Copyright.

copyright refers to a regime of law that protects literary, scienti 昀 椀 c and artistic works. The law of
copyright, therefore, gives an author of original work exclusive rights for an ascertainable period of time
to exploit and bene 昀 椀 t from the work including in publication, distribution and reproduction. In Prof.
George W. Kakoma vs.Attorney General, H.C.C Suit No. 197 Of 2008 Before: The Honourable Mr.
Justice Yorokamu Bamwine de 昀 椀 ned Copyright as a ‘set of exclusive rights granted to the author or
creator of an original work, including the right to copy, distribute and adopt the work. These rights can be
licensed, transferred and/or assigned. Copyright lasts for a certain time period after which the work is said
to enter the public domain.In the case of Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 565, p.
637. , the Court noted that "the claimant's work had su 昀 케 cient aural and musical signi 昀 椀 cance to attract
copyright protection. "Thus, copyright protection is designed to protect a person from others taking the
fruits of her labour and circumventing their obligation to seek consent and authorization from the owner of
the work.. Article 26 of the constitution. Article 189 ibid
The In 昀 氀 uence of International Developments on the Growth of Copyright Law in Uganda.The
development of copyright laws in the United Kingdom started with the 1710 Statute of Anne, which laid
the foundation. This progress continued with the 1971 Berne Convention, establishing key principles for
copyright protection. International copyright regulation was further shaped by agreements like the
Universal Copyright Convention and the 1994 General Agreement on Tari 昀昀 s and Trade (GATT). The 1995
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) aimed to standardize and streamline intellectual property regulations
globally.
Origins of Uganda Copyright Law.
Since the British declared Uganda a Protectorate, English Common Law and the Statutes of General
Application were applied in Uganda. This continued until 1991 when the Supreme Court of Uganda, in the
case of Uganda Motors Limited vs. Wash Holdings Limited, declared that acts of general application
no longer held relevance in the jurisdiction of the High Court, signaling a signi 昀 椀 cant shift in legal
approach.
After gaining independence, Uganda transitioned from the Copyright Act of 1956 to the Copyright Act of
1964, maintaining the same content without amendments. This legislation remained in e 昀昀 ect until the
enactment of the current Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act in 2006.

Scope of copyright protection.

Works eligible for copyright protection - section 4 CNRA cap.[cap.222]
a) literary works
De 昀椀 ned in sec 2 CNRA.: To be eligible must ful 昀椀 ll requirements of sec.3 CNRA.
In the case of University of London Press, Limited v University Tutorial Press, Limited, [1916] 2 Ch
601 the court determined that examination papers set by examiners were considered 'literary work' under
the Copyright Act of 1911, and thus, copyright protection applied to these papers as 'original literary
work.' Importantly, the court clari 昀 椀 ed that the copyright was vested in the examiners rather than the
university, emphasizing that the examiners were not deemed to be 'in the employment of the university'
under a contract of service. In the case of Exxon Corporation and others v Exxon Insurance
Consultants International Ltd [1982] 1 Ch. 119 at p. 120., the court made a signi 昀 椀 cant observation
regarding the term 'original literary work.' They emphasized that 'original literary work' should be viewed
as a uni 昀椀 ed concept, not as three distinct words. The court de 昀椀 ned a literary work as something that
provided information, instruction, or pleasure in the form of literary enjoyment. In this particular case, the
court determined that the term "Exxon," being a mere arti 昀椀 cial combination of four letters used for identi 昀椀
cation purposes, did not meet the criteria of an original literary work and thus did not qualify for protection
under section 2 of the Copyright Act 1956 In the case of Hollinrakes vs. Truswell, Davey J held that
Literary works should be something that a 昀昀 orded information, instructions or pleasure in the form of literary
enjoyment. Names Tittle and simple phrases have been rejected
b) Dramatic works.
To qualify for protection, it must be a work of action that is capable of being performed. In Creative
Records vs. News Group News (TRL29.4.97, it was held that dramatic work must have movement, story
or action and cannot be purely static.
Sec 2 de 昀椀 nes performance and performers Section 5(1)(b) CNRA.
In the case of Tate Fullbrook, the court made an observation regarding dramatic copyright. They noted
that the Acts related to dramatic copyright were designed to protect works that could be printed and
published. Therefore, when comparing two dramatic pieces for potential copyright infringement, if the
verbal composition of one piece is substantially di 昀 昀 erent from another, even if certain accessory
elements like scenic e 昀昀 ects, actor make-up, or stage business appear similar, this would not constitute an
infringement of the copyright in the former piece. These accessory elements, when considered on their
own, are not subject to protection under the Acts related to dramatic copyright. However, in cases where
the verbal composition of the pieces is more or less similar, these accessory elements may be relevant in
determining whether copyright infringement has occurred.
In the case of Green v Broadcasting Corp of New Zealand,[1989] 2 All ER 1056. the court emphasized
that for a work to be eligible for copyright as a dramatic work, it must possess a cohesive unity suitable for
performance. The claimed 'dramatic format' lacking this essential characteristic was denied copyright
protection, emphasizing that copyright applies to integrated and performable works, not disconnected
elements or accessories unrelated to a uni 昀椀 ed performance.
c) Musical works.
Section 4(1) (b) CNRA. In the Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ. 565, the court
addressed whether modern performing editions of music that was no longer under copyright could be
protected by copyright as original works. The court held that the e 昀昀 ort, skill, and time invested in creating
these editions made them "original" works. This was true even if the claimant didn't compose new music but
focused on correcting and improving existing scores. The court clarified that a performing edition didn't
have to introduce entirely new musical elements to be protected by copyright; improvements and
corrections surfaced. This case underscored that copyright can extend to e 昀昀 orts enhancing and presenting
existing musical works, not solely to creating completely new compositions. In the case of Wood v
Boosey (1868) LR 3 QB 223, the court dealt with a situation where an opera was composed and published
by N., and after N.'s passing, B. arranged the opera for the pianoforte. The key question was whether this
arrangement could be considered as a separate musical composition deserving copyright protection.
The court concluded that B.'s arrangement for the pianoforte was indeed an independent musical
composition. Even though it was based on the original opera, the arrangement demonstrated skill and
creativity on its own, making it eligible for copyright protection. This ruling emphasized that creativity in
musical works can manifest through arrangements or adaptations, and such derivative works can hold their
own copyright distinct from the original composition.
Separate copyright exists in the lyrics and the song itself; the lyrics constitute literary works and the song
(tune) is protected as musical works. Stuart vs. Barret 1994 EMLR 488; it was held that the contribution
by a drummer in a rock band to a song was recognized as part of the musical works and was therefore co-
author.
Chappell & Co. Ltd vs. Redwood HOL held the 昀椀 rst owner of the words was the owner of the copyright.
The distinction came up in case of C.F.A O VS. Archibald where it was held by the supreme court of
Ghana that mere words or verses with no intelligible musical notation indicating the melody did not
qualify to be called musical works.
d) Artistic works.
Section 4(1)(f),section 4(1)(g) CNRA: In the case of George Henshar Limited v. Restawille Upholstery
(Lancs) Limited[1976] A.C. 64., the main issue was whether a prototype, although not long-lasting, could
still be considered a piece of 'artistic craftsmanship.'The court clari 昀 椀 ed that deciding if something is
'artistic craftsmanship' should not solely rely on its appearance. Instead, it should be assessed objectively,
considering all available evidence. The court stressed that while the purpose and intention of the creator
matter, the most critical aspect is the skill and intention that went into creating it. The court emphasized
that the conscious e 昀昀 ort and craftsmanship put into making the piece were the key factors in determining
if it quali 昀 椀 ed as 'artistic craftsmanship. In The case of George Hensher Ltd v Restawhile Upholstery
(Lancs) Ltd164, the house of Lords attempted to lay down a test for determining whether a speci 昀椀 c work
falls under the category of artistic Works. They all came to a consensus that the test is a question of fact
and evidence; in particular, and as such expert evidence could be used . Lord Reid said that a work of
artistic craftsmanship would be regarded as one if any substantial section of the public genuinely admired
and valued the thing for its appearance even though others may have considered it common or Vulgar.
Creation Records vs. News Group News (TRL29.4.97. It was held that the process of arranging objects
and members of a group to form a scene comprised in the photograph could be considered as sculpture or
a collage under the act or as a work of artistic craftsmanship. In Metix (UK) vs. Maughan Plastics (1997)
FSR718, it was held that something which had a transient existence might nevertheless be work of
sculpture.
e) Copyright and Sui Generis Protection of functional Innovation: Legal Protection of Programmes,
Software and Databases.
TRIPS Agreement. Article 10 of the TRIPS Agreement obliges all member States to protect computer
programs, whether in source or object code, as literary works under the Berne Convention.
Article 10(2) of the TRIPS Agreement also provides that "compilations of data or other material, whether
in machine readable or other form, which by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents
constitute intellectual creations shall be protected as such." Section 4(1)(e) of the CNRA section 12(6) of
the CNRA In the case of a computer program, the economic rights of the author are protected for fifty
years from the date of making the program available to the public.
Professor David I. Bainbridge in his book Bainbridge, ID, duction to Information Technology Law
(London: Pearson Longman, 6 Edition, 2008) p. 33.observes that "copyright law protects computer
software, whether it be computer programs, databases, computer 昀椀 les or printed documentation.
In the case of Digital Solutions Ltd v MTN Uganda Ltd,(Misc Appl. No. 546 of 2004) (2004) UGComunC
28 (20 October 2004). the applicant had developed a software program enabling peer-to-peer airtime and
service fee transfers between mobile phone subscribers using SMS commands. They sought an injunction
to stop the respondent from infringing on their copyright and recognized the applicant's authorship rights.
The court ruled in favor of the applicant, acknowledging their right to authorship and allowed
compensation for the program's development, considering that the intention was to sell the program, not
operate it.
Apple Computer Inc. v Franklin Computer Corp 714 E2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). held that The de 昀椀 nition of
literary works in section 101 includes expression not only in words but also numbers, or other numerical
symbols or indicia, thereby expanding the common usage of literary works. Thus a computer program,
whether in object code or source code, is a literary work and is protected from unauthorized copying.
whether from its object or source code version.

