Banha University

Faculty of Arts

Translation

Compiled by

Dr Hesham hasan

Banha University
2021/2022
PART I

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CATFORD AND TRANSLATION 'SHIFTS'
Although Vinay and Darbelnet do not use the word
‗shift‘, in discussing translation shift, that is in effect
what they are describing. The term itself seems to
originate in Catford‘s A Linguistic Theory of
Translation (1965), where he devotes a chapter to the
subject. Catford (1965: 20) follows the Firthian and
Hallidayan linguistic model, which analyses
language as communication, operating
functionally in context and on a range of different
levels (e.g. phonology, graphology, grammar,
lexis) and ranks (sentence, clause, group, word,
morpheme, etc.).
As far as translation is concerned, Catford makes
an important distinction between formal
correspondence and textual equivalence, which was
later to be developed by Koller.

A formal correspondent is ‗any TL category

(unit, class, element of structure, etc.) which can
be said to occupy, as nearly as possible, the
"same" place in the "economy" of the TL as the
given SL category occupies in the SL‘ (Catford
1965: 27).
A textual equivalent is ‗any TL text or portion of
text which is observed on a par- ticular occasion .
. . to be the equivalent of a given SL text or
portion of text‘.
Textual equivalence is thus tied to a particular ST–
TT pair, while formal equivalence is a more
general system-based concept between a pair of
languages. When the two concepts diverge, a
translation shift is deemed to have occurred. In
Catford‘s own words (1965: 73; 2000: 141),
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translation shifts are thus ‗departures from formal
correspondence in the process of going from the
SL to the TL‘.
Catford considers two kinds of shift: (1) shift of
level and (2) shift of category:

(1) A level shift (1965: 73–5; 2000: 141–3) would

be something which is expressed by grammar
in one language and lexis in another; this
could, for example, be:
aspect in Russian being translated by a
lexical verb in English: e.g. igrat ’ (to
play) and sigrat ’ (to finish playing);
or cases where the French conditional
corresponds to a lexical item in English:
e.g. ‗trois touristes auraient été tués‘ [lit.

‗three tourists have been reported killed‘.

(2) Most of Catford‘s analysis is given over to
category shifts (1965: 75–82; 2000: 143–7).
These are subdivided into four kinds:
(a) Structural shifts: These are said by
Catford to be the most common form of
shift and to involve mostly a shift in
grammatical structure. For example, the

structures of I like jazz and j’aime le jazz in

English and French are translated by an

noun structure in Spanish (me gusta el jazz

) and in Italian (mi piace il jazz ).
(b) Class shifts: These comprise shifts from
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 one part of speech to another. An example
given by Catford is the English a medical
student and the French un étudiant en
médecine, where the English premodifying
adjective medical is translated by the
adverbial qualifying phrase en médecine.
(c) Unit shifts or rank shifts: These are shifts
where the translation equivalent in the TL is
at a different rank to the SL. ‗Rank‘ here
refers to the hierarchical linguistic units of
sentence, clause, group, word and
morpheme.
(d) Intra-system shifts: These are shifts that
take place when the SL and TL possess
approximately corresponding systems but
where ‗the translation involves selection of
a non-corresponding term in the TL
system‘ (1965: 80; 2000: 146). Examples
given between French and English are
number and article systems, where,
although similar systems operate in the two
lan- guages, they do not always
correspond. Thus, advice (singular) in
English becomes des conseils (plural) in
French, and the French definite article la in
‗Il a la jambe cassée‘ corresponds to the
English indefinite article a in ‗He has a
broken leg‘.

Catford‘s book is an important attempt to apply to

translation advances in linguistics in a
systematic fashion. However, his analysis of intra-
system shifts betrays some of the weaknesses of his
approach. From his comparison of the use of French
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and English article systems in short parallel texts,
Catford concludes (1965: 81–2) that French le/la/les
‗will have English the as its translation equivalent
with probability .65‘, supporting his statement that
‗translation equivalence does not entirely match
formal correspondence‘. This kind of scientific-like
statement of probability, which characterizes
Catford‘s whole approach and was linked to the
growing interest in machine translation at the time,
was later heavily criticized by, amongst others,
Delisle (1982) for its static contrastive linguistic
basis. Henry (1984), revisiting Catford‘s book
twenty years after publication, considers the work to
be ‗by and large of historical academic interest‘ only
(p. 157). He does, however, (p. 155) point out the
usefulness of Catford‘s final chapter, on the limits of
translatability. Of particular interest is Catford‘s
assertion that translation equivalence depends on
communicative features such as function, relevance,
situation and culture rather than just on formal
linguistic criteria. However, as Catford himself notes
(p. 94), deciding what is ‗functionally relevant‘ in a
given situation is inevitably ‗a matter of opinion‘.
Despite the steps taken by Catford to consider
the communicative function of the SL item and
despite the basis of his terminology being founded
on a functional approach to language, the main
criticism of Catford‘s book is that his examples are
almost all idealized (i.e. invented and not taken
from actual translations) and decontextualized. He
does not look at whole texts, nor even above the
level of the sentence.
THE COGNITIVE PROCESS OF
TRANSLATION
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Translation shift analysis seeks to describe the
phenomenon of translation by analysing and
classifying the changes that can be observed by
comparing ST–TT pairs. It is a means of describing
what constitutes the translation product but there
are limits about what it can (or even attempts to) tell
us about the actual process of translation.
However, other models choose a different approach,
based on the observation, analysis and/or explanation
of the cognitive processes of the translators
themselves. As Roger Bell (1991: 43) puts it: ‗focus
on the description of the process and/or the translator
[. . .] form the twin issues which translation theory
must address: how the process takes place and what
knowledge and skills the translator must possess in
order to carry it out.‘ Thus, the ‗interpretive model‘
of translation, championed in Paris from the 1960s
onwards by Danica Seleskovitch and Marianne
Lederer and initially applied to the study of
conference interpreting, explains translation as an
(overlapping) three-stage process involving:
(3) Reading and understanding (Lederer 1994;
2003: 23–35) using linguistic competence and
‗world knowledge‘ to grasp the sense of the
ST. The linguistic component needs to be
understood by reference not only to explicit
but also to implicit meaning in an attempt
to recover the authorial intention. The world
knowledge we have, according to Lederer, is
de-verbalized, theoretical, general,
encyclopaedic and cultural and activated
differently in different translators and by
different texts: ‗Translators are privileged

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 readers called on to understand the facts in a
text and to feel its emotional connotations.
That is why translators do not feel equally
close to all texts‘ (Lederer, p. 31).
(4) Deverbalization (Lederer, p. 115) is ‗an
essential intermediate phase if the translator is
to avoid transcoding and calques‘. An
explanation developed to explain the cognitive
processing of the interpreter, where transfer is
supposedly through sense and not words,
deverbalization is claimed to be ‗less obvious
in translation . . . but is still present‘ (p. 13).
(5) Re-expression (Lederer, pp. 35–42) where the
TT is constituted and given form based on the
deverbalized understanding of sense.
A fourth stage, verification, where the translator
revisits and evaluates the TT, was added by Jean
Delisle (1982/88, see Lederer 2003: 38). In some
ways, this model might appear quite similar to Nida‘s
model of analysis, transfer and restructuring (see
Chapter 3). However, rather than placing the
emphasis on a structural representation of semantics,
the interpretive model stresses the deverbalized
cognitive processing that takes place. Yet
deverbalization, a key plank in the interpretive
model, is really underdeveloped theoretically partly
because of the problems of observing the process. If
deverbalization occurs in a non-verbal state in the
mind, how is the researcher going to gain access to
it, apart from in the reconstituted form of the
verbalized output after the re-expression stage?
From the perspective of relevance theory
(Sperber and Wilson 1986/95), the important work
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of Ernst-August Gutt (1991/2000) posits
translation as an example of a communication
based around a cause-and-effect model of
inferencing and interpretation.
Any successful communication is said to depend on
the communicator‘s ensuring that his/her
‗informative intention‘ is grasped by the receiver,
and this is achieved by making the stimulus (words,
gestures, etc.) optimally relevant to the extent that the
receiver ‗can expect to derive adequate contextual
effects without spending unnecessary effort‘ (Gutt
2000: 32). That is, the communicator gives the
hearer communicative clues that allow the inference
to be made. Translators, for their part, are faced with
a similar situation and have several responsibilities
(pp. 190–3): they need to decide whether and how it
is possible to communicate the informative intention,
whether to translate descriptively or interpretively,
what the degree of resemblance to the ST should be,
and so on. These decisions are based on the
translator‘s evaluation of the cognitive environment
of the receiver. To succeed, the translator and
receiver must share basic assumptions about the
resemblance that is sought and the translator‘s
intentions must agree with the receiver‘s
expectations (p. 192). As an instance of failed
communication, Gutt (pp. 193–4) gives the example
(from Dooley 1989) of a translation of the New
Testament into Gauraní, as spoken in Brazil. There,
the initial, idiomatic translation had to be completely
rewritten because the Guaraní expectation was for a
TT that more closely corresponded to the form of the
high-prestige Portuguese.

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 By focusing on the communicative process and
cognitive processing, Gutt rejects those translation
models, such as register analysis and descriptive
studies, that are based on a study of input–output. He
even contends that trans- lation as communication
can be explained using relevance theoretic concepts
alone. In that respect, he claims (p. 235) ‗there is no
need for developing a separate theory of translation,
with concepts and a theoretical framework of its
own‘.
Roger Bell, in his own modelling of the
translation process (Bell 1991: 35–81), draws on
linguistic concepts such as semantic structure
analysis on discourse analytic categories such as
transitivity, modality and cohesion and on psycho-
linguistic processing. He posits a process that
involves analysis and synthesis, each of which
occurs in three ‗areas‘ (syntax, semantics and
pragmatics). Analysis of the ST segment is
‗converted‘ into ‗a completely language-free
semantic representation‘ (p. 56) which tallies with
the deverbalization of the interpretive school but is
broken down into the functional and pragmatic
linguistic categories of clause structure,
propositional content, thematic structure, register
features, illocutionary force and speech act.
Synthesis (pp. 58–60) covers purpose, thematic
structure, style and illocutionary force before
reaching the syntactic synthesis, where the
description is illustrative of the influence of artificial
intelligence on this kind of approach:
The TL syntactic processor accepts the input
from the semantic stage, scans its FLS
[frequent lexis store] for suitable lexical items and
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 checks in the FSS [frequent structure store] for an
appropriate clause-type which will represent the
proposition. If there is no available clause
structure in the FSS to convey the particular
meanings, the proposition is passed through the
parser (which is now functioning as a syntactic
synthesizer) and, finally, the writing system is
activated to realize the clause as a string of
symbols which constitute the target language text.
(Bell 1991: 60)
This model must remain hypothetical, since Bell does
not support it with empirical evidence and the
illustrative texts are decontextualized. Other theorists
have attempted to gather observational data towards
the explanation of the decision-making processes of
translation by adopting methods such as think-aloud
protocols, where the translator is asked to verbalize
his/her thought processes (e.g. Krings 1986,
Tirkkonen-Condit and Jääskeläinen 2000 and the
special issue of Across 3.1 (2002)), and technological
innovations such as the Translog software at the
Copenhagen Business School (Jakobsen and Schou
1999, Hansen 2006), which records the key-strokes
made by the translator on the keyboard, and eye-
trackers (O‘Brien 2006), which record the focus of
the eye (and, therefore, presumably, the brain) on the
text. Potentially profitable as such developments are,
Hurtado Albir and Alves warn that ‗the field needs to
put more effort into refining experimental designs
and fostering the replication of studies, thus allowing
for validation or falsification of previously findings‘.

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Universals of Grammar and Creative
Transpositions
We have established thus far that stylistic approaches can
look at different parts of the translation process, and that style itself
can be seen to mean different things in relation to language, and
therefore in its relation to translation. A third area about which there
are very different views is the relationship of language, and
specifically of style, to the universal and the particular. On the face of
it, translation would seem to demand that at least something is
universal, and for stylisticians concerned with the translation of style,
an important question will always be this: which aspects of style are
universal and which are inextricably linked with a particular
language? In considering this question, it is worth looking at
Jakobson‘s work. Though one of the criticisms commonly made of his
work in stylistics by what Bradford (1994) refers to as the anti-
Jakobson School of the 60s and 70s, typified by Fowler (e.g. 1975), is
that it is overly formalist, and ignores the effects of situation and the
reader, he makes rewarding reading for those working in translation,
even today.
Jakobson was particularly interested in what made texts
literary. In common with many structuralist and text-based writers
(including American New Critics such as Wimsatt and Brooks and
English proponents of close-reading such as Richards) he preferred to
work with poetry, because he felt that its close and easily observable
link between form and content embodied the essential nature of
literature (1978b). However, according to Tabakowska (1993:11), all
his work is based on the ―assumption that ‗normal‘ language is not
qualitatively different from ‗poetic language‘‖, a view shared by
Fowler (1981:162-179). Nevertheless, while he pointed out that all
language uses the same resources, Jakobson saw literary (and
specifically poetic) language as being functionally different in that it
used these resources differently in order to meet the ―poetic function‖.
In a 1960 article on poetics he states that this function ―projects the
principle of equivalence from the axis of selection onto the axis of
combination‖ (1960:358). In other words, if a non-poetic utterance
might choose to say ―the cat lay on the rug‖, a poetic one would select
or insert words in the syntactic structure of the sentence in a way
governed by their similarity to one another: the cat sat on the mat.
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 According to Bradford, who traces the life and views of
Jakobson, the underlying theme in all his work (whether on
phonology, film, aphasia, translation or poetry) was that “the
material substance of the sign is never fully distinguishable from its
signifying properties” (1994:3). If this is so, then it does not bode well
for translation, which by its nature needs to transport the sign into
another language and situation, where its “signifying properties” will
be different. So is that unity between form and meaning doomed to
be lost in translation? Or worse, does it render translation
impossible?
Jakobson’s answer, in a 1959 article on translation, was that
translation in a strict sense is not possible, at least for poetic texts,
but “creative transposition” is possible because “cognitive
experience” is universal, as are certain characteristics of poetry such
as its concern with style and pattern (2000:118, 115). In focussing on
the poetic function of language, Jakobson differed from the common
structuralist view (e.g. Saussure 1959) that language is arbitrary.
Poetic language was non-arbitrary, governed by its sound patterns,
partially hermetic, and ambiguous, and thus functionally distinct not
just from non-literary language but also from non-poetry.
Jakobson’s concern, like that of Richards, went far beyond
the formal aspects of poetry. He saw stylistic figures such as
metaphor and metonymy as psychological processes (1987:100) and
in this was the forerunner of later cognitive stylistics, to be discussed
in section 1.4 and in Chapter 4. However, the linguistics on which his
stylistics was based was essentially a structuralist, inductive
linguistics, and did not, therefore, place the human mind at the
centre of linguistic explanation. Nevertheless, Jakobson’s
identification of common “cognitive values” (2000:115) of language,
which, unlike the close bond between form and meaning in poetry,
were translatable, emphasizes the interaction between universal and
specific as the basis for translation. This is an interaction noticed by
many translators who distinguish the formmeaning relation fixed by
the linguistics of a particular language from what Levine, for example,
calls the “secret bonds among all languages”(1991:8). The latter
make translation possible.

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 Such bonds might be lexical: Goddard & Wierzbicka (1994),
for example, identify “semantic primitives” such as “big”, “small”,
“think”, “live”, “now” and “like” (cf. Wierzbicka 1997:26). They might
also be stylistic. For van Peer (1993:73), foregrounding is an example
of a universal stylistic characteristic of literature. He finds support for
this view in Miner’s study Comparative Poetics; Miner (1990:38-40)
argues that what he calls estrangement (foregrounding) is central to
all literature, echoing the Russian Formalists. Other writers such as
McCully (1998:23) and Goldsworthy (1998:40) have argued for the
universality of linguistic patterns such as rhyme, rhythm and
parallelism in literature, and in an earlier book (Boase-Beier 1987) I
suggested that figures such as metaphor, iconicity or ambiguity have
the nature of stylistic principles, implying that they are in fact
universal. Besides lexical or stylistic universals, there could be
semantic ones, that is, what Catford (1965:50) calls common
“features of situation substance”, suggesting universality of
experience. Such universality, which Assman calls “the regulative
ideal of the One‖ (1996:85) has often been considered an essential
prerequisite for translation. For Assman, this view of translation has
been a hindrance; postmodernism has allowed the
―fundamentalization of plurality‖ (1996:99), a view which he sees as
deriving from Hofmannsthal (see e.g. 1979). Plurality, for writers such
as Assman, is the only way to respect otherness in translation, and
here he voices a suspicion of universalism common to many recent
writers on translation, especially of a poststructuralist or
postmodernist persuasion (see e.g. Venuti 2000:124).
But there is nothing wrong with universalism per se, as long
as it is combined with an awareness of its possible shortcomings (cf.
Miner 1990). And indeed, it could be argued that Venuti, though he
disparages universal views for ignoring cultural relativity, is himself
universalizing about the nature of literature. If his notion of
foreignizing (1995:20) is more about preserving what constitutes the
literary rather than merely mimicking the foreignness of the original
text, then it is based on a universalizing notion of the literary, such as
Jakobson held. Furthermore, if some types of universals can be shown
to have a biological basis, there would be little point in denying them.
Malmkjær (2005:51), for example, points to work done in the late
1960s by researchers such as Berlin & Kay (1969) on colour, which
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suggests a universal set of concepts that vary in each particular
language. Such work emphasizes the ―commonality‖ (Malmkjær
2005:50) of languages.
Or, as Crane & Richardson put it, though ―the link between
the word red and the colour is … arbitrary … the experience of
redness is not‖ (1999:128). And Goldsworthy‘s reasons for positing
the universality of literary features is that they arise from the ―biology
of literature‖ (1998:39).
A view of universality based on biology was simply not
available to Jakobson; his sense of common cognitive values was
empirical, intuitive and perhaps ideological, just as a postmodernist
emphasis on difference is all these things.
Jakobson‘s concern with the universal underlying the specific
was not just a view of language and style, but also affected how he
saw the similarity of literature to other genres, and the connections
between different types of translation. If Jakobson‘s quest was for
―The Magic of a Common Language‖ (Toman 1999), then that
common language underlies also what he describes as different types
of translation in his 1959 article. Here he famously distinguished
intralingual translation (rewording in the same language),
intersemiotic translation (such as a film based on a novel) and
―translation proper‖, or interlingual translation, whereby an ―entire
message‖ is transposed into another language (Jakobson 2000:114).
Just as everything can be translated, so too different types of
transposition, rewording or adaptation are forms of translation.
The strong universalizing tendency of structuralism,
combined with its attention to linguistic detail, has been linked to
close-reading criticism (Bradford 1994:4). But it would be simplistic,
as I have suggested, to equate structuralism (or close-reading) with
universalizing and poststructuralism and postmodernism with
difference. All these approaches are concerned, to a greater or lesser
extent, with both universalism and difference.
At the time Jakobson wrote his early work, structuralist
linguistics found regularities behind the detail of individual languages
which appeared to point to common characteristics, but could not be
given any explanation. Once linguistics began to focus on the mind,
and to explain linguistic data as the result of the structure of the mind,
15
what Jakobson saw as the two defining factors of languages – their
individual spirit and their unifying aspects – could be formulated as
characteristics of the mind. In particular, the notion of context as a
cognitive entity in recent theories of style such as Semino (1997)
allows for both Jakobson‘s factors, and thus for the main concerns of
translation.

Cognitive, Pragmatic, and Cognitive Aspects

of Style and Translation
In the previous two sections we saw how the formalist
approaches of scholars such as Jakobson to the concept of style, while
offering which could begin to explain some of its perceived
importance for translation, nevertheless tended to decontextualize the
literary text. For early writers on stylistics such as Culler (1975) or
Riffaterre (1970) – as for the New Critics twenty years earlier – this
decontextualization was in part a reaction to the over contextualization
of previous literary criticism with its emphasis on the author‘s life and
circumstances. While such decontextualization enabled the first
detailed studies of style and provided a useful basis for the
development of stylistics, it was not especially helpful for translation
studies. And early translation studies such as Levý (1969) do – as
historically they were bound to – suffer to some extent from such
decontextualization and the concomitant danger of universalizing. But
such generalizing tendencies continued to be countered by a concern
with the individual contextual meaning which is ―rarely the same in
any two languages‖ (Catford 1965:36). Nevertheless, the notion of
context was not particularly well-developed in these early writers.
This lack can be seen broadly to have four aspects:
i) the sociological, historical and ideological aspects of the
genesis of source and target text are largely ignored;
ii) there is sometimes little consideration of psychological
aspects of the production and interpretation of texts;
iii) pragmatic aspects, that is, aspects which have to do with
the way people speak and understand texts beyond their actual
linguistically determined structures, are not taken into account; and
iv) there is little consideration of the role of the reader.

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 These are all problems for a study of style in general and
especially for the study of style in translation. As I suggested above,
there were some attempts even in the 1960s, but especially in the
1970s and 1980s, to broaden stylistics away from formalism to
encompass sociological, historical, psychological and pragmatic
aspects (see e.g. Ohmann 1962; Chapman 1973; Traugott & Pratt
1980). And this has made stylistics much more attractive to translation
studies. D‘haen, comparing the two stylistics anthologies by Donald
Freeman of 1970 and 1981, notes that the former ―concentrates on
style in the more narrow sense‖ whereas the later collection is
concerned with ―the functioning of literature in society‖ (1986:1).
D‘haen goes on to locate the development of Translation Studies by
Toury (1980) in Israel and by Bassnett (1991, but with a first edition
in 1980) in England within these later developments in stylistics, thus
signalling a convergence of stylistics and translation that had earlier
not been possible.
As far as sociological aspects of style are concerned – (i)
above – the integration of these issues, which involves ―viewing a text
as a cultural process‖ (Verdonk 1988:6), is still being developed
today. Much as did the Marxist criticism of literary theorists like
Eagleton (1976), work by stylisticians such as Fowler (e.g. 1977,
1996) emphasized the sociolinguistics of style, taking into account
that factors which determine social identity ―have an influence on the
way in which language is used, and ... language ... exercises a
dominant influence on our perception of social structure‖ (Crystal
1987:17). If language use is not autonomous, then neither literature
itself nor literary style can simply be seen as closed off from the
influences of society; this latter view is described by Burton
(1982:197) as ―merely naively supporting and demonstrating the
(largely unseen and unnoticed) political bias of the status quo.‖ For
Burton, as for writers such as Mills (1992, 1995), one way to
counteract such naivety is with feminist stylistics.
Stylistics with such sociolinguistic awareness can be seen as
―the variety of discourse analysis dealing with literary discourse‖
(Leech 1983:151) where discourse is language used in context (Carter
1997:xiii ff.) Discourse, and therefore also literary discourse, is seen
as ―a social and political phenomenon‖, and its effects are viewed
within the context of ―larger social patterns‖ (Carter 1997:117) which
go beyond the micro-context of the text in question. For translation,
17
this has meant an increasing concern with ways in which texts are
―concretised and rewritten‖ (Lefevere 1986:218).
The study of literature as discourse could be seen to fall
within the remit of Critical Discourse Analysis, a further development
of stylistics in a broader sense which takes especially ideology into
account. As Verdonk shows, Critical Discourse Analysis does not
necessarily make a distinction between literary and non-literary texts,
because all ―can be construed as social documents in which
ideological positions are implicitly or explicitly expressed‖ (2002:74).
Such ideological influences might be unconscious and uncovering
them is an aim that Critical Discourse Analysis shares with
poststructuralist theory (cf. Derrida 1976). Awareness of ideological
influence is obviously important in translation, where not only
analysis but an actual translated work could suffer from its lack.
Tourniaire (1999), for example, shows how an understanding of the
censorship imposed in Greece in 1969 when the poems of Rhea
Galanaki were written can have profound effects on the way the
poems are understood and translated. Similar considerations are
behind the use of annotations and footnotes giving historical and
political background in translations such as Seidensticker‘s (1976)
rendering of Murasaki Shikibu‘s 11th century Japanese novel The
Tale of Genii. But there is a danger in such attempts to situate
translations historically, sociologically or ideologically: annotations
can ―narrow the domestic audience to a cultural elite since footnotes
are an academic convention‖ (Venuti 1998:22).
For Lefevere, writing in the 1980s, a time D‘haen calls ―very
much the decade of discourse analysis‖ (1986:20), a broad
sociolinguistic basis meant that ―linguistically inspired literary
research‖ was now in a position to consider ―the world view (or co-
existing world views) of a given society at a given time‖ (1986:219),
including ideologies, opinions of what was acceptable in literature and
other types of writing, what made a text successful, and other views of
literature and the world in general.
Such constraints, argues Lefevere, are not only present but
are ―actually enforced, or at least applied‖ (1986:219) by people and
institutions within society which have the power to determine how
texts are written or translated. For Lefevere, the constraints which
apply to all texts include the world view of source-text and target-text
18
communities and the constraints imposed by the different languages
themselves. Sociolinguistic literary research might take Jakobson‘s
example of a Russian child‘s incomprehension at finding death,
feminine in Russian, portrayed as an old man in German tales
(2000:117), and show not only how an audience‘s understanding of
the translated text depends on overcoming such linguistic differences,
but might in addition consider death as differing in social value
depending upon whether it was sought, accepted, meted out or
observed.
Sociological, historical or ideological circumstances include
issues of gender and its effects on style. There have been a number of
such studies, such as Mills (1995) and Threadgold (1988). Gender,
like other sociological characteristics, might also affect translation
strategy more deliberately: a feminist translator might for example
intervene in the translation ―on a political level‖ (von Flotow 1997:6).
These and other contextual aspects of style were relatively
easily integrated into a stylistics increasingly concerned with its
origins in the mind of the writer and its effects upon the mind of the
reader. Thus the second limitation of early stylistics, (ii) – that it
ignored psychology – ceased to be a problem once stylistics had
started to take context, in the form of sociological and historical
background, into account. Background is knowledge, so context in the
sense of background is a psychological entity. Earlier theorists such as
Richards (e.g. 1924:87ff.) had in fact emphasized the psychological
aspects of literature, but at that time there was no real sense of the
psychological nature of contexts. But Fowler, in particular, was
concerned with how society, ideology and attitude contributed to what
he called mind style: the ―distinctive linguistic presentation of an
individual mental self‖ (1977a:103), a notion which depends upon
Halliday‘s ―ideational function‖ (1971:332), through which a writer
embodies in language her or his experience of the world. Though
some writers (e.g. Weber 1996:4) have seen the development of
stylistics into social and critical stylistics as a trend at odds with the
development of cognitive stylistics, there is no real opposition, but
merely a difference of emphasis, because the social and the
psychological always interact. ―Cognitive‖ can mean rather different
things but in its broadest sense it means having to do with knowledge
and the mind, and to this extent, generative grammar,

19
poststructuralism and sociolinguistic criticism all take more interest in
the cognitive than structuralism did.
In the approach of Fowler, Semino (2002) and others who
have used the notion of mind style, reading a literary text is seen as
giving access, not just to whatever meaning is attachable to the
linguistic structures, but also to a state of mind. This was a view
suggested as early as 1962 by Ohmann, who had said ―stylistic
preferences reflect cognitive preferences‖ (1962:2), and it is inherent
in all approaches which see pragmatics – those aspects of
understanding language which go beyond the strictly linguistic – as ―a
capacity of the mind‖ (Carston 2002:4). Pragmatics of this persuasion
could be called ―cognitive pragmatics‖ (ibid.)
Tabakowska‘s 1993 book, entitled Cognitive Linguistics
and Poetics of Translation
; uses the term ―cognitive‖ to mean something rather different from its
use a decade earlier, as exemplified by Winograd in his Language as a
Cognitive Process (1983). Winograd was speaking in particular of
processes for producing and understanding language based on models
from computer science, and it is on this basis that he decides ―the
cognitive approach‖ has not produced much of interest for poetic
language or its ―emotive dimension‖ (1983:29). Winograd‘s
assumption appears to have been that knowledge structures were
irrelevant to the processing of poetic and stylistic effects. And yet
insights from computer science which help explain how we organize
knowledge and create contexts have become commonplace, especially
in discourse analysis, in talking about the way we understand texts,
including literary ones; an example is Cook (1994). For Tabakowska
(1993:4), the notion of ―cognitive‖ is much broader than either
Winograd‘s or Cook‘s view; her concern is with what we know, and
how the study of what we know can help make clear the universal-
individual distinction mentioned in the previous section. She
expresses this in terms of an interaction of ―sameness‖, arising from
―the universal in human cognition‖ with the difference in the ―infinite
variety of products of cognition processes‖. It is at the point where
sameness and difference interact that she locates both style and
translation.
Cognitive stylistics, then, following the way in which
linguists such as Fowler linked psychology and society, has made it
20
possible to integrate aspects (i) and (ii) above with aspect (iii): the
pragmatics of style. Theories of pragmatic inferencing, such as
Sperber & Wilson‘s (1995) Relevance Theory, are dealt with in
Chapter 2. What they share with cognitive theories based directly on
cognitive linguistics, such as cognitive theories of metaphor and
foregrounding, both considered in Chapter 4, is an emphasis on
psychology and the view that meaning is not autonomous from
thought but is constructed by human minds (cf. Ortony 1993:2). This
implies an emphasis on the reader, point (iv) above. Relevance Theory
can be seen to combine pragmatic and cognitive aspects of style in a
way which fills a number of the perceived gaps in formalist
approaches. It has even been suggested, by Gutt (2000:1- 23), that if
one takes this cognitive pragmatic development as the basis for
translation, then no independent translation studies is needed because
all the facts fall out from the theory of relevance. That this cannot be
so is shown by the rather cursory treatment of style in Gutt‘s book. A
fuller treatment of style would in fact require a fuller treatment of
cognitive and pragmatic issues, as Chapters 2 and 4 in particular
attempt to show.
The notion which links pragmatic aspects of stylistics with
the sociological and cognitive aspects, and with the reader‘s role, is
―context‖. Context can be defined as the psychological and social
circumstances under which language is used (Stockwell 2002a:60);
pragmatics focuses on how we interpret utterances in context (cf.
Blakemore 1987:30), and thus could be defined as ―the study of
meaning beyond that which is encoded in the linguistic structures
themselves‖ (Watts 1991:26). If semantics is the study of truth
conditions, then pragmatics is non-truth-conditional aspects of
meaning, and covers those aspects which depend on the reader‘s
inferences (as in relevance theory) as well as those which depend on
the relationships between the text and its context, including its
sociolinguistic and psychological content.
For Lecercle (1990), an important aspect of a pragmatic view
of language is that it stresses the ―remainder‖ (1990:6), the ―linguistic
equivalent of the Freudian unconscious‖ which is ―not interested in
rules‖ (Butler 1993:70). Lecercle sees both generative grammar and
structuralism as incomplete because neither can deal with the
remainder, especially as it is used in literary texts. Venuti has taken up
Lecercle‘s notion of remainder, but confusingly says that views based
21
on pragmatics are ―diametrically opposed‖ (1998:21) to his own, a
statement which can only be understood if one assumes Venuti is
using ―pragmatics‖ in a narrow sense, perhaps to refer exclusively to
the now outdated work of Grice (1989).
Using an image from the sort of computer-science model of
knowledge that Winograd rejected for poetics, Enkvist sees literary
pragmatics as showing that ―the interpretability of discourse depends
on the receptor‘s ability under prevailing circumstances to build a
scenario, a text world around the text, a world in which that text
makes sense‖ (1991:11). Thus pragmatic approaches to literature
invariably stress, according to Watts (1991:27) the open-endedness of
the literary discourse and the plurality of readings it allows. It is this
open-endedness which allows for a study of the reader‘s response,
something which will be discussed in Chapter 2.
Pragmatics, with its emphasis on context, also touches on one
of the central problems of translation: to what extent is the
understanding of texts, especially literary texts, dependent upon a
particular cultural background? An approach to style which focuses on
its universal aspects will obviously see fewer problems. For Watts,
cultural references which are clearly incomprehensible to members of
another culture are unproblematic, as they can be explained by
―editorial notes‖ (1991:28). But we recall that Venuti (1998:22)
pointed to the limiting effect of such notes. And cultural differences
may be less obvious, and have to do with, for example, ―cognitive
orientation‖ towards literary texts in terms of what is perceived to be
their place and value in a particular culture (Watts 1991:28).
Cognitive stylistics can be said in general to have brought
together the pragmatic concern with what goes beyond a text‘s
relation to an observable reality with a concern for context as a
cognitive construct (cf. Semino 1997:9) which takes in the social and
historical aspects of the production and understanding of texts. It is
one of the assumptions made throughout this book that the study of
translation will need to consider all these factors, and that a cognitive
stylistic approach seems the one most likely to make this possible.

