G.R. No.

L-5877

September 28, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ARTURO MENDOZA, defendant-appellant.
Nestor A. Andrada for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felicisimo R.
Rosete for appellee.
PARAS, C.J.:
The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Laguna, finding him guilty of the crime of bigamy and
sentencing him to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of from 6 months
and 1 day to 6 years, with costs.
The following facts are undisputed: On August 5, 1936, the appellant and
Jovita de Asis were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the
subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema in
the City of Manila. On February 2, 1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19,
1949, the appellant contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in
Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and
conviction of the crime of bigamy.
The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941
is null and void and, therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while
his first marriage with Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and
that his third marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot be
the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after the death of
Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues that, even assuming
that appellant's second marriage to Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt
from criminal liability, in the absence of a previous judicial annulment of said
bigamous marriage; and the case of People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134,
is cited.
The decision invoked by the Solicitor General, rendered by the Court of
Appeals, is not controlling. Said case is essentially different, because the
defendant therein, Jose Cotas, impeached the validity of his first marriage

for lack of necessary formalities, and the Court of Appeals found his factual
contention to be without merit.
In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga
Lema was contracted during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita
de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the
appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as
follows:1wphl.nt
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years
at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case
until declared null and void by a competent court.
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by
any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity,
as distinguished from mere annulable marriages. There is here no pretence
that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the
belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven
consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said
marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent court.1wphl.nt
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-appellant
acquitted, with costs de officio so ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes,
J.B.L., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
REYES, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with prision mayor "any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved".
Though the logical may say that where the former marriage was void there
would be nothing to dissolve still it is not for the spouses to judge whether
that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. As
Viada says "La santidad e importancia del matrinonio no permite que los
casados juzguen por si mismos de su nulidad; esta ha de someterse
precisamente al judicio del Tribunal competente, y cuando este declare la
nulidad del matrimonio, y solo entonces, se tendra por nulo; mientras no
exista esta declaracion, la presuncion esta siempre a favor de la validez del
matrimonio, y de consiguente, el que contrae otro segundo antes de dicha
declaracion de nulidad, no puede menos de incurrir la pena de este
articulo."(3 Viada, Codigo penal p. 275.)
"This is a sound opinion," says Mr. Justice Tuason in the case of People vs.
Jose Cotas, (CA), 40 Off. Gaz., 3145, "and is in line with the well-known rule
established in cases of adultery, that "until by competent authority in a final
judgment the marriage contract is set aside, the offense to the vows taken
and the attack on the family exist."
Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-10016

February 28, 1957

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,

vs.
PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Adolfo
Brillantes for appellee.
Prospero V. Manuel, Fernando Moncada and Antonio Abad Tornis for
defendant and appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding
appellant guilty of bigamy. The facts are not disputed and, as found by the
trial court, are as follows:
On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso
Rosima, contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in the
Philippine Independent Church in Cebu (Exhibits "1" and "1-A"). While
his marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused under the
name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria
Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City.
The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy,
who was then an employee of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of
Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomesa, a clerk in the said office (Exhibit "A"
and testimonies of Eulogio Giroy and complainant Maria Faicol). After
the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established residence
in Iloilo. As the accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted
between Iloilo where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he
maintained his first wife, Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City on August 5,
1939 (Exhibit "2"). After Maria Gorrea's death, and seeing that the
coast was dear in Cebu, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu
City in 1940, where she worked as a teacher-nurse.
It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy
marital life in Cebu, for it appears that in 1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol
suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment in the
hands of the accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria

Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her

eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage
with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga,
Cebu. (See Exhibits "C", "D", "E" and "F")
The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C.
Maglasangin Sibonga, Cebu, on October 3, 1953, Although the
accused made an attempt to deny his previous marriage with Maria
Faicol, the Court, however, believes that the attempt is futile for the fact
of the said second marriage was fully established not only by the
certificate of the said marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria
Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one of the sponsors of the wedding, and
the identification of the accused made by Maria Faicol. (See Exhibits
"A" and "B"; t.s.n. pp. 32-33, 40, 41, hearing of April 27, 1954).
The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an
express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for
judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could not
legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution
of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the
judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the
latter. Authorities given for this ruling are 5 Viada, 5th edition, 651; 35
American Jurisprudence, Marriage, Sec. 46, p. 212; Bickford vs. Bickford,
74 N. H. 466, 69 A. 579.
Appellant in this Court relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza, (95 Phil.,
845; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] 4767). In this case the majority of this Court
declared:
The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No.
3613) plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person
during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its
invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. There is
here no pretense that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema
was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, had
been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as
dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void
by a subsequent court.

We are of the very weighty reasons by Justice Alex Reyes in the dissent in
the case above-quoted But this weighty reasons notwithstanding, the very
fundamental principle of strict construction of penal laws in favor of the
accused, which principle we may not ignore, seems to justify our stand in
the above-cited case of People vs. Mendoza. Our Revised Penal Code is of
recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America
requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within
the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect
would or should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound
by said rule of strict interpretation already adverted to.
It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second
wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of
the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last
marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this
marriage can not prosper.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby
reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without
prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the second bigamous
marriage. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and
Felix, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
REYES, A.J., dissenting:
I dissent.
Dissenting in the case of People vs. Mendoza, replied on by the majority, I
there said:
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with prision mayor
"any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved."
Though the logician may say that there were the former marriage was
void there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to
judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is

reserved to the courts. As Viada says, 'La satidad e importancia del

matrimonio no permite que los casados juzguen por si mosmos de su
nulidad; esta ha de someterse [precisamente al juicio del
Tribunalcompetente, y cuando este declare la nulidad del matrimonio,
y solo entonces, se tendra por nulo; mientras no exista esta
declaracion, la presuncion esta siempre a favor de la validez del
matrimonio, yde consiguiente, el que contrae otro segundo antes de
dicha declaracio de nulidad, no puede menos de incurrir la pena de
este articulo. (3 Viada, Codigo Penal, p. 275.)
"This is a sound opinion," says Mr. Justice Tuason in the case of
People vs. Jose Cotas, (CA), 40 Off. Gaz. 3145, "and is in line with the
well-known rule established in cases of adultery, that "until by
competent authority in a final judgment the marriage contract is set
aside, the offense to the vows taken and the attack on the family
exists."
I may add that the construction placed by the majority upon the law
penalizing bigamy would frustrate the legislative intent rather than give
effect thereto.
Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-23214 June 30, 1970

OFELIA GOMEZ, as Administratrix of the Estate of the late ISIDRA
GOMEZ Y AQUINO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOAQUIN P. LIPANA, defendant-appellant.
Marcelo Y. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
Presentacion G. Santos for defendant-appellant.