f) Derivative works
section 5(1)(i) of the CNRA section 5(2)(a)
section 5(3)
Section 2 of the CNRA de 昀椀 nes "derivative work
In the case of Byme v Statist Company[1914] 1 K.B.622, in which the issue was whether translated works
can be considered to be "original" so as to constitute "derivative works. Held that the translation was an
'original work within section 1 of the Copyright Act, 1911 (the equivalent of section 4 of the CNRA), of
which the plainti 昀昀 was the author and the owner of the copyright therein, within section 5 of the Act.
In the matter of an Objection by Mr. Mambusya Ndebesa and De Katono Nzana Deo v Yoweri Kaguta
Museveni , ( 昀 椀 led in) 2010, and decided on February 14, 2013.,Objectors contested the registration of
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni's musical work "You want another rap," claiming it was in the public domain.
The Registrar had to decide if the work was eligible for copyright, if Museveni was entitled to copyright,
and if the work quali 昀 椀 ed as a derivative work. Holding- Registrar clari 昀 椀 ed that copyright in a derivative
work covers only the additions, changes or other new material appearing for the 昀椀 rst time in the work and
does not extend to any pre-existing material and does not prevent anyone else from using the existing
work for another derivative work."Consequently, the Registrar allowed the registration of Museveni's
derivative work "You want another rap.
Karmazoo Ltd. ans another v System African Lad [1973] EA 242 held that It is, therefore, pertinent for
any person claiming copyright in x derivative work to prove that there are clear variations between the
derivative work and the pre-existing work. There must be evidence of skill and a degree of concentration
expended in the creation of the derivative work.
Redwood Music Ltd v Chappel and Co Ltd ( 1982) R.P.C 109 (UK: High court, it was held that if any
author composes work the copyright of that work vests in him or her. However, if he decides to license
some other person to adapt the work, the copy of the work created from the original work stands on its
own as original and copyright vests in the licensee.
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS.
Section 4 of the CNRA.
Hence for a work to be considered copyrightable it must evidently conform to four basic principles:
(a) originality
(b) non- application to ideas
(c) material form and
(d) principle de minims non curat lex.
a) Originality.
originality has been explained in section 4(3), which provides that "a work is original if it is the product of
the independent e 昀昀 orts of the author.
the case of Lamwaka v M/S Mukono Bookshop Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd1 6 , it washeld that for
any author's work to be eligible for copyright protection it must be original and musthave been reduced
into a material form.
In the case of Byrne v Statist Company, a translation of a work in which the author had expended su 昀케
cient e 昀昀 ort in making the work was considered to be of an original character.
b) Ideas not Protected
in Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd[1964] 1 WLR. 273 at p.277., the court observed,
that Copyright Acts are not concerned with the originality of ideas, but with the expression of thought,
and, in the case of literary work', with the expression of thought in print or writing. The originality which
is required relates to the expression of the thought. But the Act does not require that the expression must
be in an original or novel form, but that the work must not be copied from another author.
University of London Press Lad University Tutorial Press Ltd. [1916] 2 Ch 601, 610. Held that The works
do not have to be new rather originality is more concerned with the manner in which the work was
created.
Ladbroke (Football) Lade Wilham Hill (Football) Lim held that originality is dependent on the degree of
skill, labour and judgment involved in the creation of the work.
If I come up with an idea of a new work I cannot claim copyright protection until I have expressed the
idea in a material form. Likewise, if I share that idea with someone and the person goes a head to express
it in a material form, I cannot succeed if I bring an action again that person for infringement of my
copyright. In Norowzian V Ark Ltd No. 2 [2000] FRS 363 The plainti 昀昀 sued the defendant for copyright
infringement. The defendant had earlier on borrowed his idea of editing his 昀椀 lm in a speci 昀椀 c way. Court held
that there was no copying of the plainti 昀昀 s work or his original 昀椀 lm.
Donoghue v. Allied Newspapers Ltd [1938] Ch. 106 (U.K: High Court) Justice Farwell held that There is
no copyright in an idea, or in ideas. A person may have a brilliant idea for a story, or for a picture, or for a
play, and one which appears to him to be original; but if he communicates that idea to an author or an
artist or a playwright, the production which is the result of the communication of the idea to the author or
the artist or the playwright is the copyright of the person who has clothed the idea in form, whether by
means of a picture, a play, or a book, and the owner of the idea has no rights in that product.
Any person who shares his idea with another person and the person reduces the idea into a material form
cannot claim co authorship. If Ivan comes up with an idea about a story and shares it with Mariam, if
Mariam writes the story, Ivan cannot claim that he and Mariam are coauthor of the work. In Limited v.
Alfred Mc Alpine Homes East Ltd1995] F.S.R. 818 (“Cala”) it was held that: A joint author must
participate in the writing and share responsibility for the form of expression in the literary work. He must
accordingly do more than contribute ideas to an author: he must be an author (or creator) of the work in
question. It is not enough that he thought up the plot of a play or made suggestions for a comic routine to
be included …; or indeed that he passed on his reminiscences to a ghost writer … It is not
su 昀 케 cient that there is established to have been a division of labour between two parties in the project of
writing a book if one alone is entirely responsible for the skill and labour of authorship of the book
c) Material form/昀椀 xation.
Under section 4(1) of the CNRA, in order for an author to be entitled to copyright protection in Uganda,
he or she must reduce his or her work to a material form....
Sec 6 and 9 of the TRIPS Agreement
In Plix Products Ltd Vs Frank (1985) 5 IPR 156, court stated that there is a distinction between the general
idea or basic concept of a work and the details of form and shape which are used to transform the basic
concept into concrete form. When the ideas which are essentially constructive in character are reduced to
concrete form, the form they take is where copyright lies.
Walter and another v Lane,[1990] A.C. 539.
The case revolved around the issue of who holds the copyright for a verbatim report of a speech published
in a newspaper.The question was whether the person making notes of a public speech and transcribing it
for publication in a newspaper could be considered the author of the report and, consequently, hold the
copyright to it.
The House of Lords held that the speaker is the author of the speech itself, while the reporter is the author
of the verbatim report.
- This case underscores the fundamental principle that copyright is a reward for the expression of ideas
and not the ideas themselves. It establishes that the person who reduces the work to material form, in this
case, the reporter transcribing the speech, is recognized as the author of that work and, thus, holds the
copyright

