Introduction

On 22 April, India was shocked by a deadly terrorist attack at a tourist spot on a scenic
meadow near the hill station of Pahalgam. The attack reportedly targeted Hindu tourists
as they were allegedly asked to recite the Quran. This attack, which resulted in 26
deaths, was supposedly carried out by a relatively unknown terrorist group in the
Kashmir region called The Resistance Front (TRF).

The international community condemned the terrorist attack and the UN underlined ‘the
need to hold perpetrators, organizers, financiers and sponsors of this reprehensible act
of terrorism accountable and bring them to justice’. Two weeks later, India struck back
with a military operation leading to an escalation of violence between the two rivals,
India and Pakistan. Although a fragile ceasefire has been reached, the hardened stance
of New Delhi may mark a turning point in India's approach to countering terrorism.

While providing some context on the status of Kashmir, this analysis will shed some
light on the alleged perpetrators, both countries’ responses, and the counter terrorism
measures that could be taken.

The status of Kashmir

Kashmir - also known as the Switzerland of Asia - was once a princely state and has
always been a central point of contention between India and Pakistan since partition.
The Kashmiri population is religiously and culturally very diverse, consisting of Muslims,
Hindus, and Buddhists. During partition, the princely states were given the choice to
either join India or Pakistan. At the end of British rule, the Hindu ruler of Kashmir -
Maharaja Hari Singh – despite a majority of Muslims living in the Kashmir
valley, opted to join India in exchange for military support against attacks by invading
tribesmen from Pakistan. After three wars, the 1972 Shimla Agreement divided Kashmir
into two separately administered regions and established the Line of Control that still
applies today and determines that any dispute should be settled bilaterally without any
third-party intervention.

India-administered Kashmir (IaJK) consists of the Kashmir Valley, Jammu, and Ladakh.
Pakistan-administered Kashmir consists of Azad Jammu, and Kashmir, and Gilgit-
Baltistan. A third, much smaller portion at the north-east of Kashmir - Shaksgam Valley
and Aksai Chin, is controlled by China but claimed by India. In particular, Aksai Chin is
of strategic relevance to China as it connects Tibet and the western region of Xinjiang.

In August 2019, India revoked Article 370 of the Indian Constitution that granted India-
administered Kashmir special autonomy. This provision was intended to be temporary
and allowed Jammu and Kashmir more governance in areas like education, health, and
property, but to adopt their own constitution and raise their own flag. With the revocation
of the special status of Kashmir, the region was placed under the direct control of Delhi,
as this would improve prosperity and security in the region. To avoid any unrest, the
government shutdown the internet for months and severely curtailed access to
information. The Supreme Court of India considered that access to the internet forms an
integral part of the freedom of expression and ruled that the shutdown - which had
already lasted over 150 days - because it cannot be indefinite and needs to be
necessary and proportionate. Several of the reforms, including the abolition of Article
35A of the Indian Constitution, were intended to allow non-Kashmiris to settle down in
the region. Nearly 85,000 resident permits have reportedly been issued to non-locals in
the last two years, causing a growing resentment amongst Kashmiri Muslims.
Another reason for this resentment is the government-led resettlement of Kashmiri
Hindus - also known as Kashmiri Pandits - according to one estimate, 40,000 families
fled due to armed militants in the 1990s. After six years, elections were held in 2024 in
India-administered Kashmir. While the elections were relatively peaceful, the newly
elected local government headed by Omar Abdullah has, in reality, very limited powers.

Although Pakistan-administered Kashmir is legally autonomous, it is controlled by the

government in Islamabad. Media outlets need permission from the Pakistan Minister for
Kashmiri Affairs to operate in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and are strictly forbidden
to promote the independence of the region. Several terrorist groups have and continue
to operate from Pakistan. Just days before the Pahalgam attack, the commander of the
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a UN designated terrorist organisation, called for jihad in
Kashmir from a town in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

Human rights violations are being committed on both sides of the Line of Control. In
both Indian- and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, in particular, anti-terrorism laws are
being misused and continue to marginalise minorities and stifle political dissent. The
rights to freedom of speech, freedom of association, and religion are being severely
restricted, and minorities are systematically discriminated without any form of
accountability. The lack of autonomy further fuels local grievances. Like human rights,
the media outlets are often being weaponised by both India and Pakistan to shape the
narrative for domestic consumption, but also to influence international perceptions.
While freedom of press was already declining in both countries before the Pahalgam
attack, media are further being curtailed since, with websites being blocked or
instrumentalised to portray a certain image. In the aftermath of the attacks, India
blocked over 8,000 social media accounts in the interest of national security, but this
also includes blocking accounts of political dissent.

