TEST PUB

JOINT PUB 3-06

DOCTRINE FOR
JOINT RIVERINE OPERATIONS

SEPTEMBER 1991
TEST PUB
Reply ZIP Code: Joint Test Pub 3-06
20318-7000 11 September 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution list

Subject: Joint Test Pub 3-06, "Doctrine for Joint Riverine

Operations"

1. This test publication contains proposed joint doctrine to

guide the activities and employment of the Armed Forces of the
United States in conducting joint riverine operations.

2. Joint test publications are developed and issued in accordance

with Joint Pub 1-01. This test publication has been staffed with
the Services and combatant commands. It is now ready to undergo
evaluation in the field. After a thorough evaluation is
accomplished, and feedback from the evaluation process is
considered, the publication will be implemented under the
provisions of CJCS MOP 9.

3. The lead agent for this publication is the US Navy. The Joint
Staff doctrine sponsor is J-7.

Enclosure
Distribution:

By Secretary, Joint Staff:

Joint Staff OSD NSA DCA DMA FEMA

JSTPS DIA DNA CIA US Coast Guard (G-ODO)
NDU (CS) NWC (NWFA) ICAF (ICWA) AFSC (DAO)

Ten copies each to: Offices of CSA (DAMO-FDQ), CNO (OP-607), CSAF
(XOXWD), CMC (PL-68)

Ten copies each to:

USCINCLANT (J-32)
USCINCCENT (CCJ5-0)
USCINCEUR (ECJ5-D)
CINCFOR (FCJ3-FC)
USCINCPAC (J318)
USCINCSO (SCJ5-PSD)
USCINCSPACE (SPJ5X)
USCINCSOC (SOJ5-J)
CINCSAC (XPXP)
USTRANSCOM (TCJ3/J4LL)

Additional copies may be obtained from the Joint Doctrine and

Allied Interoperability Division (JDAID), Operational Plans and
Interoperability Directorate (J-7), Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.
20318-7000.

2
 RECORD OF CHANGES FOR JOINT TEST PUB 3-06
(DOCTRINE FOR JOINT RIVERINE OPERATIONS)

RECORD OF CHANGES

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POST

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS

While this publication is in the "Test Pub" stage, change

recommendations should be submitted through the chain of command
to the Joint Doctrine and Allied Interoperability Division,
Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), Joint
Staff, Washington, DC 20318-7000, in accordance with guidance
provided in Joint Pub 1-01.

i
(INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK)

ii
 PREFACE

1. Purpose. This publication sets forth doctrine to govern the

conduct of joint riverine operations of the Armed Forces of the
United States. It provides guidance for the planning and
execution of joint riverine operations. Further, this doctrine is
intended to facilitate interoperability between the Services
conducting joint riverine operations.

2. Application

a. Doctrine established in this publication applies to

commanders of unified and specified commands, subordinate
unified commands, joint task forces, and components. The
doctrine and guidelines contained herein provide for the
planning and execution of joint riverine operations across the
operational continuum, from peacetime competition through war.

b. If conflicts arise between the contents of this

publication and the contents of Service publications, this
publication will take precedence unless the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific
guidance.

3. Scope. The doctrine herein applies to joint riverine

operations from the planning stage to the termination stage. Since
the tasks to be performed in any riverine operation are
functionally the same, the doctrine is applicable to all riverine
operations. It is written for those who:

a. Provide strategic direction to joint forces (Secretary of

Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and commanders
of combatant commands).

b. Employ joint forces (commanders of unified commands,

sub-unified commands, or Joint Task Forces).

c. Support joint forces, or who are supported by joint forces

(commanders of specified commands, component commands, joint
task forces, and Chiefs of the Services).

4. Basis. This publication was sponsored by the Joint Staff and

developed by the US Navy, in coordination with the Services,
unified and specified commands, and the Joint Staff, for use by
the US Armed Forces.

iii
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I CONCEPT................................................ I-1

Concept of Joint Riverine Operations.................. I-1

Types of Joint Riverine Operations.................... I-5
Composition of Force.................................. I-9

II COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION.............................. II-1

General.............................................. II-1
Initiating Directive for Joint Riverine Operations... II-1
Joint Riverine Force Organization.................... II-4

III APPROACH TO PLANNING..................................III-1

Basic Considerations.................................III-1
Concurrent Planning..................................III-5
Detailed Planning....................................III-6
Planning Procedures..................................III-8
Basic Decisions......................................III-10
Rehearsals...........................................III-20
Operations Security..................................III-21

IV Special Operations PLANNING............................ IV-1

Special Operations................................... IV-1

V SUPPORTING ARMS PLANNING............................... V-1

Fire Support Planning................................. V-1

Supporting Arms Requirements.......................... V-3
Fire Support Coordination............................. V-4
Special Considerations................................ V-6
Air Operations.........................................V-9

VI INTELLIGENCE PLANNING................................ VI-1

Scope of Intelligence Planning...................... VI-1

Intelligence Planning Responsibilities.............. VI-2
Intelligence Sources and Collection................. VI-8
Environmental Considerations........................ VI-8
Sociological Considerations.........................VI-11
Security............................................VI-12
Intelligence and Counterintelligence Estimates......VI-12
The Intelligence Annex..............................VI-13
Joint Riverine Force Intelligence Support...........VI-13

iv
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

VII COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING..............................VII-1

Scope and Requirements..............................VII-1

Considerations......................................VII-1
Responsibilities....................................VII-8
Communications Security.............................VII-9
Communications Deception and Countermeasures.......VII-11
The Communication Plan.............................VII-11

VIII LOGISTICS PLANNING................................. VIII-1

Scope............................................. VIII-1
Logistic Planning Considerations.................. VIII-1
Logistic Planning Responsibilities................ VIII-9
Logistic Plans....................................VIII-11
Medical Planning..................................VIII-14
Engineer Planning.................................VIII-16
Base Development Planning.........................VIII-18

IX SUPPORTING OPERATIONS PLANNING........................ IX-1

Definition and Authority............................. IX-1

JRF Operations....................................... IX-1
Logistics Operations................................. IX-2

X EMERGENCY ACTIONS, DISASTER CONTROL, AND COMBAT

SEARCH AND RESCUE...................................... X-1

Effect of Environment and Organization................ X-1

Emergencies Aboard Riverine Craft..................... X-1
Disaster Control and Emergency Assistance............. X-3
Combat Search and Rescue.............................. X-5

XI TACTICAL GUIDANCE..................................... XI-1

General Considerations............................... XI-1

Movement of the Joint Riverine Force................. XI-1
Joint Riverine Afloat Base Movement.................. XI-3
Measures to Prevent Mutual Interference.............. XI-5
Command and Control Facilities....................... XI-9

XII RIVERINE ASSAULT OPERATIONS.......................... XII-1

Scope............................................... XII-1
Tactical Loading.................................... XII-1
Movement of the Assault Force....................... XII-4
Landing, Assault, Pursuit, and Explotiation
Operations......................................... XII-8
Planned Withdrawals.................................XII-18

v
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

XIII WATERWAY INTERDICTION, SURVEILLANCE, BARRIER, AND

SECURITY OPERATIONS................................. XIII-1

Purpose............................................ XIII-1
Tactical Considerations............................ XIII-4

XIV ANCILLARY OPERATIONS................................ XIV-1

Scope of Operations................................. XIV-1

Reconnaissance and Waterway Clearance............... XIV-1
Joint Riverine Base Security........................ XIV-2
Mine Warfare Operations.............................XIV-13
Salvage Operations..................................XIV-15
Cover and Deception.................................XIV-17
UW and Direct Action Operations.....................XIV-18
Psychological Operations............................XIV-20
Civil Affairs.......................................XIV-21

XV LOGISTICS............................................. XV-1

Logistics Support Provided to the JRF................ XV-1

APPENDIX

A US Navy Riverine Assets................................ A-1

B US Army Riverine Assets................................ B-1
C US Coast Guard Riverine Assets......................... C-1
D US Marine Corps Riverine Assets........................ D-1

GLOSSARY

Part I--Abbreviations and Acronyms.........................GL-1

Part II--Definitions.......................................GL-2

vi
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

CHAPTER I

CONCEPT

1. Concept of Riverine Operations

a. Joint riverine operations integrate and employ various

types of ground, maritime, air, and special operations
forces in a concerted effort to gain and/or maintain
control of riverine, coastal, or delta areas. These
operations will be conducted under the command of a single
joint riverine force commander (CJRF). Command and
organization will be in accordance with Chapter 3 of Joint
Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)." The
establishing authority may organize on an area, function,
or Service basis. This doctrine is not intended to direct
the use of either Service or functional components.
Service command and organization responsibilities are well
established. Functional relationships are less well
understood. Therefore, this publication provides guidance
based on functional relationships wherever appropriate.

b. The riverine area is an inland or delta area

comprising both land and water, characterized by limited
land lines of communication with extensive waterways that
provide natural routes for transportation and
communications. Where navigable waterways exist and roads
do not, or where forces are required to use waterways, an
effective program to control the waterways and/or
interdict hostile movement becomes paramount. The
riverine area requires unique capabilities and tactics to
achieve success against hostile forces.

c. The primary advantage of a joint riverine force (JRF)

is its ability to concentrate a mix of forces effectively
for operations in the riverine area, including the ability
to attack selected targets throughout that area. Riverine
operations exploit the advantages of the waterways for
movement, capitalizing on mobility to find, fix, and
destroy hostile forces. Surface mobility is achieved
primarily by riverine craft maintaining control of water
LOCs and providing combat support and combat service
support.

d. Because of the inherent waterborne mobility and unique

capabilities of a riverine force, it is

I-1
appropriate to concentrate these forces on their primary
riverine role, rather than divert them to maintaining
territorial control beyond the limits of a riverine area.
However, JRFs can contribute to wide-area territorial
control by performing the riverine operations set forth in
subparagraph 1f below, in support of other forces.

e. Environmental factors that can affect the composition

and employment of the JRF include:

(1) Shallow water.

(2) Large tidal range.

(3) Swift currents.

(4) Narrow waterways.

(5) Natural or man made obstacles.

(6) Bridges.

(7) Lack of suitable areas for ground force maneuver,

staging, and/or resupply.

(8) Concentrations of population (friendly, hostile,

or neutral) along the waterways.

(9) Dense vegetation, and in some cases, essentially

impassable riverine terrain.

f. The entire riverine operation may include:

(1) Intelligence collection.

(2) Planning.

(3) Embarkation of troops and equipment.

(4) Patrol/barrier, interdiction, and surveillance

operations.

(5) Riverine assault operations.

(6) Close fire support.

(7) Suppression of enemy air defenses.

I-2
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

(8) CAS.

(9) Naval surface support.

(10) Repositioning of forces.

(11) Resupply of the riverine force until termination

of the operation.

(12) Support for PSYOP and civic action programs.

(13) Reembarkation or withdrawal.

(14) Support for FID.

(15) Offensive or defensive mining and mine

countermeasures.

(16) Support of humanitarian requirements and

disaster relief.

g. A riverine operation may include helicopter operations

conducted by elements of the JRF, including heliborne,
airborne, and ground operations conducted by other forces
in conjunction with JRF operations.

2. Types of Riverine Operations. The JRF conducts operations

in areas where local response may range from hostile action to
a friendly welcome. The two general types of riverine
operations, assault and interdiction, are defined below and
described in Chapters XII and XIII.

a. Assault. These operations employ maritime, ground,

air, and/or SOF to achieve one or more of the following
objectives:

(1) Establish control of waterways in a geographic

area.

(2) Establish control of land areas, population, and

resources.

(3) Locate and destroy hostile forces, enemy

installations, and enemy supplies.

(4) Establish and secure an area for a combat support

base.

I-3
b. Waterway Interdiction, Surveillance, Barrier, and
Security Operations. These operations employ ground,
maritime, air, and/or SOF to achieve one or more of the
following objectives:

(1) Protect friendly LOCs.

(2) Deny hostile forces the use of waterways.

(3) Collect intelligence information.

(4) Perform security assistance missions.

(5) Enforce population and resources control.

c. Supporting Operations. Guidance for command

relationships of attachment and support is outlined in
Joint Pub 0-2 "Unified Action Armed Forces". Operations
in support of the JRF may be required. Although these
supporting operations normally will be at the request of
the CJRF, they will be directed by higher authority and
may be conducted inside or outside the JRF area of
operations. The commander of forces conducting supporting
operations will coordinate with the CJRF. Examples of
supporting operations are:

(1) Feints or demonstrations intended for purposes of

deception.

(2) Isolation of the area of operation by

interdiction of enemy forces.

(3) Operations to assist gaining or maintaining air,

ground, or maritime superiority.

(4) Air, surface, or SO to secure information.

(5) PSYOP and UW operations.

d. Operations conducted by elements of the JRF in the

riverine area (or en route to an objective area) before
riverine assault forces arrive are considered preassault
rather than supporting operations. Examples of such
operations are waterway patrol and interdiction, mine
countermeasures, obstruction clearance, and swimmer
detection and defense.

I-4
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

e. Supported Operations. Riverine operations are

frequently conducted as an adjunct to an amphibious
landing; however, these operations may also be conducted
in support of other commands or with other commands in
mutual support. The CJRF must remain prepared to conduct
short-term or protracted operations in support of taskings
by the theater, combatant, or joint force commander. In
particular, the JRF area of operations may overlap or be
adjacent to the naval coastal warfare (see Joint Pub 3-10)
area of operations. If such a situation occurs, a program
of mutual support with early liaison will benefit both
commands. The following areas of mutual concern should be
coordinated closely:

(1) Intelligence collection.

(2) Base location, including a possible joint command

post.

(3) Patrol or barrier, interdiction, and surveillance

operations.

(4) Security.

(5) Assault operations.

(6) Supporting arms.

3. Composition of Force. The composition of the JRF will be

determined by the assigned mission, special characteristics of
the particular riverine area of operations, and enemy
capabilities. Interoperability of C3 systems within the JRF
is a primary consideration. For detailed information on
Service riverine assets and capabilities, see Appendies A
through E.

I-5
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

CHAPTER II

COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION

1. General

a. Guidance on the exercise of COCOM and OPCON is

provided in Joint Pub 0-2. A commander of a unified
command, in the exercise of COCOM, has full authority to
organize and employ commands and forces considered
necessary to accomplish assigned missions. OPCON will be
exercised through the commanders of subordinate
organizations, normally through the Service component
commander.

b. The CJRF’s staff should be allocated so that Service

representation generally reflects the overall composition
of the force. The staff will usually be sourced from
within the JRF, at the discretion of the CJRF.

2. Initiating Directive for Joint Riverine Operations

a. An initiating directive from the commander having

overall responsibility for the operation directs the MRF.
The directive may be an OPLAN or OPORD, a letter of
instruction, or an order to execute an already existing
plan or order.

b. The initiating directive:

(1) Establishes the JRF and assigns the mission.

(2) Defines command relationships.

(3) Defines the AO.

(4) Provides an operation nickname or code word and

sets target dates to execute the operation.

(5) Contains instructions on the allocation,

employment, and control of special ordnance.

(6) Provides information or assigns responsibility

for the conduct and coordination of combat, combat
support, and combat service support and of Special
Operations (SO) related to or in support of the
riverine operations.

II-1
 (7) Provides instructions governing termination of
riverine operations and, if feasible, command
arrangements and disposition of forces to occur at
that time.

(8) Provides information concerning possible

operations to be conducted after termination of
riverine operations.

(9) Provides communications-electronics instructions

to ensure that joint interoperability requirements are
satisfied.

(10) Provides special instructions on ROE.

(11) Provides for coordination with other forces

whose operations affect the JRF or the AO.

(12) Deconflicts simultaneous operations within the

AOR.

(13) Provides instructions for combined operations

with indigenous military and paramilitary forces, if
needed.

(14) Provides instructions for civil-military

operations, if needed.

(15) Contains instructions concerning intelligence

support responsibilities, including joint or
Service-component intelligence production
responsibilities, and clarifies JRF intelligence
tasking authority.

(16) Contains instructions concerning tactical

counterintelligence support responsibilities.

3. Joint Riverine Force Organization

a. The combat commander, or his appropriate subordinate

commander, having overall responsbility for the operation
will designate the CJRF. The objective in organizing for
riverine operations is the formation of a fully integrated
combined arms force specifically tailored to provide the
necessary mobility, unity of effort, and fire superiority
to achieve the assigned task. The force may be organized
along either functional or Service component lines, as
best suited to meet the mission. Service component
organization is the norm. Figure II-1a

II-2
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

provides a sample task organization along functional

lines, Figure II-1b provides a task organization along
service component lines.

b. This publication is written to support execution of

riverine operations in both functional and Service
component organizations.

+------+
| CJRF |
+---+--+
-------------------------------------------------------
--------- --------- --------- -----------
| Air | | Ground | |Maritime | | Special |
|Component| |Component| |Component| |Operations |
--------- --------- --------- | Component|
-----------

Figure II-1a Sample JRF Task Organization (Functional)

------
| CJRF |
------

-------------------------------------------------------------
--------- --------- --------- ----------- -----------
|Com Army | |Com Naval| |Com Air | Com Marine | Special |
|Forces | |Forces | |Forces | Forces |Operations |
--------- --------- --------- ------------ | Component|
-----------
-------
MAGTF
-------

Figure II-1b Sample JRF Task Organization (Service Component)

b. A typical riverine assault or patrol group would

normally consist of the following elements:

(1) C3I.

(2) Assault.

(3) Combat.

(4) Combat service support.

(5) Craft with assigned crews capable of lifting

troops and supplies.

II-3
(6) Mine countermeasures craft with assigned crews.

(7) Fire support craft with assigned crews.

(8) Escort craft with assigned crews.

(9) Aircraft support.

II-4
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

CHAPTER III

APPROACH TO PLANNING

1. Basic Considerations. Planning for riverine operations is

a continuous process from receipt of the initiating directive
to termination of the operation. It necessitates concurrent,
parallel, and detailed planning by all participating forces.
Plans must be detailed enough to give all participants
complete information, while being simple and flexible enough
to be modified as the tactical situation changes.

a. Plans for a riverine operation will be based on the

mission, forces available, and intelligence concerning
hostile forces, terrain, and weather.

b. The assigned mission must be analyzed to identify

specific and implied tasks. A coordinated plan must be
developed for the accomplishment of each of these tasks.
The concept of operations must be such that the operation
can be supported by the forces available and, therefore,
must be examined by all commanders concerned to determine
its feasibility in this respect. The concept of
operations, commander’s intent, and commander’s guidance
must be promulgated by the CJRF in the planning phase to
facilitate detailed planning.

c. Enemy capabilities, limitations, and modes of

operation must be estimated. Information on the enemy
order of battle must be updated and refined during the
planning phase of the operation.

d. Weather, terrain, and hydrography take on significant

importance in riverine operations. Under some
circumstances, they may even be controlling factors in any
concept of operations. Consequently, thorough knowledge
and consideration of the environment are extremely
important in planning riverine operations. Because of the
problems associated with position location and orientation
in various environments, use of gridded aerial mosaics
should be considered to supplement topographic maps.

e. Mine countermeasures and obstruction removal are

critical considerations when planning for riverine
operations.

