Re SP Arms
Re SP Arms
(a) Engrs carry out imp functions in the prep period of war to enable effective
launch of the field forces in battle, the rationale for their existence stems from
the sp they provides during the actual conduct of ops.
(b) The engr sp plan is an integral part of the fmn cdr’s plans from bde to
theatre army.
(c) The role of the mil engrs in war is to apply engineering knowledge, skill and
resources for the furtherance of the cdr’s plan.
(d) Implicit in this role is his responsibility for advising the cdr with regards To
tac and strategic opportunities and limitations arising out of engineering
considerations and capabilities.
(e) Engrs are an imp element of the combined arms teams performing a host of
tasks in the combat zone that enable deployed forces to “live, move and fight
better”.
(f) Basically this role involves maint of or restoring own mobility in the btlfd and
restricting that of the en.
(g) Engr org for combat are designed to carry out combat engr tasks which may
be broadly categorized under three generic heads:-
(ii) Plans for rendering critical installations like airfields, depots and
comn facilities in own territory unusable in the event of their
capture by the en.
(iii) Provide engr elements with airborne, air tpted or heliborne forces
inserted for interdiction of en forces, the engr being tasked to
deny/demolish critical facilities like airfield or bridges in en
territory.
(c) Survivability tasks. These will correspond to tasks that enable the
field forces in the combat zone ‘to live and fight better’. Some of these
tasks are:-
(a) Dply of engrs for the battle task takes place in two stages:-
(i) First, the entire engr force is grouped with the division for the opn.
(ii) Thereafter, each individual task force is deployed on its allotted task.
3
(b) An engr task force is a composn of a certain no. of tps and eqpt suitably
formed to accomplish a certain engr task.
(c) The reqt of tps and eqpt for various types of engr tasks differ, and sometime
even for the same task, from site to site.
(d) The rqmt of task force will vary depending upon the opnl situation and the
task envisaged.
(e) The task force is generally located either with the brigades or in the engr assy
As or harbor.
(f) Arrangement should be made to ensure reasonable security of the task force
at the work site.
Sequence of Events
(a) Task forces are deployed by adopting a dply procedure for a task so that time
in commencement and completion of work is saved; Task force is divided into
different functional groups and the dply procedure involves simultaneous
action by these different functional groups which are;
(b) In offensive ops, task forces have to be closely married up with the sped
forces; therefore each of these groups will have to be integrated with the
corresponding component of the sped forces.
(c) A task may be a recurring reqmt in an area of ops and therefore worthy of a
drill.
(d) However, it may never occur in another area; the need for a drill should
therefore, be judged on its own merits.
(e) Only those aspects of a drill which are not standard should form the
substance of standing orders.
4
2. Discuss the dply of engrs for the major tasks in various ops of war.
Advance
(a) Opening of routes. "Rush job for “(tr/wheel veh) leading element and
more permanent job for the rest of the fmn for rush job involve followings:-
(b) Breaching of obsts. As speed is the main consideration, the use of asslt
engr eqpt like mine trawls and heavy mobile bridges becomes imp.
(c) Seizing of Bridge Intact. A suitable size of sapper party grouped with the
force for this task. It will be their duty to neutralize the charges to facilitate
the capture the bridges intact.
(d) Ensuring water supply to advancing tps.
(e) Constr of Helipad & airstrips.
Attack
(a) The dply of engr should start from the engr assy A or harbor in the vicinity of
brigade assy As, before they go off to work or marry up with brigades.
(i) Patrolling to ascertain the str and extent of en defence and obst.
(ii) Constr of tracks for the dply of the attacking forces.
(iii) Breaching of minefds and other obsts.
(iv) Constr of br.
(v) Constr of landing strips and helipads.
(vi) Mine laying and devt of obsts during reorg stage.
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(i) Patrolling.
(i) The breaching force. This consists of the engr HQs, tps,
plant and eqpt allotted to the asslting to the fmn specifically
for the breaching ops. This is grouped with and is ‘in sp’ of
the asslting bde or Bdes.
(iv) Lane cdr. The breaching party for safe lane is comded by
a lane cdr during breaching.
6
(b) Water obsts. Deny the roads and tracks leading to the water obst on the far
bank. However most of the effort will be used to improve the near bank.
(c) Ditch obst and flooding. More applicable in plains where water canal exists.
This requires considerable time and effort to construct.
(d) Counter attack. Improving tracks and rds so that CA force can be launched
from an unexpected direction. Prior to CA assistance would be required for
making gaps through minefd.
