Meditations on First Philosophy

in which are demonstrated the existence of God and the distinction between
the human soul and body
René Descartes

Copyright © Jonathan Bennett 2017. All rights reserved

[Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as
though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations,
are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates
the omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is worth.—In his title for this work,
Descartes is following a tradition (started by Aristotle) which uses ‘first philosophy’ as a label for metaphysics.
First launched: July 2004 Last amended: April 2007

Contents
First Meditation 1

Second Meditation 3

Third Meditation 9

Fourth Meditation 17

Fifth Meditation 23

Sixth Meditation 27
Meditations René Descartes Fifth Meditation

Fifth Meditation:
The essence of material things, and the existence of God considered a second time

There are many enquiries still to be made about God’s of these ideas or not, as I choose, I didn’t invent them: they
attributes, and many about my own nature (that is, the have their own true and immutable natures, ·which are not
nature of my mind). I may take these up at some time; but under my control·. Even if there are not and never were
right now I have a more pressing task. Now that I have seen any triangles outside my thought, still, when I imagine a
how to reach the truth—what to do and what to avoid—I triangle ·I am constrained in how I do this, because· there is
must try to escape from the doubts that beset me a few days a determinate nature or essence or form of triangle that is
ago, and see whether anything can be known for certain eternal, unchanging, and independent of my mind. Consider
about material objects. the things that I can prove about the triangle—that its three
Before enquiring into whether there are any such things, angles equal two right angles, that its longest side is opposite
I should consider the ideas of them in my thought, in order its greatest angle, and so on. I now clearly recognize these
to see which of those ideas are distinct and which confused. properties of the triangle, whether I want to or not, even if I
I distinctly imagine quantity—that is, the length, breadth didn’t give them a thought when the triangle first came into
and depth of the quantity, or rather of the thing that is my mind. So they can’t have been invented by me.
quantified. I also enumerate the thing’s parts, to which I It does not help to point out that I have sometimes seen
attribute various sizes, shapes, positions and movements; triangular bodies, so that the idea of the triangle might have
and to the movements I attribute various durations, ·that is, come to me from them through my sense organs. I can
I say how long each movement lasts·. prove truths about the properties not only of triangles but of
Size, shape, position and so on are well known and countless other shapes that I know I have never encountered
transparent to me as general kinds of phenomenon, but through the senses. These properties must be something,
there are also countless particular facts involving them that not pure nothing: whatever is true is something; and these
I perceive when I attend to them. The truths about all these properties are true because I am clearly aware of them. (I
matters are so open to me, and so much in harmony with have already proved that everything of which I am clearly
my nature, that when I first discover any of them it feels aware is true; and even if I hadn’t proved it, my mind is so
less like •learning something new than like •remembering constituted that I have to assent to these ·geometrical· propo-
something I had known before, or •noticing for the first time sitions as long as I perceive them.) I remember, too, that even
something that was already in my mind without my having back in the times when the objects of the senses held my
turned my mental gaze onto it. attention, I regarded the clearly apprehended propositions of
The most important point is that I find in myself countless pure mathematics—including arithmetic and geometry—as
ideas of things that can’t be called nothing, even if they don’t the most certain of all.
exist anywhere outside me. For although I am free to think

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Meditations René Descartes Fifth Meditation

