GREENSTAR BOCAY MANGANDINGAN v. JUDGE SANTOS B.
ADIONG, Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Marawi City;
A.M. NO. RTJ-04-1826
February 6, 2008
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
In his Affidavit-Complaint dated April 15, 2003, complainant Greenstar Bocay
Mangandingan charges respondent Judge Santos B. Adiong, presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur, Marawi City, Branch 8, with gross ignorance
of the law or procedure; manifest unfaithfulness to a basic legal rule as well as
injudicious conduct; grave abuse of authority; grave misconduct; conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice; violation of Rules 3.012 and 3.023 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct; knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order; and bias and partiality.
Complainant was proclaimed the Punong Barangay of Basak-Bangco, Madalum, Lanao
del Sur during the special election on August 13, 2002 by virtue of Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) En Banc Resolution No. 03-0062.
On March 3, 2003, the losing candidate, Alizaman S. Sangcopan, filed with the RTC of
Lanao del Sur an action for damages with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
preliminary mandatory injunction and (TRO) against the seven commissioners of the
COMELEC; the winning and duly proclaimed barangayofficials of BarangayBasak-Bangco
including herein complainant; the Acting Election Officer; the Board of Election Tellers of
Precinct No. 68A; the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); and the Chief of Barangay
Affairs-Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), Province of Lanao del Sur.
Said case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1912-03. 4
On March 5, 2003, the respondent Clerk of Court Atty. Cairoding P. Maruhom issued the
summons.5 Before these could be served on any of the defendants, however, Judge
Adiong issued a TRO without conducting a hearing. He also set the hearing on the
application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on March 20, 2003.6
Complainant claims that there is no showing in the records that the case was raffled to
Branch 8 of the RTC presided by Judge Adiong when said TRO was issued.7
On March 7, 2003, the sheriff made a return of service which partly provides that the
defendants were served with summons through Datu Hassan Mangondaya at his
residence in Madalum, Lanao del Sur.8
Complainant claims that there was no valid service of summons on the defendants in
accordance with Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court since the same was
given to a certain Datu Hassan Mangondaya of Madalum, Lanao del Sur who had
absolutely nothing to do with the case and was not even authorized by the court to
receive summons for the defendants.
Complainant also alleges that on March 11, 2003, or barely six days after issuing the
TRO, Judge Adiong, without notice or hearing, issued another order extending the
effectivity of the illegally issued TRO for another twenty (20) days, prior to the
expiration of the TRO's effectivity and in blatant and open violation of Section 5 of Rule
58 of the Rules of Court and Batas Pambansa Blg. 224.9
On March 20, 2003, Judge Adiong considered the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction submitted for resolution. The following day, he granted plaintiff's application
for a writ of preliminary injunction then issued the writ on March 25, 2003. 10
Complainant avers that it was only on March 28, 2003 when he received a copy of the
summons at the Municipal Hall of Madalum, Lanao del Sur.
In his Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint11 dated May 7, 2003, complainant charges
respondents Atty. Cairoding P. Maruhom and Masbod Sybil with dishonesty, grave
misconduct in office, conduct prejudicial to the orderly administration of justice, and
violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.12
Complainant claims that Maruhom and Sybil conspired with Judge Adiong and Atty.
Edgar Masorong, counsel for the plaintiff, to manipulate the raffle of the case.
Based on the record of the rafflig proceedings conducted at the Office of the Executive
Clerk of Court of Marawi City on April 1, 2003, Civil Case No. 1912-03 was raffled only on
said date and to Branch 10, not to Branch 8. 13 Complainant also alleges that instead of
immediately notifying and/or summoning the parties pursuant to Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 20-95,14 Maruhom delivered the record of the case to Judge
Adiong on March 5, 2003. After the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued on March
25, 2003, the record of the case was returned to the Office of the Executive Clerk of
Court where it was finally raffled to Branch 10 on April 1, 2003.
The complaint and supplemental complaint having been filed directly with the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA), then Court Administrator17 Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
directed respondents, Judge Adiong, Atty. Maruhom and Mr. Sybil, to submit their
respective comments.
In his Comment18 dated June 25, 2003, Judge Adiong claims that there was valid service
of summons or if there was any defect the same had been cured when the defendant
filed his answer. According to Judge Adiong, the summons were served through Datu
Hassan Mangondaya, the former Municipal Vice Mayor of Madalum, Lanao del Sur. As
such, he is certainly a man of suitable age and discretion as well as a prominent citizen
who literally knows everybody in the community. Judge Adiong claims that he relied
upon the belief that the court sheriff had regularly done his job.
Judge Adiong argues that the issuance of the TRO on March 5, 2003 without prior notice
and hearing was valid pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95,
which authorizes the ex parte issuance of a TRO by an executive judge in matters of
extreme urgency, in order to prevent grave injustice and irreparable injury. He claims
that such circumstance was clearly obtaining at the time he issued the TRO.