(e) Fighting as Inf. Unless tps are very short, Engr should not be used to hold
def posns due to their heavy commitment on engr tasks. However if they have
to be used, the following considerations should be kept in mind:-
(i) Their ground holding task should not be on objectives likely to come
under initial asslt, as they would not have enough time to prepare their
defence.
(ii) When employed as inf, field companies should be organized on lines
similar to rifle companies by giving them machine gun, a-tk wpns and
mortars.
(iii) Arty fire sp and forward obsn officer should also be allotted.
(iv) All vehicles, eqpt and plant should be sent back to the field park
company in the DAA.
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River Crossing
(a) The area chosen for an asslt crossing will be influenced, if not dictated by the
choice of raft and bridge sites.
(b) Therefore; engr int must be collected well in adv from air photograph,
civilian sources, tech data etc.
(c) Int must be confirmed by engr recce party before the final choice of the site is
made.
(i) Both banks of the river to ensure that the eqpt will suit a natural
condition.
(ii) Suitable appch and exit route for tracks and/or wheel betn the nearest
road and the river banks.
(iii) Marshalling harbor and assy As for eqpt and engr tps.
(e) In order to make the best use of engr tps and river crossing eqpt aval, it is
imp that engr plg is coordinated at the highest possible level.
(f) Considerable time as needed for engr recce, plg and prepn for a deliberate
crossing.
8
3. What are the responsibilities of all arms other than Engrs in various engineering
task?
(a) All arms other than engrs, are capable of doing many field-engineering tasks.
(c) For this every inf units and sub-units must have few personnel to train and do
the above mentioned engineering tasks.
(d) In NA, we have all arms field engr qualified officers/JCO and other ranks in
every units/sub-units.
(e) A team of engrs in every units/sub-units on ERE duty provide engrs trg and
manage other opnl and admin matter.
(a) To achieve the best engrs sp, co-opn betn the sped fmn and engrs must exist.
(b) For this the staff must do the followings:
(i) Keep the engr adviser in the complete picture of anticipated opn and
ensure all the aval info is fed to him.
(ii) Involve engr adviser in plg of all opn right from the beginning.
(iii) Involve engrs in the patrol team when required by informing engrs
about the patrol as early as possible.
(iv) Ensure all arms pass back the info of engr interest.
(v) Clearly lay down the priorities of engr tasks.
(vi) Provide extra logistic back up in terms of tpt, wireless and labor.
(vii) Arrange protection.
(viii) Ensure all arms are capable of carrying out their share of minor engr
tasks.
(ix) Provide engr rqmts of air photos and other info.
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(a) Keep the engr cdr fully informed at all times and obtained for him any
additional info reqd for engr plg.
(b) Consult the engr adviser before plg matters requiring engr plg.
(c) Informed the engr as early as possible of any ptl which, by att of engr recce
parties, might yield use full engr info.
(d) Impress upon all arms the imp of passing back info of engr interest.
(e) Clearly letdown priorities of engr tasks.
(f) Arrange for the provision of tpt , labor & extra wireless sets as reqd.
(g) Arrange for the protection of engr working parties & eqpt , where necessary.
(h) Ensure that all arms are capable of carrying out their share of minor engr
tasks & that, where both engr & other arms are concerned; their respective
responsibilities are laid down clearly.
(i) Include & provide engr reqd of air photos.
(a) Obsts
The aim of all obsts is to assist in the destruction of the enemy by the
following means.
a) Wire Obst
b) Anti Personal Minefds
c) Thorn Fence
d) Punji Fields
e) Wall
f) Ditch
a) Marshes
b) River
c) Cliff, Steep Slope
d) Dense Growth Bushes
(i) Axial
(ii) Lateral
(d) Categories of obst belt. In an organized defense or wdl, obst belts are of the
fol two categories:-
(i) Primary belt. Continuous across the whole front and selected by
highest cdr.
(ii) Subsidiary belt. Normally selected at Div level to supplement the
primary belt.
4. What are the various types of wire obst? Which types are suitable for op wiring?
(a) Low Wire Entanglement. Laid to slow the speed of movt of en tps. It is
suitable in plain terrain. It is prepared by using barbed wire. Frontage and
depth of this type of wire obst depends on the type of terrain and resources
aval.
(b) Double Apron Fence. can be prepared by using barbed wire and can halt
en’s movt. It is suitable for both plain and mtn trn. Frontage depends upon
the frontage of the defence and rqmt of cdr.
(c) Cat Wire Fence Type – A. prepared by using concertina wire and barbed
wire and can halt the en’s move. is plain and hilly trn.
