Doctrine: Marriage may be solemnized by any xxx priest, rabbi, imam, or
minister of any church or religious sect xxx and shall be solemnized
publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church xxx.
JERRYSUS L. TILAR v. ELIZABETH A. TILAR and the REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, July 12, 2017, G.R. No. 214529, J. Peralta
Facts: In 2010, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the grounds of the private respondent's psychological
incapacity based on Article 36 of the Family Code.
The parties were married in June 1996 in a Catholic Church in Poro, Poro
Camotes, Cebu with Rev. Fr. Vicente Igot as the solemnizing officer. He
stated that their marriage went well in the first months but she later became
extremely jealous and violent, which resulted in frequent quarrels. He
would be threatened and physically harmed. She was also a happy-go-
lucky and extravagant and a gambler. They separated in 2002 and she is
now living with another man in Cebu City.
Petitioner consulted a clinical psychologist and the respondent was said to
be suffering from "aggressive personality disorder as well as histrionic
personality disorder" which made her psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her essential marital obligations.
The RTC ruled against the petitioner stating that the court has no
jurisdiction as that marriage was held in church citing the separation of
church and state.
Issue: Whether the court has jurisdiction in church marriages.
Held: Yes. The contract of marriage is entered into by complying with the
requirements and formalities prescribed by law. The marriage of the
parties, which was solemnized by a Catholic priest and was held in a
church, was in accordance with the Family Code. Although, marriage is
considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and legal
consequences which are governed by the Family Code. The petition only
seeks to nullify the marriage contract between the parties as postulated in
the Family Code of the Philippines and the declaration of nullity of the
parties' marriage in the religious and ecclesiastical aspect is another
matter.
The Supreme Court also stated that the proceedings for church annulment
which is in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon
the State as the couple is still considered married to each other in the eyes
of the civil law. Thus, the principle of separation of church and state finds
no application in this case.
Doctrine: There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the
accused of the existence of such marriage.
Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ELIAS BORROMEO, J.
RELOVA, G.R. No. L-61873, October 31, 1984
Facts: In 1981, Elias Borromeo killed Susana Borromeo. The RTC then
found the accused guilty of parricide.
In his appeal, he stated the RTC erred in ruling that Elias and Borromeo
was legally and validly married as there was no marriage contract that was
executed and thus he should only be guilty of homicide.
Other than the stand of appellant's counsel against the existence of
marriage in order to lessen or mitigate the penalty imposable upon his
client, accused Elias Borromeo himself admitted that the deceased-victim
was his legitimate wife.
Issue: Whether Elias and Susana Borromeo were validly married despite
no marriage contract signed between them.
Held: Yes. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the
accused of the existence of such marriage. (Tolentino vs. Paras, 122
SCRA 525). Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed,
in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law. The
presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the strongest known in law.
There is the presumption that persons living together as husband and wife
are married to each other.
The mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of
marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration
thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of
the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of the said requisites.
Doctrine: When the question of whether a marriage has been contracted
arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence.
Filiation may be proven by the following:
“ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of
birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final
judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article,
the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a
legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final
judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.”
Title: ARTURIO TRINIDAD v. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD
(deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD, J. PANGANIBAN, G.R. No.
118904, April 20, 1998
Facts: On August 10, 1978, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance,
an action for partition of four parcels of land, described therein, claiming
that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three children of
Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio
Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four parcels of land to his three children,
Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the
defendants to partition the land into three equal shares and to give him the
one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants
refused.
The CFI ruled in favor of petitioner. However, upon appeal with the Court of
Appeals, the ruling was reversed. The CA contended that petitioner did not
adduce sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad and that he did not establish that he was recognized, as a
legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, in the record of birth or a final
judgment, in a public document or a private handwritten instrument, or that
he was in continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Issue: Whether petitioner presented sufficient evidence in proving the
marriage and filiation despite absence of a marriage contract and birth
certificate.
Held: Yes. This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias 18 ruled that when the
question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation,
said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of
marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony
of a witness to the matrimony, the couple's public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal
certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such
nuptial in subsequent documents. Petitioner presented witnesses saying
that they attended the said ceremony and testified that the couple identified
themselves as married.