MAKALINTAL, J.:
The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two marriages: the
first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the second with Isidra Gomez y
Aquino in 1935. At the time of the second marriage the first was still
subsisting, which fact, however, Lipana concealed from the second wife.
On December 17, 1943 the spouses of the second marriage acquired by
purchase a piece of land in Cubao, Quezon City, for the price of P3,000.00.
The Torrens title for the property (Transfer Certificate No. 25289 of the
Register of Deeds for Quezon City) was issued on February 1, 1944, in the
name of "Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez." On July 20, 1958 Isidra
Gomez died intestate and childless, and survived only by her sisters as the
nearest relatives. On August 7, 1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of
her estate, commenced the present suit, praying for the forfeiture of the
husband's share in the Cubao property in favor of the said estate. Reliance
is placed on Article 1417 of the old Civil Code, the Spanish text of which
provides:
La sociedad de gananciales concluye al disolverse el matrimonio
o al ser declarado nulo.
El conjuge que por su mala fe hubiere sido causa de la nulidad,
no tendra parte en los bienes gananciales.

The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and that
the husband was the one who gave cause for its nullity, applied the
aforequoted provision and declared his interest in the disputed property
forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.
In the present appeal by the defendant he attributes two errors to the trial
court: (1) in allowing a collateral attack on the validity of the second
marriage and in holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio; and (2) in
holding that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is applicable in this case.
The first error has not been committed. The controlling statute is Act 3613 of
the Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law which became effective on
December 4, 1929 and was in force when the two marriages were
celebrated. The pertinent provisions are as follows:
SEC. 29. Illegal Marriages. Any marriage subsequently
contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance, unless;
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years
at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case
until declared null and void by a competent court.
SEC. 30. Annullable marriages. A marriage may be annulled
for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
xxx xxx xxx

(b) That the former husband or wife of either was living and the
marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force;
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 31. Time for filing action for decree of nullity. The action
to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage, for causes mentioned in
the preceding section, must be commenced within the periods
and by the parties as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) For causes mentioned in subdivision (b); by either party during
the life of the other, or by the former husband or wife.
xxx xxx xxx
The appellant, relying on Section 30(b) quoted above, maintains that his
marriage to Isidra Gomez was valid and could be annulled only in an action
for that purpose, which in the light of Section 31 could be filed only by either
party thereto, during the lifetime of the other, or by the former spouse.
However, it is not Section 30 but Section 29 which governs in this case,
particularly the first paragraph thereof, which says that "any marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance." This is the general rule, to which the only exceptions
are those mentioned in subsections (a) and (b) of the same provision.<re||
an1w>
There is no suggestion here that the defendant's 1930 marriage to Maria
Loreto Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he married Isidra
Gomez in 1935, and there is no proof that he did so under the conditions
envisioned in sub-section (b). The burden is on the party invoking the
exception to prove that he comes under it; and the defendant has not
discharged that burden at all, no evidence whatsoever having been

adduced by him at the trial. Indeed, he contracted the second marriage less
than seven years after the first, and he has not shown that his first wife was
then generally considered dead or was believed by him to be so.
The second error bears closer analysis. Is Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil
Code applicable under the facts of this case?
There is one primordial fact which must be considered, namely, that since
the defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the
conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has
the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband
under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death
should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still
subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the
husband's share in the property here in dispute, even if it was acquired
during the second marriage, of which interest she would be deprived if his
share should be declared forfeited in favor of the second wife.
There is a difference of opinion among the members of this Court as to
whether such resulting prejudice to the first wife is within the contemplation
of the Spanish Civil Code when it decrees in general terms in Article 1417
that the spouse who in bad faith has given cause for nullity (of the marriage)
shall have no share in the conjugal properties, considering that in the
present case the first marriage has not been terminated and therefore
likewise impresses the conjugal stamp of that marriage upon whatever
properties are acquired during its existence. We believe, however, that it is
not necessary to resolve that question here inasmuch as the facts do not
call for the application of Article 1417. The first paragraph of this Article
states two causes for the termination of the conjugal partnership: (1)
dissolution of the marriage and (2) declaration of nullity. Under the second
paragraph of the same Article it is upon the termination of the partnership by
either of said causes that the forfeiture of the guilty spouse takes place.
Now then, when did the conjugal partnership formed by virtue of the
marriage of the defendant to the deceased Isidra Gomez terminate?
Obviously when the marriage was dissolved by the latter's death in 1958. By

that time Article 1417 was no longer in force, having been eliminated in the
new Civil Code, which took effect in 1950. The legal situation arising from
these facts is that while insofar as the second wife was concerned, she
having acted in good faith, her marriage produced civil effects and gave
rise, just the same, to the formation of a conjugal partnership wherein she
was entitled to an equal share upon dissolution, 1 no action lies under Article
1417 for the forfeiture of the husband's share in her favor, much less in
favor of her estate, with respect to which there are after all no children, but
only collateral relatives, who are entitled to succeed.
It would not do to say that since the second marriage, in this case was
void ab initio the application of Article 1417 should be reckoned as of the
date it was celebrated in 1935. This article speaks from the moment of the
termination of the conjugal partnership (either by the dissolution of the
marriage or by the declaration of its nullity); and it would be selfcontradictory to consider that the conjugal partnership was formed and
terminated at the same time and by the same act, that is, by the celebration
itself of the marriage. Colin y Capitant 2 comments on this provision as
follows:
Disuelven matrimonio y, por tanto la sociedad de gananciales, la
muerte de uno de los conjuges y la declaracion de nulidad.<re||
an1w>
En caso de declaracion de nulidad, la sociedad de gananciales se
extingue al ser declarado nulo el matrimonio, es decir, en el
momento en que sea firme la sentencia declarativa de la nulidad.
xxx xxx xxx
It may thus be seen that if the nullity, or annulment, of the marriage is the
basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial
declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that
purpose. In the instant case, however, the conjugal partnership formed by
the second marriage was dissolved by the death of the second wife; and

there has been no judicial declaration of nullity except possibly in this very
action, filed after dissolution by death had taken place and when Article
1417 of the Spanish Civil Code was no longer in force.
There is, to be sure, a statement of Manresa 3 that in case of nullity it is
presumed, with respect to the spouse who acted in bad faith, that neither
the marriage nor the conjugal partnership ever existed, and hence such
spouse has no right to a share in the conjugal properties; but this legal
effect of such presumption derives from the premise that Article 1417 is still
in force, and in any event is of doubtful application if it would be in
derogation of and to the prejudice of the right of the other spouse of the first
marriage in the conjugal partnership formed thereby, which includes
properties acquired by the husband during its existence.
The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the
right of the second wife to her husband, and consider the other half as
pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is
dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-28093 January 30, 1971

BASILIA BERDIN VDA. DE CONSUEGRA; JULIANA, PACITA, MARIA
LOURDES, JOSE, JR., RODRIGO, LINEDA and LUIS, all surnamed
CONSUEGRA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, COMMISSIONER OF
PUBLIC HIGHWAYS, HIGHWAY DISTRICT ENGINEER OF SURIGAO
DEL NORTE, COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE, and ROSARIO
DIAZ,respondents-appellees.
Bernardino O. Almeda for petitioners-appellants.

