POLITICAL

Question:
1. A committee of the Senate invited Mr. X and Mr. Y , the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
and Secretary of Energy, respectively , as resource speakers for an inquiry in aid of
legislation. Mr. X refused to attend, arguing that the Senate, not its committee, has
the power to compel attendance. Meanwhile, Mr. Y attended the committee hearing
but upon being asked about discussions made during a close-door cabinet meeting,
he refused to answer invoking executive privilege. The committee members insisted
that Mr. Y answer the question pursuant to the right of Congress to information
from the executive branch.

a. Based on his argument, is Mr. X’s non-appearance permissible?

Suggested Answer:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution specifically provides that “the
Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure.”
Own Answer:
No. Mr. X’s non-appearance is not permissible.
Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution specifically provides that “the Senate
or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure.”
Thus, the Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation against Mr. X.

b. Is Mr. Y’s refusal to answer based on executive privilege valid? Explain.

Suggested Answer:
Yes, Mr. Y’s refusal is valid. The privilege includes “presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door cabinet meetings. “ The
intention of the President to prevent leakage of information to the public is crystal
clear because the discussions were made in a “closed-door meeting.” [Sereno v.
Committee on Trade and Related Matters, G.R. No. 175210, February 01, 2016]
Own Answer:
 Yes. Mr. Y’s refusal is valid.

The Supreme Court ruled in the case of Sereno v. Committee on Trade and Related
Matters , G.R. No. 175210 , February 01, 2016, that the privilege includes
“presidential conversations , correspondences, or discussions during closed-door
cabinet meetings. “The intention of the President to prevent leakage of information
to the public is crystal clear because the discussions were made in a “closed-door
meeting.”.

Here, it is evident that Mr. Y’s refusal is an executive privilege.

2. Ang Araw, a multi-sectoral party-list organization duly registered as such with the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) , was proclaimed as one of the winning party-list
groups in the last national elections. Its first nominee, Alejandro, assumed office as
the party-list representative.

About one year after Alejandro assumed office, the Interim Central Committee of
Ang Araw expelled Alejandro from the party for disloyalty and replaced him with
Andoy , its second nominee. Alejandro questioned before the Comelec his expulsion
and replacement by Andoy.

The Comelec considered Alejandro’s petition as an intra-party dispute which it could

resolve as an incident of its power to register political parties; it proceeded to
uphold the expulsion.

Is the Comelec’s ruling correct?

Suggested Answer:
Alejandro’s petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It is the HRET which has
jurisdiction over the case, because Alejandro is already a Member of the House of
Representatives (Lico v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205505, September 29,
2015).
Own Answer:
No. The COMELEC’s ruling is incorrect.
In the case of Lico v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015,
the Supreme Court ruled that it is the HRET which has jurisdiction over the case,
because Alejandro is already a Member of the House of Representatives.
 Thus, Alejandro’s petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

3. Two petitions for the cancellation of Certification of Candidacy (CoC)/ Denial of Due
Course were filed with the Comelec against two candidates running as municipal
mayors of different towns.

The first petition was against Anselmo. Years, ago, Anselmo was charged and
convicted of the crime of rape by final judgment, and was sentenced to suffer the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua which carried the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification. While Anselmo was in prison , the President
commuted his sentenced and he was discharged for prison.

The second petition was against Ambrosio. Ambrosio’s residency was questioned
because he was allegedly a “green card holder ,” i.e. a permanent resident of the
US , as evidenced by a certification to this effect from the US Embassy.

Acting on the recommendation of its Law Department , the Comelec en banc, motu
proprio issued two resolutions granting the petitions against Anselmo and Ambrosio.

Both Anselmo and Ambrosio filed separate petitions with the Supreme Court
assailing the resolutions cancelling their respective CoCs. Both claimed that the
Comelec en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction because the petition should have first heard and resolved by one of the
Comelec’s Division.

Are Anselmo and Ambrosio correct?

