporate Criminal Liability

3
 In Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement 4, the Supreme Court held
thatcompanies can be prosecuted and punished for criminal acts. Although ForgeAI may not
have directly uploaded the video, its failure to implement safeguards and monitor misuse of
its technology- especially given the volatile political context - amounts to gross negligence
and culpablefacilitation. As such, the court of Bharat Pradesh acted within its jurisdiction in
pursuing prosecution. In sum, the prosecution maintains that both the statutory framework
and public interest justify theassertion of jurisdiction by Bharat Pradesh. The presence of the
subsidiary, the impact within thestate, and the extra-territorial provisions of Indian law all
reinforce the legal validity of the court’s actions.

ISSUE 2: Whether the court of first instance was justified in holding

ForgeAI Pvt. Ltd. not liable under Section 147 and 196 of the Zindian
Nyaya Sanhita and Section 66F of the IT Act, for the creation and
dissemination of the deep fake video?

The counsel humbly submits that the court of first instance has wrongly acquitted the
company ForgeAI not liable for the creation and dissemination of the deepfake video.

According to Section 196 read with Section 66F of the IT Act which states that the whoever
promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence,
language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of
enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, race, language or regional groups or
castes or communities. Applying the principles of tortious liability the intermediary company
can be held liable

1. Strict Liability

The counsel humbly submits under the doctrine of strict liability established in Rylands v.
Fletcher, a person who brings and keeps on their land anything likely to do harm if it escapes,
is liable for any damage it causes, regardless of negligence. Applying this principle to
ForgeAI, if the company knew that its AI-powered application had the potential for misuse—
such as generating harmful or inflammatory content—then it bears responsibility for ensuring
safeguards were in placeThe company’s awareness of the volatile nature of the video content

4
and the possible consequences may justify holding it strictly liable for the damages caused,
even if it did not directly create or disseminate the video.

Similarly in the case of B.S.N.L vs Reliance Communication Ltd5 the court held the view
that the in order to uphold the principle of strict liability the quantum of damages caused to
the public has to be proved and not the negligence applying this principle the riots and the
public commotion caused due to spread of the video invokes the principle of strict liability
against the company and makes the company liable for the damage caused by the spread of
the video.

In the case of Union Of India vs Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar & Ors 6 Strict liability
focuses on the nature of the defendants' activity rather than, as in negligence, the way in
which it is carried on. There are many activities which are so hazardous that they may
constitute a danger to the person or property of another. The principle of strict liability states
that the undertakers of these activities have to compensate for the damage caused by them
irrespective of any fault on their part. As Fleming says "permission to conduct such activity is
in effect made conditional on its absorbing the cost of the accidents it causes, as an
appropriate item of its overheads. In the case of Jay Laxmi Salt Words (P) Ltd vs State Of
Gujarat the court held that that injury or damage resulting without any intention yet due to
the lack of foresight is also responsible for the defendant being held liable for his negligence
applying the principles of this case the company had no knowledge of the potential damages
that could arise out of the use of its application the company had acted negligently therefore
they are held liable for the damages caused.

2. Vicarious Liability

The counsel humbly submits that in this case, ICICI Bank was held vicariously liable for the
unlawful actions of its loan recovery agents, demonstrating that corporations can be held
responsible for third-party actions conducted on their behalf. Applying this to ForgeAI, if the
platform allowed users to create and distribute potentially unlawful or harmful content
without adequate controls, the company could be seen as enabling the commission of the act,
thereby attracting vicarious liability. Similarly in the case -In a case, Avnish Bajaj v State
5