·The preceding two paragraphs lead to this conclusion·: think of a supremely perfect being as lacking a perfection,
The mere fact that I find in my thought an idea of something namely the perfection of existence. [What Descartes wrote is
x, and vividly and clearly perceive x to have a certain property, usually translated as ‘mountains in a world where there are no valleys’,
it follows that x really does have that property. Can I not turn but that is obviously not self-contradictory. The Latin provides no escape
this to account in an argument - a demonstrative proof of from this, but Descartes may have been thinking in French, in which
the existence of God? The idea of God (that is, of a supremely vallée can mean ‘valley’ in our sense but can be used to refer to foothills,
perfect being) is certainly one that I find within me, just as I the lower slopes of a mountain, or the plain immediately surrounding the
find the ideas of shapes and numbers; and I understand mountain. So ‘highlands’/‘lowlands’ has been adopted as a compromise:
·from this idea· that it belongs to God’s nature that he compact and fairly close to what he presumably meant.]
always exists. This understanding is just as vivid and clear ·Here is a possible objection to the preceding two para-
as what is involved in ·mathematical· proofs of the properties graphs·:
of shapes and numbers. So even if I have sometimes gone I can’t think of God except as existing, just as I can’t
wrong in my meditations in these past days, I ought still to think of a river without banks. From the latter fact,
regard the existence of God as being at least as certain as I though, it certainly doesn’t follow that there are any
have taken the truths of mathematics to be. rivers in the world; so why should it follow from the
At first sight, this looks like a trick. Where things other former fact that God exists? How things are in reality
than God are involved, I have been accustomed to distinguish is not settled by my thought; and just as I can imagine
a thing’s existence from its essence. ·The question ‘What a winged horse even though no horse has wings, so I
is the essence of triangles (or flames or sparrows)?’ asks can attach existence to God in my thought even if no
what it takes for something to qualify as a triangle (or flame God exists.
or sparrow). Answering this still leaves open the existence This involves false reasoning. From the fact that I can’t think
question, which asks whether there are any triangles (or of a river without banks, it does not follow that a river with
flames or sparrows)·. I can easily believe that in the case of banks exists anywhere, but simply that river and banks—
God, also, existence can be separated from essence, ·letting whether or not there are any in reality—are inseparable. On
us answer the •essence question about God while leaving the the other hand, from the fact that I can’t think of God except
•existence question open·, so that God can be thought of as as existing it follows that God and existence are inseparable,
not existing. But on more careful reflection it becomes quite which is to say that God really exists. My thought doesn’t
evident that, just as having-internal-angles-equal-to-180° make it so; it doesn’t create necessities. The influence runs
can’t be separated from the idea ·or essence· of a triangle, the opposite way: the necessity of the thing constrains how
and as the idea of highlands can’t be separated from the I can think, depriving me of the freedom to think of God
idea of lowlands, so existence can’t be separated from the without existence (that is, a supremely perfect being without
essence of God. Just as it is self-contradictory to think of a supreme perfection), like my freedom to imagine a horse
highlands in a world where there are no lowlands, so it is with or without wings.
self-contradictory to think of God as not existing—that is, to

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Meditations René Descartes Fifth Meditation

Here is a ·further· possible objection to this line of one God exists, I plainly see that it is necessary that he has
thought: existed from eternity and will stay in existence for eternity.
Admittedly, once I have supposed that •all perfections •I perceive many other attributes of God, none of which I can
belong to God, I must suppose that he exists, because remove or alter.
existence is one of the perfections. But what entitles Whatever method of proof I use, though, I am always
me to suppose God to have all perfections? Similarly, brought back to the fact that nothing completely convinces
if I suppose that •all quadrilaterals can be inscribed me except what I vividly and clearly perceive. Some things
in a circle, I have to conclude that a rhombus can be that I vividly and clearly perceive are obvious to everyone;
inscribed in a circle; but that is plainly false, which others can be learned only through more careful investiga-
shows that the original supposition was wrong. tion, but once they are discovered they are judged to be just
I agree that I don’t have to think about God at all; but as certain as the obvious ones. (Compare these two truths
whenever I do choose to think of him, bringing the idea of about right-angled triangles: ‘The square on the hypotenuse
the first and supreme being out of my mind’s store, I must equals the sum of the squares on the other two sides’ and
attribute all perfections to him, even if I don’t attend to them ‘The hypotenuse is opposite the largest angle’. The former
individually straight away. This necessity ·in my thought· is less obvious than the latter; but once one has seen it,
guarantees that, when I later realize that existence is a one believes it just as strongly.) ·Truths about God are not
perfection, I am right to conclude then that the first and in the immediately obvious class, but they ought to be·. If
supreme being exists. Similarly, I don’t ever have to imagine I were not swamped by preconceived opinions, and if my
a triangle; but whenever I do wish to consider a figure with thoughts were not hemmed in and pushed around by images
straight sides and three angles, I must attribute to it proper- of things perceived by the senses, I would acknowledge God
ties from which it follows that its three angles equal no more sooner and more easily than anything else. The supreme
than 180°, even if I don’t notice this at the time. When on being exists; God, the only being whose essence includes
the other hand I examine what figures can be inscribed in a existence, exists; what is more self-evident than that?
circle, I am not compelled to think that this class includes all Although I came to see this only through careful thought,
quadrilaterals. Indeed, I cannot—while thinking vividly and I am now just as certain of it as I am of anything at all. Not
clearly—even pretend that all quadrilaterals can be inscribed only that, but I see that all other certainties depend on this
in a circle. This kind of false pretence is vastly different from one, so that without it I can’t know anything for sure. ·The
the true ideas that are innate in me, of which the first and next two paragraphs explain why this is so·.
chief is the idea of God. This idea isn’t a fiction, a creature of While I am perceiving something vividly and clearly, I
my thought, but rather an image of a true and unchanging can’t help believing it to be true. That is a fact about my
nature; and I have several indications that this is so. •God nature. Here is another: I can’t fix my mind’s eye continually
is the only thing I can think of whose existence necessarily on the same thing, so as to keep perceiving it clearly; so that
belongs to its essence. •I can’t make sense of there being sometimes the arguments that led me to a certain conclusion
two or more Gods of this kind; and after supposing that slip out of my focus of attention, though I remember the