Binag and Arevalo, Jr. for respondent-appellee Government Service

Insurance System.
Office of the Solicitor General for other respondents-appellees.

ZALDIVAR, J.:
Appeal on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Surigao del Norte, dated March 7, 1967, in its Special
Proceeding No. 1720.
The pertinent facts, culled from the stipulation of facts submitted by the
parties, are the following:
The late Jose Consuegra, at the time of his death, was employed as a shop
foreman of the office of the District Engineer in the province of Surigao del
Norte. In his lifetime, Consuegra contracted two marriages, the first with
herein respondent Rosario Diaz, solemnized in the parish church of San
Nicolas de Tolentino, Surigao, Surigao, on July 15, 1937, out of which
marriage were born two children, namely, Jose Consuegra, Jr. and Pedro
Consuegra, but both predeceased their father; and the second, which was
contracted in good faith while the first marriage was subsisting, with herein
petitioner Basilia Berdin, on May 1, 1957 in the same parish and
municipality, out of which marriage were born seven children, namely,
Juliana, Pacita, Maria Lourdes, Jose, Rodrigo, Lenida and Luz, all
surnamed Consuegra.
Being a member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS, for
short) when Consuegra died on September 26, 1965, the proceeds of his
life insurance under policy No. 601801 were paid by the GSIS to petitioner
Basilia Berdin and her children who were the beneficiaries named in the
policy. Having been in the service of the government for 22.5028 years,
Consuegra was entitled to retirement insurance benefits in the sum of
P6,304.47 pursuant to Section 12(c) of Commonwealth Act 186 as amended

by Republic Acts 1616 and 3836. Consuegra did not designate any
beneficiary who would receive the retirement insurance benefits due to him.
Respondent Rosario Diaz, the widow by the first marriage, filed a claim with
the GSIS asking that the retirement insurance benefits be paid to her as the
only legal heir of Consuegra, considering that the deceased did not
designate any beneficiary with respect to his retirement insurance benefits.
Petitioner Basilia Berdin and her children, likewise, filed a similar claim with
the GSIS, asserting that being the beneficiaries named in the life insurance
policy of Consuegra, they are the only ones entitled to receive the
retirement insurance benefits due the deceased Consuegra. Resolving the
conflicting claims, the GSIS ruled that the legal heirs of the late Jose
Consuegra were Rosario Diaz, his widow by his first marriage who is
entitled to one-half, or 8/16, of the retirement insurance benefits, on the one
hand; and Basilia Berdin, his widow by the second marriage and their seven
children, on the other hand, who are entitled to the remaining one-half, or
8/16, each of them to receive an equal share of 1/16.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing ruling and apportionment made by the GSIS,
Basilia Berdin and her children1 filed on October 10, 1966 a petition for
mandamus with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of
Surigao, naming as respondents the GSIS, the Commissioner of Public
Highways, the Highway District Engineer of Surigao del Norte, the
Commissioner of Civil Service, and Rosario Diaz, praying that they
(petitioners therein) be declared the legal heirs and exclusive beneficiaries
of the retirement insurance of the late Jose Consuegra, and that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining the implementation of the
adjudication made by the GSIS. On October 26, 1966, the trial court issued
an order requiring therein respondents to file their respective answers, but
refrained from issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. On
February 11, 1967, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts, prayed that
the same be admitted and approved and that judgment be rendered on the
basis of the stipulation of facts. On March 7, 1967, the court below rendered
judgment, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:

This Court, in conformity with the foregoing stipulation of facts,

likewise is in full accord with the parties with respect to the
authority cited by them in support of said stipulation and which is
herein-below cited for purposes of this judgment, to wit:
"When two women innocently and in good faith are legally united
in holy matrimony to the same man, they and their children, born
of said wedlock, will be regarded as legitimate children and each
family be entitled to one half of the estate. Lao & Lao vs. Dee Tim,
45 Phil. 739; Estrella vs. Laong Masa, Inc., (CA) 39 OG 79;
Pisalbon vs. Bejec, 74 Phil. 88.
WHEREFORE, in view of the above premises, this Court is of the
opinion that the foregoing stipulation of facts is in order and in
accordance with law and the same is hereby approved.
Judgment, therefore, is hereby rendered declaring the petitioner
Basilia Berdin Vda. de Consuegra and her co-petitioners Juliana,
Pacita, Maria Lourdes, Jose, Jr., Rodrigo, Lenida and Luis, all
surnamed Consuegra, beneficiary and entitled to one-half (1/2) of
the retirement benefit in the amount of Six Thousand Three
Hundred Four Pesos and Fourty-Seven Centavos (P6,304.47)
due to the deceased Jose Consuegra from the Government
Service Insurance System or the amount of P3,152.235 to be
divided equally among them in the proportional amount of 1/16
each. Likewise, the respondent Rosario Diaz Vda. de Consuegra
is hereby declared beneficiary and entitled to the other half of the
retirement benefit of the late Jose Consuegra or the amount of
P3,152.235. The case with respect to the Highway District
Engineer of Surigao del Norte is hereby ordered dismissed.
Hence the present appeal by herein petitioners-appellants, Basilia Berdin
and her children.
It is the contention of appellants that the lower court erred in not holding that
the designated beneficiaries in the life insurance of the late Jose Consuegra