Suggested Answer:
Anselmo is incorrect. The rule is every quasi-judicial matter must first be tackled by a
division subject to appeal by way of a Motion for Reconsideration to the COMELEC
en banc. In Jalosjos v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013), it was determined
that a cancellation on the basis of perpetual disqualification is a matter that can be
taken judicial notice of. When it cancels a CoC on that ground, it is acting in
performance of an administrative function and , therefore, the rule in Article XI ,
Section 3 does not apply.
Ambrosio , on the other hand, is correct that the petition for the cancellation of CoC
should have been first heard and resolved by the Comelec Division. Cancellation
proceedings involve the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions. The Constitution
mandates the COMELEC , in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicia powers ,
 to hear and decide cases first by division and , upon motion for reconsideration , by
the COMELEC en banc (Bautista v. Comelec , G.R. Nos. 154796-97, October
23,2003).
Own Answer:
Anselmo is incorrect while Ambrosio is correct.
In Jalosjos v. COMELECT (G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013), it was determined that a
cancellation on the basis of perpetual disqualification is a matter that can be taken
judicial notice of. When it cancels a CoC on that ground, it is acting in performance
of an administrative function and, therefore , the rule in Article XI , Section 3 does
not apply.
Cancellation proceedings involve the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions. The
Constitution mandates the COMELEC , in the execrcise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers , to hear and decide cases first by division and , upon motion for
reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc.
Thus, The rule is every quasi-judicial matter must first be tackled by a division
subject to appeal by way of a Motion for Reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc.
On the other hand, he petition for the cancellation of CoC should have been first
heard and resolved by the Comelec Division
4. In 1990, Agripina migrated to Canada and acquired Canadian citizenship.

In 2008, Agripina retired and returned to the Phililippines to permanently reside in

her hometown of Angeles , Pampanga. A month after returning to the Philippines ,
Agripina too, her oath of allegiance and executed a sworn renunciation of her
Canadian citizenship in accordance with R.A. No. 9225.

In 2009 , Agripina filed her certificate of candidacy for Congress for the 2010
elections. Agripina’s political rivals lost no time in causing the filing of various actions
to question her candicacy. They questioned her eligibility to run as member of
Congress. Since Agripina had to take an oath under RA No. 9225, it meant that she
needed to perform an act to perfect her Philippine citizenship

They claimed , therefore, that Agripina could not be considered a natural-born

citizen. Agripina raised the defense that , having complied with the requirements of
RA No. 9225 , she had reacquired , and was deemed never to have lost , her
Philippine citizenship .

Is Agripina disqualified to run for Congress for failing to meet the citizenship
requirement?
Suggested Answer:
Agripina is eligible to run as member of Congress. Repatriation results in the recovery
of a person’s original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a Filipino citizen. If she were
originally a natural-born citizen before she lost her Philippine citizenship , she would
be restored to her former status as a natural-born Filipino (Bengson III vs. HRET , G.R.
No. 142840, May 7,2001 . See also: Parreno v. Commission on Audit , G.R. No.
162224, June 7, 2007 , and Tabasa v. Commission on Elections , G.R. Nos. 221697 &
221698-700 , March 8, 2016).
RA 9225 makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of RA No. 9225. For those who were
naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have reacquired their
Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63. In the case of those who
became foreign citizens despite having acquired foreign citizenship, provided they
take the oath of allegiance under the new law.
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the
effectivity of RA 9225 , she belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos who
lost their Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country , under the first
paragraph of Section 3. As the new law allows dual citizenship , she was able to
reacquire her Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance (See
Bengson v. HRET and as affirmed by Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC , G.R . No. 221697,
March 8, 2016).
Own Answer:
No. Agripina is not disqualified to run for Congress.
Repatriation results in the recovery of a person’s original nationality. This means that a
naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a Filipino citizen. If
she were originally a natural-born citizen before she lost her Philippine citizenship, she
would be restored to her former status as a natural-born Filipino (Bengson III v. HRET,
G.R. No. 142840, May 7,2001)

Considering that petitioner was a naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the

effectivity of RA 9225, she belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos who lost
their Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country, under the first
paragraph of Sec. 3. As the new law allows dual citizenship, she was able to reacquire
her Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.