III-1
f. Plans for countering an ambush will depend on whether
the JRF is to force passage through the ambush or to land
and destroy the ambushing force. If the mission of the
JRF specifies the destruction of ambushing forces
encountered en route, plans for landing combat elements
ashore could be required.

g. Logistic plans should include equipment, levels of

supplies to be embarked, resupply, and evacuation
instructions. In general, embarked troops should be
equipped for highly mobile operations. The remaining
supplies and equipment should remain with the JRF,
consistent with its resupply capability. Detailed
logistic planning is covered in Chapter VIII.

h. Supporting arms plans will be developed in consonance

with the scheme of maneuver. Detailed supporting arms
planning is covered in Chapter V.

i. Civil affairs and civic action plans must be developed

in coordination with the local government.

j. The JRF should plan and conduct its operations in

accordance with international law. This includes the Law
of War Program (such as the rules for targets and
protection of noncombatants) domestic US laws and
regulations, and laws pertaining to military justice,
claims, and disposition of captured property. Training of
riverine forces should ensure knowledge by members,
commensurate with their duties and responsibilities, of
the principles and rules of the Law of Armed Conflict,
including the duty to report alleged violations. ROE
should delineate the circumstances and limitations under
which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat
engagement with enemy forces. The Law of Armed Conflict
provides the framework within which US ROE are forumlated.
Because ROE also reflect operational, political, and
diplomatic factors, they often restrict combat operations
more than the requirement of international law alone. The
rationale for this restiction is that the original
statement on US ROE confused military justice terminology
(e.g., search and seizure) and the Geneva Convention on
POWs with the ROE pertaining to use of force. The revised
paragraphs more clearly define the applicable legal
concepts and terms.

k. If assigned forces have not had previous experience

or training in riverine operations, plans should provide

III-2
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

for training of joint and subordinate riverine commanders

and staffs in the peculiarities of riverine operations
planning and coordinating. This training should include
joint training, if feasible, and training in control and
coordination of assault craft, direct and indirect
gunfire, mine courtermeasures, helicopter gunships, and
fixed-wing aircraft in the often densely vegetated
riverine environment. If possible, ground forces
scheduled for riverine employment should conduct
advance-maneuver training in a similiarly difficult
riverine terrain environment.

l. Communications plans will be developed in consonance

with the concept of operations.

2. Concurrent Planning. Each echelon of the JRF should

participate in the development of a joint riverine OPLAN. To
expedite the preparation of plans, major commanders should be
designated as soon as the decision has been reached to conduct
a riverine operation. Early and efficient assembly of assault
craft, support craft, ships, aircraft, and other resources
necessary to the operation depend on expeditious and thorough
concurrent planning. Initial planning must be originated by
subordinate commanders on the basis of preliminary information
provided in concepts of operations, outline plans, warning
orders, planning memorandums, and decisions emanating from
higher authority. The recommendations and estimates of
subordinate commanders produced often incluence the final
plans and decisions of senior commanders.

3. Planning by Parallel Chains of Command. The concurrent

participation by joint forces requires coordinated planning
between corresponding echelons of command. Basic decisions,
even those primarily the responsibility of an individual
commander, must be reached on the basis of understanding the
mission, objectives, tactics, capabilities, and limitations of
the command. At the higher command levels, parallel planning
commences with the inception of the operations. At the lower
levels, it usually begins on receipt of an initiating
directive and continues for successive operations. Commanders
other than those assigned to the MRF, may be directed by
higher authority to provide necessary liaison for planning and
coordination of supporting operations.

a. Detailed planning. Detailed plans must be made for

movement, base support, and logistics, as well as for
operations to be conducted, including air support.

III-3
 Specific attention should be given to the water movement
and assault. When appropriate, this should include close
integration and optimum employment of assault craft with
the assault element scheme of maneuver and correlation
with helicopter assault planning.

b. Collection and Dissemination of Intelligence.

Current, accurate intelligence is a prerequisite to sound
planning; therefore, prompt collection of essential
information is necessary for timely development of plans.
Collection can be complicated by the following factors:

(1) The objective area may be relatively inaccessible

because of location and/or enemy defense.

(2) Real-time enemy information may not be available.

(3) Many available collection agencies are not part

of the JRF.

(4) The necessity to avoid revealing future

operations may require extensive compartmentalization
by collecting agencies.

(5) Sufficient time may lapse between the start of

planning and the execution of the operation that the
enemy situation and characteristics of the area may
change significantly.

(6) Specific provisions must be made to ensure that

timely, accurate intelligence is disseminated by the
most rapid means available.

c. Security. Security of planning is the responsibility

of all echelons of command. The assembly of staffs and
the concentration of forces tends to disclose the nature
of projected operations, making concealment difficult.
Special attention must be given to OPSEC.

4. Planning Procedures

a. In planning, decisions by a commander at one level may

affect the plans of other commanders on the same or other
levels. To keep all commanders and staffs informed during
the planning phase, there must be early and continuous
dissemination of planning data by each commander to his
senior, subordinate, and corresponding echelon commanders.
Early exchange of liaison officers is also desirable.

III-4
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

b. The basic documents employed in planning for a joint

riverine operation are set forth in the following
subparagraphs:

(1) Planning Directive. Following receipt of the

initiating directive, the CJRF issues a planning
directive to ensure that interdependent plans will be
coordinated, will be completed in the time allowed,
and will not overlook importance aspects. The
planning directive specifies the principal plans to be
prepared. It also establishes time limits for the
completion of each major step in the planning process
for the force headquarters and major forces assigned.
The planning directive contains the commander’s
analysis of the overall mission, previous decisions
about related operations, relevant assumptions, and
the necessity for alternate plans.

(2) Planning Schedule. Using the planning directive

as a guide, each commander prepares a schedule of
planning events for his force.

(3) Planning Memorandums. As additional information,

guidance, and instructions are received, commanders
may issue planning memorandums in advance of the
preparation of formal plans to ensure that subordinate
commanders are informed of all available details that
will affect their planning.

c. Planning for Continuing Operations. Planning for

continuing riverine operations will follow the basic steps
outlined herein; however, once SOPs have been established,
planning is normally abbreviated and less formal in
context and may use the technique of fragmentary orders.

d. Distribution of Draft. Drafts of OPLANs and OPOEDs,

or portions thereof (such as annexes and appendixes),
should be distributed to other commanders as appropriate
to keep them abreast of current planning for the
operation.

5. Basic Decisions. Basic decisions must be made at the

highest level within a JRF before detailed planning for a
riverine operation can proceed. Since the factors on which
these decisions must be based are interrelated, and since the
decisions will have some effect on every element of the JRF,
each factor must be considered from the viewpoint of all
participants. This section deals with these basic decisions,

III-5
delineates the participation of various commanders in making
them, and sets forth considerations affecting them.

a. Determination of Mission Taskings and AO. The

initiating directive will normally specify the AO and the
mission. Mission taskings are promulgated by the CJRF to
subordinate commanders to initiate detailed planning for
specific objectives in support of the given mission.

(1) If the mission assigned the JRF by the initiating

directive does not include a clear designation of the
area or areas to be controlled, the CJRF may select
the area best suited to accomplish the assigned
mission.

(2) For complementary supporting operations, the CJRF

may further subdivide the area of operations; this may
be necessary if the objective areas are so widely
separated as to preclude effective control by a single
commander. These areas should be large enough to
include land areas and waterways necessary for
maneuver and support of the force and the
reconnaissance and surveillance needed for target
acquisition and security. Primary consideration is
given to terrain, hydrography, and enemy combat power
and modes of operations.

b. Concept of Operations

(1) Scope. The concept of operations embodies the

scheme of maneuver and plan of supporting fires. It
includes:

(a) Allocation of forces.

(b) Landing areas.

(c) Subsequent maneuver.

(d) Objectives.

(e) Tactical control measures.

(f) Plan of supporting fires (surface and air).

(g) Alternate or contingency plans.

(h) Designation of main effort.

III-6
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

(i) Promotion for unity of effort.

(j) Tasks to JRF components.

(k) Priority of organic intelligence collection

effort.

(2) Principal Considerations. Principal

considerations in the formulation of the concept of
operations are:

(a) Mission.

(b) Enemy capabilities and limitations.

(c) Terrain, climatology, and hydrography.

(d) Forces available.

(e) Logistic supportability.

(f) Fire support available.

(g) Nature and extent of landing areas,

helicopter landing zones, and terrain suitable
for fire support bases.

(3) Selection of Riverine Landing Areas and Sites.

The CJRF selects the riverine landing areas based on
the recommendations from the land subordinate
commanders. Landing areas are segments of a river
bank or similar feature on which troops, supplies, or
equipment can be landed by watercraft. A river
landing area contains one or more points at which
individual craft can land and disembark troop units.
Whenever possible, river landing areas are selected to
avoid opposition and facilitate the rapid and orderly
debarkation of ground combat units. Primary
considerations in the selection of riverine landing
areas are:

(a) Scheme of maneuver.

(b) Enemy situation.

(c) Hydrography.

(d) Obstacles.

III-7
 (e) Terrain river bank.

(4) Selection of Waterway Routes and Patrol Areas.

To select the most favorable waterway route and/or
patrol areas, multispectral imagery from satellites
can provide current information on area hydrography
and terrain/bank characteristics. Primary
considerations in the selection of waterway routes
between the mobile riverine base and the selected
landing areas are:

(a) Asset capabilities and limitations.

(b) Mission objective.

(c) Hydrography.

(d) Enemy capabilities.

(e) Capabilities to support primary and

alternate plans.

(f) Terrain/bank characteristics.

(5) If not prescribed by the CJRF, waterway routes

are selected by the maritime component commander in
coordination with the ground and/or SO component
commanders.

(6) Selection of Helicopter Landing Zones. The

primary considerations in selection of helicopter
landing zones are:

(a) The concept of operations.

(b) Enemy capabilities, disposition, and known

counterhelicopter tactics.

(c) Friendly capabilities to suppress enemy air

defenses and to provide air, artillery, and naval
gunfire support for ground operations.

(d) Ease of identification from the air.

(e) Firm, dry ground suitable for landing

helicopters (this frequently may not be
available). Accurate data on the depth of water
in inundated landing zones and the location of

III-8
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

minor waterways within the landing zones is

essential to prevent unnecessary loss of life and
inordinate delay in troop reorganization upon
landing when jumping from hovering helicopters
becomes necessary.

(f) Adequate obstacle clearance for approach and

departure routes.

(g) Advice and recommendation of subordinate

force commanders.

(h) Potential for establishment of combat

service support area.

c. Selection of Base Sites

(1) Criteria. The CJRF selects the sites of riverine

bases, either ashore or afloat, based on the mission,
concept of operations, and recommendations of
subordinate force commanders. Riverine base sites
must meet the following criteria:

(a) Be within an area that can be defended by

available forces without jeopardizing the
offensive capabilities of the JRF.

(b) Be able to provide for mooring assigned

ships and craft and, when necessary, sufficient
area and facilities to accommodate forces ashore.

(c) Be within operational and communications

range of deployed elements of the JRF so the base
site can facilitate its logistic support as well
as serve as a C3 center.

(d) Have the potential for deployment of combat

service support.

(2) Other Factors to be Considered are:

(a) If the mobile riverine base element does not

include a helicopter landing capability, it may
be desirable to locate the afloat base, if one is
established, adjoining a land area suitable for
staging and loading helicopters.

III-9
 (b) Defense plans should permit rapid
establishment of defense on land and along
waterways.

(c) Mine countermeasures and antiswimmer

defenses must be provided.

(d) The location of the afloat base of

operations, if one is established, should permit
safe passage of other waterway traffic.

(e) Alternate waterway traffic routes should be

available to the base.

d. Selecting Tentative Operating Dates and H-Hours

(1) The Joint Riverine Force Commander. The CJRF

selects tentative operating dates and H-hours after
consultion with land, maritime, air, special
operations component commanders, and other commanders,
as appropriate. During planning, tentative operating
dates for operations are based on:

(a) Availability of forces.

(b) Readiness of forces.

(c) Present and projected enemy situation.

(d) Seasonal climatology in the AOs.

(e) Local tides and currents.

(f) Directives of higher headquarters.

(g) Requirement to coordinate with other

friendly forces.

(2) Principal Factors. The principal factors in

selection of tentative H-hours are:

(a) Known enemy routine.

(b) Duration of daylight.

(c) Need for tactical surprise.

(d) Concept of operations.

III-10
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

(e) Favorable conditions of wind, current, tide,

and phases of the moon.

(f) Requirement to conduct certain operations or

movements during hours of darkness.

(g) Most effective employment of supporting

arms.

6. Rehearsals

a. Rehearsals are designed to test command structures,

communications, fire support, information flow, and
adequacy of plans. The complex interdependence of joint
forces in riverine assault operations makes rehearsals
essential if the forces involved have not previously
operated together in riverine operations.

b. Rehearsals may take the form of maneuvers, command

post exercises, or communications exercises.

c. Early in the planning phase, a decision must be made

whether to conduct a rehearsal. If a full scale maneuver
is not feasible, a rehearsal of communication plans, fire
support procedures, and information flow should be
conducted as a minimum.

7. Operations Security. Operations security (OPSEC) is a

process of analyzing friendly actions attendant to military
operations to identify those actions that can be observed by
adversary intelligence systems, determining which indicators
hostile inteligence systems might obtain that could be
interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information
in time to be useful to adversaries, and selecting and
executing measures to eliminate or reduce the vulnerabilities
of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. OPSEC measures
cover a spectrum ranging from routine protection of classified
material through protection of classified transmissions during
an operation.

III-11
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

CHAPTER IV

SO PLANNING

1. Special Operations. SO may be conducted in support of

riverine operations. For example, SOFs can perform specific
missions in support of assault, riverine patrol, and
reconnaissance operations. As a category or form of warfare,
SO is characterized by a unique set of objectives, weapons,
and forces (Joint Pub 3-05, "Doctrine for Joint Special
Operations"). A mission under a certain set of environmental
constraints may require the application of SO skills and
techniques.

2. Missions. SOF can perform five principal missions in

support of the JRF (explained in detail in Joint Pub 3-05):
UW, DA, SR, FID, and CT.

3. Planning Considerations. Planning considerations for SO

in support of a JRF begin on receipt of the initiating
directive. Because of the unique considerations involved in
the conduct of an SO, the CJRF must have personnel with SO
experience assigned or attached to the JRF joint Staff. This
expertise can also come from a Joint Special Operations Task
Force. The planning of an SO without current SO expertise
within the planning staff may seriously jeopardize the success
of the mission. A detailed list of planning considerations
for the employment of SOF is provided in Appendix D, to Joint
Pub 3-05. Also see Joint Pub 3-05.5, "Joint Special
Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures," for
additional planning considerations.

IV-1
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

CHAPTER V

SUPPORTING ARMS PLANNING

1. Fire Support Planning

a. Commander, Joint Riverine Force. The CJRF is

responsible for coordination of all fire support planning.
The CJRF normally establishes fire support coordination
elements at subordinate or appropriate echelons. These
elements should provide the capability to transfer fire
support coordination/control from afloat to shore and
back, as required. For fire support coordination with
commands not within the JRF, or with higher echelons, the
CJRF should ensure that the requisite liaison is
established with these commands. See Joint Pub 3-09,
"Doctrine for Joint Fire Support."

b. Subordinate Commanders. The JRF component commanders

are responsible for preparing the supporting arms plans to
support their operations. Through the CJRF, these
commanders request support from other JRF components.
Subordinate component commanders will provide liaison
officers, as required, to supported or supporting
components as the situation dictates.

c. Selection of Targets. Target selection is the prerogative

of the commanders being supported, subject to the ROE and law
of war.

d. Target Classification and Priority. Coordinating

supporting arms requires specific analysis of all targets
and a determination on methods to be used for their
destruction, suppression, or neutralization. This
analysis of targets allows determination of both
classification and priority. Planners should be aware
that the Services have different procedures for target
classification and priority.

e. Classification. Classification is assigned to targets

as they are added to the target list. A general policy
for classification of targets to be attacked by supporting
arms should be promulgated by the CJRF. Usually, targets
are grouped according to their classification.

f. Priority. Priority is assigned to each target,

indicating the desired sequence of attack. The supported
commander recommends target priorities for targets that
are primary concerns of his force.

V-1
 g. Selection of Means. The selection and allocation of
which supporting arms will deliver fire support is a
function of the CJRF or a CJRF designated representative.
The proposed selections, allocations, and availability of
fire support means are interdependent, and constant
liaison and exchange of information on the subject are
essential.

2. Supporting Arms Requirements

a. Maritime Forces Requirements. Operations such as

riverine force movement, hydrographic survey, removal of
underwater obstacles, minesweeping, sensor employment, and
patrols could require support from all supporting arms.
Definite provisions should also be made for artillery,
aircraft, and suitable water craft to maintain protective
screens for the mobile riverine base element. Maritime
forces will require fire support from artillery, naval
surface fire, and fixed- and rotor-winged aviation.

b. Ground Forces Requirements. Ground forces may require

reconnaissance, artillery, RAC fire, naval surface fire,
and air support before, during, and after the initial
landing to destroy, suppress, or neutralize hostile forces
capable of opposing the assault and to provide covering
screens. Ground forces fire support plans may include:

(1) Artillery fire plan.

(2) Assault craft gunfire plan.

(3) Naval surface fire plan.

(4) Air support plan.

c. Aviation Forces Requirements. Aviation forces may

require assistance in security of forward landing zones,
suppressing enemy air defenses (SEAD), recovering downed
aircrews, and searching landing zones/bases.

d. Special Operations Forces. SOF may require supporting

arms to cover insertions, extractions, movements, or
actions at the objective area.

V-2
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

3. Fire Support Coordination

a. Plans for the supporting fires of artillery, RAC,

naval gunfire ships, and aircraft must be coordinated to
ensure those arms are economically employed with maximum
effectiveness and the requisite degree of safety.
Coordination in planning is achieved by:

(1) Avoiding unnecessary duplication of missions.

(2) Adhering to call for fire procedures.

(3) Eliminating mutual interference between

supporting units.

(4) Ensuring that each means of support is employed

on missions best suited to its capabilities consistent
with the situation, time available, relative amounts
and types of ammunition on hand, and ammunition
logistics considerations.

(5) Assigning responsibility for control of fires to

the lowest echelon having the necessary C2 of the
supporting arms.

(6) Assigning responsibility for final coordination

of fires to the lowest echelon able to effect complete
coordination for the particular mission. Fires are
coordinated at each echelon to the degree with which
that echelon is affected by the mission.

(7) Maintaining common system of target designation

used by all supporting arms.

(8) Understanding completely the ROE.

b. The defeat of hostile force with minimum loss of

noncombatant lives and property in densely populated areas
requires a thorough understanding of the ROE established
by higher authority. ROE within a riverine area may vary
from locale to locale because of social and/or political
considerations.