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Meditations René Descartes Fifth Meditation

conclusion itself. That threatens me with the following state accept this (·i.e. the proposition about triangles·), as long
of affairs, from which I am protected only by being aware of as I remember that I vividly and clearly perceived it no
the existence of God: counter-arguments can make me doubt it. It is something
In a case where I am not attending to the arguments that I know for certain ·and in an unshakable way· to be true.
that led me to a conclusion, my confidence in the That applies not only to this one proposition but to anything
conclusion might be undermined by arguments going that I remember ever having proved in geometry and the like.
the other way. When I think hard about triangles, for Why should I call these matters into doubt? •Because I am
instance, it seems quite obvious to me—steeped as so built as to be prone to frequent error? No: I now know
I am in the principles of geometry—that a triangle’s that when I have something in mind in a transparently clear
three angles are equal to 180°; and while I am attend- way I cannot be in error about it. •Because I have in the
ing to the proof of this I can’t help believing it. But past regarded as certainly true many things that I afterwards
as soon as I turn my mind’s eye away from the proof, recognized to be false? No: the things that I later came to
then in spite of still remembering that I perceived it doubt had not been vividly and clearly perceived in the first
very clearly ·but without now getting it clear in my place: I had come to accept them for reasons that I later
mind again·, I can easily doubt its truth. So nothing found to be unreliable, because I hadn’t yet discovered this
is ever finally established and settled—I can have no rule for establishing the truth. •Because I may be dreaming,
true and certain knowledge, but only shifting and so that my present thoughts have as little truth as those
changeable opinions. For I can convince myself that I of a person who is asleep? I put this objection to myself a
am naturally liable to go wrong sometimes in matters while ago. It doesn’t change anything, because if something
that I think I perceive as evidently as can be. This is evident to my intellect, even when I am dreaming, then it
seems even more likely when I remember that I have is true.
often regarded as certainly true some propositions Thus I see plainly that the certainty and truth of all
that other arguments have later led me to think false. knowledge depends strictly on my awareness of the true
That is what my situation would be if I were not aware of the God. So much so that until I became aware of him I
existence of God. couldn’t perfectly know anything. Now I can achieve full
But now I have seen that God exists, and have understood and certain knowledge of countless matters, both concerning
that everything else depends on him and that he is not a God himself and other things whose nature is intellectual,
deceiver; from which I have inferred that everything that I and also concerning the whole of the corporeal nature that
vividly and clearly perceive must be true. So even when I is the subject-matter of pure mathematics.
am no longer attending to the arguments that led me to

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Meditations René Descartes Sixth Meditation

Sixth Meditation:
The existence of material things, and the real distinction between mind and body

