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impression of the simple manners then prevailing at Rome,
especially when we contrast them with the cruelty of the
Carthaginian government, who crucified their unfortunate admiral.
To have defeated the Mistress of the Sea upon her own element in
the first trial of strength was indeed remarkable.
The sea fight of Duilius was fought in the year 260 b.c. In the
following years the Carthaginians were only able to act upon the
defensive. Not only Agrigentum, but Camarina, Gela, Enna, Segesta,
and many other cities had surrendered to the Romans. The
Carthaginians were confined to their great trading marts, Drepana,
Lilybæum, Eryx, and Panormus. They did not dare to meet the
Romans in the field; yet these places were very strong, especially
Lilybæum. Against its iron fortifications all the strength of Pyrrhus
had been broken. It was not time yet for Carthage to despair.
But in the eighth year of the war the senate determined on more
decisive measures. They knew the weakness of the Carthaginians at
home; they had a victorious fleet, and they determined not to let
their fortune slumber.
SECOND PERIOD (256-250 B.C.)
Duilius appears for a brief time as the hero of
[256-255 b.c.] the first part of the war; but its second period is
marked by the name of a man who has become
famous as a patriot—M. Atilius Regulus. It was in the year 256, the
eighth of the war, that the consuls, M. Regulus and L. Manlius, sailed
from Italy and doubled Cape Pachynus with a fleet of 330
quinqueremes. The Carthaginian fleet, even larger in number, had
been stationed at Lilybæum to meet the enemy, whether they
should approach from the north or from the east. They now put to
sea, and sailed westwards along the southern coast of Sicily. They
met the Roman fleet at a place called Ecnomus, a little more than
halfway along that coast. The battle that ensued was the greatest
that, up to that time, had ever been fought at sea; it is calculated
that not fewer than 300,000 men were engaged. It was desperately
contested on both sides; but at Ecnomus, again, we are astonished
to find the Roman fleet victorious (256 b.c.).
Roman Embassy at Carthage
(After Mirys)
The way was now open to Africa. The consuls, after refitting and
provisioning their fleet, sailed straight across to the Hermæan
promontory, which is distant from the nearest point of Sicily not
more than eighty miles. But the omens were not auspicious; the
Roman soldiery went on board with gloomy forebodings of their fate;
one of the tribunes refused to lead his legionaries into the ships, till
Regulus ordered the lictors to seize him. The passage, however, was
favoured by the wind. The consuls landed their men, drew up the
fleet on shore, and fortified it in a naval camp; and then, marching
southwards, they took the city of Aspis or Clupea by assault. No
Carthaginian army met them; every place they came near, except
Utica, surrendered at discretion, for they were unfortified and
defenceless. Carthage, being of old mistress of the sea, feared no
invaders, and, like England, trusted for defence to her wooden walls.
Yet she had not been unwarned. Sixty years before the adventurous
Agathocles had landed like Regulus. Then, as now, the whole
country lay like a garden before him, covered with wealthy towns
and the luxurious villas of the Carthaginian merchants. Then two
hundred towns or more had surrendered almost without stroke of
sword. It appeared as if the same easy success now awaited
Regulus and the Romans.
The consuls were advancing along the coast of the gulf towards
Carthage, when Manlius was recalled with the greater part of the
army, and Regulus was left in Africa with only fifteen thousand foot
and five hundred horse. Yet even with this small force he remained
master of the country. He had gone round the whole Gulf of Tunis as
far as Utica, and now he turned upon his steps with the intention of
marching upon the capital itself. On his way he was obliged to cross
the river Bagradas, and here (so ran the legend) the army was
stopped by a huge serpent, so strong and tough of skin that they
were unable to destroy it, till they brought up their artillery of
catapults and balists; he then continued his route southwards to the
Bay of Carthage. He was allowed to take Tunis, which stood within
twenty miles of Carthage. The great city was now reduced to the
utmost straits. A Roman army was encamped within sight; famine
stared the townsmen in the face; the government trembled. In this
abject condition the council sent an embassy to ask what terms of
peace Regulus would grant.
The consul was so elated by success, that he demanded the most
extravagant concessions. The Carthaginians were to give up their
fleet, pay all the expenses of the war, and cede all Sicily, with
Sardinia, Corsica, and the Balearic Isles, to Rome. When these terms
were reported, the government took care to publish them, and
public indignation rose against the arrogant invaders. The civic force
was not untrained to arms, and they had now to fight for their
hearths and altars. A good general was sought for. At that time there
happened to be at Carthage a soldier of fortune, by name
Xanthippus, a Lacedæmonian.[49] This man had been heard to
censure the native generals, and to declare that the victories of the
Romans were due, not to their own superior skill, but to the faults of
their opponents. He was summoned before the council and desired
to give reasons for his remarks. He did so; and, for a moment, the
government, dismissing all jealousy, appointed this obscure foreigner
general-in-chief. Xanthippus immediately drew together all the
mercenaries he could find, and united them with the armed citizens;
then, supported by a large body of elephants, he boldly took the
field. The Romans were astonished; but they were too much
accustomed to victory to hesitate about accepting battle. But they
were both outnumbered and outgeneralled. Xanthippus gained a
victory as easy as it was complete. Regulus himself was taken
prisoner; only two thousand of his men succeeded in making good
their retreat to Clupea.
Thus was Carthage delivered by the ability of one man, and that
man a foreigner. The government did not improve in wisdom or
generosity; their incapable generals resumed the command, and
Xanthippus, loaded with honours and presents, prudently withdrew
from the jealous city.
The Roman senate did their best to repair this great calamity. The
new consuls were ordered to put to sea, and bring off the garrison
and fugitives from Clupea. Near the Hermæan promontory they
encountered the enemy’s fleet, and again defeated it; and then,
having taken up the ships and men at Clupea, they sailed for
Syracuse. But a still greater disaster was in store for Rome than the
destruction of her African army. This was the loss of that fleet of
which she was justly proud. The time of year was about the
beginning of the dog-days, when the Mediterranean is apt to be
visited by sudden storms. The consuls, upon their passage, were
warned that such a storm was at hand; but they were ignorant and
rash, and continued their course. Before they could double Cape
Pachynus they were caught by the tempest; almost the whole fleet
was wrecked or foundered; the coast of Sicily from Camarina to
Pachynus was strewed with fragments of ships and bodies of men.
Such was the end of the first Roman fleet (255 b.c.).
