Olviga v. CA, GR No. 104813, Oct.
21, 1993
FACTS:
In 1950, twelve-year-old Eutiquio Pureza and his father cleared and began cultivating a parcel of
public forest land, later known as Lot 13, Pls-84, in the Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision. By 1954,
they had planted fruit-bearing trees, and in 1956 the Bureau of Lands surveyed and registered the land
under Pureza’s name. Around the same time, Godofredo Olviga, son of Jose Olviga and brother of
petitioners, lodged a formal protest with the Bureau, acknowledging Pureza's title but objecting to a
one-half hectare portion at the area’s northeast corner
Pureza later filed a homestead application in 1960 and transferred his rights to Cornelio Glor in 1961.
The Bureau took no action on either the application or the transfer, although no reason for this inaction
appears in its files
In 1967, the land was fraudulently registered in the name of Jose Olviga through a cadastral proceeding
before the Municipal Court of Guinayangan. Olviga falsely declared the parcel uncontested and omitted
any acknowledgment of the Glors’ possession or Pureza’s prior claim. Crucially, neither Cornelio Glor nor
his wife Angelita were notified, and no hearing notices were posted—facts underscored by testimonies
on record
By 1971, the registered title was divided into two Torrens certificates for Lots 12 and 13. Lot 13 was later
transferred to Olviga’s son-in-law and daughter—Jaime and Lolita Olila. However, these spouses were
found to be neither in possession of the land nor innocent purchasers in good faith
Angelita Glor, Cornelio’s widow, filed a reconveyance action in the Regional Trial Court (Civil Case No.
C-883), asserting that the land rightfully belonged to the Glor family based on actual and continuous
possession commencing in 1950. The trial court ruled in her favor, ordering the Olvigas to reconvey the
property and pay attorney's fees and costs
Unsatisfied, the Olvigas appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, on January 13, 1992, affirmed the trial
court’s decision in full. The appellate court sustained the factual findings: the Glors—and their
predecessors—had actual possession; the Olilas were not bona fide purchasers or possessors; and the
fraudulent registration was unconscionable .
The Supreme Court reviewed whether the action had prescribed — if considered as one for quieting of
title or based on constructive trust, which usually prescribes in ten years from registration. It
distinguished that when a claimant is in actual possession, prescription does not begin until such
possession is disturbed. In this case, the Glors' possession persisted until around 1988, when they
became aware of Olviga’s adverse claim, and filed suit in 1989—well within ten years
Finding no reversible error, the Court denied the review petition, upheld the reconveyance order, and
remitted costs against the Olvigas.
FACTS:
Eutiquio Pureza and his father cleared and cultivated the land in 1950 and introduced
improvements. In 1961, Pureza transferred his rights to Cornelio Glor. In 1967, Jose Olviga obtained a
registered title for the land in a cadastral proceeding, without notifying the Glors, who were the
actual occupants. The Glors filed an action for reconveyance in 1989 after learning of Olviga's title in
1988. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the Glors, ordering the Olvigas to reconvey the land.
The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. The Olvigas then appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Does the action for reconveyance, based on implied or constructive trust, prescribe when the
plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous possession of the property?
Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that the private respondents' cause of action accrued not
in 1967 (date of registration of title) but in 1988 (date of discovery of title)?
RULING:
#1The Court reiterated the established jurisprudence that one who is in actual possession of a
piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.
The Court cited *Faja vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441, 446*, stating that the right to quiet
title to the property, to seek its reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrued
only from the time the one in possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his own.
Since the Glors and their predecessors-in-interest were in actual possession of the property
since 1950, their undisturbed possession gave them the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of petitioners.
#2 The Court implicitly affirmed the Court of Appeals' finding that the prescriptive period
should be counted from the date the plaintiffs acquired knowledge of the title in 1988, as the action
for reconveyance is imprescriptible due to the respondents' continuous possession.
CO-OWNERSHIP
Pardell v. Bartolome, 23 Phil. 450
FACTS:
Vicenta and Matilde inherited several properties from their parents. The defendants, Gaspar
and Matilde, managed these properties and collected rents. Vicenta claimed that the defendants
refused to divide the properties and account for the rents. The defendants lived in the upper story of
a house on Calle Escolta, while Gaspar used a portion of the lower floor as his office as a Justice of the
Peace. A house on Calle Escolta was damaged by an earthquake and required significant repairs.
Procedural History: The plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking partition of the inherited
properties, accounting of rents, and damages. The defendants counterclaimed for reimbursement of
expenses incurred in repairing the house on Calle Escolta and for administration fees. The lower court
absolved the defendants from the complaint and the plaintiffs from the counterclaim. The defendants
appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Can a co-owner occupy a jointly owned property without compensating the other co-owner
for its use?
