Upon taking a more in-depth look at the civil war in Ukraine due to a conflict between its
people, one can see a lot of active Russian participation. Russia has been playing a role there
through sending its military equipment, supplies, and participation of its military. Ever since
2014, it has been recorded at least 137 attacks out of 149 have been launched from inside Russia
towards Ukraine. (Case & Anders, 2016) Ukraine also seems to be pointing the finger at Russia
for several power discrepancies taking place on its lands. A group of hackers has launched the
earlier attack managing to switch off power causing 3 to 6-hour blackouts. These attackers have
used a piece of malware of Russian origin called Black Energy where the attack's density implies
the participation of a nation-state. (Constantin, 2016) This comes to prove that Russia is taking
some pointers from Sun who is well known to be a Chinese military leader and philosopher,
especially in unconventional warfare. Such a hidden cyberattack shows how Russia is following
Sun Tzu’s idea of winning without combat. He emphasizes the strategy following deception and
the use of spies to infiltrate one’s opponent to gain the upper hand stressing over the fact of
manipulation and plotting instead of firepower. (McCready, 2003) This comes to show that Putin
is working a set of specific strategies in his attacks towards Ukraine. His strategies come in three
different plays, one being a defender, one being an imperialist, and the last being an improviser.
(Treisman, 2016)
The first option shows Russia acting as a defender of the Russian western border from the
expansion of NATO while making sure the Russian Black Sea Fleet is kept in position.
(Treisman, 2016) This shows how the fleet is a crucial part of the Russian army and shows how
Putin is inspired by Sir Julian Corbett, whose name is important in British naval history and geo-
strategy since the 19th century especially for his work in “Some Principles of Maritime
Strategy.” (Gibson, 1998) Corbett emphasizes the importance of focusing on a naval strategy
including diplomatic support, the protection or destruction of exchange with the military
providing protection ashore. He believes that to win in a war, the army, fleet, and diplomacy
should operate as one becoming a defining weapon. (Gibson, 1998) It is seen in a similar
approach in Putin’s movement towards Ukraine, with a diplomatic approach based on supporting
the pro-Russian rebels, with a military force is done in a way to keep his fleet afloat supporting
this Corbett strategy. This strategy proves itself to be a part of Putin’s plan as it is confirmed
from a source close to Oleg Belaventsev, the commander of Russia’s military operation in
Crimea, which states that Russia has been worried about Ukraine thinking about canceling the
Russian lease on the naval base in Sevastopol forcing the Black Sea Fleet to retreat. (Treisman,
2016)
The second option shows Putin as an imperialist, where he aims to bring back the
territories of the Soviet Union. It is a well-known fact that Putin and a lot of Russians never truly
accept the loss Russia faced by the end of the Cold War making him want to restore the
reputation lost by expanding the border. (Treisman, 2016) However, the more believable strategy
is that Putin is using the nationalism of the Russian people to further his popularity especially
since the movement towards Crimea alone skyrocketed the number of his supporters. This shows
a huge political influence in his decision also showing inspiration from Corbett. Sir Julian
Corbett is said to have believed that war is by far an extension of politics and political gains
rather than simply standing on its as mere bloodshed. (Gibson, 1998) The Russian attack and war
show here strong links to politics rather than a simple decision just for war.
The third option is Putin being an improviser. This shows that the Russian movements
across borders are not well thought off but rather are impulsive decisions due to geopolitical
aspirations. The proof for this would lie in the fact that the military aspect of moving into Crimea
has been done smoothly, but the political aspects of it show a shortage of groundwork.
(Treisman, 2016) However, a fourth option can here be stated being that Putin is all the above.
He wants to defend his fleet while making sure Russia’s prestige is restored. His movements
show inspiration from Corbett and his impulses to get it right, as in the last option, it shows some
inspiration from Sun Tzu. One of his important strategies is getting inside the enemy’s mind to
maintain an advantage resulting in controlling the enemy’s reaction while keeping one’s strategy
secret and deceptive. (McCready, 2003) While following such an improvised approach, Putin has
put Russia in an advantage. The fact remains that a rational leader can always be contained and
controlled but responding to a “gambler” with instant decisions proves to be harder to deal with
(Treisman, 2016) allowing Putin control over the result.
References:
Case, S., & Anders, K. (2016). Putin's Undeclared War: Summer 2014 - Russian Artillery Strikes
against Ukraine - bellingcat. bellingcat. Retrieved 27 March 2020, from
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2016/12/21/russian-artillery-strikes-
against-ukraine/.
Constantin, L. (2016). Cyberattack suspected in Ukraine power outage. PCWorld. Retrieved 27
March 2020, from https://www.pcworld.com/article/3152010/cyberattack-suspected-in-
ukraine-power-outage.html.
Gibson, J. (1998). Sir Julian Corbett on amphibious operations. Quantico, 82(3), 68- 73.
McCready, D. (2003). Learning from Sun Tzu. Military Review, 83(3), 85-88.
Treisman, D. (2016). Why Putin Took Crimea. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 27 March 2020, from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/why-russian-president-putin-
took-crimea-from-ukraine.