6
the CEO of Bazee.com7 failed to prove lack of knowledge and adoption of due diligence
when a third party uploaded MMSof two students of a school on its auction site. The FIR
againstthe Director was not quashed as Section 85 of the I.T. Act,2000made a Director
vicariously liable for acts committed by thecompany as the Director was in charge of the
conduct of thebusiness of the company when such contravention was made. In the case of
Nirmaljeet Singh Narula v. Yashwant Sinha, the Plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction
and damages against Bhadas4media.com a news portal. The Plaintiff filed an application for
interim relief of temporary injunction against the Defendants on the ground that Defendants
published false and malafide allegations against the Plaintiff which were defamatory in
nature. It was alleged that the freedom of press was being misused by the Defendants as its
sole agenda was to defame the Plaintiff. The court granted a conditional injunction restraining
the Defendants from licensing, writing, publishing, hosting, advertising defamatory material
against the Plaintiff through their website or other media.Vyakti Vikas Kendra v. Jitender
Bagga8 the Delhi High Court granted interim injunction against the Defendant restraining
them from publishing defamatory materials about the founder of Art Living Foundation on
www.blogger.com. The court held that Defendant No.2 was an Intermediary within the
definition of Section 2(1)(w) and Section 79 of the I.T. Act, 2000. On receiving actual notice
the Defendant ought to remove such defamatory content within 36 hours. By virtue of this
order, the Defendant No.1 was injuncted from sending any email or posting any materials
defamatory to Plaintiff.

3. Constructive Knowledge and Awareness

The counsel humbly submits that in the caseGoogle India Pvt. Ltd. v. Visaka Industries
Ltd8, the Supreme Court examined the scope of intermediary liability and held that failure to
remove unlawful content after notification could result in liability. Although this case
emphasized the importance of actual knowledge, it also opened the door to arguments based
on the platform’s awareness of the consequences of allowing such content to remain
accessible. In this context, if ForgeAI was aware of the heightened tensions or the potential
impact of the video but chose not to act or implement any filters or safeguards, it could be
7

8
argued that the company was negligent or complicit through inaction. Similarly In Sanjay
Kumar Kedia v. Narcotics Control Bureau9the petitioner’s plea to escape liability under the
old section 79 was rejected by the court as the petitioner’s company had actual knowledge of
the malafide actions of sale of ‘psychotropic substance’ through their website which violated
the Narcotic Drugs Psychotropic Substance Act, 1985. On this ground they were not
considered to fall within the immunity provision provided under Section 79 of the I.T.
Act,2000 thus the when the company has constructive knowledge of the effects of the video
caused to the public they are liable to remove the video and ensure strict monitory
mechanisms.

ISSUE 3: Whether the court of first instance was correct in convicting

Priya Mehta for aiding or abetting the commission of the criminal offenses
charged, given the resulting harm to public order from her circulation of
the potentially doctored video?

The counsel humbly submits that the court of first instance was correct in convicting Ms
Priya Mehta for the sharing as it is the journalist duty to properly verify the credibility of the
information whether it is authentic or not

3.1The dissemination of harmful content directly led to large-scale public unrest.

The counsel humbly submits that the Petitioner’s actions triggered communal tensions, riots,
curfews, and widespread public disorder. The causal link between her act and the outcome is
clearly established. In Ramesh v. Union of India10the Court upheld restrictions on freedom
of speech where the content has a proximate and direct tendency to incite violence. Given the
volatile political and communal atmosphere in Bharat Pradesh, Ms. Mehta’s careless
dissemination of inflammatory content had immediate and devastating consequences,
justifying her conviction.

3.2 Journalists carry a higher duty of care during election-sensitive periods.

10
The counsel humbly submits that even if the Petitioner did not create the video, her act of
amplifying it materially contributed to the criminal outcome — widespread unrest. In Gian
Kaur v. State of Punjab11 the Court recognized that abetment includes acts of facilitation,
not merely direct instigation. Dissemination of unverified content known to have public
consequences amounts to aiding the commission of the principal offense. Given the political
climate, a seasoned journalist like Ms. Mehta ought to have anticipated the video’s incendiary
impact.