(d) Cat Wire Fence Type – B. Same as type-I with double concertina wire and
with more delay potential. It is prepared when enough resources are avail.
As the purpose of op is not to fight any def battle; no specific type of wire obst is
req. However, for the perfection of the personals of op and also prevent any
interference from wild animals, following types of wires can be used in op-
6. Defence Brick
(i) Constr of fd def for a bde gp for apprx seven days. Only emergency
items catered.
(ii) Constr of 115 bunkers with 3 ft earth cover. Sufficient for all MMGs
and a portion of LMGs and ops.
(iii) Revetment and splinter proof OHPs for all fire trenches and wpn pits.
(iv) Approx 130 shelters with 3 ft earth cover for comd posts, ads and such
reqmt.
(v) 5400m of LWE & 1800m cat wire fence type II.
(ii) Plg For Defense Store. The DEFENSE BRICK should not be used for the
plg purpose below the comd or rarely core level. At all other level
DEFENSE STORE must be catered for on item basis.
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(d) Weight. The weight of the new defense brick is 540 ton and it can be carried
in 180*3 ton vehicle.
7. What are the purposes of obst and what their kinds?
8. What are the principles to be observed while siting and designing of obst?
(a) Continuous
(b) Cover by fire
(c) Concealment
(d) Depth
(e) En’s likely appch
(f) Masking of fire
(g) Effective
(h) Security and secrecy
(i) Confirm with Natural obst.
(j) En’s breaching capability
(k) Co-ord
(i) Mine field. Protective mine fd in front of def area is laid down by Bn
cdr and coordinated by bde Cdr. The frontage of the mine fd is as per
the defended area. Depending on the terrain and other rqmt, depth may
be min 600m to 1000m. the density of mine fd depends upon the
resources avail, amount of delay to be imposed and the policy laid down
by the higher cdr.
(ii) Other mine fd. When the Bn is taking def as a part of the higher fmn,
other types of mine fds like def, tac, nuisance, dummy mine fds are laid
in front of defence by the higher fmn to delay, canalize, disorganize the
en attack.
(iii) Wire Obst. Wire obst covering the def is laid just in front of the fdl
and behind the minefd. The depth of the wire obst may be approx 35m.
The wire obst may depend upon the resources avail, trn condition and
the amount of delay to be imposed.
(iv) Natural obst. Natural features like hills, mtn, rivers, flood, and
swamps may act as natural obst. They should be suitably exploited in
the bn obst plan.
(v) Other artificial obst. They can be created in front of def area in
conjunction with natural obst, mixed and wire obst to achieve more
effects. The obst may be –
a) Inundation
b) Craters
c) Ditches
d) Rd block
10. In view of the large no of tasks reqd to be completed for the exec of an effective
obst plan and the shortage of types, how would you plan these under fd
circumstances?
(a) Continuous
(b) Depth
(i) Prevent hand breaching in one ni and expl breach in one ni.
(ii) Should be covered by fire.
(iii) Prevent aimed firing by tks at ni.
(iv) Obscure fwd edge using short strip (IOE).
Roles of Signal
To the Cdr- Cdrs rqrs efficient and reliable coms for effective command and con of battle.
To the Staff- Signals are vital for his job and he must understand their characteristics and
limitations.
Function of Signal
Keep in touch with the sit in his sphere of comd.
Keep in touch with higher HQ and flk fmn HQ.
Obtain rapid sp, for ex- armr, arty and air.
Con and administer his force.
1. What are the role and responsibilities of SIGNALS with reference to the NA?
(a) Provision of signal comns down to infantry battalion or equivalent level and static
army installations.
(b) Provision of signal comns ex-Nepal as ordered by the general staff at Army HQ.
(c) Provision of non-scheduled dispatch service forward of Div HQ.
(d) Provision of advice and co-ordination of electronic warfare.
(e) Control and issue of codes and ciphers.
(f) Control and co-ord of radio frequencies within the army.
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(g) Co-ord of all signal comns within the Army incl gen responsibility about
suitability of signal eqpt used by all arms.
(h) Advice and technical assistance to other arms.
(i) Advice to general staff on policy matters, issue of detailed instructions and
maintenance of watch on signal security.
(j) Technical advice to cdrs and their staff at all levels on signal matters.
(k) Plg, co-ord and progress for implementation of electronic data processing system
in the Army.
(l) R1 and R2 repair of all signal eqpts held by signal units and battery charging in
static and field signal units and non-signal units of Army.
(m) Field repair of static signal eqpts.
(n) Training of all Signals personnel including higher technical training of offrs.
(o) Training of regimental signal instructors.