Is the husband of a co-owner liable to compensate the other co-owner for using a portion of
the jointly owned property for his personal business?
Are the plaintiffs liable to reimburse the defendants for expenses incurred in repairing a
jointly owned property?
Is the husband of a co-owner entitled to remuneration for administering the jointly owned
property?
RULING:
Holding on Issue 1: A co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in
accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor
prevent the co-owners from utilizing them according to their rights.
The Court cited Article 394 of the Civil Code, stating that each co-owner has the right to use the
property, provided they do not injure the interests of the community or prevent other co-owners
from utilizing the property.
The Court found that Matilde Ortiz's occupation of the upper story of the house did not cause
detriment to the community property or prevent Vicenta from utilizing it, as the lower floor was
rented and accounted for.
The Court reasoned that until a division is made, the respective part of each holder cannot be
determined, and every co-owner exercises joint ownership over the pro indiviso property.
The Court found that Gaspar, as the husband of a co-owner, had no right to gratuitously occupy and
use a part of the lower floor for his personal business to the detriment of Vicenta, who did not receive
her share of the potential rent.
The Court fixed the monthly rental value of the occupied space at P16, and ordered Gaspar to pay
Vicenta P384, representing one-half of the total rent for the four years he occupied the space.
Holding on Issue 3: Yes, Vicenta Ortiz is liable to reimburse Matilde and Gaspar de Bartolome for one-
half of the expenses incurred in repairing the house on Calle Escolta.
The Court acknowledged that the house was damaged by an earthquake and required significant
repairs, costing P6,252.32.
The Court found that the rents collected from the properties were insufficient to cover the repair
costs, leaving a balance of P2,598.17 advanced by the defendants.
The Court concluded that Vicenta should pay one-half of this balance, amounting to P1,299.08, but
reduced this amount by P384, the amount owed by Gaspar for the use of the office space, resulting in
a net payment of P915.08 from Vicenta to the defendants.
Holding on Issue 4: No, Gaspar de Bartolome is not entitled to remuneration for administering the
jointly owned property.
The Court found that there was no stipulation between Gaspar and Vicenta regarding remuneration
for his administration of the property.
The Court stated that Gaspar acted as an officious manager and is only entitled to reimbursement for
actual and necessary expenditures, not compensation for his services.
The Court noted that Gaspar and Matilde resided in the upper story of the house without paying rent,
which served as compensation for his efforts in administering the property.
Ongsiako v. Ongsiako
Petitioner: Carmen de la Paz Vda. de Ongsiako, landowner
Respondent: Teodorico Gamboa and Pantaleon et al., tenants
Key Facts: Petitioner and respondents entered into tenancy
contracts in June-July 1946, stipulating a 50-50 crop division
with the landowner shouldering planting expenses and the
tenant defraying harvesting expenses. Republic Act No. 34 was
approved on September 30, 1946, amending the Rice Share
Tenancy Act to favor tenants with a 55-45 crop division. During
the 1946-1947 harvest, the tenants sought application of the
new law.
Procedural History: The Tenancy Law Enforcement Division
ruled in favor of the tenants, applying Republic Act No. 34. The
Court of Industrial Relations sustained this ruling. The
landowner appealed to the Supreme Court via certiorari.
⚖️
LEGAL ISSUES
1. Does Republic Act No. 34 apply to tenancy contracts entered
into before its enactment, or does it unconstitutionally impair
the obligation of contracts and have retroactive effect?
2. Did the Court of Industrial Relations err in its factual finding
regarding the contribution of the petitioner for planting and
cultivation expenses?
🏛️
COURT'S RULING & REASONING
Holding: The petition is denied, and the decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations is affirmed.
Republic Act No. 34 does not impair the obligation of contracts
because constitutional provisions against impairing contracts
do not prevent legislation enacted by the State in the proper
exercise of its police power.
The law is a valid exercise of police power to secure the
general welfare of the community and promote social justice.
The intent of the legislature in enacting Republic Act No. 34
was to make the division of crops more equitable to the
tenants, and the law expressly provides that stipulations giving
the tenant less than 55% of the net produce are against public
policy.
JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPACT
This decision clarifies that laws enacted to promote social
justice and the well-being of the working class, such as
Republic Act No. 34, can apply to existing contracts without
violating the constitutional prohibition against impairing the
obligation of contracts.
The case establishes the principle that the State's police power
can override contractual stipulations when necessary to
protect public welfare and promote social justice.
Future cases involving similar conflicts between contractual
rights and social legislation will be guided by this precedent,
emphasizing the primacy of the State's police power in
promoting the general welfare.