Who is The Resistance Front (TRF)?

TRF is considered to be a proxy of Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba

(LeT) and has been designated by India under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act
(UAPA) in January 2023. India claims that TRF was involved in the recruitment of
fighters and smuggling of weapons from Pakistan into India-administered Kashmir. TRF
and several other splinter groups, such as the Kashmir Tigers, the People’s Anti-Fascist
Front, and the United Liberation Front of Kashmir, emerged in the aftermath of the
revocation of Jammu and Kashmir's special status in 2019. TRF has
violently opposed the resettlement plan of the Kashmiri pandits - perceived as a
measure to change the demography of the region. TRF has been responsible for a
wave of targeted killings of Kashmiri pandits, including two school teachers in October
2021.
TRF initially claimed the Pahalgam attack on Telegram, reportedly stating that “violence
will be directed toward those attempting to settle illegally.” A few days later, TRF
retracted the claim and denied responsibility for the attack, indicating the claim was the
result of a coordinated cyber intrusion. Considering the outrage by Kashmiris and
international condemnation, TRF could have been pressured by Pakistan to deny the
attack. Research also indicates that terrorist groups are more likely to claim
responsibility when the attack targets the military and not civilians. The previous big
attack in Kashmir dates back to 2019, when a suicide attack killed 40 Indian military in
Pulwama. This attack was claimed by Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a
UN designated terrorist group operating from Pakistan.

Operation Sindoor and escalating violence

India has been trying to 'normalise' India-administered Kashmir by promoting tourism

and prosperity. However, room for political dissent remains tightly controlled, and
militancy has been rising underneath the surface. The question is whether the portrayal
of peacefulness has also led to underestimating security risks in Kashmir. The
Pahalgam attack exposed the possible failure of the Indian intelligence to anticipate the
incident. At the same time, the government was under a lot of pressure from the public
to respond to the terrorist attacks, which were specifically targeting Hindu tourists.

In response to the attack, India suspended the Indus Water Treaty that distributes the
water between India and Pakistan - which was perceived as an ‘act of war’ by Pakistan -
and in return suspended the Shimla Agreement. On 9 May, India launched Operation
Sindoor, named after the red vermilion often used in Hindu ceremonies and worn by
married Hindu women. India carried out air strikes across the border against sites that
have been used by LeT, JeM and Hizbul Mujahideen, allegedly killing a hundred
terrorists. The Indian army was apparently given carte blanche to target terrorists across
the borders.

While Operation Sindoor was intended to deter Pakistan and deemed non-escalatory, in
the days that followed, both countries carried out strikes at military bases across the
border. Pakistan claims over 40 civilians have died in these strikes and in response,
downed five Indian air jets. In the days that followed, air strikes continued, Pakistan
retaliating and carrying out air strikes not only in Kashmir but also in Punjab and
Rajasthan. Considering that both countries possess nuclear weapons, the need to de-
escalate tensions is crucial. While India has a nuclear doctrine in place, which includes
a ‘no first use’ policy, it appears that Pakistan does not have a formal nuclear policy,
providing more flexibility to use nuclear weapons.

Both countries have been on the brink of war before and are aware of the risks. The
ceasefire that President Trump claimed to have brokered - which has firmly
been denied by India - is fragile and without any clear conditions. Pakistan
has internationalised the Kashmir issue, like before in 2019 when India revoked the
special status of Kashmir, an approach which India has always strongly opposed,
reaffirming that the Kashmir dispute should be resolved bilaterally as stated in the
Shimla agreement. Just two days after the ceasefire, Prime Minister Modi announced
that any future terrorist attack would be met with a strong response, implying that further
military strikes will follow and that the country had merely paused its military action. This
can be perceived as a clear invitation for one of the Kashmiri terrorist groups to carry
out an attack.