are also the exclusive beneficiaries in the retirement insurance of said

deceased. In other words, it is the submission of appellants that because
the deceased Jose Consuegra failed to designate the beneficiaries in his
retirement insurance, the appellants who were the beneficiaries named in
the life insurance should automatically be considered the beneficiaries to
receive the retirement insurance benefits, to the exclusion of respondent
Rosario Diaz. From the arguments adduced by appellants in their brief We
gather that it is their stand that the system of life insurance and the system
of retirement insurance, that are provided for in Commonwealth Act 186 as
amended, are simply complementary to each other, or that one is a part or
an extension of the other, such that whoever is named the beneficiary in the
life insurance is also the beneficiary in the retirement insurance when no
such beneficiary is named in the retirement insurance.
The contention of appellants is untenable.
It should be noted that the law creating the Government Service Insurance
System is Commonwealth Act 186 which was enacted by the National
Assembly on November 14, 1936. As originally approved, Commonwealth
Act 186 provided for the compulsory membership in the Government
Service Insurance System of all regularly and permanently appointed
officials and employees of the government, considering as automatically
insured on life all such officials and employees, and issuing to them the
corresponding membership policy under the terms and conditions as
provided in the Act.2
Originally, Commonwealth Act 186 provided for life insurance only.
Commonwealth Act 186 was amended by Republic Act 660 which was
enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on June 16, 1951, and, among
others, the amendatory Act provided that aside from the system of life
insurance under the Government Service Insurance System there was also
established the system of retirement insurance. Thus, We will note in
Republic Act 660 that there is a chapter on life insurance and another
chapter on retirement insurance. 3 Under the chapter on life insurance are
sections 8, 9 and 10 of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended; and under the

chapter on retirement insurance are sections 11, 12, 13 and 13-A. On May
31, 1957, Republic Act 1616 was enacted by Congress, amending section
12 of Commonwealth Act 186 as amended by Republic Act 660, by adding
thereto two new subsections, designated as subsections (b) and (c). This
subsection (c) of section 12 of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by
Republic Acts 660, 1616 and 3096, was again amended by Republic Act
3836 which was enacted on June 22, 1963.lwph1.t The pertinent
provisions of subsection (c) of Section 12 of Commonwealth Act 186, as
thus amended and reamended, read as follows:
(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to a member, regardless of age,
who has rendered at least twenty years of service. The benefit
shall, in addition to the return of his personal contributions plus
interest and the payment of the corresponding employer's
premiums described in subsection (a) of Section 5 hereof, without
interest, be only a gratuity equivalent to one month's salary for
every year of service, based on the highest rate received, but not
to exceed twenty-four months; Provided, That the retiring officer
or employee has been in the service of the said employer or office
for at least four years, immediately preceding his retirement.
xxx xxx xxx
The gratuity is payable by the employer or office concerned which
is hereby authorized to provide the necessary appropriation to
pay the same from any unexpended items of appropriations.
Elective or appointive officials and employees paid gratuity under
this subsection shall be entitled to the commutation of the unused
vacation and sick leave, based on the highest rate received,
which they may have to their credit at the time of retirement.
Jose Consuegra died on September 26, 1965, and so at the time of his
death he had acquired rights under the above-quoted provisions of
subsection (c) of Section 12 of Com. Act 186, as finally amended by Rep.

Act 3836 on June 22, 1963. When Consuegra died on September 26, 1965,
he had to his credit 22.5028 years of service in the government, and
pursuant to the above-quoted provisions of subsection (c) of Section 12 of
Com. Act 186, as amended, on the basis of the highest rate of salary
received by him which was P282.83 per month, he was entitled to receive
retirement insurance benefits in the amount of P6,304.47. This is the
retirement benefits that are the subject of dispute between the appellants,
on the one hand, and the appellee Rosario Diaz, on the other, in the present
case. The question posed is: to whom should this retirement insurance
benefits of Jose Consuegra be paid, because he did not, or failed to,
designate the beneficiary of his retirement insurance?
If Consuegra had 22.5028 years of service in the government when he died
on September 26, 1965, it follows that he started in the government service
sometime during the early part of 1943, or before 1943. In 1943 Com. Act
186 was not yet amended, and the only benefits then provided for in said
Com. Act 186 were those that proceed from a life insurance. Upon entering
the government service Consuegra became a compulsory member of the
GSIS, being automatically insured on his life, pursuant to the provisions of
Com. Act 186 which was in force at the time. During 1943 the operation of
the Government Service Insurance System was suspended because of the
war, and the operation was resumed sometime in 1946. When Consuegra
designated his beneficiaries in his life insurance he could not have intended
those beneficiaries of his life insurance as also the beneficiaries of his
retirement insurance because the provisions on retirement insurance under
the GSIS came about only when Com. Act 186 was amended by Rep. Act
660 on June 16, 1951. Hence, it cannot be said that because herein
appellants were designated beneficiaries in Consuegra's life insurance they
automatically became the beneficiaries also of his retirement insurance.
Rep. Act 660 added to Com. Act 186 provisions regarding retirement
insurance, which are Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Com. Act 186, as amended.
Subsection (b) of Section 11 of Com. Act 186, as amended by Rep. Act 660,
provides as follows:

(b) Survivors benefit. Upon death before he becomes eligible

for retirement, his beneficiaries as recorded in the application for
retirement annuity filed with the System shall be paid his own
premiums with interest of three per centum per annum,
compounded monthly. If on his death he is eligible for retirement,
then the automatic retirement annuity or the annuity chosen by
him previously shall be paid accordingly.
The above-quoted provisions of subsection (b) of Section 11 of
Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Rep. Act 660, clearly indicate that
there is need for the employee to file an application for retirement insurance
benefits when he becomes a member of the GSIS, and he should state in
his application the beneficiary of his retirement insurance. Hence, the
beneficiary named in the life insurance does not automatically become the
beneficiary in the retirement insurance unless the same beneficiary in the
life insurance is so designated in the application for retirement insurance.
Section 24 of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Rep. Act 660,
provides for a life insurance fund and for a retirement insurance fund. There
was no such provision in Com. Act 186 before it was amended by Rep. Act
660. Thus, subsections (a) and (b) of Section 24 of Commonwealth Act 186,
as amended by Rep. Act 660, partly read as follows:
(a) Life insurance fund. This shall consist of all premiums for
life insurance benefit and/or earnings and savings therefrom. It
shall meet death claims as they may arise or such equities as any
member may be entitled to, under the conditions of his policy, and
shall maintain the required reserves to the end of guaranteeing
the fulfillment of the life insurance contracts issued by the
System ...
(b) Retirement insurance fund. This shall consist of all
contributions for retirement insurance benefit and of earnings and
savings therefrom. It shall meet annuity payments and establish