The remaining task is to consider whether material things from other many-sided figures. In the case of a pentagon,
exist. Insofar as they are the subject-matter of pure mathe- the situation is different. I can of course understand this
matics, I perceive [here = ‘conceive’] them vividly and clearly; so figure without the help of the imagination (just as I can
I at least know that they could exist, because anything that I understand a chiliagon); but I can also imagine a pentagon,
perceive in that way could be created by God. (The only rea- by applying my mind’s eye to its five sides and the area they
son I have ever accepted for thinking that •something could enclose. This imagining, I find, takes more mental effort
not be made by him is that there would be a contradiction in than understanding does; and that is enough to show clearly
my perceiving •it distinctly.) My faculty of imagination, which that imagination is different from pure understanding.
I am aware of using when I turn my mind to material things, Being able to imagine isn’t essential to me, as being able
also suggests that such things really exist. For when I think to understand is; for even if I had no power of imagination
hard about what imagination is, I find that it is nothing but I would still be the same individual that I am. This seems
an application of •the faculty of knowing to •a body that to imply that my power of imagining depends on something
is intimately present to it—and that has to be a body that other than myself; and I can easily understand that ·if there
exists. is such a thing as my body—that is·, if my mind is joined to a
To make this clear, I will first examine how •imagination certain body in such a way that it can contemplate that body
differs from •pure understanding. When I imagine a triangle, whenever it wants to—then it might be this very body that
for example, I don’t merely •understand that it is a three- enables me to imagine corporeal things. So it may be that
sided figure, but I also •see the three lines with my mind’s imagining differs from pure understanding purely like this:
eye as if they were present to me; that is what imagining is. •when the mind understands, it somehow turns in on itself
But if I think of a chiliagon [= ‘thousand-sided figure’, pronounced and inspects one of its own ideas; but •when it imagines, it
kill-ee-a-gon], although I •understand quite well that it is a turns away from itself and looks at something in the body
figure with a thousand sides, I don’t •imagine the thousand that conforms to an idea—either one understood by the mind
sides or see them as if they were present to me. When I or one perceived by the senses). I can, I repeat, easily see
think of a body, I usually form some kind of image; so in that this might be how imagination comes about if the body
thinking of a chiliagon I may construct in my mind—·strictly exists; and since I can think of no other equally good way
speaking, in my imagination·—a confused representation of of explaining what imagination is, I can conjecture that the
some figure. But obviously it won’t be a chiliagon, for it is body exists. But this is only a probability. Even after all my
the very same image that I would form if I were thinking of, careful enquiry I still can’t see how, on the basis of the idea
say, a figure with ten thousand sides. So it wouldn’t help of corporeal nature that I find in my imagination, to prove
me to recognize the properties that distinguish a chiliagon for sure that some body exists.

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Meditations René Descartes Sixth Meditation

As well as the corporeal nature that is the subject-matter were my ideas, but it was reasonable for me to think that
of pure mathematics, I am also accustomed to imagining what I was perceiving through the senses were external
colours, sounds, tastes, pain and so on—though not so bodies that caused the ideas. For I found that these ideas
distinctly. Now, I perceive these much better by means of came to me quite without my consent: I couldn’t have that
the senses, which is how (helped by memory) they appear kind of idea of any object, even if I wanted to, if the object
to have reached the imagination. So in order to deal with was not present to my sense organs; and I couldn’t avoid
them more fully, I must attend to the senses—that is, to having the idea when the object was present. Also, since the
the kind of thinking [here = ‘mental activity’] that I call ‘sensory ideas that came through the senses were much more lively
perception’. I want to know whether the things that are and vivid and sharp than •ones that I formed voluntarily
perceived through the senses provide me with any sure when thinking about things, and than •ones that I found
argument for the existence of bodies. impressed on my memory, it seemed impossible that sensory
To begin with, I will (1) go back over everything that I ideas were coming from within me; so I had to conclude that
originally took to be perceived by the senses, and reckoned they came from external things. My only way of knowing
to be true; and I will go over my reasons for thinking this. about these things was through the ideas themselves, so it
Next, I will (2) set out my reasons for later doubting these was bound to occur to me that the things might resemble
things. Finally, I will (3) consider what I should now believe the ideas. In addition, I remembered that I had the use of
about them. my senses before I ever had the use of reason; and I saw that
(1) First of all, then, I perceived by my senses that I had a the ideas that I formed were mostly composed of elements
head, hands, feet and other limbs making up the body that I of sensory ideas. This convinced me that I had nothing at
regarded as part of myself, or perhaps even as my whole self. all in my intellect that I had not previously had in sensation.
I also perceived by my senses that this body was situated As for the body that by some special right I called ‘mine’: I
among many other bodies that could harm or help it; and had reason to think that it belonged to me in a way that no
I detected the favourable effects by a sensation of pleasure other body did. ·There were three reasons for this·. •I could
and the unfavourable ones by pain. As well as pain and never be separated from it, as I could from other bodies; •I
pleasure, I also had sensations of hunger, thirst, and other felt all my appetites and emotions in it and on account of it;
such appetites, and also of bodily states tending towards and •I was aware of pain and pleasurable ticklings in parts
cheerfulness, sadness, anger and similar emotions. Outside of this body but not in any other body. But why should that
myself, besides the extension, shapes and movements of curious sensation of pain give rise to a particular distress of
bodies, I also had sensations of their hardness and heat, mind; and why should a certain kind of delight follow on a
and of the other qualities that can be known by touch. In tickling sensation? Again, why should that curious tugging
addition, I had sensations of light, colours, smells, tastes in the stomach that I call ‘hunger’ tell me that I should eat,
and sounds, and differences amongst these enabled me to or a dryness of the throat tell me to drink, and so on? I
sort out the sky, the earth, the seas and other bodies from couldn’t explain any of this, except to say that nature taught
one another. All I was immediately aware of in each case me so. For there is no connection (or none that I understand)