4. Special Considerations. Commanders at all levels should

consider certain factors unique to the employment of
supporting arms in a riverine area.

V-3
a. Artillery. Current Service doctrine for the
employment of artillery is applicable in the riverine
area; however, planning must consider factors unique to
the area, which may include:

(1) Ability of surface craft or barges to provide

mobility and/or firing platforms.

(2) Requirements to pre-position artillery in advance

of assault operations to avoid premature disclosure of
the planned operation.

(3) Firing positions of limited size that may dictate

the number and caliber of weapons employed.

(4) Lack of firing positions in defilade.

(5) Absence of survey control and concurrent use of

observed fire gunnery procedures.

(6) Limited ground observation.

(7) Requirement for helicopter-transportable

artillery firing platforms for use in inundated areas,
if barge-mounted or boat-mounted artillery is not
available. Because of the hydrography, area fire
weapons play a greater role in fire support than
precision fire support. In addition, special
consideration for weapon fuzing must be made.

(8) Difficulty in defining unit boundaries.

(9) Requirement to provide mutual support in the

event of split battery operations.

b. Assault Craft Gunfire. Fire support planning must

include a system for control and coordination of riverine
assault craft fire in supporting the scheme of maneuver.

c. Naval Gunfire. The demoralizing effect of naval

gunfire, combined with the difficulty of providing
artillery fires in the normal volume, justifies heavy use
of naval gunfire whenever range permits. In delta areas,
the distance naval gunfire can extend inland may be
restricted by mud flats and sandbars extending several
miles to sea. Under optimum conditions, ships may be able
to provide support from principal rivers.

V-4
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

d. Observation of Fire. Lack of vertical relief in most

riverine areas severely limits surface observation and
adjustment of supporting fire. Ground observers must
position themselves to accurately direct effective fire.
Unusual dependence on aerial observers may be essential.

e. Special Operations. The SR capability of SOFs can

provide vital information for target selection,
acquisition, fire adjustment, and battle damage
assessment, which can augment supporting arms operations
normally available to conventional forces.

5. Air Operations. Present doctrine, tactics, techniques,

and equipment for aviation are readily adaptable to riverine
operations. Although present publications do not address the
term "riverine," they provide most of the information and
doctrinal guidance required to plan and execute the air
portion of riverine operations. Therefore, this section will
be limited to aspects of air operations that are unique,
require emphasis, or result from recent developments and
advancements in technology.

a. Organization. The composition of aviation elements

assigned to support riverine operations is determined by
the mission, enemy threat, operational environment,
available resources, and support requirements.

b. Helicopter Support. The helicopter plays a vital role

in riverine operations. The JRF must have the capability
to conduct air reconnaissance, air surveillance, air
support, evacuation operations, airborne control, armed
escort, and close-in fire support. If there is no
riverine land base of operations, provisions must be made
to include a helicopter support ship in the riverine base
element. As a minimum, the JRF must be able to provide
landing platforms, fuel, emergency repairs, and ammunition.

c. Close Air Support. CAS for waterborne units will be

provided by using current doctrine, principles, and
procedures. Effective CAS requires distinct marking of
friendly elements as well as positive and reliable
communications between the supported unit and the
attacking aircraft. Aircraft must be under control of the
fire support coordinator when delivering ordnance to
ensure the safety of friendly forces. Control measures
must be sufficient to help ensure coordination of fire
among forces and safety of friendly forces. Although

V-5
both preplanned and on-call CAS missions are envisioned,
the nature of the threat to waterborne units emphasizes
the need for immediately available CAS.

d. Air Interdiction. AI operations can be an especially

effective method of attacking hostile movement in
riverine, coastal, or delta areas. Often, air-delivered
mines are more effective for interdiction than directly
delivered munitions such as bombs, because mines continue
to be effective after delivery aircraft have left the
area. Also, enemy uncertainty regarding the presence of
mines can result in excessive delays, diversion of
resources into time-consuming mine countermeasures, and
reduced enemy morale. AI employing mines should
complement surface riverine operations.

e. Supporting Arms. Supporting arms are used during the

landing attack primarily for close support of the riverine
assault force and require the coordinated employment of
artillery, assault craft fire, naval gunfire, and CAS.
The use of supporting arms will be in accordance with
current joint and Service doctrine, tactics, techniques
and procedures.

(1) Artillery. Standard artillery procedures should

be followed and each battery should be capable of
conducting independent fire direction from craft,
barges, or ashore.

(a) The use of all means of mobility is a key

factor when employing artillery in riverine
operations because artillery frequently must be
repositioned before the assault landing. This
usually requires that artillery displacements be
supported by air and other artillery during
movement. Additional security forces may be
required as temporary augmentation to the
displaced unit.

(b) Lack of adequate position areas may deny use

of the quantity and caliber of artillery normally
dictated by hostile strength and area
characteristics. Positions will usually be
relatively small and established in insecure
areas. The absence of firing positions in
defilade, lack of cover and concealment, and

V-6
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

positioning in insecure areas will frequently

require use of direct-fire techniques and heavy
expenditures of anti-personnel ammunition for
self-defense.

(c) Because of the lack of survey control and

concurrent meteorological data, adjusted fires
will be the primary method used to obtain maximum
effect on the enemy.

(d) Artillery batteries may be deployed by

either surface craft, helicopters, or on barges
that act as firing platforms.

(e) Buoy markers should be placed on artillery

weapons and prime movers to facilitate possible
salvage operations.

(f) Positions selected for either land- or

afloat-based fire support should allow for
providing fire support for the maneuver force
while enroute to or from the AO.

(g) Normally, the lack of commanding terrain in

the AOs increases emphasis on aerial observation,
particularly during waterborne movement. A
combination of aerial observers and forward
observers on the ground allows the best artillery
coverage, coordination, and surveillance of the
battle area.

(h) Support of water movements and patrols

requires special emphasis on replotting targets
and establishment of control points from which
firing data can be transferred.

(2) Assault Craft Gunfire. Assault craft gunfire can

provide direct and indirect fire to the ground force.
These craft deliver direct fire with a wide variety of
automatic weapons. Craft can also provide indirect
fire support with naval mortars installed on selected
craft. A high degree of coordination is required to
provide support of troops ashore.

(a) The riverine ground component commander is

responsible for coordination of all fires, including
assault fires, in support of operations ashore.

V-7
 (b) Once troops begin landing, all assault craft
fire into the AOs must be either delivered at the
request of the supported unit or cleared by the
on-scene commander of the assaulting forces.

(3) Direct-Fire Support. Assault craft providing

direct fire in support of a specified ground unit for
one phase of an operation will also normally be in
direct support of that unit. The boat unit commander
advises the supported commander concerning the
capabilities of assault craft weapons. These weapons
may be given neutralization, interdiction, harassing,
or destruction fire missions. They may augment
infantry weapons with fires through gaps in friendly
fires. Whatever the mission, fires must be executed
in coordination with the supported unit commander’s
fire support plan.

(4) Indirect Fire Support

(a) Craft equipped with indirect fire weapons

may be employed as a fire unit. With all craft
in close proximity, one can direct the fires of
all to provide supporting indirect fires.

(b) Normally, indirect fire will be observed by

an aerial or ground observer who can communicate
directly with supporting boats or through the
ground unit fire-support coordination center.

(5) Naval Surface Support

(a) Naval surface support can be used for

riverine operations. For current doctrine and
procedures refer to NWP 22-2.

(b) Shore fire control parties are assigned to

ground forces, as required.

(6) Close Air Support. CAS will be provided, using

current doctrinal principles and procedures.

V-8
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

CHAPTER VI

INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

1. Scope of Intelligence Planning

a. The nature of the riverine AOs places an increased

importance on intelligence. Intelligence planning must be
designed to give commanders accurate and timely
information concerning the enemy threat and the status of
the AOs in order to assist him in the determination of
objectives and operations planning.

b. Intelligence planning for riverine operations is

divided into three phases:

(1) Determination of intelligence requirements and

planning for the collection, processing, and
dissemination of that intelligence required for
operational planning.

(2) Preparation of the Intelligence Annex to OPLANs

or OPORDS.

(3) Preparation and dissemination of intelligence plans,

estimates, reports, and summaries during operations.

2. Intelligence Planning Responsibilities

a. Upon receipt of a mission, the CJRF initiates planning

procedures. He prepares an estimate of the situation
based on the mission and available intelligence on the
area of operations. With the assistance of the
intelligence officer, J-2, he identifies intelligence gaps
and requirements for update/currency. These are levied on
JRF intelligence organizations for collection, analysis,
production, and dissemination; those that cannot be
accomplished by JRF assets are validated and passed up the
chain of command. Each level of command responds and/or
passes the unsatisfied requirements until they reach the
national level agencies.

b. The CJRF tasks subordinate intelligence units with

continuing intelligence or special collection missions and
requests higher headquarters to execute such mission
requirements that are beyond the capabilities of
subordinate units. Additionally, he directs requirements
for finished intelligence products to include priorities.

VI-1
c. Responsibilities of Component Commanders. JRF
component commanders are responsible for:

(1) Determination of intelligence requirements for

planning and making these requirements known to the
CJRF through the submission of intelligence
requirements requests.

(2) Collection and processing of information and

dissemination of intelligence to major elements of the
JRF.

(3) Establishing liaison with subordinate

intelligence units and the JRC to assist in the
collection, production and dissemination of
intelligence.

(4) Obtaining and distributing maps, charts,

photographs, and special intelligence materials.

(5) Preparation of intelligence estimates.

(6) Security and counterintelligence measures, in

addition to those specified by higher authority.

d. Intelligence Requirements. The CJRF requires current,

useable intelligence in a timely manner in order to plan
and direct operations, achieve mission success, and
protect his force. While some intelligence needs are one
time, many are recurrent or standing. New requirements
are submitted via intelligence channels for validation by
the chain-of-command. The following is a list of generic,
standing requirements.

(1) Hydrographic information, including waterway

depth, length, width, bottom composition, tidal
ranges/currents, and bank characteristics (e.g.,
length, bedrock/soil composition and trafficability).

(2) Navigational hazards, including natural and

manmade waterway obstacles such as vegetation, debris,
fish traps, and barricades.

(3) Location of bridges and clearances underneath

bridges.

(4) Real-time locations, capabilities, limitations,

activities, and probable courses of action of enemy
units in the objective area.

VI-2
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

(5) Loading, departure, and delivery points for

hostile watercraft.

(6) Routes followed by the enemy on inland waterways,

including staging areas.

(7) Evasion tactics used by the enemy, including

camouflage and deception.

(8) The enemy logistic system, with emphasis on

waterborne transport routes.

(9) Location of arms and supply caches.

(10) Identification of warning systems used by the

enemy against patrol craft.

(11) Identification of points where the enemy usually

crosses rivers and canals.

(12) Identification and capabilities of enemy

watercraft. Emphasis should be placed on determining
whether they are owned by the enemy or are impressed
from the local populace.

(13) Enemy swimmer capabilities, equipment, and

methods of operation.

(14) Enemy mining, including tree-mounted directional

antipersonnel mines, ambush operations (with
particular emphasis on early warning of ambush sites),
and mining tactics.

(15) Enemy tactics concerning antipersonnel devices

such as command and trip-wire-detonated claymore
mines, grenades, traps, camouflage pits, and stakes or
spikes driven into the ground.

(16) Location, capabilities, and tactics employed by

enemy antiaircraft elements.

(17) Identification of enemy intelligence and

counterintelligence elements in the AO.

(18) Susceptibility of the populace to pressure from

the enemy to provide information on friendly forces
and operations.

VI-3
 (19) Identification of guerilla, paramilitary, or
similar groups in the objective area.

(20) Identification of individuals, groups, or

organizations in the objective area that may be
exploited by the enemy for espionage, sabotage, or
subversive activities or by friendly forces for
intelligence.

(21) Weather, including temperature, precipitation,

humidity, visibility, wind, fog, cloud cover, ice
incidence (including normal locations and thickness of
surface ice in specific weather/temperature
conditions), and the effect of weather at various
seasons on the river’s characteristics.

(22) Astronomical conditions, including sunrise,

sunset, moon rise, moon set, and phase of the moon.

(23) Identification of civilian uses of waterways,

including type of craft, traffic pattern and density,
and civil registration and licensing system.

(24) Determination of medical characteristics of the

AO, including plant and animal ecology, terrain,
climatological and disease incidence data, and
sanitary conditions ashore.

(25) Identification of helicopter landing zones.

3. Intelligence Sources and Collection. All sources and

methods of collection should be applied. Riverine Operations
are generally conducted in areas of heavy vegetation and that
change regularly due to the action of river water, tides and
storms. As a consequence, hydrographic charts and maps become
outdated. In order to obtain current map and chart
information the full range of human, imagery, and unique
sensor collectors may have to be applied to gain the requisite
intelligence to support operations.

4. Environmental Considerations

a. Requirements. Terrain analysis and route

reconnaissance have a direct effect on operational
planning. Detailed intelligence is necessary on the width
and depth of waterways, velocity and nature of currents,
tidal changes, bottom characteristics, gradient

VI-4
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

of possible river landing sites, condition of the banks,

location of debris, vegetation, obstacles, and topography.
Accurate intelligence concerning terrain and hydrographic
conditions is generally lacking. The physical
characteristics of a riverine environment are not stable,
as stream courses may change and sand bars constantly
shift positions.

b. Characteristics of Waterways. Major rivers and inland

waterways can be placed in one of the following
categories:

(1) Headwaters or Upper Sector (Type 1). In this

category, the river is variable, unpredictable, and
usually not navigable by motorized craft.

(2) Central Valley or Middle Sector (Type 2). The

waters in this category can usually be navigated by
small motorized craft. The upper portions of this
type of waterway have river bedrock formations and
conditions similar to the headwater sector. Multiple
channeling often occurs in the lower portion of this
type of waterway. Accurate information becomes more
significant because deep channels are either scarce or
nonexistent in multiple channeling areas. The channel
with the strongest current is usually the deepest.

(3) Delta or Lower Sector (Type 3). This category is

the widest part of the river. The current is usually
slower than upstream and may change or even reverse
with the tide. Channels that are navigable by ships
are often found in the lower sector. Numerous
low-lying islands and locations where the primary or
secondary river channels double back exist in this
type of waterway; therefore, this category requires
special attention and tactics.

(4) Canals (Type 4). Canals may be encountered and

used in an operation. Since canals are manmade, their
characteristics are usually predictable, and they are
often navigable by shallow draft boats. Entrances and
exits are the critical points on canals, and special
emphasis should be placed on obtaining information
about these areas. It should be noted that enemy
tactics include using deceptive mud or wood barricades
to open or close manmade canals.

VI-5
 c. Biological and Medical Factors. Biological and
medical factors must be included in the intelligence
assessment. Information on diseases endemic to the area,
such as malaria, cholera, typhus, and so forth, should be
provided. Harmful insects and poisonous snakes, marine
life, leeches and other parasites, and harmful plants
native to the area must also be identified. Other
anticipated medical problems, such as intestinal
disorders, immersion foot, and conjunctivitis, that may be
contracted by personnel living and operating in the area,
and general health and sanitation standards must be
identified.

d. Weather. Adverse weather conditions can either

enhance or degrade riverine operations, and the ability to
predict weather conditions accurately in a given locale
must be included in the intelligence estimate. For
example, although the reduced visibility caused by heavy
rains or fog can be exploited in the movement of a
riverine assault force, the detrimental effects of severe
weather on communications, river navigation, force
integrity, and safety may outweigh any potential benefits
derived. Further, seasonal or other prolonged periods of
extreme weather (i.e., heat, cold, rain, etc) may have a
significant effect on the endurance and alertness of
assigned personnel, as well as contribute to degraded
performance of equipment.

5. Sociological Considerations. In a riverine area,

extensive river and canal systems are the principal LOCs. The
population tends to settle along these waterways, which are
often their only LOCs. Civilian traffic and congested
settlements provide cover for clandestine movements by hostile
forces and help to conceal their mining and ambush efforts.
Sociological and civil conditions are tied closely to the
physical characteristics of the environment. Waterways may be
used extensively by local government agencies to establish and
maintain control in the riverine area.

6. Security

a. Efforts to maintain the security of tactical

operations may be hampered because the forces involved
will be under observation by the local population, a
portion of which may support the enemy. In these
circumstances, every individual and unit must understand
and practice security measures.

VI-6
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

b. To prevent sabotage, security of the riverine base

must be maintained, since absolute control of waterways is
usually not possible. Only carefully screened, essential
civilians, excluding those with appropriate security
clearances and those previously determined not to require
an escort, should be permitted inside land or afloat base
areas, and they must be kept under constant control and
supervision. The CJRF’s enforcement of curfews on waterway
are by time and area, and enforcement in coordination with
existing authorities is an effective security measure.

7. Intelligence and Counterintelligence Estimates. The CJRF

is responsible for maintaining the intelligence and
counter-intelligence estimates. These estimates should analyze
enemy activity and the counterintelligence threat to riverine
forces, and they should provide appropriate recommended plans
to neutralize threats, using both passive and active security
measures, and aggressive counterintelligence operations.

8. Intelligence Annex. The Intelligence Annex to the OPORD

or OPLAN should be formatted in accordance with JOPS Volume II
and should be a means of disseminating information and
intelligence concerning collection management, intelligence
tasks assigned (i.e., collection, reporting, disseminaiton,
sensor employment, etc), and other tasks or procedures, as
necessary. At the JRF level, the Intelligence Annex includes
the reconnaissance/surveillance plan, reference to current
intelligence estimates and summaries, special reports, and
studies on the enemy and enemy AOs (particularly, those
studies concerned with weather, terrain, hydrography,
sociology, economics, and politics). If not previously
distributed, such studies are included as appendixes to the
Intelligence Annex.

9. Riverine Force Intelligence Support. In support of the

intelligence mission, all components of the JRF will
accomplish the following tasks:

a. Collect and report any information which could

support the current operations and the Essential Elements
of Information of the JRF.

b. Develop the capability to meet collection requirements

assigned by higher authority with available assets.

c. Evaluate collected information in accordance with unit

capability.

VI-7
d. Maintain a capability to report and disseminate
collected intelligence rapidly.

e. Conduct intelligence liaison with other US and

friendly forces, when feasible and as operations permit.

f. Determine and request from higher authority those

intelligence requirements that cannot be satisfied by
organic JRF collection assets.

VI-8
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

CHAPTER VII

COMMUNICATIONS PLANNER

1. Scope and Requirements

a. Riverine operations require reliable, secure, and

rapid communications systems. Several special forms of
control and lateral communications between elements of the
force must be exercised in the execution of common or
coordinated functions.

b. Flexibility. The JRF communications system must be

flexible enough to support modified or new taskings.
Common facilities must be used where practical to decrease
frequency requirements. Alternate methods of
communication other than electrical must be exploited to
ensure the most rapid and secure delivery of information
between widely dispersed forces.