These successive disasters might well raise the
[255-250 b.c.] hopes of Carthage, and they sent a considerable
force into Sicily, with 140 elephants. Agrigentum is
said to have been recovered, and no doubt it was expected that the
whole island would once more become their own. But the Romans
showed a spirit equal to the need. In three months’ time (so wonderful
was their energy) a new fleet of 220 sail was ready for sea. The consuls
of the year 254 b.c., having touched at Messana to take up the remnants
of the old fleet, passed onwards to Drepana. They could not take this
strong place, but they were more successful at Panormus, the modern
Palermo, which yielded after a short siege to the Roman arms. This was
an important conquest.
Next year the fleet touched at several places on the African coast, but
without making any impression on the country. Among the shoals and
currents of the Lesser Syrtis it ran great danger of being lost; but having
escaped this peril, the consuls returned to Panormus and thence stood
straight across for the mouth of the Tiber. On the passage they were
overtaken by another of those terrible storms, and again nearly the
whole fleet was lost. Thus, within three years, the Romans lost two
great fleets. This was enough to damp even their courage; and the
senate determined to try whether it were not possible to keep their
ground in Sicily without a navy. For the present they gave up all claim to
the command of the sea, and limited themselves to a small fleet of sixty
ships.
Matters continued in this state for two years. Neither party seemed
willing to hazard a battle by land; but in 250 b.c. Hasdrubal, the
Carthaginian general, was induced to march secretly from Lilybæum to
Panormus, in the hope of surprising and recovering that important town.
The Roman commandant was the proconsul L. Cæcilius Metellus. He
allowed the enemy to approach the walls, and then suddenly sallied
forth, covering his attack by a cloud of light troops, slingers, and javelin-
men. Some of the elephants being wounded, carried confusion into their
own ranks, and Metellus, seizing the occasion, charged the enemy and
defeated them utterly. Besides thirteen Carthaginian generals, 120
elephants were taken and carried across the sea on strong rafts to
adorn the triumph of the proconsul. The battle of Panormus was the
greatest battle that was fought on land in the course of the war, and it
was the last. In memory of this victory we find the elephant as a
frequent device on the coins of the great family of the Metelli.b We may
well quote here Polybius’ account both of the loss of the fleet in 255 and
of this victory at Panormus or Palermo.
POLYBIUS’ ACCOUNT OF ROMAN AFFAIRS[50]
The Romans had made ready, early in the Spring,
[255-251 b.c.] a Fleet of Three Hundred and Fifty Sail; and
Embarking their Army under the Command of their
new Consuls, M. Æmilius, and Servius Fulvius, and standing along the
Coast of Sicily towards Africa, they met, and fought off of Cape Mercury
with the Carthaginian Fleet, which was not able to sustain the first
shock, but being entirely beaten, lost in the Ingagement, an Hundred
and Fourteen of their Vessels, and all that was in them, to the Romans;
who afterwards prosecuting their course, arriv’d at Aspis; where taking
their Men on Board that remain’d in Africa, they shap’d their Course
back to Sicily. And being well advanc’d on their way, they were surpriz’d
off of Camarina with so dreadful a Tempest, that the losses and
hardships they sustain’d were without Example, and beyond Expression:
So terrible it was, that of Three Hundred and Seventy odd Vessels that
compos’d their Fleet, Fourscore only escap’d Shipwreck, the rest being
either founder’d in the Sea, or were lost and broken against the Rocks,
that whole Coast being cover’d with dead bodies, and strew’d with the
Ruines and Fragments of their Ships, insomuch as History affords no
Example of the like dreadful disaster. And yet it may be said, that this
Calamity was not owing so much to Fortune, as to the obstinacy of the
Consuls: For the Pilots endeavour’d to obviate the hazard they should be
expos’d to by Navigating on that Coast of Sicily, which borders on the
African Sea, there being there not only no Harbours to succour vessels
in distress; but the Season too of the Year was now improper; for by
observation of the rising and setting of Orion and the Dog Star, they
compute and know the safe Seasons for Navigation. But the Consuls,
contemning their Counsel, stood boldly out to Sea, in hopes that after
this signal Victory, their appearing suddenly on the Coast, might terrify
many Towns, and awe them to submission: But their folly was chastis’d
by this memorable loss, which they sustain’d upon a motive much too
little for the hazard. The Romans have indeed this inflexibility of Mind
peculiar to them, believing that whatsoever they have resolv’d and
determin’d to undertake, ought to be indispensably perform’d; and they
have establish’d it into a Principle, that what they once have decreed to
execute, cannot be impossible to bring to pass: The effect, indeed, of a
generous obstinacy, but the cause oftentimes of their falling into
pernicious Errors and Misfortunes, and their sustaining unspeakable
losses, especially in their Naval Expeditions. As to their Exploits by Land,
where the Encounter is only Man to Man, their Courage frequently
conducts them to the Success they propose, by reason their adventures
are with Men like themselves; and yet there want not Examples wherein
their Measures and Forces have fail’d, and they have sunk and
miscarry’d under the weight of their Enterprises. But whenever, by a
temerarious Audacity, they act against these raging Elements, and
attempt to vanquish the Sea and Wind, they are sure to reap no other
fruit of their Obstinacy, than Loss and Calamity. This we have now
mentioned, is an instance, and they have heretofore smarted by the like
Errors; and they shall always stand liable to the same disasters, till they
appear better advis’d and instructed in the weakness of that
overweening Presumption, which they are apt to entertain in all their
Designs, vainly imagining, that both Sea and Land should on all
occasions consent and open their way to Success in all their Enterprises.