(p) Development, procurement and introduction of signal eqpts as under:-
3. Comn Provision Elements. These consist of three basic types of comn dets as
under:-
COMMUNICATION SECURITY
1. What do you understand by the term ‘Comn Security’ and why is there a need to
maintain it?
Comn security is the ensuring of denial to the en of own info through lapses in comn.
Therefore the need to maintain it. (Op Plan, maintain continuous, reliable and secure
comn)
(a) Interception.
(b) Tfc analysis.
(c) Crypto analysis.
(d) Direction finding
(e) Capture or salvage of signal comns eqpt of sy value for example cryptographic
docs and machines.
(f) Theft, espionage, observation and photography.
(a) Radio
(b) Line
(i) Cl of line ccts to restrict the nature of comns that can be passed over them.
(ii) All tele conversations are prone to interception unless secrecy eqpt a
provided.
(iii) Physical safe guarding of line routes.
(a) Interception.
(b) Traffic Analysis.
(c) Crypto-Analysis.
(d) Direction Finding.
(e) Capture or salvage of signal comns eqpt of security value for example
cryptographic docs and machines.
(f) Theft, espionage, observation and photography.
Armour
Mobility
Tanks by virtue of their ability to move with speed cross country or on roads posses a high
degree of mobility. Armoured formations/units have adequate organic transport for their
equipment, stores and personnel to be moved in one load. Their ability to undertake moves
over extended distances by day and night, concentrate, deploy for battle and engage the enemy
allows commanders to :-
(ii) Concentrate maximum force at the critical point at the correct time and if necessary,
regroup it and shift its fire power rapidly.
Fire power
Fire Power. Armour possesses the ability to bring to bear heavy and accurate fire on a target
with great speed. Its fire power is extremely flexible both in terms of application and type in
that it can be switched rapidly from one target to another or the type of ammunition changed
to suit the target. Modern tanks with computerised fire control systems and thermal imaging
and image intensifier, stabilized gun control equipment can fire on the move with remarkable
accuracy. Search lights and other night fighting devices permit and enable tanks to acquire and
engage targets accurately at night also
Protection
This characteristic is a product of mobility, efficient and reliable radio communications and
sound organisations. Grouping, issue of orders, implementation of such orders and passage of
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information can be carried out at great speed. Thus tasks can be altered by a commander with
little delay, and reorganisation effected in order to meet a changing tactical situation. This
characteristic, therefore, multiplies the effective strength of an armoured unit, which can be
applied against the enemy at several points within a short space of time. It is vital to inculcate
this concept of flexibility as a state of mind in armour commanders at all levels.
Shock Action
Shock Action is the cumulative physical and psychological effect produced by the violent
impact of mobile and armour protected fire power upon the enemy. This is achieved by full
exploitation of the characteristics of mobility, fire power and armour protection. The tank, as a
whole, as opposed to merely its armament must, therefore, be regarded as a weapon. The
effect of shock action multiplies as the number of tanks employed enmasse increases.
Flexibility
This characteristic affords the tanks comparative immunity to hostile artillery and mortars,
complete immunity to small arms fire and a high degree of protection against anti-tank
weapons and ground attack aircraft. The armour of a tank, in addition, provides a very
significant degree of protection against the effects of nuclear weapons. Its tracks and belly are,
however, vulnerable to mines. Such immunity as armour protection provides the tank
considerable freedom of movement on the battlefield, and enables it to close in with the
enemy
(a) Integration-The Combined Arms Team Concept. The combat potential of the division
is derived from its inherent ability to integrate various elements of combat power, combat
support and logistics from within the division as also additional resources allotted to it, into
combat commands, combat groups and combat teams, tailored to achieve their missions.
Success of this concept hinges upon a high standard of integrated training, permitting rapid
regrouping of forces during the conduct of operations.
(d) Grouping and Regrouping. The initial grouping of various elements of the division are
mission and task oriented; related to time, space and the consequent phasing of operations.
Due to changes in the task, the battle situation or a wide separation of the mechanised forces,
regrouping is ordered. Short term regrouping poses few problems but long term regrouping
needs anticipation and planning. Both, however, require correct reading of the battle by
commanders at all level. In fluid operations, regrouping will be a common phenomenon. It
will affect tactical orientation of commanders command and control, signal communication
and logistics support. It requires detailed staff coordination and efficient standard operating
procedures to ensure speedy execution with minimum orders. Training to meet and accept
these changes as routine will enhance the combat power of the regrouped task force as well as
the Armoured Division.