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between the tugging sensation and the decision to eat, or senses didn’t depend on my will was not enough to show
between the sensation of something causing pain and the that they came from outside me; for they might have been
mental distress that arises from it. It seems that nature produced by some faculty of mine that I didn’t yet know.
taught me to make these judgments about objects of the (3) But now, when I am beginning to know myself and
senses, for I was making them before I had any arguments my maker better, I don’t think I should recklessly accept
to support them. everything I seem to have acquired from the senses, but I
(2) Later on, however, my experiences gradually under- don’t think I should call it all into doubt.
mined all my faith in the senses. A tower that had looked First, I know that if I have a vivid and clear thought of
round from a distance appeared square from close up; an something, God could have created it in a way that exactly
enormous statue standing on a high column didn’t look large corresponds to my thought. So the fact that I can vividly and
from the ground. In countless such cases I found that the clearly think of one thing apart from another assures me that
judgments of the external senses were mistaken, and the the two things are distinct from one another—·that is, that
same was true of the internal senses. What can be more they are two ·—since they can be separated by God. Never
internal than pain? Yet I heard that an amputee might mind how they could be separated; that does not affect the
occasionally seem to feel pain in the missing limb. So even judgment that they are distinct. ·So my mind is a distinct
in my own case, I had to conclude, it was not quite certain thing from my body. Furthermore, my mind is me, for the
that a particular limb was hurting, even if I felt pain in it. To following reason·. I know that I exist and that nothing else
these reasons for doubting, I recently added two very general belongs to my nature or essence except that I am a thinking
ones. •The first was that every sensory experience I ever thing; from this it follows that my essence consists solely in
thought I was having while awake I can also think of myself my being a thinking thing, even though there may be a body
as having while asleep; and since I don’t believe that what that is very closely joined to me. I have a vivid and clear
I seem to perceive in sleep comes from things outside me, I idea of •myself as something that thinks and isn’t extended,
didn’t see why I should be any more inclined to believe this and a clear idea of •body as something extended that does
of what I think I perceive while awake. •The second reason not think. So it is certain that •I am really distinct from •my
for doubt was that for all I knew to the contrary I might be body and can exist without it.
so constituted that I am liable to error even in matters that Besides this, I find that I am capable of certain special
seem to me most true. (I couldn’t rule this out, because I kinds of thinking [= ‘mental activity’], namely imagination and
did not know—or at least was pretending not to know—who sensory perception. Now, I can vividly and clearly under-
made me.) And it was easy to refute the reasons for my stand •myself as a whole without •these faculties; but I
earlier confidence about the truth of what I perceived by the can’t understand •them without •me, that is, without an
senses. Since I seemed to be naturally drawn towards many intellectual substance for them to belong to. A faculty or
things that reason told me to avoid, I reckoned that I should ability essentially involves acts, so it involves some thing
not place much confidence in what I was taught by nature. that acts; so I see that •I differ from •my faculties as •a
Also, I decided, the mere fact that the perceptions of the thing differs from •its properties. Of course there are other