Thus, Agripina is eligible to run as member of Congress.

 5. Under Section 6 of Article V (on Criminal Jurisdiction) of the Visiting Forces
Agreement , (VFA) , the custody of a United States (US) personnel who becomes
subject to criminal prosecution before a Philipine court shall be with the US military
authorities , if the latter so requests. The custody shall begin from the commission of
the offense until the completion of all judicial proceedings. When requested , the US
military authorities ,however , shall make the US personnel available to Philippine
authorities for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense which
the person has been charged. In the event that the Philippine judicial proceedings
are not completed with one year, the US shall be relieved of any obligation under
Section 6.

The constitutionality of Section 6 , Article V of the VFA is challenged on two

grounds : (1) it nullifies the exclusive power of the Supreme Court to adopt rules of
procedure for all courts in the Philippines ; and (2) it violates the equal protection
clause to the extent that it allows the transfer of the custody of an accused to a
foreign power is providing a different rule of procedure for that accused.
Suggested Answer:
The challenge is without merit.
The rule in international law is that foreign armed forces allowed to enter one’s
territory are immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. As a
result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of the Supreme Court to
adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, rather, it is one in which, as is
normally encountered around the world, laws (including rules of procedure) of one
State do not extend or Apply , except to the extent agreed upon , to subjects of
another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such
bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from
jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-
recognized subjects of such immunity , like Heads of State , diplomats and members
of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another State’s
territory. The Constitution, on the contrary, states that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of internation law as part of the law of the land (Art. II,
Sec. 2).
The equal protection clause is not violated,either , because there is a substantial
basis for a different treatment of foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our
territory and all other accused (Nicolas v. Romulo , G.R. No. 175888, February
11,2009)
Own Answer:
 The challenge is without merit.
Article II, Sec. 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides that the Philippines adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such aggrements recognizing immunity
from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long
recognized subjects of such immunity , like Heads of State, diplomats and members
of the armed forces of contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another
State’s territory.
As held in the case of Nicolas v. Romulo , G.R. No. 175888, February 11,2009, the
equal protection clause is not violated either, because there is a substantial basis for
a different treatment of foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory
and all other accused.
CIVIL
Question:
6. D, an Overseas Filipino Worker , was on his way home to the Philippines after
working for so many years in the Middle East. He had saved P100,000.00 in his home
country. On his flight home, tragedy struck as a suicide bomber blew up the plane.
All the passengers , including D, died. He Left behind his widowed mother M; his
common-law wife , W, who is the mother of his twin sons , T and S ; and his brother ,
B. He left no will, no debts , no other relatives , and no other properties except the
money in his savings account

Who are the heirs entitled to inherit from D and how much should each receive ?
Explain.
Suggested Answer:
D’s heirs entitled to inherit from him are :
M (his mother) – P50,000 and T and S (his twin sons) – P25,000
D died intestate and his heirs are the mother (legitimate ascendant) and his twin sons
(illegitimate) . The mother gets one-half of his estate and his two illegitimate sons gets
the other half (Article 991).
W, the “common-law wife “ is not heir ab instestato because she is not a legal spouse.
She is merely a partner in a non-marital union.

Own Answer:
 The heirs that are entitled to inherit from D are M (his mother) and T and S (his twin
sons).
Under the New Civil Code, the “common-law wife “ is not heir ab instestato because she
is not a legal spouse. She is merely a partner in a non-marital union. D died intestate and
his heirs are the mother (legitimate ascendant) and his twin sons (illegitimate) . The
mother gets one-half of his estate and his two illegitimate sons gets the other half
(Article 991).
Thus, M (his mother) – P50,000 and T and S (his twin sons) – P25,000.

7. M, single , named his sister N in his will, as a devisee over a certain parcel of land
that he owned , with the obligation of preserving the land and transferring it , upon
N’s death, to her illegitimate daughter O , who was then only a year old.