3.3. Free speech does not protect reckless or harmful dissemination.

The counsel humbly submits that article 19(2) of the Constitution allows reasonable
restrictions on free speech in the interests of public order. In Kedar Nath Singh v. State of
Bihar12 the Court held that freedom of speech must yield to the interests of public safety and
tranquility when necessary. The Petitioner’s act endangered communal harmony, undermined
democratic stability, and contributed to digital misinformation. Her professional status
exacerbates, not excuses, the gravity of the act.

3.4 Journalists carry a higher duty of care during election-sensitive periods

The counsel humbly submits that As a prominent journalist, Ms. Mehta had a professional
and ethical obligation to verify the authenticity of such explosive material before making it
public. In Bilkis Bano v. State of Gujarat13, the Court emphasized that individuals in
positions of influence must exercise heightened responsibility, especially in conflict-prone
contexts. Her failure to verify, particularly in the midst of a charged electoral atmosphere,
constituted gross negligence with foreseeable consequences.

3.5 Legal responsibility flows from consequence, not merely intent

While intent is critical in establishing criminal liability, the law also recognizes the doctrine
of negligence resulting in public harm. In cases involving mass unrest, accountability cannot
be contingent only upon knowledge. Ms. Mehta’s actions had clear and traceable public
11

12

13
impact, fulfilling the criteria for conviction under Section 66F of the IT Act and Section 353
of the ZNS.

ISSUE 4:Whether the court of first instance was justified in admitting the
video and otherdigital evidence under the Zindia Sakshya Adhiniyam,
considering the allegedmishandling of the digital evidence?

4.1.Substiantialcompliance with certificationundersection 63, BSA:

The counsel humbly submits thatSection 63 of the Zindia Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
mandates that digital evidence must be accompanied by a certificate attesting to the
authenticity of the electronic record. While absolute compliance is ideal, substantial
compliance—when the essential purpose of the requirement is met—is often considered
sufficient.

In the present case, the digital video in question was accompanied by certificates issued by
the investigating officer and the regional forensic science laboratory, affirming the process of
log retrieval, device seizure, and system imaging. Though there were minor deficiencies—
such as incomplete metadata logs due to overwritten servers—the core elements of
authentication were present. The forensic analyst provided a certification that the retrieved
logs showed consistent timestamps, IP logs, and usage history of the FaceForge application
on Rajiv Kumar’s device.

Moreover, the confession of the accused and corroborative evidence support the provenance
of the video. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that minor procedural lapses cannot
nullify otherwise credible digital evidence. The emphasis is on whether the integrity and
reliability of the evidence have been reasonably established, not on rigid technical perfection.

Hence, the trial court rightly relied on substantial compliance with Section 63 and admitted
the evidence.

4.2 Chainofcustodylapsesaffectweight, notadmissibility:

A key argument from the appellant is the alleged break in the chain of custody. However, the
legal position is clear: chain of custody primarily affects the probative value (weight) of
evidence, not its admissibility, particularly when the content remains untampered and is
corroborated by independent sources. In Mohd. Faizan v. State14, the Court held that minor
gaps in chain of custody are not fatal where there is no demonstrable tampering and where
the content’s integrity is confirmed through forensic consistency and circumstantial evidence.

In the present case: The FaceForge logs were retrieved from Rajiv Kumar’s local device, not
from an insecure public server;

• Confessional statements by Rajiv Kumar admit to the use of FaceForge to create a

politically sensitive fake video;
• Circumstantial evidenceincluding WhatsApp backups, shared drive logs, and
eyewitness accounts—tie the accused directly to the creation and dissemination of the
video.

Thus, while server logs were overwritten, the digital trail remained coherent. The forensic
examiner also verified the extracted video’s hash value upon acquisition, ensuring that the
content was not altered after retrieval. Consequently, the court was correct in admitting the
evidence, considering that content integrity was preserved and corroborated.

