Thomas S.

Kuhn (1922–1996) was an American physicist and

philosopher of science, best known for his groundbreaking work
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). His work
fundamentally changed the way we understand the development
of scientific knowledge.
Kuhn challenged the traditional view that science evolves through
a steady accumulation of facts. Instead, he proposed that science
progresses through a series of paradigm shifts — revolutionary
changes in the basic concepts and experimental practices of a
scientific discipline.
According to Kuhn, scientific development follows this cycle:
1. Normal science – research under an accepted framework (or
“paradigm”)
2. Anomalies – observations that don’t fit the paradigm
3. Crisis – growing contradictions within the paradigm
4. Scientific revolution – one paradigm is replaced by a new,
incompatible one

I. Introduction to Kuhn and the Role of History

Kuhn's seminal work fundamentally challenges the prevailing image of
science, which has historically been shaped by scientific classics and,
more predominantly, by textbooks. This traditional image often portrays
scientific development as a straightforward, linear, and purely cumulative
process, where new facts, theories, and methods are simply added to an
ever-growing body of knowledge. Kuhn argues that this "unhistorical
stereotype" is deeply misleading and fails to capture the true dynamics of
scientific progress.

 Critique of Traditional View:

o Science textbooks, while serving an essential pedagogic and
persuasive function, do not accurately represent the complex
and often messy process by which scientific knowledge is
produced. They present finished scientific achievements as if
they were discovered in isolation and accumulated piecemeal,
obscuring the revolutionary transformations that led to their
acceptance. This portrayal, much like a tourist brochure for a
national culture, offers a polished, idealized version that
doesn't reflect the actual "enterprise that produced them."
o The conventional understanding frames scientific
development as a "piecemeal process" where individual
discoveries and inventions are incrementally added to an
"ever growing stockpile" of scientific technique and
knowledge. This view implies a continuous, uninterrupted
ascent towards present-day understanding, where each new
piece of knowledge simply builds upon the last without
fundamental disruption.
o Under this traditional lens, historians of science are primarily
tasked with pinpointing the exact moment and the specific
 individual responsible for each contemporary scientific fact,
law, or theory. Furthermore, they are expected to chronicle
and explain the "congeries of error, myth and superstition"
that supposedly hindered this smooth accumulation of modern
scientific constituents, effectively categorizing past scientific
endeavors as either direct contributions to current knowledge
or as misguided deviations.
 Kuhn's Alternative Perspective:
o Kuhn unequivocally suggests that science does not develop
solely by the accumulation of individual discoveries and
inventions. Instead, its history reveals a more complex, often
discontinuous pattern, marked by profound shifts rather than
mere additions. This perspective emerges from the growing
difficulties historians face in answering seemingly simple
questions like "When was oxygen discovered?" or "Who first
conceived of energy conservation?" — questions that prove
unexpectedly problematic when examined closely.
o Intensive historical research increasingly uncovers the
inherent difficulties in precisely dating individual discoveries
and inventions. More significantly, it challenges the clear-cut
distinction between "scientific" components of past
observation and belief and what earlier historians readily
dismissed as "error" or "superstition." For instance, a careful
study of Aristotelian dynamics, phlogistic chemistry, or caloric
thermodynamics reveals them to be, in their own time, no less
scientific, and no more a product of "human idiosyncrasy,"
than contemporary views. If these "out-of-date beliefs" are
labeled myths, then myths can arise from the same methods
and reasons as modern scientific knowledge. Conversely, if
they are called science, then science has demonstrably
included bodies of belief fundamentally incompatible with
those held today. This forces a profound rethinking of scientific
progress as a simple accretion, suggesting instead a process
of transformation.
o A "historiographic revolution" is currently underway in the
study of science, albeit in its early stages. Historians are
increasingly asking new types of questions, aiming to
understand the "historical integrity" of past science within its
original context, rather than merely viewing it as a primitive
precursor to current knowledge. This involves examining the
relationships between a scientist's views and those of their
immediate group, teachers, and contemporaries, seeking to
understand their opinions from their own internal coherence
and fit to nature, rather than through the lens of modern
science.
o This new historical approach strongly implies a "new image of
science," one where methodological directives alone are
insufficient to dictate a unique substantive conclusion to many
scientific questions. Instead, an "apparently arbitrary element,
 compounded of personal and historical accident," including a
scientist's prior experience in other fields, the accidental
course of their investigation (e.g., which experiment they
perform first), and their individual makeup (e.g., what aspects
of a complex phenomenon strike them as relevant), is always
a formative ingredient of the beliefs espoused by a scientific
community at a given time. This arbitrariness means that
even with the same data, different "scientific" conclusions can
legitimately be reached.
o Crucially, the early developmental stages of most sciences are
characterized by "continual competition between a number of
distinct views of nature." While all these views may be
considered "scientific" in their adherence to some form of
observation and method, they are fundamentally
differentiated by what Kuhn terms their "incommensurable
ways of seeing the world and of practicing science in it." This
means they operate with different fundamental assumptions,
problems, and standards, making direct comparison or
translation difficult, and leading to a situation where
"observation and experience can and must drastically restrict
the range of admissible scientific belief... But they cannot
alone determine a particular body of such belief."