C) Principle de minimis non curat lex the law does not concern itself with tri 昀氀 es)
In ascertaining whether a work is signi 昀 椀 cant enough to a 昀 昀 ord copyright. In Sinanide v lamaisonkosmeo
(1928) 139 LT 365, Held: it was held that to quote a bit of a sentence of a literally was too small a matter
on which to base a copyright infringement action. Basically for one to sustain an action in copyright
infringement, a substantial part of the work must be copied to include:
I. Exact usage of part of the work, taken verbatim or
II. Some reworking of the whole of it or
III. A combination of these.
This aims at reducing frivolous claims and not opening the 昀氀 oodgates which situation would overwhelm the
courts.
Authorship and ownership.
Section 2 of the CNRA de 昀椀 nes the term author to mean "the physical person who created or creates work
protected under section 5 and includes a person or authority commissioning work or employing a person
making work in the course of employment.
Ownership 昀氀 ows from authorship, which means the person who makes the work is normally the 昀椀 rst owner
of the copyright in the work, provided he did not create the work in the course of employment.
As far as they use of devices is concerned as in the case of sound recordings the author is deemed to be the
person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work was undertaken. The author of a
sound recording is the producer according to the statutory law. Under the Ugandan law section 2 of the
CNRA, 2006 de 昀 椀 nes a producer to mean the person who organizes and 昀 椀 nances the production of an
audiovisual 昀椀 xation or sound recording.
There were suggestions of materials for the creation of the work does not make the person o 昀昀 ering the
suggestions an author. In the case of Tate vs. Thomas (1921)1 Ch 503 it was held that; the defendants had
produced the 昀椀 rst version of the dramatic work in which the plainti 昀昀 claimed copyright. The defendant relied
on the claims of one Peterman who based his claim to the work of his general involvement which indeed
suggesting the title …The court declined to accept Peterman’s contributions as su 昀 케 cient to sustain the
claim to partake in the copyright and held that he was neither the sole author nor a joint author.
Co-owner ship - s11
are three requirements of co- authorship's right as listed in section 11, viz
(a) The work is created by more than one person:
(b) No particular part of the work is identi 昀椀 ed to have been made by each person, and
(c) Their (authors) contribution is indistinguishable.
Authorship can only be attributed to the person or persons originating the work. It, therefore, follows that
the authorship right cannot be transferred or otherwise assigned except for enforcement
purposes.- S10(3) and 14. This is because authorship is a matter of fact [which is permanent in the
copyright) whereas ownership is a matter of law.
Employee works.
Section 8(1)(a)(b) of the CNRA
In Barnett Instruments v Overton[1994] 69 RPC 315., the court held that the products of labour of an
employee belong to the employer unless otherwise provided for in the contract of employment.
However, there is a requirement that an employer-employee relationship must be proved to exist.
Patchett v Steering[1955] R.PC., in which the court noted that "there is an implied term in the contract of
service that the products of the employee, skills or exercise of his inventive faculty shall become property
of the employer.
as an independent contractor, which part of the work falling within the contract of an independent
contractor is owned by the employee and cannot therefore be claimed by the employer In the case of VIP
Tours & Travel Limited v S.M. Tours & Travel Limited, H.C.C.S No. 511 of 1983 ([1988-1990) HCB97 ,
Mukanza, Ag., J held that as a designer of a copyright, the defendant could not claim a copyright in a
work he designed during his employment by the plainti 昀昀 company.
Similarly, derivative works, which are created out of pre-existing works, are owned by the author of such
derivative works.- section 5 of the CNRA and the case of Bryne Statist.
Commissioned Works.
Sec 8(1)(b)
In the case of Prof. George W.Kakoma The Attorney General, HCCS No. 197 of 2008 Bamwine, PJ,
relying on Jennifer Davis, Intellectual Property Lau, Butterworths Core Text Series, at page 97 held that as
a general rule, copyright in a commissioned work belongs to the author, [and] in the absence of an express
or implied term to the contrary. Where the contract is unclear as to the rights of the Commissioner to use
the work, the courts may imply the grant of an appropriate right. And if the lacuna can be satis 昀椀 ed by the
grant of a licence rather than an assignment of the copyright, then the court will imply the former.
Kalamazoo Ltd and another v Systems Africa Lad [1973] 1 EA 242 (HCK) held that It is only logical and
fair that the person who has commissioned another to create some work owns the copyright in that work
for the creator of such work would not have created the work if it were not for the commission.
Public Bene 昀椀 t Works, Government Works International Works. Section 8(2) of the CNRA.
section 7 of the CNRA