The Carthaginians, upon advice of this Misfortune of the Romans at
Sea, were of Opinion, that they should now be a match for them by
Land, whereunto they were perswaded through the late Victory they had
gain’d. That they should be equal to them likewise by Sea, they had no
doubt, by reason of their late great loss by Tempest; howbeit they
omitted not to reinforce their Strength both by Sea and Land. They
dispatch’d Hasdrubal into Sicily, to whom, besides the Forces already
there, they order’d a farther supply of Troops out of those that were
lately drawn out of Heraclea, together with an Hundred and Forty
Elephants: He was no sooner departed, but they sent after him Two
Hundred Vessels laden with all things necessary for the Service of the
War. Hasdrubal, being safely arriv’d at Lilybæum, apply’d himself with
diligence to Exercise and Discipline his Troops and his Elephants,
intending to spread his Army all over the Country, and to make himself
entire Master of the Field. As for the Romans, they were not without a
very sensible sorrow, when by those who had escap’d Shipwreck, they
receiv’d an account of the mighty loss they had sustain’d at Sea;
nevertheless, being determin’d not to yield the Advantage to the Enemy,
they order’d a new Fleet to be speedily built, to consist of Two Hundred
and Twenty Sail; which Fleet (a wonderful and incredible thing to relate)
was compleatly built and finish’d in the space of three Months; on which
the new Consuls, Aulus Atilius, and C. Cornelius speedily Embark’d; who,
after having pass’d the Streight, and touch’d at Messina, to take with
them the Vessels that had been sav’d in the late Storm, shap’d their
Course for Palermo with a Naval Army consisting of Three Hundred Sail,
and forthwith sat down and besieg’d that place, which then was the
Capital City of the Carthaginians in Sicily. They made their Attacks in two
several places, and when their Works were advanc’d to their Minds, they
approach’d with their Engines of Battery, by which, a Tower or Work
standing near the Sea, was quickly, and without much trouble,
demolish’d; at which breach the Souldiers enter’d, and took by Assault,
and kept Possession of that quarter of the City call’d the New Town,
whereby the place it self was put into manifest danger; but the
Inhabitants coming seasonably in to the Relief, they advanc’d no farther;
so the Consuls, after they had put a good Garrison into the place they
had taken, return’d back to Rome. Early the next Summer the new
Consuls, C. Servilius, and C. Sempronius, sail’d over to Sicily with all
their Naval Power, and from thence, soon after, stood for the Coast of
Africk, where they made several Descents, but perform’d nothing of
moment; at length arriving at the Island of the Lotophagy, which is
likewise call’d Meninx, not far distant from the lesser Syrtis, or Flatts;
here being unacquainted with the Coast, their Fleet fell among the
Sands, where their Vessels grounded, and stuck fast, as if they had been
a-shoar, and there remain’d till the Flood fetch’d them off; when with
great difficulty and hazard, throwing their Lumber over-board, they
made a shift to escape. From thence, like People flying from an Enemy,
they stood away for the Coast of Sicily; and after they had doubl’d the
Cape of Lilybæum they got into the Port of Palermo. But from thence
steering their Course homeward, a Storm took them in the Phare of
Messina, where, by a blind Obstinacy they were imbay’d, which Storm
attack’d them with such violence, that above an Hundred and Fifty of
their Ships miscarry’d. Things happening thus adverse to them by Sea,
tho’ the Senate and People could not subdue their Thirst of Glory and
Empire, nevertheless their Losses and Calamities, and the straits to
which they were now reduc’d, prevail’d with them to quit all farther
attempts of trying their Fortune by Sea; so they now totally abandon’d
all thoughts of Naval Preparations. And determining to rely solely on
their Land Armies, they dispatch’d the Consuls, L. Cæcilius, and Cn.
Furius to Sicily with the Legions, alotting them only about Threescore
Vessels whereon securely to Embark and waft over the Army, their
Baggage and Amunition. These Misfortunes of the Romans much
augmented the Carthaginian Glory and Fame in the World, and gave a
new Face to their Affairs. In a word, as the Romans had now yielded
them up the Dominion of the Sea, it was no difficulty for them to be
entirely Masters there; nor were they without hopes of succeeding in
their Affairs by Land; nor did they reckon very wide of the matter, for
from the time of the defeat of the Roman Army, by the assistance of the
Elephants, which discompos’d and broke their Ranks in the Battel fought
in Africk, where those Animals made such destruction of their People,
the Souldiers became so terribly aw’d, that tho’ they had been on
several occasions drawn up in Battalia to ingage within five or six
Furlongs of the Carthaginian Army; sometimes in the Territory of
Selinunce, sometimes about Lilybæum, yet for the space of two Years
together they wanted Resolution to ingage them, or to adventure to
abide in the Champain Country, so great a dread they had conceiv’d of
the Fury and Shock of those stupendious beasts: So that little or no
Progress was made in their Affairs during all that space, saving the
taking of Lipary and Thermes, the Army continuing Coopt up in the
Mountains, and Inaccessible Places. Wherefore the Romans, observing
this Terrour among their Legions, took a Resolution once more, to tempt
their Fortune by Sea: Accordingly upon the Creation of C. Atilius and L.
Manlius Consuls, they Order’d the Building of Fifty Vessels, and Levies of
men for that Service; and now they had a Navy once again establish’d.
REGULUS’ DEPARTURE FOR CARTHAGE
Hasdrubal having observ’d this dread that
[251-250 b.c.] possess’d the Roman Army, when ever he
presented them Battel, and having Intelligence that
one of the Consuls was now return’d back to Rome, and one half of the
Army with him; and that Cæcilius with the rest of the Troops was at
Palermo, Assisting their Allies in gathering in their Harvest, their Corn
being now Ripe; he March’d out of Lilybæum with his Troops, and came
and Incamp’d on the Borders of the Territory of Palermo. Cæcilius
observing this weak Proceeding of the Carthaginian, kept his People
within the Walls of the Town, thereby to ingage him to Advance nearer,
which Hasdrubal accordingly did, perswaded thereto by the shew of fear
the Romans were under, and imagining that Cæcilius had not the
Resolution to appear in the Field, he rashly adventur’d his Army into a
narrow Straight: and albeit he wasted the Country to the very Walls of
Palermo, Cæcilius nevertheless held his first determination, not to move
till the Enemy had pass’d the River that runs close by the Town. When,
in short, after the Elephants and the whole Army had got over, he
Order’d some of his light Arm’d Souldiers, to advance out against them
to Pickeer, and draw them the more boldly on. And observing all things
to Succeed as he had projected, he Posted a Body of select and skilful
Souldiers upon the Counterscarp of the Town, with Orders that if the
Elephants advanc’d upon them, to Attack them with Darts and Missive
Weapons, and in case they should be press’d by those Animals, that
they should then retire into the Ditch; and from thence gall and molest
them all they could. He Order’d the Towns People at the same time to
furnish themselves with great quantities of Darts, and Post themselves
without the Town at the Foot of the Walls, and there abide in a Posture
of Defence. Cæcilius himself with all his troops remain’d in readiness at
a certain Gate of the Town, that was oppos’d to the Right Wing of the
Enemy, from whence he sustain’d the Troops with fresh Supplies of men,
who were already Ingaged. In a Word, the Battel began now to grow
warm, and the Leaders of the Elephants being resolv’d to be sharers
with Hasdrubal in the Honour of the day, proceeding as if they design’d
the Victory should be wholly owing to them, advanc’d all in Order upon
the Romans, whom they soon forc’d to give Ground and retire into the
Ditch. But now the Elephants, smarting with the Wounds they had
receiv’d, and vex’d with the Darts wherewith they were gall’d both from
the Ditch and the Walls of the Town, began to grow unruly, fell upon
their own People, and destroy’d many, and put their Troops in disorder.