2. Considerations

a. In as much as the JRF may contain maritime, ground,

air, and SOF components, and since information and orders
must be provided to all elements of the JRF, a joint
communications plan should be prepared. Accordingly,
planning should be a joint effort and carefully
coordinated at each echelon of command in order to meet
the requirements of the force.

b. All communications requirements tasked to units not a

part of the JRF must be thoroughly coordinated.

c. The communications requirements of the JRF vary with

the size and composition of the force. Planning to meet
these communications requirements commences with other
planning and is conducted concurrently. It also includes
ensuring that communications are adequate to support the
planning process itself. The following factors must be
carefully considered during the planning process:

(1) Each component of the JRF must have

communications compatible with the tactics and
techniques employed. The channels provided must
ensure effective exercise of command, coordination of
supporting fire, and administrative and logistic
support. Because of the dissimilar nature of the
forces involved, additional circuits may be required
to permit the desired degree of C2.

VII-1
 (2) Elements of the JRF may operate in widely
separated areas during some phases of the operation.
Communications capabilities of major units must be
adequate to support all operations.

d. Environmental Effects and Operating Conditions.

Environmental effects may vary widely between areas of
operation; however, some problem areas in planning remain
constant. For example, vegetation absorbs radiated radio
frequency energy, and terrain may mask receiving stations.
A study of the specific physical environment, with
emphasis on the adverse effects of weather, geography,
vegetation, and terrain may enable communications planning
to overcome some of the limitations imposed.

e. Climatology. Climate will affect equipment and radio

propagation characteristics. For example, high
temperatures and humidity normally associated with
riverine operations will reduce both shelf life and
operating life of batteries and will decrease the power
output and sensitivity of radios.

f. Terrain and Vegetation. Flat terrain generally

permits greater operating ranges to be obtained with
line-of-sight, VHF, and UHF communications. However, in
delta areas, the dense vegetation frequently encountered
along these waterways will absorb transmitted energy and
reduce the usual terrain advantages. To overcome the
absorbent effects of vegetation, antennas should be raised
above the tree tops, if possible. Additionally, antennas
that provide horizontal polarization may be used to lessen
the effects of vegetation absorption.

g. Equipment. The communications equipment used by

ground force units has been developed specifically for the
ground environment. Equipment of mobile ground forces is
usually portable, lightweight, easy to operate, equipped
with several options of antennas and transmitting and
receiving devices, rugged, and resistant to environmental
conditions. Communications equipment employed by sections
of the JRF must have compatible components, parts, and
test equipment to reduce logistic support problems.
Planning for the choice of communications media will
require consideration of the following:

VII-2
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

(1) Radio. In view of the wide dispersion of forces,

and the inherent mobility of the JRF, radio is the
primary means of communications. Radio nets must be
structured to support the tactical organization.

(2) Wire. The only foreseeable use of wire

communications is for intrabase use. The area
commander coordinates requirements and provides
external integrated wire and radio communications.

(3) Multichannel Radio Systems. Tactical

ground-based multichannel radio systems are
characterized by directional line-of-sight
propagation, which may serve to minimize the
probability of enemy interception, jamming, and
direction finding. However, since multichannel
equipment transmitters must be continuously keyed and
since it may not always be possible to orient
directional antennas away from enemy listening
stations, the vulnerability of multichannel radio
systems to interception, jamming, and radio direction
finding is increased. With these constraints in mind,
multichannel radio systems can support the various
components of the JRF.

(4) Signal Communications. Signal communications,

judiciously employed by ships and craft in a riverine
environment, may offer significant advantages to the
maritime component commander. The use of semaphore,
flag hoist, directional flashing light, infrared
flashing light, and/or hand signals can be an
effective means of communication, even in the
confusion and uproar of an ambush. In addition, the
use of signal communications with brevity or code
words can be an effective, simple means of "secure"
communications.

(5) Messenger Service. Bulky materials such as maps,

overlays, charts, and lengthy low-precedence message
traffic can be economically delivered by aircraft or
by watercraft couriers. A planned courier system
should take advantage of the numerous liaison and
logistic craft that support the riverine force away
from its base. A well-planned system will relieve the
radio communication networks of much superfluous
traffic and permit rapid radio transmission of
essential messages.

VII-3
 (6) Air Drops. Message air drop and pickup
techniques are satisfactory for use in riverine
operations. There are simple procedures that involve
marking the pickup site, indicating wind direction,
and rigging the pickup device.

(7) Airborne Radio Retransmission or Satellite

Communications. Airborne radio relay or satellite
communications techniques can be employed to extend
radio communications. This technique can extend the
range of the effects of terrain, such as masking or
absorption.

(8) Sound Communications. Sound amplifiers are

particularly effective in a riverine environment.
Relatively low-level audio signals are capable of
traveling great distances over water and flat
marshlands. Extensive use of helicopter-mounted sound
systems are useful in PSYOP and civic action programs.

g. Radio Circuit Requirements

(1) C2 Craft. The C2 craft assigned to the JRF must

have adequate communications facilities to meet the
requirements of the force as a whole.

(2) River Assault Craft. RAC must have adequate

communications facilities for control of waterborne
movement and support of the overall scheme of
maneuver. A minimum of two transceivers will be
required for riverine operations.

3. Responsibilities

a. The CJRF:

(1) Determines and consolidates communications

requirements for the JRF as a whole.

(2) Acquires and assigns the necessary technical

facilities to subordinate elements of the force.

(3) Determines, consolidates, and coordinates the

ECCM requirements of all participating forces.

(4) Promulgates guidance for cover and deception

plans for the operation.

VII-4
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

(5) Provides requirements for establishing

communications liaison between commands of the
participating forces for communications planning.

(6) Prepares and promulgates a complete and

coordinated communications plan.

(7) Assigns frequencies and call signs.

b. Component commanders:

(1) Determine and submit requirements for use of

communications facilities controlled by higher
headquarters.

(2) Develop EW plans and requirements for EW support.

(3) Provide planning coordination requirements to

subordinate JRF units and supporting forces.

(4) Develop and promulgate a complete and coordinated

communications plan to support the plan of the CJRF.

4. Communications Security. The CJRF is responsible for

COMSEC. This is accomplished by the development of
communications security plans and procedures that should
consider the following:

a. The use of earphones and voice-muffling devices on

voice circuits and continuous wave transmission, when
practicable.

b. Communications should be prepared and authenticated to

prevent analysis and imitative deception by the enemy.

c. Since recognition and identification signals may

become known to the enemy, they should only be regarded as
evidence -- but never as proof -- of friendly identity.

d. Visual communications may be used in preference to

radio communications, when practical.

e. When communicating by light, care should be taken to

use light of minimum brilliance and to employ proper
directional procedures.

VII-5
 f. Locally generated substitution and authentication
codes not approved by the National Security Agency will
not be used.

g. Secure voice equipment should be used on all tactical

radio nets and as practical on administrative nets. At
least one tactical radio net common to all units will be
kept uncovered for emergency communications. Code changes
will be made as directed by the CJRF.

5. Communication Deception and Countermeasures. The scope of

employment of imitative communications deception is usually
specified in directives from higher authority. In the case of
manipulative communications deception, the CJRF may initiate
it if he has the available assets and if he has thoroughly
coordinated the effect beforehand.

6. The Communications Plan. The JRF communications plan is

based on the operation and administrative plans that it
supports. The communications plan fulfills the requirements
of the operation in terms of circuits, channels and
facilities, and policies, and it governs the procedures for
operation and coordination of the overall system. The plan is
prepared in detail to facilitate its use at all echelons and
normally includes:

a. General coverage of the communications situation,

guiding principles, and the concept of operational
employment.

b. The communications mission.

c. Delegation of tasks and responsibilities.

d. Detailed instructions relative to the organization,

installation, operation, and coordination of the
communications system.

e. Assignment and use of call signs, frequencies,

cryptographic aids, and authentication systems.

f. Instructions on countermeasures, cover and deception,

security, recognition and identification, and other
special communications and electronics functions.

VII-6
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

g. Instructions concerning communications and electronics

logistic support.
h. Instructions for medical evacuation that are
compatible with all deployed units and medical aid craft.

j. Special planning considerations to ensure joint

coordination in the allocation, use, and monitoring
responsibilities of frequencies.

7. Rehearsals. Full rehearsals of the communications plan

are important to identify unrealistic requirements and
identify COMSEC weaknesses.

VII-7
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

CHAPTER VIII

LOGISTIC PLANNING

1. Scope. The mission of the JRF will determine the logistic

support required. Although accepted principles remain
generally valid for riverine operations, variation from normal
logistic techniques may be necessary to cope with the riverine
area. Consideration must be given to special items of
equipment; prescribed loads; levels of supplies; distribution;
services; and engineer, maintenance, transportation, and
medical support. This chapter deals wioh logistic planning
matters peculiar to a riverine area of operations that may
require special emphasis.

2. Logistic Planning Considerations

a. The CJRF will coordinate all logistic support.

Although the extent of the logistic control exercised by
the CJRF will be established by his commander, such
control will normally be limited to what is necessary to
meet logistic needs essential to the success of the
m ssion. The CJRF must constantly strive for economics
and efficiencies of efforts.

b. Logistics is a Service responsibility, and each

component of the JRF must ensure that appropriate support
is provided by the parent Service or through validated
agreements established during the planning phase.

c. Each Service is responsible for the logistic support

of its own forces in a combatant command, except when
logistic support is otherwise provided by agreements or
assignments for common servicing, joint servicing, or
cross-servicing. Logistic procedures at all levels must
provide for coordinated and continuing support, including
the use of common facilities by Service component forces
in the riverine AOs. For detailed information on joint
logistic planning, see Joint Pub 4-0, "Logistics Support
of Joint Operations."

d. Logistic planning to support riverine operations is

divided into two categories:

(1) Logistic support provided to the JRF from

external sources.

(2) Organic logistic support provided by the JRF.

VIII-1
e. A characteristic of logistic support in riverine
operations is the near total reliance on ships and small
craft to provide not only transportation, but also
storage, maintenance, and billeting facilities. The
afloat basing of logistic support, either riverine or sea
based, increases flexibility and provides facilities
essential to the conduct of riverine operations while
reducing security requirements.

f. Logistic Functions. Logistic planning for riverine

operations must provide for the following:

(1) Embarkation of personnel and equipment in the

riverine afloat base of operations.

(2) Tactical loading of personnel and supplies from

the riverine base of operations to assault craft.

(3) Establishment and maintenance of an inter-Service

logistic support system.

g. Logistic Planning Factors. The following factors

exert a marked influence on logistic planning for riverine
operations:

(1) Number of units to be supported.

(2) The availability and accountability of equipment.

(3) The size of the area over which the equipment is

to be distributed.

(4) Type of equipment essential to the success of the

mission.

(5) Length of time before equipment is readily

available.

(6) Source of resupply.

(7) Base defense plan.

(8) Character and expected duration of the

contemplated operation.

(9) Distance of the area of operations from the

riverine base and of the base from its sources of
supply.

VIII-2
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

(10) Freedom from the enemy disrupting supply lines,

both maritime, aerial, and land.

(11) Availability of logistic means.

(12) Progressive increase in the level and form of

logistics support that may be required in the AOs.

(13) Climatology and astronomical conditions for the AOs.

(14) Terrain and hydrography in the AO.

(15) Availability of host nation resources.

(16) Support required for enemy POWs and the civilian

population.

(17) Medical support requirements.

(18) Helicopter landing-site availability.

(19) Support required for SOF and other unique

elements that employ SOFs peculiar equipment.

(20) Durability and suitability of emergency and life

support equipment for the climatic and hydrographic
conditions.

h. Riverine Base of Operations

(1) Requirements. Even when a JRF is introduced into

an AO by means other than amphibious shipping, or when
riverine operations are conducted after termination of
the amphibious operation, a riverine base of
operations is established. The base may be located
afloat or ashore.

(a) Forces assigned to the riverine base of

operations should be capable of performing all
essential logistic functions so that the JRF is
logistically self-sufficient except for periodic
resupply and major maintenance on equipment.

(b) Whether the base is afloat or on land,

storage and maintenance space will normally be at
a premium in the riverine area. Space within

VIII-3
 shallow-draft ships and craft used to form
riverine bases is limited and must be used
efficiently. Supply and maintenance operations
of the component services must be integrated to
permit maximum use of space available.

(c) Afloat basing, sea or riverine, allows for

maximum support and flexibility while placing
only the requisite forces ashore. Riverine
afloat basing reduces security requirements and
provides excellent facilities for C2,
maintenance, billeting, medical, and helicopter
operations. However, storage space on most ships
suitable to riverine operations is limited.
Multiple platforms for helicopter operations
permit launching of forces from diverse
locations, adding maneuverability to the ground
forces and to the operation’s deceptive plan.
Optimum logistic support may be attained through
a combination of both types of afloat basing.

i. Transportation. In a riverine area, an adequate road

system capable of handling heavy logistic traffic normally
does not exist. Railroads are either nonexistent or very
limited, and they are easily interdicted. Airfields are
scarce and usually inadequate for handling heavy loads.
Consequently, unusual dependence is placed on water
transportation, using the existing network of rivers and
canals. In general, bulk movements of supplies,
personnel, and equipment to support riverine operations
will be accomplished principally by water.

(1) Ships and craft for riverine logistic support

must be of shallow draft. For either afloat or land
bases, these craft may be required to transport
resupply items from the designated source to such
bases. It is usually preferable to provide
additional ships or craft to shuttle between the
riverine base and its sources of supply (service
force ships, shore-based depots, or other sources),
rather than to move ships of an afloat base to the
depots for resupply. Such movements will normally
lessen the capability of the base to provide
continuous support of tactical operations. In
general, the degree of logistic support, which can be

VIII-4
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

provided by a riverine afloat base of operations, will

depend on the amount and type of resupply shipping
available, as well as the composition of the maritime
riverine base element.

(2) Helicopters are especially well-suited for

resupply and evacuation missions because of their
speed and high degree of flexibility.

3. Logistic Planning Responsibilities. The CJRF and his

component force commanders have specific and complementary
logistic planning responsibilities.

a. Joint Riverine Force Commander. The CJRF is

responsible for:

(1) Determining overall logistic requirements of the

JRF, including units, special equipment, and shipping.

(2) Allocating the means to meet logistic

requirements of the JRF.

(3) Planning for coordination of logistic support.

(4) Providing base development planning.

(5) Approving component commander’s logistics,

embarkation, and tactical loading plans.

b. Component Commanders. The subordinate component

commanders of the JRF are responsible for the following:

(1) Developing plans, in coordination with the CJRF

and other JRF component commander for the
accomplishment of logistic functions.

(2) Determining logistic requirements of their

components, including special equipment and shipping
requirements.

(3) Determining transportation requirements, and

requesting support, through the CJRF, from other
components as required.

(4) Developing plans, in coordination with the

supporting commander, for assembly, embarkation, or
tactical loading of personnel, supplies, and equipment
aboard riverine assault craft, ships, or aircraft as
appropriate.

VIII-5
 (5) Providing logistic support for component forces
deployed in forward operating areas.

(6) Accomplishing logistic and support requirements

and function, assigned by the CJRF.

(7) Allocating resources of their forces to meet

consolidated logistic requirements.

(8) oroviding Service-peculiar items to other

components as required.

4. Logistic Plans

a. Only logistic planning affecting the JRF as a whole is

set forth in this chapter. Service and individual
component logistic planning guidance will normally be
found in service SOPs and specific OPLANs or OPORDs.

b. Embarkation and Loading Plans. The planning tasks

enumerated for embarkation and loading refer onl to that
phase during which the ground components, together with
their supplies and equipment, initially embark on assigned
shipping of the JRF. Plans for tactical loading are set
forth in Chapter XII.

c. Supply

(1) Requirements. Supply planning is accomplished

under two major categories:

(a) Initial supply. This comprises the level of

supplies carried by the JRF in order to provide
the required support for riverine operations.
Riverine craft should carry sufficient quantities
of Classes I, III, and V supplies to accommodate
all embarked personnel for the length of the
operation.

(b) Resupply. This is replenishment of the

JRF’s level of supplies or from the riverine
base of operations to an objective area for
support of tactical operations. Resupply of
those forces operating away from the riverine
base will be accomplished by riverine assault
craft, aircraft, or riverine ground force
vehicles, as appropriate. Pre-positioned loads
of ground component supplies aboard riverine

VIII-6
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

assault craft will substantially increase

flexibility and responsiveness of resupply for
high-use items.

(2) Responsibility. Coordination of supply support

for the JRF is the responsibility of the CJRF.

(a) The originator of the initiating directive

may assign responsibility for providing
common-item supplies. If this responsibility is
not assigned in the initiating directive, the
CJRF should encourage component commanders to
conclude appropriate cross-servicing agreements
for supply as early as practical.

(b) Service-peculiar supply items will be the

responsibility of the Service concerned.

(c) If the riverine base of operations is

afloat, the riverine maritime component commander
will develop a plan for storing and distributing
supplies. If a riverine land base is employed,
the riverine ground component commander will
normally be assigned this function.

(3) Maintenance. Riverine component commanders

retain responsibility for maintenance of assigned and
organic equipment.

(a) Space limitations dictate the merging of

maintenance facilities to the maximum extent
feasible. If maintenance responsibilities are
not assigned in the initiating directive,
component commanders should be encouraged to
conclude cross-servicing agreements at an early
stage.

(b) To conserve space, maximum use of mobile

maintenance teams should be planned.

(c) Maintenance and overhaul schedules for

assigned ships, boats, aircraft, and vehicles
should be developed early in the planning phase
and be provided to operational planners to
facilitate forecasting of operational
availability. Operational planners must be kept
advised of changes to the forecast availability.

VIII-7
5. Medical Planning. Coordination of medical planning for
riverine operations is the responsibility of the CJRF. In
addition to the general health of the force, plans must
provide for early, adequate, and definitive treatment of
casualties as outlined in Joint Pub 4-02, "Doctrine for Health
Service Support in Joint Operations". This latter requirement
is the principal goal of medical planning. Medical facilities
in the afloat base of operations may be the only ones
reasonably accessible.

a. Medical Planning Considerations

(1) Overall mission of the JRF and the supporting

medical mission.

(2) Policies of higher commands.

(3) Characteristics of the riverine AO, including

plant and animal ecology, terrain, climatology,
disease incidence data, sanitary conditions, and
available cover.

(4) Preventive medicine, hygiene, and sanitation

measures that must be instituted before and during the
riverine operation. This should include
recommendations on the type of preventive measures
that ground maneuver units must take to operate in a
riverine environment.

(5) Physical and psychological factors affecting own

personnel.

(6) LOCs and evacuation routine.

(7) Evacuation policies and treatment procedures.

(8) Specific medical supplies required.

(9) Size and types of forces involved and their

tactical employment.

(10) Estimated numbers and types of casualties based

on the projected strength and type of enemy opposition
and on the character, probable duration, and
objectives of the riverine operation.

(11) Medical personnel available and status of

training, including adequacy of medical facilities.

VIII-8
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

(12) Medical needs for the civilian population and

enemy POWs.