Even with a ceasefire in place, the long-term implications should not be underestimated.
Firstly, the fact that the terrorist attack is targeting civilians is deeply concerning. Equally
alarming is the fact that, for the first time in years, both nations carried out strikes deep
into each other’s territory. This normalisation of cross-border retaliation sets a
dangerous precedent. The military rule in Pakistan and its continued territorial
revisionist approach, combined with India’s majoritarian nationalism based on Hindutva
(Hinduness) and Hindu Rashtra (Hindu nation), are a toxic mix that could lead to an
escalation of the conflict. Furthermore, the response of India to the terrorist attack is
being used by Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) to call for jihad against India.
While AQIS does not pose a significant threat to India, the impact on radicalisation
within India of the online propaganda should be taken seriously. Against this
background, the international community should also reflect on their role and how they
can contribute to prevent future escalation through diplomacy, but also through military
support and strategic partnerships.

Addressing terrorism and underlying grievances

Clearly, in the short term, India should investigate and prosecute those who were
involved in the Pahalgam terrorist attacks. In the aftermath of the hostilities, six alleged
terrorists were shot during a counter-insurgency operation, including a commander of
LeT engaged in recruitment activities. While a courtroom can be used by the accused
as a forum to portray themselves as victims or disseminate propaganda, it is also an
opportunity for the prosecutor to dispel such narratives, bring justice to the victims, and
demonstrate that terrorism can be addressed through a fair trial by an independent
court established by law. In addition, India should also look at why the intelligence
services failed to detect the terrorist attack. Investing in inter-agency coordination and
improving detection capabilities is crucial. It should, however, not lead to overly broad
surveillance that violates human rights, in particular of minorities. India’s digital
surveillance structure is expanding rapidly and has already been criticised for
encroaching on the right to privacy and for its lack of independent oversight. Investing
more in understanding the regional differences in radicalisation between and within the
communities in Kashmir, Jammu, and Ladakh is needed to tailor longer-term
interventions that effectively deal with the underlying grievances.

Pakistan has a history of supporting terrorist groups, its denial of any involvement in the
terrorist attack is met with some scepticism. Pakistan had ‘allowed’ Osama Bin Laden to
reside in the country and provided support - including weapons - to the Taliban and
Haqqani network in Afghanistan. Both LeT and JeM are designated by the UN as
terrorist groups and have their base in Pakistan. The leader of JeM - although arrested
twice - has not been charged and is believed to be free. However, the founder of LeT -
which is responsible for the Mumbai attack - has been convicted of financing terrorism
and is serving a sentence of 31 years. Despite the numerous terrorist groups that have
been operating from Pakistan, the FATF believed that the country has made significant
progress and removed it from its grey list - a list of countries placed under increased
monitoring due to higher risks of financing terrorism. After the recent terrorist attack in
Kashmir, several politicians, including former Minister of Foreign Affairs Bilawal
Bhutto in Pakistan, also alluded to the fact that Pakistan indeed had ties with terrorist
groups. Pakistan - currently a member of the UN Security Council and backed by China
- should nevertheless see to it that it does not lend any support to terrorist groups and
provides full cooperation in bringing those responsible for the terrorist attack in Kashmir.
India has recently expressed their concerns that the Netherlands is supplying weapons
to Pakistan as it supports terrorism. Furthermore, India is now actively lobbying to get
Pakistan listed again by the FATF, although it would need to support this with credible
and robust evidence. Sanctions and becoming listed against by the FATF would cripple
the already weak economy of Pakistan.

Conclusions

For seven decades, the conflict in Kashmir has been lingering on, and every terrorist
attack is being met with a familiar cycle of kinetic response, diplomatic friction and
manoeuvring.

While both countries are claiming victory and are lobbying support for their narrative
internationally, military leadership in Pakistan and Prime Minister Modi in India have
seemingly boosted their image domestically. Yet, as the rhetoric is becoming more
assertive and more hostile - often amplified by the media - there is a genuine risk of
renewed hostilities with both countries willing to move up the escalation ladder.

A durable solution in reducing terrorist threats can only be achieved - in addition to

security-related measures - by addressing underlying grievances, human rights
violations and governance deficits in both parts of Kashmir. If the last two decades of
countering terrorism and the War on Terror have taught us anything, it is that hard
security responses alone will not reduce terrorist threats in the long term. Preventing
terrorism requires a combination of hard and soft measures that focus on both the short
and long term. Both countries are members of the Global Counter Terrorism Forum and
contributed actively to various best practices and tools that have been developed to
deal with terrorism that focus on reducing radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism
through community policing, investing in education and rehabilitation programmes.
India and Pakistan know the local context and should avail the broad set of measures
available to address terrorism.

This article represents the views of the author(s) solely. ICCT is an independent
foundation, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy unless clearly stated
otherwise.