the required reserves to the end of guaranteeing the fulfillment of

the contracts issued by the System. ...
Thus, We see that the GSIS offers two separate and distinct systems of
benefits to its members one is the life insurance and the other is the
retirement insurance. These two distinct systems of benefits are paid out
from two distinct and separate funds that are maintained by the GSIS.
In the case of the proceeds of a life insurance, the same are paid to
whoever is named the beneficiary in the life insurance policy. As in the case
of a life insurance provided for in the Insurance Act (Act 2427, as amended),
the beneficiary in a life insurance under the GSIS may not necessarily be a
heir of the insured. The insured in a life insurance may designate any
person as beneficiary unless disqualified to be so under the provisions of
the Civil Code.4 And in the absence of any beneficiary named in the life
insurance policy, the proceeds of the insurance will go to the estate of the
insured.
Retirement insurance is primarily intended for the benefit of the employee
to provide for his old age, or incapacity, after rendering service in the
government for a required number of years. If the employee reaches the
age of retirement, he gets the retirement benefits even to the exclusion of
the beneficiary or beneficiaries named in his application for retirement
insurance. The beneficiary of the retirement insurance can only claim the
proceeds of the retirement insurance if the employee dies before retirement.
If the employee failed or overlooked to state the beneficiary of his retirement
insurance, the retirement benefits will accrue to his estate and will be given
to his legal heirs in accordance with law, as in the case of a life insurance if
no beneficiary is named in the insurance policy.
It is Our view, therefore, that the respondent GSIS had correctly acted when
it ruled that the proceeds of the retirement insurance of the late Jose
Consuegra should be divided equally between his first living wife Rosario
Diaz, on the one hand, and his second wife Basilia Berdin and his children
by her, on the other; and the lower court did not commit error when it

confirmed the action of the GSIS, it being accepted as a fact that the second
marriage of Jose Consuegra to Basilia Berdin was contracted in good faith.
The lower court has correctly applied the ruling of this Court in the case of
Lao, et al. vs. Dee Tim, et al., 45 Phil. 739 as cited in the stipulation of facts
and in the decision appealed from.5 In the recent case of Gomez vs. Lipana,
L-23214, June 30, 1970, 6 this Court, in construing the rights of two women
who were married to the same man a situation more or less similar to the
case of appellant Basilia Berdin and appellee Rosario Diaz held "that
since the defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void
the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor
has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her
husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his
death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in
a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the
husband's share in the property here in dispute.... " And with respect to the
right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the
first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of
such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the
second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, "[t]he
only lust and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right
of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her
and her husband and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage."
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
petitioners-appellants. It is so ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 The minor children were represented by Basilia Berdin as their

natural guardian.
2 Section 4 of Com. Act 186 as originally enacted. Under Section
2(d) of the Act a "member" is an employee who is admitted into
the Government Service Insurance System in accordance with
the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Under Section 8 of the Act
every member is granted a membership policy. Under Section 2(f)
a "membership policy shall mean a life insurance pay for an
amount, the annual premium of which is equivalent to six
per centum of an employee's basic annual salary or
compensation..."
3 No such chapters were designated in Com. Act 186 before it
was amended by Rep. Act 660.
4 Article 2012 of the New Civil Code.
5 See also Pisalbon vs. Bejec, 74 Phil. 88.
6 33 SCRA 615.

A.M. No. 58 June 2, 1977

PEDRO ODAYAT, complainant,

vs.
DEMETRIO AMANTE, respondent.

ANTONIO, J.:
In a verified amended letter-complaint dated March 10, 1973,1 Pedro
Odayat charged Atty. Demetrio Z. Amante, Clerk of Court, Court of First
Instance, Branch IX, Basey, Samar, with oppression, immorality and
falsification of a public document. 2
Briefly stated, complainant's basic allegations are: (1) that respondent
grabbed a portion of complainant's land, and, when this latter resented, the
former arrogantly challenged the complainant to bring the matter to court;
(2) that respondent is cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada, with whom he
begot many children, even while his spouse Filomena Abella is still alive;
and (3) that respondent, although married, falsely represented his status as
single in the information sheet be submitted in connection with his
appointment to his present position as Clerk of Court.
After respondent Demetrio Amante had submitted his letter-comment dated
April 24, 1973, 3 which was considered as his answer to the amended
complaint, this Court, in its minute resolution of July 16, 1974, 4 referred this
Administrative Matter No. P-58 to the Executive Judge of the Court of First
Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, for investigation, report and
recommendation, and the matter was docketed therein as Administrative
Case No. 264. The charges were investigated by District Judge Segundo M.
Zosa of said Court. After appropriate proceedings, Judge Zosa submitted to
this Court his Report and Recommendation dated December 3,1974. 5
1. Oppression. In the course of formal investigation on August 26, 1974
before Judge Zosa, complainant acquiesced to the dropping of this charge
of oppression against respondent, inasmuch as the issue involved therein
refers to a boundary dispute between the complainant and the respondent

and admittedly being more properly a cause for a civil action. 6 Hence, the
scope of the investigation by Judge Zosa is limited to the other two charges.
2. Immorality. To prove this charge of immorality against respondent,
complainant Pedro Odayat testified and presented Exhibits "A" to "E", to the
effect that respondent and Filomena Abella were married in Tacloban City
on October 16, 1948 before Judge Eugenio Brillo (then Justice of the Peace
of Tacloban, Leyte; 7 ) that they had one son, who was born on August 23,
1949 and baptized on October 1, 1949 by the name of Romeo Amante, in
the Sto. Nino Church, Tacloban City, by Rev. Fr. Magdaleno Agnes;8 that he
came to know Filomena Abella, who is a native of Sta. Rita, Samar, only
after her marriage to the respondent when they took up their residence for
five years in Basey, Samar; that he did not know if Filomena Abella was still
single when she married the respondent; that long before he filed his
complaint against respondent on March 10, 1973, he came to know that the
respondent and one Beatriz Jornado were living as husband and wife in
Basey, Samar; that they had several children, two of whom are Maria Felisa
J. Amante, who was born on April 12, 1967, as per certified true copy of the
Certificate of Birth of said child, 9 duly signed and issued on May 7, 1973 by
Perfecto Cabuquit, the Local Civil Registrar, 10 and Alma Amante y Jornada,
who was born on April 8, 1965 and baptized on July 5, 1965, as per
Certificate of Baptism, duly signed and issued on March 6, 1973 by the
Parish Priest, Rev. Fr. Jose M. Lentejas; 11 and that one of the reasons why
he filed his complaint against the respondent was because of their land
dispute.
On the other hand, respondent Demetrio Amante testified, in his behalf, and
presented Atty. Demosthenes Duquilla, as well as Exhibits "1" and "2".
Respondent admits his marriage with Filomena Abella on October 16,
1948.12 He also admits that he has been living with Beatriz Jornada, whom
he married on April 4, 1964 during a religious revival in Almagro, Samar,
before Rev. Fr. John Belly, a Franciscan Missionary, 13 and with whom he
begot six (6) children.14Respondent, however, claims he was coerced into
marrying Filomena Abella, unaware that she was already married to another