Public bene 昀椀 t works are exempted from the protection of copyright because a majority of these works
are created using public funds and are also so bene 昀椀 cial to the public that they should not be left to the
restrictions that come with the protection of copyright.
RIGHTS COMPRISED IN COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS.
Economic Rights. Section 9 of the CNRA.
according to the case of Prof. George W.Kakoma v The Attorney Ge supra, Bamwine, PJ., stated that
copyright is a set of exclusive righ granted to the author or creator of an original work, including the right
to copy, distribute and adopt the work. These rights can be licensed, transferred and/or assigned.
Copyright lasts for a certain time/period after which the work is said to enter the public domain.
They are provided for under Article. 6 of the Berne convention of 1979 and Articles 8 and Article 9 of the
WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty.
Moral Rights.
Section 10 of the CNRA.
Section 2 of the CNRA de 昀椀 nes moral rights.
Section 10 above recognizes only two major moral rights, viz
(1) The right of attribution or paternity which refers to the right of the author to be made known or identi 昀
椀 ed to the public an the originator or creator of the work.
(2) Integrity which refers to the right of the author to prevent - "any distortion, matilation, alteration or
modi 昀椀 cation of the work.
Supposing someone modi 昀 椀 es another person’s work such that it looses its original quality or value, that
person would have infringed the author’s right of integrity. The distortion or modi 昀椀 cation in whatever
form it may take, may possibly injure the author’s reputation as was held in Show v Eaton Center Ltd
(1982) 77 C.P.R (2d) 705 (Canada: Ontario High Court)
Moral rights are also provided for under Berne convention of 1979 under Article. 6 and Article 5 of the
WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty.
Moral Rights vs. Economic Rights:
Moral rights protect the author's integrity, while economic rights safeguard 昀椀 nancial interests.
Moral rights endure perpetually, even after the author's death, enforceable by successors or the estate.
Where as Economic rights are temporary, applicable as long as the work is protected; they expire once the
work enters the public domain.

Moral rights are non-transferable (inalienable) and exclusively belong to the author, enduring
permanently.where as Economic rights can be assigned, licensed, or transferred, belonging to the owner of
the work, who may be the author, assignee, licensee, or transferee.
Moral rights are permanent and tied to authorship, unalterable.where as Economic rights are subject to
change in ownership and are tied to the owner of the work, allowing transfers and assignments.
Critisms of moral rights.
According to Professors L. Bently and B. Sherman, criticisms include:
Romanticized Image of the Author:
Moral rights are founded upon a romanticized concept of the author as an isolated creative genius who
imparts their personality upon the work.
Critics argue that this image of the author is unrealistic and fails to acknowledge the collaborative and
inter-textual nature of the creative process.
Foreign or Alien Nature:
Moral rights, originating in continental copyright systems, may not easily 昀椀 t into common law systems. And
Attempting to integrate them can disrupt existing copyright systems
Unjusti 昀椀 ed Legal Intervention:
Critics argue that moral rights represent an unnecessary legal intervention in free markets.They may
secure the interests of authors at the expense of entrepreneurs, disseminators, and exploiters of copyright.
Con 昀氀 ict with Free Expression:
Moral rights, particularly the right to integrity, may con 昀 氀 ict with the right to free expression. For
example, using the right of integrity to prevent the publication of a parody can impede free expression and
broader public interest.
Moral rights, as described by Rizk, encompass several rights that authors retain independent of economic
rights. These rights include:
The right to make the work available to the public for the 昀椀 rst time, The right to claim authorship and
The right to object to any distortion, mutilation, or modi 昀椀 cation of the author's work that could harm
their honor or reputation. These rights remain with the author (or their successors) inde 昀 椀 nitely, even if
economic rights are transferred, and they cannot be assigned, waived, transferred, or sold.