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the
Civil Registrar that all records of births, deaths and marriages were either
lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said
municipality. Although the marriage contract is considered the primary
evidence of the marital union, petitioner's failure to present it is not proof
that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take
its place.
Petitioner also presented family pictures with him and Felix and Inocentes.
Although they do not directly prove petitioner's filiation to Inocentes, they
show that petitioner was accepted by the private respondents as Inocentes'
legitimate son ante litem motam. Petitioner also presented his baptismal
certifiacate. The Supreme Court stated that a baptismal certificate is not a
conclusive proof of filiation but it is one of "the other means allowed under
the Rules of Court and special laws" to show pedigree.
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes' surname (Trinidad)
without objection from private respondents — a presumptive proof of his
status as Inocentes' legitimate child.
Doctrine: Marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise,
such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided
that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid.
Title: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, G.R. No.
198780. October 16, 2013, J. Mendoza
Facts: In 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married
before the MTC.
In 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage,
they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never
really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with
any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as
one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared.
Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the
schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
The RTC ruled in favor of Albios. The RTC stated that when marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and
family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its
inception. The OSG filed an MR, which the RTC denied. The RTC added
that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely
give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00.
The OSG filed an appeal with the CA but the CA ruled again in favor of
Albios.
Issue: Whether a marriage contracted for the purpose of acquiring US
citizenship in exchange for money is considered void.
Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled that consent was not lacking between
Albios and Fringer. There was real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial
and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and
valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application
for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie
that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
The marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and
Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very
bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their
objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter
into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited
purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
Doctrine: The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Title: RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA v ROSITA A. ALCANTARA AND HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 167746. August 28, 2007, J. CHICO-
NAZARIO
Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of marriage alleging that on
December 8, 1982, they were wed before a certain reverend and without
securing the required marriage license. They had another wedding at a
church in Manila on March 26, 1983 which was allegedly with securing a
marriage license. Petitioner also contend that the marriage license
procured in Carmona, Cavita was faked as neither party was a resident
there. They had a child born in 1985. In 1988, they parted ways and lived
separate lives.
Respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there
was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the
Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioner's
representation, they had two children, the other being born on 1992.
Respondent also assert that petitioner has a mistress with whom he has
three children. Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage, which she has filed a case for already.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent and upon appeal with the CA, again,
ruled in her favor.
Issue: Whether the marriage between the parties be considered void
considering there allegations of petitioner.
Held: No. Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to
impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the Supreme Court
considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering
the marriage void are clear-cut.
It can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage
license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage
contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license
number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil
registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it
specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued,
namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact
that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
Doctrine:
Title: SYED AZHAR ABBAS v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS, G.R. No. 183896.
January 27, 2013, J. VELASCO JR.
Facts: Petitioner filed an annulment case against respondent on the ground
that there was no marriage license. In the Marriage Contract of Gloria and
Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona,
Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer.
Petitioner alleges that he never went to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a
marriage license. In 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, to check the license and was told that it cannot be found.
Petitioner presented an employee of the OCR and testified that the
aforementioned license number was issued to another couple and has not
issued the same license number to another person.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. Upon appeal with the CA, it was
overturned.
Issue: Whether the marriage between parties is void.
Held: Yes. Respondent failed to present the actual marriage license, or a
copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies
of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no
such license was issued, petitioner turned to the office of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It
was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued.
Jurisprudence states that the certification issued by the civil registrar
enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Doctrine: The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity - meaning
no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity -
that is unbroken.
Title: ENGRACE NIÑAL FOR HERSELF AND AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM
OF THE MINORS BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL &
PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., v. NORMA BAYADOG, J. YNARES-SANTIAGO,
G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
Facts: Petitioner’s parents Pepito and Teodulfa was married in 1974.
Pepito killed Teodulfa in April 1985. In December 1986, Pepito and the
respondent got married without any marriage license as they executed an
affidavit that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years thus exempted from securing a marriage license. Pepito died in
1997. Thereafter, petitioner field a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage between Pepito and respondent citing lack of marriage license.
Issue: Whether the marriage between Pepito and respondent is void.
Held: Yes. In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for
at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had
started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is
valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make
any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
"husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void
ab initio because of the absence of such element.
Doctrine:
Title: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE A. DAYOT, G.R. No.
175581, March 28, 2008, J. CHICO-NAZARIO
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