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faculties—such as those of moving around, changing shape, ·Those are the •clearly understood properties of bodies •in
and so on—which also need a substance to belong to; but it general·. What about •less clearly understood properties (for
must be a bodily or extended substance and not a thinking example light or sound or pain), and properties of •particular
one, because a vivid and clear conception of those faculties bodies (for example the size or shape of the sun)? Although
includes extension but not thought. Now, I have a passive there is much doubt and uncertainty about them, I have a
faculty of sensory perception, that is, an ability to receive sure hope that I can reach the truth even in these matters.
and recognize ideas of perceptible objects; but I would have That is because God isn’t a deceiver, which implies that he
no use for this unless something—myself or something has given me the ability to correct any falsity there may be in
else—had an active faculty for producing those ideas in the my opinions. Indeed, everything that I am ‘taught by nature’
first place. But this faculty can’t be in me, since clearly it certainly contains some truth. For by ‘nature’ as a general
does not presuppose any thought on my part, and sensory term I now mean nothing other than God himself or the
ideas are produced without my cooperation and often even ordered system of created things established by him. And
against my will. So sensory ideas must be produced by my own nature is simply the totality of things bestowed on
some substance other than me—a substance that actually me by God.
has (either in a straightforward way or in a higher form) all As vividly as it teaches me anything, my own nature
the reality that is represented in the ideas that it produces. teaches me that I have a body, that when I feel pain there
Either (a) this substance is a body, in which case it will is something wrong with this body, that when I am hungry
•straightforwardly contain everything that is represented in or thirsty it needs food and drink, and so on. So I shouldn’t
the ideas; or else (b) it is God, or some creature more noble doubt that there is some truth in this.
than a body, in which case it will contain •in a higher form Nature also teaches me, through these sensations of pain,
whatever is to be found in the ideas. I can ·reject (b), and· hunger, thirst and so on, that I (a thinking thing) am not
be confident that God does not transmit sensory ideas to me merely in my body as a sailor is in a ship. Rather, I am
either directly from himself or through some creature that closely joined to it—intermingled with it, so to speak—so
does not straightforwardly contain what is represented in that it and I form a unit. If this were not so, I wouldn’t feel
the ideas. God has given me no way of recognizing any such pain when the body was hurt but would perceive the damage
‘higher form’ source for these ideas; on the contrary, he has in an intellectual way, like a sailor seeing that his ship needs
strongly inclined me to believe that bodies produce them. repairs. And when the body needed food or drink I would
So if the ideas were transmitted from a source other than intellectually understand this fact instead of (as I do) having
corporeal things, God would be a deceiver; and he is not. So confused sensations of hunger and thirst. These sensations
bodies exist. They may not all correspond exactly with my are confused mental events that arise from the union—the
sensory intake of them, for much of what comes in through intermingling, as it were—of the mind with the body.
the senses is obscure and confused. But at least bodies have Nature also teaches me that various other bodies exist
all the properties that I vividly and clearly understand, that in the vicinity of my body, and that I should seek out some
is, all that fall within the province of pure mathematics. of these and avoid others. Also, I perceive by my senses a

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great variety of colours, sounds, smells and tastes, as well mind and body. My ‘nature’, then, in this limited sense, does
as differences in heat, hardness and so on; from which I indeed teach me to avoid what hurts and to seek out what
infer that the bodies that cause these sensory perceptions gives pleasure, and so on. But it doesn’t appear to teach
differ from one another in ways that correspond to the sen- us to rush to conclusions about things located outside us
sory differences, though perhaps they don’t resemble them. without pausing to think about the question; for knowledge
Furthermore, some perceptions are pleasant while others of the truth about such things seems to belong to the mind
are nasty, which shows that my body—or rather my whole alone, not to the combination of mind and body. So, although
self insofar as I am a combination of body and mind—can a star has no more effect on my eye than a candle’s flame,
be affected by the various helpful or harmful bodies that my thinking of the star as no bigger than the flame does
surround it. not come from any positive ·‘natural’· inclination to believe
However, some of what I thought I had learned from this; it’s just a habit of thought that I have had ever since
nature really came not from nature but from a habit of childhood, with no rational basis for it. Similarly, although
rushing to conclusions; and those beliefs could be false. I feel heat when I approach a fire and feel pain when I go
Here are a few examples: too near, there is no good reason to think that something in
•that if a region contains nothing that stimulates my the fire resembles the heat, or resembles the pain. There is
senses, then it must be empty; merely reason to suppose that something or other in the fire
•that the heat in a body resembles my idea of heat; causes feelings of heat or pain in us. Again, even when a
•that the colour I perceive through my senses is also region contains nothing that stimulates my senses, it does
present in the body that I perceive; not follow that it contains no bodies. I now realize that
•that in a body that is bitter or sweet there is the same in these cases and many others I have been in the habit
taste that I experience, and so on; of misusing the order of nature. The right way to use the
•that stars and towers and other distant bodies have sensory perceptions that nature gives me is as a guide to
the same size and shape that they present to my what is beneficial or harmful for my mind-body complex; and
senses. they are vivid and clear enough for that. But it is a misuse of
To think clearly about this matter, I need to define exactly them to treat them as reliable guides to the essential nature
what I mean when I say that ‘nature teaches me’ something. of the bodies located outside me, for on that topic they give
I am not at this point taking ‘nature’ to refer to the totality of only very obscure and confused information.
what God has given me. From that totality I am excluding I have already looked closely enough at how I may come
things that belong to the mind alone, such as my knowl- to make false judgments, even though God is good. Now
edge that what has been done can’t be undone (I know this it occurs to me that there is a problem about •mistakes I
through the natural light, without help from the body). I am make regarding the things that nature tells me to seek out
also excluding things that relate to the body alone, such as or avoid, and also regarding •some of my internal sensations.
the tendency bodies have to fall downwards. My sole concern Some cases of this are unproblematic. Someone may be
here is with what God has given to me as a combination of tricked into eating pleasant-tasting food that has poison