(13) Need for medical units, including surgical

teams.

(14) Use of specifically designated and outfitted

river assault craft and helicopters to provide
ambulance facilities.

(15) Use of specific ships designated as hospital

ships to meet anticipated hospitalization
requirements. These ships should be capable of
providing surgical, morgue, and holding facilities.

(16) The use of specially configured craft as medical

treatment and evacuation stations.

6. Engineer Planning

a. The mission of engineer units will be diversified.

Engineer units normally operate under the centralized
control of the CJRF when stability permits; however, as
units become more dispersed and support requirements more
varied, decentralized employment of engineer teams will be
required to a greater extent. Engineer unit commanders
must plan for and be prepared to accomplish their mission
with little, if any, of their heavy equipment because of
the environment in the riverine AO. Joint Pub 4-04,
provides additional guidance concerning joint engineer
support.

b. Engineer Tasks. Engineer planning for riverine

operations may include the following special tasks:

(1) Providing engineer reconnaissance.

(2) Obstacle breaching, including underwater

obstacles.

(3) Removing and/or raising bridges that are a

navigational hazard.

(4) Constructing and preparing riverine landing

sites.

(5) Constructing and preparing of fire support bases.

VIII-9
 (6) Installing obstacle and/or barriers.

(7) Providing survey control.

(8) Preparaing helicopter landing zones.

(9) Maintaining and repairing of canals and waterway

systems.

(10) Detecting and neutralizing mines and booby

traps.

(11) Clearing vegetation and destruction from field

and firing fortifications at potential ambush sites.

(12) Destroying facilities and/or specific locations

of value only to the enemy.

(13) Supporting civic action programs.

(14) Constructing forward operating base(s) ashore.

7. Base Development Planning. Base development planning may

include the necessity to create new dry ground by dredging or
installing drainage systems.

VIII-10
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

CHAPTER IX

SUPPORTING OPERATIONS PLANNING

1. Definition and Authority

a. Operations in support of the JRF may be required. The

commander of forces conducting supporting activities will
coordinate with the CJRF.

b. The principles in Chapter V regarding air, helicopter,

and CAS operations also apply to the conduct of supporting
operations.

2. JRF Operations. Supporting operations may include:

a. Amphibious operations. (Joint Pub 3-02)

b. CAS or aerial observation. (Joint Pub 3-09)

c. Reconnaissance/surveillance and demolition. (Joint

Pub 3-55)

d. Naval gunfire support. (NWP 22-2)

e. Coastal surveillance. (NWP 13-1)

f. Harbor clearance. (Joint Pub 3-15)

g. Search and rescue. (Joint Pub 3-50; 3-50.2)

h. Unconventional warfare. (Joint Pub 3-05)

i. Those SO listed in Chapter IV when conducted by SOFs

external to the MRF.

j. Artillery support. (Joint Pub 3-09)

k. Intelligence support. (Joint Pub 2-0)

l. Engineer support. (Joint Pub 4-04)

m. Air defense support. (Joint Pub 3-01.3)

n. CBR support. (Joint Pub 3-11)

IX-1
 o. EW support. (Joint Pub 3-51)

p. PSYOP deception. (Joint Pub 3-13)

q. Suppression of enemy air defenses. (Joint Pub 3-01.4)

3. Logistic Operations. Principles set forth in Chapters

VIII and XV apply equally to supporting logistic operations.

IX-2
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

CHAPTER X

EMERGENCY ACTIONS, DISASTER CONTROL,

AND COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE

1. Effect of Environment and Organization

a. Environmental conditions in riverine operations and

the unique composition of the JRF may require certain
modifications to normal contingency procedures.

b. The following paragraphs concern aspects of

emergencies, disaster control, and combat search and
rescue as they apply to riverine operations.

2. Emergencies Aboard Riverine Craft

a. Man Overboard. All craft will be prepared for a man

overboard. Frequent drills are required to train
personnel to quickly react to a man overboard. Rapid
small craft action is normally required in riverine
currents in order to be effective. Flexible SOPs for
rescuing a crewman must be clearly understood and
rehearsed because an entire craft and crew should not
normally be placed in jeopardy for a crewman being swept
by the current into a known ambush.

b. Fire. Depending on the severity of the fire, it may

or may not be necessary to debark troops. If it is
necessary, rehearsed emergency debarking procedures will
be followed and designated craft will assist with debarkation
and fire fighting support. The possibility for grounding
a craft that has caught on fire should be considered.

c. Mechanical Problems. All riverine craft and ships

should be prepared to tow other craft and ships in the
event of a breakdown.

(1) In the event of a breakdown that requires slowing

the entire formation, a decision will be made whether to
declare the disabled ship a "straggler" or slow the
formation. An escort detachment for stragglers may be
necessary.

(2) Preselected and temporary anchorages may be used

in the event a slowed speed of advance detains the
whole formation and prevents it from reaching its
destination on schedule.

X-1
 d. Emergency Relocation. An emergency relocation is an
extremis relocation of the afloat base of operations
forced by enemy action or inclement weather conditions.
If forced by enemy fire, it may be necessary to execute a
planned withdrawal of shore perimeter defense troops and
equipment, disposal of inoperable craft, and emergency
destruction of classified material. If a riverine assault
operation is in progress, a subsequent rendezvous will be
conducted in accordance with instructions given in the
OPORD.

3. Disaster Control and Emergency Assistance

a. Procedures. Disaster control and emergency assistance

procedures are executed in accordance with current
directives and SOPs.

(1) The CJRF is responsible for:

(a) Conducting disaster control measures and

operations in areas where the force is located.

(b) Rendering assistance in local emergencies to

other US agencies and activities.

(c) Rendering assistance to the friendly local

government and population in emergencies.

(2) The CJRF will be prepared to provide disaster

control forces, to the extent possible, on the basis
of noninterference with essential operations.

b. Coordinating Instructions. The CJRF:

(1) Supports other commanders, as requested, by

providing forces and material assistance consistent
with the requirements of the mission.

(2) Exercises economy of forces consistent with the

mission assigned.

(3) Supports disaster recovery operations of other US

and friendly government agencies consistent with the
requirements of the mission at hand.

c. Riverine component commanders. The commanders will:

(1) Coordinate plans, training, and operations for

evacuation and disaster recovery with foreign

X-2
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

military and civil defense authorities as directed by

higher authority.

(2) Provide for own disaster control operations, as

appropriate.
d. C2. Control of forces in actual emergencies and in
training operations rests with the riverine component
commander. During an emergency, additional forces may be
provided for temporary augmentation. OPCON of these
augmenting forces will normally be given to the commander
whose forces are being augmented.

e. Communications. Commercial communications facilities

may be used to augment government facilities, as required
and available.

4. Combat Search and Rescue. CSAR is a specific task

performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of
distressed personnel during wartime or contingency operations.

a. Execution. CSAR operations should be conducted in

accordance with Joint Pub 3-50.2, for joint search and
rescue.

b. Responsibility. The CJRF assumes specific

responsibility for direction of CSAR operations for forces
within the riverine AO. The commanders of adjacent joint
and Service commands are responsible for conducting CSAR
in support of their own operations. This does not alter
the mutual responsibility to provide CSAR support to
adjacent commands as circumstances may require and
operations permit. This mutual support should be
coordinated through respective joint/component rescue
coordination centers or through exchanged liaison
personnel.

X-3
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

CHAPTER XI

TACTICAL GUIDANCE

1. General Considerations. This chapter contains doctrine

specifically directed toward riverine assault operations;
waterway interdiction; and surveillance, barrier, and security
operations.

2. Movement of the Joint Riverine Force

a. The JRF has two types of movement: nontactical

movement, such as the relocation of the force to a new
base of operations; and tactical movement, including
riverine operations. Any movement of the JRF or its
subordinate elements must be controlled and coordinated.
Standard tactical control measures, such as checkpoints,
phase lines, boundaries, and objectives, may be used. The
CJRF must ensure that the location and purpose of control
measures are understood by all elements of the JRF.

b. Security of the forces during movement is a primary

consideration during planning.

c. Enemy threats during movement include water mines,

water obstacles, ambushes, and harassing fire. Armed
helicopters should be used to escort all water movements,
because they can provide reconnaissance, fire support, and
communications relay. On-call CAS should be available
when required. Whenever possible, waterborne movements
should be preceded by reconnaissance and security operations
conducted by all available means. Troops should be thoroughly
briefed on security plans, with emphasis on counterambush
reaction plans and maximum use of security measures.

d. Plans should include:

(1) Designation of counterambush maneuver elements.

(2) C2 measures.

(3) Fire support.

(4) Security.

(5) Identification and recognition of committed elements.

(6) Recovery and reorganization of the committed force.

XI-1
 e. Provisions must be included for security of craft when
the ground force elements have been committed to
counter-ambush missions. Actions may range from complete
commitment of the waterborne force to evasive action and
continuing movement. Responsibility for immediate action
rests with the commander designated by the CJRF.

f. During water movement, RAC should be organized to

provide an advanced guard, including mine countermeasures
craft, flank and rear guards, and a main body. This
facilitates control and provides tactical integrity of the
main body. The objective of the organization for movement
is to provide uninterrupted movement and security for the
entire force.

3. Joint Riverine Afloat Base Movement

a. The riverine afloat base of operations normally will

be relocated as tactically necessary and to better support
riverine operations.

b. The limited hydrographic data available on most rivers

and tributaries, as well as rapidly shifting depth, sand
bars, and mud banks, make river navigation difficult.
Strong currents are not unusual. Navigational aids may be
few and inaccurately charted; ships should ensure that
navigation charts are corrected to include the latest
available data. Commanding officers of ships and officers
in charge of craft must exercise caution in navigating
island waters. Navigation teams must be well trained and
highly proficient in piloting.

c. During all movements, each element of the riverine

assault force will be escorted by designated RAC. Rivers
will be swept for mines along the movement route where a
credible threat of mining exists. Ground units may be
pre-positioned in high threat areas along the route of
advance. Air and artillery support should be available.
Ships of the force will take hostile targets ashore under
fire only as permitted by the ROE. Caution must be
exercised at all times to ensure that any firing does not
endanger other friendly craft or troops ashore.

d. RAC will be stationed in accordance with the movement

order for each change in location of the riverine base.
Escort combat craft may be used for:

XI-2
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

(1) Predeployment along the route in locations of

greatest threat.

(2) Forward, rear, and flank escort.

(3) Establishment of base defense patrols and

clearance of new anchorage areas.

(4) Minesweeping in areas of suspected mining

threats.

e. River assault squadron units that are not engaged in

escort of ships during movement of the riverine base, will
be directed to proceed ahead or astern of the formation to
the new base site.

f. An advance force is normally employed during

relocation of the riverine base. This force includes
reconnaissance, minesweeping, engineer, and infantry
elements to reconnoiter, clear, and establish initial
defenses at the new base site.

4. Measures to Prevent Mutual Interference

a. Measures to prevent mutual interference should be

promulgated by the CJRF. Mutual interference between
friendly units, including aircraft, must be prevented by
close coordination between units conducting riverine
assault operations and waterway interdiction and
surveillance and security operations. Information
exchanged between the operations control centers should
include:

(1) Proposed transits of friendly units through areas

assigned to other friendly units and frequent (at
least hourly, if possible) position reports of units
making the transit.

(2) Proposed OPLANs in areas where overlaps occur.

(3) Other information that will assist friendly units

in identifying each other. This coordination may
require the establishment of havens and transit lanes.

b. Commanders of forces in adjacent areas, operating

within a TAOR, or operating in conjunction with a JRF
should be provided copies of all operation orders. If

XI-3
this is precluded by security requirements, provisions for
continuing liaison with these commanders should be made.

c. Commanders should ensure that pre-operations briefings

include:

(1) All available information about friendly units

that may be encountered.

(2) Applicable intelligence reports.

(3) Challenge and reply codes/deconfliction

procedures.

(4) Light-array sequencing.

(5) Established havens and transit lanes.

(6) Chain of OPCON.

(7) A review of ROE.

(8) All known environmental information (tides,

currents, moon, terrain, etc.).

(9) Replenishment information.

(10) Rally points.

(11) Communications instructions.

(12) Supporting arms coordination.

(13) Combat service support arrangements.

d. This information should be updated as additional data

become available.

e. Particular caution must be taken near operation area

boundaries. All available means should be used to
determine the hostile character of any contact before
commencing destruction fire. Strict compliance with local
ROE is mandatory.

f. Ambushes established by friendly forces must be

coordinated with appropriate operations centers.

XI-4
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

g. To prevent firing on friendly craft, regulations

should be established concerning the movement of craft
within the riverine base during darkness. The following
considerations apply:

(1) A maritime tactical operations center should be

established by the riverine maritime element commander
to monitor and/or control waterborne traffic in a
designated area. Its location and composition will be
suited to the tasking and situation.

(2) Only craft authorized by the maritime tactical

operations center to be under way should be under way.
All craft should be accompanied by at least one other
craft.

(3) Craft authorized to be under way should be

prepared to respond immediately to the daily
recognition and identification code when challenged.

(4) The maritime TOC should advise all patrol units

concerned of any authorized craft movements within the
riverine base area.

5. C2 Facilities. JRF component commanders should be located

as near to each other as possible for optimum coordination of
their actions.

a. Operations Center. The JRF will be configured to

provide C2 facilities for participating forces. This JOC
provides C3 for all JRF operations. Ships that have
subordinate tactical elements of the JRF embarked should
provide TOC support for the embarked elements.

b. Similar C2 facilities ashore must be provided if a

riverine land base of operations is employed.

c. Other Command Facilities

(1) C2 Craft. These craft are provided as tactical

command facilities for subordinate commanders for
employment in forward areas.

(2) Aircraft. C2-configured aircraft (fixed- and

rotary-wing aircraft) provide platforms for command of
riverine operations. The absence of relief in most
riverine areas severely limits the capability of
commanders to observe and direct the actions of their

XI-5
forces from the surface. JRF component commanders
should have access to airborne command facilities with
sufficient communications to control tactical
evolutions and coordinate supporting fires.

(3) Amphibious Vehicles. Amphibian C2 vehicles may

provide the ground force command posts to be
established ashore. Unless LVTC-7s (amphibious
assault vehicle-command configured) can be used
jointly, manned shipboard operations centers, and C2
boats must be utilized.

(4) Communications. It may be necessary to establish

communications relay facilities between deployed
forces and the riverine base. Such relay points
provide for automatic retransmission or for relay of
voice communications. A C2 craft, aircraft, or ground
relay station may be used. Secure voice
communications should be available between operations
centers, C2 boats, and C2 aircraft.

XI-6
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

CHAPTER XII
RIVERINE ASSAULT OPERATIONS

1. Scope

a. A riverine assault operation commences when troops

begin assault loading to depart the riverine base for an
operation and normally terminates when all forces involved
have returned to the base.

b. In any assault landing against a hostile or

potentially hostile point, several options rest with the
assaulting force. In each option, the assault must
support and contribute to the ttainment of the mission.
The phases of the mobile riverine force assault operations
are: tactical loading, movement, landing, assault,
exploitation operations, and planned withdrawal.

2. Tactical Loading. Tactical loading of troop units in

riverine assault craft from a land or afloat base must be
carefully planned and coordinated. Detailed tactical loading
procedures must be established and promulgated with the OPORD.
Factors that must be considered are:

a. Safety of personnel during loading.

b. Timing.

c. Logistic requirements.

d. Security.

e. Accountability of personnel.

f. Availability of standby craft in the event of a

material casualty.

g. Tactical Loading Plan

(1) The tactical loading plan is prepared by JRF

subordinate commanders.

(2) Tactical loading of troops into helicopters from

either land or afloat bases will be in accordance with
established Service doctrine. The small size of
helicopter platforms on ships of the mobile riverine
force may require use of helicopter loading zones ashore.

XII-1
 (3) When loading assault craft, strict communications
security is essential to avoid compromising the
operation. Use of visual signals, either flag hoist
or signal lights, to coordinate loading should be
considered.

h. Loading from a Riverine Land Base of Operations. The

tactical loading plan is based on the scheme of maneuver.
Staging is organized to support the loading plan. Staging
areas for loading will be assigned on pontoons or piers
and troops should load only into craft moored alongside
pontoons or piers.

i. Loading from an Afloat Base. The procedures for

loading from an afloat base into RAC are the same as those
from a land base except that:

(1) The staging area is a designated area number on

the side of a pontoon or a ship’s hull.

(2) Units remain in their assigned areas until

directed to load into RAC. The boat team leader of
each wave of RAC must be familiar with the route from
the loading station to the riverine landing site and
must be prepared to lead his unit when it is called
away.

j. Safety Precautions. Loading and unloading of troops

is a hazardous operation, especially at night. There is
always a danger of personnel falling into the water and
being carried away by the current. Where possible, a
safety boat equipped with a swimmer in a harness, portable
floodlights (for night landings), and life rings attached
to lines should be positioned close downstream during
loading or unloading operations. Troops and boat crews
must put on life preservers prior to loading. All combat
harness gear will be unbuckled while loading and
unloading. To the maximum extent possible, all troops
should have both hands free; they should pass heavy
equipment between river assault craft and pontoon piers
prior to loading and unloading.

3. Movement of the Assault Force

a. The movement phase of riverine assault operations

begins with the start of tactical loading at the riverine
base of operations and ends with the arrival of the main
body of the assault force in the riverine landing area.

XII-2
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

b. During movement to an AO, unit commanders will

maintain a readiness posture consistent with enemy
capabilities and threat.

c. Tactical Organization for Movement

(1) The tactical organization for movement should

parallel the organization for landing to avoid
reorganization on arrival at the river landing area.

(2) The maritime elements of the riverine assault

force are task organized to provide an advance guard,
main body, and rear guard. Essential tasks such as
reconnaissance, minesweeping, fire support, troop
lift, and escort are assigned to movement groups and
units as appropriate.

d. Preparation for Movement. Prior to departing the

riverine base, the subordinate maritime element commanders
will thoroughly familiarize themselves with the waterways
to be transited. All available navigational information,
including depths, river and canal widths, bridges and
obstructions enroute, tides, and currents will be studied.
The latest intelligence, including the enemy threat en
route, possible mining and ambush locations, population
concentrations, and shoreline characteristics should be
obtained. Before each operation, task group/unit
commanders will be provided with a detailed and current
intelligence estimate of the AO and the movement route.
Since independent action is frequently required by
individual boat crews, task group/unit commanders will
ensure that boat crews are adequately briefed on the
topics discussed in this paragraph.

e. Command and Control

(1) During the movement phase, the commander

designated by the CJRF exercises tactical control of
the forces assigned, normally through the respective
participating component commander.

(2) Control measures employed normally include the

use of water checkpoints and a movement table to
regulate the water movement.

f. Techniques. The following techniques may be

applicable during movement to and from the AO:

XII-3
 (1) Escort. Whenever possible during both daylight
and night transport movement, an escort should be
provided. Escorts may be RAC, river patrol boats, or
attack helicopters, depending on the tactical situation.
Provision of escorts is the responsibility of the
commander of the maritime unit conducting the movement.