22
Relevance Theory and Translating for
Relevance
Gutt (2000), first published in 1991, is the book most
translation theorists associate with the application of Relevance
Theory to translation. Gutt‘s aims were laudable: to show that we can
explain (rather than merely classify and describe) the facts of
translation without the need for a special translation theory, focussing
on translation as communication. Like all good theories, that put
forward in Gutt‘s book aims not to drive but to explain its subject.
Thus, Gutt said, quite rightly, in a recent contribution to the
Relevance-Theory email list, that ―I do not advocate any particular
translation approach‖ (2004). But, Gutt‘s book is both dense and a
little disorderly; it is sometimes difficult to make out a clear line of
argument. And the notion that translation does not need its own
theory, while clearly a strong argument for Relevance Theory, in the
sense that it is shown to explain data outside the range of those it was
originally called on to clarify, has been viewed with surprise or
wariness by translation theorists such as Malmkjær (1992), though
others such as Hatim (2001) have acknowledged its usefulness for
translation. Gutt made a number of suggestions about how translation
could be explained using Relevance Theory. The most important of
these are:
i) translation, as communication, works under the assumption
of relevance (that what the translator intends to communicate to the
audience is relevant enough to them to make processing it
worthwhile);
ii) a translated text is an instance of interpretive, as opposed to
descriptive, use (the translator is saying what someone else meant);
iii) texts in which the way of saying – the style – plays an
important role require direct translation, as opposed to indirect
translation, which, like indirect quotation, just gives the substance.
In English-speaking countries comparatively little work has
been done with Relevance Theory and translation. Exceptions are
Boase-Beier (2004a, 2004b), Hatim & Mason (1990), Hatim (2001).
The latter, in particular, discusses the difference between notions such
as direct and indirect translation, but does not consider how this
23
distinction affects the translation of style in very great detail. In Spain,
on the other hand, there are more studies that directly apply a
Relevance-Theory approach, such as Dahlgren (1998), Dahlgren
(2000), Edwards (2001). As I suggested in the previous section, it may
be the focus on relevance itself which has rendered the approach less
useful than it might be for translation. Taking relevance as given, here
are some insights from Relevance Theory and cognitive pragmatics
more generally (the first four are adapted from Boase-Beier 2004a)
which might be useful for studying what happens to style when we
translate:
i) The notion of mind style (see Chapter 1) can be integrated
into translation theory as a set of weak implicatures which are
communicative clues to a cognitive state.
ii) Relevance Theory allows for the importance of a cognitive
state as that which a translator will try to recreate, rather than meaning
in a truth-conditional sense.
iii) By allowing a view of style as weak implicatures,
Relevance Theory provides a framework and a legitimation for the
translator‘s interpretive freedom and the creativity of the translation
act.
iv) By tying poetic effect to the extra work, in terms of
maximal relevance, that stylistic features call for, a Relevance Theory
view can help explain the common intuition of translators that
preserving style helps recreate the effects of the source text on the
target reader.
v) An important difference between the way literary and non-
literary text are translated is that the former will tend to require direct
translation (which preserves the style) while the latter will tend to
require indirect translation (see Gutt 2000:68ff.).
In the previous section, we saw that weak implicatures are a
way of formalizing the notion of meaning which goes beyond
―primary‖ lexical or syntactic meaning (Katz 1990). If such
implicatures, with the openness that their description as ―weak‖
entails, serve to provide clues to a state of mind, then the elements of
style and in particular those aspects which are consistent enough to
constitute a ‗mind style‘ in the sense of Fowler (1977a) will be a
24
starting point for creating a reading which captures something of what
writers like Pope and Denham must have meant (see 1.2) by the
―spirit‖ of the original text. This suggests that in many cases a
translator will need to start with the style, not the content of a text. As
an example, consider the following lines, from the poet Ernst Meister
(1979:102):
Die moisten
The most
Sterne
Stars
sind leblos.
are lifeless

These are translated (Boase-Beier 2003c:113) as

Most of
my stars
are lifeless.
In this translation, it is the cognitive state suggested by the
semi-anagram of the poet‘s name in ‗meisten Sterne‘ which has led to
the inclusion of ―my‖ in the English translation. A full explanation of
how this poem has been read and translated is in Chapter 5 (see also
Boase-Beier 2004a), but it is enough here to note that the final stanza,
which these three lines make up, is seen as introducing the way the
poet might see himself, his usefulness, his afterlife. It would not be
easy to introduce an anagram of the poet‘s name into an English
version, but it is not necessary: what is needed is a reference to the
subject, the voice in the poem. That ‗my stars‘ echoes in its sound
‗Meister‘ ―sufficiently for the reader to infer a connection‖ (as I
maintain in the article in question) may not be convincing to every
reader, but it will not be disputed that the introduction of the ―my‖ in a
poem which up to now has only addressed a ―you‖ will be noticed.
And it is this link to the cognitive state of the poet which is the
decisive factor. This is what ―starting with the style‖ is taken to mean.

25
Meister‘s name is not actually there, but, for this translator, is
implicated. The translator can exercise the freedom to include it or
not, or include some other clue to the cognitive state the poem is seen
to suggest. It will take a certain amount of reading and re-reading to
see ‗Meister‘ in ‗my stars‘. But this is true of the original, too, because
it is the way poetry works: stylistic features demand engagement with
the text. This is what I take direct translation to mean, but the
distinction between direct and indirect translation does not correlate
exactly with the literary / non-literary distinction; a translator will
almost certainly want to do justice to the style of a critic such as
Wilson Knight (e.g. 1961) or a medical historian such as Roy Porter
(e.g. 1997). And the distinction is a question of degree, rather than an
absolute opposition. One translation may be more direct (pay more
attention to the style) than another, but still both may attempt to give
more than just substance. Erkazanci, in an as yet unpublished thesis,
explores how Turkish translators, bowing to target culture pressures,
fail to do justice to heteroglossia in English texts as diverse as Lady
Chatterley's Lover (Lawrence 1961) and Trainspotting (Welsh 1994),
but do make some inconsistent attempts to indicate stylistic variety.
Such translations are largely indirect, and could therefore be adjudged
unsuccessful as examples of literary translation.
As Erkazanci (unpublished) points out, both domesticating
and foreignizing translation practices could in fact be seen as instances
of direct translation, because both render the style of a text in one way
(to fit target expectations) or another (to violate target expectations),
but in neither case is style ignored.
As Sperber & Wilson (1995:38f.) make clear, not all
interpretations of a text are available to all readers in all contexts.
Assuming that the text will work subject to relevance (not because the
author obeys the relevance constraint consciously but simply because
this is the way communication works) then the more literary the text is
(in the sense given in 1.6, of being a text whose style carries much of
the meaning), the more readers will look for maximal relevance, as
opposed to the ―optimal relevance‖ (Sperber & Wilson 1995:57ff.) of
non-literary communication situations.
Following the assumption of maximal rather than optimal
relevance involves accepting that the input to the reading of a text may
be enormous. It may not extend to selling one‘s house or turning one‘s
26
back on society (though even this is possible), but it might well mean
we want to maximize output to such an extent that we are prepared to
devote to the reading of a poem, or a sacred text, or the work of a
philosopher, a whole afternoon, a year, or a lifetime, because the
output is equally limitless. And if the output is limitless, as in the
reading of such texts it might be, then we would expect the effort to be
correspondingly great. This view of literary texts offers one way of
explaining the Reader-Response view that a literary text is often ―a
cascade of possibilities‖ (Iser 2004:14) for the perceiver. It also
suggests that Venuti (2000:334) misinterprets Gutt when he says that
the reader is ―characterized by an overwhelming desire for minimal
processing effort.‖ This is in fact not what Gutt says: on the contrary,
he emphasizes the ―reward‖ (2000:156) that the processing of weak
implicatures brings.
So what is the reward of reading for maximum relevance?
Several writers (MacKenzie 2002, Gutt 2000, and Pilkington 2000)
have defined it as ―cognitive gain‖ (Boase-Beier 2004a:276). It is
important to realize that ―cognitive‖ is not used here in the sense in
which it is used by Iser (or Winograd 1983; see section 1.4), to
contrast with what is apprehensible by ―the human senses‖ (2004:10).
As will be discussed in Chapter 4, cognition as used in cognitive
stylistics is not meant in this narrow sense; because the body,
especially in metaphor theory (e.g. Lakoff & Turner 1989) is seen as
the basis for cognition, the latter could be said to depend on the results
of sensory perception.
As the example from R.S. Thomas given in the previous
section suggests, Relevance Theory would not bemoan the
impossibility of locating definite meaning, but would celebrate it (cf.
MacKenzie 2002:3). In this particular case, it is linked directly to the
need for the reader to explore the religious and philosophical
possibilities the poem gives rise to.
A translator, on attempting to translate a text, will make a
distinction (whether in the terms favoured by Katz (1990) or Dowling
(1999) or Gutt (2000) does not matter) between what the words mean
in a basic (lexical-semantic) sense, on the one hand (the meaning of
―cloud‖ as a noun and as a verb), and what they implicate (for
example in the ambiguous structure ―mind clouds‖) on the other. The
first is sometimes referred to in pragmatics as ―utterance meaning‖ or
27
―sentence meaning‖ (Mey 2001:43) and the second, unhelpfully for
our purposes, as ―speaker‘s meaning‖. Assuming that as translators we
are consciously constructing what we assume (and know that we
merely assume) to be an inferred speaker‘s or author‘s meaning (or
that of the voice in the text, which may not be the author‘s), I would
prefer to call this ―reader‘s meaning‖. If a literary text in particular ―is
deliberately organized in such a way as to almost compel readers to
read, as it were, their own concept of the thing meant‖ (Wilss
1996:27) into the text, and bearing in mind that the translator‘s
concept of ―the thing meant‖ will be affected by reading for
translation (see section 1.5), I propose to use ―translator‘s meaning‖
for the extended meaning which goes beyond what can be assigned to
the text or passage on the basis of semantics. Looking at the passage
from Thomas‘ poem, utterance meaning would be the sort of thing
that goes into a gloss, including information on possible word
categories and semantics, whereas the translator‘s meaning would
include the further religious, philosophical and stylistic meanings that
the text implicates. Such meanings are not finite; as Pilkington
(1996:159) points out, there is both ―the problem of saying exactly
what range of implicatures are communicated‖ and the problem that
―sources of poetic effects are difficult, if not impossible, to translate‖
(ibid).
Yet the fact that these are the ―weakly implied‖ meanings,
the gaps which, as a literary text, these lines invite me to fill, means
that the other side of the difficulty is that I could in fact proceed to do
a translation based on a gloss without any further knowledge of the
source text than that gives. I would simply have more gaps to fill and
fewer clues and guidelines to shape the process. In fact, this is what
frequently happens, when translators translate out of languages they
do not speak. It is how Hughes himself produced the poem ‗The
Prophet‘ (Weissbort 1989:15), a translation of Pushkin‘s poem. It is
also the way we judge translation, especially when we cannot fully
appreciate the nuances of the source text. In these cases, the easy part
to judge is primary or utterance meaning, and this is frequently the
basis for evaluations of translation, especially within a language-
learning situation or in reviews. Similarly, the straightforward part of
a translator‘s task (and a machine could do it) is the primary meaning.
The interesting part, the real translation, is those second-order
meanings, the translator‘s meanings which reside largely in the style,
28
and take on particular importance for the act of literary translation. In
his 1998 book Translating Style, Parks notices that the passages in
translations which show most stylistic deviation from the original
―point to the peculiar nature of [the author‘s] style and the overall
vision it implies‖ (p.vii). Style will be less important in a non-literary
text and such texts, by their nature, will not encourage the reader to
maximize relevance. The sound repetition in an advert, such as ―you
can – Canon‖ will serve a mnemonic purpose, and will provide a
pleasurable reading experience, thus encouraging purchase. But it is
not likely that it expresses anything else and the reader is unlikely to
try and get further effects from it. If the text were constructed in such
a way as to encourage a ―maxmax‖ rather than ―minimax‖ reading,
then it might well fail in its object.
So what are the cognitive effects that ―maxmax‖ reading
engenders? Pilkington (2000:184) points particularly to the affective
use of language in literature: ―[o]ne can come to have the feeling as a
result of reading the words‖. And yet we should be aware that the
experiencing of emotion is in part also precognitive. According to
Crisp (2003:379), ―you may react with fear to a half-perceived shape
before you infer that it is or is not a snake‖, and indeed experiments
have supported this view, as a recent article ‗All in the Mind‘
(Wellcome Science 1, 25) shows. This suggests that even superficial
reading may trigger emotions, which are then heightened or prolonged
when cognition is exercised, and when our thought and beliefs are
examined, as in literature.
All cognitive effects, which are the maximized payoff for the
increased effort it takes to process stylistic features of the text, are
effects which change the cognitive state of the reader. More will be
said on cognitive effects and cognitive views of style in Chapter 4. For
the moment, we can note that a translator reading a source text as
literary will read it from the point of view of style as (i) an expression
of choices attributable to the speaker (author, character, narrator) and
(ii) a set of points at which the reader can engage with the text, for
maximum cognitive effect.
But before that, now that we have considered some views of
how a translator understands the source text and its style, I want to
look, in Chapter 3, at what those assumptions about the style might

29
mean and how they might relate to what the translator does in creating
a target text.
COHERENCE
The more cohesive, the more formalised a text, the more
information it, as a unit, affords the translator. Consider first its genre;
A Greek or seventeenth-century French tragedy; the agenda or
minutes of a well-organised meeting; a recipe, a marriage service or a
ceremony - all these compel the translator to follow either SL or TL
practice as closely as possible. Similarly, if a narrative has a formulaic
opening ('Once upon a time') and a formulaic close ('They all lived
happily ever after') the translator has to find standard phrases if they
exist. Other stereotypes - weather reports, surveys, enquiries, official
forms, medical articles - may have standard forms, a house-style.
Recent work on conversations of all kinds, stemming from Grice's
implicatures and co-operative principle, tends rather optimistically to
suggest that these run on tramlines which could act as pointers in the
course of translation.
For a seventeenth-century French tragedy, the translator has a
remarkable quantity of pre-in format! on; the unities of time, place and
action; a small number of aristocratic characters, each with their less
well-born confidants OT gouverneurs: a lexicon of less than 2000
'noble*, abstract words; various stichomvThia sequences; alexandrine
couplets, which she may want to turn to blank verse; other lines that
parallel and echo each other; restricted length, about 1800 hnes
equally divided into five acts; a serious tone and an unhappy ending
usually (not always) marked by a death followed by a brief
explanatory epilogue, bringing the survivors back to normality, as in
Hamlet or Don Giovanni.
Next, consider the structure of the text. Notionally, this may
consist of: a thesis, an antithesis and a synthesis; an introduction, an
entry into the subject, aspects and examples, a conclusion; a setting, a
complication, a resolution, an evaluation; a definition of the argument
of the title, the pros and cons, and the conclusion; a build-up, a
climax, and a denouement; a retrospect, an exposition, a prospect. It
may be useful to the translator to note deviations from these and other
standard structures. Further, the structure is marked concretely by
certain pointers; e.g. chapters, headings, sub-headings, paragraph

30
lengths, and you should consider if these as such will be appropriate in
the translation setting, and will conform to its house-style.
COHESION
Next we consider the relations between sentences. The most
common forms these take are connectives denoting addition,
contradiction, contrast, result, etc. These connectives are tricky
when they are polysemous, since they may have meanings
contradicting each other, e.g. cependant ('in the meantime',
'nevertheless1), inverse-meniy par contre ('however1, 'on the other
hand1), d'auire part ('moreover1, 'on the other hand*), d'ailteurs
('besides', 'however'), toujour*, encore ('always', 'never- theless'), aussi
('therefore', 'consequently', 'also'), tout en + present participle ('whilst',
'although', etc.); cf. 'still1 pertanto (It.), vse (R),zhe(R), 'why1 ('for
what reason*, 'for what purpose1, 'on what ground1), 'so that\ dis ton,
('from then on', 'that being the case', 'consequently'), en effet.
German notably uses modal connectives (mots-charnieres)
such as aber, aIsot denn, docht sckliesslichy eben, eigentlick^
einfach^ etwa, gerade, halt, ja^ mal, nun^ sckon, vietleickt, so
uberkaupt, bitte, bestimmt-zW these in talk three times as often as in
newspapers and six times as often as in 'literature* (Helbig).
Normally, these words can only be over-translated and therefore
they are often rightly and deliberately omitted in translation: their
purpose is partly phatic, i.e. they are used partly to maintain the
reader's or listener's interest, usually with the nuance that the
accompanying information is just a reminder, they should know it
already.
Note here English's tendency to turn SL complex into co-
ordinate sentences on the lines of Situ marches, jecours, 'You can
walk but Pll run.'
REFERENTIAL SYNONYMS

Sentences cohere through the use of referential synonyms,

which may be lexical, pronominal or general. Thus referential
synonyms, as in J'ai acheti YHuma: ce journal m'interessait, may have
to be clarified: *I bought Humaniti. The paper interested me.' Note
also familiar alternatives as referential synonyms, such as The

31
Emerald Isle', 'John Bull's Other Country', 'the land of the
shamrock'or'of St Patrick' (cf 'Hibernian',
'Milesian'), or 'Napoleon', 'the Emperor', 'Boney', He Petit
Caporai\ 'the Bastard', 'he' in more or less consecutive sentences; SL
pronouns and deictics including le premier^ le second (cf. 'the
former', 'the latter') are often replaced by English nouns, since the
range of some English pronouns, ('it', 'they', 'this one') is much wider
than in languages with nouns split between two or three genders. An
example of mistranslation of pronouns is in the Authorised Version,
Isaiah 37,36: 'Then the angel of the Lord went forth and smote in the
camp of the Assyrians a hundred and four score and five thousand.
And when they arose early in the morning, behold, they were all
dead.' Today's English Version: 'An Angel of the Lord went to the
Assyrian camp and killed 185,000 soldiers- At dawn the next day,
there they lay, all dead.'
Note tale (It.), tel (FT.) are also used as pronoun synonyms.
Lastly, words at all degrees of generality can be used to connect
sentences, from general words ('thing', 'object', 'case', 'affair' (cf.
Vetsh (Cz.) Makropoulos), machin, true, phenomene, il&nent,
'business', faccenda^ deb (R), through 'hypernyms' (super-
ordinate nouns) ('horse') and 'hyponyms1 {'foal1) to proper name,
nickname, familiar alternative, pronoun.
In many cases, all three types of referential synonym are used
to avoid repetition rather than to supply new information (which, in
any event, is incidental, thematic, and not pan of the sentence's
message). Whilst the translator must reproduce the new information,
he should not be afraid of repetition, in particular of repeating the
most specific termor the proper name to avoid any ambiguity.
ENUMERATORS
Enumerators (Lenumeralive conjuncts') also act as connectors
between sentences. Numerical adverbs are usually straightforward,
although zundckst can mean "for the time being' as well as 'first1,
enfin has five distinct senses, words like a la fin, somme t<mtey alors,
dann, 'next', 'then', 'primarily', aliora have various senses, and double
enumerators ('on the one hand . . . on the other', etc.) may
32
oscillate between enumeration and contrast, Umer andern may
have to be cunningly trans-lated ('include'), and *or' is too often
ambiguous.
OTHER CONNECTIVES
Linguistic synonyms are also used as a cohesive device to
avoid repetition, par- ticularly in a reinforcing sentence. Thus
(Dressier, 1973); Die Linguistik kann man sit den progressiven
Wissenschaften zahlen. Die Sprachwxssemchaft ist ein Element des
Fortschritts. The second sentence is almost redundant, but it
emphasises (social) progress whilst the first denotes academic
progressiveness, or buoyancy in a head-count; Sprachzvissenschaft,
which in this context (not always) is identical in meaning with
Linguistik, could be translated as Lthe subject' or 'the discipline.
(Outside a context, the 'Classical' member of a couplet of German
synonyms is often more 'modern' and voguish, being closer to English
and French, as a reaction against the old purist pedantry.)
Words more or less vaguely expressing analogy, e.g.
'similarly, 'likewise, egalement, 'also', dememe, 'so', 'parallel,
'correspondingly', 'equally1, are also used as connectives. Notoriously,
e'gatement usually means 'also*, and it is the degree of analogy which
the translator often finds difficulty in establishing.
Vinay and Darbelnet’s model
Influenced by earlier work by the Russian theorist and translator
Andrei Fedorov (1953), as described by Mossop (2013) and Pym
(2016), Vinay and Darbelnet carried out a comparative stylistic
analysis of French and English. They looked at texts in both
languages, noting differences between the languages and identifying
different translation ‗strategies‘ and ‗procedures‘. These terms are
sometimes confused in writing about translation. In the technical
sense a strategy is an overall orientation of the translator (e.g. towards
‗free‘ or ‗literal‘ translation, towards the TT or ST, towards
domestication or foreignization) whereas a procedure is a specific
technique or method used by the translator at a certain point in a text
(e.g. the borrowing of a word from the SL, the addition of an
explanation or a footnote in the TT).
Exploration: Metalanguage of strategies and procedures

33
 See the article by Gil Bardají (2009) on the ITS website for a
further discus- sion of terms.
Although the model proposed in Stylistique comparée ... centres
solely on the French–English pair, its influence has been much
wider. It built on work on French–German translation (Malblanc
1944/1963) and inspired two similar books on English–Spanish
translation: Vázquez-Ayora‘s Introducción a la traductología
[‗Introduction to traductology‘] (1977) and García Yebra‘s Teoría y
práctica de la traducción [‗Theory and practice of translation‘]
(1982). A later French response to the work was Chuquet and
Paillard‘s Approche linguistique des problèmes de traduction
[‗Linguistic approach to problems of translation‘] (1987). Vinay and
Darbelnet‘s model came to wider prominence in 1995 when it was
published in revised form in English translation, thirty-seven years
after the original.
Two strategies and seven procedures
The two general translation strategies identified by Vinay and
Darbelnet
(1995/2004: 128–37) are (i) direct translation and (ii) oblique
translation, which hark back to the ‗literal vs. free‘ division discussed
in Chapter 2. Indeed, ‗literal‘ is given by the authors as a synonym
for direct translation (1995: 31; 2004: 128). The two strategies
comprise seven procedures, of which direct translation covers
three:
(1) Borrowing: The SL word is transferred directly to the TL.
This category (1995: 31–2; 2004: 129) covers words such as the
Russian rouble, datcha, the later glasnost and perestroika, that are
used in English and other languages to fill a semantic gap in the
TL. Sometimes borrowings may be employed to add local colour
(sushi, kimono, Osho–gatsu . . . in a tourist brochure about Japan,
for instance). Of course, in some technical fields there is much
borrowing of terms (e.g. computer, internet, from English to Malay).
In languages with differing scripts, borrowing entails an additional
need for transcription, as in the borrowings of mathematical,
scientific and other terms from Arabic into Latin and, later, other
languages (e.g. [al- jabr] to algebra).

34
(2) Calque: This is ‗a special kind of borrowing‘ (1995: 32–3;
2004: 129–30) where the SL expression or structure is transferred in
a literal translation. For example, the French calque science-fiction for
the English.
Vinay and Darbelnet note that both borrowings and calques often
become fully integrated into the TL, although sometimes with some
semantic change, which can turn them into false friends. An example
is the German Handy for a mobile (cell) phone.
(3) Literal translation (1995: 33–5; 2004: 130–2): This is ‗word-
for-word‘ translation, which Vinay and Darbelnet describe as being
most common between languages of the same family and culture.
Their example is:
English ST: I left my spectacles on the table
downstairs. French TT: Jv ai laissé mes lunettes sur la table
en bas.
Literal translation is the authors‘ prescription for good translation:
‗literal- ness should only be sacrificed because of structural and
metalinguistic requirements and only after checking that the meaning
is fully preserved‘ (1995: 288).3 But, say Vinay and Darbelnet (ibid.:
34–5), the translator may judge literal translation to be
‗unacceptable‘ for what are grammatical, syntactic or pragmatic
reasons.
In those cases where literal translation is not possible, Vinay and
Darbelnet say that the strategy of oblique translation must be used.
This covers a further four procedures:
(4) Transposition: This is a change of one part of speech for
another (e.g. noun for verb) without changing the sense. Transposition
can be:
Q obligatory: French dès son lever [‗upon her rising‘] in a past
context would be translated by as soon as she got up; or
Q optional: in the reverse direction, the English as soon as she got
up could be translated into French literally as dès qu’elle s’est levée
or as a verb-to-noun transposition in dès son lever [‗upon her
rising‘].

35
Vinay and Darbelnet (1995: 94) see transposition as ‗probably the
most common structural change undertaken by translators‘. They list
at least ten different categories, such as:
verb A noun: they have pioneered A they have been the first;
adverb A verb: He will soon be back A He will hurry to be back.
(5) Modulation: This changes the semantics and point of view of the
SL. It can be:
Q obligatory: e.g. the time when translates as le moment où [lit.
‗the moment where‘];
Q optional, though linked to preferred structures of the two
languages: e.g. the reversal of point of view in it is not difficult to
show > il est facile de démontrer [lit. ‗it is easy to show‘].
Modulation is a procedure that is justified ‗when, although a literal, or
even transposed, translation results in a grammatically correct
utterance, it is considered unsuitable, unidiomatic or awkward in the
TL‘ (2004: 133).
Vinay and Darbelnet place much store by modulation as ‗the
touchstone of a good translator‘, whereas transposition ‗simply
shows a very good command of the target language‘ (ibid.: 246).
Modulation at the level of message is subdivided (ibid.: 246–55)
along the following lines:
abstract< >concrete, or particular< >general: She can do no
other > She cannot act differently; Give a pint of blood > Give a little
blood
explicative modulation, or effect< >cause: You’re quite a stranger
> We don’t see you any more.
whole< >part: He shut the door in my face > He shut the door in my
nose
part< >another part: He cleared his throat > He cleared his voice
reversal of terms: You can have it > I’ll give it to you
negation of opposite: It does not seem unusual > It is very normal

36
active< >passive: We are not allowed to access the internet > they
don’t allow us to access the internet
rethinking of intervals and limits in space and time: No parking
between signs > Limit of parking
change of symbol (including fixed and new metaphors): Fr. La
moutarde lui monta au nez [‗The mustard rose up to his nose‘] > En.
He saw red [‗he became very angry‘].
Modulation therefore covers a wide range of phenomena. There is
also often a process of originally free modulations becoming fixed
expressions. One example given by Vinay and Darbelnet (1995:
254) is Vous l’avez échappé belle [lit. ‗You have escaped
beautifully‘] > You’ve had a narrow escape.
(6) Équivalence, or idiomatic translation:4 Vinay and
Darbelnet use this term (1995: 38–9; 2004: 134) to refer to cases
where languages describe the same situation by different stylistic or
structural means. Équivalence is particularly useful in translating
idioms and proverbs: the sense, though not the image, of comme un
chien dans un jeu de quilles [lit. ‗like a dog in a game of skittles‘]
can be rendered as like a bull in a china shop. The use of équivalence
in this restricted sense should not be confused with the more common
theoretical use discussed in Chapter 3 of this book.(7)
Adaptation (1995: 39–40; 2004: 134–6): This involves
changing the cultural reference when a situation in the source
culture does not exist in the target culture. For example, Vinay and
Darbelnet suggest that the cultural connotation of a reference to the
game of cricket in an English text might be best translated into French
by a reference to the Tour de France. The authors claim that a refusal
to use such adaptation in an otherwise ‗perfectly correct‘ TT ‗may
still be noticeable by an undefinable tone, something that does not
sound quite right‘ (1995: 53). However, whereas their solution may
work for some restricted metaphorical uses, it would make little
sense to change the domain cricket to that of cycling in phrases such
as that isn’t cricket (‗that isn‘t fair‘) or ‗a sleepy Wednesday morning
county match at Lords [cricket ground in London]‘.

37
PART II

38
39
Words of wisdom

MAHATIR Mohamed, Malaysia's former prime minister

and the engineer of its economic modernisation, visited
Egypt on Monday to share with the local business arena his
country's experience. During his speech at the conference
"Post revolutionary Egypt" held by the Egyptian Federation
of Industries, Mahatir stressed that democracy comes with a
cost and that Egypt has to know how to deal with the
consequences of giving its people more freedoms.
"Democracy means that people resort to their elected
parliament to get their needs met and only when this fails do
they go into the streets and organise demonstrations. The
problem with demonstrations is that they drive investors
away."
Mahatir, who during his 22 years as prime minister helped
turn his country from a distressed economy into one of the
world's largest industrialised nations with industry
accounting for 90 per cent of its GDP, stressed that Egypt
should not depend on borrowing from abroad to deal with
its post-revolutionary economic challenges. "Malaysians
refused the IMF and World Bank's assistance because we
wanted our economic decisions to be independent."
In the early 1990s Mahatir put forward his country's 2020
vision which aimed at changing it from a developing
country to a developed economy and is based on
industrialisation and a market economy in addition to an
overhaul in Malaysian working habits starting with going to
work as early as 8am, organising regular training workshops
and fighting corruption. Mahatir stepped down in 2003.

40
How to revive civil society?
Now that a sense of inclusion and pluralism is needed, don't
we all wish that civil society were more vibrant? Everyone
expects civil society to fill in the vacuum left by years of
neglect. The erosion of human rights, the distortion of
democracy, the terrible sense that Islamists are undermining
national unity, all these are things that one would have
hoped civil society to address. Alas, it cannot, at least not in
its current form.
Civil society lacks a lot of things that could have helped it
play the role that many people expect it to step into. There is
the fact that many of the organisations are undertrained and
underfunded. There is the fact that religious polarisation is
encouraging attempts by both Islamists and Christians to use
civil society groups for their own advantage. And there is
the fact that the focus on charity work is distracting
attention from the long-term goals of development,
democracy and empowerment.
All is not lost, however. Measures to empower civil society
in the short term are not hard to implement. For one thing,
we can reform the laws governing civil society
organisations, to allow cooperatives, syndicates and youth
centres the chance to partner with business and government
departments in various development projects.
There is also a chance that umbrella organisations can be
established to help small and medium-scale groups to get
more engaged in development efforts and rights advocacy.
Also, if foreign funding seems to be such a problem,
perhaps we need to improve the skills of fundraising among
civil society groups and start encouraging a culture of
volunteer work throughout society.

41
Civil society organisations, with a bit more training and
information, can be essential in monitoring government
projects and stamping out corruption.
The empowerment of civil society, once it translates into
empowerment of local societies, could offer a considerable
boost to democracy. This in turn could energise civil society
and allow it to play the role on which so much hope is
pinned.

42
Water emergency
Climate change is no longer a foreboding scientific forecast.
It is a daily reality unfolding in various parts of the world,
threatening us with a host of disasters, with deadly
earthquakes, devastating tsunamis and blinding volcanoes.
A few days ago, a massive earthquake shook the northwest
parts of China, killing hundreds. This was followed
immediately by a volcanic eruption in Iceland that blocked
air traffic in Europe and disrupted the lives of millions. Who
knows what's next?

In other parts of the world, people get ready for such

unpleasant eventualities. Many advanced nations try either
to harness nature or to forecast its course. In these countries,
authorities remain prepared for natural disasters, and they
keep their people abreast of any threatening forecasts.
Precautionary measures make the whole nation prepared for
the worst. And once the worst happens, governments start
coordinating relief work and the people proceed to make the
necessary precautions.

In the Arab region, we currently face two threats, both

emanating from climate change. One is that sea water could
rise and inundate the Nile Delta. Another is that draught and
desertification may undermine our agriculture and
irrigation. In other words, if we don't drown in the sea, we
may starve on scorched land.

Consequently, we have to look into the future in a more

earnest manner. There are already signs that the scarcity of
water in the Nile Valley, a scarcity driven by climate change
43
as well as the increase in population, may set off terrible
conflicts and wars. Recently, Egypt and Sudan were unable
to get other Nile littoral countries to agree on a treaty on
dividing the Nile waters. For the first time, Egypt's
irrigation minister admitted this fact, and the government
seems finally to understand that there are dire consequences
for the current disagreement over Nile water. Indeed, the
possibility of a worsening conflict can no longer be ruled
out.