4.3.Expertopinionwasnotthesolebasis – Confessionandcorroborationexist:

The appellant’s argument places undue weight on the forensic expert’s shifting opinion.
While the expert initially flagged potential AI interference and later revised the opinion to
“inconclusive,” this does not render the entire body of evidence inadmissible. Expert opinion
under Section 39 of the BSA is not conclusive in itself—it is one of many factors the court
may consider. In this case, the digital evidence was bolstered by Rajiv Kumar’s confession,
which was voluntary and made before a magistrate under Section 164 CrPC. Furthermore,
independent digital logs from the FaceForge platform, IP address matches, and the app usage
timestamps corroborate the confession.The Supreme Court in Selvi v. State of Karnataka15
affirmed that a confession, if voluntarily made and duly recorded, forms a strong evidentiary
foundation, especially when supported by corroborative material. In State of Maharashtra v.

14

15
Damu16 (2000), it was held that even imperfect forensic evidence cannot override a credible
confession corroborated by other material.This case emphasized that a confession
accompanied by corroborative material evidence holds strong evidentiary value, and
inconsistencies in expert testimony cannot negate such confessions.Here, the court did not
rely solely on expert opinion. Instead, it considered the totality of evidence, including:Rajiv
Kumar’s confession,App usage logs,download history of FaceForge,Testimony of a witness
who saw the editing process in real-time. Hence, the admission of the video was based on a
composite evidentiary framework, not on a weak expert opinion alone

4.4. Presumptionofintergrityundersection 65applies:

Section 65 of the Zindia Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 permits the court to presume the integrity
and authenticity of electronic records if the system generating the record is secure, reliable,
and properly maintained.Despite FaceForge being an open-source platform, the logs of usage
were traceable, time-stamped, and cross-verifiable. The device used by the accused was
seized in working condition, and the FaceForge application history reflected recent activity
consistent with the creation of the deepfake video. The forensic analyst verified usage
metadata and confirmed that the system retained no signs of malware, unauthorized
modification, or external tampering.Therefore, the conditions under Section 65 for
presumptive validity were met. The court could rightly presume that the system operated
properly at the material time,the output (i.e., the video) was produced in the ordinary course
of activity, there was no reason to suspect tampering based on available logs and forensic
reports.Thus, the presumption under Section 65 supports the admissibility of the video,
further strengthening the trial court’s decision.Hash value comparison between the seized
device and the presented video confirmed that no post-seizure tampering occurred. This
serves as technical proof of integrity, thereby justifying the presumption of authenticity under
Section 65.

4.5.Publicinterestandgravityof offensejustifyadmissiondespitetechnicallapses:

Finally, it is essential to consider the larger public interest and the seriousness of the offense
involved. The deepfake video in question triggered widespread public unrest, political
tension, and breakdown of civil order across Bharat Pradesh. The court cannot ignore the
social and political harm caused by the dissemination of such digital misinformation.

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In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu 17 (Parliament Attack Case), the Supreme Court
acknowledged that in cases involving national security and public disorder, the courts may
admit electronic records even in the absence of strict compliance with procedural formalities,
provided the overall reliability is not in doubt.

In this case the digital evidence, although procedurally imperfect, was substantively
credible,it was critical to identifying the source and motive behind the unrest, suppressing
such evidence on minor procedural grounds would be disproportionate and would defeat the
interest of justice.

Thus, in view of the serious public impact, the high evidentiary value, and the presence of
corroborative material, the trial court rightly admitted the evidence under a balanced
application of statutory and constitutional principles.

ISSUE 5: WHETHER THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE WAS CORRECT IN

ALLOWING EXPERT OPINIONS ON THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE DEEP
FAKE VIDEO, DESPITE CONFLICTING EXPERT TESTIMONIES?