(2) Avoiding Patterns. When operations are being

conducted over an extended period, times of transits
and routes for troop rotation or resupply should be
varied, consistent with operational requirements.

g. Reaction to Unforeseen Situations

(1) Target of Opportunity. Waterborne or land

targets of opportunity may occur during movements to
and from the objective area. ROE may require that
authorization be obtained before engaging such
targets.

(2) Attack on the Force

(a) If the force is attacked during movement,

immediate action will be taken to neutralize the
hostile fire. C2 boats and armored troop
carriers (with troops embarked) should clear the
area of attack quickly, unless the decision is
made to assault the enemy. If required, naval
gunfire, artillery, and air support will be
requested. When the tactical situation permits,
a quick-reaction force may be landed to conduct
followup operations. If the decision is made to
counterattack, RAC will land previously
designated counterambush forces.

(b) It is always desirable, and often necessary,

to control both banks on which riverine forces
operate. However, it is especially important to
control the shore opposite the area where
landings take place. As a minimum, the opposite
shore must be controlled by fire and, in many
instances, it will be necessary to have troops
occupy the opposite shore to provide the
necessary rear security for the landing force
making the main attack.

(3) Responsibility. The reaction to unforseen

situations is the responsibility of the maritime
element’s assigned commander--the person responsible
for accomplishing the assigned mission. However,

XII-4
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

once forces have been landed for ground operations,

the authority and responsibility for subsequent action
ashore rests with the landing force commander.

4. Landing, Assault, Pursuit, and Exploitation Operations.

The landing attack phase begins with the arrival of the main
body of the riverine assault force in the landing area and
ends with the seizure of initial objectives. It encompasses
preparation of the landing area, landing, initial ground and
waterborne maneuver, and SOs in support of the landing attack.
Following the seizure of initial objectives, exploitation
operations are conducted by riverine air, ground, maritime,
and/or SOF in accordance with the concept of operations.

a. Task Organization. The organization for landing is

designed to maintain the tactical integrity of assault
units, to provide flexibility in reacting to the situation
encountered, and to facilitate control of subsequent
maneuver.

b. Landing Plan

(1) Purpose. The landing plan supports the scheme of

maneuver. It includes the sequence, time and place of
arrival of combat unit(s), combat support and combat
service support units in the landing area(s), and
plans for reorganization and securing initial
objectives.

(2) Landing Areas. Landing areas that encompass one

or more riverine sites are selected to avoid prepared
hostile defensive positions. Plans for landing in
unsecured areas must assume that the units may have to
conduct an assault landing. The CJRF selects the
landing area on the basis of initial objectives and
plans for subsequent operations and the capability of
assault craft to support the landing attack.
Alternate landing areas are selected whenever
practicable. The selection and location of a landing
area are influenced by:

(a) Mission, size, and draft of the waterborne units.

(b) Enemy situation and capabilities.

(c) Characteristics of the waterways, adjacent

land areas, and airspace.

XII-5
 (d) Available riverine landing sites.

(e) Capabilities and limitations of maritime

craft.

(f) Nature of subsequent ground tactical

operations.

(3) Riverine Landing Sites. A riverine landing site

is a continuous segment of coastline over which
troops, equipment, and supplies can be landed by
surface means. The selection of riverine landing
sites within the landing area is based on similiar
criteria as the selection of landing areas. If a
landing area cannot support multiple landing sites,
several elements may have to use the same site in
turn.

(4) Landing. The assault landing is an exacting

operation, requiring combat and combat support
elements to be landed as rapidly as possible. Every
element must be prepared to contribute its combat
power in a coordinated effort to seize and defend the
landing area. Plans for landing, seizure of initial
objectives, and reorganization are prepared
concurrently. They include a scheme of maneuver and a
fire support plan.

(5) Time. The riverine ground component commander,

in coordination with the riverine maritime component
commander, recommends the time for the waterborne
landing to the CJRF. Consideration must be given to
capabilities of the enemy, weather, tides, visibility,
characteristics of watercraft being used, availability
of fire support and the plan for supporting fires, and
the security of the force in transit. Units may land
at first light to take advantage of darkness during
the water movement and conduct the ground tactical
operations in daylight. Units may also land at last
light to facilitate landing and consolidation of
forces in daylight and then conduct ground tactical
operations during darkness. Waterborne landings may
be made at night or under other conditions of reduced
visibility to gain tactical surprise and reduce the
effectiveness of hostile fire. Limitations of night
landings are:

XII-6
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

(a) Accurate delivery of units to their landing

area is more complicated.

(b) Air, RAC, and artillery fire support may be

less effective.

(c) Seizure of initial objective, and

consolidation and reorganization of forces, if
required, may be more difficult and time consuming.

(6) Initial Objectives. Rapid assembly and

reorganization ashore are essential following the
landing attack. Assignment of initial objectives to
subordinate units will facilitate assembly of the units
and provide for initial defense of the landing area.
Characteristics of initial objectives should include:

(a) Protection from hostile observation and

effective fire.

(b) Sufficient area security for dispersion.

(c) Proximity to assault areas.

(d) Ease of movement in carrying out subsequent

ground tactical operations.

(e) Ease of identification.

(f) Ability to facilitate the accomplishment of

the riverine mission.

(g) Tactical advantages for the ground force.

(7) Landing Techniques. In the final approach to the

riverine landing site, preparatory fires may be
delivered by artillery, RAC gunfire, CAS, and naval
gunfire. Predesignated fire support craft mark the
limits on either flank of the riverine landing site.
These craft may beach if conditions permit, in order
to deliver more effective fire as the troops land. A
C2 craft should be stationed in the vicinity of the
transport craft. Escort craft are stationed to
protect the transport craft. Escort duties may
include establishing patrol barriers up and down
stream from the riverine bank site to control waterway
approaches and along the opposite bank to protect the
rear flank of the JRF.

XII-7
 (a) When the transport craft of the first wave
reach positions opposite the riverine landing
sites, they turn (independently or on signal) and
beach on the shore where troops are landed.
After debarkation, the transport craft retract,
clear the riverine landing site, and move to act
as a blocking force or transit to an assembly
area by prescribed routes, avoiding interference
with succeeding waves. During landing
operations, RAC may also provide afloat C2
facilities, close fire support, evacuation, and
selective resupply.

(b) If available, AAV, e.g., LVTP-7s, may be

used to land troops. Depending on the situation,
troops may be debarked or stay aboard AAVs to
achieve the objective ashore.

(c) After the landing has been completed, RAC

may assemble and perform other assigned tasks
such as providing patrol, blocking, minesweeping,
or fire support operations. If the riverine
ground force’s task will entail extended
operations ashore, all or part of the supporting
RAC may be returned to the riverine base.

(8) Scheme of Maneuver. Riverine assault operations

are strike operations. Riverine schemes of maneuver
are normally designed to fix, entrap, and destroy a
hostile force in a given area of operations. The lack
of definite intelligence may make it necessary to base
the selection of objectives on terrain rather than a
hostile force location. However, the primary
objective is the hostile force, not the terrain
itself.

(a) Pressure must be maintained once contact is

made, and forces must deploy rapidly to fix the
hostile force to an area where maximum fire
support can be used. Riverine ground force
assault units close with and destroy or capture
the hostile force.

(b) Riverine assault operations capitalize on

supporting watercraft capabilities and the
tactical flexibility inherent in the continuous
availability of assault support craft to support
tactical maneuver. Riverine craft may:

XII-8
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

1. Transport and support units in the assault.

2. Withdraw or redeploy troops.

3. Act as, or in support of, a blocking force.

4. Transport a raiding force.

5. Carry crew-served weapons.

6. Transport reserves.

7. Perform resupply and evacuation.

8. Serve as a C2 platform.

9. Serve as mobile aid stations.

10. Provide direct and indirect fire support.

11. Evacuate EPW, defectors, and detainees.

12. Perform damage control, salvage, and

Explosive Ordnance Disposal operations (on a
limited basis).

(c) To take maximum advantage of available

watercraft and exploit terrain characteristics,
planners must consider all possible uses of
watercraft and water routes when selecting
objectives. They must also determine short-term
requirements for watercraft by other units
participating in the operations, and provide for
pre-positioning, security, and control of such
craft.

(9) Reserve Reaction Force

(a) Planning. The retention of a reserve force

is highly desirable in all riverine operations.
Riverine operations normally have destruction of
the enemy forces as their primary mission and do
not orient on terrain objectives to the extent
that most other operations do. Although the
reserve force may be committed to assist other
elements of the force, its primary employment
should be to capitalize on opportunities to

XII-9
 destroy enemy forces. In this regard, the
reserve force can be more appropriately thought
of as a reaction force. Reaction operations
require flexibility, careful planning,
coordination, and reliable communications between
all elements. Reaction forces meet established
reaction times through planning, rehearsals, and
pre-positioning.

(b) Evaluating Requirements. Helicopter

reaction forces can deploy directly against
located enemy positions and are usually the
preferred type. Elements on airborne alert are
expensive in terms of resource expenditure;
therefore, their use is infrequent even though
they are the most responsive type of reaction
force. Waterborne reaction forces can be
available for rapid and effective commitment in
the riverine environment and will often be the
only type available. Reaction forces, in the
desired condition of readiness, are maintained in
assembly areas either at land bases or at afloat
bases.

5. Planned Withdrawals. The planned withdrawal phase covers

the period between completion of the mission ashore and the
completion of unloading upon return to the riverine base of
operations. During the backloading phase of the withdrawal,
special attention must be given to security measures to
protect the forces as the strength ashore decreases. Fire
support to cover the withdrawal must be planned, and an
adequate reaction force must be designated.

XII-10
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

CHAPTER XIII

WATERWAY INTERDICTION, SURVEILLANCE,

BARRIER, AND SECURITY OPERATIONS

1. Purpose

a. Waterway interdiction, surveillance, barrier, and

security operations can be conducted by specially
configured subsurface and surface craft and/or aircraft in
the waters and airspace of the riverine area. These
operations may be used to gain control of waterways
preparatory to subsequent riverine assault operations, or
they may be conducted by maritime or air components alone,
with ground component elements provided only as a reaction
or security element.

b. Waterway interdiction and surveillance and security

operations serve five basic purposes:

(1) Protect friendly LOCs.

(2) Deny hostile forces the use of waterways.

(3) Collect intelligence information.

(4) Perform security missions.

(5) Enforce population and resource control.

c. To be effective, waterway interdiction and

surveillance and security forces should include both
surface craft and aircraft. The decision to use surface
or subsurface craft, as well as deciding what type of
craft to select, will depend on the environment, enemy
threat, and assigned mission. The air and surface
operations are mutually supporting and may be conducted
independently or concurrently. During waterway
interdiction, surveillance, and security operations, close
coordination is required between airborne and waterborne
patrols in the employment of mutually supporting fires.

d. Effectiveness of the combined surface and airborne

operation can be aided by rigid enforcement of curfews and
traffic/zone restrictions, as appropriate.

XIII-1
 e. Air-delivered mines and remote sensors used in
conjunction with supporting arms or remotely fired
demolitions is one of several effective methods of
interdiction offering minimal risk to friendly personnel.

f. Successful accomplishment of waterway interdiction,

surveillance, barrier, and security operations may require
pacification of the region.

g. A vital aspect of securing riverine AOs is controlling

the flow of resources, including those introduced from
outside the country, in order to deny the enemy the means
to wage war. Isolating the enemy from his support may
take away his operational initiative and make his primary
task that of supply. This greatly facilitates the
clearing of an area by military forces and assists in the
identification and elimination of indigenous supporters.

h. Effective control of resources requires that all modes

of indigenous transportation be controlled, including
those on waterways and rivers. Effective control of the
smaller rivers and canals in the riverine area can best be
maintained by controlling the banks and adjacent
territory; however, connecting tributaries between major
waterways may be controlled by patrol-blocking action.
Waterway interdiction, surveillance, and security forces
will conduct patrols and inshore surveillance to enforce
curfews and prevent enemy infiltration, movement, and
resupply along and across the major waterways of the area.

2. Tactical Considerations. An individual waterway

interdiction, surveillance, and security operation may be
called a patrol, and it consists of two or more craft in
execution of a specific operation. This section outlines some
doctrinal and tactical considerations. However, these are not
all-inclusive, nor do they necessarily apply to all phases of
waterway interdiction, surveillance, and security operations.

a. Area Familiarization. Prior to initial patrols,

commanders should arrange for area indoctrination and
familiarization for the crew and embarked personnel.

b. Secondary Missions. Waterborne and air patrols may be

modified at times to accommodate requests for combat
support of forces ashore, including blocking and similar
operations.

XIII-2
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

c. Response to Hostile Fire. The response to hostile

fire must be governed by the type and volume of fire
received and the ROE in effect. The presence of civilian
populace and/or other friendly forces in the operational
area must also be considered. ROE and measures to prevent
mutual interference must be observed.

d. Mutual Support. Joint air and waterborne operations

and multiple boat patrols are frequently useful in
providing mutual support.

e. Time and Pattern of Patrols. Boats should conduct a

random patrol and not establish a pattern, such as passing
through the same points on subsequent passes or at regular
intervals.

f. Readiness. A high state of combat readiness,

appropriate to the area being patrolled, will be
maintained at all times.

XIII-3
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

CHAPTER XIV

ANCILLARY OPERATIONS

1. Scope of Operations

a. Riverine ancillary operations are conducted by the JRF

as adjuncts to a riverine assault operation or as a
waterway interdiction, surveillance, and security
operation. These operations are normally characterized by
employment of procedures that require special training and
equipment. The capability to conduct these operations is
generally limited to specific units, that have been
assigned primary mission responsibility within the Service
organization.

b. The operations set forth in this chapter represent the

minimum capability required by the CJRF to conduct
sustained ancillary operations in a riverine environment.
The magnitude of a particular operation, the enemy threat,
or terrain considerations may make it necessary to augment
assigned units and provide specialized units in support.

2. Reconnaissance and Waterway Clearance

a. Determination of Waterway Characteristics. Gathering

information regarding waterway characteristics is a
prerequisite to the proper use of waterways. Since
waterway characteristics constantly change because of
seasonal effects, this requirement is continuous
throughout the operation. The methods of determining
waterway characteristics should be included in training,
since gathering reliable information involves techniques
that may not be familiar to all personnel. Surface
efforts should be coordinated with the aerial
reconnaissance plan.

b. Waterway Clearance of Barricades and Obstacles. The

JRF must have a capability for clearing navigable
waterways that have been obstructed by barricades and
obstacles. An orderly and continuing barricade-removal
program is required throughout the riverine environment.
Close coordination with local officials is recommended
before any barricade or obstacle is removed.

XIV-1
3. Joint Riverine Base Security. Measures should be taken to
provide an integrated defense for mobile riverine base
elements, troop installations, equipment, lines of
communication, and nearby friendly installations.

a. Command Responsibility. The CJRF is responsible for

the security of the riverine base and for integration of
the local defense plan into the overall area security
plan. The CJRF may designate a base defense commander for
all jointly occupied bases. The base defense commander
will exercise OPCON of all forces assigned for purposes of
base defense. Plans normally provide for unity of effort
and ensure the most efficient use of available means of
defense. Units will be tasked according to their
respective capabilities.

b. Base Defense Planning. The riverine base of

operations should be organized for defense against attack
from any direction. Plans should provide flexibility and
must position reserves for rapid reaction to any threat.
Tasks for ground combat forces and supporting weapons are
to detect, engage, and destroy or repel an attacking
force. All elements within the base area should be
appropriately tasked and/or assigned sectors of
responsibility.

(1) The size of the base may limit defense in-depth.

Combat outposts and mutually supporting strong points
forward of the riverine base main defense positions
can be employed to add depth to the defense.
Defensive fires should be planned throughout the area.
Plans should also include patrols, listening posts,
and obstacles.

(2) Plans should be prepared, rehearsed, evaluated,

and revised, if necessary, to ensure immediate
reaction to any threat.

(3) The ability to disperse is limited in most

riverine base areas. This deficiency must be
compensated for by increasing the depth of the
security area through aggressive patrolling and the
use of outposts and airborne observers. Other
passive measures such as using camouflage, varying
normal routines, and controlling access of
noncombatants into the base area should be employed.
Remotely monitored ground sensors can also increase
the depth of the security area by providing an

XIV-2
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

effective warning barrier against infiltration

attempts. Routines must be altered frequently to
prevent the disclosure of information about locations,
compositions, and habits of the defender.

c. Riverine Base Defense Areas. A riverine base defense

area, which is organized for all-around defense, has
asecurity area, forward defense area, and reserve area.
The elements within these areas vary in composition and
strength, as determined by the specific mission,
capabilities of the hostile force, terrain, location and
size of the base area, and the strength and capabilities
of forces available.

d. Security Area

(1) A security area is a reconnaissance and

surveillance area that extends forward from the
forward defense area to the limit of employment of
security elements. These elements are far enough
forward to:

(a) Provide timely warning of the enemy’s

approach.

(b) Deny the enemy direct observation and/or

fire into the base areas.

(c) Deny the enemy observed mortar fire into the

base area.

(2) Sufficient security element personnel assigned to

the reconnaissance and surveillance area may prevent
unrestricted observation of the base area and the
undetected assembly of enemy forces within striking
distance of the base, if agressive patrolling is
routinely conducted. The organization of the security
elements provides an appropriate balance of available
combined and supporting arms. The base operations
center controls fire and maneuvers and integrates all
units into an effective defense.

e. Forward Defense Area. The forward defense area

encompasses positions and forces necessary to engage the
enemy in decisive combat to preserve integrity of the
riverine base. Within this area, forces are organized to
repel and destroy the enemy force and prevent its entry

XIV-3
into the riverine base. The forward defense force
provides defense capabilities to overcome the enemy’s
attack capabilities.

f. Reserve Area. The reserve area is the riverine base

itself. For both land and afloat bases, personnel not
employed in the security and forward defense areas are
assigned sectors within the reserve area. In addition to
forces regularly assigned missions as part of the reserve,
all units and personnel not assigned a security or defense
mission are incorporated into the defense plan to defend
installations within assigned sectors.

g. Operations Center. The JRF base operations center

coordinates all forms of maneuver (e.g., patrols) and all
types of defensive positions with supporting arms and
integrates them into an effective defense. Operations,
intelligence, appropriate fire support, and other friendly
force liaison representatives should be present in the
operations center.

h. Defensive Measures. The JRF is vulnerable to

virtually all direct and indirect fire weapons, with air
artillery mortars, antiarmor and antiair weapons, and
recoilless weapons as particularly significant threats.
An aggressive plan is required to detect infiltration of
these weapons and locate their firing positions. When
formulating the plan for defense from direct fire and
guided weapons, the CJRF considers likely firing
positions, intelligence reports, reports by indigenous
personnel, and resources available. The CJRF also plans
defensive tactics to minimize casualties and damage and
offensive tactics to locate and destroy hostile forces.

i. Defense of an Afloat Base. Although possibly located

in hostile territory, the riverine base of operations
should be relatively secure before barracks ships arrive.
The base area selected should have enough room to moor the
afloat force without impeding the normal flow of
indigenous commercial and military traffic.