Is the condition imposed on N to preserve the land and to transmit it upon her death
to O a valid case of fideicommissary substitution?
Suggested Answer:
Yes, this is a valid case of fideicommissary substitution. Article 863 of the Civil Code
provides that a fideicommisary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir
instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir
the whole or part of the inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted. First ,
there is the absolute obligation imposed upon the fiduciary N to preserve and to
transmit to the fideicommisary O the part of the inheritance. Second , O, the
fideicommisary , as the fiduciary’s illegitimate daughter is one degree from the fiduciary.
Furthermore , O’s illegitimate status is of no moment, because Article 863 , referring to
the “heir” does not distinguish between legitimate from illegitimate relationships.
Own Answer:
Yes. The condition imposed on N is a valid case of fideicommissary substitution.
Article 863 of the Civil Code provides that a fideicommisary substitution by virtue of
which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted wit hteh obligation to preserve
and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance , shall be valid and
shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the
heir originally instituted.
First, there is the absolute obligation imposed upon the fiduciary N to preserve and to
transmit to the fideicommisary O the part of the inheritance. Second, O, the
fideicommisary , as the fiduciary’s illegitimate daughter is one degree form the fiduciary.
 Here, O’s illegitimate status is of no moment, because Article 863 , referring to the
“heir” does not distinguish between legitimate from illegitimate relationships.
8. Mr. P offered to sell his Manila Polo Club shares to Ms. Q for P2,500,000.00. Ms. Q
accepted on the condition that their agreement will not take effect until after one
(1) year. Mr. P then acceded and both of them shook hands. Excited about the
prospect of acquiring Mr. P’s shares, Ms. Q approached Mr. P seeking the
enforcement of their agreement for Mr. P to sell his shares to her . Mr. P refused to
honor their agreement, claiming that the same was covered by Statute of Frauds
because it was not reduced into writing and hence, unenforceable.

Is the position of Mr. P correct? Explain.

Suggested Answer:
No, the position of P is incorrect. The Statue of Frauds only applies to purely executory
contracts; partial performance removes the contract from the ambit of the Statute of
Frauds and not to partially or completely executed contracts. Article 1482 of the Civil
Code provides that whenever earnest money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be
considered as part of the price and as proof of the perfection of the contract. The
payment of earnest money, such as in this case, is tantamount to partial execution of
the contract which precludes the application of the Statute of Frauds. The contract has
been partially performed and a benefit was already accepted when the seller accepted
earnest money from the buyer [Article 1403 (2) (d) ; Averia v. Averia , G.R. No 141877,
August 13,2004 ; Mactan – Cebu International Airport Authority v. Tudtud , (2008)]
Own Answer:
No. Mr. P’s position is incorrect.
Article 1482 of the Civil Code provides that whenever earnest money is given in a
contract of sale, it shall be considered as part of the price and as proof of the perfection
of the contract. The payment of earnest money , such as in this case , is tantamount to
partial execution of the contract which precludes the application of the Statue of
Frauds.
The contract has been partially performed and a benefit was already accepted when the
seller accepted earnest money from the buyer.
Thus, Statute of Frauds only applies to purely executory contracts ; partial pefromance
removes the contract from the ambit of the Statute of Frauds and not to partially or
completely executed contracts.
9. Mr. A entered into a lease contract covering one of his commercial buildings with
XYZ Company, a partnership composed of X, Y, and Z , as lessee , for use as an office
 space. Upon failure to receive the rental payments when they fell due, Mr. A
immediately sought payment of the same from X, Y, and Z , asserting that the
individual partners are solidarily liable together with the partnership for its debts.

Y,Y, and Z disagreed with Mr. A’s contention , arguing further that in any event,
rentals should not be paid up until Mr. A makes the necessary arrangements for the
repair of the defective electrical wirings in the office that caused power outages and
hence, made it difficult , if not impossible , for them to conduct their usual business
operations.

Rule on the parties’ respective arguments.