5.1 Media report constitutes hearsay evidence, hence inadmissible:

The appellant's attempt to rely on media reports to challenge the forensic analysis is
fundamentally flawed under established evidentiary principles. The Bhartiya Sakshya
Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) strictly limits the admissibility of such secondary evidence. While
Section 4 provides for exceptions under the doctrine of res gestae, and Section 26 permits
secondary evidence in limited circumstances, the Supreme Court has consistently held - In
Samant N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandez18 , (1969) 3 SCC 238; Laxmi Raj Shetty v.
State of T.N19. , (1988) 3 SCC 319; Qamarul Islam v. S.K. Kanta20 , 1994 Supp (3) SCC 5;

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18

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Ghanshyam Upadhyay v. State of U.P21., (2020) 16 SCC 811 ; Kushum Lata v. Union of
India22 , (2006) 6 SCC 180 and Rohit Pandey v. Union of India 23 , (2005) 13 SCC 702, and
observed that newspaper report by itself do not constitute evidence of the contents of it and
are only hearsay evidence. They must be proved either by production of the reporter who
heard the said statements and sent them for reporting or by production of report sent by such
reporter and production of the Editor of the newspaper or it’s publisher to prove the said
report; thus, newspaper report is not “legal evidence” which can be examined in support of
the complainant.

In India, a media release is generally considered inadmissible as evidence in court,

particularly when it comes to social media posts, due to concerns about authenticity and
reliability, with key case law citing the need for a "certificate of authenticity" under Section
65B of the Indian Evidence Act to admit electronic evidence, including social media posts, as
per the Supreme Court ruling in cases like Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal
Pradesh24 where the court emphasized the importance of verifying the source and integrity of
electronic records before admitting them as evidence. Now, sections 62 and 63 of BSA, 2023.

In the present case, the viral news reports and social media posts regarding the alleged
deepfake video lack any certification under Section 65B of the Evidence Act (now Sections
62-63 of BSA 2023). The prosecution correctly objected to their admission since neither the
original reporters who broke the story, nor the editors who published the claims, were called
to testify about the source and veracity of these reports. This evidentiary deficiency is
particularly glaring given that the video first surfaced through unverified social media
channels on October 10, 2024, before being amplified by certain media outlets. Media
Reports are hearsay evidence, making them unreliable. (Note: Sometimes allowed under the
guise of the principle of Res Geste under Section 4 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023

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and sometimes can be considered as secondary evidence under Section 26 of Bhartiya
Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) But a series of Supreme Court cases have clearly laid down the
rule that media reports cannot be considered a reliable source of evidence and some have
even gone to the extent to say that the same is inadmissible.

5.2 Expert evidence corroborates rajiv kumar's confession:

The trial court properly admitted and relied upon the digital forensic analysis conducted by
state-appointed experts, which demonstrated the video's artificial manipulation through
FaceForge AI tools. This expert opinion stands corroborated by Rajiv Kumar's voluntary
confession on November 5, 2023, where he admitted to creating the deepfake video with the
specific intent to damage Chief Minister Sharma's reputation during the election period. Mr.
Rajiv’s confession was accepted by the court and on that basis he was convicted, so at this
juncture, when court has accepted the fact and statement of the convict that Faceforge AI was
indeed utilised to impose Chief Minister Rajiv Sharma’s conviction, there cannot be a
contrary evidence accepted unless mr. Rajiv’s confession is disproved as well.

In Murari Lal v. State of Andhra Pradesh, the Supreme Court has laid down the following
rules on which the reliability of such opinion has to be tested:

1. There is no rule of law, not any rule of discreteness which has crystallised into a rule
of law, that the opinion evidence of an expert must never be acted upon, unless
substantially corroborated.
2. But, having due regard to the various adverse factors operating in case of expert
opinion, the approach should be on caution. Reasons for the opinion must be carefully
probed and examined thereto. All other relevant evidence must be considered.
3. In appropriate cases where corroboration must be sought. In cases where the reasons
for the opinion are convincing and there is no reliable evidence throwing a doubt, the
uncorroborated testimony of an expert may be accepted.
4. The hazard in accepting the expert opinion, is not because experts, in general, are
unreliable witnesses - the quality of credibility or incredibility being one which an
expert may go wrong because of some defect of perception, or honest mistake
conclusion. The more developed and more perfect a science, the less is the chance of
an incorrect opinion.
5. The opinion of experts is not decisive. The Court should not surrender its opinion to
that of the expert. An expert deposes and does not decide. His duty is to furnish the
 judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of his conclusion,
so as to enable the judge to form his own independent judgment by the application of
those criteria to the facts proved in evidence.
6. An expert opinion is not to be believed upon when it is in conflict with direct
evidence; Wilayat Khan v. State25, MANU/SC/0068/1951.