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concealed in it; but here nature urges the person towards with an accurate one—whereas I have been using ‘nature’
the pleasant food, not towards the poison, which it doesn’t not to make comparisons but to speak of what can be found
know about. All this shows is that the person’s nature in the things themselves; and this usage is legitimate.
doesn’t know everything, and that is no surprise. When we describe a dropsical body as having ‘a dis-
But often enough we go wrong about things that nature ordered nature’, therefore, we are using the term ‘nature’
urges us towards. Sick people, for example, may want food merely to compare sick with healthy. What has gone wrong
or drink that is bad for them. ‘They go wrong because they in the mind-body complex that suffers from dropsy, however,
are ill’—true, but the difficulty remains. A sick man is one of is not a mere matter of comparison with something else.
God’s creatures just as a healthy one is, and in each case it There is here a real, intrinsic error of nature, namely that
seems a contradiction to suppose that God has given him a the body is thirsty at a time when drink will cause it harm.
nature that deceives him. We have to enquire how it is that the goodness of God does
A badly made clock conforms to the laws of its nature in not prevent nature from deceiving us in this way. ·This
telling the wrong time, just as a well made and accurate clock enquiry will fall into four main parts·.
does; and we might look at the human body in the same •There is a great difference between the mind and the
way. We could see it as a kind of machine made up of bones, body. Every body is by its nature divisible, but the mind
nerves, muscles, veins, blood and skin in such a way that, can’t be divided. When I consider the mind—i.e. consider
even if there were no mind in it, it would still move exactly myself purely as a thinking thing—I can’t detect any parts
as it now does in all the cases where movement isn’t under within myself; I understand myself to be something single
the control of the will or, therefore, of the mind. If such a and complete. The whole mind seems to be united to the
body suffers from dropsy [a disease in which abnormal quantities whole body, ·but not by a uniting of parts to parts, because:·
of water accumulate in the body], for example, and is affected by If a foot or arm or any other part of the body is cut off,
the dryness of the throat that normally produces in the mind nothing is thereby taken away from the mind. As for the
a sensation of thirst, that will affect the nerves and other faculties of willing, of understanding, of sensory perception
bodily parts in such a way as to dispose the body to take and so on, these are not parts of the mind, since it is one
a drink, which will make the disease worse. Yet this is as and the same mind that wills, understands and perceives.
natural as a healthy body’s being stimulated by a similar ·They are (I repeat) not parts of the mind, because they are
dryness of the throat to take a drink that is good for it. ·In a properties or powers of it·. By contrast, any corporeal thing
way, we might say, it is not natural·. Just as we could say can easily be divided into parts in my thought; and this
that a clock that works badly is ‘departing from its nature’, shows me that it is really divisible. This one argument would
we might say that the dropsical body that takes a harmful be enough to show me that the mind is completely different
drink is ‘departing from its nature’, that is, from the pattern from the body, even if I did not already know as much from
of movements that usually occur in human bodies. But that other considerations ·in (3) on page 29·.
involves using ‘nature’ as a way of comparing one thing with •The mind isn’t immediately affected by all parts of the
another—a sick man with a healthy one, a badly made clock body but only by the brain—or perhaps just by the small part