For years, Egypt's irrigation ministers denied the existence

of any problems in the Nile Valley. For years, we failed to
reach a solution satisfactory to all Nile littoral states, but
went on hoping that our weight and influence would keep
everyone in line. This is no longer a wise policy, for we are
not the only big boys on the block. Israel is already
infiltrating deep into the continent. And a host of other
foreign powers are not far behind. Everyone wants a piece
of Africa's immense wealth.

Israel has already grabbed all the water it can grab from
Arab land. Now African countries are making it clear that
they want more Nile water. This is not a problem that will
go away on its own. This is a national problem that we have
to discuss in public, worry about, and do everything to
address.

Some think that they can keep African countries at bay by

promising them greater Egyptian investment. This is a false
hope, for we are not the only ones with money. Israel is
already investing in Africa. China has quite a presence
there. And the Americans are obviously interested.
44
Everyone is building bridges, roads, and factories for
African nations. Everyone is interested in Africa's
agriculture and mining.

We're not the only ones with interests in Africa, but we are
the ones who will suffer the most if Nile waters are kept
south of our borders. We need to come up with new ideas,
both for Egypt and for Africa. We need to pay more
attention to our southern front.

45
Garbage is money
The better our life is, the more precarious it becomes. The
bigger our cars the more gasoline we burn. The bigger our
homes the more energy we need to keep them cool or warm.
And the larger the supermarket we shop at, the more likely
that you'll be unpacking your fruits from plastic and
Styrofoam containers.
It used to be that we bought our food in paper bags, that we
lowered a basket from the window and got fresh fruit, and
that the milkman would show up at the door with a shining
container of our favourite dairy products. Countryside
women used to deliver eggs and butter to our doors,
wrapped in heaps of rice hay.
Now everything is packed, wrapped and bottled, and our
garbage bin is not coping well with it. Nor are our streets for
that matter. Garbage is piling high on every street corner,
waiting for someone to remove it, waiting and
decomposing.
I have an idea. We can recycle, like everyone else. We can
keep the organic away from the metal and paper away from
bottles. This will make it easier to put our refuse to good use
in industry and agriculture.
The Cairo governor recently promised to resolve the
problem of garbage. His solution was to end reliance on
foreign companies and give garbage collection back to local
entrepreneurs. This may actually work, for the foreign
companies always relied on local subcontractors and labour
anyway.
Garbage doesn't have to be a problem. There is money in
garbage, but only if we know what we're doing.

46
 Infrastructure matters
At a time when Egypt is focused on raising levels of foreign
direct investment (FDI), accidents happen confirming the
dire need to focus on improving infrastructure and public
utilities in order for investments to have good and viable
returns in the long run. Expanding infrastructure projects
contributes to raising economic growth rates and creating
new economic opportunities. Most importantly, it facilitates
investing in human capital. Accordingly, there is a pressing
need to raise investment rates in infrastructure, which is the
policy of many emerging countries and developing
economies to reach clear goals such as reducing poverty
rates, reaching sustainable development goals, and
effectively combating the impact of climate change.

International studies show that the absence of necessary

infrastructure and public utilities hinders sustainable
development, while there is growing support for
partnerships between the public and private sectors to
improve performance and implementation of infrastructure
projects. At many of the economic conferences attended by
the president recently, there were assertions we are currently
confronting challenges that began a long time ago. There are
chronic economic problems, and hefty spending on services,
subsidies and infrastructure. We need to find alternative
means to fund overhauling public utilities and completing
needed infrastructure projects to attract more investment.

Egypt still has a long way to go. A study published by the

Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics on
infrastructure in 2015 places Egypt at 100 among 144

47
countries regarding indicators of achieving basic
infrastructure requirements for 2015.

Despite high performance in road building, power

generation, water delivery, and sewage treatment over the
past two years, resident needs remain high, especially due to
high birth rates, estimated at 500,000 in 84 days according
to the latest official statistics, which puts immense pressure
on public utilities. One cannot deny that public utilities have
been greatly harmed due to targeting by terrorist attacks to
disrupt the state and halt the wheel of development.

On 6 August, President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi issued Law

146/2017 adopting a plan for economic and social
development for fiscal year 2017-2018, after it was
approved by parliament. The plan includes allocating large
investments for public works and infrastructure. The figures
by the Ministry of Planning, Follow Up and Administrative
Reform show that 60 per cent of government investment is
allocated for improving infrastructure, especially
transportation, housing, public utilities, agriculture,
irrigation and electricity.

Minister of Planning Hala Said said these investments aim

to provide an attractive climate for foreign and domestic
investment, especially small, medium and micro projects.
This would increase economic growth by increasing GDP,
raise operation levels, create large numbers of jobs and
directly improve the quality of life of citizens.

48
Developing infrastructure in Egypt is a paramount challenge
that requires combining efforts by the state, private sector
and international partners to achieve the goals of the
ambitious plan.

49
Economic Impact of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict: A
Blow to the Region?
The Ukraine war has captured widespread media attention
in recent weeks, with news organisations providing wall-to-
wall coverage and reports appearing on phones, televisions,
radios, magazines, and newspapers.
We have been bombarded with images and videos of
horrific destruction, human misery, and geopolitical
maneuverings, which is both engrossing and terrifying to
say the least.
However, the impact of this war on our region is less clear
and less well reported. To us, it is more than a human-
interest story; it has a direct impact on people. That is why
Asharq Business with Bloomberg has dedicated extensive
coverage of the Russia-Ukraine crisis providing up-to-date
news and in-depth analysis while shedding light on the
conflict‘s economic secrets.
What now?
As a result of political power plays, we occasionally hear
about gas, oil, and in rare cases, wheat, and today it is
discussed in the context of Germany's initial reluctance to
take strong measures against Russia or the US president's
concern about rocketing inflation ahead of the crucial mid-
term elections.
To begin with, the rise in oil prices has a double effect:
Arab oil producers will benefit with oil prices returning to
levels that will allow them to generate massive budget
surpluses after 8 years of ballooning deficits. We can expect
increased pressure on the government to begin spending
more of the windfall as well. So, it's mostly good news,
right?
Yes, for oil producers, but not really for those who must
import their energy needs because it will raise the cost of
living even more than the Covid-induced supply-chain
50
squeeze has already done. As a result, this will have
significant impact on the entire region‘s population, and not
just those in non-oil producing countries; but at least oil
producers will be able to mitigate the impact.
It does not stop there. Many Arab countries must now
budget for higher prices for wheat and other agricultural
products imported from Russia and Ukraine. Egypt for
example imports 84 percent from the two countries, while
Lebanon imports 60 percent from Ukraine and Saudi Arabia
around 1.2 million tons of Russian wheat. Alternatives exist,
but they will be more expensive. This is, in a nutshell,
another round of inflationary pressure; Add to that the fact
that the Russian currency has plummeted, and you can
expect far fewer Russian tourists to be able to afford a trip
to Egypt or Dubai.
Of course, this is a global phenomenon. Central banks were
increasingly concerned that inflation would become sticky,
requiring them to intervene to limit the supply of money and
reduce the rate of inflation. In that context, the Fed has just
announced that it will raise borrowing costs this month, and
with another inflationary surge expected as a result of the
Ukraine war, borrowing will become significantly more
expensive. While many countries in our region have pegged
their currencies to the dollar, this will make your mortgage,
car loan or any other debt you have or want to take much
more expensive.
China‘s Economic Development Injects Strong Momentum
into China-Egypt Economic and Trade Cooperation
In 2021, China took multiple measures to promote
sustainable economic recovery and development by
promoting reform, opening-up and innovation, and
effectively improving people‘s well-being.

51
More efforts have been made to create a new development
paradigm, promoting high-quality development and getting
off to a good start in implementing the 14th Five-Year Plan.
Despite the ravages of the COVID-19 pandemic,
accelerated evolution of major changes unseen in a century,
and turbulence and transformation around the globe, China
coordinated pandemic control and economic and social
development, maintained a solid momentum of economic
growth, and achieved fruitful results in China-Egypt
economic and trade cooperation. China‘s economic
development will surely inject strong impetus and new
vitality into China-Egypt cooperation .
1. Landscape of China‘s Economy in 2021
The economic growth rate was at the forefront among the
major economies. The annual GDP grew by 8.1% year on
year to 114.367 trillion RMB. According to the latest
forecast of the International Monetary Fund, China‘s GDP
would account for about 18% of the world economy, and
the contribution to the world economy has increased
steadily year after year.
Foreign trade and utilization of foreign investment grew
rapidly. The total volume of import and export of goods was
39.1 trillion RMB, up by 21.4% year on year. Both of the
export volume and China‘s share in international market
scaled new heights. The actually used foreign investment
was 1.15 trillion RMB, up by 14.9% year on year.
New industries and new business models thrived. The added
value of high-tech manufacturing sector increased by 18.2%
year on year. The new generation of information technology
gained speed in penetrating into new consumption fields
such as online shopping, mobile payment, and integration of
online and offline consumption.
Public well-being was effectively ensured. The growth of
personal income was basically in step with economic
52
growth, which further consolidated the gains of lifting all
poor people out of poverty. Government spending in
meeting people‘s livelihoods kept expanding. Investment in
education and health sectors increased by 11.7% and 24.5%
respectively year on year. 12.69 million new urban jobs
were added throughout the year, and the average rate of
surveyed urban unemployment was 5.1%, down by 0.5
percentage points over the previous year.
The Chinese government continued to follow the general
principle of pursuing progress while ensuring stability, and
increased support for the real economy. Some of the policies
on cutting taxes and fees were continued and improved, new
measures of structural tax cuts were implemented, and costs
on businesses in using land, network, road freight were all
reduced. Reform and opening-up were further deepened to
improve business environment. The top-level designing and
working mechanism was built for carbon dioxide peaking
and carbon neutrality. Strategies for regional development
were implemented. Practical cooperation in the joint
construction of the Belt and Road was deepen. RCEP took
effect as scheduled.
2. China-Egypt Economic and Trade Cooperation Has
Broad Prospects
China remained as Egypt‘s largest trading partner for eight
consecutive years in 2021, and has been one of the most
active and fastest growing investors in Egypt in recent
years. The total trade volume between China and Egypt
increased by 37.3% year on year to reach US$19.98 billion,
of which China‘s imports from Egypt stood at US$1.71
billion, increasing by 85.2% year on year. In the first three
quarters of 2021, China‘s industry-wide direct investment in
Egypt amounted to US$223 million, increasing by 150%
year on year. Major projects such as the Central Business
District of the New Administrative Capital and the 10th of
53
Ramadan Railway Project progressed smoothly; the TEDA
Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone provided
direct and indirect employment opportunities for more than
40,000 Egyptians.
Since the outbreak of COVID-19, China has provided Egypt
with three batches of medical supplies and four batches of
vaccines, assisted Egypt in establishing mask production
lines, and signed the agreement on localized production of
Chinese vaccines, which made Egypt the first country in
Africa with COVID-19 vaccine production capacity. This
year, China will provide 60 million doses of vaccine to
Egypt. China-Egypt economic and trade cooperation has
achieved fruitful results.
Recently, President Sisi attended the opening ceremony of
the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympic Games and had a bilateral
meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The two leaders
applauded the comprehensive strategic partnership between
China and Egypt, and expressed that the two sides would
continue to dovetail Belt and Road Initiative and Egypt
Vision 2030, maintain solidarity against the pandemic, and
work together to address various challenges. This is the
shared aspiration of the two leader and the two peoples.
2022 is a year full of challenges and opportunities
coexisting in the context of profound changes in the world.
While pursuing its own development, China will go hand in
hand with Egypt to continuously deepen practical
cooperation in all fields and firmly move toward the goal of
building the China-Egypt community with a shared future in
the new era.

54
New geopolitical architecture in the Mediterranean
Egypt, France, and Greece are the three focal states in the
new geopolitical architecture that is emerging in the
Mediterranean and North Africa region
There is a new geopolitical architecture emerging in the
Mediterranean, North Africa and greater region comprising
important bilateral agreements and multilateral cooperation
projects. Egypt, France and Greece are essential actors in
this new landscape.
Last week, Greece and France signed a $3.5 billion defence
and security deal accompanied by a strategic defence
partnership between the two countries that provides for
military support beyond their joint NATO membership.
Under the deal, Greece will obtain three advanced Belharra
FDI frigates with the option for an additional one. It will
also obtain three or four Gowind corvettes from the French
side. Over the past year, Greece has agreed to obtain 24
fourth-generation Rafale fighter jets from France, upgrading
its fleet of fighter jets, which already stands at 187 and is
the 16th largest globally.
The state-of-the-art warships agreed on in the new deal can
establish effective aerial and naval control over an area of
up to 200 kms. The Belharra frigates, the first to be obtained
by a state other than France, feature cutting-edge weapons
such as up to 32 Aster-30 hypersonic surface-to-air missiles
that travel at four-and-a-half times the speed of sound and
can strike guided ballistic missiles.
These weapons are supported by sophisticated radar
systems, advanced digital technology and overall highly
advanced capabilities in anti-air, anti-submarine and anti-
ship warfare. What is most important, though, is not just the
ships themselves, but also the provision of a strategic
defence partnership with France.

55
Article 2 of the French-Greek Agreement is a mutual
defence clause that includes the use of military means by the
signatories to protect the national territory of each state in
case of external attack, even if the attacking party is a
NATO member. This is the first time that two NATO
members have concluded such a defence pact overriding the
NATO framework. Greece has also signed a similar mutual
defence pact with the UAE, while the Greek military has
deployed a Patriot missile system in Saudi Arabia intended
to bolster its defence against external attacks.
We are thus seeing the emergence of a new geopolitical
architecture in the Mediterranean and North Africa region
based on important binding bilateral agreements, such as the
one between Greece and France and the partial Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) deal between Egypt and Greece, and
fundamental multilateral projects, such as the Eastern
Mediterranean Gas Forum under the leadership of Egypt.
There are three focal states in this new architecture: Egypt,
France and Greece.
Egypt is the leader of both the Arab world and the continent
of Africa, controlling the strategic Suez Canal and with
interests extending to Libya, the Sahel region and the
African continent, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.
France is the emerging leader of Europe against a receding
Germany, the only nuclear power in the EU, and a
permanent Security Council member.
Greece has the fifth-strongest air force in Europe, an
extended maritime front in the Mediterranean, a large EEZ
and is the guarantor of the independence of the Cyprus
Republic. As a result, its commitments stretch from the
Adriatic Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean. The three states
share amicable relations on the military, financial and
cultural levels, and their national interests coincide in both
the Mediterranean and North Africa.
56
The new geopolitical order is based on overlapping
networks of cooperation and defence that are not
contradictory but complementary. Greece and France are
members of both NATO and the EU, France has a
diplomatic network in the Sahel region and in Sub-Saharan
Africa, and Egypt is a member of both the Arab League and
the African Union and has excellent relations with both
Greece and France.
Egypt could take into consideration the possibility of
concluding a moderate version of a defence pact with
Greece, with provisions for indirect military assistance and
coordination in the case of external interference. It could
also, if deemed necessary, consider a trilateral defence pact
including Egypt, Greece and France.
In the event of a bilateral defence agreement with Greece,
this could cover four major aspects: strategic cooperation,
foreign-policy coordination, joint military exercises in the
Mediterranean and Red Sea and inter-state cooperation with
regard to the two countries‘ respective national military
forces, as well as intelligence and technology sharing in
joint-production projects.
The future of international cooperation and regional stability
lies in a pro-active strategic mentality and depending on
national forces and cooperation with trustworthy allies in
the long run. Egypt and Greece have repeatedly proved their
commitment to regional stability and international law. In
the near future, they could upgrade their relations to a
version of a new alliance.

57
Abiy Ahmed’s many challenges
Within days of the Ethiopian parliament confirming
incumbent Abiy Ahmed as prime minister for a second,
five-year term, humanitarian organisations reported that
Ethiopian troops had launched yet another wave of air and
ground raids on Tigray rebels in the northern region of
Amhara.
The bombardments seemed to reflect speculations about a
major push by Ethiopian government forces against the
rebels, led by the Tigray People‘s Liberation Front (TPLF).
The two sides have been locked in a brutal conflict for
nearly a year, pushing thousands of refugees into Sudan,
displacing over two million people and leaving up to seven
million in Tigray, Amhara and Afar in need of food and
other emergency aid. This includes more than five million
people in Tigray, where an estimated 400,000 people are
―living in famine-like conditions,‖ according to UN
officials. The UN humanitarian chief told the Associated
Press last week that the situation in Ethiopia is a ―stain on
our conscience.‖
In his inaugural speech on 4 October, Abiy vowed to ―stand
strong‖ and defend ―Ethiopia‘s honour‖ despite mounting
international criticism of the conflict and alarm about the
humanitarian crisis it has triggered. Only a handful of
visiting African leaders – those from Nigeria, Senegal,
Uganda and neighbouring Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya and
South Sudan – attended the inauguration, in which Abiy
bristled at international pressure aimed at changing his
confrontational and many would say arrogant policies.
Yet the misery on the ground and massive humanitarian
suffering will not be solved with populist, defiant speeches.
When the war broke out in November, Abiy, who won the
Nobel Peace Prize in 2019, promised a swift victory as
government forces quickly took control of Tigray‘s cities
58
and towns. However, only a few months later, the TPLF
recaptured most of the region including the capital Mekele.
However, Abiy‘s wars in Tigray and other Ethiopian
regions are not the only challenges he needs to face. Due to
his intransigent stands and refusal to listen even to nations
and world organisations known to maintain friendly ties
with Addis Ababa, Abiy is facing deteriorating ties with the
United States, the European Union, the United Nations and
African allies.
The ongoing dispute with Egypt and Sudan, reflecting
Abiy‘s insistence on disregarding the drastic damage the
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) will cause to
their shares of the Nile waters, is one more example of how
the Ethiopian prime minister seems to be triggering conflicts
with historic neighbours in a bid to distract observers from
his own internal difficult challenges.
During his visit to Cairo this week, South Sudanese
President Salva Kiir revealed that Ethiopia would have
started the GERD negotiations this month, but has so far
delayed them due to the war in the Tigray region.
After meeting President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi on Sunday,
Kiir said the Ethiopian prime minister is not in a good
position now to move forward despite all his capabilities,
adding that Ethiopia is facing two problems with Egypt and
Sudan in addition to its problem with the Tigray.
Yet, Egypt and Sudan should not be expected to continue
waiting for Premier Abiy to solve his endless internal
problems. President Al-Sisi reiterated in his talks with his
South Sudanese counterpart the necessity of reaching a
legally binding agreement on the operation and filing
policies of the GERD. ―Reaching a legally binding
agreement on the GERD will boost stability in the region for
all and will open new ways of cooperation between the Nile
basin‘s countries,‖ Sisi said.
59
The ongoing wave of fighting in Tigray, worsening
humanitarian conditions, and the delay in restarting GERD
talks are a further blow to Abiy‘s international standing and
a test to his new government from day one.
While preparations were underway to launch the new wave
of fighting against Tigray rebels last week, Abiy‘s
government sparked global outrage when it expelled seven
senior UN officials from Ethiopia for ―meddling‖ in its
affairs, exacerbating concerns about the humanitarian
response in Tigray.
UN Chief Antonio Guterres was clearly shocked with the
Ethiopian decision, which surpassed all measures nations in
similar conflict situations have taken against UN officials.
He added that Ethiopia had no right to expel UN staff and it
was violating international law in doing so. Guterres
confirmed that the UN ―has only one agenda in Ethiopia,
and that agenda is the people of Ethiopia – Tigrayans,
Amharans, Afaris, Somalis, the people of Ethiopia.‖
Similarly, a month ago, US President Joe Biden threatened
to impose sanctions on Ethiopian officials and rebel leaders
in Tigray unless they stopped fighting and opened up
humanitarian access to the region. The US State
Department also announced that access to essential supplies
and services to refugees and the displaced was being denied
by the Ethiopian government.
A senior Biden administration official warned in statements
to The New York Times last week that if the conflict
continues on its current trajectory, it could cause the
collapse of Ethiopia, a country of over 110 million people,
with ―disastrous‖ consequences for the Horn of Africa
region and beyond.
As he begins his second term, the Ethiopian leader can
either reconsider his policies and cooperate with his
country‘s neighbours to solve their differences peacefully,
60
or maintain his policy of responding to mounting
international pressure with anger and defiance.

61
Tunisia's Bumpy Road
When Tunisian President Kais Saied dismissed the country's
prime minister and closed the Parliament, he said he was
doing so to "restore social peace...and save the state."
Saied was addressing a series of crises that had been
plaguing what many viewed as the one "Arab Spring"
success story. Tunisia had less than 7% of its public
vaccinated against COVID-19, the economy was in
shambles, there was widespread government corruption, and
major cities were being rocked by mass protests.
A few weeks later, from mid-August throughearly
September, Zogby Research Services (ZRS) conducted a
survey of 1,551 Tunisian adults to examine their attitudes
about satisfaction with their lives and optimism for the
future, their most important priorities for their country and
approval of the government‘s handling of those concerns,
the current crisis of governance, and the way forward.
What we found was that Tunisians are dissatisfied with their
current situation (more say they are worse off now than they
were five years ago) and pessimistic that their lives will get
better in the next five years. Maybe the most telling
expression of this deep dissatisfaction is the fact that 71% of
Tunisians say that life was better before the 2010 revolution.
Tunisians clearly blame the government of Prime Minister
Hisham Mechichi and Speaker of the Parliament Rachid
Ghannouchi for this state of affairs and give the government
extremely low scores for its handling of what respondents
say are the three top issues facing the country: controlling
the pandemic (a performance rating of 22% positive), the
economy (only 13% positive rating), and ending corruption
(22% positive rating).
Opinion is divided down the middle on President Kais
Saied‘s actions to dismiss the Prime Minister and shutter
Parliament and whether there is concern for Tunisian
62
democracy. When asked to recommend the way forward, an
overwhelming majority of Tunisians say that they want the
constitution and the election law amended and early
elections. They do not want to restore the system as it was.
And they lean toward a presidential system instead of a
parliamentary system.
ZRS has been polling in Tunisia since 2011 and a look back
at findings shows how opinion has changed during the past
decade.
Back in 2011, shortly after the revolution 54% of Tunisians
said they were confident that the country was on the right
track; the remaining 46% said they weren‘t sure because it
was too early to tell. By 2013, when we asked Tunisians to
look back and tell us how hopeful they had been in 2011,
83% said they had been hopeful. But in that same 2013 poll,
only 39% said they were still hopeful, with 55% saying they
were disappointed. Opinion had soured with only 27%
saying the country was on the right track (with 64% saying
it was on the wrong track).
This decline in satisfaction was due to the fact that the
Ennahda party that was leading the government at that time
was seen as having been ineffective in addressing all of the
major issues facing the country, with around two-thirds of
respondents giving the government poor scores in dealing
with the economy, protecting personal and civil rights,
fighting extremism, and stopping corruption. As a result,
only 28% said they had confidence in Ennahda.
It is important to note that Tunisians have little confidence
in all of the country's political parties and the Parliament.
Unlike the situation in Egypt, where the objection to the
Muslim Brotherhood-led government of Mohamed Morsi
was based on concern with its ideologically-driven agenda,
Tunisian frustration with Ennahda in 2013 and now appears

63
to be driven by its failure to govern competently and deliver
on the promises of the revolution.
After several governments rose and fell over the next five
years, by 2018 only 20% of Tunisians said the country was
on the right track and only 21% said they were better off
than they had been five years earlier. And only 25% had any
confidence in the Parliament as an institution.
In 2019, in the midst of presidential and parliamentary
elections, we witnessed an upward movement in Tunisians‘
optimism. For the first time since 2011, more than 50% of
Tunisians said they were optimistic about the future. But
that optimism collapsed by 2021 owing largely to the
government‘s failure to address the pandemic, the economy,
and corruption.
What comes through quite clearly from our past decade of
polling in Tunisia is that precisely because there is a vibrant
democratic culture in the country, public opinion can be
quite volatile.
Tunisians are deeply dissatisfied with the failure of the
Mechichi government, and its inability to address what
overwhelming majorities say are the most pressing issues
facing the country.
While it appears that Tunisians are not of one mind on to
how to move forward toward securing their future, there
appears to be strong consensus in the public‘s desire to have
both the election law and the Constitution amended and then
to hold early elections.
While the public appears to have more confidence in the
President than they do in the Speaker or the Prime Minister,
President Saied should recognize that he doesn‘t have much
time to deliver both on structural change and meeting the
basic unmet needs of a deeply divided and restless polity.

64
Beating terrorism with progress
In its Human Development Report (HDR) for Egypt in
2021, issued last week, the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) reviews what can objectively be
described as a ―success story‖ of which the Egyptian people
can reasonably be proud.
In barely seven years, the state has managed to tackle many
extremely difficult challenges simultaneously, both
domestic and regional, combined with keeping at bay the
threat of extremism and terrorist groups, all the while
focusing on improving living conditions for the majority of
Egyptians.
While attending the launch of the report, President Abdel-
Fattah Al-Sisi reiterated his deep belief that any successes
the government achieved would not have been possible
without the understanding and endurance of the Egyptian
people, who withstood the harsh effects of an ambitious
economic reform plan, knowing that it would bear fruit in
the near future, and provide a better life.
The UNDP report is the 12th to be issued on Egypt since
1994 and the first in 10 years. The UNDP introduced the
report in 1990 to define and measure development and to
rank countries based on their Human Development Index
(HDI), which ranks education, health and income.
Issuing the report this year is another indication of the
keenness of the Egyptian government to be transparent in
listing both successes and challenges. This will certainly
help to provide a clear picture for all outside investors
whom Egypt is looking forward to attracting.
Egypt‘s 2021 report highlights human development between
2011 and 2020, stressing the key philosophy behind the
measures that President Al-Sisi took to achieve
development in many sectors: Egyptians must be at the

65
centre of the development process, providing them with a
better life that respects their human dignity.
―The report renews and confirms Egypt‘s commitment to a
development approach that puts people at the centre of the
development processes as the principal driver of and the
primary stakeholder in its outcomes,‖ said Randa Abul-
Hosn, UNDP resident representative in Egypt during the
launch last week.
For her part, the Minister of Planning and Economic
Development Hala Al-Said, stressed that ―the national
sustainable development strategy, Egypt‘s Vision 2030,
aims primarily at improving the quality of life for the
Egyptian citizen, out of a steadfast belief that human beings
are the main actors in achieving development, and
ultimately the desired goal.‖
Accordingly, Egypt increased investments in its human
capital, undertaking serious reforms, and implemented
major development projects and initiatives in the sectors of
education, health, housing and utilities to provide adequate
housing and a decent life for all Egyptians, while paying the
utmost attention to politically, economically and socially
empowering women and the young, within a more general
and comprehensive framework for guaranteeing human
rights, foremost among which is the right to development.
Across the world, poverty has spiked, inequalities have
widened due to Covid-19, and global human development is
going backwards for the first time since 1990. Yet Egypt
has managed to maintain positive economic growth, mostly
due to the implementation of bold economic reforms, noted
the UNDP Administrator Achim Steiner, while
congratulating Egypt on its achievements in key
development areas.
Even though the government has taken social protection
measures to ease the consequences of the economic reform
66
programme, eventually the challenges the Egyptian state has
been facing will continue to burden Egyptian society.
President Al-Sisi‘s motto for facing those challenges,
especially while confronting terrorist groups active in Sinai
as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, is to defeat terrorism
with construction and development.
The state has worked on developing all key economic
sectors in a comprehensive manner. The latest initiative on
this front has involved developing the countryside with an
estimated budget of LE 250 billion over three years.
Through the Decent Life initiative, ―hayah karima‖ in
Arabic, infrastructure projects will be carried out in as many
as 4,658 villages over three phases, improving the lives of at
least 58 million Egyptians. Sisi launched the first phase of
the initiative in mid-2021, and it is due to be completed by
the end of the 2021-22 fiscal year.
Moreover, ambitious government projects have managed to
raise the availability of sanitation services provided to the
countryside from 12 to 38 per cent, affirming that during the
next three years the country aims to provide sanitation
services to the entire countryside.
In order to improve sanitation, and to save water, the
government has also exerted tremendous efforts to line
canals so that they can eliminate pollution and establish dual
and triple sewage treatment plants. Between 2014 and 2024,
the government‘s spending will exceed LE 600-700 billion
to this end.
While praising the successes achieved on several fronts,
highlighted by the UNDP report, President Al-Sisi asked
those involved to include in their future reports challenges
that Egypt and the region continue to face such as terrorism,
illegal emigration and refugees in Egypt. Egypt hosts five-
six million refugees who live among Egyptians as guests,
mingling with the people and enjoying the same services the
67
state provides to its citizens. Al-Sisi rightly noted that this
number of refugees ―can be equal to the [population] of two
or three countries,‖ and therefore, the report should take this
into consideration.
There are many challenges lying ahead, and the population
growth rate at 2.6 per cent increases makes them more
difficult. However, with the achievements of the past seven
years, Egyptians can certainly be hopeful nonetheless.

68
Hello autumn
The air is colder, the days are shorter, and the nights are
longer. Autumn is here.
It is often referred to as the saddest of seasons, as the
―falling leaves drift by the window‖ accompanied by a
sense of melancholy.
It cannot be helped. Nature takes its course and we have no
choice but to abide by its rules.
This will be the second autumn that the ominous shadow of
the pandemic hovers over us. Are we going to give in, now
that the evening of the year has started, before the cruel
winter weather arrives? By no means. We have to look for a
bright spot in the midst of all this darkness.
Psychologists have names for everything, including our
seasonal changing moods. They call it, appropriately, SAD,
or Seasonal Affective Disorder. But SAD or sad, we shall
overcome.
A pleasurable distraction is fashion. It is everyone‘s passion,
functional, necessary and even fun.
Time to peer into our closets and air our warmer outfits.
Coronavirus or not, designers have been hard at work,
creating new ways to tempt and seduce us with their
irresistible creations. Now that they have discovered
―virtual‖ techniques to present their chef d‘oeuvres, their
world is buzzing and booming — as though ―all‘s well with
the world.‖
So on with the show. The first thing that strikes you is the
names they give to their colours. Do you not love them? So
innovative, and sometimes puzzling. For example, one of
the big colours of the season is scarlet orange. Ever heard of
it? We have heard of burnt orange, bright orange, pale
orange, but what would a scarlet orange look like? Perhaps
inspired by Scarlett O‘Hara? It looks naughty.

69
This is only an example of how bright the autumn colours
are this season. They stand out in defiance like lemon
yellow and shocking pink. Pink, which was a favourite this
summer, has no intention of retiring. Can you imagine
yourself in a shocking pink coat? Unforgettable?
No more autumnal blues, with a parade of these eye-
catching hues.
The Pantone Establishment sets the official colours of each
season, not only for clothes, but for house furnishings,
draperies, etc. What is their proclamation for this season?
The edict is green. Not just any green; grass green, fern
green, emerald green, which is a good choice for this
disturbing era. It is peaceful, soothing, uplifting, evoking
visions of endless grass fields, palm trees, and promenades
in an English garden.
It certainly detracts from any SAD syndrome. Versace,
Prada, and Gucci took advantage of this joyful, natural,
disposition in their collections.
If you will have none of these fashion dictates, go for the
classic Chanel red, never out of style. Disruptive and
exciting, it was exquisite in striking pantsuits, and especially
jumpsuits.
Speaking of jumpsuits, ever Fashion House had a number of
them, edging dresses for both day and night wear.
As diverse as we are, so is our 2021-22 fall and winter
fashion. From pastel princess‘ dresses to properly pleated
skirt suits to glittering evening jumpsuits, the world is your
oyster.
How many occasions do you have on your calendar for a
gala evening? Not too many I would guess, with
coronavirus raging on, they have dwindled to a precious
few. However, there may be a wedding, a charity gala or a
concert you must attend. To step in style opt for a dreamy,
goddess fabric like chiffon, silk, satin duchess, organza or
70
lace. And here is the good news. Velvet is back in and
surely most of us have a velvet dress tucked away
somewhere.
Velvet has been in style for centuries, and regardless of the
era, it makes an impression. Dolce and Gabbana, Valentino,
Dior and Fendi made an impression with it, especially when
paired with lace.
If you are a fan of the mini-dress you are in luck. It had
disappeared for a while except for teen agers. But now it is
back with a vengeance — and in striking colours. Use same
colour tights and knee-length boots and you‘re right back in
the 60s. Retro is the savior of designers.