Suggested Answer :
Mr. A’s contention that the individual partners are solidarily liable together with the
partnership for the partnership debts is untenable. Article 1768 of the Code provides
that the partnership has a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of
each of the partners. Article 1816 of the Civil Code further provides that all partners,
including industrial ones , shall be liable pro rata with all their property and after all
the partnership assets have been exhausted , for the contracts which may be entered
into in the name and for the account of the partnership , under its signature and by
a person authorized to act for the partnership.
The contention of X, Y, Z that the rentals should not be paid up until mr. A. , makes
the necessary arrangements for the repair of the defective electrical wirings in the
office that caused power outages is correct. Article 1658 of the Civil Code provides
that the lessee may suspend the payment of the rent in case the lessor fails to make
the necessary repairs or to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment
of the property leased. Repair of defective electrical wirings are necessary repairs.
Own Answer:
Mr. A’s contention that the individual partners are solidarily liable together with the
partnership debts is untenable.
Article 1768 of the Code provides that the partnership has a juridical personality
separate and distinct from that of each of the partners. Article 1816 of the Civil Code
further provides that all partners, including industrial ones, shall be liable pro rata
with all their property and after all the partnership assets have been exhausted , for
the contracts which may be entered into in the name and for the account of the
partnership, under its signature and by a person authorized to act for the
partnership.
 The contention of X,Y, Z that the rentals should not be paid up until Mr. A makes the
necessary arrangements for the repair of the defective electrical wirings in the office
that caused power outages is correct. Article 1658 of the Civil Code provides that the
lessee may suspend the payment of the rent in case the lessor fails to make the
necessary repairs or to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of
the property leased. Repair of defective electrical wirings are necessary repairs.

10. Sammy and Santi are cousins who separately inherited two (2) adjoining lots from
their grandfather. Sammy is based overseas but wants to earn income from his
inherited land, so he asked a local contractor to build a row of apartments on his
property which he could rent out. The contractor sent him the plans and said
nothing and gave approval to construct based on the plans submitted by the local
contractor . Santi , based locally , and who loved his cousin dearly, did not object
even if he knew of the encroachment since he was privy to the plans and visited the
property regularly. Later, the cousins had a falling out and Santi demanded that the
portion of the apartments that encroached on his land be demolished.

Can Santi successfully file legal action to require the demolition?

Suggested Answer:
No, Santi cannot successfully file a legal action to require the demolition. Since the
builder and the landowner both acted in bad faith, their rights shall be the same as
though both had acted in good faith (Article 453, Civil Code). Sammy is not a builder in
good faith with respect to the portion of the apartment encroaching on Santi’s property,
because he knew that he was not the owner of the land when he built the apartment.
There is bad faith, likewise , on Santi’s part, because he did not object to the
construction although he had knowledge thereof (Article 453, Civil Code).
In cases where both the landowner and the builder acted in good faith, the landowner
does not have the option to demand the demolition of the work (Article 448, Civil Code).
Own Answer:
No. Santi cannot successfully file legal action to require the demolition.
Article 453 of the Civil Code provides that since the builder and the landowner both
acted in bad faith, their rights shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.
Sammy is not a builder in good faith with respect to the portion of the apartment
encroaching on Santi’s property, because he knew that he was not the owner of the
land when he built the apartment. There is bad faith, likewise, on Santi’s part, because
he did not object to the construction although he had knowledge thereof.
 Thus, in cases where both the landowner and the builder acted in good faith , the
landowner does not have the option to demand the demolition of the work.

REMEDIAL
Question:
11. Dendenees Inc. and David, both stockholders owning collectively 25% of Darwinkle
Inc., filed an action before the RTC of Makati to compel its Board of Directors (BOD)
to hold the annual stockholders’ meeting (ASM) on June 21, 2017, as required by
Darwinkle Inc.s By-Laws , with prayer of preliminary mandatory injunction to use, as
record date , April 30, 2017. The complaint alleged , among others , that the refusal
to call the ASM on Jun 21,2017 was rooted in the plan of the BOD to allow Databank,
Inc. (which would have owned 50% of Darwinkle Inc. after July 15,2017) to
participate in the ASM to effectively dilute the complaints’ shareholdings and case
them out of the BOD. Dendenees Inc. and David paid the amount of Php 7,565 as
filing fees based on the assessment of the Clerk of Court. The Board of Directors filed
a motion t o dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They averred that the filing
fees should have been based on the actual value of the shares of Dendenees Inc.
and David , which were collectively worth Php 450 million.