(1) The afloat base ships are subject to a variety of

waterborne threats, including swimmers, limpet-type
mines, drifting contact mines, suicide attack boats,
and drifting boats loaded with explosives. The enemy
may also attack by air or with direct and indirect
weapons.

XIV-4
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

(2) Additional considerations in preparing the

defensive plan include:

(a) Congestion of personnel and vulnerability of

the afloat base as they affect the choice of
forces to be used for defense.

(b) Integration of all weapons into a

coordinated fire support plan.

(c) Use of surveillance equipment.

(d) Coordination of antiswimmer defense

requirements employing multisensor systems,
surface-search, radar, night vision sonar,
optics, and waterborne sensors in conjunction
with explosive weapons, electrical deterrents,
and physical barriers.

(e) Designation of a command ship to serve as

the control center. Overall communications
requirements must be considered when the TOC is
selected.

(f) The use of regular boat patrols to control

indigenous civilian and military traffic and
detect and destroy waterborne attacks by
swimmers, drifting mines, or boats.

(g) Contingency plans to provide for situations

where tide, current, or weather has an influence
on the defense of the afloat base.

(h) Lighting required to perform repair and

maintenance tasks.

(i) Establishment and enforcement of a river

curfew and a traffic plan to divert or escort
river traffic past the base area anchorage.

(j) Use of boat patrols to protect routes of

communications and resupply.

(k) Use of aircraft to conduct aerial

reconnaissance.

(3) The use of boat patrols may require forces to

operate on a continuing or periodic basis to achieve
and maintain dominance of designated water routes.

XIV-5
 (4) A ships’s crew may require augmentation from
ground components in unusual cases to act as sentries
aboard ship (watch standers) and/or boat patrols.
Normally, administrative units of the ground
components will be tasked for this purpose. Combat
troops should be used only in an emergency situation.
Ground component personnel will be briefed concerning:

(a) The overall defensive plan, including

locations of friendly forces, ships, and craft.

(b) Location of all embarked personnel during

general quarters.

(c) Plans for darkening ship and maintaining

watertight integrity.

(d) Specific tide and water conditions that

require added security, such as slack tides and
periods of reduced visibility.

(e) Detection and reaction plans against special

threats with specific instructions on the
detection of swimmers, the approach of indigenous
craft, and the use of defensive measures.

(f) Fire discipline and control procedures for

explosives and individual and crew-served
weapons.

j. Security of Berth and Anchorages. A berth is the

location of ships and craft secured to a pier or otherwise
made fast to an object for a relatively long period of
time. An anchorage is the location of ships and craft not
under way, whether anchored off a river bank or beached.
It is necessary to differentiate between temporary halts
during movement and periods spent in ports and riverine
bases. In the latter case, the enemy will have more time
to prepare any attack, which may consist of swimmers,
drifting mines, artillery/mortar fire, or raids.
Systematic firing on all suspicious floating debris, use
of patrol craft, and detonation of percussion grenades at
irregular intervals in the approaches to anchorages may be
employed as defensive measures, if not otherwise
restricted by the applicable rules of engagement.

XIV-6
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

(1) Protection against enemy artillery is treated as

a counterbattery problem. The ground component is
normally tasked to deploy forces ashore to prevent
observed fire from being placed on ships and craft of
the JRF. Berths and anchorages should be shifted at
irregular intervals to avoid preplanned firings.

(2) The adjacent waters should be patrolled by small

craft. These craft should operate within sight of one
another to provide mutual support in the event of attack.

(3) Protection against air attack is an area defense

problem. Airspace control and area air defense should
be conducted in accordance with Joint Pub 3-52.

4. Mine Warfare Operations. Riverine mine warfare operations

include mining and mine countermeasures when friendly surface
operations are vital. Mine countermeasures assume primary
importance because of the need to keep key waterways open.
When friendly surface operations in certain areas are not
vital, it may be tactically advantageous to restrict use of
designated waterways and disrupt enemy movement by mining.
However, waterway control in the riverine AO is normally
maintained by continuous patrol, surveillance, and
interdiction. The environment will impose a variety of
restrictions and limitations on mine warfare operations in
inland waterways.

a. Mine Countermeasures. The first step in mine

countermeasures is to assess the mine threat and evaluate
countermeasures that might be employed. It is necessary
to consider the various environmental characteristics,
enemy mining capabilities and tactics, ambush threat, and
waterway hydrography. Mine attacks may be conducted
against river craft in locations where the banks of
waterways afford protection to the enemy. Mining is
frequently used in conjunction with ambushes.
Conventional naval mines or land mines may be
encountered. Mines can be constructed from dud ordnance
such as recoilless rifle shells, mortar shells, and
bombs. These mines may be either surface or subsurface
mines, and they are usually bottom moored and
electrically detonated. Time-delay detonation techniques
also may be used. Contact drift mines may be
encountered, as well as boats or rafts loaded with
explosives detonated by time-delay or contact devices.

XIV-7
 Because of their simple construction and low cost,
pressure-activated mines may be implanted along shallow
waterways. Limpet-type mines, which might be attached to
the ship or anchor chain by swimmers or drift techniques,
constitute a serious threat to an afloat base. Mine
countermeasures include all methods that may be used to
counter the threat of an enemy mining effort. One of the
most effective countermeasures is to interfere with or
restrict enemy minelaying activities. Patrol,
surveillance, and interdiction activities must be
emphasized as preventive measures and should be included
in mine countermeasures planning and operations.
Countermeasures employed against mines already laid
require locating the mines. Classification of mines in
the riverine environment is difficult because of waterway
characteristics. Therefore, primary emphasis is placed on
minesweeping and area clearance. The most effective
countermeasures against drifting mines, explosive charges,
or swimmer-delivered limpet mines is an alert watch and
patrols around the anchorage or base area.

c. Passive Protection. When the threat of drifting mines

or explosive charges or swimmer-delivered limpet mines is
great, the use of nets and/or booms will provide some
protection for anchored ships or craft. However, in swift
river currents, passive measures are less effective.
Mooring tackle must be extraordinarily heavy because the
buildup of floating debris will often carry away even the
heaviest equipment. The most effective countermeasure
against this type of threat is an alert watch and patrols
around the anchorage or base area.

5. Salvage Operations. Salvage operations require highly

skilled personnel with specialized equipment. The salvage
effort must provide for highly mobile teams that can deploy to
remote areas on short notice. A salvage capability is
important because without it the number of lost craft is
likely to be extraordinarily high. Small craft are especially
vulnerable to accidental flooding. Salvage operations may
also include the recovery of land and air equipment.

a. Mission of Salvage Units. The mission of salvage

units is to provide salvage, repair, diving, and recovery
services to the riverine commander. To effectively carry
out its mission, the salvage unit must have a mobile lift
capability to transport the assigned heavy craft
equipment.

XIV-8
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

b. Salvage Support. Salvage personnel are highly trained

and skilled, yet vulnerable, and require area security
from the appropriate joint riverine component commander.
When requesting salvage support, the commander of the JRF
should provide the following information:

(1) Type of craft or equipment and how sunk.

(2) Water depth, visibility, tide ranges, and sea

state.

(3) Security and support available.

c. Salvage Plan. Before commencing a salvage operation,

the salvage unit prepares, taking into consideration the
following factors:

(1) Should the sunken craft be refloated, removed, or

destroyed?

(2) Can the salvage job be accomplished using locally

available assets?

(3) Can adequate security for the salvage forces be

provided?

(4) Is transportation available to bring the required

equipment to the salvage site?

6. Cover and Deception. Riverine cover and deception

operations undertake to deceive the enemy to enhance the
ability of the JRF to accomplish its mission.

a. Need for Cover and Deception Operations. The need for

cover and deception operations in a riverine area is based
on the following factors:

(1) Surprise is essential to a well-planned military

operation. Cover and deception provide a means of
achieving the tactical advantage of surprise.

(2) In a riverine area, the JRF may be under constant

surveillance by enemy agents with the capability to
exploit communication systems.

XIV-9
 b. Planning Cover and Deception Operations

(1) Cover and deception planning should be conducted

concurrently and in coordination with riverine
assault, waterway interdiction, and surveillance
plans. Similiar analysis is required for both the
operations plan and the cover and deception plan.

(2) The units participating in cover and deception

operations should be tasked to assist with the planning.

c. Security. Security is paramount in any cover and

deception operation. Distribution of the cover and
deception plan should be limited to those with a specified
need to know.

7. UW and Direct Action Operations

a. JRF UW and DA operations are normally conducted within

enemy or enemy-controlled territory by specialized
military and paramilitary forces. Resources assigned to
the JRF to conduct UW and/or DA operations normally
operate clandestinely and are capable of performing the
following missions:

(1) Interdict enemy lines of communication.

(2) Destroy or sabotage enemy craft, base areas, and

caches.

(3) Collect intelligence.

(4) Implant and recover sensors.

(5) Disrupt enemy political infrastructure.

(6) Assist with evasion and escape and CSAR of

friendly forces.

(7) Conduct special reconnaissance.

(8) Conduct foreign internal defense.

b. The nature of UW and DA operations requires that

particular emphasis be given to the mutual planning
process to ensure that operations are generated in support
of the overall mission. UW and DA operations are closely
coordinated with conventional operations being conducted
in the same or adjacent areas

XIV-10
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

c. Security is of prime importance during the planning,

execution, and, in many instances, after a UW and DA
operation. Distribution of UW and DA OPLANs and annexes
are normally held to an absolute minimum and include only
those commands that will be required to support or
coordinate the activities involved.

8. Psychological Operations

a. PSYOP are of major importance to joint riverine

operations. PSYOP personnel and assets can use riverine
platforms for dissemination of materials and messages
within remote riverine areas. PSYOP are intended to
influence the behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly
foreign groups on behalf of the riverine forces objective.
PSYOP activities (i.e., posters, leaflets, TV, radio and
loudspeakers broadcasts) should be considered a means by
which the goals of civic actions associated with riverine
forces are communicated to the indigenous populace.

b. Initial military operations disrupt commerce and

inconvenience or even endanger large segments of the local
population. The populace usually has been thoroughly
propagandized by the enemy force. Therefore, indigenous
and foreign military forces will likely be greeted with
hostility, suspicion, and at best, passive resistance.

c. To obtain the support of the civil population, the

words, deeds, and actions of the military force must be
carefully considered for their effect on the populace.
The creation of a favorable image of the national
government and its military forces may foster improved
cooperation of the civilian population.

d. The responsibility for conduct of PSYOP rests with

commanders at all echelons. Policy direction, propaganda
materials, and guidance as to themes, target groups,
intelligence, and specified programs are normally provided
by higher headquarters. Local commanders should adapt the
materials available to achieve the best effect in their
own areas.

9. Civil Affairs

a. CA operations are activities intended to gain

essential civilian cooperation and support or reduce
civilian interference in attainment of the military

XIV-11
objective. They affect the relationship between the
commander’s military forces and the indigenous civil
authorities and people. These operations may require
military forces to perform some or all of the functions
normally performed by the indigenous government. CA is
the responsibility of the commander, and his relationship
with the local civil authorities may require him to
establish both personal and organizational contacts.
Joint CA operations should be planned and conducted in
accordance with Joint Pub 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil
Affairs".

b. Military civic action is one of the major activities

of CA in a riverine area. It consists primarily of
encouraging the indigenous military forces to participate
in projects useful to the local population. US forces may
also advise or engage in direct civic action. The role of
US forces should be primarily that of providing skills and
mutual assistance not generally available to the host or
foreign country’s civilian participants. Such action
serves to improve the image of the friendly military
forces in the eyes of the population, as well as alleviate
or eliminate some of their basic grievances.

XIV-12
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

CHAPTER XV

LOGISTICS

1. Logistics Support Provided to the JRF. Logistic support

provided by external forces must be responsive to the needs of
the JRF. A system must be established with the capability of
performing the following functions:

a. Provision and transportation of supplies and equipment

to locations designated by the JRF component commanders.

b. Evacuation of casualties beyond the medical capability

of the JRF.

c. Operation of maintenance and salvage facilities over

and above those authorized by the components of the JRF.

d. Evacuation of POWs and refugees beyond the capability

organic to the JRF, or providing humane conditions to
enemy POWs or refugees in the event evacuation is not
immediately possible.

2. Logistics Support Provided by the Mobile Riverine Force

a. Basic Consideration. The basic consideration of

logistic support provided by the JRF is to make the
assault elements of the force self-sufficient as long as
possible, in relation to the operation.

(1) The prescribed load for individual RAC assigned

to a riverine assault element should include food,
water, and ammunition for embarked troops. Resupply
of the assault craft in the AOs will depend largely on
the duration of planned operations, as well as the
total lift capability of resupply craft.

(2) Waterborne craft and aircraft are the normal

means of resupply.

(3) RAC or assault helicopters should be assigned to

resupply craft when transiting especially dangerous
portions of the resupply route. The withdrawal of
surface craft from assault operations for this purpose
will temporarily reduce the fire support capability of
the force.

XV-1
b. Supply and Maintenance Functions. The close and
constant association of ground and maritime components
during joint riverine operations lends itself to the
establishment and operation of joint facilities that
include, but are not limited to, supply, maintenance, and
services support.

XV-2
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

APPENDIX A

U.S. NAVY RIVERINE ASSETS

Graphics for appendix A normally placed here.

A-1
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

APPENDIX B

U.S. ARMY RIVERINE ASSETS

B-1
 APPENDIX C

U.S. COAST GUARD RIVERINE ASSETS

C-1
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

APPENDIX D

US MARINE CORPS RIVERINE/WARFARE ASSETS

D-1
1. Purpose and Scope. This appendix to provides information
on the application and capabilities of USMC forces in riverine
operations. This appendix contains an explains the basic USMC
organization for combat and the concept and capabilities for
employment of USMC forces in riverine operations. For more
detailed information on USMC doctrine, tactics, techniques,
and procedures for planning and executing riverine operations,
see NWP 13 (Rev A/FMFM 7-5), "Doctrine for Navy/Marine Corps
Joint Riverine Operations" and FMFM 7-5A, "Marine Air-Ground
Task Force (MAGTF) Riverine Operations".

2. Organization

a. Marine Air-Ground Task Force. USMC riverine forces

are fully integrated combined arms MAGTFs tailored to
accomplish specific missions. MAGTFs are capable of
functioning as self-sustaining uni-Service forces under
the operational control of unified, subordinate unified,
or joint task force commanders. This tailored force
exploits the combat power inherent in closely integrated
air and ground operations and allows the MAGTF commander
to focus the point of effort and strike the enemy at his
weakness. The central operational concept for employing a
MAGTF is that it is most effective in battle when used as
a strategically mobile, combined arms force under a single
commander. It provides a balance of combat, combat
support, combat service support, and/or elements. The
MAGTF is structured and equipped for expeditionary
operations and has organic weapon systems, amphibious
vehicles, and boats that can be used to exploit the
marginal terrain encountered in a riverine environment.

b. Elements of the MAGTF. Although the size and

composition of a MAGTF will vary with the tactical
situation and the assigned mission, it will normally
consist of four major components as described in Figure
D-1.

+---------------+
|COMMAND ELEMENT|
| (CE) |
+-------+-------+
+----------------------+---------------------+
+------+------+ +-------+-------+ +-------+-------+
|GROUND COMBAT| |AVIATION COMBAT| |COMBAT SERVICE |
| ELEMENT | | ELEMENT | |SUPPORT ELEMENT|
| (GCE) | | (ACE) | | (CSSE) |
+-------------+ +---------------+ +---------------+
Figure D-1. Organization of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces

D-2
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

(1) Command Element. The CE is the MAGTF

headquarters. It is composed of the commander, the
general or executive and special staff sections, the
headquarters section, and requisite communications and
service support facilities, including the SRI Group or
its detachment thereof. The SRI Group provides the
command, control, and coordination essential for
effective planning and execution of riverine
operations.

(2) Ground Combat Element. The GCE may be composed

of combat, combat support, and organic combat service
support units organized to conduct riverine
operations. It is constructed around an infantry
organization and varies in size from a unit smaller
than a battalion to one or more Marine divisions,
based on the tactical situation and the mission of the
MAGTF.

(3) Aviation Combat Element. The ACE may be composed

of those aviation units (including air control
agencies), combat, combat support, and organic combat
service support units organized to provide aviation
support required by the situation. Aviation support
may include all, or a portion of, the functions of
USMC aviation in varying degrees based on the tactical
situation and size of the MAGTF and its mission. The
functions of aviation include: air reconnaissance,
anti- air warfare, assault support, offensive air
support, EW, and control of aircraft and missiles.
The ACE is organized around an aviation headquarters
and varies in size from an aviation detachment to one
or more Marine aircraft wings.

(4) Combat Service Support Element. The CSSE is

organized to provide the full range of combat service
support functions and capabilities necessary to
support the MAGTF. The combat service support
functions that may be provided include: supply,
maintenance, transportation, general engineering,
health services, and services. The CSSE may vary in
size from a combat service support detachment to a
force service support group.

D-3
 c. Types of MAGTFs. There are four types of MAGTFs that
may be formed to conduct riverine operation (Figure D-2):

+----------------------+
| MEF |
| COMMAND ELEMENT |
|(Commanded by a LtGen)|
+----------+-----------+
+----------------------+---------------------+
+------+------+ +-------+-------+ +-------+-------+
| MARINE | | MARINE | | FORCE SERVICE |
| DIVISION | | AIRCRAFT WING | | SUPPORT GROUP |
+-------------+ +---------------+ +---------------+
Figure D-2. Example of a Marine Expeditionary Force

(1) Marine Expeditionary Force. A MEF is the largest

(30,000 to 60,000 Marines and sailors) and most
powerful of the MAGTFs. It may range in size from one
to multiple Marine divisions and aircraft wings,
together with a force service support group. A MEF is
capable of conducting sustained independent riverine
operations against the most capable adversarial
threat. The MEF is supported by a Naval Construction
Regiment. The MEF deploys with 60 days of
sustainment.

+---------------------+
| MEB |
| COMMAND ELEMENT |
|(Commanded by a BGen)|
+----------+----------+
+----------------------+---------------------+
+------+----------+ +-------+-------+ +-------+-------+
|INFANTRY REGIMENT| | MARINE | |BRIGADE SERVICE|
| (Rein) | | AIRCRAFT GROUP| | SUPPORT GROUP |
+-----------------+ +---------------+ +---------------+
Figure D-3. Example of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade

(2) Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The MEB, with

4,000 to 18,000 Marines and sailors, is normally built
around a reinforced infantry regiment, an aircraft
group, and a brigade service support group. It is
capable of rapid deployment by amphibious shipping or
strategic or tactical airlift. The MEB is supported
by a naval mobile construction battalion. It deploys
with up to 30 days of sustainment.