ASSIGNMENT OF LICENSE OR TRANSFER OF A COPYRIGHT

Section 14 CNRA
In Uganda Performing Rights V MTN (U) Ltd( Civil Suit 287 of 2010) [2012] UGComm 169 ( 21st
December 2012, Court cited Blacks law dictionary in which the word ‘assign’ is de 昀 椀 ned to mean to
convey, to transfer rights or property. It further de 昀 椀 ned assignee as one to whom property rights or
power is transferred to. A copyright owner who assigns his work relinquishes his performing right as was
held in Performing Rights Society Ltd v Harlequin Record Shop Ltd ( 1972) ALL ELT 828
DURATION OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS.
Section 13 of the CNRA.
In the case of Lauri v Renad [1892] 3 Ch. 403., court observed that "the plainti 昀昀 had no right either to an
injunction or damages in respect of a translation the copyright in which had expired before the Act came
into force.
Uganda's Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act, Section 21(1) establishes neighbouring rights for
performers, producers, and broadcasting companies. Section 2 de 昀 椀 nes these rights. Internationally,
TRIPS Article 12 ensures a minimum 50-year protection period for copyright and related rights from the
end of the calendar year of authorized publication or creation. This standardizes protection for intellectual
property.
In Uganda's Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act (CNRA), Section 212 underscores that neighbouring
rights, linked to performers, producers, or broadcasting companies, do not a 昀 昀 ect the copyright of the
original literary, scienti 昀 椀 c, or artistic work. Additionally, Section 28(8) protects producer rights for 昀 椀 fty
years from the matrix cutting date. Section 21(2) highlights that while copyright and neighbouring rights
are distinct, they mutually reinforce each other, as neighbouring rights are derived from copyright-
protected works.
ASSIGNMENT AND LICENSING OF COPYRIGHT.
Section 14 of the CNRA.
to assign is to transfer proprietary rights whereas to license is to grant permission to someone to make use
of your work(s).
Assignment
An assignment in copyright transfers economic rights from the assignor to the assignee, leading the
assignor to lose all economic rights. The assignee can modify the work within moral rights' limits, which
remain permanent and unchangeable within the work.
section 13(3) of the CNRA.
Performing Right Society Ltd v Harlequin Record Shops Ltd [1972] 2 All ER. 828, the court held that
where the original owner of the copyright assigns his works, he no longer owns the performing rights.

An assignment for future copyright is posible.

Performing Right Society Ltd v Grand Theatres Ltd and another [1970] 1 EA 576 (HCK). Simpson, J..
held that an assignment in writing is e 昀昀 ective even if only for some of the acts of the owner, for a period
or for future works, and such a valid statutory assignment constitutes the assignee the owner of the
copyright.
Licensing.
A license is a form of contract, which is availed to another person to use the copyright only. section 14(1)
(b) of the CNRA
Section 17 of the CNRA on non-exclnive licence.
With an exclusive license, the licensee alone has the right to use the work in the ways covered by the
license.
A non-exclusive license grants permission to others to exercise certain exclusive rights of copyright or
related rights without barring the rights holder from allowing others to do the same simultaneously. For
instance, the rights holder can authorize multiple entities to produce, distribute, or reproduce the
copyrighted work. Non-exclusive licenses, like exclusive ones, can have limitations and restrictions.
Section 18 of the CNRA sets out the scope and condition of non-exclusive licence.
A non-exclusive licence may only be granted to a person who is a citizen of Uganda- section 17 of the
CNRA.
Unlike assignments (as per section 14(2) of the CNRA), licenses (section 14(1) of the CNRA) don't
transfer ownership of copyright. Changes to licenses depend on contract terms, and moral rights (section
14(2) of the CNRA) can't be violated. Moral rights, a 昀케 xed to the copyright work, are available only to the
author, not merely the copyright owner. Authorship (section 14(2) of the CNRA) is permanent and can't
be altered.
assignment or transfer of economic rights must be in writing and signed (section 14(3) of the CNRA), but
a "licence to do an act falling within a copyright can be oral, written, or inferred (section 14(4) of the
CNRA). This distinction sets assignment apart from licensing, even though the CNRA uses assignment
and transfer interchangeably.
the Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act (CNRA) allows holders of neighbouring rights, such as
performers and producers, to license or assign their economic rights. Section 22(2) grants performers the
right to enter into contracts for the use of their performance. Sections 22(3) and 22(4) provide performers
the right to authorize commercial rental, public distribution, and availability of their performances through
various means.
TRIPS Agreement Article 14 , enables performers and producers to authorize or prohibit speci 昀椀 c acts,
typically done through licensing or assignment. Sections 35 and 44(1) of the CNRA emphasize that
contracts related to exploitation and use of copyrighted works, including neighbouring rights, must be in
writing and require authorization or licensing from the rights holders.
Who can claim copyright?
Only the author or those deriving rights through the author can claim copyright.Authors of a joint work
are automatically co-workers of the copyright in a workunless there is an agreement to the contrary.
The mere ownership of a copyrighted work does not mean that you own the copyright in it. There has to
be written transfer of all of the copyrights in that work.As in accordance of Section 10 of the CNRA
WORKS MADE FOR HIRE
In the case of “works made for hire” it’s the employer or other person for whom the work is prepared who
is considered the “author” (i.e. the owner of the copyright) and not the employee or the person (such as an
independent contractor) who actually created the work, unless there is an express written agreement to the
contrary.
Under Section 5 CNRA includes a person or authority commissioning work or employing a person
making work in the course of employment.Therefore Section 11 if CNRA gives the requirement for the
rights to a co-authorship asit was held in Tate .V. Thomas (1922) 1 Ch. PP 503-504.
However, Section 10(3) and (14) of the CNRA. This is shown that authorship is a matter of fact (which is
permanent in the copyright) whereas ownership is a matter of law.
Issues of ownership of copyright, normally arise in three basic scenarios.
a) Where the work is created by an employee in which case the question is between the employer and the
employee, who should own the work?
b) Where the work is created on commission by a third (3rd) party?
c) Who owns public works?
Note that not every “work” prepared by an independent contractor on special order or commission is a
“work made for hire” rather works made for hire are only those that fall within one of the statutory
categories set in Section 5 of the CNRA, however, concerning which the parties enter into an express
written agreement designating the work as such. Thus, if an architect draws up plans for you, you
commission an artist to create a painting or an independent programmer creates a computer program for
you. Such works normally cannot be a “work made for hire” and the architect, artist, or programmer will
own any copyright interest in those plans, picture or program unless there is a written agreement assigning
copyright to you. One exception to the computer program example would be a video game program that
contains audio. As an audiovisual work, it could be treated as a “work made for hire” if the parties so
agree in writing.

NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT.
A notice of copyright should be placed on all published and unpublished copies of work though the law
does not require such a notice for copyright to exist.
The elements of the copyright notice
a. For published works, there are three elements;
i. The word “copyright” or the abbreviation “©”;
ii. The year date of 昀椀 rst publication; and
iii. The name of the owner of the copyright.
Additionally, the phrase “All rights reserved” can be added to the notice for protection. Position of notice
The notice should be a 昀케 xed in such a manner and location to “give reasonable notice of the claim of
copyright”. The notice should be permanently a 昀케 xed to the work and not placed on a detachable tag or label.
COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION.
Section 43 of the Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act, provides for some steps or criterion to follow
for registration of copyright works. These include;-
i. The copyright owner or author should register with the Registrar of Copyright at the Uganda
Registration Services Bureau (URSB) by submitting in an application for copyright Registration upon
payment of the application fee.
The copy of the work for which protection is sought must be attached such as on books, CDs, DVD.
ii. The application will then be advertised in the o 昀케 cial “Gazette’’ for 60days. This is intended to allow other
parties get involved either to oppose or appoint your copyright.
iii. Once the 60 days expire, the Registrar will register that copyright and issue the applicant a Certi 昀椀 cate of
Registration with no charge fee.
Henceforth, the copyright owner/author starts to enjoy and have exclusive rights and protection for his
works for his life time and 50years after his death. This means that it is not only the creators that bene 昀椀 t
from their works, but also their heirs/bene 昀椀 ciaries.
Revocation.
This is when an invention or ownership is withdrawn or cancelled from the author or owner. Copyright
rights can be revoked due to the following reasons -

1. Lack of novelty; - If it is proved that such an invention was already part of the state of art before
earliest claimed priority date, ownership will lose e 昀昀 ect.
2. Invention is not patentable; - This occurs where if any of the requirements are not met for example
where a copyright/ patent does not clearly explain who is entitled to it.
3. Inventive step; - If proved that the alleged invention was obvious of the person skilled and general
public.
4. Insu 昀케 ciency; - When the speci 昀椀 cation does not disclose the invention clearly and completely enough for
it to be performed by the skilled person without undue e 昀昀 ort.
DURATION OF COPYRIGHT.
Section 13 of the CNRA.
PIRACY AND INFRINGEMENT
All piracy is copyright infringement but not all copyright infringement is piracy.
Piracy
This term refers to the unauthorized duplication of copyright content that is then sold at substantially
lower prices in the grey market such as computer software, video games, music and DVD’s. Article 12 of
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works uses the term ‘Piracy’ in relation
to copyright infringement, stating ‘Pirated works may seize on importation into those countries of the
Union where the original work enjoys legal protection.
Types of piracy
A. Software piracy; this is an illegal copying of software that does not belong to you in a manner that
violates the copyright and it is done by the
following ways-
1) Counterfeiting. This is illegal duplication, distribution or sale of copyrighted material with the intent
of imitating the copyrighted product. In the case of packaged software, it is common to 昀椀 nd counterfeit copies
of the compact disks incorporating the software programs as well as related packaging manuals, license
agreements, labels, registration cards and security features.
Richard Roe v Attorney General (Constitutional Petition No. 5 of 2020) [2021] UGConsC 1 (23
September 2021).
This case de 昀 椀 ned counterfeiting as the unauthorized reproduction of a registered trademark or other
intellectual property. The court held that counterfeiting is a violation of the rights of trademark owners and
that it can cause signi 昀椀 cant harm to consumers.
Court further held that To be successful in a counterfeiting case, the plainti 昀 昀 must prove the following
elements:
* The defendant reproduced a registered trademark or other intellectual property without the authorization
of the trademark owner.
* The defendant intended to deceive consumers into believing that the counterfeit goods were genuine.
* The defendant caused actual or potential harm to consumers.
The court also held that the plainti 昀 昀 does not need to prove that the defendant actually deceived any
consumers. It is su 昀케 cient to show that the defendant intended to deceive consumers.
The court's de 昀 椀 nition of counterfeiting is broad and covers a wide range of activities. For example,
counterfeiting can include the following:
* Manufacturing and selling counterfeit goods
* Importing and exporting counterfeit goods
* Distributing counterfeit goods
* Possessing counterfeit goods for the purpose of selling them
* Using counterfeit goods in a business.
2) End user piracy.
Sikuku v Uganda Baati (HCCS 298 of 2012) [2014] UGCommC 135 (5 September 2014), .The court
explicitly de 昀 椀 ned end user privacy as the right of an individual to control the collection, use, and
disclosure of their personal information. The court also identi 昀 椀 ed two main types of end user privacy:
informational privacy to mean the right to control the collection, use, and disclosure of personal
information and communicative privacy to mean the right to control the communication of personal
information.
This occurs when an individual reproduces copies of software without authorization- these include;
a) Using one licensed copy to install a program on multiple computers.
b) Copying discs for installation or distribution.
c) Taking advantage of upgrade o 昀昀 ers without having a legal copy of the version to be upgraded.
d) Acquiring academic or other restricted on non-retail software without aproper license.
e) Swapping discs in or outside the work.
3) Client server overuse. This type of piracy occurs when too many users on a network are using a central
copy of a program at same time. For example, if you have a Local Area Network (LAN) and install
programs on the server for several people to use, you have to be sure your license entitles you to do so. If
you have more users than allowed by the license, that is ‘over use’.
4) Hard disk loading. This occurs when a business sells new computers with illegal copies of software
loaded onto the hard discs to make the purchase of the machines more attractive.
5) Bootlegs. These are the unauthorized recordings of live or broadcast performance. They are duplicated
and sold sometimes at a premium price without the permission of the artist, composer, or record company.
B. Video piracy;
This is the unauthorized and illegal production and sale of copies of commercial video 昀椀 lms.
C. Internet piracy;
This occurs when software is downloaded from the internet. The same purchasing rules apply to online
software purchases as for those bought in compact disk format. Common Internet piracy techniques are;-
a) Websites that make software available for free download or in exchange for others.
b) Internet auction sites that the seller o 昀昀 ers software and/or content in an online action. Some examples
would be counterfeit copy of a software program or an electronic archive of several years’ worth of
magazines or school textbooks in PDF format on DVD. The seller will often attempt to sell multiple
copies simultaneously and as quick as possible to avoid detection by the enforcement agencies. Such
sellers may also attempt to collect the names and emails of losing bidders and contact those bidders in an
attempt to sell additional copies.
c) Peer to Peer (P2P) networks that enable unauthorized transfer of copyrighted programs to each other.
Because of the distributed and often anonymous nature of P2P applications, they have been widely used
for the distribution of pirated copies of software and/or content. P2P applications have also been popular
because they are basically “one stop shopping ”… a user can 昀 椀 nd just anything they are looking for,
including music, software, books, movies, games, etc.
d) Newsgroup- which is a location within the Usenet system for messages posted from users via the
internet in di 昀 昀 erent locations. Newsgroup is similar to discussion forums on websites. Newsgroup is
commonly used to read newsgroups. The technology used to run such network services allows for 昀椀 les to be
attached to messages, or posts, on the newsgroup. There are thousands of newsgroups used dedicated to
distributing pirated copies of software and/or content.
e) File Transfer Protocol (FTP) - is a network protocol used to transfer data from one computer to another
over the internet. A FTP program allows a user to upload 昀椀 les and download 昀椀 les from a site. Pirates who
transfer illegal copies of software and/or content to one another commonly use FTP sites because it is e 昀케
cient for transferring large 昀椀 les and most FTP servers support some of anonymous login to allow any user to
access the site freely and download illegal copies of software and/or content.
f) Classi 昀 椀 ed Ads Sites – These began in newspapers and allow private individuals to solicit sales for
products and services. Due to the perceived anonymity of the internet, many pirates use these sites to post
listings. advertising the sale of pirated copies of software and/or content typically providing email address
or website address where they can be contacted to facilitate a sale.
g) Sharehosting Sites – are sites which allow internet users to upload one or more 昀 椀 les from their
computers onto the Sharehosting site free of charge. Some examples are RapidShare, SendSpace and
MegaUpload. Most of these sites simply provide a website address (URL) which can be given out freely
to users who can then access the 昀椀 le at a later time. An even greater number of websites and internet
forums exist solely to archive and share such links-these sites are often referred to as “link sites” or
“indexing sites”. This type of 昀椀 le distribution has grown to such a large volume that it has eclipsed the
remaining P2P 昀椀 le sharing services.