Big purses almost broke our backs for many years. They
were replaced by medium, lady-like clutches and Kellys, but
we discovered we are addicted to them. Instead of
abandoning them, we carried both, so now they are back,
bigger and better than ever. You can put on your shoes with
their ever so chunky heels, even your boots if you like.

Morning wear is apres-ski styles…and for the few who ski

in our neck of the woods, they are covered. The rest of us
can find some knitted vests, quilted jackets and fur boots.

The general look is one of glamour in a season as sad and

drab with bare trees and brown bushes, as solitary autumn.
Makeup finishes the look with disco eyes, lip gloss, flushed
cheeks and loud lipstick.

Would you consider plum lips? Good for you. It is the in

colour for lipstick this season, to go with the smoky eyes
and abundant blusher. No more that natural, freshly washed
face of the California Dreamers. This face with its extra
shine is out to attract attention.
71
As for the hair, forget that long silky peasant-like do. Go for
a sharp straight cut or a wavy bob. Fringes are in so are
headbands, embellish hair with glitter or better still more
designer logos as hair clips. Prada has the best.
Yes coronavirus, no more SAD for autumn. We are defiant.

72
More fear than hope in Afghanistan
Scenes of thousands of Afghanis crowding the Kabul
Airport, sometimes crushed to death while trying to flee the
country, are harrowing enough. But they might not be the
worst to come out of this country, war-torn for over four
decades now, following the astonishing Taliban takeover.
At least seven Afghans including a two-year-old girl died
were trampled to death while applying for evacuation on
board British, American and NATO military and civilian
planes outside the British embassy. Jane Ferguson, one of
the few Western correspondents still in Kabul, said, ―the
scenes are apocalyptic. People are fainting and dying.
Children are going missing.‖
The Biden administration‘s obsession with a quick
withdrawal has led to massive, widespread chaos all over
Afghanistan, made worse by the humiliating escape of
former Afghani president, Ashraf Ghani while Taliban
fighters were hours away from the presidential palace. The
Afghan army and security forces – financed and equipped
for over 20 years in the presence of the US and NATO –
simply collapsed and disappeared.
Taliban leaders have been trying hard to assure the outside
world that they are not back in Kabul to implement the
same, terrifying regime that marked their short reign, which
ended with the US occupation of Afghanistan in late 2001 to
retaliate against the Taliban hosting Al-Qaeda, which
proudly claimed responsibility for the 11 September attacks.
Taliban leaders say they have learned from their mistakes.
They have vowed to form an inclusive government made up
of different political groups and ethnicities, to respect
women‘s and girls‘ right to education, not to revive their
policy of banning women from any appearance in public
except with a male guardian and, most importantly, not to

73
let Afghanistan to become a safe haven for militant and
terrorist groups from all over the world.
However, many Afghanis and most world countries remain
doubtful that those pledges are more than lip-service to win
international recognition, and would not be carried out on
the ground. In the light of past experiences since the country
fell into chaos and civil war after the former Soviet Union
occupied it to back up its communist allies in 1979, there
seems to be more opportunity for the situation in
Afghanistan to deteriorate than for it to improve.
Many fear the deceptively nonviolent, swift entry of the
Taliban into Kabul, and the official new Taliban rhetoric on
future ―moderate‖ rule, will be able to keep the peace, and
that civil war will break out as soon as US, British and other
troops leave the country within days, or weeks, depending
on Biden‘s decision on how long he would allow US troops
to maintain their presence at the airport to evacuate
American and a few thousand Afghan nationals after the 31
August deadline he set earlier.
The US president seems himself doubtful while offering a
few inducements, mainly economic assistance. He told
reporters at a recent news conference, ―the Taliban has to
make a fundamental decision. Is it going to attempt to unite
and provide for the well-being of the people of Afghanistan,
which no one group has ever done for hundreds of years? If
so, it‘s going to need everything from additional help in
terms of economic assistance, trade and a whole range of
things.‖
But it is very hard to believe that the Taliban, with its
extremist ideology and leaders, will be able to achieve what
―no one group has ever done for hundreds of years.‖
Reports on the ground indicate that Taliban fighters have
already begun searching homes, hunting for former Afghan
leaders they accuse of cooperating with US and NATO
74
allies. Peaceful protests in a few Afghani cities raising the
national flag, instead of the white Taliban banner, were met
with violence and deadly shots from Taliban fighters
holding automatic machine guns. Tajik leaders, including
the son of the late Ahmed Shah Massoud, announced that
they have already recruited a small army to resist Taliban
rule.
Meanwhile, Biden‘s gamble that the Taliban would keep
their word in fear of losing US aid could be easily be
disregarded, considering the announcements made by more
influential neighbours, namely Russia and China, that they
were ready to recognise and help the new Afghani
government formed by the Taliban. Even the Shiite majority
Iran, which nearly went to war with the Taliban in the early
1990s after the slaughter of Iranian diplomats on sectarian
grounds, issued friendly statements, though they expressed
more joy with the humiliating US withdrawal from
Afghanistan. The same applies to India, despite awareness
that the Taliban takeover would weaken its interests in
Afghanistan and embolden its historic rival, Pakistan, where
many Taliban leaders were based for decades.
In the worst case scenario, Afghanistan will deteriorate into
civil war again; extremist groups, including Daesh or the so-
called Islamic State, will find a safe haven where they can
move and plan freely, fearing only occasional US aerial
raids as the situation is in Yemen or other failed states in
Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Regional and influential
world countries will pick sides based on their share of
whatever gains they can draw from this impoverished, vast
country. But those who will pay the heaviest price are the
Afghan people who will witness yet another episode in their
long, bloody history.

75
Winners and losers in the Afghan crisis
Some will gain and some will lose from the Taliban‘s
takeover of Afghanistan
The losers are in the majority. Let‘s start by focusing on the
Afghans themselves.
Despite the futile promises made by the Taliban saying that
they will respect women‘s rights ―within the framework of
Sharia law,‖ women will return to the repressive past they
earlier endured.
Women have gained much during the last 20 years: freedom
of movement, education and many other rights. Under the
Taliban, education for women and girls may be prohibited
again, and women may not be allowed to leave their homes
without a male guardian escorting them or without wearing
a burka. Already advertisements picturing women are being
whitewashed on billboards in Afghanistan.
Setting aside women and girls, the rest of Afghan society
will suffer, too. Cinemas, music and entertainment will all
be banned, those convicted of adultery will be executed, and
those guilty of theft will have their hands amputated. The
harrowing video of those who resorted to clinging to a plane
trying to take off from Kabul Airport last week, knowing all
too well the consequences of their actions, says it all.
Another visible loser, despite US President Joe Biden‘s
rebuttal of the world‘s outcry, is the US. The photograph of
the 640 panic-stricken Afghans sitting on the floor of a US
aircraft last week with no luggage or belongings was a tell-
tale image of the desperation of the Afghans and a source of
shame to the US. It is more damaging than any other
moment in US history.
The US was in Afghanistan in the first place to rid the world
of extremists, yet today the Taliban are victorious. In its
withdrawal process, the US lost much of its credibility and
suffered severe humiliation. Undoubtedly, the world at large
76
believes that the US should have foreseen the collapse of
Afghanistan and avoided the tragedy.
If Afghanistan becomes a haven for terrorists, the whole
world will fall prey. Imagine Afghanistan as a breeding
ground for those who hate the West and Arab countries such
as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for those who seek revenge and
retaliation for Western meddling and intrusion, and for
those who will be free to harm others as they impose a
wrong understanding of Islam on all. Attacks may soon
follow in various parts of the world as extremists gain in
confidence and support.
There are also many winners, however. At the top of the
pole are the Taliban themselves, who have managed,
apparently without losing a single soul, to regain what they
lost 20 years ago – power. US forces removed the Taliban
from power in 2001. Twenty years later, the US has allowed
them to move back at a far faster pace than they could have
imagined.
Cheering the Taliban on in this are those who think alike –
regimes that distrust the US or are Islamist at the core,
whether Qatar, Iran or Pakistan. There are also groups with
a similar mindset – the Islamic State (IS) group, Al-Qaeda,
the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, among others. To
them, this is a field day and an opportunity like no other.
Qatar has long sheltered and backed religious extremists,
including Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. Today, it
will do the same for the Taliban. Qatar‘s Aljazeera TV
network will also remain sympathetic to the Taliban,
displaying them favourably to viewers.
After the Taliban moved into Kabul, Hamas congratulated
the Taliban for ―defeating the US.‖ The leader of Hamas,
Ismail Haniyeh, said that the ―departure of US forces from
Afghanistan is the prelude to the demise of all occupation
forces.‖
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Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader Wagdi Ghoneim,
based in Turkey, tweeted that ―we ask Allah to complete the
victory of the Taliban over America and the infidel West;
they are mujahedeen and we are mujahedeen and we are the
nation of jihad.‖
Any country defiant to the ways of the US, such as Iran, is
also celebrating today. Anyone affected by the atrocities
caused by the US is gloating, whether those who suffered at
the hands of US soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq or
those who fled war zones after September 11.
According to the Watson Institute for International and
Public Affairs at Brown University in the US, ―at least
801,000 people have been killed by direct war violence in
Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen and Pakistan.‖ It also
concludes quite justly that the US could have pursued
several non-military alternatives to hold accountable those
responsible for perpetrating the 9/11 attacks on New York
and Washington in 2001.
Last but not least, Russia and China are quietly watching
and enjoying the fiasco that the US had placed itself in. The
chances are that the Taliban will look for support elsewhere,
and soon Chinese and Russian products, commodities and
weapons, once the stack left behind is used up, will pour
into Afghanistan.
Both countries have hosted Taliban delegations at one point
or another, and they may soon recognise them as the new
government of Afghanistan, maybe even backing them in
the UN, which would provide the Taliban with recognition
across the world.
The US withdrawal from Afghanistan is a sobering reality
that will resonate far and wide.

78
Taliban’s Darkness
Music, art and cultural heritage in general have no value
among Islamist sects, be they ISIS fanatics who beheaded
Yazidi artists in Iraq and banned music in weddings and
other social activities in Yemen, or Muslim Brothers who
closed down the Opera House and fired its director when
they came to power in Egypt.
Just as expected, the Taliban have reinstated the same harsh
laws they imposed during their first period of rule in
Afghanistan in 1996. They banned music, having their
squads smash musical instruments in public. The painful
sight recalls their destruction of the ancient Buddhas that
precipitated an international outcry. Taliban Spokesman
Zabihullah Mujahid declared that music was the work of the
devil and would be henceforth prohibited in public spaces.
Also true to form, the Taliban excluded females in their
decree ordering only male students and staff back to school.
They eliminated the Ministry of Women‘s Affairs and
reintroduced the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and
Prevention of Vice – to impose their fanatical interpretation
of religious strictures. It appears they banned women from
working there, too. Video footage circulating on social
media shows female ministry employees demanding to be
allowed back at work.
Afghanistan has an ancient and rich musical heritage that
reflects the country‘s ethnic, linguistic and geographical
diversity. Perhaps the best known is Pashto music, a folk
music influenced in part by Indian music. One of the most
famous Pashto singers is Momin Khan Biltoon, known by
the honourific Ustad Biltoon, who sang in both Pashto and
Dari. He died in 1995 after more than 70 years of
contributing to traditional Afghan music. Fazel Ahmad
Zekrya was another famous musician. Known
professionally as Ustad Nainawaz, he was a poet and a
79
composer as well as a performer. He composed some of the
most famous pieces in popular Afghan music, but died
young, at the age of 44, in 1979.
Mohali is another category of Afghan music – and the most
diverse. It is divided into three basic genres that have
evolved in the mountains over the years without being
influenced by the outside world: Qataghani, Logari and
Qarsak.
The rubab, a three stringed instrument similar to the rababa,
is the most widely used instrument in Afghan popular
music. Rare is the composition that lacks its melancholy
tones. Among the most famous rubab players are Essa
Kassemi, Mohamed Rahim Khushnawa and Homayun
Sakhni. The dombura and ghichak are two other popular
string instruments.
Music, art and cultural heritage in general have no value
among Islamist sects, be they ISIS fanatics who beheaded
Yazidi artists in Iraq and banned music in weddings and
other social activities in Yemen, or Muslim Brothers who
closed down the Opera House and fired its director when
they came to power in Egypt. Islamist politicians and
pundits also demanded that pharaonic statutes be covered in
wax to conceal their limbs, condemned ballet as sinful,
defamed artists and performers and described the novels of
Nobel Prize Laureate Naguib Mahfouz as the ―literature of
hash dens and whore houses.‖
If they knew more about the history of Islamic civilisation,
they might realise what a wealth of art, poetry and music it
engendered, especially in the Abbassid and Andalusian eras.
Just one of innumerable examples is the 9th-century musical
genius, Abu Al-Hassan Ali Bin Nafie, who was born in Iraq
and invited to serve as chief entertainer at the court of
Cordoba. He was given the nickname ―Ziryab‖, or ―The
Blackbird‖ - because of his melodious voice, eloquence and
80
dark complexion. His contributions to music and
musicology were widely influential all across the civilised
world.
Some Islamic musical heritage is known to date to the era of
the Prophet who is said to have been greeted with music on
entering Yathrib (which later became Madina). Ubayd Allah
Bin Muhammad Bin Aisha relates that when the Prophet
arrived in Madina after his flight from Mecca, women and
children welcomed him with the song, ―The full moon has
risen upon us.‖ The song, which expresses gratitude to the
Lord for sending His messenger to the city, has become
something of an Islamic anthem inspiring musicians across
the ages to modern times. Of particular note is Malek
Jandali, the widely acclaimed German composer of Syrian
origin who based The Moonlight, a symphony for piano and
orchestra, on the ancient verse. Talaa Al-Badru Alayna, as
the song is called in Arabic, was also performed by the
famous British musician and singer, Cat Stevens, or Yusuf
Islam as he is known after his conversion.
Clearly when the Taliban think of music, they can only
think of sin, their sole obsession. The moon that rose upon
Madina a millennium and a half ago has not risen over
Afghanistan and is not likely to do so.

81
The refugee weapon
According to international political reports, Russia has been
striking civilian targets in Ukraine, from residential areas to
hospitals and shelters. In this way it can force inhabitants to
flee their homes, thereby creating a humanitarian crisis that
would give Moscow leverage against the ruling regime in
Ukraine, which Putin openly states he wants to topple on the
grounds that it is ―neo-Nazi.‖ As the crisis worsened, the
numbers of people seeking refuge in neighbouring countries
has increased.
Some analysts believe that Putin‘s aim is to create an
international refugee crisis of some five to ten million
people, taking advantage of the racist tendencies in Western
countries that have made them more sympathetic to the
plight of white skinned, blue eyed and blond people and
therefore more willing to open their doors to them than to
darker complexioned refugees from the Middle East and
Africa. The idea is that the economic and social burden of
this huge number of Ukrainian refugees in Poland, Hungary
and other neighbouring nations will lead these governments
to pressure Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to
cave in to Putin‘s demands in order to end the war.
According to AFP, more than 3.5 million Ukrainians,
mostly women and children, have crossed the borders into
neighbouring countries in what the French news agency
describes as the fastest growing refugee crisis since World
War II. As for the numbers of people displaced in Ukraine,
UN reports place the figure at around 6.5 million. Certainly
causing this crisis and using it as a weapon would count as a
war crime attributable to Putin. But then, what war has been
without war crimes committed by its various parties?

82
Israel, Ukraine
Has Israel overreached itself by acting as though it were a
great power with the ability to play a leading role as a
mediator between Russia and Ukraine? Just because Israel is
on good terms with a superpower like Russia, does it think it
can end a conflict in which real world powers can not
intervene for fear of how it could evolve? Or maybe it is
because Israel has excellent relations with the Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky, who also holds Israeli
citizenship and is unswerving in his support for Israel‘s
genocidal war against the Palestinian people?
Israel‘s history since the founding of the Jewish state tells us
that this country has always carried out the policies of
colonialist powers, as exemplified by the Suez War. How
has Israel suddenly become a great power in the
international arena with the wherewithal to settle wars?
How can it persuade Russia that it is a credible and neutral
mediator when it has given its own citizens the green light
to join Zelensky‘s forces and the mercenaries fighting on his
side against the Russians?
A whole train of Israeli governments since the founding of
the state have failed to reach a solution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict triggered by that state‘s aggressive settler policies.
So how does it expect to end the Russian-Ukrainian war
when it, itself, has been in a state of war for three quarters of
a century? As for the height of absurdity, it is to be found in
the Israeli offer to host negotiations in occupied Jerusalem.
The mind boggles at the very thought of Israel sponsoring a
settlement to prevent a Russian occupation of Ukraine in a
city that the entire international community (apart from the
US under Donald Trump) recognises as an occupied Arab
city, in which, what is more, the occupation authorities have
aroused international censure for house demolitions,
expropriations, revocation of residence documents dating
83
back generations, expulsions of the native inhabitants and
other such wrongful measures in their relentless drive to
Judaise the occupied city. Perhaps these are some of the
reasons why Russia has so far given no indication that it
might take the Israeli offer seriously.

84
Ongoing Judaisation
In an article published by the pro-Zionist, anti-
Arab Washington Post, Mairav Zonszein argues that the
current Israeli government is not as different from its
predecessor led by Benjamin Netanyahu as it would like the
world to believe. Naftali‘s government is in fact following
the previous government‘s same policy albeit with silk
gloves on. In an attempt to repair what was ruined by
Netanyahu‘s arrogance with the European countries, Yair
Lapid, the current Israeli foreign minister, stated last July
that Israel would no longer immediately declare that anyone
who disagrees with its anti-Semite and Israel-hater, but that
is not how you handle a country‘s foreign relations.
Zonszein clarifies that when one company announced that it
won‘t sell its products in the illegal settlements located in
the occupied Palestinian lands, Lapid himself described the
decision as anti-Israel and anti-Jewish. At the same time,
Bennett‘s government continues with the expansionist
settlement policy adopted by Netanyahu, which is based on
forcing Palestinians out of their lands and destroying their
homes.
On the other hand, the education minister announced her
commitment to suspending Israel‘s award to mathematics
professor Oded Goldreich due to his endorsement of
boycotting the Israeli Ariel University located inside one of
the occupied West Bank settlements. Likewise, the deputy-
foreign minister cancelled a meeting scheduled with Belgian
officials following Belgium‘s announcement that it will put
a label on the Israeli products manufactured in settlements,
not with the aim of boycott, but in the interest of
transparency. The Israeli Foreign Ministry quickly issued a
statement describing the Belgian decision as anti-Israel,
ignoring the current government‘s alleged policy of
improving Palestinian lives and Israeli relations with
85
Europe. What the article demonstrates is that the Israeli
government considers the settlements built on occupied
Palestinian land an inseparable part of Israel.
Netanyahu‘s government retreated from annexing the
occupied West bank to Israel after declaring its intention to
do so. But Bennett‘s government uses the West Bank
settlements to behave as if it were already annexed; any
boycott of the settlements is a boycott to Israel itself. This
makes the present government worse than its predecessor.
While Netanyahu‘s government was clear in its policies –
whether we agreed or disagreed with it – the present
government is characterised by evasion and concealment of
its intentions under the false guise of moderation. It also
announces its desire to reach a settlement without
demonstrating any wish to approach the negotiating table.
All this occurs while the situation is worsening in the
occupied lands, where a few days ago extremist settlers
stormed the Aqsa Mosque under the protection of the
security forces. The Palestinians‘ lives are growingly more
miserable by the day at the hands of a racist Jewish
government that doesn‘t accept the Gentiles, be they
Muslim or Christian.
Indeed Christians in Jerusalem are facing mounting
persecution aimed at the reduction of their presence as well
as the Judaisation of the holy lands which have been
multireligious throughout history. Christian leaders in
Jerusalem warned recently that their communities are facing
the threat of expulsion from the Holy Lands. Father
Francesco Patton, the Catholic Church‘s Custos of the Holy
Lands and guardian of the Christian holy places in the Holy
Land, wrote an article in the Daily Telegraph saying that the
presence of Christians in Jerusalem is precarious and their
future at risk, adding that their lives have become
unbearable due to the radical moves by Israeli groups aimed
86
at making the old city of Jerusalem free of Christian
existence, including the Christian quarter itself. Some
churches and holy sites were desecrated and vandalised and
systematic crimes against priests, monks and worshippers
go unpunished. Patton mentioned in his article that
Christians used to constitute 20 per cent of Jerusalem‘s
inhabitants, and now they don‘t exceed two per cent.
Patriarchs and heads of churches in Jerusalem issued a joint
statement warning about the danger represented by radical
groups, which they said aim at diminishing Christian
presence in Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories. Similar
warnings came from the Archbishop of Canterbury Justin
Welby in a joint article published in the Sunday Times with
Hosam Naoum, the Anglican Archbishop in Jerusalem, in
which they warned of what they called a historical tragedy
now unfolding. They said that what drove them to write the
article was the joint statement issued by the Jerusalem
churches. However, the Israeli government rejected the
statement and described it as leading to violence and
harming innocent people.
Perhaps there really is no difference between the current
government and its predecessor.

87
Egypt is changing
In order to renew my weapon licence, I was required to take
a medical examination that had not been required
previously. The Ministry of the Interior stipulated that this
medical exam should be administered at its Security Camp
in Medinat Al-Salam off the Cairo-Ismailia Desert Road. I
kept postponing going there, unable to face the prospect of
confusion and chaos to which government departments have
accustomed us for decades. Perhaps Egypt is one of those
rare where dealing with the bureaucracy requires a fixer, a
person who bears the brunt of the red tape, all those
documents and stamps, journeys in and out of offices and
convoluted procedures usually ending with ―Come back
tomorrow‖. You cannot send a fixer to take a medical exam
in your stead, however.
That is how I ended up going to the camp in the Cairo-
Ismailia Desert Road, come what may. But there was a
surprise in store, starting at the camp gate where I found a
decent man awaiting for me as if he knew beforehand of my
arrival time, which he couldn‘t have. I‘d made up my mind
to get rid of that weapon, which I inherited from my father
and is of no use to me. I only ever remember once a year for
fear of becoming the owner of an unlicenced weapon. The
man asked for my identity card and handed me a receipt
informing me that they would ask for it inside, then he gave
detailed directions to the person who was driving me.
As for the second surprise, it was the medical building,
which I found tidy and clean, and I was guided to go to one
of the upper floors through an elevator in good condition.
When I reached the intended place, I found a woman who
seemed to be a nurse or doctor‘s assistant. She collected
everyone‘s papers in an orderly way before leading us to a
spacious, clean hall, clarifying that there was a cafeteria
attached for those who might want to use it. She left us all in
88
shock. A few minutes later the same nurse came to
accompany me to the examination room where a qualified
specialist examined me for internal, ophthalmological and
psychological faults before asking me to go back to the hall
where they would hand me the certificate.
In the hall I ran into a friend, Mahmoud Murad, the son of
the late politician Mustafa Kamel Murad, with whom I have
old family ties. I noticed he was accompanied by an
acquaintance, a police general with enough official clout to
ease the bureaucratic burden. But the whole process took
less than an hour and went very smoothly – a very pleasant
experience.
It may be argued that this camp is the exception, but in the
same week I was similarly surprised at the Tax Authority in
Maadi. An elegant venue that had me wondering whether I
got the address wrong, a polite and efficient receptionist,
and smiling government employees all confirmed my belief
that Egypt is indeed changing. It is changing in silence,
without hubbub but in gradual steps that some may not even
notice. For the development that Egypt is witnessing right
now isn‘t confined, as some propagate, to constructing roads
and bridges. Bridges are what everybody sees every day but
we are also building the biggest solar power plant in the
world and the biggest fish farm in the Middle East, and we
are clearly modernising government services. I have no
doubt that the new republic will see the same kind progress
in every other aspect of life after ending emergency law,
declaring a National Strategy for Human Rights and
reorganising the National Council for Human Rights – not
to mention the recent prison releases.

89
New Republic
The ―new republic‖ is a term we hear frequently these days.
Is there, indeed, a new republic in Egypt?
Some point to the development mega projects, such as the
highway, bridge and overpass networks and the urban
renewal and expansion projects that are visibly transforming
the face of the country as never before. But that is merely
the infrastructure for the new republic which, in fact, should
be based on investment in people and the establishment of a
new way of life for them.
President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi stressed this point when he
launched the concept during his opening address to the
Ministerial Conference of the Organisation of Islamic
Cooperation on Women in July 2021. That occasion, he
said, confirmed the birth of ―the new republic which is open
to all, without distinction or discrimination, and based on
the principles of democracy, justice, equality and
citizenship.‖
We should bear in mind that, in choosing this name, the
president averted a futile debate over whether the new
republic was the second or the third. In one numbering
system, Abdel-Nasser established the first and Sadat
ushered in the second with his political and economic
reorientation and the 1971 Constitution.
According to others, Nasser‘s and Sadat‘s regimes were two
eras in the same republic. All agree that the Mubarak regime
was an extension of Sadat‘s and its outlooks. As for the rule
of Mohamed Morsi, that was but a brief transitional that the
people did not want to take root. But there is no doubt that,
on July 2013, a new republic was born by dint of the
historical break marked by the dual grassroots uprising that
overthrew Mubarak in 2011 and Muslim Brotherhood rule
in 2013. Then the constitutional referendum in 2014
established the new legitimacy.
90
The new republic immediately set out to build vitally
needed infrastructure, as well as to modernise healthcare
services, address the needs of youth, women and the
handicapped, eliminate slums and develop rural areas in the
Delta and Upper Egypt. That spirit is epitomised by the
Decent Life initiative. But what I am looking forward to is a
document embodying the philosophy of our new republic
and serving as a compass to orient the state and society in
the upcoming period. I wonder what such a document would
look like.

91
Cotton, tomatoes, strawberries
Do you remember Egyptian cotton being the pride of Egypt
all over the world? Do you remember the tall sugar cane
swaying in the wind for miles on end in Upper Egypt, a
major source of sugar and other foodstuffs? Do you
remember strawberries? I don‘t mean the generic, tasteless
strawberries wrapped in cellophane on supermarkets
shelves, which look like the artificial fruits that used to
decorate dining rooms in our grandmothers‘ homes. I mean
the old Egyptian strawberries with their sweet taste and
strong scent, which would fill the house so thoroughly I
could always tell what dessert would be.
Where did those strawberries go? How did local bananas,
the tastiest in the world, become such a rarity, to be seen
only very occasionally on hand-drawn carts coming from
the countryside surrounding Cairo? And when were the old
Egyptian tomatoes driven out of the market by exported
strains with thick skin and mediocre taste?
The Egyptian crop map has changed significantly in the last
decades in ways that have transformed the shape, taste and
availability of agricultural products. Part of the blame for
this is ours and another part outside our control. The most
important factor is climate change, which has swept the
world due to industrial progress, together with all manner of
pollution due to nuclear tests and weapons of mass
destruction, especially chemical and biological ones, and the
damage we have made to the ozone layer which we are
unable to repair.
Agriculture in the region is facing an existential challenge.
Arab agricultural output constitutes a little over four percent
of world agricultural output. However, it is vital to us. Over
the few past years, many studies sent alarming signals
pointing to a bleak future awaiting agriculture, not only in
Egypt but in the entire Middle East. A study made by the
92
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
showed that the Arab world is suffering from an extended
drought exceeding 20 years, the longest in the last
millennium.
At the same time, the UNDP warned that continued water
scarcity could result in a decrease of about 20 per cent in
agriculture in the Arab region by 2080. As for the World
Bank, it mentioned in a study conducted in 2017 that
climate change will lead to water scarcity, which will result
in losses in the gross domestic product in the region‘s
countries ranging between six per cent and 14 per cent by
2050. The Arab world is already importing 80 per cent of its
food needs. Would that figure reach 100 if agricultural land
shrunk in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and the Maghreb?
Through the centuries, agriculture was the mainstay of
Egypt‘s national economy and Egypt used to be described
as the granary of Rome when it was under Roman rule. But,
together with our negligence towards such special crops as
cotton, rice and fruits, some of which used to yield
considerable sums of foreign currency, climate change has
taken its toll. The rise in temperature in Egypt has caused
the spread of the fall armyworm, which attacked last year,
damaging much of the maize crop in Upper Egypt. This rise
has also caused a 70 per cent drop in the olive yield.
Agriculture has often become an unprofitable profession.
Under these conditions, many farmers decided to leave
agriculture and find another profession instead. That is why
the government‘s projects that are now being executed in
order to benefit from ground water, recycling sewage and
agricultural drainage and using them for all purposes other
than drinking – as per the recommendations of international
institutions – are important. Non-governmental desert
agricultural projects, that depend on drip irrigation and
recycled water and work on extracting different organic
93
strains of vegetables and fruits, have become widespread.
Some of those farm owners are trying to go back to the
original Egyptian strains that for so long made our fruits and
vegetables the tastiest in the world. Who knows, maybe our
grandsons, on their return from school to their homes, will
be able to tell they are having strawberries for dessert.

94
Fahmi initiatives
Former foreign minister Nabil Fahmi‘s Egypt‘s Diplomacy
in War, Peace and Transition, recently published in Arabic
by Dar El-Shorouk, is particularly important and
enlightening in view of the sensitive posts Fahmi held
during equally sensitive times. He served as Egypt‘s
ambassador in Washington, our most important embassy
abroad, during a period of heightened tensions between
Egypt and the US under president George W Bush and,
through September 11, until 2008 just before Obama came
to power; he also served as foreign minister when all
Western countries aligned themselves against the will of the
Egyptian people who had risen up to overthrow the Muslim
Brotherhood. In both eras, Fahmi applied approaches he had
learned from the diplomatic school of his father, Ismail
Fahmi, who had served as Anwar Al-Sadat‘s foreign
minister. Essentially, his initiatives were grounded in
awareness of Egypt‘s pivotal importance in the region and
internationally.
In his book, which is both a history and a memoir, Fahmi
recounts how he was shown a copy of the speech that Bush
was going to deliver during his visit to Sharm El-Sheikh in
2008. He immediately called the White House to caution
that if this was what Bush planned to say when he came to
Egypt, it would be better if he did not come at all. Fahmi
then informed president Hosni Mubarak of the action he had
taken. Mubarak praised the diplomat for his quick thinking
which resulted in important changes to the address that
Bush delivered at Sharm El-Sheikh.
Five years later, following the 30 June 2013 Revolution,
Nabil Fahmi, foreign minister at the time, was informed that
the Americans planned to call for a special session of the
UN Security Council to discuss the latest development in
Egypt and that this could result in resolutions
95
disadvantageous to the country. He then contacted US
Secretary of State John Kerry to ascertain whether the
information was correct. Kerry denied that it was and said
that France was behind the move. However, the former
French foreign minister Laurent Fabius refuted Kerry‘s
claim and countered that, in fact, it was the US and Britain
that were pushing for a Security Council resolution. At that
point, Fahmi decided to take the most practical step. Rather
than wasting time on determining whether or not Kerry was
telling the truth, he contacted Moscow and Beijing, ensuring
their veto if the situation came to that point.
Such insights are a rare find in history books which is one
reason why Fahmi‘s work is so valuable.