D-4
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

+---------------------+
| MEU |
| COMMAND ELEMENT |
|(Commanded by a Col) |
+----------+----------+
+----------------------+---------------------+
+--------+---------+ +-------+-------+ +------+------+
|INFANTRY BATTALION| | HELICOPTER | | MEU SERVICE |
| (Rein) | |SQUADRON (Rein)| |SUPPORT GROUP|
+------------------+ +---------------+ +-------------+
Figure D-4. Example of a Marine Expeditionary Unit

(3) Marine Expeditionary Unit. The MEU, with 1,000

to 4,000 Marines and sailors, is normally composed of
a reinforced infantry battalion, a helicopter squadron
reinforced with deployed and CONUS on-call fixed-wing
assets, and a service support group. The MEU is
routinely forward deployed embarked aboard the ships
of an Amphibious Ready Group and is uniquely organized
and equipped to initiate and conduct short-notice
riverine operations. The MEU is task organized,
trained, and equipped to conduct a wide variety of
conventional and specialized operations. Foremost is
its capability to conduct long-range raids from over
the horizon without electronic emissions, during
periods of darkness, and under adverse weather or sea
conditions. For sustained operations ashore, the MEU
may serve as the forward element of a MEB. The MEU
can also deploy on short notice by a mix of tactical
and strategic airlift. The MEU is supported by a
naval mobile construction detachment. MEUs deployed
in amphibious shipping normally carry 15 days of
sustainment.

+---------------------+
| SPF |
| COMMAND ELEMENT |
+----------+----------+
|
+----------------------+---------------------+
+-----+-------+ +-----+----+ +---------+--------+
|RIFLE COMPANY| | AVIATION | | COMBAT SERVICE |
| (Rein) | |DETACHMENT| |SUPPORT DETACHMENT|
+-------------+ +----------+ +------------------+
Figure D-5. Example of a Special Purpose Force

D-5
 (4) Special Purpose Forces. These forces are small,
task organized MAGTFs configured to accomplish
missions for which the MEF, MEB, and MEU are not
appropriate. They can be configured, trained, and
equipped to conduct a wide variety of conventional and
other operations within the riverine environment.
They can be deployed by a variety of means, including
amphibious or commercial ships, tactical or strategic
airlift, or by organic USMC aviation assets. These
forces are normally composed of Marines highly trained
in day or night operations, including insert/extract,
raid, and strike operations. They may possess
extensive surveillance and reconnaissance
capabilities, including unmanned aerial vehicles,
radio reconnaissance, and counterintelligence assets,
as required. These forces’ can be employed in a
variety of missions, including mobile training teams,
security assistance operations, and small independent
action forces within the riverine environment.

3. MAGTF Employment

a. General. MAGTFs are trained and equipped with weapon

systems, vehicles, and watercraft that can be employed in
the riverine environment. Although there is an inherent
capability in these forces, the full capability and
flexibility of their combat power in riverine operations
is better exploited when employed as part of a Navy-USMC
mobile riverine force.

b. Concept of Employment. A MAGTF embarked aboard the

ships of an ARG is uniquely organized and equipped to
initiate and conduct short-notice riverine operations. A
low profile in the host nation can be maintained by
specifically tailoring the riverine force to the mission.
The remaining forces, equipment, and support can be kept
aboard an amphibious seabase. Upon establishing an
initial lodgement in the riverine area, the riverine force
can be reinforced by forces and equipment from sources
external to the ARG/MAGTF should it become necessary to
expand the scope of the operations.

(1) Initial Phase of Employment

(a) The MRF, using assets currently organic to

the ARG/MAGTF, will primarily conduct operations
to protect friendly lines of communications and
deny the use of the riverine area to hostile

D-6
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

forces through surveillance, interdiction, raids,

and/or aggressive reconnaissance, combat, and
security patrols. The MRF will also be able to
conduct limited PSYOP (through words and actions)
and small-scale military civic action projects
(expedient road and/or bridge repair or
construction, minor carpentry, drainage or
irrigation improvement, medical or dental
assistance, etc.).

(b) The MRF’s capability to achieve control of a

hostile riverine area and its adjoining land
areas will initially be limited because the only
survivable waterborne troop-carriers and C2 craft
are the amphibious vehicles and craft presently
organic to the ARG/MAGTF. Lack of specialized
mine countermeasures craft, armed escort craft,
and fire support craft will also impose
operational constraints. These initial
limitations can be offset by using innovative
techniques and tactics that capitalize on the
capabilities of organic amphibious vehicles,
landing craft, raiding craft, and airborne
platforms. For example:

1. Troop-laden AAVs can operate in the

riverine environment under their own power
or be transported in landing craft,
splashed, and swum ashore to provide for
rapid maneuver of the ground combat element.

2. Light armored infantry with LAVs can

also be rapidly positioned in an inland
riverine environment via landing craft.

3. Barge-mounted artillery, LAVs (mortar

variants) embarked aboard landing craft, and
organic infantry mortars fired from floating
platforms can provide expedient fire
support.

4. Helicopters can be used to provide

airborne command posts, evacuate casualties,
lift reaction or raid forces, provide
supporting fires, resupply critical

D-7
 items, provide aerial observation and
adjustment of supporting fires, conduct
visual reconnaissance or surveillance, and
relay communications.

5. Radio battalion collection teams and/or

radio reconnaissance teams embarked aboard
airborne or waterborne platforms can provide
an enhanced signals intelligence collection
capability.

6. AAV and LAV command vehicles can operate

in the riverine environment under their own
power or be embarked aboard landing craft to
provide MRF C2.

7. Remote piloted vehicles can assist in

surveillance, reconnaissance, and
intelligence gathering and relay of
communications.

8. Mine hunting from airborne or waterborne

platforms, coupled with aggressive
patrolling to restrict minelaying, can be
effective mine countermeasures.

9. AV8B HARRIERs can provide CAS.

(2) Subsequent Phases of Employment

(a) After friendly LOCs have been secured and

hostile use of the riverine area has been denied
as necessary, the MRF could be reinforced with
assets that are external to the ARG MAGTF, and
the scope of riverine operations may be expanded
to include operations to achieve and maintain
complete control of the riverine area and its
adjoining land areas. This would involve
isolating the riverine area, seizing key terrain,
finding and destroying hostile forces, and
increasing the scope of PSYOP and military civic
action projects. Control of the riverine area
may also involve the use of combined action
forces.

(b) The MRF may require reinforcement with

additional assets, including:

D-8
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

1. Ground, aviation, and combat service

support forces and equipment.

2. SOF, including SEALs, special boat

units, civil affairs and PSYOP units.

3. Specialized watercraft for C2 mine

countermeasures, armed escort, and fire
support craft.

4. Armored troop-carrying craft.

5. Naval construction forces.

6. Carrier-based aircraft support.

7. Naval gunfire support ships.

4. Summary. MAGTFs, supported by amphibious ships and

landing craft, can conduct sea-based riverine operations.
Innovative use of organic equipment will be required to
compensate for the initial lack of specialized riverine craft.
Once established in the riverine area, the MAGTF can provide
the infrastructure for the phased introduction of external
forces and equipment to facilitate measured increases in the
scope of operations.

Remaining pages through D-14 are blank in this file. Figures

are present in the printed version.

D-9
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

GLOSSARY

PART I -- ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAV assault amphibian vehicles

ACE Aviation Combat Element
AI air interdiction
AO area of operations
AOR area of responsibility
ARG Amphibious Ready Group
ASPB assault support patrol boat

C2 command and control

CA civil affairs
CAS close air support
CCB command and control boat
CE command element
CJRF commander, joint riverine force
COCOM Combatant Command (command
authority)
COMSEC communications security
CSAR combat search and rescue
CSSE Combat Service Support Element
CT counterterrorism

DA direct action

ECCM e l e c t r o n i c
counter-countermeasures
EW electronic warfare

FID foreign internal defense

GCE Ground Combat Element

JOC joint operations center

JRF joint riverine force

LAV light amored vehicle

LOC lines of communications

MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force

MATC mini-armored troop carrier
MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit
MRF Mobile Riverine Force

NSW naval special warfare

GL-1
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security

PBR patrol boat, river

POW prisoner of war
PSYOP psychological operations

RAC riverine assault craft

ROE rules of engagement
RRC Rigid Raiding Craft

SBD special boat detachment

SBU special boat unit
SEAL sea-air-land
SOF special operations forces
SOP standing operating procedure
SPECBOATRON special boat squadron
SPF Special Purpose Force
SR special reconnaissance
SRI Surveillance Reconnaissance
Intelligence

TAOR tactical area of responsibility

TOC tactical operations center

UW unconventional warfare

GL-2
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

PART II -- DEFINITIONS*

assault craft gunfire.* Direct and indirect fire provided to

forces ashore by naval craft.

command and control craft.* Craft equipped to provide C2

facilities for field units and river assault craft.

counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter,

and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

direct action mission. In special operations, a specified act

involving operations of an overt, covert, clandestine or low
visibility nature conducted primarily by a sponsoring power’s
special operations forces in hostile or denied areas. (Joint
Pub 1-02).

direct action operations.** Short-duration strikes and other

small scale offensive actions principally taken by special
operations forces to seize, destroy, or inflict damage on a
specified target; or to destroy, capture, or recover
designated personnel or material. In the conduct of these
operations, special operations forces may employ raid, ambush,
or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions;
conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime
platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision guided
munitions; and conduct independent sabotage. Also called DA.

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and

military agencies of a government in any of the action
programs taken by another government to free and protect its
society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (Joint
PUB 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force which is

composed of significant elements of the Army, the Navy or the
Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these
Services, operating under a single commander authorized to
exercise unified command or operational control over joint
forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander.** A general term applied to a

commander authorized to exercise Combatant Command (command
authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also
called JFC.

GL-3
joint riverine force.* A joint or single-Service force
trained and equipped to conduct riverine operations.

mini-armored troop carrier.* An assault support craft which

provides troop transport, combat support, and combat service
support to the assault elements of the MRF. Also called MATC.

mobile riverine base.* A group of ships, barges, and craft

operating in a riverine area as a base for a joint riverine
force, or elements thereof. Also called MRB.

naval special warfare.* A specific term describing a

designated naval warfare specialty and covering operations
generally accepted as being unconventional in nature, and in
many cases, covert or clandestine in character. These
operations include utilization of specially trained forces
assigned to conduct unconventional warfare, psychological
operations, beach and coastal reconnaissance, operational
deception operations, counterinsurgency operations, coastal
and river interdiction, and certain special tactical
intelligence collection operations in addition to those
intelligence functions normally retained for planning and
conducting special operations in a hostile environment.

naval special warfare group.* The Navy organizations to which

most naval special warfare forces are assigned for some
operational and all administrative purposes. It consists of a
group headquarters with command and control, communications,
and support staff, SEAL teams, special boat squadrons and
subordinate special boat units, and SEAL delivery vehicle
teams. The group is the source of all deployed naval special
warfare forces and administratively supports the naval special
warfare units assigned to the theater CINCs. The group staff
provides general operational direction and coordinates the
activities of its subordinate units. A naval special warfare
group is capable of task-organizing to meet a wide variety of
requirements. Also called NSWG.

naval special warfare task group.* Elements that provide

command, control, and communications for naval special warfare
units deployed in support of fleet commanders, special
operations commands of unified and subordinate unified
commands, and joint special operations task forces. Also
called NSWTG.

patrol boat, riverine.* A high speed, armed, and lightly

armored patrol boat used to conduct riverine interdiction and
surveillance operations. Also called PBR.

GL-4
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

rally point. An area selected for regrouping of forces before

continuing; it may be predesignated. Also RP.

riverine area. An inland or coastal area comprising both land

and water, characterized by limited land lines of
communication, with extensive water surface and/or inland
waterways that provide natural routes for surface
transportation and communications. (Joint Pub 1-02).

riverine assault craft.* A generic term applied to the family

of riverine warfare craft. These craft include, but are not
limited to: the patrol boat riverine, mini-armored troop
carrier, landing craft utility, landing craft medium, landing
craft air cushion, rubber raiding craft, rigid inflatable
boat, and combat rubber raiding craft. The inventory may
include specifically designed US built or indigenous craft.
Also called RAC.

riverine assault support elements.* The assault craft

elements of the mobile riverine force which provides combat
support and combat service support to the assault elements of
the riverine ground force.

riverine assault operations.* Those strike operations

conducted in a riverine area.

riverine forces.* Forces specifically task organized,

equipped, and trained to operate in and exploit the unique
characteristics of a riverine area.

riverine landing area.* A segment of a waterway that includes

one or more riverine landing sites. Both banks of the
waterway may be included in the riverine landing area.

riverine landing point.* A point within a riverine landing

site where one riverine assault craft can land.

riverine landing site.* A specified location along a waterway

where one or more riverine craft can embark or disembark
troops, supplies, or equipment.

riverine operation.** An operation conducted by forces

organized to cope with and exploit the unique characteristics
of a riverine area; to locate and destroy hostile forces;
and/or to achieve or maintain control of the riverine area.
Joint riverine operations combine ground, maritime, air and
special operations, as appropriate, and are suited to the
nature of the specific riverine area in which operations are
to be conducted.

GL-5
riverine patrol operation.* Maritime operation conducted in a
riverine environment that typically includes surveillance,
interdiction, blocking, and security, and is characterized by
the primary employment of maritime forces.

sea-air-land team. A group of officers and individuals

specially trained and equipped for conducting unconventional
and paramilitary operations and to train personnel of allied
nations in such operations including surveillance and
reconnaissance in and from restricted waters, rivers, and
coastal areas. Commonly referred to as SEAL team. (Joint Pub
1-02)

special boat detachment.* An element of a special boat unit,

consisting of combatant craft and assigned crewmen. Also
called SBD.

special boat squadron.* Naval command that operates assigned

craft in support of naval special warfare operations as
directed; develops, tests, and evaluates operational
procedures, techniques, and equipment; improves and documents
tactics in coastal and restricted water warfare; maintains
assigned craft and crews in readiness to conduct or support
naval special warfare; conducts coastal and riverine patrol
and surveillance; conducts harassment and interdiction of
maritime lines of communications; and conducts operations to
assist in the training of fleet units in anti-patrol boat
tactics. Special boat squadrons are an arm of the naval
special warfare groups comprised of several commissioned
special boat units, each with complementary warfare mission
areas. Also called SPECBOATRON.

special boat unit.* Those US Navy forces organized, trained,

and equipped to conduct or support naval special warfare and
joint special operations with coastal and riverine patrol
boats and other surface combatant craft designed primarily for
special operations support. Also called SBU.

special operations. Operations conducted by specially

trained, equipped, and organized DOD forces against strategic
or tactical targets in pursuit of national military,
political, economic, or psychological objectives. These
operations may be conducted during periods of peace or
hostilities. They may support conventional operations, or
they may be prosecuted independently when the use of
conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible
(Joint Pub 1-02).

GL-6
 Joint Test Pub 3-06

special reconnaissance operations.** Reconnaissance and

surveillance actions conducted by special operations forces to
obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection
methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions,
and activities of an actual or potential enemy, or to secure
data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, geographic,
or demographic characteristics of a particular area. These
operations include target acquisition, area assessment, and
post-strike reconnaissance. Also called SR.

suppression of enemy air defenses. That activity which

neutralizes, destroys or temporarily degrades enemy air
defenses in a specific area by physical attack and/or
electronic warfare. Also called SEAD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical area of responsibility. A defined area of land for

which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander
of the area as a measure for control of assigned forces and
coordination of support. Commonly referred to as TAOR (Joint
Pub 1-02).

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and

paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held,
enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory.
Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the
interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape,
subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low
visibility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelated
aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or
collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually
supported and directed in varying degrees by (an) external
source(s) during all conditions of war or peace. (Joint Pub
1-02).

* Unless identified as extracted from Joint Pub 1-02,

terminology herein is not standardized within the
Department of Defense and is applicable only in the
context of this document.

** Upon final approval of this publication, this term will be

included in Joint Pub 1-02.

GL-7
 INDEX

PAGE

Afloat base movement, riverine XI-2

Air drops VII-4
Air operations V-5
Area of operations, determination of III-5
Arms planning supporting V-1
Artillery V-4
Assault force, movement of the XII-3
Assault operations XII-1
Attack and subsequent operations landing XII-5
Automatic airborne radio retransmission VII-4

Barrier operations XIII-1

Base security, riverine XIV-1
Base sites, selection of III-9
Breakdown or riverine craft X-1

Chains of command parallel III-3

Civil affairs XIV-11
Close air support (CAS) V-7
Collection of intelligence III-3
Command and control X-3, XI-5, XII-4
Command and organization II-1
Command craft VII-4
Command during operations II-1
Communication deception and countermeasures VII-6
Communication plan VII-6
Communications planning VII-1
Communications security III-13, VII-6
Concurrent planning III-2
Contingency planning X-1
Counterintelligence estimates VI-6
Countermeasures, communication VII-6
Cover and deception XIV-10

Deception communication VII-6

Directive, initiating II-1
Disaster control X-2
Dissemination of intelligence III-3

Emergencies aboard riverine craft X-1

Emergency assistance X-1
Emergency sortie X-1
Engineer planning VIII-13

Index-1
Environment, effect of VII-2
Environmental considerations VI-4
Essential elements of friendly
information (EEFI) III-14

Fire support planning V-1

Fire X-1
Flag hoist VII-3

H-hours, selecting of tentative III-10

Helicopter landing zones, selection of III-8

Initiating Directive II-1

Intelligence
annex VI-6
collection of III-3
dissemination of III-3
estimates VI-6
planning VI-1
sources and collection VI-4
intelligence support riverine force VI-6

Logistics VIII-1, XV-1

Man overboard X-1

Measures to prevent mutual interference XI-3
Medical planning VIII-9
Messenger service VII-3
Mine warfare operations XIV-8
Mission objective, determination of III-5
Mobile riverine force, movement of XI-1
Multichannel radio systems VII-3

Naval gunfire V-4, XII-12

Operating dates, selecting tentative III-10

Operations
security III-11
ancillary XIV-1
Organization, effect of II-1

Planned withdrawal XII-15

Planning III-1
by parallel chains of command III-3
concurrent III-3
procedures III-4
Psychological operations XIV-11

Index-2
Radio circuit requirements VII-4
Radio VII-3
Reaction force XII-12
Reconnaissance XIV-1
Rehearsals III-11
Reserve force XII-12
River assault craft VII-4
River landing areas, selection of III-7
River landing sites, selection of III-7
Riverine afloat base movement XI-2
Riverine base security XIV-1
Riverine force intelligence support VI-6
Riverine operations, concept of I-1

Salvage operations XIV-9

Search and rescue X-3
Security, communications VI-6
Sociological considerations VI-5
Sound communications VII-4
Special operations IV-1
Supporting arms requirements V-2, XII-12
Supporting operations, planning IX-1

Tentative operating dates and

H-hours selecting III-10
Terminology IX

Unconventional warfare operations XIV-10

Waterway clearance XIV-1

Waterway interdiction operations XIII-1
Waterway routes, selection of III-8
Wire VII-3

Index-3