(e) Initiative. The division commander must retain/seize every opportunity to gain the
initiative at the very beginning and thereafter retain it. Bold action, achieving surprise and
exploitation of enemy weaknesses will help to seize the initiative. The initiative should be
retained by continuous application of force against enemy formations/units which are most
vulnerable, acting/ reacting faster than the enemy’s decision cycle and interfering with his
mobile reserves, thereby denying him the means to influence the battle. The exploits of
Rommel in North Africa are a good example of this attribute in practice.
(g) Armour Protection. Tanks, infantry combat vehicles(ICVs), self propelled field and air
defence guns of the division are provided with varying degree of armour protection. The
fighting echelons of the division are comparatively immune to hostile artillery fire, completely
immune to small arms fire and possess limited degree of protection against anti tank mines.
Neutralisation of enemy anti-tank weapons and circumvention/breaching of minefields should
generally form the essential ingredients of the plan to enable the assault echelons to close with
and destroy the enemy. The psychological advantage which the division enjoys by virtue of its
armour protection- the ability to advance in the face of hostile tank and antitank weapons fire-
should be exploited to the full by making aggressive use of armour in closing with and
destroying the enemy.
(h) Intelligence and Information. Combat intelligence of the enemy, terrain and information
about own plans and progress of operation are often localised and not disseminated. Within
the division, the successful conduct of operations will be faster and with fewer casualties if the
available information of own and enemy is quickly disseminated as a matter of drill. It will
enable anticipatory planning at lower levels, foster initiative and help in exploitation based on
21
actual locations on the ground, reduce chances of engaging own troops and motivate
aggressive action at all levels. As a rule of thumb, combat group commander should be able to
plan to 8 to 12 hours ahead, combat command commanders 24 hours and the divisional
commander upto 48 hours ahead. Training of commanders and staff to understand and ensure
this principle in practice is an essential pre-requisite.
(i) Speed in Decision Making. This will invariably decide the final outcome of the battle.
Commanders must operate well forward so that they can assess the situation and take
decisions on the spot. The reconnaissance and intelligence system should be so organized that
the commanders get latest and accurate information about the enemy by the fastest means. In a
mobile battle, it will seldom be possible to build up a complete intelligence picture. The
commanders should therefore learn to take quick decisions based on scanty information,
keeping in view the overall capabilities of the enemy.
(ii) Speed in Issue of Orders. Before the commencement of operations, the division
commander should, if the situation permits, brief his commanders down to combat group
level. After the verbal briefing, written instructions to combat commanders and heads of arms
and services are issued. Once the division is committed to battle, all orders and instructions
are passed on the radio. These orders are mission type and fragmentary in nature. Such orders
indicate the mission and terms of reference, if any. Detailed execution is left to the
subordinate commanders who are allowed as much freedom of action as possible.
(iii) Speed in Execution. Quick response to command, complete coordination and speed of
manoeuvre in executing an operation are vital to success. The main criterion for the division
commander is to ensure that the assigned missions are accomplished within the stipulated
time. Speed in execution is achieved by good battle procedure, well rehearsed battle drill and
exploiting fleeting opportunities in battle.
(k) Logistics Support. An armoured division has a large number of A and B vehicles. The
consumption of FOL and ammunition is heavy. The wear and tear on equipment and A and B
vehicle casualties during battle impose a heavy drain on the division’s logistic resources. A
sound system of logistic support, tailored to support the combat command/combat groups, is a
primary pre-requisite for the successful launching of the division in battle.
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Div HQ
Armed Bde Armed Bde Armed Bde HQ Arty Engr Sig ASC Med Fd
(Armed Regts -2 (Armed Regts -2 (Armed Regts -2 Bde Regt Regt Bn Amb (2)
Mech Bns-2) Mech Bns-1 Mech Bns-1
HQ
a. En disposns
b. Str
c. Composn
d. Tac
e. Deg of opposition
h. Task
i. Trn
CC
Mech Inf Predominant. More mech inf bns than armd regts
24
Combat Group
Sub units may be retained as pure sub units or org into CTs
Composn.
COMBAT TEAM.
25
Combat Team
Composn
BC and OP parties
Tp / Bty AD (SP)
CGTF
BLT
Tp trawls / FWMP
Tr Amb
CT Grouping
FOO
BLT
Mount AD (SP)
CC
CG
CT
• Designated by suffixing the alphabetic letter of the sqn/coy or at times the name of the
CT Cdr
• Cdr’s personality
b. Team work
d. Trg
Maneuverability
27
Frontage of obsn
Fmn is based on :-
Task
Grnd
Tac Sit
Two factors that decide the fmn- Posn of Cdr and Visibility
Line ahead
One up
Two up
Diamond
Box
28
double
Mov at ni
During day / ni mov by tps other than leading CTs and leading tk tps
30
One up fmn
• Uses.