man, and they separated in 1949 after Filomena Abella told him of her
previous marriage; that from 1949 to 1964, the respondent did not hear or
received any communication from Filomena Abella, much less knew of her
whereabouts.
To rebut the charge of immorality, respondent presented in evidence the
certification dated September 12, 1974 of David C. Jacobe, the Local Civil
Registrar of Pateros, Rizal 15 attesting that, in accordance with the Register
of Marriages in his office, Filomena Abella was married to one Eliseo
Portales on February 16, 1948. Respondent's contention is that his
marriage with Filomena Abella was void ab initio, because of her previous
marriage with said Eliseo Portales.
The Investigator finds for the respondent and recommends his exoneration
from this charge. Indeed, there is no question that Filomena Abella's
marriage with the respondent was void ab initio under Article 80 [4] of the
New Civil code, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of void marriages. 16
3. Falsification of a This document. The Investigator found that the
complainant failed to prove this charge. Contrary to the allegation of the
complainant, the document in question, 17 shows that the respondent
actually placed in "Item 6. Civil Status" therein the word "Married". 18
In view of the foregoing, We find that the recommendation of the
Investigator is in accordance with law and the evidence on record.
WHEREFORE, respondent Demetrio Amante is hereby exonerated from the
charges filed against him by complainant. Let a copy of this decision be
attached to his personal record,
Castro, C.J., Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Muoz-Palma,
Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-43905 May 30, 1983

SERAFIA G. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, MARIA CLEMENTE and THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PAOMBONG, BULACAN, respondents.
Amelita G. Tolentino for petitioner.
Hermin E. Arceo for Maria Clemente.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The reversal of respondent Court's Order, dismissing petitioner's suit for her
"declaration ... as the lawful surviving spouse of deceased Amado Tolentino
and the correction of the death certificate of the same", is sought in this
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The records disclose that Amado Tolentino had contracted a second
marriage with private respondent herein, Maria Clemente, at Paombong,
Bulacan, on November 1, 1948 (Annex "C", Petition), while his marriage

with petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, celebrated on July 31, 1943, was still
subsisting (Annex "A", Petition).
Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy in Criminal Case No. 2768 of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II, which Court, upon Amado's
plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the corresponding penalty. After
Amado had served the prison sentence imposed on him, he continued to
live with private respondent until his death on July 25, 1974. His death
certificate carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse Maria Clemente."
In Special Proceedings No. 1587-M for Correction of Entry, petitioner sought
to correct the name of the surviving spouse in the death certificate from
"Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her name. The lower Court
dismissed the petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law" and
indicated the need for a more detailed proceeding,
Conformably thereto, petitioner filed the case below against private
respondent and the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan, for her
declaration as the lawful surviving spouse, and the correction of the death
certificate of Amado. In an Order, dated October 21, 1976, respondent
Court, upon private respondent's instance, dismissed the case, stating:
The Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants in this case, thru
counsel Atty. Hernan E. Arceo, for the reasons therein mentioned,
is hereby GRANTED. Further: (1) the correction of the entry in the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the proper remedy
because the issue involved is marital relationship; (2) the Court
has not acquired proper jurisdiction because as prescribed under
Art. 108, read together with Art. 412 of the Civil Code
publication is needed in a case like this, and up to now, there has
been no such publication; and (3) in a sense, the subject matter of
this case has been aptly discussed in Special Proceeding No.
1587-M, which this Court has already dismissed, for lack of the
proper requisites under the law.

In view of the above dismissal, all other motions in this case are
hereby considered MOOT and ACADEMIC.
SO ORDERED. 1
Thus, petitioner's present recourse mainly challenging the grounds relied
upon by respondent Court in ordering dismissal.
We rule for petitioner.
First, for the remedy. Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the correction
of entry contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, she initially seeks a judicial declaration that she is the lawful
surviving spouse of the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the
correction of the entry in the death certificate of said deceased. The suit
below is a proper remedy. It is of an adversary character as contrasted to a
mere summary proceeding. A claim of right is asserted against one who has
an interest in contesting it. Private respondent, as the individual most
affected; is a party defendant, and has appeared to contest the petition and
defend her interests. The Local Civil Registrar is also a party defendant. The
publication required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is not absolutely necessary for no other parties are involved. After all,
publication is required to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make
an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established. 2 Besides, even assuming that this is a proceeding under Rule
108, it was the Court that was caned upon to order the publication, 3 but it
did not. in the ultimate analysis, Courts are not concerned so much with the
form of actions as with their substance. 4
Second, for the merits. Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was
convicted for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the
marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no better proof of
marriage than the admission by the accused of the existence of such
marriage. 5 The second marriage that he contracted with private respondent
during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and

of no force and effect. 6 No judicial decree is necessary to establish the

invalidity of a void marriage. 7 It can be safely concluded, then, without need
of further proof nor remand to the Court below, that private respondent is not
the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado, but petitioner. Rectification of
the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may,
therefore, be validly made.
Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, the other issues raised need no
longer be discussed.
In fine, since there is no question regarding the invalidity of Amado's second
marriage with private respondent and that the entry made in the
corresponding local register is thereby rendered false, it may be
corrected. 8 While document such as death and birth certificates, are public
and entries therein are presumed to be correct, such presumption is merely
disputable and will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing their
inaccuracy. 9
WHEREFORE, the Order, dated October 21, 1975, of respondent Court is
hereby set aside and petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, hereby declared the
surviving spouse of the deceased Amado Tolentino. Let the corresponding
correction be made in the latter's death certificate in the records of the Local
Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan.
No costs.
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL
HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage
(celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church
Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel
(Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous
existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been
performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City.
Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed
that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A.
Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pretrial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of
the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against both
parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting
the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an
opportunity to present evidence(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and
the first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already
married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the
existence of force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already
been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the
following Orders of therespondent Judge(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to
submit the case for resolution based on "agreed facts;" and

(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her
to present evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated
by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the
marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and
therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is
clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her
first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80,
Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior
marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then
such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial
declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would
still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of
petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the
Orders complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-40003 October 28, 1986