This being observ’d by Cæcilius he forthwith Salli’d out with his Troops
fresh and in good Order, and attacking the Enemy in Flank, who were
already in Confusion, slew many, and put the rest of the Army to Flight.
Ten Elephants were then taken with the Indians their Guides, and others
who had lost their Leaders fell likewise into their Hands after the Battel.
The happy Issue of this Action got Cæcilius the Reputation every where
of having Restor’d the Roman Courage by Land, to Attempt Incamping
in the open and plain Country, and to know how to behave themselves
well again out of their Retrenchments. There was great joy at Rome
upon the Arrival of the News of this Defeat, not so much on account of
the Elephants which had been taken, tho’ it was a very sensible blow to
the Enemy, but because the taking of those Animals, and the Victory
obtain’d against them, had restor’d the Souldiers Resolution. Wherefore
they determin’d once again, as had been propos’d (to the end they
might at any rate put a Period to this War) to Dispatch the Consuls away
with a new Navy. And when all things were in readiness for the
Expedition, they departed for Sicily with a Fleet of Two Hundred Sail, it
being now the Fourteenth Year of the First Punic War.d
After the battle of Panormus, the hopes of the
[250-249 b.c.] Romans rose again, and the senate gave orders to
build a third fleet of two hundred sail. But the
Carthaginians, weary of the expenses of the war, and suffering greatly in
their commerce, thought that a fair opportunity for making peace was
now offered. The Romans had not so entirely recovered from their late
disasters, but that they might be glad to listen to fair terms. Accordingly
an embassy was despatched to offer an exchange of prisoners and to
propose terms on which a peace might be concluded. Regulus
(according to the well-known story) accompanied this embassy, under
promise to return to Carthage if the purposes of the embassy should
fail. When he arrived at Rome he refused to enter the walls and take his
place in the senate, as being no longer a citizen or a senator. Then the
senate sent certain of their own number to confer with him in presence
of the ambassadors, and the counsel which he gave confirmed the
wavering minds of the fathers. “Useless it was,” he said, “to ransom
prisoners who had ignobly yielded with arms in their hands: let them be
left to perish unheeded; let war go on till Carthage be subdued.” His
counsel prevailed, and the embassy returned without effect. Regulus
also returned to suffer the vengeance of the Carthaginians. Every one
knows the horrid tortures by which it is said that life was taken from
him; how his eyelids were cut off; how he was placed in a barrel stuck
full of nails, with one end knocked out; and how he was exposed to the
unmitigated glare of an African sun, to die by the slow agonies of pain,
and thirst, and fever.
Regulus was a man of the old Roman kind, like Curius and Fabricius,
devoted to his country, eager for glory, frugal, bold, resolute or (call it)
stubborn. He has been censured for excessive presumptuousness in his
African campaign, and for the extravagance by which he lost all the
advantages which he might have secured. But it must be allowed that
he had some grounds even for overweening confidence. Ever since the
two nations had met in arms, the star of Carthage had grown dim
before that of Rome. Even on the sea, where her navies had long ridden
triumphant, the Queen of the Mediterranean had twice been beaten by
her unskilled rival. There was enough to make more sagacious men than
Regulus believe that Carthage was well-nigh powerless against Rome.
The Romans had yet to learn that when the jealous government of
Carthage allowed great generals to command their armies, such as
Xanthippus, and Hamilcar, and Hannibal, then the well-trained
mercenaries might gain easy victories over their own brave but less
practised citizens.
The whole story of the embassy and death of Regulus has been
doubted, chiefly because of the silence of Polybius, the most authentic
historian of the time; and from the certainty that at least one mythical
marvel has been introduced into the narrative. But if allowance be made
for some patriotic exaggeration, there is nothing improbable in the story.
Those who crucified their own unlucky generals would not be slow to
wreak any measure of vengeance on a recusant prisoner. We read also
that the Romans retaliated by torturing some Carthaginian prisoners,
and this fact can hardly be an invention. At all events, the personal
qualities of Regulus rest too firmly on old tradition to be questioned.
While we read the beautiful passage in which Cicero describes his
disinterested patriotism; while we repeat the noble ode, in which Horace
paints him as putting aside all who would have persuaded him to stay—
people, friends, and family—and going forth to torture and death with
the same serene indifference as if he were leaving the busy life of Rome
for the calm retirement of his country house, so long will the blood flow
more quickly and the heart beat higher at mention of the name of
Regulus.b
Regulus Returns To Carthage
(After Mirys)
Of Regulus, Niebuhr writes rather sharply: Few events in Roman
history are more celebrated than this embassy and the martyrdom of
Regulus, which have been sung by Roman poets and extolled by orators.
Who does not know that Regulus, as a slave of the Carthaginians,
refused to enter the city; that he attended the deliberations of the
senate with their sanction, and rejected the exchange no less
vehemently than the peace; that he confirmed the wavering fathers in
their resolution; that he preferred his honour and his oath to all the
enticements to remain behind; and that, in order to remove the
temptation, he pretended that a slow poison had been administered him
by Punic faithlessness, which would soon end his days, even if the
senate, less mindful of the country than of the individual, should wish to
retain him by exchange or protection; how he withdrew from the
embraces of his friends as a dishonoured man, and after his return to
Carthage was put to death by diabolical tortures?
Palmeriusg was the first who attacked this account after the Valesian
extracts from Diodorush had become known, and his reasons have been
strengthened by Beauforti with very appropriate arguments besides. But
Beaufort has perhaps carried his scepticism too far in doubting, and in
reality rejecting, the truth of the embassy on account of the silence of
Polybius.
Neither of these writers has mentioned, which is of great importance,
that Dion Cassiusj declared the martyrdom of Regulus to be a mere
fable, although he repeated it. He also related that after Regulus had
fallen into captivity, his sleep was at first disturbed, as he was kept shut
up with an elephant, but that this cruelty did not last long. It may be
accounted for, and even pardoned, as Regulus forgot all human feelings
towards Carthage when it had fallen and implored his compassion; and
it is not unlikely that this account may have given rise to the more
widely extended one respecting the mode of his death.