During adv
32
Two fmn up
Uses.
Devp max fire power and shock action and adequate res
Line Fmn.
Uses.
During aslt
Lateral dist between CTs specified by axes of adv/ Thrust Lines or by laying down
bdys between CTs.
Dist between tp / pl dply in the front or flk or rear will be one tac bd
Gen varies from 400-600m in open trn and 200-400m in close country
34
In mobile ops specially in Obst Ridden Trn and desert trn there is necessary of combine
arm
Armr has good protection, mobility and fire power. But armr cannot win the battle alone.
It also need infantry. Hence infantry is required. To match the mobility mechanized
infantry is required.
Since armr is good tgt of air and arty hence need of arty SP to match mobility and AD SP
to match the mobility.
1915- tank
Mvre Warfare
• Compatibility
• Interoperability
• Collaboration- Combined trg
• Trn Factors Consi
• Battlefd Management System
• Matching Mobility
• Lgs Arrangement (IRG, EVC)
Arty
TERMINOLOGIES
Fire Discipline
FSE
Interdiction
36
Degradation
MRSI
Shoot and Scoot
Counter Bombardment
SATA
Superimposed and Reinforcing Arty
Precision Shoot
OP’s
• IM 200 M 150 M
• FD REGT 105 MM 250 M 250 M
• MED 130MM 350 M 300 M
• GUNS 200 M
• RKTS 400 M
• NAPALM 1000 M
• BOMB 2000 M
EFFECTS OF ARTY FIRE
Destruction
Neutralization
Harassment
Demoralization
PRINCIPLES OF EMP
• Cooperation
• Concentration
• Coordination
• Flexibility
• Surprise
• Economy of force
• Info superiority
• Strike effectiveness
SCALES OF AMMUNITION
130mm 90 45 *
155mm 96 48
ATTACK.
DURATION x RATE OF FIRE x No OF FUs ENGAGING
DEF.
RGF x No OF TIMES RPTD x No OF FUs ENGAGING
To attack by fire power, in all stages of the battle, in conjunction with all other combat
power resources, so as to achieve favorable conditions ie, to shape the battlefield, for the
decisive defeat of the enemy.
• Battery/ Troops
• Bty as basic FU
• Troops fire used for regn purpose
• Standard of six guns in bty
• Regiment / Battalion
• 3 x Bty of same equipment
• Div Arty Bde
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Synergised and orchestrated application of all fire assets, aimed at the destruction,
neutralization or suppression of the enemy, leading to the disruption of his combat potential,
thereby, ultimately breaking his will to fight
• Main. The locations from which the major fire plans or tasks for a battle are fired
• Temporary. The location from which guns may fire before the main positions are
occupied.
Main position is not disclosed to the enemy in the early stages of a battle
Fire can be brought to bear on the targets out of range of the main position and may also
be required during preliminary phases of an operation, such as support of covering
troops and screens
• Alternative. Reconnoitered and, if possible prepared gun positions, to which a unit or
sub unit may move, usually to avoid enemy CB
• Roving. Gun positions occupied for a comparatively short time to carry out a specific
task
40
DEFENCE
ATTACK
• Modification to fire plans should be catered for and measures taken to implement these
without delay
• Should opportunities present themselves for advance after the attack, the artillery
support must cater for such eventualities
• Some fire units must be superimposed to cater for impromptu targets
ADVANCE
• Unless mutually supporting, each axis of advance must have artillery allotted
• Command of the artillery must be decentralized sufficiently to ensure quick support
against light opposition
• Artillery must be so disposed that control can be centralized with speed
• Reconnaissance parties including survey parties should be correctly placed in the order
of March for quick deployment
• The major portion of artillery including medium should be well forward
WITHDRAWAL
• Support static security posts and operational bases against guerrilla attack by engaging
preplanned defensive fire tasks
• Harass guerrillas during periods of reduced patrolling activity by own troops
• Providing protection of convoys against ambushes
• Flush guerrillas out of areas of limited or difficult accessibility into pre-planned
ambushes
• Deceive the guerrilla force as to the plans of counter guerrilla action by bringing down
fire in areas other then where an operation is planned
• Provide illumination during hours of darkness
PART III
• COMD
• Mov, adm, dply & siting of guns
• CONT
• Cont of fire of guns
• COMD & CONT
• Cont of dply
• When & to what place to mov guns
• Who has cont of fire
• COMD
• Scope of comd over arty fmn.