II. Normal Science

'Normal science' is defined as the predominant research activity within a
mature scientific field, "firmly based upon one or more past scientific
achievements" that a particular scientific community collectively
acknowledges as supplying the foundational framework for its ongoing
practice. This shared foundation is what Kuhn refers to as a 'paradigm'.
 Characteristics of Normal Science:
o Normal science operates within a clearly defined framework of
"accepted theory," a body of successful applications, and
exemplary observations and experiments. This framework is
typically codified and disseminated through science textbooks,
both elementary and advanced, which serve to expound the
accepted theoretical structure and illustrate its successful
applications. Before the widespread adoption of textbooks in
the 19th century, foundational classics like Newton's Principia
or Franklin's Electricity fulfilled a similar function, implicitly
defining legitimate problems and methods.
o It represents a "strenuous and devoted attempt to force
nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by professional
education." Scientists engaged in normal science are not
seeking to discover entirely new phenomena or to overturn
established theories. Rather, they are meticulously working to
articulate, refine, and extend the existing paradigm, solving
the "puzzles" it presents. These puzzles are not random but
are precisely those that the paradigm defines as solvable
within its framework.
 o The remarkable success and efficiency of normal science
derive significantly from the scientific community's collective
willingness to defend its basic assumptions about "what the
world is like." This commitment allows scientists to focus their
efforts and resources on specific, well-defined problems,
rather than constantly debating fundamental principles. This
shared conviction provides the stability necessary for in-depth,
specialized research.
o Paradoxically, normal science often "suppresses fundamental
novelties" because such novelties are inherently subversive of
its basic commitments. Anomalies—unexpected phenomena
or failures of equipment to perform as anticipated—that do
not fit the existing paradigm are frequently ignored, explained
away, or treated as minor discrepancies, precisely because
the paradigm provides a robust framework for understanding
the world. However, this suppression is not indefinite; the very
nature of normal research ensures that persistent anomalies
will eventually challenge the paradigm.
o It is fundamentally a "puzzle-solving" activity, not a paradigm-
testing one. Scientists engaged in normal science are akin to
chess players who, given a problem and a board, try out
various alternative moves to find a solution. These trials are
tests of their ingenuity in solving the puzzle within the
established rules of the game, not tests of the rules
themselves. The paradigm itself is taken for granted, and its
validity is rarely questioned during normal scientific practice,
even when individual attempts to solve a puzzle fail.