It is most probable that the death of Regulus happened in the course
of nature; and it is very possible that the cruel maltreatment of the
Punic prisoners, respecting whom it is certain, even according to Roman
testimonies, that they were surrendered to the family as hostages or for
revenge, has become the occasion of the prevailing narrative through
that unpardonable calumny which the Romans constantly indulged in
against Carthage. It seems most credible that Hasdrubal and Bostar
were given as hostages, because Regulus actually believed, and the
Romans shared his opinion, that he was secretly poisoned. But with an
unbiassed judgment we must regard the narrative of Diodorus
respecting the perfectly inhuman fury of the family of Regulus against
these innocent prisoners to be no less doubtful than the Roman one;
since it is quite certain that no Roman recorded this disgrace to his
nation, and here, as well as elsewhere, Philinus must be regarded as the
source of Diodorus, whose hatred against Rome is very pardonable, but
always renders his testimony highly suspicious.
For the rest, if this deed of Regulus had not been praised to us in
early years as heroic, we should without prejudice find it less brilliant.
That he went back because he had sworn, was an act which, if he had
not done it, would have been branded with infamy. If he had reason to
fear, it was a consequence of the shameful abuse which he himself had
made of his victory, inasmuch as he only knew how to use it as a mere
child of fortune, and in a way inferior to most of the generals who were
his contemporaries.e
THIRD PERIOD (249-241 B.C.)
It has been said that the senate, encouraged by
[249-244 b.c.] the victory of Panormus, resolved once more to
attempt the sea. In the year 249 b.c. the third fleet
was ready, and its purpose soon became evident. The consuls were
ordered to invest Lilybæum, the queen of Carthaginian fortresses, both
by sea and land. If this strong place fell, the Carthaginians would have
no firm hold on Sicily: but it could not be taken unless it were blockaded
by sea, for by sea supplies could be poured into it from Carthage. The
Romans began the siege with activity; they constructed enormous
works, they endeavoured to throw a dam across the harbour, but in
vain. The skilful seamen of Carthage contrived to carry provision ships
into the harbour through the midst of the Roman fleet. Their navy lay at
hand in the Bay of Drepana, ready to take advantage of any remissness
on the part of the Romans.
Yet the invincible perseverance of the Romans would have prevailed
but for the headstrong folly of the patrician consul for the year 249 b.c.
This was P. Claudius, a younger son of the old censor, brother of him
who had relieved Messana. As he lay before Lilybæum, he formed a plan
for surprising the enemy’s fleet at Drepana, and left his station for this
purpose. In vain he was warned by the pullarii, that the sacred chickens
would not feed. “Then let them drink,” said the irreverent commander,
and threw them into the sea. But the men were much dispirited by the
omen and the contempt of the omen. And the consul had managed
matters with so little secrecy and skill that the enemy were informed of
his intended attack. As the Romans sailed in column into the harbour,
the Carthaginian fleet was seen sailing outward. But on a sudden they
tacked and bore down upon the side of the Roman column. Of Claudius’
220 ships, only thirty escaped.
The reckless consul was recalled to Rome by the senate, and ordered
to supersede himself by naming a dictator. With the old insolence of his
family, he named the son of one of his own freedmen, by name Claudius
Glycias. But the senate set aside the nomination, and themselves
appointed A. Atilius Calatinus, also called Serranus. What became of
Claudius we know not. But he was dead three years after; for a story is
preserved, that at that time his sister insolently expressed a wish that he
were still alive, that he might lose more men, and make the streets less
crowded. She was heavily fined for this speech; and if words deserve
punishment, none deserved it more than hers.
The loss of the fleet of Claudius was not the only disaster of the year.
L. Junius, his plebeian colleague, was less guilty, but even more
unfortunate. He was convoying a large fleet of ships, freighted with
supplies for the forces at Lilybæum, when, near Camarina, he was
overtaken by a tremendous hurricane, and both the convoy and the
convoying squadron perished. The destruction was so complete, that
every single ship was broken up, and not a plank (says Polybius) was fit
to be used again.
Thus by the folly of one consul and the misfortune of the other, the
Romans lost their entire fleet for the third time. It seemed to them as if
the god of the sea was jealous of these new pretenders to his favour.
These disasters left the Carthaginians once more masters of the sea.
And at the same time a really great man was appointed to a command
in Sicily. This was Hamilcar, the father of Hannibal. He seems not to
have had many ships or troops at his command; but the skill with which
he used his means abundantly shows what might have been done if the
government had trusted him more completely. He made continual
descents on the coast of Italy, plundering and alarming. Before long he
landed suddenly near Panormus, and in the face of the Roman
commandant seized a hill called Hercta, which overhung the town (the
same with the modern Monte Pelegrino). Here he fortified himself; and
hence he carried on a continual predatory warfare against the Romans
for the space of three years. After this, by an equally sudden movement,
he made a descent on Eryx, which had been taken by the Romans not
long before, and surprised it. To this place he now shifted his quarters,
and continued the same harassing attacks.
Except for this, matters were at a standstill. The
[243-241 b.c.] whole strength of the Romans was concentrated in
the lines of Lilybæum; but they had no fleet now,
and therefore the place was fully supplied from the sea. On the other
hand the activity of Hamilcar kept the enemy always in alarm. Slight
actions constantly took place; and an anecdote is told by Diodorus,
which sets the character of Hamilcar in a pleasing light. In a skirmish
with the Roman consul, C. Fundanius, he had suffered some loss, and
sent (according to custom) to demand a truce, that he might bury his
dead. But the consul insolently replied that he ought to concern himself
about the living rather than the dead, and save further bloodshed by
surrendering at once. Soon after it was Hamilcar’s turn to defeat the
Romans, and when their commander sent for leave to bury their dead,
the Carthaginian general at once granted it, saying that he “warred not
with the dead, but with the living.”
These interminable hostilities convinced the senate that they must
once more build a fleet, or give up all hopes of driving the Carthaginians
out of Sicily. Lilybæum would foil all their efforts, as it had foiled the
efforts of Pyrrhus. The siege had now lasted eight years, from 250 to
241 b.c., and it appeared no nearer its conclusion than at first. All
sacrifices must be made. A fleet must be built. And it was built. At the
beginning of the year 241 b.c., the patrician consul, C. Lutatius Catulus,
put to sea with more than two hundred sail. This was the fourth navy
which the Romans had created. It is impossible not to admire this iron
determination; impossible not to feel satisfaction at seeing it rewarded.
The consul, with his new fleet, sailed early in the year, and blockaded
Drepana by sea and land, hoping to deprive the Carthaginians of the
harbour in which their fleet lay to watch the Romans at Lilybæum. He
also took great pains to train his seamen in naval tactics. In an action
which took place at Drepana he was severely wounded.