h) Internet Relay Chat- is a program designed to facilitate real-time internet text message (chat) as well as
昀 椀 le-transfers. It is mainly designed for group communication in various discussion forums known as
“channels,” but it also allows one-to-one communication between computers and 昀椀 le transfers via Direct
Client-to-Client (DCC) connections. Pirates operate their own channel which they use to distribute pirated
copies of software and/or content through their computers which they have control over, often referred to
as “bot”. A bot is a term for a computer whose sole function is to maintain large volumes of 昀椀 le storage
and respond to users’ commands to distribute 昀椀 les via DCC 昀椀 le transfer.
i) Cracks/Serials site-is another form of piracy that uses circumvent technologies to provide access to
software. These technologies are commonly referred to as “cracks” and key-generators. “Cracks” are
small 昀 椀 les that alter the source code of a software program; circumventing the Digital Rights
Management (DRM) which is designed to limit the installation of software to a speci 昀 椀 c number of
machines, as established in every software program EndUser License Agreement (EULA). A key
generator or “keygen” is a program that uses a mathematical algorithm to create fake, yet still valid, serial
numbers and CD keys for use with legitimate copies of software, providing another method for bypassing
DRM.
E 昀昀 ects of Piracy
A. To Users.
• Exposure to software viruses, corrupt disk or defective software.
• Inadequate or no product documentation.
• No warranties.
• Lack of technical support.
• Ineligibility of software upgrades o 昀昀 ered to properly licensed users.
• Bugs-leading to loss of work, lost time and frustration.
B. To Business.
• Loss of Revenue.
• Security risks-viruses-malware.
• Legal risks-high penalties under copyright law for users caught in the act (copyright infringement).
• Economic risks-pirated software takes away sale of legitimate software.
Disadvantages of Piracy
1. Crime-stealing-taking part of another’s work without acknowledgment or perform.
2. Expenses-paying for illegal software. According to a study in 2001- software companies lost eleven
billion dollars in revenue and approximately 40% business software was pirated.
3. Responsibility
INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS.
Section 46 of the CNRA.
In order for an action for copyright infringement to be sustainable, it nant be shown that the work, which
is alleged to have been infringed is actually part of the works eligible for copyright protection
within section 5 of the CNRA The plainti 昀昀 mast sanity court that the work alleged to have been infringed is
the subject of protection under the CNRA.
Even works of artistic craftsmanship may also be object of copyright infringement - George Hesher Ltd.
Restauille Upholstery (L) Lad, (1976) AC, 64.
sections 10 and 46(2) of the CNRA.
Under section 45(5) of the CNRA, "infringement is not actionable unless the infringement involves the
whole piece of work or a substantial part of the work.
meaning that the plainti 昀 昀 must prove that the defendant has taken a substantial portion of the
plainti 昀 昀 's work. In the case of Francis Day and Hunter, Limited and Twentieth Century Fox Corporation,
Limited, and others, the House of Lords noted, that in order for a claim for infringement of copyright to
succeed, it must be shown that there was a substantial taking of the part of the work.
Ravenscroft v Herbert and New English Library Limited [1980) RPC 193-212., the court noted that "the
plainti 昀 昀 in order to succeed in an action for infringemen of copyright must prove that not only was there
copying of his o her work but also that such copying constituted a substantial taking of the work.
In the case of Francis Day & Hunter Ltd, and another v Bron and another[1963] 1 Ch. 587, p.589., the
court held that once the two elements of su 昀 케 cient objective similarity and causal connection are
established it is no defence that the defendant was unaware that what he was doing infringed the copyright
in the plainti 昀昀's work. The court noted that coincidental copying is not su 昀케 cient to constitute infringement.
The plainti 昀昀 must prove a causal connection between his work and that of the defendant. The court further
noted that if the two works (the plainti 昀 昀 's and the defendant's) are su 昀 케 ciently similar, that raises a
presumption of copying and the burden now shifts to the defendant to prove that his or her work is a
creature of his or her e 昀昀 ort." This is mainly so because the mind of the defendant may be key especially
in respect of criminal prosecutions for infringement of copyright.
According to Professor Colston, subconscious copying is still infringement of copyright although
damages may not be awarded for unknowing infringement as was held in the case of Francis Day and
Hunter v Bron.
Primary Infringement.
Occurs only under restricted acts.
The copyright work must be the source of the infringing work,there must be substantial copying of the
work
Section 9
Here activities of those involved in infringing the copyright owner's exclusive rights are looked at.