 Role of Textbooks:
o Textbooks are absolutely crucial for the perpetuation and
practice of normal science. They serve as the primary vehicles
for expounding accepted theory, illustrating its successful
applications, and comparing these applications with
exemplary observations and experiments. They embody the
"body of accepted theory" and its successful applications.
o They play a pivotal role in preparing students for membership
in a specific scientific community by providing "concrete
models" of successful scientific practice. This shared
educational experience, based on learning from the same
concrete models, leads to a fundamental consensus on the
rules and standards for scientific practice among members of
the community, ensuring that "his subsequent practice will
seldom evoke overt disagreement over fundamentals."
o This shared commitment and the apparent consensus it
produces are indispensable prerequisites for normal science,
enabling the "genesis and continuation of a particular
research tradition." Without this common ground, scientific
research would remain a fragmented, disorganized activity,
 with each practitioner needing to build their field anew from
its foundations.
o By codifying the paradigm, textbooks allow creative scientists
to "begin his research where it leaves off." This frees them
from the need to constantly re-establish first principles and
justify every concept, enabling them to concentrate
exclusively upon the "subtlest and most esoteric aspects of
the natural phenomena" that concern their group. This
specialization leads to research communiqués that are
increasingly brief articles addressed only to professional
colleagues, rather than comprehensive books for a general
audience.
o The increasing reliance on textbooks, or their equivalent (like
the foundational works of Aristotle, Newton, or Franklin in their
time), is an "invariable concomitant of the emergence of a
first paradigm" in any field of science. It signifies the transition
from a disorganized, pre-paradigmatic stage, characterized by
competing schools and random fact-gathering, to a more
mature, organized scientific discipline where research
becomes highly directed and efficient.

III. Paradigm and Paradigm Shifts

Kuhn introduces the concept of 'paradigms' as central to understanding
scientific development. These are not merely theories but comprehensive
"achievements that are sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring
group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity" and
"sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined
group of practitioners to resolve." They serve as the bedrock for normal
science.
A paradigm encompasses accepted examples of actual scientific practice,
including not just laws or theories, but also their applications and the
instrumentation used. These provide the fundamental "models from which
spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research," such such as
'Ptolemaic astronomy' (or 'Copernican'), 'Aristotelian dynamics' (or
'Newtonian'), 'corpuscular optics' (or 'wave optics'), and so on. The
adoption of a paradigm signifies maturity in a scientific field.
1. Pre-Paradigm Period: Before a paradigm is established, a field
lacks a cohesive framework for research, leading to what Kuhn
describes as a "morass" of information.
o Fact-gathering is "far more nearly random" and restricted to
readily available data. Without a guiding theoretical
framework, all facts can seem equally relevant, leading to
encyclopedic but often unilluminating collections of
observations, like Baconian natural histories. Crucially, early
fact-gathering often misses details that later prove vital
because there's no theoretical reason to seek them (e.g., early
electricians not noting that attracted chaff bounces off a
rubbed rod).
 o Writers in this period feel compelled to "build his field anew
from its foundations," as there is no common body of belief to
take for granted. Their choice of observations and
experiments is relatively free, and their dialogue is often
directed as much to members of other competing schools as
to nature itself. This leads to a proliferation of distinct, often
incompatible, views about the same phenomena, as seen in
pre-Franklinian electrical research, where numerous concepts
of electricity coexisted.
o The "disappearance" of these initial divergences is usually
caused by the "triumph of one of the pre-paradigm schools,"
which, due to its "characteristic beliefs and preconceptions,"
emphasizes and effectively organizes a specific part of the
previously "too sizable and inchoate pool of information." For
instance, the fluid theory of electricity, despite its limitations,
led to the discovery of the Leyden jar, a "particularly revealing
piece of special apparatus" that ultimately helped Franklin's
theory become a paradigm.
o The acceptance of a paradigm transforms a group previously
interested merely in the study of nature into a "profession or,
at least, a discipline." This transition is often marked by the
formation of specialized journals, the foundation of specialists'
societies, and the claim for a special place in the curriculum,
indicating a more rigid definition and institutionalization of the
scientific group.