On the other hand the Carthaginians had of late neglected their navy;
and it was not till early in the following year (241) that a fleet was
despatched to the relief of Drepana. It was heavily freighted with
provisions and stores. Hanno, its commander, touched at Hiera, a small
island, about twenty or twenty-five miles from the port of Drepana. Of
this (it appears) Catulus was informed, and, though still suffering from
his wound, he at once put to sea, hoping to intercept the enemy before
they unloaded their ships. On the evening of the 9th of March he lay to
at Ægusa, another small island, not above ten miles distant from Hiera.
Next morning the Carthaginians put to sea and endeavoured to run into
Drepana. But they were intercepted by the Roman fleet, and obliged to
give battle. They fought under great disadvantages, and the Romans
gained an easy victory. Fifty of the enemy’s ships were sunk, seventy
taken; the rest escaped to Hiera.
This battle, called the battle of the Ægatian Islands (for that was the
general name of the group), decided the war. It was plain that Lilybæum
must now surrender; and that though Hamilcar might yet stand at bay,
he could not recover Sicily for the present. The merchants of Carthage
were eager for the conclusion of the war; and the government sent
orders to Hamilcar to make a peace on the best terms he could obtain.
Catulus at first required, as a preliminary to all negotiations, that
Hamilcar should lay down his arms, and give up all Roman deserters in
his service. But when the Carthaginians disdainfully refused this
condition, the consul prudently waived it, and a treaty was finally agreed
on by the two commanders to the following effect—that the
Carthaginians should evacuate Sicily; should give up all Roman prisoners
without ransom; and should pay twenty-two hundred talents in twenty
years towards the expenses of the war. But the Roman tribes refused to
ratify the treaty without inquiry. Accordingly the senate sent over ten
envoys, who confirmed the treaty of Catulus, except that they raised the
sum to thirty-two hundred talents, and required this larger sum to be
paid in ten years, instead of twenty. They also insisted on the cession of
all the small islands between Italy and Sicily.
Thus ended the First Punic War. The issue of this long struggle was
altogether in favour of Rome. She had performed few brilliant exploits;
she had sent few eminent men to conduct the war; but she had done
great things. She had beaten the Mistress of the Sea upon her own
element. She had gained possession of an island nearly twice as large as
Yorkshire, and fertile beyond the example of other lands. Her losses,
indeed, had been enormous; for she had lost seven hundred ships, a
vast number of men, and large sums of money. But Carthage had
suffered still more. For though she had lost not more than five hundred
ships, yet the interruption to her trade, and the loss of her great
commercial emporiums of Lilybæum and Drepana, not only crippled the
resources of the state, but largely diminished the fortunes of every
individual citizen. The Romans and Italians, who fought in this war, were
mostly agricultural; and the losses of such a people are small, and soon
repaired, while those suffered by a great commercial state are often
irreparable.
This war was only the prelude to a more fierce and deadly contest.
Carthage had withdrawn discomfited from Sicily, and her empty treasury
and ruined trade forbade her to continue the conflict at that time. But it
was not yet decided whether Rome or Carthage was to rule the coasts
of the Mediterranean. The great Hamilcar left Eryx without despair. He
foresaw that by patience and prudence he might shake off the control of
his jealous government, and train up an army in his own interest, with
which he might defy the Roman legions.
EVENTS BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PUNIC WARS
The First Punic War lasted three-and-twenty
[241-218 b.c.] years; and the interval between the end of this war
and the beginning of the next was of nearly the
same duration. In the course of this period (from 240 to 218 b.c.) both
Rome and Carthage, notwithstanding their exhausted condition, were
involved in perilous wars. In the next three years Carthage was brought
to the very brink of destruction by a general mutiny of her mercenary
troops, which had been employed in Sicily, and were now to be
disbanded. Their leaders were Spendius, a runaway Campanian slave,
who feared to be given up to the Romans, and Matho, a Libyan, who
had been too forward in urging the demands of the army for their pay,
to hope for forgiveness from the Carthaginian government. Led on by
these desperadoes, the soldiers gave full vent to their ferocity; they
seized Gisco, who had been sent to treat with them, as a hostage;
plundered the country round about; raised the subject Africans in
rebellion; besieged the fortified towns of Utica and Hippo; and cut off all
communication by land with the promontory upon which Carthage
stands. At the end of the second year, however, Hamilcar, being invested
with the command of the civic forces, reduced Spendius to such
extremities that he surrendered at discretion, and compelled Matho to
shut himself up in Tunis.
The spirit of the insurgents was now quite
[240-235 b.c.] broken, and they would fain have given in. But
Matho and his officers were fighting with halters
round their necks, and whenever any one attempted to persuade
peaceful measures, a knot of the more violent cried him down; and
thus, as usually happens in popular commotions, the real wishes of the
greater part were drowned in the loud vociferations of a few bold and
resolute desperadoes. What made the task of these men easier was that
the army was composed of a great many different nations; and the
soldiers, not being able to understand one another, could not so readily
combine against their leaders. Almost the only word which was
understood by all, was the terrible cry of “Stone him, stone him!” which
was raised by the leading insurgents, whenever any one rose to
advocate peace, and was re-echoed by the mass in ignorance or fear.
But Hamilcar maintained a strict blockade, and the insurgents in Tunis
were reduced to such extremities of famine that Matho was obliged to
risk a battle. He was utterly defeated, taken prisoner, and put to death.
Thus terminated this terrible war, which had lasted more than three
years and four months, and at one time threatened the very existence
of Carthage. It was known by the name of the War without Truce, or the
Inexpiable War.
The forbearance shown by the Romans to Carthage during this fearful
war makes their conduct at its close the more surprising. The mercenary
troops in Sardinia had mutinied after the example of their brethren, and
had taken possession of the island. After the close of the war in Africa
these insurgents, fearing that their turn was come, put themselves
under Roman protection; and their prayer for aid, like that of the
Mamertines, was granted. The senate had the effrontery not only to
demand the cession of Sardinia and Corsica, but also the payment of a
further sum of twelve hundred talents. The Carthaginians were too weak
to refuse; not even Hamilcar could have counselled them to do so. But
this ungenerous conduct strengthened Hamilcar’s grim resolve, to take
full vengeance on the grasping Italian republic.
To execute this resolve it was necessary for him to obtain an
independent authority, so as to form armies and carry on campaigns,
without being fettered by the orders of the narrow-minded government.
And now seemed the time to obtain this authority. Hanno and the
leading members of the council had long been jealous of the family of
Barca, of which Hamilcar was the chief. Hamilcar’s fame and popularity
were now so high that it was possible he might overthrow the power of
the council of One Hundred. It was, therefore, with pleasure that they
received his proposal to reduce Spain under the Carthaginian power.
