Saguinsin v. Lindayag, G.R. No.

L-17759, December 17, 1962

Facts:

Maria V. Lindayag died intestate on November 10, 1959, leaving behind real and personal properties.
On May 27, 1960, Isabel V. Saguinsin, the deceased's sister, filed a petition for letters of administration
over Maria's estate. She alleged the existence of properties and identified the surviving heirs as Dionisio
Lindayag (surviving husband) and other sisters, including herself.

Dionisio Lindayag, the surviving spouse, filed a motion to dismiss the petition. He argued that Saguinsin
lacked an interest in the estate because she was neither an heir nor a creditor. He asserted that Maria
V. Lindayag was survived by him and their three legally adopted minor children (Jesus, Concepcion,
and Catherine Lindayag), thereby excluding the petitioner from being an heir. A certified true copy of
the adoption decree was presented as evidence.

The Court of First Instance of Zambales dismissed the petition, finding that Saguinsin was merely the
sister of the deceased, while the surviving heirs were the husband and the three adopted children. The
court also noted that the surviving heirs opted for an extra-judicial settlement.

Saguinsin's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading her to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether Isabel V. Saguinsin, as the deceased's sister, qualifies as an "interested person" in the estate
of Maria V. Lindayag, thus having the legal capacity to petition for letters of administration.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding that Isabel V. Saguinsin was not
an "interested person" in the estate.

The Court reiterated the well-settled doctrine that an "interested party" in special proceedings, such as
a petition for letters of administration, must have a material and direct interest, not merely an indirect
or contingent one. This interest is typically held by an heir who would benefit from the estate or a creditor
who has a claim against it.

In this case, the evidence presented during the motion to dismiss (which the Court held can be
introduced and considered at such a hearing) clearly established that Maria V. Lindayag was survived
by her husband and three legally adopted children. Under the law, legally adopted children are
considered legitimate children for all purposes, including inheritance. Therefore, they and the surviving
spouse are the compulsory heirs, excluding collateral relatives like a sister.

Since Isabel V. Saguinsin was not an heir and had no direct and material interest in the estate, she
lacked the legal capacity to institute the proceedings for letters of administration.

Dispositive:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the petition for
letters of administration.

Armas v. Calisterio, G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000

Facts:

Teodorico Calisterio died intestate on April 24, 1992, leaving behind an estate. He was survived by his
wife, Marietta Calisterio. However, Marietta had been previously married to James William Bounds on
January 13, 1946. James disappeared without a trace on February 11, 1947. Eleven years later, on
May 8, 1958, Marietta married Teodorico without first securing a judicial declaration that James was
presumptively dead.

Antonia Armas y Calisterio, Teodorico's sister, filed a petition for intestate probate of Teodorico's estate,
claiming to be the sole surviving heir. She argued that Marietta's marriage to Teodorico was bigamous
and thus null and void due to the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James
Bounds.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of Antonia, declaring her the sole heir. Marietta appealed
to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the RTC decision, holding that Marietta's marriage to
Teodorico was valid and that she was a compulsory heir, entitled to one-half of Teodorico's estate, while
Antonia and her children were entitled to the other half. Antonia then elevated the case to the Supreme
Court.

Issue:

1. Whether Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico Calisterio was valid despite the absence
of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of her first husband.
2. Whether the Family Code or the Civil Code should apply in determining the validity of the
marriage.
3. What are the proper successional rights of the parties?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision with modification, ruling as follows:

1. Validity of the Marriage (Applicability of the Civil Code): The Supreme Court held that
the Civil Code, not the Family Code, was the law applicable to the marriage between Marietta
and Teodorico, as it was solemnized on May 8, 1958, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988. Under Article 83 of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted by a
spouse whose first spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years without news of being
alive, or who is generally considered dead, is deemed valid "until declared null and void by
a competent court." In this case, James William Bounds had been absent for over eleven
years before Marietta married Teodorico. The Court found no evidence of bad faith on Marietta's
part. Therefore, the second marriage was valid under the Civil Code, even without a prior
judicial declaration of presumptive death. The burden of proof to assail the second marriage
lies on the party challenging it.
2. Successional Rights:
o Since Marietta's marriage to Teodorico was valid, she is considered a compulsory heir.
As the surviving spouse concurring with Teodorico's sister, Marietta is entitled to one-
half (1/2) of Teodorico's estate.
o The other half (1/2) of the estate pertains to Teodorico's sister, Antonia Armas. The
Court corrected the CA's ruling by clarifying that Antonia's children are not entitled
to inherit alongside Antonia. Under the rules of intestate succession, brothers and
sisters exclude nephews and nieces, except when the latter succeed by right of
representation of their parents who are already dead or incapacitated. In this case,
Antonia, as Teodorico's sister, is alive and capable of inheriting.
3. Conjugal Property: The Court affirmed that the house and lot at #32 Batangas Street, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, was conjugal property, and upon Teodorico's death, it
should be divided into two equal portions, one for Marietta and the other for Teodorico's estate.
4. Administrator: The matter of appointing an administrator for Teodorico's estate was remanded
to the trial court to determine Marietta's competence and willingness to act as administrator. If
found competent and willing, she should be appointed; otherwise, another competent and
willing next-of-kin should be chosen.

Dispositive:
The Supreme Court affirmed with modification the decision of the Court of Appeals. Marietta
Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico Calisterio was upheld as valid, and she was declared a compulsory
heir entitled to one-half of the estate. The other half was awarded to Antonia Armas, to the exclusion of
her children. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the ruling.