2. Scientific Revolutions (Paradigm Shifts): These are not gradual

evolutions but "extraordinary investigations" that occur when the
"profession can no longer evade anomalies that subvert the existing
tradition of scientific practice." Such anomalies, persistent failures of
normal science to solve its puzzles, lead to a crisis that challenges
the fundamental commitments of the community.
o They lead to a "new set of commitments, a new basis for the
practice of science." This shift is profound, moving beyond
mere adjustments to the old framework.
o Revolutions are "tradition-shattering complements to the
tradition-bound activity of normal science." They represent a
fundamental break with past practice, rather than a
continuous extension of it.
o They necessitate the "community's rejection of one time-
honored scientific theory in favor of another incompatible with
it." This is not a simple choice between two theories but a
fundamental reorientation, as exemplified by the transitions
associated with Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, and Einstein.
o They produce a "consequent shift in the problems available for
scientific scrutiny and in the standards" for what counts as an
admissible problem or solution. What was once a central
problem might be banished, or entirely new problems might
emerge as legitimate. For example, Newton's theory banished
 the question of the cause of gravity, which was a central
concern for Aristotelian and Cartesian physics.
o They transform the "scientific imagination" and the "world
within which scientific work was done." After a revolution,
scientists literally "see" the world differently, perceiving new
relationships and entities that were previously invisible or
considered irrelevant.
o New theories, even those with special applications (like
Maxwell's equations), are rarely just increments; their
assimilation "requires the reconstruction of prior theory and
the re-evaluation of prior fact," an "intrinsically revolutionary
process" that is seldom completed by a single individual or
overnight. This makes precisely dating revolutions difficult for
historians.
o Discoveries (like oxygen or X-rays) are also revolutionary, not
simply adding items to the world, but requiring re-evaluation
of experimental procedures, alteration of conceptions of
familiar entities, and a fundamental shift in the "network of
theory" through which the professional community interacts
with the world. The unexpected discovery is not merely factual
in its import; it qualitatively transforms the scientist's world.

IV. Incommensurability
A central concept in Kuhn's work, incommensurability refers to the idea
that competing paradigms are "at least slightly at cross-purposes" and
cannot be fully compared or translated into one another. This makes
direct, logical proof for one paradigm over another impossible during a
scientific revolution.
 Aspects of Incommensurability:
o Disagreement on Problems and Standards: Proponents of
competing paradigms often disagree fundamentally on "the
list of problems that any candidate for paradigm must
resolve." Their "standards or their definitions of science are
not the same." For instance, Newton's dynamics was initially
resisted because, unlike Aristotle's or Descartes's theories, it
did not explain the cause of attractive forces, only noted their
existence. When Newton's theory was accepted, this question
was effectively "banished from science" for a time, only to re-
emerge with general relativity. Similarly, Lavoisier's chemistry
inhibited questions about why metals were alike, a question
phlogistic chemistry had addressed.
o Shift in Meaning of Concepts: New paradigms incorporate
vocabulary and apparatus from old ones but "seldom employ
these borrowed elements in quite the traditional way." Old
terms and concepts "fall into new relationships." This leads to
a "misunderstanding between the two competing schools,"
where seemingly shared terms carry fundamentally different
meanings. For example, laymen scoffed at Einstein's "curved
space" because their concept of 'space' was inherently flat,
 homogeneous, and isotropic, as required by Newtonian
physics. To accept Einstein's universe, the entire "conceptual
web whose strands are space, time, matter, force, and so on,
had to be shifted and laid down again on nature whole."
Similarly, for Copernicus's critics, 'earth' inherently meant a
fixed position, making the idea of a "moving earth" seem
"mad" within their conceptual framework.
o Different Worlds: Most fundamentally, proponents of
competing paradigms "practice their trades in different
worlds." They "see different things when they look from the
same point in the same direction." This is not to say they can
see anything they please; they are both looking at the same
world. However, their conceptual frameworks filter and
organize their perceptions differently. This is why a "law that
cannot even be demonstrated to one group of scientists may
occasionally seem intuitively obvious to another." For
example, a world where solutions are compounds is
profoundly different from one where they are mixtures, even if
the raw chemical phenomena are the same.

 Consequences of Incommensurability:
o The transition between competing paradigms "cannot be
made a step at a time, forced by logic and neutral
experience." Because there is no neutral ground or shared
language for direct comparison, the shift is not a matter of
logical deduction or empirical proof in the traditional sense.
o It must occur "all at once (though not necessarily in an
instant) or not at all," similar to a gestalt switch (like seeing a
duck or a rabbit in the same image). One cannot gradually
transition between two fundamentally different ways of seeing
the world; the shift is a sudden reorientation of perception and
understanding.
o "Communication across the revolutionary divide is inevitably
partial." Since the very meanings of terms and the structure of
problems change, full understanding between proponents of
old and new paradigms is difficult, leading to situations where
they "are bound partly to talk through each other."

V. Challenge to the Traditional View of Scientific Progress and

Criticisms
Kuhn directly challenges the notion of scientific progress as a continuous,
cumulative process, especially through his emphasis on revolutions and
incommensurability. He argues that the historical record does not support
a linear accumulation of knowledge.
 Rejection of Cumulative Progress:
o The "textbook tendency to make the development of science
linear hides a process that lies at the heart of the most
significant episodes of scientific development." Textbooks
present a sanitized history, implying that scientists have
 always striven for today's objectives, adding "bricks to a
building" of knowledge.
o In reality, many puzzles of contemporary normal science "did
not exist until after the most recent scientific revolution."
Earlier generations pursued their own problems with their own
instruments and canons of solution, problems that might be
entirely meaningless or irrelevant within a later paradigm.
o The "whole network of fact and theory that the textbook
paradigm fits to nature has shifted." This means that what
counts as a "fact" itself is paradigm-dependent. For example,
the constancy of chemical composition was not a mere
empirical fact waiting to be discovered; it was an indubitable
element within a new "fabric of associated fact and theory
that Dalton fitted to the earlier chemical experience as a
whole, changing that experience in the process."
o Theories don't evolve piecemeal to fit pre-existing facts;
rather, "they emerge together with the facts they fit from a
revolutionary reformulation." The knowledge-mediated
relationship between the scientist and nature is transformed,
leading to new facts and new ways of interpreting old data.
o Concepts like 'element' are not simply invented but gain
significance within a context; their meaning changes with
paradigm shifts. Robert Boyle, for instance, offered a definition
of 'element' similar to today's, but his historical function was
to lead a revolution that transformed the relation of 'element'
to chemical manipulation and theory, making it a tool "quite
different from what it had been before."

 Resolution of Revolutions (How Paradigm Shifts Occur):

o New paradigms typically emerge from individuals, often
"young or so new to the crisis-ridden field" who are less
deeply committed to the world view and rules determined by
the old paradigm. Their attention is intensely concentrated on
the crisis-provoking problems that the old paradigm cannot
resolve.
o The process of paradigm replacement is not one of "testing,
verification, or falsification" of established theories in a simple
sense. Instead, it's a "competition between two rival
paradigms for the allegiance of the scientific community." This
competition is the "only historical process that ever actually
results in the rejection of one previously accepted theory or in
the adoption of another."

o Critique of Verification/Falsification (Popper):