96
Turkey, Ethiopia and Israel, and the Middle East’s
water crisis
A recent report published by the United Nations Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
highlights the growing threat posed by the water crisis and
drought confronting the future of millions of Arabs across
the Middle East. It is crisis that is the result of both climate
change and the callous and selfish policies pursued by some
governments.
For millennia, the history of the peoples of this region has
been defined by its waterways — from the Tigris and
Euphrates in the East, the Nile in the West, and the Sea of
Galilee and Jordan River flowing through its heart. Dozens
of civilisations and hundreds of millions of souls have been
nourished by these waters. Crops were grown, fish were
caught, people drank, bathed and washed clothes in them,
and they figured prominently in various religious texts. The
waterways were a constant — taken for granted, because
they were always there and, it was assumed, would always
be there. But this is no longer the case.
A combination of climate change and unilateral initiatives
by three regional governments have had a dramatic impact
on the supply of water available to their neighbours. If these
challenges are not addressed, the results will be devastating
to the livelihood and survival of hundreds of millions and
the resultant tensions have the potential to fuel even greater
conflicts than we see at present.
It should be noted that the three countries involved are the
non-Arab states of Turkey, Israel and Ethiopia, while the
affected populations are the Arab peoples of Iraq, Syria,
Jordan, Palestine, Egypt and Sudan.
With rising temperatures and reduced rainfall, several Arab
countries have already experienced severe drought — the
worst in 900 years. These climate changes have resulted in
97
increased evaporation, lower water levels and spreading
desertification. The consequences can be seen not only in
the drying up of once irrigated farmlands and the dislocation
and impoverishment of small farmers, but also in the
increased intensity of dust storms, with effects felt as far
away as the Arabian Peninsula.
There is ample evidence that drought was one of the
precipitators of the conflict in Syria. Several years of
dangerously low levels of rain coupled with government
mismanagement and lack of foresight resulted in hundreds
of thousands of Syrian farmers being forced to leave their
lands and flee to cities. The pressure that they and the influx
of over a million Iraqi refugees placed stress on resources,
preparing the ground for civil strife and extremism,
ultimately erupting into mass protests. The regime‘s brutal
response to this unrest only fuelled the population‘s anger at
their dislocation and poverty.
Syria‘s water problems were not only the result of drought
and the regime‘s behaviour. They were exacerbated by the
Turkish dams on the Euphrates River that reduced the flow
of water into the country by 40 per cent.
The bottom line is that not only have water shortages been a
precipitating factor in Syria‘s long war, but also that the
pressures created by people internally displaced by war
coupled with the persistent lack of water resulting from
Turkey‘s expanding dam projects threaten to create even
greater hardships and concerns for the survival of Syria‘s
people.
Iraq, which has also experienced rising temperatures, lower
levels of rainfall and spreading desertification, has been
even more dramatically impacted by the Turkish dams of
both the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. It is estimated that the
Euphrates‘ dams have resulted in an 80 per cent decline in
Iraq‘s water supply. Much of Iraq‘s date crop, once famous
98
world-wide, its citrus orchards, and rice fields have also
dried up. Iraq is losing an average of 100 square miles of
arable land each year.
In addition, the dangerously low level of fresh water in the
rivers, a major source of drinking water in the country, has
now been compromised as the back flow of salt water from
the Gulf is seeping into the rivers rendering them unsafe for
consumption and irrigation.
With Turkey planning to construct 22 more dams on both
rivers, the situation downstream will only worsen. It is
estimated that the new dams on the Tigris will reduce the
water flowing from that river into Iraq by more than 50 per
cent.
Facing the same water problems as its Arab compatriots in
the Levant, Egypt and Sudan are now struggling with how
to confront the threats to their well-being that will result
from Ethiopia‘s new dam project — the largest on the
African continent. Egyptians depend on the Nile for 97 per
cent of their water and it is estimated that they will lose
about 20 per cent of its waters to the Greater Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam. Sudan estimates that it will lose almost
50 per cent of its supply. With water already a scarce
commodity and with both countries confronted by climate
change-induced desertification, their rapidly growing
populations and struggling economies will soon face
monumental challenges and growing unrest.
For its part, Israel has long been diverting the waters from
the Sea of Galilee to support its agriculture and population.
In the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration not only
objected to Israel‘s unilateral actions, warning that it was
increasing tensions with Syria and Jordan, it also took the
step of suspending US aid. Israel, however, did not relent.
Some analysts see Israel‘s water diversion schemes as a
precipitating factor leading to the 1967 War.
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In 1967, Israel overran the West Bank, seizing all of
Mandatory Palestine and the Golan Heights. This enabled it
to intensify its exploitation of the waters of the sea, the
Jordan River and the waters of the West Bank‘s aquifers.
Today, Israelis drain more than 80 per cent of the West
Bank‘s aquifers and their diversion of Galilee and Jordan
River‘s waters have resulted in shrinking that historic river
to five per cent of its original volume. To add insult to
injury, Palestinians and Jordanians are now forced to buy
water from Israel at inflated prices.
All of these situations pose real threats to human life,
because of the poverty and dislocation they create and the
danger they pose to greater conflict. Each could be resolved
through negotiations. For decades, Syria and Iraq have
sought compromise with the Turks. At a minimum, Egypt
and Sudan have appealed to Ethiopia to stretch out the time
for the filling of GERD to 10 to 15 years, so that they could
make needed adjustments downstream. And water was one
of the ―final status issues‖ that Israel agreed at Oslo they
would refrain from impacting through unilateral actions.
But Turkey, Ethiopia and Israel have pursued their own
agendas and refused to act in a manner that would promote
regional cooperation and stability. The consequences of
their short-sighted actions will be felt in the near term.
For millennia the Tigris, Euphrates, Nile and Jordan Rivers
fed civilisations that flourished along their banks. Now the
selfish actions of a few states are serving instead to fuel
conflict because they are threatening the lives of others.
Anti-Muslim Bigotry and GOP
There was a flurry of news reporting last month after a
newly elected Republican member of Congress was
captured on video telling a crowd of supporters about her
nervous elevator ride with a Muslim member of Congress.

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As her audience giggled in delight, she noted that there was
no worry because her Muslim colleague didn't have a
backpack — in other words, no bomb. The story wasn‘t true
— it never happened. But what was true was that she was
playing to an audience that was primed to believe her.
The news coverage lasted a few days and then drifted off
into the ether. The congresswoman in question is part of a
new breed of Republican members cut from the same cloth
as Donald Trump. They are confrontational, creating
outrage to generate attention and money, and bigots who,
because they pay no price for their bigotry, continue on their
merry way.
A toxic disease of bigotry has taken hold in the GOP polity.
It didn't start with this congresswoman or with the former
president. The anti-Muslim remarks and policies they serve
up are merely the fruit of a poisonous tree that was planted
and carefully cultivated by some in the GOP for decades.
This wasn't always the case. During the administrations of
Ronald Reagan and George HW Bush, the White House was
respectful in its outreach to the still-new American Muslim
community. It wasn't the terror attacks of September 11,
2001 that brought on the change; it was the way anti-
Muslim ideologues used 9/11 to foment fear and hatred that
made the difference. Specifically, it was the ascendancy of
neoconservatives and the Christian right in the Republican
party that was largely responsible for the change.
Recall how after 9/11 while President George W. Bush was
warning Americans not to target Arabs and Muslims, both
his attorney general and neocon ideologues were doing just
that. Even some of the networks, not just Fox News, were
complicit. When Americans were asking the question "Why
did they attack us?" the networks too often gave a platform
to well established anti-Arab, anti-Muslim bigots to provide
the answers — some were even paid commentators.
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At first the impact was limited. Throughout the 1990s, and
as late as mid-2003, polling showed that American attitudes
toward Arabs and Muslims were still favorable — among
both Democrats and Republicans. There was a steady
erosion during the next few years.
It was the ascent of Barack Obama that decisively turned the
tide. Racism and anti-Muslim bigoty came together in an
all-out campaign to "other" Obama. "He wasn't born here."
"He's not like us." "He's a secret Muslim who hates
America." All were propagated by a well-funded, well-
organized campaign. Many will remember how Senator
John McCain, who ran for president against Obama, was
forced to confront a supporter who challenged him at a 2008
rally by saying that she couldn't support Obama because
"He's an Arab." Attacking America‘s first Black president
with conventional racism was less desirable then, so it was
more acceptable to focus on his fabricated Muslim identity
or Arab heritage.
It continued. In 2009, Republican Congresswoman Sue
Myrick wrote the introduction to the "Muslim Mafia," a
bigoted assault on American Muslim staffers on the Hill.
Then, in 2010, former GOP Speaker of the House Newt
Gingrich preyed on the growing anti-Muslim sentiment,
charging that plans to build an Islamic Community Center
blocks away from the site of the World Trade Center was a
thinly disguised Muslim effort to build a "Victory Mosque"
celebrating "their conquest of America." The National
Republican Congressional Committee ran TV ads opposing
this so-called "Victory Mosque in NYC" in 17
congressional races.
By 2012 the hysteria within the GOP had grown to such an
extent that during a Republican presidential primary debate
almost every candidate on stage pledged either never to
appoint a Muslim or to make Muslims take a special loyalty
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oath before appointing them. Only the eventual nominee,
Mitt Romney, disagreed.
The campaign continued. In 2012 Representative Michele
Bachmann drew headlines charging that then-Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton's aide Huma Abedin was a Muslim
Brotherhood supporter. And then with the ascent of Donald
Trump, the campaign reached its peak with his pledge to
ban immigration of Muslims, warning that "there's
something going on with them."
So, when, a month ago, the Republican congresswoman was
telling her fictional elevator story, she knew she was playing
to an audience who had been primed to understand it.
Recent polling shows a deep partisan divide on attitudes
toward Arabs and Muslims. Republicans have
overwhelmingly unfavorable views of both, while
Democrats, possibly in reaction to the policies of Trump,
have far more favorable views.
Considering this background, it's important to recognize that
the problem is deeper than one congresswoman or one
president. It has become organic to the GOP. They created
this bigotry and weaponized it for electoral advantage. It's
their cancer, and they must root it out.
It's also important to note the extent to which Democrats
have been timid in response. They haven't attacked it and
stigmatized it with the same vigor they use to combat
bigotry against Blacks, Jews, Latinos, Asians, or the gay
community. And Democratic leaders, including former
President Obama, have played into this "othering" of
Muslims by securitizing their relationship with that
community — too often viewing them through the lens of
national security, instead of dealing with Muslims as simply
citizens, neighbors, and friends.
Finally, Democrats must acknowledge their responsibility
for this ―othering‖ and end their fear of engaging with Arabs
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or Muslims who raise legitimate criticism of Israel. When
Democratic leaders demonize these voices as anti-Semitic or
accept the GOP's effort to challenge their fitness to serve in
government to avoid the fallout of engagement, Democrats
allow the bigotry to continue.
This is a battle that can be won. But it will only be won if it
is confronted head on in both parties.

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The Importance of the Arbery Verdict
Like many Americans, I was overjoyed by news that a
Georgia jury had found three white men guilty of the
murder of Ahmaud Arbery, a young Black man.
The jury rejected the defense‘s argument that the three men
were "protecting and defending" their neighborhood and
therefore were justified in using their trucks to chase and
trap Arbery and then use a shotgun to shoot him three times
at close range. This verdict was especially welcome, coming
just a few days after a Wisconsin jury found Kyle
Rittenhouse, a white teenager, innocent in the shooting
deaths of two other young white men.
Though there were obvious differences between these two
cases, at stake in both were issues and values fundamental
to the future of America: our obscene, pathological
obsession with guns; the right-wing's growing celebration of
vigilantism; and racism.
First, a bit of background on the Rittenhouse story: It began
in August of 2020 following the murder of Jacob Blake, a
young Black man who was shot in the back by police in
Kenosha, Wisconsin. Coming on the heels of a series of
such incidents nationwide, Kenosha erupted in protests that
came to include some rioting and looting.
Heeding the calls of some white nationalist groups, 17-year-
old Kyle Rittenhouse secured an AR-15 semiautomatic
weapon, left his home in Illinois to join the effort to "defend
property and help bring law and order" to Kenosha. It was
there, on August 25th that Rittenhouse killed two men and
wounded another. His lawyers argued that Rittenhouse felt
threatened and killed the men in self-defense. And the jury,
after deliberating for four days, agreed and found him
innocent.
The jury verdict in the Rittenhouse case was troubling as it
left several critical questions unanswered. How is it
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acceptable for a 17-year-old to secure a weapon of war?
What is the justification for his crossing state lines with the
intent to use this weapon? And if Rittenhouse had been a
young Black man, wouldn't he have been shot dead by
police merely being seen on the streets holding a
semiautomatic weapon?
During the past several years, there has not only been an
epidemic of police killings of unarmed Black men, but also
a number of dangerous incidents where armed white men
have menaced both unarmed Black men and even elected
officials with whom they disagree on matters of policy.
There were, for example: the group of white militia who
threateningly took to the steps of Michigan's state capitol in
April of 2020 to demonstrate their opposition to their
governor's Covid-19 lockdown order; the couple in St.
Louis, Missouri, who menacingly brandished weapons as
Black Lives Matter demonstrators peacefully marched
through their neighborhood; the armed militia units who
posted themselves along the southern border to shoot those
whom they suspected were illegal migrants; George
Zimmerman who, back in 2012, murdered Trayvon Martin
because Zimmerman found it threatening that a young Black
male was walking in his all-white neighborhood; and
finally, on January 6th, the armed militia groups who
stormed the US Capitol Building in a violent insurrection
with the aim of threatening Congress, in order to overturn
the results of the 2020 election.
In each instance, the perpetrators were lionized by the right
as heroes because they have been white and their intent was
deemed patriotic. Millions of dollars were raised for their
defense; the St Louis couple were invited to speak at the
Republican National Convention; the January 6th
insurrectionists and the "border vigilantes" have been called
"patriots" by former President Trump and a host of
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Republicans leaders; and Kyle Rittenhouse has become a
cause célèbre, hosted by Trump at Mar-a-Lago, appearing
on Fox TV, and offered congressional internships by a
number of Republican congressional offices.
The danger all of this poses is real. In legitimizing vigilante
behavior, the right is returning us to the days of the Wild
West or post-Reconstruction, when mobs lynched thousands
of Blacks or foreigners deemed a threat.
It's also important to consider the issue of guns and the
right's insistence that the Constitution's "right to bear arms"
is absolute and without limits. While the Second
Amendment does proclaim that right, it does so with the
qualification as part of a ―well regulated Militia."
It is a bizarre stretch to interpret "well regulated Militia" to
include the mobs that stormed the Capitol, threatened the
safety of Michigan's governor, or a 17-year-old's self-
proclaimed mission to "protect property." And despite the
successful pressure exerted by the National Rifle
Association, Washington's most powerful lobby, the
Constitution does not provide citizens the unfettered right to
own, brandish, and use weapons of war.
Finally, there's the critical issue of race. It is a fact that
white vigilantes are often tolerated and celebrated by the
right — even when they threaten "law and order" and our
democracy. One doesn't have to imagine what the reaction
might be should Black vigilantes arm themselves with the
expressed purpose of defending their communities or
threatening a governor or Congress. All we need do is recall
the way the Black Panthers were violently suppressed in the
late 1960s and early 1970s.
The fact that our hyperpartisan, polarized political
environment is becoming weaponized by white vigilantes
who are being validated by political leaders poses an
existential threat to our democracy. It is a danger we cannot
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ignore. That is why the guilty verdict in the murder of
Ahmaud Arbery is so important. While the jury decision in
the Rittenhouse case threatened to open the door to the
chaos of the "law of the jungle," in rejecting the defendants'
argument that Arbery‘s killers were acting in self-defense
and protection of property, the Georgia jury slams that door
shut.

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Repeating the Same Mistakes: Part I
I remember Albert Einstein's definition of insanity: "Doing
the same thing over and over again and expecting different
results." I've been thinking about this quote in relation to the
recent bizarre behavior of all the parties involved in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel, the US government, and
the major Palestinian actors, Hamas and the Palestinian
Authority. Each of them appears determined to keep
repeating the same mistakes, over and over, without ever
learning the lessons from their past disasters.
Let me start with Israel and Hamas. I'll never understand
what Israel feels it gains by massively bombing Gaza,
destroying buildings, hospitals, and the desalination and
power plants. This has been going on for decades, first in
response to Hamas-directed suicide terror bombings in
Israel and now following rocket attacks originating from
Gaza.
While Israel terms their bombings "self-defense," respected
international jurists and human rights organizations have
correctly called them war crimes, both because of the
overwhelmingly disproportionate death and destruction they
have caused and because these attacks have deliberately
targeted the civilian infrastructure. The "self-defense"
argument is further called into question given Israel's Iron
Dome network which has shown itself capable of
neutralizing Hamas' attacks.
Since Israel has been using such violence for decades, even
before the use of rockets, the more likely reason Israel acts
as it does is its belief that by demonstrating uncontested
power, it will force Palestinians into submission. Sometimes
they have cruelly referred to their assaults as "mowing the
grass" – by which they mean causing enough damage to buy
a few years of peace. The problem, of course, is that it never

109
works quite that way. Instead, their actions only create more
suffering and hatred, seeding the ground for more violence.
In 2005 Israel left Gaza ignoring the appeal from US
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that they do so in an
orderly fashion, turning the area over to the Palestinian
Authority. Instead, they chose to depart unilaterally, leaving
the territory ripe for a Hamas takeover. After Hamas seized
control, Israel imposed a suffocating economic closure,
believing that this would force Palestinians into submission.
Since then, Hamas has only gained strength in the territory.
During the past decade, Israel has behaved in a
contradictory manner toward Hamas. At times it mercilessly
punishes the Palestinian civilian population for Hamas'
actions, while at other times allowing funds, from external
parties to go to Hamas and even engaging in indirect
negotiations with the group over prisoner exchanges –
something they have refused to do with the Palestinian
Authority.
It appears that Israel is pleased to have fostered a deep
division in the Palestinian polity – weakening and
discrediting the PA, while strengthening Hamas, which it
sees as a convenient whipping-boy.
For its part, Hamas appears more than happy to play the part
of spoiler. In the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, they
suborned young Palestinians to commit suicide attacks that
killed scores of Israelis in a successful campaign to sabotage
the failing peace process. Each time, the result was the same
– a massive Israeli response that killed many more innocent
Palestinians. It was only after the blockade and closure of
Gaza, that Hamas turned to firing primitive rockets – with
the same tragically fatal results. In all of this, the victims are
the people of Gaza. Too many are homeless, jobless,
suffering from PTSD, and left without hope.

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After the last round of violence, it has been both unnerving
and infuriating to see Hamas' leaders visiting Arab capitals
on a "victory tour." A writer recently chided me for calling
into question Hamas' actions saying, "How dare you
criticize the group that brought Israel to its knees." My
response was "On what planet do you live? What victory?
Hundreds of Palestinians are dead, and Gaza is in ruins,
again. And Israel is proceeding apace with demolitions in
Silwan, seizures of homes in Sheikh Jarrah, and settlement
expansion in the West Bank!"
It is as though for Hamas' supporters, like Israel, lessons are
never learned. Just as overwhelming bombardments and
massive oppression will not end the resistance to the
injustices of the occupation, neither will rockets or suicide
bombings end the occupation.
From all available evidence, neither Israel nor Hamas
appear to have learned anything. Israel has stepped up its
efforts to seize homes in Jerusalem and expand settlements
and intensify repression in the West Bank, while continuing
to strangle Palestinians in Gaza. For its part, Hamas, riding
high on its hollow boasts of victory, demonstrates no
understanding of the devastation wrought by its insistence
on provoking confrontations it cannot win.
Let me be clear, while both Israel and Hamas stand guilty
of stupidly repeating their mistaken approaches, Israel bears
the greater responsibility. It is the oppressive occupying
power that has created the nightmare of Palestinian
existence. It could change this reality, but it is unwilling to
do so. That said, Hamas bears responsibility for not altering
its course. This is not blaming the victim; it is asking Hamas
to be smarter, and not continuing to play into Israel's
hands.
In my next column, I will look at how both the US and the
Palestinian Authority are also guilty of repeatedly making
111
wrongheaded moves that have only served to make a bad
situation even worse. I will also point to hopeful
developments that suggest a way forward out of this morass.

112
Anti-Arab Bias and Ignorance of European History
The double standards in political commentary regarding the
war in Ukraine have been widely discussed — from the
welcoming of Ukrainian refugees (while Arab refugees face
closed doors), to the support of Ukrainians‘ right to self-
determination and resistance to invasion (while these are
denied to Palestinians), to the US and Europeans decrying
the illegality of invading a sovereign nation (while ignoring
our own histories).
One additional form of bigotry in some comparisons of
Ukraine and the Arab World is particularly galling and
requires a response.
An example: A prominent New York Times columnist,
comparing the world‘s response to Russia‘s preparation to
invade Ukraine with its response to Saddam‘s invasion of
Kuwait, wrote:
―Kuwait is a small authoritarian emirate, representing few
grand political ideals, in a war-torn region. Ukraine is a
democracy of more than 40 million people, on what was a
largely peaceful continent home to major democracies.‖
So much is objectionable in these two sentences; most
egregious is the writer‘s underlying thinking, i.e.,
Ukrainians are more deserving of defense than Kuwaitis.
Looking more closely reveals the bias (and ignorance of
history) that led to this observation.
We can dismiss the comparative size of the two countries. I
feel certain the writer wouldn‘t claim that Egypt, because of
its size, is more worthy of defense than Israel.
As for their forms of government, the writer clearly doesn‘t
understand that Kuwait, while a traditional society, has a
vibrant political culture, with highly competitive
parliamentary elections. The parliament has a long history
of challenging government ministers, frequently clashing on
matters of policy and accountability. While Ukraine does
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have a democratically elected executive, its governance has
not been without turbulence, unsavory characters, and
charges of corruption. The form of government can‘t
determine a nation‘s worthiness to exist or a people‘s right
to self-determination.
The Times‘ columnist appears to view Ukraine as more
deserving of support than Kuwait because Ukraine comes
from ―largely peaceful Europe‖ while Kuwait is located in
the ―war-torn‖ Arab World — in other words, invasions and
violence are expected from Arabs, but not Europeans. These
few words demonstrate a willful ignorance of history and a
healthy dose of bigotry.
―Largely peaceful?‖ In the last century, Europeans fought
two bloody World Wars in which more than 60,000,000
people were killed. First, millions of young men were
sacrificed as pawns in a competition between European
powers. Then, the birth of fascism in Germany, Italy, and
Spain gave way to an even more deadly war including an
effort to exterminate the Jewish people, mass murders of
Poles, Russians, Gypsies, and others, and cruel and
indiscriminate mass bombings of cities (by both sides). At
war‘s end, Europe was divided with the establishment and
expansion of the Soviet Union which repressed and
murdered millions as it consolidated control and brutally
suppressed rebellion. The end of communist rule brought
more violence in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Georgia, and
Ukraine, and the rise of far-right movements across Europe.
Beyond these murderous conflicts, European powers were
fighting to expand colonial holdings or, by mid-century,
repressing colonies that had independence movements.
Millions of Arabs, Africans, and Asians died seeking to
throw off European colonizers who had conquered their
lands, exploited their treasures, and denied them their
rights.
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But the legacy of ―largely peaceful‖ Europe didn‘t end
there. European colonial powers then drew artificial lines
dividing peoples and creating new states to serve their own
interests. They pitted religious, tribal, or ethnic groups
against one another, or gave lucrative concessions to
compliant partners, who prospered at the expense of their
compatriots. In these regions European powers left a legacy
of division and seeds of future conflict.

Europe hasn‘t been ―largely peaceful,‖ and deserves

significant blame for the Arab World being ―war torn.‖
My intention isn‘t to dump on Europe nor totally absolve
Arabs from responsibility for their current situation, nor
pick on one NYT writer. Rather, my point is that the
invasion of Ukraine isn‘t a solitary blot on an otherwise
pure European landscape. Russia should be condemned for
its invasion and Ukrainians deserve their freedom — not
because they are Europeans from a ―largely peaceful‖
continent, but because invasion and occupation by bullies
are wrong wherever they occur and whoever they are.

115
Second Nakba in the making
Two years ago, Friday, President Donald Trump formally
recognised Jerusalem as Israel‘s capital. We knew then that
this was an irresponsible and cruelly insensitive act that
would do grave harm to the rights and well-being of
Palestinians and put an end to any pretence that the United
States could help negotiate an end to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. What we didn‘t know was that this dangerous
move was only the beginning of the damage Trump would
do to Palestinian rights and the prospects for peace.
During the past two years, the Trump administration has
closed the US consulate in East Jerusalem; closed the
Palestinian consular office in Washington, DC; suspended
aid to the Palestinians and to American non-governmental
organisations working in the West Bank and Gaza; denied
funding to UNWRA, the United Nations agency that
provides essential services to Palestinian refugees; removed
the designation ―occupied‖ from all official publications and
statements referring to the Occupied Territories; declared
that in its view Israeli settlements in the West Bank are not
―illegal‖; and even gone so far as to deny that Palestinians
should qualify as refugees.
While each of these acts presents problems on their own,
added together the toll they may take on the Palestinian
people can ultimately be as devastating as a second Nakba
(Catastrophe).
In the short span of only two years, President Trump and his
administration have attempted to undo all of the gains
Palestinians had won during the past seven decades.
Because the US has shuttered the PLO office and denied
that Palestinian refugees are, in fact, refugees and therefore
part of the Palestinian community, the US is saying that it
no longer sees Palestinians as a national community
deserving of recognition and the right to self-determination.
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Because the US has repeatedly given carte blanche to every
Israeli whim, regarding Jerusalem, refugees and settlements,
they have left Palestinians particularly vulnerable to more
extreme Israeli measures: annexation, massive land seizures
and even expulsion. And because the administration has
flaunted its contempt for the rule of law and international
norms of behaviour, it has created a far more dangerous and
precarious world in which any regional power backed by the
US can act with impunity and suffer little or no
repercussions for their behaviour.
I sometimes wonder if this is what the ―Deal of the
Century‖ is supposed to look like. Maybe, all along, it was
intended to be nothing more than what they have been doing
for the last two years; creating a nihilistic order in which the
Israelis are free to act out their most extreme fantasies while
vulnerable Palestinians are forced to inhabit a dystopian
world in which they have no rights and no recourse open to
them. It is for this reason I suggest that the cumulative
impact of what Trump has done created the conditions for a
second Nakba.
There are, of course, avenues open before us that provide
ways to avoid such a disaster. While the US has created this
mess on its own, each and every one of its moves have been
rejected by Arab states and the overwhelming majority of
nations of the world. For example, only a smattering of
minor US dependencies have considered joining the US in
moving their embassies to Jerusalem; last month, by a vote
of 170 to 2, the United Nations reaffirmed its support for
UNWRA; and then there were the denunciations issue by
Arab states and the Europeans on the new US position on
Israeli settlements.
The problem is that while the Trump administration has
become increasingly politically isolated by its reckless
behaviour, they have not been effectively challenged. To
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change the current downward spiral that is unfolding in the
Israel-Palestinian arena requires a bold confrontation of
both the US and Israel. Statements or resolutions will not
suffice since they are routinely dismissed and ignored. What
is required is that other nations say ―enough is enough‖ and
tell the US that its days of hegemonic control over the
―peace process‖ have come to an end. Israel, too, must be
confronted and made to pay a price for its lawless behaviour
and gross systematic violations of Palestinian human rights.
Of course, a unified Palestinian response utilising a
campaign of non-violent resistance would also be important,
but I hesitate to place emphasis on this factor for two
reasons. First, the burden of doing the heavy lifting
shouldn‘t rest on the most vulnerable party to the conflict.
And even if the Palestinians were to rise up, as they have
before, unless the nations of the world are ready to
challenge both the US and Israel, their resistance would
come to a bloody end.
We are running out of time. If action isn‘t taken soon, we
may well see a second, and potentially more devastating
Nakba. If it occurs, the responsibility for this tragedy will
fall not only on the Israelis who carry it out and the US that
aided and abetted them; it will also fall on the nations of the
world who failed to act in time to stop this tragedy from
occurring.

118
The political toll of COVID-19
The COVID-19 crisis is taking a human and economic toll
everywhere across the U.S. An additional casualty may be
what it does to our political parties and our electoral
processes, which were already struggling in a weakened
state and may not survive the onslaught of this crisis.
Take, for example, the news that the Democratic Party
decided to move their national convention from mid-July to
mid-August because of concerns with COVID-19. Since the
danger of contagion will not have passed by then and it still
won‘t be safe to bring tens of thousands together to conduct
party business, the extra month simply buys more time for
the party to figure out how to create a viable and acceptable
process in which it can elect a nominee, issue a platform,
adopt rules that will guide the party forward during the next
four years, and take steps to ensure party unity.
Given the state of our politics, this will not be an easy task.
Nor, it appears, are these even the major concerns of the
party operatives involved in the decision to move the
convention. Reading through the news articles reporting on
this story, it becomes clear that the focus of party operatives
is how best to stage the event to guarantee maximum TV
coverage. This is what has become of our politics.
It wasn‘t always this way. There was a time when political
parties were actual membership organizations that mattered
and national conventions were serious and sometimes
contentious affairs where real decisions were made. I can
recall watching the national conventions with my parents,
sometimes all day, from gavel to gavel. They were
unpredictable, exciting, important, and memorable.
When I was a youngster, my mother was an elected precinct
captain for the Democratic Party. I remember going door to
door with her to meet the neighbors, discuss their concerns,
and ask for their votes. You knew who the party leaders
119
were. They worked for you and, in turn, you worked for
them. Being a member mattered.
Now there are still are some state and local parties where
members are consulted, where leaders are elected, and the
party and its organization still matter. This, however, is not
the way, in particular, the national parties operate.
The parties have largely become fundraising vehicles that
raise hundreds of millions of dollars that are then spent on
consultants hired to craft messaging used to design massive
advertising campaigns. The consultants also assist in
developing the tools to be used in ―virtual organizing‖
efforts to raise more money and help get out the vote on
election day.
In this new world, being a member of either the Democratic
or Republican party means you are a name, a number, and
an address on a list. What your membership earns you are
all-too-frequent emails, phone calls, or direct mail
solicitations for money.
In this impersonal world, members are treated more like a
commodity. Increasingly, voters have become alienated
from the political parties. As a result, over 40% of all voters
no longer identify with either party.
Compounding this problem is the fact that competing with
both parties for loyalty and attention are a growing number
of groups that focus on interests or identity. There are, for
example, pro- and anti-gun groups, organizations
representing women, racial and ethnic groups, unions,
businesses, etc. They may support candidates from one or
another of the parties, but they remain independent, raise
money, and organize on their own.
Also competing with the parties are the growing number of
political action committees that raise — oftentimes from
anonymous sources — and spend more money than the
parties while pursuing some of the same goals. These PACs
120
will raise hundreds of millions to support specific
candidates or to advocate for issues embraced by either
party.
All of this has further weakened the political parties, since it
is no longer the parties that drive the national agenda.
Instead, parties must seek the support of the interest groups
or PACs in order to support their candidates or advance
their agendas.
As a result, the national conventions, which were once the
place where real politics happened, have become highly
controlled stage-managed affairs, shorn of all drama. The
more managed they have become, the less coverage they
receive. They are no longer ―must-watch‖ events during
which substantial debates will occur over civil rights and
voting rights, workers‘ rights, or nuclear weapons. Even
before the delegates meet at convention, the nominee is
known, the platform is decided, and the speeches have been
written and vetted by consultants. Instead of conventions,
we are left with overly long campaign commercials. This is
how our campaigns have largely been run in recent decades.
The elected delegates and party leaders who, in an earlier
era, were the heart and soul of the conventions — after all, it
was them who were being convened to make the decisions
for the party — have now been reduced to props in an
audience who is there to clap, cheer, and carry signs on cue.
Now, with COVID-19 hanging over us, even the props may
be gone.
This year, Republicans should have no problem adapting to
this new reality. Donald Trump put a final end to the
Republican Party at the 2016 convention. He defeated the
party establishment, which then bowed to his leadership and
transformed themselves into a party of one. There‘s no
longer a competing wing in the GOP. There‘s nothing left to
be decided. As the consummate showman, Trump will run
121
his own show and entertain his followers, with or without a
live audience.
Democrats, on the other hand, face a real dilemma. There
remains a viable competing wing of the party that contests
the establishment and demands to be heard and respected.
With 20 states still not having voted, calls for Bernie
Sanders, the leader of the progressive wing of the party, to
drop out of the race and allow the establishment‘s candidate,
Joe Biden, to begin to plan the convention are both
premature and dangerous.
Democrats will need to be unified and all signs indicate that
Sanders‘ supporters will not accept being silenced or stage-
managed out of existence. If, given the cloud of COVID-19,
voting in the remaining states is not viewed as fair and
transparent, if the platform is written without input from the
Sanders‘ wing of the party, and if the convention is seen by
them as a managed coronation, it will spell trouble for
Democrats in November.
It‘s too much to expect that between now and August the
parties can reform themselves and become fully
participatory organizations. And in all likelihood, we won‘t
have an in-person convention where we can involve all of
the party‘s competing voices in a fair and open process that
leads to party unity. But between now and then, if
Democrats want to win, they should be planning how, in the
wake of COVID-19, to address the challenges they face in
order to ensure that even in a ―virtual convention‖ there is
full participation that respects all wings of the party and
builds unity.