He also claims that when he extended the TRO to its maximum duration of twenty (20)
days from its issuance, no violation of Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court or B.P.
Blg. 224was committed.
Judge Adiong maintains that the grant and issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
were perfectly valid. Complainant's claim that he was not properly served a summons is
belied by the appearance of his counsel at the Office of the Clerk of Court in the
morning of March 20, 2003, shortly before the hearing of the application for issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction was called.
OCA RULING:
Upon evaluation of the case, the OCA found the complaint partly meritorious. It found
that the summons served through the former vice mayor of Madalum, Lanao del Sur
was not the valid substituted service contemplated by law.
It also found that "[t]here could be no way to avoid the impression of irregularity when
the raffling procedure is circumvented. For which reason, Judge Adiong and Sybil should
be held administratively liable."22 It recommended that the complaint against Maruhom
be dismissed for lack of merit and that both Judge Adiong and Sybil be held liable for
violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars and each be fined in the
amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000).
ISSUE:
WON OCA ERRED IN DECIDING IN FAVOR OF THE COMPLAINANT,
RULING:
NO. OCA CORRECTLY HELD RESPONDENT JUDGE ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE.
No matter how urgent a case may be, this fact cannot justify the procedural shortcuts
employed by respondent judge, i.e. dispensing with the proper service of
summons, and the violation of Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be
served handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive
and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.
It is glaringly obvious from the service return 24 of the sheriff that the proper service as
provided for in the rules was not followed.
No copy of the summons was handed to any of the defendants who were natural
persons. Neither was a copy left at any of their residences or offices. What the sheriff
did was to leave a copy of the summons at the residence of Datu Hassan Mangondaya,
a total stranger to the case. The sheriff also left a copy of the summons for defendant
LBP with the manager of the LBP Marawi City Branch, although the latter is not one of
those enumerated in Section 1125 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court upon whom service
may be made when the defendant is a corporation. In the face of contrary evidence
clearly showing that there was defective service of summons, Judge Adiong could not be
justified in assuming that the sheriff regularly performed his duties.
Worth stressing, Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court states that:
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. - No preliminary
injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by
the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant
before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for
preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to
be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person
sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period,
the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place,
why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or
not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding
order.
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of
extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the
executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court
may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72)
hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next
preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith.
Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the
case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary
restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can
be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining
order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours provided
herein.
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved
within the said period, the temporary restraining order is deemed automatically
vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not extendible without need
of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall have authority to extend or
renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued.
Judge Adiong disregarded these provisions of the Rules. He could not plausibly claim
that he issued a 72-hour TRO under the second paragraph of the rule quoted above
because, first, he was not the executive judge. Second, his order did not state that the
TRO was effective for 72 hours only. On the contrary, the defendants were ordered to
desist from releasing the subject funds "until further orders from this Court." Third,
there was no showing that the order was being issued because of extreme urgency to
justify the issuance of a 72-hour TRO. Judge Adiong only stated in his order that he was
"[a]cting on the prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, without
finding that the plaintiff was entitled thereto." 26
Judge Adiong's violations of the Rules in issuing the TRO are patent and inexcusable.
This Court already ruled that failure to abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-
9527 constitutes the offense of grave abuse of authority, misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. Indeed, a judge is presumed to know
this Circular. Judge Adiong's failure to comply with the clear provisions on issuing TROs
constitutes gross ignorance and gross inefficiency.28
We also agree that the presumptions of good faith and regularity in the performance of
judicial functions on the part of Judge Adiong were negated by the circumstances on
record.
First, there was no proper notice to the herein complainant and the other defendants in
Civil Case No. 1912-03 that an application for the issuance of a TRO had been filed.
Second, Judge Adiong did not conduct a summary hearing before granting the TRO.
Third, as will be discussed hereafter, he contravened the circular on the raffle of cases.
All these systematically deprived complainant and the other defendants of knowledge of
and participation in the TRO proceedings and ensured the unchallenged victory of
Sangcopan therein. These three points, taken together, paint a picture of bias or
partiality on the part of Judge Adiong. His acts amount to gross
misconduct29 constituting violations of the following provisions of the Code of Judicial
Conduct:
CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN
ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
xxx
CANON 3 A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH
IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.
xxx
Gross ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct are classified as serious
charges under Section 830 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court for which any of the
following sanctions under Section 11 of Rule 140 may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
The Court notes that Judge Adiong was previously fined P20,000 for ignorance of the
law in Bantuas v. Pangadapun31 and P5,000 for gross ignorance of the law in Mutilan v.