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of it which is said to contain the ‘common sense’. [Descartes is violent and unusual manner, this motion reaches the inner
referring to the pineal gland. The ‘common sense’ was a supposed faculty, parts of the brain via the spinal cord, and gives the mind its
postulated by Aristotle, whose role was to integrate the data from the five signal for having a sensation of a pain as occurring in the
The signals that reach the mind depend
specialized senses.] foot. This stimulates the mind to do its best to remove the
upon what state this part of the brain is in, irrespective cause of the pain, which it takes to be harmful to the foot.
of the condition of the other parts of the body. There is God could have made our nature such that this motion in
abundant experimental evidence for this, which I needn’t the brain indicated something else to the mind—for example,
review here. making the mind aware of the actual motion occurring in the
•Whenever any part of the body is moved by another part brain, or in the foot, or in any of the intermediate regions.
that is some distance away, it can be moved in the same [Descartes is here contrasting the foot with other parts of the body, and
fashion by any of the parts that lie in between, without the contrasting a feeling of pain with a merely intellectual awareness that a
more distant part doing anything. For example, in a cord But nothing else would have been so
movement is occurring.]
ABCD, if one end D is pulled so that the other end A moves, conducive to the continued well-being of the body. In the
A could have been moved in just the same way if B or C had same way, when we need drink a certain dryness arises in
been pulled and D had not moved at all. Similarly, when I the throat; this moves the nerves of the throat, which in turn
feel a pain in my foot, this happens by means of nerves that move the inner parts of the brain. That produces in the mind
run from the foot up to the brain. When the nerves are pulled a sensation of thirst, because the most useful thing for us
in the foot, they pull on inner parts of the brain and make to know at this point is that we need drink in order to stay
them move; and nature has laid it down that this motion healthy. Similarly in the other cases.
should produce in the mind a sensation of pain as though All of this makes it clear that, despite God’s immense
occurring in the foot. But since these nerves stretch from goodness, the nature of man as a combination of mind and
the foot to the brain through the calf, the thigh, the lumbar body is such that it is bound to mislead him from time to
region, the back and the neck, that same sensation of ‘pain time. For along the route of the nerves from the foot to the
in the foot’ can come about when one of the intermediate brain, or even in the brain itself, something may happen that
parts is pulled, even if nothing happens in the foot. This produces the same motion that is usually caused by injury
presumably holds for any other sensation. to the foot; and then pain will be felt as if it were in the foot.
•One kind of movement in the part of the brain that This deception of the senses is natural, because a given kind
immediately affects the mind always produces just one kind of motion in the brain must always produce the same kind
of sensation; and it would be best for us if it were always of sensation in the mind; and, given that this kind of motion
the kind that would contribute the most to keeping us alive usually originates in the foot, it is reasonable that it should
and well. Experience shows that the sensations that nature produce a sensation indicating a pain in the foot. Similarly
has given us are all of just such kinds; so everything about with dryness of the throat: it is much better that it should
them bears witness to the power and goodness of God. For mislead on the rare occasion when the person has dropsy
example, when the nerves in the foot are set in motion in a than that it should always mislead when the body is in good

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health. The same holds for the other cases. man were suddenly to appear to me and then disappear
This line of thought greatly helps me to be aware of all immediately, as happens in sleep, so that I couldn’t see
the errors to which my nature is liable, and also to correct where he had come from or where he had gone to, I could
or avoid them. For I know that so far as bodily well-being reasonably judge that he was a ghost or an hallucination
is concerned my senses usually tell the truth. Also, I can rather than a real man. But if I have a firm grasp of when,
usually employ more than one sense to investigate the same where and whence something comes to me, and if I can
thing; and I can get further help from my memory, which connect my perception of it with the whole of the rest of my
connects present experiences with past ones, and from my life without a break, then I am sure that in encountering
intellect, which has by now examined all the sources of error. it I am not asleep but awake. And I ought not to have any
So I should have no more fears about the falsity of what my doubt of its reality if that is unanimously confirmed by all
senses tell me every day; on the contrary, the exaggerated my senses as well as my memory and intellect. From the fact
doubts of the last few days should be dismissed as laughable. that God isn’t a deceiver it follows that in cases like this I
This applies especially to the chief reason for doubt, namely am completely free from error. But since everyday pressures
my inability to distinguish dreams from waking experience. don’t always allow us to pause and check so carefully, it
For I now notice that the two are vastly different, in that must be admitted that human life is vulnerable to error about
dreams are never linked by memory with all the other actions particular things, and we must acknowledge the weakness
of life as waking experiences are. If, while I am awake, a of our nature.

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