122
123
PART III

124
125
 ‫قطع قصيرة ‪:‬‬
‫بينما كاف اﻷب يقوـ بتمميع سيارتو الجديدة ‪ ،‬اذ باالبف ذو اﻷربع سنواف يمتقط‬
‫حج ار ويقوـ بعمؿ خدوش عمى جانب السيارة وفي قمة غضو إذ باﻷب يأخذ يد‬
‫ابنو ويضربو عمييا عدة مرات بدوف أف يشعر أنو كاف يستخدـ مفتاح انجميزي‬
‫( مفؾ ) يستخدمو عادة السباكيف في فؾ وربط المسامير ‪ .‬في المستشفى كاف‬
‫اال يسأؿ اﻷب متى سوؼ تنموا أصابعي ؟ وكاف اﻷب في غاية اﻷلـ ‪ ،‬عاد‬
‫اﻷب إلى السيارة وبدأ يركميا عدة مرات وعند جموسو عمى اﻷرض نظر إلى‬
‫ا لخدوش التي أحدثيا االبف فوجده قد كتب عمييا أنا أحبؾ يا أبي‪ .‬الحب‬
‫والغضب ليس ليما حدود ‪.‬‬

‫السعادة ىي شيء نحتاجو في حياتنا ‪ ،‬واف تريدوا السعادة ينبغى عميؾ أف‬
‫تسعد نفسؾ أوال وحتى إف ظف اآلخروف أنؾ تعمؿ شيء خاطئ ‪.‬‬

‫ىناؾ العديد مف المشاكؿ مثؿ الفقر والبطالة ‪ ،‬الكثير مف المجتمع لدييـ‬

‫المستشفيات غير الجيدة والمرضى ال يجدوف مكاف ليـ والمخدرات ىي مشكمة‬
‫أخرى تواجو المجتمعات والحكومات ‪ ،‬والحكومات يبذلوف قصارى جيدىـ لحؿ‬
‫ىذه المشاكؿ ‪.‬‬

‫دور المجتمع ميـ جدا‪ ،‬فالمجتمع ىو الوحيد الذي يجعؿ مثؿ اﻷيتاـ ال‬
‫يشعروف بالدنيوية وأنيـ جزٌء منا وعمى المجتمع أف يجعؿ اﻷيتاـ يشعروف‬
‫باالىتماـ بدال مف ذلؾ ‪ ،‬وعمينا أف نساعدىـ ونرحب بيـ ﻷنيـ جزء مف ىذا‬
‫المجتمع ‪.‬‬

‫‪126‬‬
‫العمؿ الجماعي يؤدي إلى انجاز العمؿ في وقت قميؿ ‪ ،‬حيث يسمح الفريؽ‬
‫بانجاز الميمات أثناء القياـ بذلؾ والنتيجة كؿ جزء سيكتمؿ بأفضؿ طريقة‬
‫ممكنة ‪.‬‬

‫تعمـ لغات ىي ىواية لكثير مف اﻷشخاص وعندما تتعمـ الكثير مف المغات‪،‬‬

‫تعمـ المغات اﻷجنبية ممتع ‪ ،‬حيث تستمتع بمغة جميمة وكثير مف اﻷشخاص‬
‫يسافروف لتعمـ المغة ‪.‬‬

‫دور المرأة في المجتمع ‪ ،‬تمعب دو ار ميما حيث أنيا معممة وطبيبة ومحامية‬
‫واﻷىـ ىي أـ‪ ،‬فيناؾ الكثير مف الطبيبات الناجحات وىناؾ الكثير مف‬
‫الشركات يعتمدوف عمى المرأة ‪.‬‬

‫كمما تـ تأجيؿ العديد مف الميـ فانيا تتراكـ وتتصاعد وتصبح مطالب كثيرة بال‬
‫انتياء مما يشعرؾ بعدـ فعؿ شيء وينصح العديد مف المختصيف ‪ ،‬عندنا‬
‫تستيقظ مف نومؾ افعؿ ما ىو مطموب عميؾ وانتيي منو فسوؼ تشعر أنؾ‬
‫أزلت حمال ثقيال مف عمى عاتقؾ حتى تنتيى مف كؿ المطموب ‪ ،‬حينما يالحظ‬
‫ابنؾ أنؾ ال تتكاسؿ فسوؼ يقوـ بانجاز ما ىو مطموب منو وسوؼ تالحظ‬
‫تطور ممحوظ في حياتؾ ‪.‬‬

‫المدرسة والمنزؿ ‪ :‬ليس عند الناس فكره عف مدى التأثير الكبير الذي يتركو‬
‫المنزؿ والمدرسة عمى اﻷطفاؿ ‪ ،‬ففي المنزؿ يتمقى الطفؿ دروسو اﻷولى في‬
‫سموكو مع اآلخريف وتساعدىـ المدرسة أيضا في أف يتعمموا احتراـ الكبار ‪.‬‬
‫لممدرسة تأثير كبير عمى الطفؿ فيي تمده مع المنزؿ بالخبرة التعميمية اﻷساسية‬

‫‪127‬‬
‫‪ ،‬والمعمـ شيء ميـ لمطفؿ فيو المالحظ والموجو لو ‪ ،‬يستطيع المعمـ أف‬
‫يالحظ المشاكؿ الشخصية او االجتماعية التي تؤثر عمى الطفؿ وربنا يقدـ لو‬
‫المساعدة في حميا ويمكف لممعمـ كذلؾ القياـ بالكثير ليتمكف الطفؿ مف أف‬
‫يدرؾ مواىبو وامكاناتو اﻷساسية ويعممو كيؼ يطور وينمي ىذه المواىب‬
‫واالمكانات ‪.‬‬

‫قناة السويس ‪ :‬لقناة السويس أىمية دولية عظيمة فيي تقصر المسافة بيف‬
‫الشرؽ والغرب وتؤثر بذلؾ عمى التجارة العالمية وليس في العالـ قناة ليا‬
‫أىميتيا سوى قناة باناما ‪ ،‬والمدينتاف التي تربط بينيما قناة السويس ىما‬
‫بورسعيد والسويس وقد أصبحت ىاتاف المدينتاف بعد حفر القناة مف أىـ المدف‬
‫المصرية‬

‫يعد الجاحظ مف أكثر الشخصيات اﻷدبية الميمة في القرف التاسع الميالدي ‪،‬‬
‫نحف ال نعرؼ الكثير عف حياتو عندنا كاف صبيا ‪ ،‬لكننا بالتأكيد نعرؼ أنو ولد‬
‫في البصرى وأنو كاف محبا جدا لممعرفة ونعرؼ أيضا أنو درس عدة كتب‬
‫عربية وأجنبية مترجمة ‪.‬‬

‫يحوؿ االسالـ كؿ ال ناس إلى االيماف بإلو واحد الذي مف صفاتو العدؿ والحب‬
‫والرحمة ‪ ،‬ال يتعارض اإلسالـ أبدا مع تعاليـ جميع اﻷنبياء منذ آدـ ونوح‬
‫وابراىيـ وموسى والمسيح ‪ ،‬يدعو اإلسالـ لخمس صموات في اليوـ عند الفجر‬
‫والظير والغروب وبعد الغسؽ ‪ ،‬يدعو اإلسالـ المسمميف إلى إعطاء الصدقات‬
‫لمفقراء والى عمؿ الخير وتجنب الشر والى معاقبة المعتديف والى اإليماف بيوـ‬
‫القيامة ‪ ،‬يمنع اإلسالـ الزنى والقمار وشرب الخمر والربى والرؽ والظمـ وجميع‬

‫‪128‬‬
 ‫الفواحش ‪.‬‬
‫كاف ىناؾ ولد عصبي وكاف يفقد صوابو بشكؿ مستمر فأحضر لو والده كيسا‬
‫ممموء بالمسامير وقاؿ لو يابني أريدؾ أف تدؽ مسما ار في سياج حديقتنا‬
‫الخشبي كمما اجتاحتؾ موجة غضب وفقدت أعصابؾ ‪ ،‬وىكذا بدأ الولد في‬
‫تنفيذ نصيحة والده فدؽ في اليوـ االوؿ ‪ ٖٚ‬مسما ار ولكف ادخاؿ المسمار في‬
‫السياج لـ يكف سيال ‪ ،‬فبدأ يحاوؿ تمالؾ نفسو عند الغضب وبعد مرور اياـ‬
‫كاف يدؽ مسامير اقؿ وفي اسابيع تمكف مف ضبط نفسو وتوقؼ عف الغضب‬
‫ودؽ المسامير ‪ ،‬فجاء الولد لوالده وأخبره بانجازه ‪ ،‬فرح اﻷب بيذا التحوؿ وقاؿ‬
‫لو عميؾ اآلف يا بني استخراج مسمار لكؿ يوـ يمر عميؾ لـ تغضب فيو ‪ ،‬وبدأ‬
‫الولد مف جديد يخمع المسامير في اليوـ الذي ال يغضب فيو حتى انتيى مف‬
‫المسامير في السياج الخشبي لمحديقة ‪ ،‬وجاء الى والده وأخبره بانجازه مرة‬
‫أخرى ‪ ،‬فأخذه والده إلى السياج وقاؿ لو يا بني أحسنت صنعا ولكف انظر اآلف‬
‫إلى تمؾ الثقوب في السياج ‪ ،‬ىذا السياج لف يكوف كما كاف أبدا وأضاؼ عندما‬
‫تقوؿ أشياء في حالة الغضب فانيا تترؾ آثا ار مثؿ ىذه الثقوب في نفوس‬
‫اآلخريف ‪ ،‬تستطيع أف تطعف إنساف وتخرج السكيف ولكف ال ييـ كـ مرة تقوؿ‬
‫أنا آسؼ ﻷف الجرح سيظؿ ىناؾ‪.‬‬
‫الطعاـ لمجميع ىو المشكمة الرئيسة في عالـ اليوـ فعالـ جائع ال ينتظر منو أبدا‬
‫أف يكوف عالما مسالما ‪ ،‬وفي جميع أنحاء العالـ غالبا ما يكوف السبب الرئيسي‬
‫في االضطرابات ىو عدـ الرضى عف ذلؾ الجزء مف مستوى المعيشة الخاص‬
‫بتوفير الطعاـ ووجود الماؿ ‪.‬‬

‫تحتؿ مشكمة زيادة السكاف عقوؿ الرياضييف وتزعجيـ ‪ ،‬ىـ يعتقدوف أف العالـ‬
‫سوؼ يواجو مجاعة في العقود القميمة القادمة ‪ ،‬إذا استمر الناس في زيادة‬

‫‪129‬‬
‫تعتادىـ بنفس الطريقة التي يتزايدوف بيا حاليا ‪ ،‬وفوؽ ذلؾ قد خفض التقدـ في‬
‫ميداف الطب نسبة الوفيات ‪.‬‬

‫تشييع حوادث الطرؽ في المدف الكبيرة ‪ ،‬فبعض السائقيف ال يقيموف اعتبا ار ﻷي‬
‫شيء ‪ ،‬فيـ يقودوف سياراتيـ بسرعة فائقة بدوف االىتماـ بالمشاه ‪ ،‬وال يتبعوف‬
‫أبدا قواعد المرور وقوانينو وال يعني ىذا أف المشاة معفوف مف الموـ ‪ ،‬فبعضيـ‬
‫ميمموف وال ينظروف يمينا وال يسا ار قبؿ عبور الطريؽ ‪.‬‬

‫‪130‬‬
 ‫قصة المرأة‬

‫سأؿ طفؿ صغير أمو ‪ ..!!..‬لماذا تبكيف ؟…؟ قالت لو‪ :‬ﻷني امرأة…‪ !.‬أجػاب‬

‫الطفؿ ‪ :‬لـ أفيـ‬

‫‪ ..‬عانقتو امو وقالت لف تفيـ أبدا‪....‬‬

‫الحقػػا‪ :‬سػػأؿ الطفػػؿ الصػػغير والػػده لمػػاذا تبكػػي اﻷـ بػػدوف سػػبب…‪.‬؟ لػػـ يسػػتطع‬

‫والده القوؿ إال أف كؿ النساء يبكيف بدوف سبب‪..‬‬

‫لـ يجد الطفؿ اإلجابة عمى سؤالو وليس ىناؾ مف يسػألو سػوى جػده سػأؿ الطفػؿ‬

‫الصغير جده لماذا تبكي النساء بسيولو‪..‬؟؟؟؟ قػاؿ الجػد‪ :‬عنػدما خمػؽ ام المػرأة‬

‫جعؿ ليا ما يميزىا!!!…‬

‫‪-‬جعػؿ ليػػا القػوة الكافيػة لتتحمػػؿ أعبػاء الحيػػاة والطيبػة الكافيػة التػػي تبعػث عمػػى‬

‫الراحة‪….‬‬

‫‪-‬وأعطاىػػا ام القػػوة الداخميػػة لتحمػػؿ ال ػوالدة وال ػرفض الػػذي غالبػػا مػػا يػػأتي مػػف‬

‫أبنائيا…‬

‫‪-‬وأعطاىا ام الصالبة التي تسمح ليا بأف تستمر فػي الوقػت الػذي يستسػمـ فيػو‬

‫الجميع‪….‬‬

‫واف تيػػتـ بعائمتيػػا أثنػػاء المػػرض واإلعيػػاء بػػدوف أف تشػػتكي وأعطاىػػا اإلحسػػاس‬
‫‪131‬‬
‫القوي الذي يدفعيا لمحبة أوالدىا في كؿ الظروؼ حتى عندما تعامؿ بقسػوة مػف‬

‫قبميـ‪….‬‬

‫وأعطاىا ام القوة لتتحمؿ أعباء زوجيا (فخمقيا مف ضمعو لتحمي قمبو‪)....‬‬

‫وأعطاىا ام الحكمة لتعمـ بأف الزوج الجيػد ال يػؤذي زوجتػو ولكنػو أحيانػا يختبػر‬

‫قوتيا وعزيمتيا لتقؼ إلى جانبو بثبات‪....‬‬

‫وأخيػ ار أعطاىػػا ام قػػدرتيا عمػػى البكػػاء اسػػتثناىا بػػذلؾ حتػػى تبكػػي عنػػدما تحتػػاج‬

‫إلى ذلؾ‪....‬‬

‫ىػؿ أريػػت يػا بنػػي الجمػاؿ فػػي المػرأة لػػيس بمالبسػيا أو شخصػػيتيا التػي تمتمكيػػا‬

‫أو تصفيفو شعرىا جماؿ المرأة في عينييا ﻷنيما المفتاح الذي يوصمؾ لقمبيا ‪...‬‬

‫‪132‬‬
 ‫الحب والوقت‬

‫ِِ ِِ ِِف ػػي ق ػػديـ الزم ػػاف ك ػػاف ىن ػػاؾ جزيػ ػرة حي ػػث ك ػػؿ المش ػػاعر عاش ػػت‪ :‬الس ػػعادة‬

‫والحػػزف والمعرفػػة وكػػؿ اآلخػريف ومػػف ضػػمنيـ الحػػب فػػي اليػػوـ الػػذي اعمػػف بػػاف‬

‫الجزيرة ستغرؽ‪ ,‬وكؿ القوارب المشيدة غادرت ما عدا الحب‪.‬‬

‫الحػػب كػػاف ىػػو الوحيػػد الػػذي بقػػى‪ .‬الحػػب اراد الصػػمود حتػػى المحظػػة المحتممػػة‬

‫االخيرة‪.‬‬

‫عندما غرقػت الجزيػرة تقريبػا الحػب قػرر السػؤاؿ عػف المسػاعدة ‪.‬مػر الغنػي مػف‬

‫اماـ الحب مف مركب كبير قػاؿ الحػب‪ :‬ىػؿ باالمكػاف اف تأخػذني معػؾ؟ اجابػو‬

‫الغنػػي ‪ " :‬ال‪ ،‬انػػا ال اسػػتطيع ىنػػاؾ الكثيػػر مػػف الػػذىب والفضػػو فػػي مركبػػي‬

‫ليس ىناؾ مكاف لؾ ‪".‬‬

‫قػػرر الحػػب سػؤاؿ الغػػرور الػػذي يمػػر ايضػػا فػػي سػػفينة جميمػػو ‪ :‬الغػػرور ارجػػوؾ‬

‫ساعدني؟‬

‫اجاب الغرور‪" :‬انا ال استطيع مساعدتؾ انت مبتؿ تماما وقد تتمؼ مركبي‪".‬‬

‫الحزف كاف قريبا مف الحب لذا سألو الحب ‪ " :‬الحزف دعني اذىب معؾ " اجابو‬

‫الحزف‪ :‬اوه ‪ ...‬الحب انا حزيف جدا بحيث مف الضروري اف اكوف لوحدي‪.‬‬

‫مرت السعاده بالحب ايضا لكنيا كانت سعيدة جدا بحيث لـ تسمع الحػب عنػدما‬
‫‪133‬‬
 ‫كاف ينادييا‪.‬‬

‫فجػ ػػأة كػ ػػاف ىنػ ػػاؾ صػػػوت " تعػ ػػاؿ الح ػػب انػػػا سػ ػػأخذؾ " ى ػػو كػ ػػاف شػػػيخا كبي ػ ػ ار‬

‫متواضعا حتى الحب نسى اف يسأؿ الشيخ ايف ىـ سيذىبوف ؟‬

‫وعندما وصمو الى اليابسو سار الشيخ في طريقو الخاص ‪ .‬وادرؾ كـ كاف يديف‬

‫لمشيخ ‪.‬‬

‫سأؿ الحب المعرفة (شيخ اخر) ‪ " :‬مف ساعدني ؟"‬

‫اجابة المعرفة ‪ " :‬ىو كاف الوقت‪" .‬‬

‫الوقت ! يسأؿ الحب " لكف لماذا الوقت ساعدني؟ "‬

‫ابتسمت المعرفة بالحكمة العميقو وأجابػة ‪ " :‬ﻷف الوقػت ىػو الوحيػد القػادر عمػى‬

‫فيـ كـ الحب ثميف"‬

‫‪134‬‬
 ‫انزل الكأس اآلن‬

‫في يوـ مف اﻷياـ دخػؿ البروفيسػور القاعػو وفػي يػده كػأس وفيػو قميػؿ مػف المػاء‬

‫طبعا رفع الكأس سائال مف في القاعو مف منكـ يعرؼ كـ جراما تزف ىذه ؟‬

‫تعددت اجابات الطالب واختمفت ‪ٖٓ :‬جـ ‪ٗٓ /‬جـ ‪ٛٓ /‬جـ ‪ٔٓٓ /‬جـ‪...‬‬

‫رد البروفسور ‪ :‬وام انا ال أعرؼ بالضبط كـ حتى ازنيا لكف سؤالي ىػو‪ :‬مػاذا‬

‫ممكف اف يحدث اذا رفعتيا ىكذا (مد يده الى اﻷعمى) لبضع دقائؽ ؟‬

‫ىنا لـ يرد أحد‪.‬‬

‫أكمؿ البروفسور قائال ‪ :‬ماذا اذا أبقيتيا لمدة ساعو ؟‬

‫رد أحد النشيطيف ‪ :‬بروؼ ستؤلمؾ ذراعؾ‪.‬‬

‫البروؼ ‪ :‬ممتاز أحسنت ‪ .‬وماذا اذا أبقيتيا ليوـ كامؿ ؟‬

‫رد أحد الجريئيف ‪ :‬بروؼ سػتبدأ يػدؾ فػي التنميػؿ ثػـ شػد عضػمي وتمػزؽ ويمكػف‬

‫شمؿ وأكيد سننقمؾ الى المستشفى ‪(.‬ضحؾ كؿ مف في القاعو)‪.‬‬

‫البروؼ ‪ :‬ممتاز عظيـ ولكف أثناء ذلؾ كمو ىؿ تغير وزف كأس الماء؟‬

‫ال طبعا كاف رد البروؼ (والكؿ حتى قاريء ىذا الموضوع )‬

‫اذا قولوا لي ما ىو سبب ألـ الذراع والشد العضمي ؟‬

‫‪135‬‬
 ‫رد أحدىـ ‪ :‬أنزؿ يدؾ واترؾ الكأس‪.‬‬

‫البػػروؼ ‪ :‬بالض ػػبط يػػا أخػ ػواف ىك ػػذا مشػػاكؿ الحي ػػاة فك ػػر فييػػا ل ػػدقائؽ اني ػػا وام‬

‫الشيء ‪.‬‬

‫وفكر فييا لوقت أطوؿ ستبدأ تؤلمؾ ثـ ﻷطوؿ سيزداد ألميا حتى يوصمؾ الى‬

‫الشمؿ فتصبح غير قاد ار عمى فعؿ أي شيء‪.‬‬

‫ميػػـ التفكيػػر فػػي تحػػديات المشػػاكؿ فػػي حياتػػؾ ولكػػف اﻷكثػػر أىميػػة ( وضػػع‬

‫تحتيػػا الػػؼ خػػط) أف تضػػع كػػؿ الثقػػة فػػي ام سػػبحانو وتعػػالى وتتػػرؾ المشػػكمو‬

‫والتفكير فييا عندما تذىب الى النوـ‪.‬‬

‫بتمػػؾ الطريقػػة ال شػػد وال جيػػد وال اي شػػيء وستسػػتيقظ اف شػػاء ام نشػػيط قػػوي‬

‫وتق ػػدر أف تس ػػتوعب اي جدي ػػد وتواج ػػو أي مش ػػكمو او تح ػػدي جدي ػػد ق ػػد يعت ػػرض‬

‫طريقؾ وتتعامؿ معيا بنفس طريقة اليوـ السابؽ‪.‬‬

‫‪136‬‬
 ‫األسد المريض‬

‫كػػاف ىنػػاؾ أسػػد قػػد بمػػخ أيامػػو اﻷخي ػرة‪ ،‬فتمػػدد مريض ػاً مش ػرفاً عمػػى المػػوت عنػػد‬

‫مدخؿ كيفو يمفظ أنفاسو اﻷخيرة‪.‬‬

‫اجتمعت حولو رعاياه مػف الحيوانػات واقتربػت منػو بينمػا ىػو ال حػوؿ لػو وال قػوة‪.‬‬

‫وعنػػدما وجػػودوا أنػػو عمػػى وشػػؾ المػػوت قػػالوا ﻷنفسػػيـ‪" :‬ىػػذا ىػػو وقػػت تصػػفية‬

‫الضػػغائف"‪ .‬اقتػػرب منػػو الخنزيػػر البػػري وض ػربو بنابػػوو ثػػـ جرحػػو الثػػور بقرنػػوو‬

‫واﻷسػػد مػػازاؿ مسػػتمقياً عػػاج اًز أمػػاميـو ممػػا جعػػؿ الحمػػار يشػػعر باﻷمػػاف فػػاقترب‬

‫مػف اﻷسػد رافعػاً ذيمػو نحػوه وضػربو بحػوافره عمػى وجيػو‪" .‬ىػذا مػوت مضػاعؼ"‪،‬‬

‫زمجر اﻷسد‪.‬‬

‫فقط الجبناء ييينوف سمطاناً يحتضر ‪.‬‬

‫‪137‬‬
 ‫حصة األسد‬

‫ذىب اﻷسد ذات مرة لمصيد مع الثعمب وابػف آوى والػذئب‪ .‬اسػتمروا بالصػيد إلػى‬

‫أف باغتوا ظبياً واصطادوه‪ ،‬فكاف السؤاؿ حوؿ توزيع الغنيمة‪.‬‬

‫قسموا ىذا الظبي إلى أربعة أجزاء"‪ ،‬زأر اﻷسد‪ .‬فقاـ البقية بسمخو وتقطيعو إلى‬
‫" ّ‬

‫أربعػػة حصػػص‪ ،‬ث ػػـ وقػػؼ اﻷس ػػد أمػػاـ الجث ػػة وأصػػدر حكم ػػو‪" :‬الربػػع اﻷوؿ ل ػػي‬

‫الح َكػـو وربػع آخػر لػي لػدوري‬

‫بصفتي ممؾ الحيواناتو والربػع الثػاني لػي بصػفتي َ‬

‫فػػي الصػػيدو أمػػا بالنسػػبة لمحصػػة الرابعػػة‪ ...‬بػػودي أف أعػػرؼ مػػف مػػنكـ سػػيجرؤ‬

‫ويضع مخمبو عمييا"‪.‬‬

‫ابتع ػػد الثعم ػػب مدم ػػدماً وذيم ػػو ب ػػيف قدمي ػػو‪ ،‬وق ػػاؿ بص ػػوت م ػػنخفض‪" :‬يمكن ػػؾ أف‬

‫تشارؾ المموؾ أعماليـ لكف لف تشاركيـ الغنائـ"‪.‬‬

‫‪138‬‬
 ‫إخالء مطار في العاصمة الصربية إثر تهديد بزرع قنبمة‬

‫أشأ‬

‫أخمت السمطات اﻷمنية الصربية مطار "نيكوال تيسال" في العاصمة ‪/‬بمجراد‪ /‬إثر‬
‫تيديد بزرع قنبمة في المطار‪.‬‬

‫وذكرت وكالة اﻷنباء الصربية ‪/‬تانيوج‪ /‬التي أوردت النبأ‪ ،‬أف الشرطة تجري‬
‫عمميات بحث وتفتيش في المطار لمبحث عف القنبمة‪.‬‬

‫يذكر أنو يتـ تمقي بالغات كاذبة شبو يومية عف زرع قنابؿ عمى متف طائرات‬
‫صربية ممف تقوـ برحالت مف بمجراد إلى موسكو وسانت بطرسبرج‪ ،‬وأف بعض‬
‫الطائرات عادت إلى مطار نيكوال تيسال‪ ،‬بينما تـ فحص طائرات أخرى قبؿ‬
‫إقالعيا لمواجية أي عمميات تخريبية‪.‬‬

‫وتجدر اإلشارة إلى أف الرئيس الصربي "ألكسندر فوسيتش" كاف قد صرح يوـ‬
‫ٕٔ مارس الماضي بأف صربيا تتعرض لضغوط بسبب قرارىا الخاص‬
‫بمضاعفة الرحالت الجوية بيف بمجراد وموسكو بعد قياـ االتحاد اﻷوروبي‬
‫بإغالؽ مجالو الجوي أماـ الطائرات الروسية في أعقاب قياـ روسيا بشف‬
‫عمميات عسكرية في أوكرانيا‪.‬‬

‫‪139‬‬
 ‫مسئول أوكراني‪ :‬مذبحة بوتشا كانت انتقاما من روسيا بسبب المقاومة‬
‫األوكرانية‬

‫قاؿ رئيس بمدية بوتشا في أوكرانيا‪ ،‬أناتولي فيدوروؾ‪ ،‬في مقابمة مع صحيفة‬
‫كورييري ديال سي ار اإليطالية إف عمميات اإلعداـ الجماعي في ضاحية بوتشا‬
‫بالعاصمة كييؼ كانت "انتقاما مف الروس بسبب المقاومة اﻷوكرانية"‪.‬‬

‫وتـ العثور عمى العديد مف جثث السكاف في شوارع بوتشا بعد انسحاب القوات‬
‫الروسية اﻷسبوع الماضي‪ .‬ويقوؿ المسئولوف اﻷوكرانيوف إف الجنود الروس‬
‫ارتكبوا جرائـ حرب خطيرة في البمدة‪ .‬وتنفي روسيا ىذه االتيامات‪.‬‬

‫وقاؿ فيدوروؾ في المقابمة‪" :‬تـ إطالؽ النار عمى شعبي مف أجؿ المتعة‪ ،‬أو‬
‫بدافع الغضب ‪ ...‬الروس أطمقوا النار عمى أي شئ كاف يتحرؾ‪ :‬المارة‪ ،‬قائدي‬
‫الدراجات‪ ،‬السيارات التي تحمؿ وسـ ‪/‬مخصصة لألطفاؿ‪."/‬‬

‫وأوضح‪" :‬شيدت بوتشا انتقاـ الروس مف المقاومة اﻷوكرانية"‪ ،‬مضيفا أف‬

‫مناطؽ مف البمدة "تحولت إلى معسكر اعتقاؿ"‪ ،‬بدوف طعاـ أو شراب‪ ،‬وأف "كؿ‬
‫مف تج أر عمى الخروج لمبحث عف الطعاـ تـ إطالؽ الرصاص عميو"‪.‬‬

‫‪140‬‬
 ‫استمرار ارتفاع أعداد اإلصابات والوفيات بسبب فيروس كورونا في أنحاء‬
‫العالم‬

‫أشأ‬

‫واصمت دوؿ العالـ تسجيؿ ارتفاعات في أعداد الوفيات واإلصابات جراء تفشي‬
‫عالميا‪ ،‬اليوـ الثالثاء‪ ،‬وفيما يمي أحدث البيانات بشأف الوفيات‬
‫ً‬ ‫وباء كورونا‬
‫واإلصابات المعمنة في عدد مف البمداف خالؿ الساعات اﻷخيرة‪.‬‬

‫أعمنت سمطات الصحة البريطانية تسجيؿ ٗ‪ ٔٔٚ‬حالة وفاة‪ ،‬وٕ٘ٗ ألفا وٖٖٓ‬
‫إصابات بفيروس "كورونا" خالؿ اﻷسبوع الماضي‪ ،‬ما يرفع عدد الوفيات خالؿ‬
‫يوما جراء إصابتيـ بالفيروس إلى ‪ ٔٙٙ‬ألفا و‪ ٔٗٛ‬شخصا‪ ،‬ويبمخ العدد‬
‫‪ً ٕٛ‬‬
‫التراكمي لإلصابات المسجمة ىناؾ منذ ظيور الوباء ٕٔ مميونا وٓٔٗ آالؼ‬
‫وٖ٘ٓ إصابات‪.‬‬

‫وفي اليوناف‪ ،‬سجمت السمطات الصحية ‪ ٔٛ‬ألفا و‪ ٜٛٛ‬إصابة وٓ‪ ٚ‬حالة وفاة‬
‫خالؿ ٕٗ ساعة‪ ،‬ليرتفع إجمالي عدد اإلصابات المؤكدة حتى اآلف إلى ٖ‬
‫مالييف وٗٔٔ ألفا ؤ‪ ٜ٘‬إصابات‪ ،‬وترتفع حصيمة الوفيات إلى ‪ ٕٚ‬ألفا‬
‫و‪ ٛٔٙ‬حالة وفاة‪.‬‬

‫أما جارتيا قبرص‪ ،‬أعمنت تسجيؿ ‪ ٕٜٛٚ‬إصابة جديدة بفيروس كورونا خالؿ‬
‫الػٕٗ ساعة الماضية‪ .‬وذكرت صحيفة "سيبروس ميؿ" القبرصية أف إجمالي‬
‫اإلصابات في البالد منذ بداية تفشي الجائحة ارتفع إلى ‪ ٗٗٙ‬ألفا و‪ ٜٜٜ‬حالة‪،‬‬
‫وأف حصيمة الوفيات بمغت ‪ ٜٜٗ‬حالة بعد تسجيؿ ٖ حاالت وفاة عمى مدار‬
‫أمس‪.‬‬

‫وأعمنت سمطات الصحة اإليطالية تسجيؿ ٗ‪ ٜٔ‬حالة وفاة‪ ،‬و‪ ٛٛ‬ألفا وٖ‪ٔٚ‬‬
‫إصابة جديدة خالؿ اليوـ اﻷخيرو ليرتفع إجمالي عدد الوفيات المسجمة في‬
‫‪141‬‬
‫إيطاليا إلى ٓ‪ ٔٙ‬ألفا وٖٓٔ حاالت‪ ،‬واجمالي اإلصابات إلى ٗٔ مميونا‬
‫و‪ ٜٙٙ‬ألفا و‪ ٘ٛ‬إصابة‪.‬‬

‫وفي فرنسا‪ ،‬سجمت و ازرة الصحة ٕٓٔ ألؼ و‪ ٕٙٙ‬إصابة جديدة ؤٖ حالة‬
‫وفاة‪ ،‬ليرتفع إجمالي اإلصابات في البالد إلى ٕ٘ مميونا و‪ ٜٜٚ‬ألفا وٕ٘‪ٛ‬‬
‫إصابة‪ ،‬فيما بمغت حصيمة الوفيات حتى اآلف ٕٗٔ ألفا و‪ ٘ٓٙ‬وفيات‪.‬‬