SHIRLEY YAP, in her own behalf and in her capacity as Administratrix

of the estate of MANING YAP, JAIME YAP, and TALINA BIANONG VDA.
DE YAP, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NANCY J. YAP, MANING YAP, JR., JULIA YAP,
JASMIN YAP, and SAMUEL YAP,respondents.
Francisco Villanueva for petitioners.
Ramon Tuangco for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals which set
aside the earlier decision of the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del
Sur in Special Proceeding No. 1334 (R-61), declaring the petitioners as the
legal heirs of the late Maning Yap entitled to inherit his estate and
dismissing the opposition filed by the private respondents. The dispositive
portion of the decision on appeal reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside
and, after a complete and correct inventory is returned by the
administratrix, the entire estate of the deceased Maning Yap shall
be divided into two equal parts, one-half (1/2) corresponding to
the petitioner Talina Bianong and her children Shirley Yap and
Jaime Yap and the other half corresponding to the oppositors
Nancy J. Yap and her children Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin
Yap and Samuel Yap, without pronouncement as to costs.
Maning Yap, during his lifetime married twice: first, to Talina Bianong in 1939
and second, to Nancy Yap on December 11, 1948.
Maning Yap and Talina Bianong were married at Bara-as Plantation,
Malabang, Lanao del Sur, in accordance with the Muslim rites and practices

prescribed by the Islam religion professed by both of them. Immediately,

after the marriage, the couple lived in the house of the parents of Maning
Yap at the poblacion of Malabang, Lanao del Sur. Out of the marriage, four
children were born; two of them died in infancy during the Japanese
occupation, while the two others are petitioners Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap.
While the first marriage was still subsisting, Maning Yap married Nancy J.
Yap on December 11, 1948 in a civil ceremony performed by District Judge
Juan Sarenas of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. Nancy Yap entered
into the marriage in the belief that Maning Yap was not a married man. They
had four children, namely respondents Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin
Yap and Samuel Yap. On February 21, 1964, Maning Yap died in Piagapo,
Lanao del Sur, in the crash of an airplane of the Philippine Air Lines. At the
time of his death he, therefore, had two families living separately about 80
kilometers apart.
On March 3, 1964, Talina Bianong Vda. de Yap filed Special Proceeding No.
1334 (Intestate Estate of Maning Yap) before the Court of First Instance of
Lanao del Sur, seeking the issuance of letters of administration for the
estate of Maning Yap. Among other things, the petition alleged that Maning
Yap left personal and real properties all located at Malabang, Lanao del Sur,
with an approximate value of P100,000.00.
The petition was opposed by Nancy J. Yap and her minor children on the
ground that she is the legitimate widow of Maning Yap and that Maning Yap,
Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap, all minors, are their legitimate
children.
Talina Bianong was initially appointed special administratrix of the intestate
estate of Maning Yap. However, after a formal hearing and on
recommendation of Talina, the lower court appointed Shirley Yap as regular
administratrix of the intestate estate of Maning Yap.
Various claims filed by the creditors against the intestate estate of Maning
Yap were duly approved by the court and paid by the administratrix. Since

there still existed a residue of the intestate estate consisting of real and
personal properties and collectible debts after payments to creditors, the
court set the case for hearing to arrive at a declaration of heirship for the
purpose of liquidating the conjugal partnership of the late Maning Yap and
his surviving spouse and to determine the heirs entitled to inherit his
intestate estate.
After trial, the lower court rendered decision declaring Talina Bianong and
her children as the legal heirs of Maning Yap. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered:
(a) Declaring Talina Bianong, Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap, the
legal heirs of the late Maning Yap and entitled to inherit or
succeed to his intestate with Talina Bianong, as his surviving
spouse, and Shirleyt Yap and Jaime Yap, as his surviving
legitimate children;
(b) Adjudicating to Talina Bianong one-third (1/3) of the whole
intestate estate of the late Maning Yap, as her share, pursuant to
Art. 996 of the New Civil Code; to Shirley Yap, the other one-third
(1/3) as her share and to Jaime Yap the remaining one-third (1/3),
also as his share, pursuant to Art. 980 in conjunction with Art. 996
of the new Civil Code.
The opposition and claim of the opposition is hereby dismissed
without costs.
Upon appeal by Nancy Yap and her children, the appellate court reversed
and set aside the decision. As stated earlier, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the estate of Maning Yap should be equally divided into two equal parts:
one-half (1/2) to Talina Bianong and her children and the other half (1/2) to
Nancy Yap and her children.

The appellate court applied the ruling in Lao and Lao v. Dee Tim (45 Phil.
739). The facts in the cited case are similar to the case at bar in that Yap
Siong in his lifetime contracted two marriages; first to Dee Tim on
September 14, 1893 in China with whom he had three children and second
to Maria Lao on June 24, 1903 with whom he had one child. Moreover,
Maria Lao entered into the marriage believing that Yap Siong was not then a
married man. Yap Siong died on September 1922 leaving properties which
were claimed by the two families. In resolving the issue on how the
properties of Yap Siong should be divided, this Court applied the Leyes de
Partidas (Law 1; Title 13, Partida 4), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
... [W]here two wome innocently and in good faith are legally
united in holy matrimony to the same man, their children and each
family will be entitled to one-half of the estate of the husband
upon distribution of his estate. That provision of the Leyes de
Partidas is a very humane and wise law. It justly protects those
who innocently have entered into the solemn relation of marriage
and their descendants. The good faith of all the parties will be
presumed until the contrary is positive proved. (Articles 69, Civil
Code; Las Leyes de Matrimonio, section 96; Gaines v. Hennen,
65 U.S., 553).
A woman who is deceied by a man who respresents himself as
single and who marries him, she and her children born while the
deception lasted, under the Spanish law, are entitled to all the
rights of a legitimate wife and children. The common law allowing
none of the incidents of a true marriage to follow another marriage
entered into during the continuance of a first, was early found to
work a great injustice upon the innocent parties to the second
marriage, and specially upon the offspring of such second
marriage. ...

The petitioners now contend that Maning Yap died in 1964 when the New
Civil Code had already super ed the old Spanish Civil Code. They state that
pursuant to Article 2263 of the New Civil Code, the distribution of the estate
of Maning Yap should be in accordance with, the new codal provisions and
not the Leyes Partidas, which is an old law no longer applicable,
We agree.
Article 2263, a transitional provision in the New Civil Code which took effect
on August 30, 1950 states:
Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a
will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the
Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of
Court. The inheritance of those who, with or without a will die after
the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be adjudicated
and distributed in accordance with this new body of laws and by
the Rules of Court; but the testamentary provisions shall be
carried out insofar as they may be permitted by this Code.
Therefore, legitimes, betterments, legacies and bequests shall be
respected; however, their amount shall be reduced if in no other
manner can every compulsory heir be given his full share
according to this Code. (Rule 12a)
The Report of the Code Commission explains the rule, to wit:
The decisive fact which gives origin to the right of the heirs,
devisees and legatees is the death of the decedent. This is the
basis of the foregoing rule. No heir, devisee or legatee has any
vested right until the moment of such death (Civil Code, Padilla,
Volume VII, 1975, p. 712).
We have accordingly ruled that the rights to the inheritance of a person who
died before the effectivity of the New Civil Code shall be governed by the
Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws and by the Rules of Court (See
Vidaurrazaga v. Court of Appeals, 91 Phil. 492; Canales v. Arrogante, 91