Carthage already had settlements in the south of Spain, and the old
trading city of Gades was in alliance with her. But the rest of the country
was peopled by wild and savage tribes, who could not be conquered in a
day. But, before we trace the consequences of this extension of
Carthaginian power in Spain, the affairs of Rome and Italy claim our
attention.
During the Mercenary War in Africa, the Romans had remained at
peace; and so profound was the general tranquillity in the year 235 b.c.,
that the temple of Janus was closed by the consul Manlius Torquatus,
for the first time (say the annals) since the reign of Numa. In the last
year of the First Punic War, the lower Sabine country had been formed
into two tribes—the Veline and the Quirine. Thus the number of thirty-
five was completed, and no addition was hereafter made to the Roman
territory.
THE MASSACRE OF THE INSURGENTS BY HAMILCAR
This tranquillity was of no long duration. The success of their arms in
Sicily, and their newly acquired maritime power, encouraged the Romans
to cross the Adriatic, not so much for the purpose of advancing their
own dominion as to render a service to all who frequented these seas
for the purposes of traffic. The far side of the Adriatic, then called
Illyricum, consists of a narrow ledge of coast land flanked by parallel
mountain chains. Many islands appear off the shore, and several large
creeks afford safe anchorage for ships. These natural advantages made
the Illyrians of the coast skilful seamen. Their light barks (lembi) issued
from behind the islands or out of the creeks, and practised piracy on
their neighbours. Their main stronghold was Scodra (Scutari). In 231
b.c., Teuta, a woman of bold and masculine spirit, became chief of this
piratical race during the infancy of her son Pinnes, and in 230 b.c. had
made herself supreme over all the islands except Issa, which she
blockaded in person in that year. The senate had not hitherto found
leisure to check the progress of these pirates. But in the year just
named, they sent C. and L. Coruncanius as envoys to remonstrate with
Teuta. But Teuta was little disposed to listen to remonstrance. It was
not, she said, customary for the chiefs of Illyricum to prevent their
subjects from making use of the sea. The younger Coruncanius,
indignant at this avowal of national piracy, replied that if such were the
institutions of the Illyrians, the Romans would lose no time in helping
her to mend them. Exasperated by this sarcasm, Teuta ordered the
envoys to be pursued and the younger one to be put to death. The
Romans at once declared war against the Illyrians.
After the surrender of Issa, the Illyrian queen
[235-229 b.c.] pursued her success by the capture not only of
Dyrrhachium, but also of Corcyra; and Demetrius, a
clever and unscrupulous Greek of Pharos (a place on the coast of upper
Illyricum), the chief counsellor of Teuta, was made governor of this
famous island. The Epirots now sent ambassadors to crave protection
from Rome; and the senate gladly took advantage of this opening. Early
in the next spring both consuls appeared at Corcyra with a powerful
fleet and army. Demetrius quickly discerned to which side fortune would
incline, and surrendered Corcyra to the Romans without a blow. This
treachery paralysed Teuta’s spirit; and Demetrius enabled the Roman
commanders to overpower her forces with little trouble. She was obliged
to surrender the greater part of her dominions to the traitor, who now
became chief of Corcyra and southern Illyricum, under the protection of
Rome. The Illyrians were not to appear south of Lissus with more than
two barks at a time.
The suppression of Illyrian piracy was even more
advantageous to the commerce of Greece than that
of Rome. The leading men of the senate began, even
at this time, to show a strong disposition to win the
good opinion of the Greeks, who, degenerate as they
were, were still held to be the centre of civilisation
and the dispensers of fame. Postumius the consul,
therefore, sent envoys to various Greek states to
explain the appearance of a Roman force in those
quarters. They were received with high distinction.
The Athenians and Corinthians, especially, paid
honour to Rome; and the latter people recognised
her Greek descent by voting that her citizens should
be admitted to the Isthmian games (228 b.c.). This
short war was scarcely ended, when Rome saw a
conflict impending, which filled her with alarm.
It will be remembered that just before the war
with Pyrrhus, the Senonian Gauls had been
Standard Bearer
extirpated, and the Boians defeated with great
slaughter in two battles near Lake Vadimo in Etruria
(283 b.c.). From that time the Gauls had remained quiet within their own
boundaries. But in 232 b.c., the tribune C. Flaminius, a man who will
hereafter claim more special notice, proposed to distribute all the public
land held by Rome on the Picenian and Umbrian coasts to a number of
poor citizens; a law which was put into effect four years afterwards.
When the colonies of Sena Gallica and Ariminum had been planted on
that same coast, the Boians were too much weakened by their late
defeats to offer any opposition. But in two generations their strength
was recruited, and they were encouraged to rise against Rome by the
promised support of the Insubrians, a powerful tribe who occupied the
trans-Padane district about Milan. The arrival of large bodies of Gauls
from beyond the Alps completed their determination, and increased the
terror which the recollections of the Allia still wrought upon the Roman
mind. Report exaggerated the truth, and the Romans made larger
preparations for this Gallic war than they had made against Pyrrhus or
the Carthaginians. Active preparations were seconded by superstitious
rites. The Sibylline books were consulted, and in them it was found
written that the soil of Rome must be twice occupied by a foreign foe.
To fulfil this prediction, the government barbarously ordered a Gaulish
man and woman, together with a Greek woman, to be buried alive in
the Forum.
The campaign opened in northern Etruria. The
[229-223 b.c.] Gauls crossed the Apennines into the vale of the
Arno and fell suddenly upon the prætor stationed
with an army at Fæsulæ. Him they overpowered, and defeated with
great slaughter. The consul Æmilius now, with great promptitude,
crossed the Umbrian hills into Etruria; and on his approach the Gauls
retired northwards along the coast, wishing to secure their booty; while
Æmilius hung upon their rear, without venturing to engage in a general
action. But near Pisa they found that the other consul, Atilius, had
landed from Sardinia; and thus hemmed in by two consular armies, they
were obliged to give battle at a place called Telamon. The conflict was
desperate; but the Romans were better armed and better disciplined
than of old, while the Gauls had remained stationary. Their large heavy
broadswords, forged of ill-tempered iron, bent at the first blow, and
while they stooped to straighten them with the foot, they were full
exposed to the thrust of the short Roman sword. The victory of Telamon
was as signal as that of Sentinum or of Vadimo (225 b.c.).