‫وسجمت باكستاف ٘٘ٔ إصابة جديدة بفيروس كورونا المستجد خالؿ الساعات‬
‫الػ ٕٗ الماضية‪ ،‬وأفاد المركز الوطني المعني برصد تطورات فيروس كورونا‬
‫بو ازرة الصحة الباكستانية صباح اليوـ أف إجمالي الحاالت المصابة بالفيروس‬
‫وصمت إلى ٘‪ ٔ ٕ٘٘ ٚٚ‬حالة‪ ،‬فيما بمخ إجمالي الوفيات ٔ‪ ٖٓ ٖٙ‬حالة وفاة‪.‬‬

‫وفي إندونيسيا‪ ،‬أعمنت فرقة العمؿ المعنية بأزمة كوفيد‪ ٜٔ-‬تسجيؿ ٕ‪ٕٕٛ‬‬
‫إصابة وٕ‪ ٚ‬حالة وفاة‪ ،‬ليرتفع بذلؾ إجمالي عدد اإلصابات المؤكدة في البالد‬
‫حتى اآلف إلى ‪ ٙ‬مالييف وٖٕ ألفا وٕٗ‪ ٜ‬إصابة‪ ،‬وترتفع حصيمة الوفيات إلى‬
‫٘٘ٔ ألفا ؤٕٗ حالة وفاة‪.‬‬

‫وفي كرواتيا‪ ،‬أعمنت السمطات الصحية تسجيؿ ٖ٘‪ ٛ‬إصابة جديدة و٘ٔ حالة‬
‫وفاة‪ ،‬ليرتفع بذلؾ إجمالي عدد اإلصابات المؤكدة في البالد حتى اآلف إلى‬
‫مميوف وٖٓٔ آالؼ وٕ‪ ٙٙ‬إصابة‪ ،‬وترتفع حصيمة الوفيات إلى ٘٘ٔ ألفا‬
‫ؤٕٗ حالة وفاة‬

‫وفي فيتناـ‪ ،‬أعمنت السمطات الصحية تسجيؿ ٗ٘ ألفا و٘‪ ٜٜ‬حالة إصابة‬
‫و‪ ٖٜ‬حالة وفاة‪ ،‬ليرتفع بذلؾ إجمالي عدد اإلصابات المؤكدة في البالد حتى‬
‫اآلف إلى ‪ ٜ‬مالييف وٕٕ‪ ٜ‬ألفا وٓٗ إصابة‪ ،‬وترتفع حصيمة الوفيات إلى ٘ٔ‬
‫ألفا و ٖٗ‪ ٙ‬حالة وفاة‪.‬‬

‫‪142‬‬
‫وفي نيباؿ‪ ،‬أعمنت السمطات الصحية تسجيؿ ٕٔ إصابة جديدة دوف تسجيؿ‬
‫حاالت وفاة جديدة ليرتفع بذلؾ إجمالي عدد اإلصابات المؤكدة في البالد حتى‬
‫اآلف إلى ‪ ٜٚٛ‬ألفا و‪ ٕ٘ٛ‬إصابة وترتفع حصيمة الوفيات إلى ٔٔ ألفا و ٔ٘‪ٜ‬‬
‫حالة وفاة‪.‬‬

‫وفي مالطا‪ ،‬أعمنت السمطات الصحية تسجيؿ ‪ ٜٚٔ‬إصابة و٘ حاالت وفاة‪،‬‬

‫ليرتفع بذلؾ إجمالي عدد اإلصابات المؤكدة في البالد حتى اآلف إلى ٕ‪ ٛ‬ألفا‬
‫و٘ٗ‪ ٛ‬إصابة‪ ،‬وترتفع حصيمة الوفيات إلى ‪ ٜٙٗ‬حالة وفاة‪.‬‬

‫وفي أفغانستاف‪ ،‬سجمت السمطات الصحية ‪ ٕٜ‬إصابة دوف تسجيؿ حاالت وفاة‬
‫جديدة ليرتفع بذلؾ إجمالي عدد اإلصابات المؤكدة في البالد حتى اآلف إلى‬
‫‪ ٔٚٚ‬ألفا وٕٖ‪ ٜ‬إصابة‪ ،‬وترتفع حصيمة الوفيات إلى ‪ ٚ‬آالؼ ؤ‪ ٙٚ‬حالة‬
‫وفاة‬

‫وفي بنجالديش‪ ،‬أعمنت السمطات الصحية‪ ،‬تسجيؿ ‪ ٖٙ‬حالة إصابة جديدة‬

‫بفيروس كورونا‪ ،‬خالؿ الساعات الػٕٗ الماضية‪ ،‬ليرتفع بذلؾ إجمالي عدد‬
‫حاالت اإلصابة المؤكدة إلى مميوف ؤ٘‪ ٜ‬ألفا و‪ ٘ٙٚ‬إصابة‪.‬‬

‫ولـ تسجؿ السمطات الصحية‪ ،‬خالؿ الفترة نفسيا‪ ،‬حاالت وفاة جديدة‪ ،‬ليستقر‬
‫عدد حاالت الوفاة عند ‪ ٕٜ‬ألفا ؤٖٕ حالة‪ .‬وتعافى عمى مدار أمس ‪ٜٜٛ‬‬
‫شخصا‪ ،‬ليرتفع بذلؾ إجمالي عدد المتعافيف مف الفيروس التاجي إلى مميوف‬
‫و٘‪ ٛٛ‬ألفا ؤٕ٘ شخصا‪.‬‬

‫‪143‬‬
 ‫الواليات المتحدة توافق عمى بيع ثماني مقاتالت إف‪ 61-‬إلى بمغاريا‬

‫أؼب‬

‫وافقت و ازرة الدفاع اﻷمريكيةعمى بيع ثماني طائرات مقاتمة مف طراز أؼ‪ٔٙ-‬‬
‫ستعزز سالح الجو لمدولة‬
‫ّ‬ ‫إلى بمغاريا مقابؿ ‪ ٔ ٙٚ‬مميار دوالر‪ ،‬في خطوة‬
‫الواقعة في شرؽ أوروبا وسط تصاعد التيديد اإلقميمي بعد اليجوـ الروسي‬
‫ﻷوكرانيا‪.‬‬

‫إف "عممية البيع المقترحة‬

‫وقالت وكالة التعاوف اﻷمني الدفاعي في البنتاجوف ّ‬
‫ستحسف مف قدرات بمغاريا عمى مواجية التيديدات الحالية والمستقبمية وتمكيف‬
‫ّ‬
‫القوات الجوية البمغارية مف نشر طائرات مقاتمة حديثة بشكؿ روتيني في منطقة‬
‫البحر اﻷسود"‪.‬‬

‫وجاءت الموافقة عمى الصفقة وسط تكينات بأف أحد حمفاء واشنطف في حمؼ‬
‫يزود أوكرانيا بطائرات ميخ‪ ٕٜ-‬لمواجية القوات الروسية‪،‬‬
‫شماؿ اﻷطمسي قد ّ‬
‫وبأف خطوة كيذه قد يقابميا تزويد الواليات المتحدة ليذا الحميؼ بطائرات‬
‫ّ‬
‫أميركية في المقابؿ‪.‬‬

‫وبمغاريا ىي واحدة مف دوؿ حمؼ شماؿ اﻷطمسي الثالث الى جانب بولندا‬
‫وسموفاكيا التي تستخدـ طائرات ميخ‪ ٕٜ-‬المقاتمة المناسبة لمطياريف اﻷوكرانييف‬
‫المدربيف عمى التحميؽ بيا‪.‬‬
‫ّ‬
‫لكف جوف كيربي المتحدث باسـ البنتاجوف أ ّكد عدـ وجود أي عالقة بيف ىذه‬ ‫ّ‬
‫الصفقة واحتماؿ منح بمغاريا طائرات ميج إلى أوكرانيا‪.‬‬

‫وكاف رئيس الوزراء البمغاري كيريؿ بيتكوؼ نفى وجود مثؿ ىذا االتفاؽ خالؿ‬
‫زيارة وزير الدفاع اﻷمريكي لويد أوستف إلى بمغاريا في ‪ٜٔ‬مارس‪.‬‬

‫‪144‬‬
‫وقاؿ "لكوني قريباً جداً مف النزاع‪ ،‬يجب أف أقوؿ ّإننا لف نتم ّكف حالياً مف إرساؿ‬
‫أي مساعدة يجب أف يوافؽ عمييا‬ ‫أف ّ‬‫مساعدات عسكرية إلى أوكرانيا"‪ ،‬مضيفاً ّ‬
‫البرلماف البمغاري‪.‬‬

‫‪145‬‬
 ‫رئيس أوكرانيا يقول إنه سيوجه كممة لمجمس األمن اليوم‬

‫قاؿ رئيس أوكرانيا فالديمير زيمينسكي إنو سيوجو كممة لمجمس اﻷمف اليوـ‬
‫الثالثاء‪.‬‬

‫وأضاؼ رئيس أوكرانيا‪ ،‬أف الروس سيحاولوف محو آثار جرائميـ‪ ،‬وفقا لمعربية‬
‫نت‪.‬‬

‫الحرب الروسية اﻷوكرانية‬

‫ىجوما عسكرًيا في أوكرانيا‪.‬‬

‫ً‬ ‫وتقود روسيا منذ ٕٗ فبراير‬

‫وتجري محادثات منذ عدة أسابيع بيف مفاوضيف روس وأوكرانييف لمحاولة‬
‫التوصؿ إلى اتفاؽ لوقؼ القتاؿ‪.‬‬

‫‪146‬‬
 ‫ولي عهد الكويت يتسمم استقالة الحكومة‬

‫تسمـ ولي العيد في الكويت‪ ،‬الشيخ مشعؿ اﻷحمد الجابر الصباح‪ ،‬اليوـ‬
‫الثالثاء‪ ،‬كتاب استقالة الحكومة‪ ،‬وفؽ ما أفادت وكالة اﻷنباء الكويتية الرسمية‬
‫"كونا"‪.‬‬

‫وذكرت "كونا" في نبأ مقتضب أف الشيخ مشعؿ اﻷحمد الجابر الصباح استقبؿ‬
‫بقصر بياف ظير الثالثاء الشيخ صباح الخالد الحمد الصباح رئيس مجمس‬
‫الوزراء‪ ،‬حيث رفع إليو كتاب استقالة الحكومة وفقا لسكاي نيوز عربية‪.‬‬

‫تأتي االستقالة بعدما تمكنت المعارضة الكويتية مف جمع اﻷصوات الكافية‬

‫إلقرار طمب عدـ التعاوف مع الحكومة‪ ،‬الذي كاف مف المقرر أف يتـ التصويت‬
‫عميو اﻷربعاء‪.‬‬

‫وواجيت حكومة الشيخ صباح الخالد تحديا كبي ار مف قبؿ صقور المعارضة بعد‬
‫أدائيا القسـ مباشرة‪ ،‬إذ تـ استجواب ثالثة وزراء وتـ التصويت عمى حجب الثقة‬
‫عنيـ‪ ،‬لكف محاوالت المعارضة فشمت‪.‬‬

‫والتحدي الذي واجيتو الحكومة أدى إلى استقالة وزيري الداخمية والدفاع قبؿ‬
‫شير‪ ،‬احتجاجا عمى ما وصفاه بالتعسؼ باستخداـ اﻷدوات الدستورية‬
‫وباإلخفاؽ التاريخي مف قبؿ الحكومة والمجمس‪.‬‬

‫يذكر أف المواجية بيف الحكومة والمعارضة قد بدأت مف اليوـ اﻷوؿ مف انعقاد‬

‫المجمس‪ ،‬عندما رجحت أصوات الحكومة كفة الخصـ الرئيسي لممعارضة‬
‫ليصبح رئيسا لمبرلماف‪.‬‬

‫‪147‬‬
 ‫بيرو تعمن حظر التجوال في العاصمة ليما وسط احتجاجات عنيفة بسبب‬
‫التضخم‬

‫أعمف رئيس بيرو حظر التجواؿ في العاصمة ليما‪ ،‬اليوـ الثالثاء‪ ،‬في مسعى‬
‫إليقاؼ احتجاجات عنيفة ضد التضخـ تصاعدت خالؿ اﻷياـ الماضية‪ ،‬مما‬
‫أدى إلى اشتباكات مع الشرطة ونقص مؤقت في المواد الغذائية وتعطؿ سالسؿ‬
‫التوريد‪.‬‬

‫ووفقا لوكالة "بمومبرج" لألنباء‪ ،‬أعمف الرئيس بيدرو كاستيو حظر التجواؿ في‬
‫خطاب لألمة‪ ،‬خالؿ إعالنو حالة الطوارئ في ليما ومدينة كاالو الساحمية‬
‫المجاورة‪ .‬وقاؿ الرئيس إف حظر التجواؿ سوؼ يبدأ مف الساعة الثانية صباحا‬
‫بالتوقيت المحمي حتى ‪ ٜٔٔ٘‬مساء‪.‬‬

‫وخفض كاستيو‪ ،‬الذي نجا اﻷسبوع الماضي مف محاولة ثانية في البرلماف‬

‫لعزلو‪ ،‬ضرائب الوقود‪ ،‬ورفع الحد اﻷدنى لألجور بنسبة ٓٔ‪ %‬خالؿ عطمة‬
‫نياية اﻷسبوع لمساعدة مواطنيو في ظؿ أسرع معدؿ تضخـ منذ ٕٗ عاما‪.‬‬

‫ومع ذلؾ‪ ،‬لـ يكف ليذه اإلجراءات سوى القميؿ مف التأثير فيما يتعمؽ بإرضاء‬
‫سائقي الحافالت‪ ،‬الذيف يعمؿ معظميـ بشكؿ غير رسمي دوف رواتب ثابتة‪.‬‬

‫ونشرت الحكومة قوات مف الجيش أمس االثنيف بعدما أغمؽ سائقو الحافالت‬
‫الطرؽ السريعة في إطار إضراب‪ ،‬لتتفاقـ اﻷزمة التي بدأت اﻷسبوع الماضي‬
‫عندما قطع السائقوف والمزارعوف المحتجوف وصوؿ اإلمدادات الغذائية إلى‬
‫العاصمة‪.‬‬

‫وانضمت ربات البيوت الالتي تممكيف الغضب مف ارتفاع أسعار المواد‬

‫الغذائية‪ ،‬إلى االحتجاجات أمس االثنيف وأظيرت تقارير إعالـ محمية تعرض‬
‫اﻷسواؽ الصغيرة لمنيب في منطقة إيكا في الجنوب‪.‬‬
‫‪148‬‬
 ‫العالم فى محنة‬

‫فاروق جويدة‬

‫مأساة الحرب فى أوكرانيا مف عشرة أياـ والعالـ كؿ العالـ يقؼ متسائال وماذا‬
‫بعد‪ ،‬وما نياية ىذه الكارثة التى دمرت وطنا وشردت شعبا وتركت واقعا جديداً‬
‫أماـ مالييف المياجريف الياربيف مف الموت؟!‪ ..‬وىناؾ أرقاـ تؤكد أف عددىـ‬
‫سوؼ يزيد عمى أربعة مالييف‪ ،‬ال أحد حتى اآلف وصؿ إلى حقيقة وأسباب ما‬
‫حدث ولماذا اجتاح بوتيف أوكرانيا ىؿ كاف ثأ ار قديما مع مف كانوا سببا فى‬
‫انييار االتحاد السوفيتى أـ كاف خوفا مف انضماـ أوكرانيا إلى حمؼ شماؿ‬
‫اﻷطمنطى أـ محاوالت أوكرانيا استعادة قوتيا النووية أـ أنيا الزعامة التى يسعى‬
‫الرئيس بوتيف إلى الوصوؿ إلييا ليقؼ العالـ مشدودا وىو يشاىد واحدا مف اكبر‬
‫جيوش العالـ يجتاح دولة صغيرة!‪ ..‬سوؼ يطوؿ الحديث عف أسباب ىذا‬
‫التدخؿ واف كانت النتائج اكبر بكثير مما نراه اآلف إذا نجحت حممة بوتيف عمى‬
‫أوكرانيا وسيطر عمى أراضييا وأسقط حكومتيا‪ ،‬فنحف أماـ واقع جديد ليس فى‬
‫أوروبا وحدىا ولكف فى العالـ كمو‪ ..‬وسوؼ تكوف أمريكا أكبر الخاسريف وسوؼ‬
‫تنتيى أسطورة القوة العظمى فى إدارة شئوف العالـ وسوؼ يكوف الكرمميف وليس‬
‫البيت اﻷبيض صاحب الييمنة والقرار‪ ..‬إما إذا فشمت حممة بوتيف فسوؼ‬
‫تمحؽ روسيا بما كاف يسمى االتحاد السوفيتى ويأخذ بوتيف مكانو بجانب‬
‫جورباتشوؼ فى الصفحات الخمفية لمتاريخ‪.‬‬

‫إف تدخؿ بوتيف ليس عمال عاب ار ولكنو يشبو كؿ الكوارث الكبرى التى توقؼ‬
‫عندىا التاريخ طويال‪ .‬ىناؾ مالييف الضحايا الذيف ىربوا مف الموت فى‬
‫فمسطيف والعراؽ وسوريا وليبيا واليمف وكميا جرائـ حرب سبقتيا ناجازاكى‬
‫وىيروشيما وكميا صفحات سوداء حيف تصبح اإلنسانية بال عقؿ أو قمب او‬
‫ضمير‪ ..‬ال احد يعمـ أيف سيكوف موقع الرئيس بوتيف فى التاريخ ىؿ سيعيد‬
‫‪149‬‬
‫أسطورة سقطت اسميا االتحاد السوفيتي؟‪ ..‬إف العالـ يتساءؿ ما ىى نياية ىذه‬
‫اﻷحداث وىؿ تتوقؼ عند دمار دولة أـ أف المسمسؿ لف يتوقؼ عند أوكرانيا‬
‫وعمى الجميع أف ينتظر دوره؟!‪.‬‬

‫‪150‬‬
 ‫االنشغا ُل بتو ِ‬
‫افه األمور‬

‫د‪ .‬وحيد عبدالمجيد‬

‫جديدا أف تكوف المشاجرةُ التى حدثت فى دورة اﻷوسكار اﻷخيرة اﻷسبوع‬

‫ً‬ ‫ليس‬
‫الماضى ىى الشغ ُؿ الشاغ ُؿ لمواقع التواصؿ االجتماعى‪ ،‬ولبعض وسائؿ‬
‫أيضا‪ .‬وليست غريبة قمةُ االىتماـ بظواىر إيجابية ميمة شيدتيا ىذه‬
‫اإلعالـ ً‬
‫ويفترض أف تكوف فى صدارة االىتماـ‪ .‬االنشغا ُؿ بتوافو اﻷمور عف‬
‫ُ‬ ‫الدورة‪،‬‬
‫تزداد الضحالةُ والسطحية‪ .‬لـ‬
‫ُ‬ ‫أكثرىا قيمةً سمةُ عامة فى عالـ اليوـ‪ ،‬حيث‬
‫مقدـ حفمة توزيع‬
‫ُ‬ ‫يمفت انتباه المتيافتيف أكثر مف مشاج ٍرة بدأت عندما زج‬
‫مرضا‬
‫ً‬ ‫الجوائز باسـ الممثمة جادا سميث فى مزحة سمجة‪ .‬تعانى ىذه الممثمةُ‬
‫نوعا مف‬ ‫ٍ‬
‫يؤثر فى شعر رأسيا‪ ،‬عمى نحو يجع ُؿ إقحاـ اسميا فى نكات ً‬ ‫ُ‬
‫زوجيا الممث ُؿ ويؿ سميث عف شعوره‪ ،‬فتوجو إلى‬
‫االستيتار وعدـ المياقة‪ .‬خرج ُ‬
‫المنصة وصفع مقدـ الحفمة عمى وجيو‪ ،‬وكاؿ لو سيال مف الشتائـ‪ .‬تصدرت‬
‫أثر ُيذكر فى‬
‫ىذه المقطةُ مواقع التواصؿ ووسائؿ إعالـ‪ ،‬رغـ أنيا لـ تُحدث ًا‬
‫سير الحفمة التى استمرت وفؽ برنامجيا‪ ،‬وحصؿ الفائزوف عمى جوائزىـ ومف‬
‫بينيـ الصافع الذى ناؿ أوسكار أفضؿ ممثؿ رئيسى عف دوره فى فيمـ (الممؾ‬
‫ريتشارد)‪ .‬ك ُؿ ثانية تقريبا فى لقطة لـ تتجاوز مدتُيا دقيقة واحدة حظيت‬
‫بنقاشات متيافتة‪ ،‬عمى حساب أىـ ما ميز دورة اﻷوسكار ىذه‪ ،‬مثؿ الحضور‬
‫القوى لمفنانيف ذوى البشرة الممونة‪ ،‬والتقدير الكبير لقضايا المرأة وذوى‬
‫االحتياجات الخاصة واﻷقميات‪ ،‬فضال عف لفتة طيبة انطوى عمييا تكريـ‬
‫(العراب) الذى ُيعد مف‬
‫َّ‬ ‫فرنسيس كوبوال لمرور نصؼ قرف عمى عرض فيممو‬
‫أىـ روائع السينما العالمية‪ .‬فوز جيف كابيوف بأوسكار أفضؿ مخرجة عف‬
‫فيمميا (قوة الكمب) ُيعد تحية مستحقة لممخرجات ذوات النزعة النسوية‪ .‬ولكف‬
‫‪151‬‬
‫فيمـ‬
‫الحدث اﻷىـ ىو حصو ُؿ فيمـ (كودا) عمى أوسكار أفضؿ فيمـ‪ .‬أف يصؿ ُ‬
‫يبعث‬
‫ُ‬ ‫يخى‬
‫حدث تار ُ‬
‫ُ‬ ‫يؤدى أدوا ار رئيسية فيو ممثموف ُبكـ إلى ىذه المكانة ليو‬
‫تماما فى ىذه المحظة التى‬
‫بعض اﻷمؿ فى أف العقؿ واإلنسانية لـ يضمحال ً‬
‫يسودىا جنوف العنؼ والتوحش‪ .‬إنيا المرةُ اﻷولى التى يحظى فييا ذوو‬
‫ُ‬
‫ٍ‬
‫بتقدير فنى عمى ىذا المستوى‪ ،‬ولعميا تكوف انطالقة‬ ‫االحتياجات الخاصة‬
‫جديدة نحو تمكينيـ مف نيؿ فرص متكافئة فى مختمؼ المجاالت‪.‬‬

‫‪152‬‬
 ‫أنيســة!‬

‫د‪ .‬أسامة الغزالى حرب‬

‫‪ ..‬وىؿ أقصد اليوـ سوى أنيسة حسونة التى رحمت عف عالمنا ىذا اﻷسبوع بعد‬
‫صراع وقتاؿ شرس شجاع مع مرض السرطاف الخبيث‪..‬؟ إف أنيسة لـ تكف‬
‫زميمة دفعة‪ ،‬فقد تخرجنا فى نفس الكمية – االقتصاد والعموـ السياسية‪ ،‬جامعة‬
‫القاىرة‪ -‬ولكنيا تخرجت بعدى بست سنوات‪ .‬ولـ تكف زميمة عمؿ‪ ،‬فقد كنت أنا‬
‫فى معقمى باﻷىراـ‪ ،‬رئيسا لتحرير السياسة الدولية‪ ،‬وتنقمت ىى بيف مياـ‬
‫وأعماؿ قيادية مختمفة‪ ،‬قبؿ أف تبرز وتعرؼ كنائبة متميزة فى مجمس النواب‪،‬‬
‫ثـ كمديرة تنفيذية لمؤسسة مجدى يعقوب ﻷمراض وأبحاث القمب‪ .‬كنت اسمع‬
‫عنيا‪ ،‬وأتابع نشاطيا عف بعد‪ ...‬إلى أف حظيت بنعمة مزاممتيا فى مجمس إدارة‬
‫المجمس المصرى لمشئوف الخارجية‪ ..‬نعـ‪ ،‬أقوؿ نعمة مزاممتيا‪ ،‬بعد أف‬
‫اكتشفتيا‪ ،‬اكتشفت عمؽ ذكائيا‪ ،‬وصفاء ذىنيا‪ ،‬وطيبة قمبيا‪ ،‬وجماؿ روحيا‪.‬‬
‫كنت عندما أذىب الجتماعات المجمس أحرص عمى أف أجمس بجانبيا عمى‬
‫المقعد الذى كانت تحجزه لى‪ ...‬إنيا شخصية رائعة‪ ،‬نقية‪ ،‬صافية ‪...‬إنيا‬
‫اإلنساف كما يجب أف يكوف‪ .‬ولـ يكف غريبا أف التقينا عائميا‪ ،‬فتعرفنا – زوجتى‬
‫وأنا‪ -‬عمى زوجيا الرائع شريؼ ناجى وابنتييا الجميمتيف ميا وسممى‪ .‬غير أف‬
‫مرض السرطاف المعيف داىـ أنيسة حسونة «دوف سابؽ إنذار» كما عبرت عف‬
‫ذلؾ عمى نحو رائؽ ومذىؿ فى كتابيا الذى ألفتو بذلؾ العنواف! وأذكر أننى‬
‫عندما حضرت عرضيا لكتابيا تأثرت كثيرا‪ ،‬ودمعت عينى وأنا أتابع حكايتيا‬
‫الصادقة والشجاعة لمعاناتيا‪ ...‬فالحظت ىى ذلؾ عف بعد‪ ،‬وقالت لى إنيا‬
‫مصممة عمى خوض معركتيا مع السرطاف بكؿ جسارة‪ ،‬وبال أى تيادف أو‬
‫تراجع‪ .‬ولـ يكف غريبا فى سياؽ تمؾ المعركة الشرسة التى فرضت عمى اسرة‬
‫أنيسة الموقؼ الرائع‪ ،‬المخمص فى حبو وفى وفائو وفى رعايتو‪ ،‬زوجيا الفاضؿ‬
‫‪153‬‬
‫اﻷستاذ شريؼ ناجى‪ ...‬إنو الجندى المجيوؿ الذى دعميا وشجعيا وشد مف‬
‫أزرىا فى محنتيا الصعبة‪ .‬ويذكرنى موقفو الكريـ واﻷصيؿ مف أنيسة‪ ،‬بالحديث‬
‫النبوى الشريؼ «اﻷرواح جنود مجندة‪ ،‬ما تعارؼ منيا ائتمؼ»‪ .‬خالص العزاء‬
‫لمصر كميا فى رحيؿ واحدة مف أجمؿ وأطير وأنقى بناتيا وأبنائيا‪ :‬أنيسة‬
‫عصاـ الديف حسونة!‬

‫‪154‬‬
 ‫فتاوى رمضان!‬

‫د‪ .‬أسامة الغزالى حرب‬

‫أف تكوف (مسمما) صائما‪ ،‬فيذا معناه أنؾ ممتنع عف الطعاـ والشراب – وأيضا‬
‫الجماع إف كنت متزوجا‪ -‬مف طموع الفجر إلى غروب الشمس‪ ،...‬وتمتد طواؿ‬
‫شير رمضاف المبارؾ! تمؾ مسألة بسيطة لمغاية! غير أف ىذه ٍ‬
‫المسألة البسيطة‬
‫تتحوؿ فى الممارسة الى طوفاف مف التفاصيؿ والتعقيدات التى ال ينفع فى حميا‬
‫إال ذوو االختصاص! وىنا تجد أوال مبطالت الصوـ‪ ،‬أى‪ :‬ماوصؿ عمدا إلى‬
‫الجوؼ (ولكف ما ىو الجوؼ؟‪..‬إنو يشمؿ البطف والحمؽ والدماغ)! وأيضا‬
‫االستقاءة‪ ،‬أى إخراج القىء مف الفـ‪ ،‬واإلنزاؿ‪...‬إلخ‪ .‬وأيضا الحيض والنفاس‬
‫والجنوف واإلغماء ‪...‬إلخ‪ .‬إف ىذا كمو يعنى أف الصائـ يمكف اف تواجيو‬
‫عشرات اﻷسئمة‪ ،‬حوؿ تفاصيؿ صيامو‪ ،.‬والتى اعتدنا سماعيا مع كؿ رمضاف‪،‬‬
‫والتى تمتمئ كتب الفقو اإلسالمى بمعالجاتيا عمى نحو مفصؿ وخصب لمغاية‪،‬‬
‫بؿ وبافتراضاتيا الكثيرة وأحيانا العجيبة والتى تبدأ بكممة أرأيت…‪..‬غير أف‬
‫شير رمضاف يمثؿ أيضا مناسبة تثار فييا كؿ القضايا الدينية التى طرحت فى‬
‫مصر فى سياؽ الدعوة إلى تجديد الفكر الدينى فمف إذف يمكف أف يجيب‬
‫عنيا‪ ..‬إنيا فقط لجاف الفتوى المتخصصة فى دار اإلفتاء وفى المجنة‬
‫االستشارية بمشيخة اﻷزىر‪ .‬وقد تابعت حديثا ميما جدا (عمى اليوتيوب)‬
‫لفضيمة الشيخ أحمد كريمة يتحدث فيو عما سماه الفوضى اإلفتائية التى يتسمؿ‬
‫منيا السمفيوف واإلخوانيوف والدواعش وبعض غالة الشيعة والتى طور اﻷزىر‬
‫أدواتو فى مواجيتيا‪ .‬حسنا‪ ،‬ىذا كمو طيب‪ ،‬ولكف طوفاف التساؤالت التى يتيحيا‬
‫صوـ رمضاف وممارساتو المعتادة‪ ،‬واجابات وفتاوى اﻷزىر‪ ،‬واص ارره المشروع‬
‫عمى إبعاد غير المتخصصيف عف اإلفتاء بشأنيا‪ ،‬سوؼ توفربال شؾ فى نفس‬

‫‪155‬‬
‫الوقت فرصة لمتعرؼ مف خالليا عمى تطوير اﻷزىر لمخطاب الدينى الذى‬
‫نأممو ونتطمع إليو‪ ....‬وانا لمنتظروف!‬

‫‪156‬‬
 ‫المصريون فى الخارج‬

‫فاروق جويدة‬

‫حوؿ ما كتبت عف بعض المشاكؿ الحياتية التى تواجو المصرييف فى الدوؿ‬

‫الشقيقة وما يعانيو البعض مف ظروؼ صعبة‪ ،‬وقمت ف المالييف مف أبناء إ‬
‫مصر يعيشوف فى ىذه الدوؿ منذ سنوات وقد شاركوا فى نيضتيا والمطموب أف‬
‫يعمؿ المسئولوف عمى مساعدة ىؤالء ومواجية مشاكميـ‪ ..‬ومنيـ مف يعانى‬
‫أزمات مع مؤسسات يعمموف فييا أو تحديات أماـ ظروؼ حياتية صعبة أو‬
‫مشاكؿ وقضايا أماـ القضاء‪..‬‬

‫كعادتى اطمعت بمقالكـ فى جريدة اﻷىراـ عما يمقاه بعض المصرييف فى‬
‫الخارج‪ ..‬ولى تعقيب قصير عمى ىذا الموضوع‪ ،‬حيث إننى عممت أكثر مف‬
‫عشريف عاما فى السعودية وكاف مف حسف حظى أننى عممت مع مف اعتبرنى‬
‫واحدا مف أسرتو فارتبطت بيـ وبجميع أفراد عائمتو وأقاربو وكنت حاض ار فى‬
‫جميع مناسباتيـ‪ ..‬وحتى اآلف عالقتى بأوالدىـ لـ تنقطع ونتبادؿ التيانى فى‬
‫المواسـ المختمفة عبر وسائؿ التواصؿ االجتماعي‪ ..‬ىذه مف ناحية‪ ..‬ومف‬
‫ناحية أخرى ال شؾ أف ليس كؿ البشر عمى شاكمة واحدة واﻷخالقيات تتبايف‬
‫فى كؿ مكاف وكؿ زماف‪ ..‬وشخصيا اعرؼ مف لجأ إلى السمطات وتـ‬
‫إنصافو‪ ..‬والمشكمة تكمف فى عدـ معرفة البعض بالنظـ القانونية التى تطبؽ‬
‫ىناؾ‪ ،‬وكما أف ىناؾ مف يمتؼ حوؿ تمؾ النظـ مف المواطنيف‪ ،‬فيناؾ أيضا‬
‫مف يمتؼ حوؿ تمؾ النظـ مف العامميف فيكوف الجزاء‪ ..‬ونحف نردد ىنا اف ىناؾ‬
‫ظمما وقع عمى احد مف مواطنينا ولكف إذا تحرينا فسوؼ نجد أف مواطننا ىو‬
‫الذى أوقع نفسو فى الخطأ فناؿ جزاءه‪ ..‬وكما أسمفت حينما يمجأ صاحب الحؽ‬
‫إلى السمطات فينصؼ‪ ..‬وأتذكر فى ثمانينيات القرف الماضى أف ميندسا تعاقد‬
‫مع احدىـ بمقابؿ ٓٓٓٗ لاير وحينما تسمـ العمؿ وذىب لتسمـ راتبو فوجئ بأف‬
‫‪157‬‬
‫الكفيؿ خفض الراتب إلى ٕٓٓٓ لاير‪ ،‬فاشتكاه الميندس إلى أمير الرياض‪،‬‬
‫وكاف وقتيا الممؾ سمماف‪ ..‬فاستدعى اﻷمير سمماف المواطف وأمره بتسميمو تماـ‬
‫عقده بالكامؿ وبمدة العقد (سنتيف) ونقؿ كفالة الميندس إلى إمارة الرياض‪.‬‬