Professors Bently and Sherman( Bently, L. & Sherman, D., suma, p.170) argue that in an action for
primary infringement, the onus falls upon the claimant to show on the balance of probabilities that: (look
at Francis and hunter limited v Bron 1963)
(1) The defendant carried out one of the activities which falls within the copyright owner's control"
(a) The defendant's work was derived from the copyright work Ccamal connection), and
(m) The restricted act was carried out in relation to the work or a substantial, thereof. section 46(1) of the
CNRA deals with exclusive rights
If two works are created independently and they are both the same,the 昀椀 rst to be created of the two won't be
copyright infringed.
Secondary Infringement.
Angella katatumba v the Anti corruption coalition of Uganda.
Bently, L. & Sherman, D., suma, p.170- secondary infringement, it is the activities of assisting in the
making of distribution of infringing copies or the giving of infringing performances.
Section 46(1) of the CNRA prohibits any person from doing any illegal acts in relation to copyright or
neighbouring rights. The only way a person can legally engage in the activities, which are only permitted
to be done by the rights holder, is when that person has a valid transfer, licence, assignment or other
authorization under the CNRA.
Bently and Sherman also list a host of types of secondary intringeme such as the distribution of infringing
copies, providing the means for making infringing copies as is the case with librarians who abet massive
photocopying.
Where a person or institution provides the means of infringement, such person or institution may be sued
for damages. Thus, in the case of Moorehouse v University of New South Wales [1976] RPC 151. The
High Court of Australia held that the University had authorized the breach and the provision of
photocopies without control or supervision amounted to authorization of infringement in books the library
used. The court further noted that authorization mean the sanction or approval and extends to indi 昀 昀
erence or inactivity of the defendant, which creates an inference of authorization.
However, in situations in which the University restricts or issues a stern warning to the students not to
make illegal copies of the work, then it can be argued that the institution has discharged its obligation and
is therefore not liable for secondary infringement or authorization of infringement as per D. J. Bakibinga
& R. M. Kakungulu in Intellectual Property Law in East Africa.
Di 昀昀 erences between Primary and Secondary Infringement.
The 昀 椀 rst relates to the scope of protection. Primary infringement is concerned with people who are
directly involved in the reproduction, performance, etc. of the copyright work. In contrast, secondary
infringement is concerned with people in a commercial context who either deal with infringing copies,
facilitate such copying, or facilitate public performance.
The second di 昀 昀 erence between the two forms of infringement relates to the mental element that the
defendant must exhibit in order to infringe...the state of mind of the defendant is not formally taken into
account when deciding whether an act of primary infringement has occurred. In the case of secondary
infringement, however, liability is dependent on the defendant knowing or having reason to believe that
the activities in question are wrongful.
Once the plainti 昀 昀 identi 昀 椀 es substantive similarity between his work and the defendant's work, then, that
raises the presumption of infringement as already explained. The evidential burden then shifts to the
defendant to prove that, notwithstanding the similarities between his or her work and that of the
plainti 昀 昀 , his or her work is a result of independent creativity and e 昀 昀 ort. Where a defendant purports to
exercise any of the rights in pursuance of a licence of assignment, which is actually a valid defense to
infringement of copyright, but the plainti 昀 昀 successfully proves to court that such rights are actually
outside the terms of the licence or assignment, infringement is deemed to have been proved.
The case of Angella Katatumba v the Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda (2014) is a landmark case in
Ugandan copyright law. The case involved the secondary infringement of Katatumba's copyright in her
song "Let's Go Green" by the Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda (ACCU).

The ACCU had used a portion of Katatumba's song in a public awareness campaign about corruption
without her permission. Katatumba sued the ACCU for secondary infringement of copyright.

The court held that the ACCU had knowingly induced, caused, or materially contributed to the primary
infringement of Katatumba's copyright. The court also held that the ACCU had pro 昀 椀 ted from the
primary infringement by using Katatumba's song in its public awareness campaign.

The court awarded Katatumba damages and an injunction against the ACCU. The injunction prevented
the ACCU from further using Katatumba's song without her permission.

The case of Angella Katatumba v the Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda is important because it
establishes a number of important principles of secondary infringement in Ugandan copyright law.
First, the case establishes that secondary infringement can occur even if the defendant did not know that
the primary infringement was taking place. The court held that the ACCU was liable for secondary
infringement even though it was not aware that Katatumba's copyright was valid.
Second, the case establishes that secondary infringement can occur even if the defendant did not directly
pro 昀椀 t from the primary infringement. The court held that the ACCU was liable for secondary infringement
even though it did not charge users to download its public awareness campaign.
Third, the case establishes that secondary infringement can occur even if the defendant's use of the
copyrighted work was in the public interest. The court held that the ACCU's use of Katatumba's song in its
public awareness campaign was in the public interest, but that did not excuse the ACCU's infringement of
Katatumba's copyright.

The case of Angella Katatumba v the Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda is a valuable precedent for
copyright holders in Uganda. The case shows that copyright holders can hold secondary infringers
accountable for their actions, even if the secondary infringers did not know that they were infringing or
even if they were acting in the public interest.

DEFENCES TO INFRINGEMENT.
section 15 of the CNRA.
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the following factors
shall be considered-
D. J. Bakibinga & R. M. Kakungulu in Intellectual Property Law in East Africa states that In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the following factors shall be
considered
(a) the purpose and character of the use, including whether the use is of a commercial nature or is for non-
pro 昀椀 t educational purpose;
(b) the nature of the protected work;
(c) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the protected work as a whole; and
(d) the e 昀昀 ect of the use upon the potential market for value of the protected work

Uganda performing rights Ltd v feed mukubira.

Uganda performing rights society v mega standard supermarket . Basajja yaku v mtn
Jude v swangz avanue
Asege Winnie v opportunity bank. Anne kansinme v Uganda telecom Nalubega v stabex