The consuls of the next year (224 b.c.) again invaded the Boian
country, and received the complete submission of all the tribes on the
left bank of the Po. In the following year C. Flaminius, the reputed cause
of the war, was consul, and pushed across the Po, with the resolution of
punishing the Insubrians (Milanese) for the part they had taken in the
invasion of Etruria. The place at which he crossed the great river was
somewhere above Mantua; and here he formed a league with the
Cenomani, who were at deadly feud with the Insubrians. Assisted by
these auxiliaries, he moved westward across the Adda, the boundary of
the Insubrian district. At this moment Flaminius received despatches
from the senate, forbidding him to invade the Insubrian country. But he
laid them aside unopened, and at once gave battle to the enemy. He
gained a signal victory; and then, opening the despatches, he laughed
at the caution of the senate.
During the winter the Insubrians sued for peace; but the new consuls,
Cn. Cornelius Scipio and M. Claudius Marcellus, afterwards so
celebrated, persuaded the senate to undertake a fourth campaign. The
consuls both marched north, and entered the Insubrian territory. But
Marcellus, hearing that Viridomarus, the Insubrian chief, had crossed the
Po to ravage the country lately occupied by the Romans, left his
colleague to reduce the principal towns of the Insubrians, while he
pursued the chief with his army. He came up with him near Clastidium,
and attacked him with his cavalry alone. A smart action ensued, in which
Marcellus encountered Viridomarus, and slew him with his own hand;
and the Gauls fled in disorder. Thus were won the third and last spolia
opima. Meanwhile Scipio had taken Mediolanum (Milan), the chief city of
the Insubrian Gauls, and the war was concluded (221 b.c.).
Soon after this it was resolved, probably at the instance of Flaminius,
to plant two colonies, Cremona and Placentia, on opposite sides of the
Po, so as to secure the territory lately won in the Boian and Insubrian
territories. But the execution of this project did not take place till three
years later, when Hannibal was on his march. Some years afterwards we
hear this district spoken of as the province of Ariminum. Communication
was secured between Rome and Ariminum by a road constructed in the
censorship of Flaminius, which bore his name (220 b.c.).
During this great disturbance in Italy, Demetrius of Pharos proved as
false to his new patrons as he had been to Teuta. Relying on the support
of Philip, king of Macedon, he assumed the air of an independent chief,
and encouraged his subjects in their old piratical practices. In 219 b.c. L.
Æmilius Paulus, the patrician consul, received orders from the senate to
put a stop to these proceedings. In one short campaign he reduced
Corcyra, took Pharos, and forced Demetrius to take refuge at the court
of Philip, where we shall find him at a later time active in promoting
hostilities against Rome. Illyricum again fell into the hands of native
chiefs; the Romans, however, kept possession of the island of Corcyra,
together with the strong towns of Oricum and Apollonia—positions of
great service in the Macedonian Wars.
Thus triumphant on all sides and on all sides apparently secure, the
Roman government had no presentiment of the storm that had long
been gathering in the west. We must now return to Hamilcar.
HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
He crossed the straits of Gibraltar in 235 b.c. With
[235-219 b.c.] him went his son-in-law Hasdrubal, and his son
Hannibal, then a boy of nine years old, but even
then giving promise of those qualities which afterwards made him the
terror of Rome. Hamilcar had not intended to take him to Spain; but the
boy pleaded so earnestly, that the father yielded on condition that he
should swear eternal enmity to Rome and the Romans. Hannibal himself,
in his old age, told the tale to Antiochus, king of Syria, how he was led
to the altar of his country’s gods, and took this direful oath. Nothing can
more strongly show the feelings with which Hamilcar left his country. He
went, not as the servant of Carthage but as the enemy of Rome, with
feelings of personal hostility, not to be appeased save by the
degradation of his antagonist.
His first object was to conquer Spain, and thus put Carthage in
possession of a province which might itself become a great kingdom,
and was worth many Sicilies and Sardinias. One of the chief advantages
he proposed to himself in this conquest was the supply of hardy
soldiers, which would be given by the possession of Spain. But he was
well aware that for this purpose conquest was not sufficient; he must
enlist the feelings of the Spaniards in his cause, he must teach them to
look up to himself and his family as their friends and benefactors.
Accordingly he married a Spanish lady of Castulo; he lived among the
natives like one of themselves; he taught them to work their rich silver
mines; and in all ways opened out the resources of the country.
Meanwhile he collected and disciplined an excellent army, with which he
reduced many of the ruder tribes to the northward of the modern
Andalusia and Murcia. Thus he reigned (this is the best word to express
his power) with vigour and wisdom for eight years; and in the ninth he
fell in battle, admired and regretted by all southern Spain.
Hannibal was yet only in his eighteenth year, too young to take up the
work which his father had left unfinished. But Hasdrubal, the son-in-law
of the great commander, proved his worthy successor. He at once
assumed supreme authority. By the gentler arts of conciliation he won
over a great number of tribes; and in order to give a capital to this new
realm, he founded the city of New Carthage, now Carthagena, on the
coast of Murcia. The successes of Hamilcar had already attracted the
notice of the senate; and in the year 227 b.c., presently after his death,
they concluded a league with Hasdrubal, whereby the river Ebro was
fixed as the northern boundary of the Carthaginian empire in Spain.
Hasdrubal fell by the knife of an assassin in the year 221 b.c., the
seventh of his command.
Hannibal was now in his twenty-fourth year. He was at once elected
by the acclamations of the army to stand in his great father’s place. Nor
did the government venture to brave the anger of a young general at
the head of an army devoted to his cause. Hannibal remained as ruler of
Carthaginian Spain. The office was becoming hereditary in his family.
Hamilcar had enlarged the Carthaginian rule in Spain from a few
trading settlements to a great province. Hasdrubal had carried the limits
of this province as far as the sierra of Toledo. Hannibal immediately
crossed this range into the valley of the Tagus, and reduced the
Celtiberian tribes which then occupied Castille. He even passed the
Castilian Mountains which form the upper edge of the basin of the
Tagus, and made the name of Carthage feared among the Vaccæans of
the Douro, by taking their chief town, Helmantica (Salamanca). At the
close of the year 220 b.c., all Spain south of the Ebro was in subjection
to Carthage, or in alliance with her. The great qualities of the three men
through whom they knew her made them not unwilling vassals.
But there was one city south of the Ebro which
[219-218 b.c.] still maintained independence. This was Saguntum,
an ancient colony from the Greek island of
Zacynthus. Its site on the coast of modern Valencia is marked by the
present town of Murviedro (Muri Veteres), rather more than halfway
between New Carthage and the mouth of the Ebro. Saguntum had been
for some time in alliance with Rome; and therefore, though it was on
the Carthaginian side of the Ebro, was by Roman custom entitled to
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