‫‪158‬‬
159
PART IIII

160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
‫ضرورة التواصؿ لحؿ عادؿ لمقضية الفمسطينية مف خالؿ استئناؼ‬
‫المفاوضات الفمسطينية االسراأيمية تحت رعاية المجتمع الدولي وضرورة إنياء‬
‫االنقساـ الفمسطيني الداخمي‬
The necessity of reaching a just solution to the
Palestinian issue through resuming Palestinian-Israeli
negotiations under the patronage of the international
community and necessarily terminating Palestinian internal
discord.
‫القمؽ لتردى االوضاع في العراؽ وأفغانستاف وضرورة العمؿ عمى انياء‬
‫الصراعات الداخمية فى البمديف‬
Concern over the deteriorating situation in Iraq and
Afghanistan and the necessity of putting an end to the
internal strife in both countries.
‫اقتراح اف يضع الحوار ورقة عمؿ حوؿ مكافحة االرىاب والتعرؼ عمى‬
‫مسبباتو‬
Proposal for the Dialogue to put forward a working
paper on combating terrorism and identifying its causes
‫دعـ حوار الحضارات خاصة بيف االسالـ والغرب بغرض تصحيح‬
‫الصورة الخاطئة لالسالـ لدى بعض الدوائر الغربية وفى نفس الوقت أدانة شتى‬
‫أشكاؿ االساءة لمديف االسالمى ورموزة والتى تعكس جيال وعدـ اكتراث‬
‫بمشاعر المسمميف‬

Consolidation of the dialogue of civilizations

especially between Islam and the West with the aim of
correcting the false image of Islam according to some
Western milieus and meanwhile condemnation of all forms
of defamation of the Islamic religion and its symbols which
reflect profound ignorance and indifference about the
174
feelings of Muslims

‫التاكيد عمى التعاوف البناء بيف دوؿ اسيا والشرؽ االوسط لمواجية‬
‫المتغيرات االقتصادية والسياسية واالجتماعية التى تحدث حاليا والعمؿ عمى‬
‫مواجية التحديات المستقبمية مف خالؿ اليات اكثر فاعمية قابمة لمتنفيذ وتحقيؽ‬
‫نتائج‬

Emphasis on constructive cooperation among Asian

and Middle Eastern countries against a backdrop of
economic, political and social variables underway and
action to face up to future challenges through more
effective and viable mechanisms.
‫اف التوتر وعدـ االستقرار فى اى مف منطقتى اسيا والشرؽ االوسط مف‬
‫شانة التاثير سمبا عمى النمو فى المنطقة االخرى ومف ثـ فاف استمرار االحتالؿ‬
‫االسراأيمى وزيادة معاناة الشعب الفمسطينى تودى لتاجج مشاعر الياس‬
‫واالحباط وخمؽ بو ار لمعنؼ والتطرؼ فى منطقة الشرؽ االوسط واف مبادرة‬
‫السالـ العربية تمثؿ فرصة تاريخية مف اجؿ ايجاد حؿ عادؿ لمقضي‬
‫الفمسطينية‬
Tension and instability either in Asia or in the Middle
East will adversely impact on growth in the other region.
Therefore, the continued Israeli occupation and the
increased suffering of the Palestinian people certainly will
further ignite feelings of despair and depression and create
hotbeds of violence and extremism in the Middle East, thus
the Arab peace initiative provides a historic opportunity for
finding a just solution to the Palestinian issue.
‫ضرورة العمؿ عمى اخالء منطقة الشرؽ االوسط مف االسمحة النووية‬
‫واسمحة الدمار الشامؿ التى تيدد االمف والسمـ الدولييف‬
175
 Action to render the Middle East a region free of
nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction
threatening international security and peace.
‫الدعوة التى أطمقيا خادـ الحرميف الشريفيف لمحوار بيف االدياف خالؿ‬
‫لقائو التاريخى ببابا الفاتيكاف والتى لقيت ترحيبا واسعا مف القيادات الدينية‬
‫والمجتمع الدولى‬

The advocacy of the Custodian of the two Holy

Mosques for dialogue among religions during his historic
audience with the Pope of the Vatican that was widely
welcomed by religious leaderships and the international
community.
‫البناء عمى ما تحقؽ خالؿ الحوار لتعزيز التعاوف في مجاالت ىامة‬
‫عمى رأسيا التعميـ واالستثمار والبنوؾ والقطاع المالى والسياحة و المأكوالت‬
‫الحالؿ‬
Building on progress made in dialogue for the
promotion of cooperation in critical areas primarily
education, investment, banks, the financial sector, tourism
and Halal food
‫القمؽ لتردى االوضاع في العراؽ وأفغانستاف وضرورة العمؿ عمى انياأ‬
‫الصراعات الداخمية فى البمديف‬
Concern over the deteriorating situation in Iraq and
Afghanistan and the necessity of putting an end to the
internal strife in both countries.

‫اقتراح اف يضع الحوار ورقة عمؿ حوؿ مكافحة االرىاب والتعرؼ عمى‬
‫مسبباتة وأشار فى ىذا الصدد الى مركز مكافحة االرىاب الذى تـ انشائو فى‬

176
 ‫كوااللمبور‬
Proposal for the Dialogue to put forward a working
paper on combating terrorism and identifying its causes,
pointing in this connection to the Terrorism-Combating
Center established in Kuala Lumpur.

‫دعـ حوار الحضارات خاصة بيف االسالـ والغرب بغرض تصحيح‬

‫الصورة الخطأ لالسالـ لدى بعض الدوائر الغربية وفى نفس الوقت أدانة شتى‬
‫أشكاؿ االساءة لمديف االسالمى ورموزة والتى تعكس جيال وعدـ اكتراث‬
‫بمشاعر المسمميف‬

Consolidation of the dialogue of civilizations

especially between Islam and the West with the aim of
correcting the false image of Islam according to some
Western milieus and meanwhile condemnation of all forms
of defamation of the Islamic religion and its symbols which
reflect profound ignorance and indifference about the
feelings of Muslims

‫التأكيد عمى التعاوف البناء بيف دوؿ اسيا والشرؽ االوسط لمواجية‬
‫المتغيرات االقتصادية والسياسية واالجتماعية التى تحدث حاليا والعمؿ عمى‬
‫مواجية التحديات المستقبمية مف خالؿ اليات اكثر فاعمية قابمة لمتنفيذ وتحقيؽ‬
‫نتائج‬

Emphasis on constructive cooperation among Asian

and Middle Eastern countries against a backdrop of
economic, political and social variables underway and
177
action to face up to future challenges through more
effective and viable mechanisms.

‫اف التوتر وعدـ االستقرار فى اى مف منطقتى اسيا والشرؽ االوسط مف‬

‫شأنو التأثير سمبا عمى النمو فى المنطقة االخرى ومف ثـ فاف استمرار االحتالؿ‬
‫اإلسرائيمي وزيادة معاناة الشعب الفمسطينى تودى لتأجج مشاعر الياس‬
‫واالحباط وخمؽ بو ار لمعنؼ والتطرؼ فى منطقة الشرؽ االوسط واف مبادرة‬
‫السالـ العربية تمثؿ فرصة تاريخية مف اجؿ ايجاد حؿ عادؿ لمقضية‬
‫الفمسطينية‬

Tension and instability either in Asia or in the Middle

East will adversely impact on growth in the other region.
Therefore, the continued Israeli occupation and the
increased suffering of the Palestinian people certainly will
further ignite feelings of despair and depression and create
hotbeds of violence and extremism in the Middle East, thus
the Arab peace initiative provides a historic opportunity for
finding a just solution to the Palestinian issue.

‫ضرورة العمؿ عمى اخالء منطقة الشرؽ االوسط مف االسمحة النووية‬

‫واسمحة الدمار الشامؿ التى تيدد االمف والسمـ الدولييف‬

Action to render the Middle East a region free of

nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction
threatening international security and peace.

‫حرص المممكة عمى استقرار سوؽ البتروؿ والذى تجمى فى المشاركة‬

‫فى تاسيس المنتدى العالمى لمطاقة بيف المنتجيف والمستيمكيف واستضافة مقر‬
178
 ‫امانتة العامة فى مدينة الرياض‪.‬‬

‫‪The Kingdom’s concern with the stability of the oil‬‬

‫‪market as evidently demonstrated in the establishment of‬‬
‫‪the World Energy Forum between Producers and‬‬
‫‪Consumers while hosting the headquarters of its general‬‬
‫‪secretariat in the City of Riyadh‬‬

‫الدعوة التى أطمقيا خادـ الحرميف الشريفيف لمحوار بيف االدياف خالؿ‬
‫لقاأه التاريخى ببابا الفاتيكاف والتى لقيت ترحيبا واسعا مف القيادات الدينية‬
‫والمجتمع الدولى‬

‫‪The advocacy of the Custodian of the two Holy‬‬

‫‪Mosques for dialogue among religions during his historic‬‬
‫‪audience with the Pope of the Vatican that was widely‬‬
‫‪welcomed by religious leaderships and the international‬‬
‫‪community.‬‬

‫اليوـ ‪ ..‬دعوى فرض الحراسة عمى أمواؿ ممدوح إسماعيؿ‬

‫تنظر محكمة القاىرة لألمور المستعجمة اليوـ دعوى احد ورثة ضحايا‬
‫العبارة السالـ ‪ ٜٛ‬وأربعة مف الناجيف ضد رئيس الوزراء و وزير التضامف‬
‫االجتماعي و وزير النقؿ والبنؾ التجاري الدولي وبنؾ ناصر االجتماعي‬
‫وممدوح إسماعيؿ رئيس مجمس إدارة شركة السالـ لمنقؿ البرى مالكة العبارة‬
‫ويطالب المدعوف بفرض الحراسة القضائية عمى أمواؿ وممتمكات ممدوح‬
‫إسماعيؿ واﻷمواؿ المودعة بالبنكيف كتبرعات لضحايا الحادث وتعييف لجنة‬
‫قضائية رفيعة المستوى لتكوف حارسة عمى تمؾ اﻷمواؿ‪.‬‬
‫‪179‬‬
 Cairo Summary Court will look today the lawsuit filed
by one of the heirs of the victims of El-Salam 98 ferry and
four survivors against the Prime Minister, Minister of Social
Solidarity, Minister of Transport, the International
Commercial Bank, Nasr Bank and Mamdouh Ismail, the
Chairman of El-Salam company for transport, and the
owner of the ill-fated ferry boat. The claimants demand of
sequester the assets of Mamdouh Ismail and the funds
deposited in the two afore-mentioned banks, as donations
to the victims of the accident. The claimants also demand
the state to form a high-level judicial committee to be the
receiver of these funds.

180
The Abortion Law in Different Countries
Abortion is not permitted by law in Egypt, all Islamic
countries and many other countries. But it is permitted in
the United Kingdom and some other countries. In countries
where abortion is permitted, the operation is best carried
out at an early stage. But for various reasons this isn't
always possible and so the authorities have had to set an
upper limit beyond which it is unacceptable. In Britain that
limit is 28 weeks. Most people would probably be happy if
a limit could be set beyond which there would be no
chance of the aborted foetus surviving.
There's a body of research suggesting that around 23
weeks vital organs such as the lungs and the kidneys gain
the ability to function outside the womb. A 20 week foetus,
for example will simply be not capable of surviving
independently of its mother. Inevitably, though, the limits
in Britain and other parts of the world will continue to
depend more on the political strength of the various
pressure groups rather than on the results of medical
research.

181
 ‫قانون اإلجهاض في البالد المختمفة‬

‫ال َي ْسػ َػمح القػػانوف بػػإجراء عمميػػات إسػػقاط اﻷجنػػة فػػي مصػػر والبمػػداف اإلسػػالمية‬

‫كافػػة وفػػي عػػدد كبيػػر مػػف البمػػداف اﻷخػػرى‪ ،‬إال أنػػو ُي ْسػ َػمح بإجرائيػػا فػػي المممكػػة‬

‫المتح ػػدة وع ػػدد آخ ػػر م ػػف البم ػػداف‪ ،‬حي ػػث يفض ػػموف إجػ ػراء ى ػػذه العممي ػػات خ ػػالؿ‬

‫الم ارحػػؿ المبك ػرة مػػف الحمػػؿ‪ .‬ومػػع ذلػػؾ ال يكػػوف اإلسػػقاط المبكػػر متيس ػ ار دائمػػا‬

‫ﻷسباب متعددةو لذا عمػدت السػمطات إلػى تحديػد موعػد أقصػى لمحمػؿ ال ُي ْس َػمح‬

‫بعده بإجراء مثؿ ىذه العمميات‪ ،‬كما عميو الحاؿ في بريطانيا حيث ال ُي ْس َمح بيا‬

‫بع ػػد اﻷس ػػبوع الث ػػامف والعشػ ػريف م ػػف الحم ػػؿ‪ .‬وربم ػػا ي ػػرى معظ ػػـ الن ػػاس أف مػ ػف‬

‫اﻷفضؿ تحديد موعد لإلسقاط ال يمكف لمجنيف بعده أف يظؿ عمى قيد الحياة‪.‬‬

‫تشػػير إحػػدى جيػػات البحػػث إلػػى أف اﻷعضػػاء الحيويػػة كػػالرئتيف والكميتػػيف تكػػوف‬

‫قادرة عمى القيػاـ بوظائفيػا خػارج الػرحـ فػي اﻷسػبوع الثالػث والعشػريف تقريبػا مػف‬

‫الحمػؿو وعميػو ال يسػتطيع جنػيف عمػره عشػروف أسػبوعا‪ ،‬عمػى سػبيؿ المثػػاؿ‪ ،‬أف‬

‫يظؿ عمى قيد الحياة خػارج رحػـ اﻷـ‪ .‬وعمػى الػرغـ مػف ذلػؾ سػيظؿ حتمػا تحديػد‬

‫موع ػػد اإلس ػػقاط ف ػػي بريطانيػ ػػا وأجػ ػزاء أخ ػػرى م ػػف العػػػالـ رى ػػف الق ػػوى السياسػػػية‬

‫لجماعات الضغط المختمفة أكثر مف اعتماده عمى نتائج اﻷبحاث الطبية‪.‬‬

‫‪182‬‬
Merits of Knowledge
It is necessary from the outset to define and understand
three basic terms. The first one is knowledge. The Arabic
lexicon defines knowledge as “the process whereby a given
thing is perceived as it really is and whereby any
uncertainty about it is removed.” Knowledge is, in fact, the
source of insight that we need to distinguish between what
is right and wrong not only in our religious practices, but
also in our daily lives. Knowledge illuminates man’s path
towards safety and, as such, can be seen as the opposite of
our next term “ignorance”, which is, needless to say, equal
to misery and darkness. Our third term is “mind” that can
overlap sometimes, depending on context, with such terms
as “reason” and “reasoning”. It is an immaterial substance
which renders the unseen perceivable through the use of
some mental mechanisms, and the sensed objects through
sensation.
By the mind, “mindful” people, so often called “sane”,
watch for the straight path, which they must pursue in life
so as not to commit wrongful acts. Mind comes first in all
man’s acts and experience comes second. At the end of the

183
day, it is mind that can lead man to goodness and
righteousness.
God bestowed on man the power to reason, which sets
man aside from other animals. Through this faculty, man
can learn about the greatness of God but also about his
own being. Mind, therefore, serves as a guide for man to
righteousness and salvation and provides him with
safeguards against being corrupted or going astray. Mind is
the standard that is used in the Day of Judgment when
reckoning man for his acts in this life.
God is also merciful and does not mean for His servants a
strenuous journey towards guidance. Rather, He sent them
messengers, prophets and heavenly books to remove any
ignorance or misunderstanding of the secrets of the
universe and the existence of God. Man needs to be
awakened and to learn about the omnipotence of God.
Thus, with the last prophet, Messenger Muhammad, and
the last heavenly book, the Quran, human life has had a
chance to get out from the darkness of digression into the
light of righteousness. It was a good omen by God to
mankind. The omen has been fulfilled and salvation has

184
been attained by those who believed in God and His
messenger.

185
 ‫منافع وحسنات العمم‬

‫العمػػـ ىػػو إدراؾ الشػػيء عمػػى مػػا ىػػو بػػو‪ ،‬وزواؿ الخفػػاء عػػف المعمػػوـ‪ ،‬وىػػو نػػور‬

‫البصيرة ونعمة الفيـ لمتمييز بيف الخطأ والصواب‪ ،‬سػواء مػا يخػص العبػادات أو‬

‫المعامالت‪ ،‬وحقيقة العمـ بالخير السكوف فيو‪ ،‬وحقيقة العمـ بالشػر الخػروج عنػو‪،‬‬

‫وبػػالعمـ تُحػػث الخطػػى فػػي طريػػؽ السػػالمة‪ ،‬والجيػػؿ نقػػيض العمػػـ مسػ ٍ‬
‫ػتغف عػػف‬

‫التعريػػؼ فيػو شػػقاء وظػػالـ‪ ،‬أمػػا العقػػؿ فيػػو جػػوىر تُػػدرؾ بػػو الغائبػػات بالوسػػائط‬

‫والمحسوسات بالمشاىدة‪ ،‬والعقؿ يمنع ذوي العقوؿ مف العدوؿ عف سواء السػبيؿ‬

‫والصػػحيح‪ ،‬وأسػػاس اﻷمػػور العقػػؿ وفروعيػػا التجربػػة‪ ،‬والعقػػؿ قائػػد اإلنسػػاف لمخيػػر‬

‫والصالح‪.‬‬

‫ميز ام سبحانو وتعػالى اإلنسػاف بالعقػؿ عػف بػاقي مخموقاتػو ليتعػرؼ مػف خاللػو‬
‫ّ‬

‫إلػػى عظمػػة ام سػػبحانو وتعػػالى ووجػػوده‪ ،‬وليكػػوف دليػػؿ اإلنسػػاف إلػػى الص ػواب‬

‫الض ػػالؿ‪ ،‬وى ػػو ُحج ػػة ام عم ػػى عب ػػده ي ػػوـ الحس ػػاب‪،‬‬
‫والنج ػػاة‪ ،‬ويجنب ػػو الفس ػػاد و ّ‬

‫وجوىر اإلنساف العقؿ‪ ،‬وىو نور في القمب ُيفرؽ بيف الحؽ والباطؿ‪ ،‬ودليؿ عقؿ‬

‫المرء قولو‪ ،‬ودليؿ أصمو فعمو‪.‬‬

‫خمؽ ام المخموقات وىو موصوؼ بالرحمة والرأفة‪ ،‬ويريػد بعبػاده اليسػر واليدايػة‬

‫والص ػػالح‪ ،‬ل ػػذلؾ أرس ػػؿ لي ػػـ الرس ػػؿ واﻷنبي ػػاء والكت ػػب الس ػػماوية إل ازل ػػة الجيػ ػػؿ‬
‫‪186‬‬
‫والغموض عف سر ىذه الكوف وخالقو كػي يسػتفيؽ اإلنسػاف مػف غفمتػو‪ ،‬ويتعػرؼ‬

‫ػي‬
‫النبػػي العربػ ّ‬
‫إلػػى قػػدرة الخػػالؽ الجميػػؿ وعظمتػػو‪ ،‬وكػػاف آخػػر اﻷنبيػػاء والمرسػػميف َ‬

‫محم ػػد (ص ػػمى ام عمي ػػو وس ػػمـ) وآخ ػػر الكت ػػب الس ػػماوية القػ ػرآف الكػ ػريـ‪ ،‬وبيم ػػا‬
‫ّ‬

‫الرشػػد‪ ،‬وتمػػت‬
‫أخرجػػت الحيػػاة اإلنسػػانية مػػف الظممػػات إلػػى النػػور ومػػف التّيػػو إلػػى ُ‬

‫البشػػرى والنجػػاة لمػػف آمػػف بػػام ورسػػولو‪ ،‬وكفػػى مػػف كػػاف بػػام صػػادقاً ومصػػدقاً‪،‬‬

‫وكاف بام عالماً ومعمماً‪.‬‬

‫‪187‬‬
Egypt’s Code of Ethics in Journalism
Adopted by the Supreme Council of the Press on March 26,
1998
General Principles
The freedom of the press is part of the freedom of the
nation, and the commitment of journalists to defend the
freedom and independence of the press from all sources of
tutelage, censorship, orientation and containment are a
national and professional sacred duty.
Freedom is the basis of responsibility. Free press shall
exclusively have the merit of bearing the responsibility of
the word and the burden of guiding public opinion on
factual grounds.
The rights of citizens to access information is the core and
goal of journalism, for which reason free flow of
information shall be ensured and journalists shall be
allowed to access information from their sources. All
constraints on the dissemination of or commenting on
information shall be eliminated.
The press upholds a message of dialogue and participation.
Journalists shall bear the obligation of preserving the

188
fundamentals and ethics of dialogue while giving full
consideration to the right of readers to correct comments
and answers and the public right of citizens to preservation
of sanctity of their lives and human dignity.
The press shall assume a special responsibility vis-à-vis the
maintenance of public morals, human rights and rights of
women, families, childhood, minorities and third parties’
intellectual property.
The honour, ethics and secrets of the profession shall be
upheld by journalists, who shall live up to their fellowship
obligations when addressing any disputes that may arise
among them during the course or as a result of performing
their work.

189
 ‫ميثاق الشرف الصحفي المصري‬

‫الذي وافؽ المجمس اﻷعمى لمصحافة عمى إصداره بتاريخ‬

‫‪26 /3/1998‬‬

‫أوال‪ :‬مبادئ عامة‬

‫ٔ ػ ػ حري ػػة الص ػػحافة م ػػف حري ػػة ال ػػوطف‪ ،‬والتػ ػزاـ الص ػػحفييف بال ػػدفاع ع ػػف حري ػػة‬

‫الصحافة واستقالليا عف كؿ مصادر الوصاية والرقابة والتوجيو واالحتواء واجب‬

‫وطني وميني مقدس‪.‬‬

‫ٕػ الحرية أساس المسئولية‪ ،‬والصحافة الحرة ىي الجديرة وحدىا‪ ،‬بحمؿ مسئولية‬

‫الكممة وعبء توجيو الرأي العاـ عمى أسس حقيقية‪.‬‬

‫ٖ ػ ػ ح ػػؽ المػ ػواطنيف ف ػػي المعرف ػػة ى ػػو ج ػػوىر العم ػػؿ الص ػػحفي وغايت ػػو‪ ،‬وى ػػو م ػػا‬

‫يس ػػتوجب ض ػػماف الت ػػدفؽ الح ػػر لممعموم ػػات‪ ،‬وتمك ػػيف الص ػػحفييف م ػػف الحص ػػوؿ‬

‫عمييا مف مصادرىا‪ ،‬واسقاط أي قيود تحوؿ دوف نشرىا والتعميؽ عمييا‪.‬‬

‫ٗػ ػ الصػػحافة رسػػالة ح ػوار ومشػػاركة‪ ،‬وعمػػى الصػػحفييف واجػػب المحافظػػة عمػػى‬

‫أصػػوؿ الح ػوار وآدابػػو‪ ،‬وم ارعػػاة حػػؽ القػػارئ فػػي التعقيػػب والػػرد الصػػحيح‪ ،‬وحػػؽ‬

‫عامة المواطنيف في حرمة حياتيـ الخاصة وكرامتيـ اإلنسانية‪.‬‬

‫٘ػ لمصحافة مسئولية خاصة تجاه صيانة اآلداب العامة وحقوؽ اإلنساف والمرأة‪،‬‬

‫‪190‬‬
 ‫واﻷسرة والطفولة واﻷقميات‪ ،‬والممكية الفكرية لمغير‪.‬‬

‫‪ٙ‬ػ ػ شػػرؼ المينػػة وآدابيػػا وأس ػرارىا‪ ،‬أمانػػة فػػي عنػػؽ الصػػحفييف‪ ،‬وعمػػييـ التقيػػد‬

‫بواجبات الزمالة في معالجة الخالفات التي تنشأ بينيـ أثناء العمؿ أو بسببو‪.‬‬

‫‪ٚ‬ػ نقابة الصحفييف ىي اإلطار الشرعي الذي تتوحد فيو جيود الصحفييف دفاعػا‬

‫عػػف المينػػة وحقوقيػػا‪ ،‬وىػػى المجػػاؿ الطبيعػػي لتسػػوية المنازعػػات بػػيف أعضػػائيا‬

‫وتأميف حقوقيـ المشروعة‪.‬‬

‫وتضع النقابة ضػمف أولوياتيػا العمػؿ عمػى م ارعػاة االلتػزاـ بتقاليػد المينػة وآدابيػا‬

‫ومبادئي ػػا‪ ،‬واعم ػػاؿ ميث ػػاؽ الش ػػرؼ الص ػػحفي‪ ،‬ومحاس ػػبة الخ ػػارجيف عمي ػػو طبق ػػا‬

‫لإلجراءات المحددة المنصوص عمييا في قانوف النقابة وقانوف تنظيـ الصحافة‪.‬‬

‫‪191‬‬
The Four Pillars of Islam
The four pillars of Islam are enshrined in one of Prophet
Muhammad’s Speeches, commonly known by scholars as
the “Mother of all Prophet’s Speeches”. It tells about the
incidence of Angel Gabriel’s visit to the Messenger and his
companions. Narrated by Imam Muslim in his collection of
verified Speeches on the authority of Omar Ibin Al-Khattab
is that “One day, we were in the presence of Prophet
Muhammad (Peace be with him). All of a sudden, a purely
white dressed black haired man appeared showing no
marks of travelling. He was known to none of us. He sat by
Prophet Muhammad (peace be with him) knees by knees
putting his hands on the Prophet’s thighs. Then, he asked
him: ‘O Muhammad! Tell me about Islam”, to which the
Prophet answered: ‘Islam means that you bear witness
there is no god but God and that Muhammad is His
messenger, perform prayers, pay alms, observe the fasting
in Ramadan and go on the Hajj to the House if you are able
to do so.’ The inquirer said ‘You have said the truth.’ It
astonished us that the inquirer would ask a question then
would testify the truth of the answer. The inquirer, then,

192
asked ‘Now, tell me about Faith’. The Messenger of God
said ‘It is to believe in God and in His angles, His scriptures,
His messengers, the Last Day, and the act of God, be it
good or bad.’ The inquirer said ‘You have told the truth’
then he asked ‘What is Benevolence?’ The messenger said
‘It is to worship God as if you could see Him, but if you
cannot see Him, then learn that He does see you.’ The
inquirer, then, asked ‘When will be the Hour?’ The
Messenger of God answered ‘The one who is asked knows
not more than the inquirer does.’ The inquirer, then, asked
‘Then what are its Signs?’ The Messenger of God replied
‘That the slave-girl gives birth to her mistress, that the
bare-footed naked sheep-herders vie each other in erecting
buildings.’ The inquirer then parted from us. I stayed for
some time until the Messenger of God said to me: ‘Did you
know who the inquirer was?’ to which I answered ‘God and
His Messenger know more.’ The Messenger of God said ‘It
was Gabriel. He came to teach you matters in your
religion.’”

193
 ‫ترجمة حديث اركان اإلسالم (صحيح مسمم)‬

‫السػػالـ عمػػيكـ ورحمػػة ام وبركاتػػو الػػنص والترجمػػة‪ :‬أركػػاف الػػديف اﻷربعػػة أصػػؿ‬

‫معرفػػة أركػػاف الػػديف اﻷربعػػة عمػػؽ النظػػر فػػي حػػديث جبريػػؿ عميػػو السػػالـ‪ ،‬وىػػو‬

‫الحديث المعروؼ بأـ السنة‪ ،‬والذي رواه اإلماـ مسػمـ فػي صػحيح عػف عمػر بػف‬

‫الخطػاب رضػي ام عنػو‪ ،‬والػػذي جػاء فيػو‪ :‬بينمػا نحػػف عنػد رسػوؿ ام صػػمى ام‬

‫عمي ػػو وس ػػمـ ذات ي ػػوـ‪ ،‬إذ طم ػػع عمين ػػا رج ػػؿ ش ػػديد بي ػػاض الثي ػػاب‪ ،‬ش ػػديد سػ ػواد‬

‫الشعر‪ ،‬ال يرى عميو أثر السفر‪ ،‬وال يعرفو منا أحد‪ ،‬حتى جمس إلى النبي صمى‬

‫ام عميػػو وسػػمـ‪ ،‬فأسػػند ركبتيػػو إلػػى ركبتيػػو‪ ،‬ووضػػع كفيػػو عمػػى فخذيػػو‪ ،‬وقػػاؿ يػػا‬

‫محمد‪ ،‬أخبرني عف اإلسػالـ‪ ،‬فقػاؿ رسػوؿ ام صػمى ام عميػو وسػمـ‪ ” :‬اإلسػالـ‪:‬‬

‫أف تشيد أف ال إلو إال ام‪ ،‬وأف محمدا رسوؿ ام‪ ،‬وتقيـ الصالة‪ ،‬وتػؤتي الزكػاة‪،‬‬

‫وتصػػوـ رمضػػاف‪ ،‬وتحػػج البيػػت إف اسػػتطعت إليػػو سػػبيال ”‪ .‬قػػاؿ‪ :‬صػػدقت‪ ،‬قػػاؿ‪:‬‬

‫فعجبنػػا لػػو يسػػألو ويصػػدقو‪ .‬قػػاؿ‪ :‬فػػأخبرني عػػف اإليمػػاف‪ .‬قػػاؿ‪ ” :‬أف تػػؤمف بػػام‪،‬‬

‫ومالئكت ػػو‪ ،‬وكتب ػػو‪ ،‬ورس ػػمو‪ ،‬والي ػػوـ اآلخ ػػر‪ ،‬وت ػػؤمف بالق ػػدر خيػ ػره وشػ ػره ”‪ .‬ق ػػاؿ‪:‬‬

‫صػػدقت ‪ .‬قػػاؿ‪ :‬فػػأخبرني عػػف اإلحسػػاف‪ ،‬قػػاؿ‪ ” :‬أف تعبػػد ام كأنػػؾ تػراه‪ ،‬فػػإف لػػـ‬

‫تكف تراه‪ ،‬فإنو يراؾ ” ‪ .‬قاؿ‪ :‬فأخبرني عف الساعة ؟ ‪ .‬قاؿ‪ ” :‬ما المسئوؿ عنيا‬

‫بأعمـ مف السائؿ ” ‪ .‬قاؿ‪ :‬فأخبرني عف أمارتيا ؟ ‪ .‬قاؿ‪ ” :‬أف تمػد اﻷمػة ربتيػا‪،‬‬

‫وأف ترى الحفاة العراة العالة رعاء الشػاء يتطػاولوف فػي البنيػاف ” ‪ [ .‬ص‪] ٜٗ :‬‬

‫ثػػـ انطمػػؽ‪ ،‬فمبثػػت مميػػا‪ ،‬ثػػـ قػػاؿ لػػي‪ ” :‬يػػا عمػػر‪ ،‬أتػػدري مػػف السػػائؿ؟‪ .‬قمػػت‪ :‬ام‬

‫ورسولو أعمـ‪ .‬قاؿ‪ :‬ىذا جبريؿ أتاكـ يعممكـ دينكـ"‬

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