• Power to mov and dply.
• Alloted but not grouped cannot be moved.
• Under comd, under comd for mov and under comd for adm.
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• CONTROL
• Tech cont of arty fire.
• Level at which fire plans are made and issued.
• Any spec auth to order conc of fire.
IMPLICATION
Arty cdrs at various fmn HQ’s have the power to move guns and dply them in conformity
with plans of their fmn cdrs
GROUPING FOR COMMAND
Under comd
Under comd for move
Under comd for adm
Q. WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND BY CONTROL IN TERMS OF ARTY?
IN DIRECT SP
IN SP
AT PRIORITY CALL
IN DIRECT SP
Fire is not guaranteed. It will be provided only when fire of such a fire unit is
not called by the unit having priority rights over its fire
However, in attack fire will be guaranteed, but pd/ phase/op and amn will
normally be given
obsn, comn and liaison will not be provided to the unit in sp to whom it has
been placed
Q. WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND BY ORDINARY, AUTH OP ANCHOR OP AND
FOO ?
ORDINARY OP
Auth to call for fire of his own bty with out ref to higher auth
Can call for fire of higher conc by ref to appropriate auth
AUTH OP
Selected op at the regt /div level
Auth to call for fire wo ref to hr auth
Amn is normally laid down
ANCHOR OP
Used during attack
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SUPERIMPOSED ARTY
Coord of wpn
• Arty is most important battle winning factor, it cannot, however, win wars on its own
• A requirement for close co-operation between the arty and the supported arms
Concentration
• Applies equally to the concentration of artillery fire power as to all other resources at
the disposal of a cdr
• Does not necessarily imply deployment of arty wpns at one place
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• Deployed to cover the whole front, yet being able to speedily conc max fire of all
calibres in critical areas when required
FLEXIBILITY
• Effort allotted to any task should not exceed that which is necessary to produce the
desired effect
• Arty fire should ordinarily be concentrated on those essential tgts which cannot be
engaged with equal or greater effect by other wpns
Surprise
• CO-OPERATION
• COORDINATION
• CONCENTRATION
• FLEXIBILITY
• ECONOMY OF EFFORT
• SURPRISE
• STRIKE EFFECTIVENESS
• INFO SUPERIORITY
PART IV
• Supported arms cdr to have intimate knowledge on tgt analysis, effects of arty fire and
types of arty spt they can count on
Q. WHAT ARE THE VARIOUS EFFECTS OF ARTY FIRE?
DESTRUCTION
Fire physically damages the target to such an extent that it is rendered useless to the enemy
A casualty rate of 50 to 60 % or more should be taken as a guide
Destruction may be accomplished by penetration, blast effect, incendiary action, fragments or
by a combination of these
Destruction of enemy def work is difficult to achieve
NEUTRALIZATION
This is achieved when artillery fire prevents the enemy from using his wpns effectively
This results in restricting his observation and/or hampering his mobility
It must be at least sufficiently lethal to inflict 15 to 20 % casualties
The area to be neutralized must be effectively covered by fire
Neutralization is temporary effect which continues only while the shells are falling. Fire must
therefore continue as long as neutralization required
HARASSMENT
Harassing fire inflicts losses or by the threat of losses disturbs the enemy, curtails movement
and in general lowers morale
Harassing fire is of less intensity than that intended to accomplish neutralization
DEMORALIZATION
Offn ops
• PREP BOMBARDMENT
• COVERING FIRE
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• DEFENSIVE FIRE
• INTERDICTION
Def ops
• DEFENSIVE FIRE
• DF IN DEPTH
• DF CLOSE
• DF (SOS)
• COVERING FIRE IN SPT OF CA
Offn and def ops
• HARASSING FIRE
• COUNTER BOMBARDMENT
• SMK SCREENS
• INDICATION OF TGT
• BATTLE FIELD ILLUMINATION
Type of fire
Prep Bombardment
• Objective is to neutralize the enemy's direct firing weapons which can engage our
assaulting troops during attack or counter attack
• It is very important and should be planned foremost and requisite ammunition catered
for
Defensive fire
• Objective firstly is to disorganize the enemy's preparation for assault and secondly to
break up his assault
DF IN DEPTH :Striking at enemy HQs and reserves when attack is launched. Eg AA
CLOSE DEFENSIVE FIRE : Breaking up the enemy attack when it is forming up or
during assault
DEFENSIVE FIRE SOS : Those close defensive fire tasks covering the most dangerous
approaches are selected as Defensive Fire (SOS)
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Interdiction
• Screen is created in between our own forces and en so that he is blinded and to hide
our own movements in the battlefield. Coloured smoke are used to indicate the tgts as
well
• Harassing Fire
• Keeping en on the run at all times, making sure he gets no rest and is forced to
deploy more often than necessary
• CB
• The aim is to ensure that the arty wpns, fire control equipments and locating
devices of the en are neutralized and cannot be used against us in ops
• Proactive and reactive CB
PART V
FIRE PLANNING
• In case of CB and Harrassing Fire spted arm cdr only gives policy which arty cdr
incorporates into fire plan
• Spted arm cdr to give out certain infos like
• Where fire is reqd (tgt) ?