The Supreme Court's guidelines in Murari Lal v. State of Andhra Pradesh26 squarely
applies here. The digital forensic team:

28 Provided detailed technical analysis showing telltale signs of AI manipulation in the

video's facial mapping and audio synchronization;
29 Explained their methodology for identifying FaceForge's proprietary algorithmic
signatures despite some metadata gaps; and
30 Demonstrated how the artifacts found matched known characteristics of deep fake videos
created through this specific platform.

While the defense highlights that some server logs were overwritten, this does not invalidate
the overwhelming technical evidence pointing to manipulation. The experts' conclusions gain
further credibility from Kumar's confession, which independently confirms their findings
about the video's artificial nature.

5.3 Procedural error of not calling the expert or the author of the media release for oral
examinations

It is a wellestablished fact that expert evidence submitted as a report will not be considered as
reliable evidence in any court proceedings until and unless such truth and expertise of the
author of such a document is put to oral examination, by way of cross and re-examination. In
an event where such oral evidence by the author of the documentary expert evidence is not
provided, the courts are to disregard and discredit such an report treating it on par with the
evidentiary value of a newspaper or an media article. In para 29 of Bal Krishna Das

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Agarwal vs. Radha Devi27, the Hon'ble Court observed that, "the expert should be subjected
to cross examination because an expert like any other witness is fallible and the real value of
his evidence consists in the rightful inferences which he draws from what he has himself
observed and not from what he merely surmises".

This procedural failure is fatal to the prosecution's case. As held in Murari Lal case28, while
expert opinion may sometimes stand uncorroborated, it must always be tested through cross-
examination - a safeguard completely absent here. The trial court's willingness to base
convictions on unexamined expert reports sets a dangerous precedent that would allow any
prosecution to avoid scrutiny of its technical evidence.

Therefore, the court of first instance correctly allowed expert opinions on the authenticity of
the deepfake video despite conflicting testimonies, as the forensic analysis was corroborated
by Rajiv Kumar’s confession, aligning with established principles. The appellant’s reliance
on media reports is inadmissible as hearsay under the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 and
Supreme Court precedents—failed to challenge the expert evidence, which detailed AI
manipulation via FaceForge tools. While the defense raised procedural concerns over the lack
of oral examination of experts, the technical analysis, supported by Kumar’s admission,
provided sufficient reliability for admissibility, rendering unverified media reports irrelevant.
The trial court’s approach adhered to evidentiary standards by prioritizing substantiated
expert testimony over uncertified secondary sources.

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 PRAYER

Wherefore in the light of the facts stated, issues raised and arguments advanced and authorities cited,
it is humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Republic of Zindia may be pleased to hold,
adjudge and declare:

1. The court of first instance was correct in asserting the territorial and subject-matter
jurisdiction of Bharat Pradesh to prosecute ForgeAI Pvt. Ltd.

2. The court of first instance was justified in convicting Priya Mehta under Section 196 and
353 of the Zindian Nyaya Sanhita for disseminating the unverified deepfake video

3. The court of first instance was justified in holding ForgeAI Pvt. Ltd. liable under Section
196 and 353, for failing to prevent the misuse of its AI tool in the creation and
dissemination of the deepfake video

4. The court of first instance was justified in admitting the video and other digital evidence
under the Zindia Sakshya Adhiniyam

5. The court of first instance was correct in allowing expert opinions on the authenticity of
the deepfake video.

It is Humbly Submitted to “Dismiss the Appeal”

AND/OR

Pass any other order as this Hon’ble Supreme Court may deem fit in the interest of justice,
equity, and good conscience.

S/d.

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT