PETITIONER:
ISSUE 1:
Whether the oral order of the Delhi High Court prohibiting the publication of a witness’s
testimony violates the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article
19(1)(a) and the right to practice one’s profession under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
The freedom of the press is a subset of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).
In Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1973) 2 SCC 788, this Court held that the press
has the right to publish matters of public interest and that such freedom cannot be curbed by indirect
means.
Miss Nikki Haley, as a journalist, has the right to report on court proceedings, especially in matters
involving public functionaries and allegations of corruption.
As held in Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641, freedom of the
press includes the right of individuals to practice journalism, and any restriction must be minimal and
justified under Article 19(6).
Denying her the ability to report court proceedings amounts to a direct restraint on her
profession.
In Mohammed Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, (2010) 4 SCC 653, this Court emphasized that
open courts are a basic element of the judicial process.
The public has a right to receive information about judicial proceedings as a part of their right to
know, which flows from Article 19(1)(a).
Mr. Amar Singh’s concern that publication would harm his business reputation is not a valid
constitutional ground under Article 19(2).
The grounds under Article 19(2) are exhaustive and include: sovereignty, integrity, public order,
decency, morality, contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to offence—not commercial loss.
See S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574, where the Court ruled that anticipated
disruption or discomfort cannot justify pre-censorship or gagging orders.
ISSUE 2:
Whether a High Court, in the exercise of its inherent judicial powers, can impose restrictions on
press reporting of court proceedings without a written, reasoned order.
An oral order is non-speaking, lacks reasoning, and is not amenable to appeal or review, violating
principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem).
In State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, (1984) 1 SCC 596, the Court held that any
restriction on speech must be based on a law and be reasonable, and not based on discretion.
The oral nature of the order violates the requirement of legal certainty and natural justice.
In Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that judicial orders must be reasoned to allow for transparency and judicial
accountability.
The oral direction lacks clarity, is not subject to appeal or review, and creates chilling
effects on press freedom.
RESPONDENT
ISSUE 1:
Whether the oral order of the Delhi High Court prohibiting the publication of a witness’s
testimony violates the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article
19(1)(a) and the right to practice one’s profession under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
It is most humbly submitted that Judicial Discretion is Integral to the Open Justice Doctrine:
In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1, the Court held that a judge
has inherent power to regulate courtroom proceedings, including barring publication where
necessary for the administration of justice.
Oral judicial orders made in open court are valid and binding. The challenge under Article 32 must
respect judicial independence and procedural discretion.
Witness Protection Linked to Article 21
The rights of witnesses are part of the fair trial guarantee under Article 21, and exposing them to
reputational damage may intimidate or deter truthful testimony.
Even in Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158, the Court emphasized the
need to insulate witnesses from external pressures to preserve the sanctity of justice.
The restriction was limited in scope, confined only to the testimony of one witness, and did not bar
reporting of the entire proceedings.
In Sahara India Real Estate v. SEBI, the Court upheld postponement or partial publication bans
in cases where public interest, fair trial, or judicial decorum are threatened.
There is no blanket censorship or violation of the public’s right to know. Press freedom is not
absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions. ajendra Sail v. M.P. High Court Bar Association,
(2005) 6 SCC 109, recognized that the integrity of judicial proceedings can justify restrictions on
media coverage.
ISSUE 2:
Whether a High Court, in the exercise of its inherent judicial powers, can impose restrictions on
press reporting of court proceedings without a written, reasoned order.
It is most humbly submitted that Under Article 215 of the Constitution, every High Court is a court
of record and has the power to issue orders necessary to maintain the integrity of judicial
proceedings.
Oral Orders Are Legally Binding and Not Without Precedent
As reaffirmed in Mirajkar and Ajmal Kasab v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1*, oral orders
passed in open court are judicial acts and have binding legal force. The emphasis is on the
substance of judicial control over proceedings, not the form in which that control is expressed.