If you were the Judge, will you grant the motion to dismiss?
Suggested Answer:
No. While the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement,
even its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the
dismissal of the case. The court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Here, Dendenees Inc. and David merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk
of court. If incorrect, the clerk of court has the responsibility of reassessing how
much they must pay within the prescriptive period (Proton Pilipinas v. Banque
Nationale de Paris, (G.R. no. 151242, June 15, 2005).
Own Answer:
If I were the judge, I will not grant the motion to dismiss.
In Remedial Law, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional
requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically
cause the dismissal of the case. The court may allow the payment of the fee within a
reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.
 Here, Dendenees Inc. and David merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk
of court. If incorrect, the clerk of court has the responsibility of reassessing how
much they must pay within the prescriptive period.
12. Dory Enterprises Inc. (Dory) leased to Digna Corporation (Digna) a parcel of land
located in Diliman , Quezon City. During the term of the lease. Digna was informed
by DBS Banking Corporation (DBS) that it had acquired the leased property from the
former owner Dory and required Digna to pay the rentals directly to it. Digna
promptly informed Dory of DBS’ claim of ownership. In response, Dory insisted on its
right to collect rent on the leased property.

Due to conflicting claims of Dory and DBS over the rental payments. Digna filed a
complaint for interpleader in the RTC of Manil. Digna also prayed that it be allowed
to consign in court the succeeding monthly rentals , and that Dory and DBS be
required to litigate their conflicting claims. It later appeared that an action for
nullification of a dacion en pago was filed by Dory against DBS in the RTC of Quezon
City. In said case, Dory raised the issue on which of the two corporations had better
right to the rental payments. Dory argued that, to avoid conflicting decisions, the
interpleader case must be dismissed.

Does the action for nullification of the dacion en pago bar the filing of the
interpleader case?
Suggested Answer:
Yes. The interpleader case must be dismissed. Interpleader, in this case, should have
been raised as a compulsory counterclaim. Failure to raise the same amounts to a
waiver of the counterclaim. ( Wack Wack Golf & Country Club , Inc. v. Won and Tan,
G.R. L-23851, March 26,1976).
Own Answer:
Yes. The action for nullification of the dacion en pago bar the filing of the
interpleader case.
In the case of Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Won and Tan , the court ruled
that , interpleader should have been raised as a compulsory counterclaim. Failure to
raise the same amounts to a waiver of the counterclaim.
Thus, the interpleader case must be dismissed.
13. Spouses Dondon and Donna Dumdum owned a residential lot in Dapitan City. Doy
Dogan bought said lot and took possession thereof with the promise to pay the
purchase price of Php 2 million within a period of six (6) months. After receiving only
Php 500,000, spouses Dumdum executed the Deed of Absolute Sale and transferred
 the title to Doy Dogan. The balance was not paid at all. Spouses Dumdum, through
their counsel, sent a demand letter to Doy Dogan for him to pay the balance of Php
1.5 million plus interest of Php 150,000. Doy Dogan responded in a letter by saying
that “while the remaining balance is admitted, the interest charged is excessive. “
There being no payment, Spouses Dumdum filed a complaint for reconveyance with
damages against Doy Dogan in the RTC of Dapitan City.

In his Answer, Doy dogan raised, by way of affirmative defense, that the purchase
price had been fully paid and for this reason the complaint should have been
dismissed.

Spouses Dumdum then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings which was
granted by the RTC of Dapitan City. The Court awarded Php 1.5 milliion actual
damages representing the balance of the purchase price, Php 200,000 as moral
damages, Php 200,000 as exemplary damages, Php 90,000 as interest, Php 50,000 as
attorney’s fees, and Php 5,000 as cost of suit.