Phil. 9; and Morales, et al. v. Yaez, 98 Phil. 677), while the rights to the
inheritance of a person who died after the effectivity of the New Civil Code
shall be governed by the New Civil Code (Del Prado v. Santos, 18 SCRA
68).
There is no dispute that the marriage of Talina Bianong to Maning Yap was
valid and that the second marriage contracted by the latter with Nancy Yap
was illegal and void pursuant to Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature, the
Marriage Law which was in force when the two marriages were celebrated
to wit:
SEC. 29. Illegal Marriages. Any marriage subsequently
contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance, unless;
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years
at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case
until declared null and void by a competent court.
Bearing this in mind, how must the estate of Maning Yap be distributed?
The records show that the real and personal properties under administration
in the intestate estate proceedings of Maning Yap were acquired by Talina
Bianong and the deceased Maning Yap during their marriage. Hence, these
properties, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary are considered
conjugal properties of Talina Bianong and Maning Yap (Article 142, New
Civil Code). Considering that there was no liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of gains during the lifetime of Maning Yap, such liquidation must
be carried out in the intestate proceedings of Maning Yap, the deceased

spouse as expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 73, Revised Rules of Court

(Lapuz v. Eufemio, 43 SCRA 177).
Article 142 of the New Civil Code provides:
By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and
wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property
and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally,
upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net
gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during
the marriage.
and Article 185 thereof states:
The net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains shall be
divided equally between the husband and the wife or their
respective heirs, unless a different basis of division was agreed
upon in the marriage settlements.
Pursuant to these provisions, the net remainder of the conjugal partnership
of gains after money claims filed by creditors against the intestate estate of
Maning Yap approved by the lower court have been paid by the
administratrix should be equally divided between Maning Yap and Talina
Bianong as their shares. The one-half share of Maning Yap would then
comprise his intestate estate to be distributed among his heirs. (See also
Vda. de Delizo v. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216)
Under the law of succession in the New Civil Code, Maning Yap's legal heirs
are Talina Bianong, her children Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap and the children
of Nancy Yap by Maning Yap namely: Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin
Yap and Samuel Yap. Talina Bianong, the first wife had not lost or
relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband. She is entitled to
share in Maning Yap's estate upon his death (Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA
615). On the other hand, Nancy Yap, the second wife cannot inherit from
Maning Yap because their marriage was void ab initio. (Art. 83, New Civil
Code; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845) However, Nancy Yap's children by

Maning Yap have the status of natural children by legal fiction and are
considered compulsory heirs of the late Maning Yap. (Articles 89 and 887,
New Civil Code).
Considering the foregoing, the estate of Maning Yap which is one-half (1/2)
pro indiviso of the net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains of the
first marriage (Articles 142 and 185 New Civil Code), the other half being
the share of Talina Bianong, should be distributed as follows:
a. To the legitimate children, Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap-one-half
(1/2) of the resulting net estate to be divided equally between
them pursuant to Article 888 of the New Civil Code;
b. To the legitimate widow Talina Bianong one-fourth (1/4) of the
net estate taken from the free portion or disposable half of the
estate pursuant to Article 999 in relation. to Article 897 of the New
Civil Code; and
c. To the natural children by legal fiction --Maning Yap, Jr., Julia
Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap-the remaining one-fourth (1/4)
of the net estate to be shared equally between them pursuant to
the first and third paragraphs of Article 895 in relation to Article
983 of the New Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the instant PETITION is GRANTED. The questioned
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The widow, Talina Bianong shall receive one half (1/2) of the whole intestate
estate as her share in the net remainder of the conjugal partnership of
gains. The other half, which is the net estate of the late Maning Yap, is
distributed and adjudicated as stated above.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose
death benefits is now the subject of the controversy between the two
Susans whom he married. 1wphi1.nt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside
the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which
affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two
marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao
Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two
offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on
November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred
to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to
diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on
November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a
total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and]
Pag-ibig, 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from
GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS). 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for
collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter
alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one
hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated
as death benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons,
petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in
default.

Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took
place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased.
She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage
and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where
she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To
bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that
the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the
same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support
thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased
and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5and 2) a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the
spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married
in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested
a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of
this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for
whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee,
holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum
of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death
benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys
fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto
the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA.
DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE
CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE
BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE
ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the
parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass
upon the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential
to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject death
benefits of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid

marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence thereof,

subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and
the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license
requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity
of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number
and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion,
as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and
the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of
petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the
required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the
trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals
and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to
refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence,
the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death
benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee.
To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of
remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.

Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous

marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the
second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial
decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation
of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property
regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the
applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles
147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages
and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then
too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household,
or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased
is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of
a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association,
Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly
renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned
by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents

proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence,
they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong
to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the
same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased
shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the
deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other
reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family
Code reads Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes
of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of
the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take
place upon termination of the cohabitation.

In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries
earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties
in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one
party earned the wages and the other did not contribute
thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by
the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a coownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half
thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both
parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half
of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her
share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased
shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children
with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the
case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance
System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of
the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding
that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared
void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased.
Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her
husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his
death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in
a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the
husbands share in the property here in dispute.... And with respect to the
right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the
first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of
such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the
second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he
only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right
of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her
and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage. 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on
the rule which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of

marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the
rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40
of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity
of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of
remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a
second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the
first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage,
otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if
the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to
determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage.
However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for
collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no
prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party
has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would
prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid.
Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it,
will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the
rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and
jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the
case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article
40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent
the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632,
is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Puno J., on official leave.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 43-47
2. Rollo, pp. 49-55
3. Exhibit F, Records, p. 38
4. Ibid
5. Exhibit D-1, Records, p. 36
6. Exhibit E, Records, p. 37
7. Rollo, p. 55
8. Rollo, p. 18
9. Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]
10. Nial, et al., v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
11. Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra
12. ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2)Their consent, freely given;
(3)Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4)A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character.
13. ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in
Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under article 75, no marriage shall
be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil
registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides

14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages

of exceptional character;
xxx

xxx

xxx

15. 236 SCRA 257, 261-262; citing the Rules of Court, Rule 132,
Section 29
16. Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5)
of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in

the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(2)The absolute community of property or the conjugal

partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad
faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty

spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the

innocent spouse;
14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad

faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by
reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in
favor of the other are revoked by operation of law
17. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, p.
233-234 (1995)
18 Id., p. 234.18
19. Id., p. 230
20. 37 SCRA 316 [1971]
21. Id., p. 326
22. Supra
23. Supra