 Kuhn argues against the idea of absolute verification
criteria, noting that no theory can be exposed to all
relevant tests. Probabilistic theories, while
acknowledging theory comparison, often rely on an
imagined "pure or neutral observation-language" or the
 construction of "all possible tests," which Kuhn contends
is impossible given that observation and concepts are
always paradigm-laden.
 He also critiques Karl Popper's emphasis on falsification.
While "anomalous experiences" evoke crisis and prepare
the way for new theories, they are not necessarily
"falsifying ones."
 "No theory ever solves all the puzzles with which it is
confronted at a given time; nor are the solutions already
achieved often perfect." Indeed, the "incompleteness
and imperfection of the existing data-theory fit" define
many of the puzzles of normal science. If every failure to
fit were ground for rejection, "all theories ought to be
rejected at all times."
 Kuhn proposes a "two-stage formulation": anomalous
experience evokes competitors, and then "falsification...
is a subsequent and separate process that might equally
well be called verification since it consists in the triumph
of a new paradigm over the old one." This joint process
is where the comparison of theories plays a central role,
akin to "natural selection" picking the most viable
among actual alternatives.
 The choice between competing theories is about which
"fits the facts better," but this comparison is complex
due to incommensurability. All historically significant
theories "have agreed with the facts, but only more or
less." The question is not how well a single theory fits
facts in isolation, but which of two competing theories
provides a better fit.
o Factors in Paradigm Conversion:
 Problem-Solving Ability: The most prevalent and
often most effective claim for a new paradigm is its
ability to "solve the problems that have led the old one
to a crisis." This includes "crucial experiments" that
sharply discriminate between paradigms, often
recognized even before the new paradigm is fully
developed. Examples include Copernicus solving the
calendar year problem, Newton reconciling terrestrial
and celestial mechanics, and Einstein making
electrodynamics compatible with a revised science of
motion.
 Quantitative Precision: New paradigms that display
"quantitative precision strikingly better than its older
competitor" are particularly persuasive. Kepler's
Rudolphine tables, Newton's astronomical predictions,
and Planck's radiation law are cited as examples where
superior quantitative success drove conversion, even if
the new theory created other problems.
  Prediction of Unsuspected Phenomena: New
paradigms can be highly persuasive if they permit "the
prediction of phenomena that had been entirely
unsuspected while the old one prevailed." Copernicus's
prediction of Venus's phases, confirmed by Galileo's
telescope, and Fresnel's unexpected prediction of a
white spot in the shadow of a circular disk (Poisson's
spot) are powerful examples of such "shock value"
arguments.
 Aesthetic Considerations: Arguments appealing to
"the individual’s sense of the appropriate or the
aesthetic"—a new theory being "neater," "more
suitable," or "simpler"—can be decisive, even if rarely
made explicit. While early versions of new paradigms
are often crude, these aesthetic judgments can attract
the initial "few scientists" who develop the paradigm to
the point where "hardheaded arguments can be
produced and multiplied."
 Faith: Embracing a new paradigm at an early stage
often requires "faith that the new paradigm will succeed
with the many large problems that confront it, knowing
only that the older paradigm has failed with a few." This
decision, made in defiance of immediate problem-
solving evidence, is crucial for the paradigm's eventual
triumph. Crisis is important because it makes scientists
more willing to take such a leap of faith.
 Resistance: Lifelong resistance to new paradigms,
particularly from older scientists whose "productive
careers have committed them to an older tradition of
normal science," is not a violation of scientific standards
but an "index to the nature of scientific research itself."
This resistance stems from the "assurance that the older
paradigm will ultimately solve all its problems," a
commitment that makes normal science possible.
Priestley's never accepting the oxygen theory and Lord
Kelvin's resistance to electromagnetic theory are
historical examples.
 Generational Shift: New scientific truths often triumph
"not by convincing its opponents... but rather because
its opponents eventually die, and a new generation
grows up that is familiar with it." (Max Planck's
observation). While some scientists can be persuaded,
the "transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is
a conversion experience that cannot be forced."
o Nature of Paradigm Debates: These debates are not solely
about "relative problem-solving ability," though they are often
couched in those terms. Instead, the issue is "which paradigm
should in the future guide research on problems many of
which neither competitor can yet claim to resolve completely."
 It's a fundamental decision about "alternate ways of practicing
science," based less on past achievement and more on future
promise.
VI. The Invisibility of Revolutions
Kuhn argues that scientific revolutions have "proved to be so nearly
invisible" because of the authoritative sources from which people learn
about science, primarily textbooks. These sources systematically disguise
the true nature of scientific development.
 Textbooks as Disguises:
o Textbooks "record the stable outcome of past revolutions and
thus display the bases of the current normal-scientific
tradition." They are written after a revolution has occurred and
a new normal science has been established, serving as the
foundation for this new tradition.
o They "systematically disguise" the existence and significance
of revolutions. Their pedagogic function is to communicate the
current "vocabulary and syntax of a contemporary scientific
language," not to provide an authentic historical account of
how these bases were first recognized or embraced.
o They are rewritten after each scientific revolution, and, once
rewritten, they "inevitably disguise not only the role but the
very existence of the revolutions that produced them." Unless
an individual has personally experienced a revolution, their
historical sense is limited to the outcome of the most recent
shifts.
o They truncate the scientist's historical sense, providing a
substitute history that "never existed." Textbooks typically
include only a minimal, often introductory, historical chapter
or scattered references to "great heroes," presenting a linear
tradition that is, in fact, a fabrication.
o Textbooks implicitly represent past scientists as having worked
on the "same set of fixed problems and in accordance with the
same set of fixed canons" as the present. This is achieved
"partly by selection and partly by distortion," ensuring that
only aspects of past work that can be viewed as contributions
to the current paradigm are highlighted, leading to the
impression that science is "largely cumulative."