Was it proper for the RTC of Dapitan City to grant the motion for judgment on the
pleadings?
Suggested Answer:
No. It was improper for the RTC of Dapitan City to grant the motion for judgment of
the pleadings.
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court states that a judgment on the pleadings is proper
where an answer failed to tender an issue or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. In this case, Doy dogan alleged that he
paid the purchase price in full, contrary to Spouses Dumdum’s allegation that doy
Dogan did not pay the balance of Php 1.5 Million. He tendered an issue in his answer
as to whether or not he has an outstanding unpaid balance with Spouses Dumdum.
The answer claims that the purchase price has been fully paid ; hence, a judgment on
the pleadings was improper.
Own Answer:
No. It was improper for the RTC of Dapitan City to grant the motion for judgment of
the pleadings.
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court states that a judgment on the pleadings is proper
where an answer failed to tender an issue or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.
 Here, Doy Dogan alleged that he paid the purchase price in full contrary to Spouses
Dumdum’s allegation that Doy Dogan did not pay the balance of Php 1.5 Million. He
tendered an issue in his answer as to whether or nothe has an outstanding unpaid
balance with Spouses Dumdum.
Hence, a judgment on the pleadings was improper.

14. In 2015, Dempsey purchased from Daria a parcel of land located in Dumaguete ,
Negros Oriental. The latter executed a Deed of Absolute Sale and handed to
Dempsey the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 777 covering the taxes, registration
and transfer costs. Dempsey kept the TCT in his possession without having
transferred it to his name. A few years thereafter, when he already had the funds to
pay for the transfer costs, Dempsey went to the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete
and discovered that , after the sale , Daria had filed a petition for reconstitution of
the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 777 which the RTC granted. Thus, unknown to
Dempsey, Daria was able to secure a new TCT in her name.

What is Dempsey’s remedy to have the reconstituted title in the name of Daria
nullified?
Suggested Answer:
Dempsey may file a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court.
The Supreme Court had consistently held that when the owner’s duplicate certificate
of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the
reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered the decision had no
jurisdiction. As a rule, reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of the
original certificate. In this regard, the remedy to nullify an order granting
reconstitution is a petition for annulment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
(Eastworld Motor Industries Corporation v. Skunac Corporation , G.R. No. 163994,
16 December 2005)
In this case , RTC Dumaguete had no jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of the
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 777, considering that the owner’s duplicate copy
thereof had not been lost , but is merely in Dempsey’s possession. The order
granting Darla’s petition for reconstitution is therefore void ; accordingly , Dempsey
may file a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 to nullify the
reconstituted title in Daria’s name.
Own Answer:
 Dempsey’s remedy is to file a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court.
The Supreme Court ruled in the case of Eastworld Motor Industries Corporation v.
Skunac Corporation , G.R. No. 163994, 16 December 2005 that when the owne’rs
duplicate certificate of title has been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another
person, then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered
the decision had no jurisdiction. As a rule, reconstitution can validly be made only in
case of loss of the original certificate.
Here, RTC Dumaguete had no jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of the owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 777 , considering that the owner’s duplicate copy thereof
had not been lost, but is merely in Dempsey’s possession.
15. Denny is on trial for homicide. The prosecution calls Danilo, a police officer , who
interviewed the victim, Drew, shortly after the shooting. Danilo’s testimony is being
offered by the prosecution for purposes of proving that (i) Drew is now dead ;(ii)
Drew asked the nurse for water but was refused because he was bleeding , which
subsequently angered Drew ; and (iv) that before dying , Drew signed a statement in
which he identified Denny as the shooter.

Is the proposed testimony of Danilo admissible?

Suggested Answer:
Yes. The subject matter of Danilo’s statements could be admitted to independently
relevant statement. They are intended to merely establish either the truth or falsity
of Drew’s statements.
Own Answer:
Yes. Danilo’s proposed testimony is admissible.
Under Remedial Law, the subject matter of police office could be admitted to
independently relevant statement.
Here, they are intended to merely establish either the truth or falsity of Drew’s
statements.