• In which form it is needed (type of fire spt) ?
• What is to be achieved (effect of fire) ?
• When it is to be applied (timings) ?
• Arty cdr to advice on all these aspects
Q. What are the principles for making a Fire Plan?
• Coop
• Conc
• Flexibility
• Simplicity
• Surprise
Cooperation
• Good comns
• SI Arty
• Res amn
Simplicity
• Simple plan
• Auth OP
• Simple to arng
• Easy to mod
• Less liable to corrn
• Have as few serials as possible
• Should not be involving too much change in amn and rates of fire
Surprise
Quick Deliberate
Responsibility Direct sp BC/ Regt CO Detailed plan by cdr arty & arty co.
Issue of Orders By bty cdr direct to guns Orders are issued at the level of op
planned (Arty HQ)
•Air: No of FB msn
•AH: No of msn
•Arty: No of FUs & amn
•Armr: Sub units
•IM: No & amn
•MMG: Secs
•Any other wpn system
Stg 3. Allocation of resources to tgt as per priorities and suitability of wpn
Stg 4. Working of time as per mov plan ie, (Dist SL- Obj, safety dist, rate of adv etc)
Q. What do you think is the sequence for making a Deliberate Fire Plan?
Div Task
• Inf bde cdr makes his tac plan advised by regt cdr
Detailed tac plan.
• Regt cdr based on BCs plan will make detailed FP and task table in coord with
bde cdr
• Coord addl guns and amn reqd
• Coord for task such as prep bomb, cov fire & CB/ CN
Q. How is the Fire Plan controlled?
Total Reqmt
Addl bids: Higher HQ asks for reasonable bids and after scrutiny, allots addl amn
Amn Expenditure
• Pre H hr bombardment
• CB
• Assault
• Reorg
• Reserve to meet the unforeseen eventualities
Points for discussion with commander
• Objs, FUP, SL, dist SL - Obj, H hr, rate of adv, units/su assaulting
• Priority of eng
• Timing of eng
• Prep B or any Pre H hr fire reqd
• DFs during re-org
• Time for regn
• Reqmt of FOOs
• Interfering tgts and duration of interference
DEFENSIVE FIRE PLAN
• Selected by bn cdr
• Aim of impeding en attack through out the affected sect and break up asslt
when del
DF SOS
• No limit in planning
• But too many will defeat the aim of the planning
• For a battalion a reasonable no. might be 6 to 8 DF tasks
• One third of these would be selected in the depth
• For a div front should not normally exceed than 75 DF tasks
Q. What are forms of engagement of DF Tasks?
• DF tasks in depth, as per group of tgts, provided tgt acqn capability exists, FUs are
concentrated
• For Close DF tasks, on multiple fronts the fire units split
• Btn FUP and fwd def localities "belts of fire" are created which aslt tps has to cross
• En annihilation by "final protective fire" (DF SOS)
Production of DF plan
• SVL OF DF
• PTLS ,SBP, AIR OP, UAV….
• EXEC OF DF
• Tgt list
• Tgt list and task table
• Tgt list and task table for grouped tgts
• Tgt list and tgt trace
PART VII
Gen
• Targets must be detected, identified and acquired in time to allow artillery fire to the
planned and executed
• Detected by continuous observation of the battle area by all arms
• Fire supremacy on the battlefield is of paramount importance
• Winning of the battle in depth
• Once the targets in depth are effectively neutralized the enemy will find it difficult to
sustain his troops in contact no matter how well they are fortified
• Pre-requisite to the destruction/neutralization is accurate location
• Target acquisition enables a cdr to know the accurate location of the en and CB
enables him to achieve destruction of the targets so located
Aim of SATA
• To provide information about the en with particular ref to the location, strength
identification, arcs of fire, move and activity of enemy weapons
• To use this information to direct the fire of own weapons, including the Air Force, on
to the enemy weapons so as to neutralize or destroy them
How can aim can achieved?