 The "Linear" View and Its Functionality:

o The tendency to "write history backward" is common across
many disciplines, but scientists are particularly affected. This
is partly because the results of scientific research often show
"no obvious dependence upon the historical context of the
inquiry," making it seem as if the discovery could have
happened at any time.
o The "depreciation of historical fact is deeply, and probably
functionally, ingrained in the ideology of the scientific
profession." To acknowledge the "human idiosyncrasy, error,
and confusion" of past science would seem to "dignify what
 science's best and most persistent efforts have made it
possible to discard." This unhistorical spirit, famously captured
by Whitehead's remark "A science that hesitates to forget its
founders is lost," serves to maintain the perceived stability
and authority of the current paradigm.
o Scientists "forget or revise their works" of heroes, making the
history of science appear linear or cumulative. For instance,
John Dalton's own accounts of his chemical atomism made it
seem as though he was always interested in the chemical
problems of combining proportions, which he later solved. In
reality, these problems only occurred to him with their
solutions, and his work involved a revolutionary reorientation
of chemistry by applying concepts previously restricted to
physics and meteorology.
o Similarly, Isaac Newton's claim that Galileo discovered that
constant gravity produces motion proportional to the square
of time is misleading. Galileo's theorem takes that form only
when embedded within Newton's own dynamical concepts.
Galileo himself rarely alluded to forces, much less a uniform
gravitational force. By attributing to Galileo an answer to a
question his paradigms did not permit, Newton's account
obscured a "small but revolutionary reformulation in the
questions that scientists asked about motion."

 Impact on Understanding Science:

o This "pedagogic form has determined our image of the nature
of science and of the role of discovery and invention in its
advance." It fosters the impression that science has reached
its current state by "a series of individual discoveries and
inventions" that simply add to a growing body of knowledge,
like individual bricks added to a building.
o In reality, "theories too do not evolve piecemeal to fit facts
that were there all the time. Rather, they emerge together
with the facts they fit from a revolutionary reformulation of the
preceding scientific tradition." The scientific world itself is
qualitatively transformed, not just quantitatively enriched, by
fundamental novelties of fact or theory. This continuous re-
creation of the scientific landscape, masked by textbooks, is
the true engine of scientific progress.