Adiong.32 He was also warned in the latter case that repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future will be dealt with most severely. In Gomos v. Adiong,33 Judge Adiong
was again found guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction in violation of Section 21(1) 34 of B.P. Blg. 12935 and Sections 4(c)36 and 5, Rule
58 of the Rules of Court and for citing FAPE employees in contempt of court in disregard
of Section 3,37 Rule 71. Accordingly, he was suspended from office without salary and
other benefits for six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely. In De la Paz v. Adiong,38 Judge Adiong was found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and abuse of authority and was suspended for a
period of six (6) months without pay, with a warning that the commission of a similar
act in the future will warrant his dismissal from the service.
This Court cannot countenance the complacence of Judge Adiong manifested in his
gross ignorance and his deliberate misapplication or misinterpretation of the very basic
procedures subject of the present case to justify his actions that favor certain litigants.
Under the circumstances, and considering his propensity for disregarding elementary
rules of procedure, the extreme sanction of dismissal is called for.
Next, we discuss the liability of respondent Maruhom, the Clerk of Court of RTC, Marawi
City. In his Comment, he states that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1912-03 was filed
on March 3, 2003 at 2:30 p.m. He referred it to Judge Adiong on March 5, 2003. 39 He
alleges that Judge Adiong was the only available RTC Judge at that time. We find such
referral unjustified. The case had already waited for more than a day after being filed in
court. From all indications, the case was not so urgent that irreparable injury would be
caused if the case was not acted upon in the first hours of March 5, 2003. It could have
waited some hours more for the arrival of the proper official, the Executive Judge, to act
on it. The undue haste of Maruhom in referring the case to Judge Adiong for action,
without a raffle being first conducted, is a blatantly unjustified violation of the circulars
of the Court which makes him administratively liable. His act was instrumental in the
resulting series of anomalous events leading to the issuance of a temporary restraining
order by an unauthorized judge. By his act he made a mockery of settled procedure for
the orderly dispensation of justice. Time and again, this Court has emphasized the
heavy burden and responsibility of court personnel. They have been constantly
reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance
of their official functions must be avoided. The Court does not hesitate to condemn and
sanction such improper conduct, act or omission of those involved in the administration
of justice that violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes or tends to
diminish the faith of the public in the judiciary. 40
For his prejudicial acts in the conduct of his official tasks, we find Maruhom guilty of
simple misconduct.41 The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
reveals that simple misconduct carries with it a penalty of suspension from one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense. In our view, his
misconduct calls for the imposition of three (3) months suspension from office.
Finally, we now consider the acts of Sybil.
Supreme Court Circular No. 742 pertinently provides:
I. Raffling of Cases
All cases filed with the Court in stations or groupings where there are two or more
branches shall be assigned or distributed to the different branches by raffle. No case
may be assigned to any branch without being raffled. The raffle of cases should be
regularly conducted at the hour and on the day or days to be fixed by the Executive
Judge.'
The importance of assigning cases by raffle is obvious. Such method of assignment
safeguards the right of the parties to be heard by an impartial and unbiased tribunal,
while protecting judges from any suspicion of impropriety. For this reason, disregard of
Circular No. 7, which requires such raffle of cases, cannot be taken lightly. 43
Parenthetically, Judge Adiong apparently sees nothing wrong with Sybil's highly
irregular act of exchanging the records of two cases in violation of the rules on raffle.
This is a reflection of moral obtuseness which further renders respondent judge unfit to
continue in the judicial office.
Going back to Sybil, he should bear in mind that employees of the judiciary must be
mindful and should tread carefully when assisting other persons. 44 Court employees
should maintain a hands-off attitude where dealings with party-litigants are concerned
to maintain the integrity of the courts and to free court employees from suspicion of any
misconduct.45
In Macalua v. Tiu, Jr.,46 this Court held:
'[A court employee] is expected to do no more than what duty demands and no less
than what privilege permits. Though he may be of great help to specific
individuals, but when that help frustrates and betrays the public's trust in the
system it cannot and should not remain unchecked. The interests of the individual
must give way to the accommodation of the public - Privatum incommodum publico
bono pensatur.47 (Emphasis supplied.)
By not abiding by the rules on raffle, Sybil opened himself to the suspicion that he is
biased and that he acted to favor the plaintiff. His highly improper conduct subjected
the court's integrity to distrust. For this, the Court finds respondent Sybil guilty of simple
misconduct.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds:
1. Judge Santos B. Adiong GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law as well as gross
misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He
is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except his accrued leave
credits, if any. He is further disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
2. Atty. Cairoding P. Maruhom GUILTY of simple misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from
office for three (3) months, effective immediately.
3. Mr. Masbod M. Sybil GUILTY of simple misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from office for
three (3) months, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.