Banawa v. Mirano, G.R. No. L-24750, May 16, 1980

Facts:

This case involves a dispute over the ownership of two parcels of land: the "Iba property" and the
"Carsuche property," both located in Taal, Batangas.

The petitioners, Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza (later substituted by their heirs Casiano
Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica), were a childless married couple. Around 1911, they took in Juliana's
niece, Maria Mirano, and raised her as if she were their own child.

Regarding the Iba Property: In 1921, Placido Punzalan sold a parcel of land in Iba, Taal, Batangas,
with the deed of sale naming Maria Mirano as the vendee. This sale was purportedly to settle a debt
Punzalan owed to the Banawa spouses. The Banawa spouses claimed they provided the funds for the
purchase, but alleged that they intended Maria to own the land only after their death, suggesting a
"simulated contract" to mask either a donation mortis causa or a trust arrangement.

Regarding the Carsuche Property: In December 1935, another parcel of land (the Carsuche property)
was acquired. There was conflicting evidence regarding the initial vendee. The Mirano heirs claimed
Maria Mirano was the vendee in a public instrument. In contrast, the Banawas asserted the sale was
actually to them via a private writing. Crucially, in 1940, the Banawa spouses executed a deed of sale
of the Carsuche property to themselves, which they then subsequently donated to their adopted
daughter, Gliceria Abrenica. The Banawa's maintained continuous physical possession of this
property from 1940 onwards.

Upon Maria Mirano's death, her siblings and their children (the respondents, Primitiva Mirano, et al.)
claimed ownership of both properties as her legal heirs. They initiated a case in the Court of First
Instance of Batangas. The trial court ruled in favor of the Mirano heirs for both properties. This decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Consequently, the petitioners (heirs of the Banawa spouses)
appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Whether the placing of the Iba property in Maria Mirano's name constituted a valid
donation inter vivos or a simulated contract intended as a donation mortis causa or a trust,
thereby affecting its ownership.
2. Whether the petitioners (Banawa heirs) acquired ownership of the Carsuche property through
acquisitive prescription due to their prolonged possession.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals.

1. Regarding the Iba Property (Valid Donation Inter Vivos to Maria Mirano): The Supreme
Court upheld the finding that the Iba property legally belonged to Maria Mirano. The Court found
no evidence of a simulated contract, fraud, or an intent to create a trust. The deed of sale
explicitly identified Maria Mirano as the vendee, stating she paid for the property. The Court
concluded that the funds used for the purchase were effectively given by the Banawa spouses
to Maria Mirano, making it her own money. This was considered an effective donation inter
vivos of the funds, which then allowed Maria Mirano to acquire ownership. The Court also held
that the Banawa spouses were equitably estopped from denying Maria Mirano's ownership,
as their conduct at the time of the sale led the vendors to believe she was the true purchaser.
 The doctrine of reserva adoptiva was ruled inapplicable as Maria Mirano was not legally
adopted.
2. Regarding the Carsuche Property (Acquisitive Prescription in favor of Banawa
Heirs): The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' ruling on the Carsuche property. The
Court found compelling evidence that the petitioners (Banawa spouses and their heirs) had
been in actual, open, public, continuous, and adverse possession of the Carsuche
property under a claim of title since 1940, when the deed of sale was registered in their names.
Even if there was a prior alleged sale to Maria Mirano, the petitioners' possession met the
requirements for acquisitive prescription under the applicable laws (Civil Code and Code of
Civil Procedure), which, depending on the circumstances, required either ten years of such
possession in good faith and with a just title, or twenty years of continuous adverse possession
regardless of good faith or just title. The Court held that their continuous, uninterrupted
possession since 1940, far exceeding the required prescriptive periods, had unequivocally
ripened into ownership.

Dispositive:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with respect to the Iba property,
thereby declaring it to belong to the respondents (Mirano heirs) and ordering the petitioners to pay
damages. However, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals with respect to
the Carsuche property, consequently declaring it to belong to the petitioners (Banawa heirs) by virtue
of acquisitive prescription.

Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 890, G.R. No. L-51263, February 28, 1983

Facts:

Francisca Reyes died intestate on July 12, 1942. She was survived by two daughters, Maria Cailles
and Silvestra Cailles, and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, who was the son of her deceased daughter
Pascuala Cailles.

Sotero Leonardo died in 1944. Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.

On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo filed a complaint for ownership of properties,
sum of money, and accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. He claimed to be the son of the
late Sotero Leonardo and sought to be declared one of the lawful heirs of Francisca Reyes, entitled to
a one-half share of her estate, jointly with Maria Cailles.

Maria Cailles, the other surviving daughter of Francisca Reyes, asserted exclusive ownership over the
properties and alleged that Cresenciano Leonardo was an illegitimate child who could not inherit by
right of representation. Another defendant, James Bracewell, claimed ownership of the properties by
virtue of a deed of sale from Maria Cailles. These properties were also allegedly mortgaged to the Rural
Bank of Parañaque, Inc.

The Court of First Instance initially ruled in favor of Cresenciano Leonardo, but the Court of Appeals
reversed this decision, dismissing his complaint. Cresenciano Leonardo then appealed to the Supreme
Court.

Issue:

Whether Cresenciano Leonardo, as the alleged great-grandson of Francisca Reyes, has the legal right
to inherit by right of representation.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that Cresenciano
Leonardo did not have the legal right to inherit by right of representation.
The Court held that even if it were true that Cresenciano Leonardo was the child of Sotero Leonardo,
he could not, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca
Reyes. This was because, as found by the Court of Appeals, Cresenciano Leonardo was born outside
wedlock. The evidence showed that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative
father and mother were not yet married, and, furthermore, his alleged father's first marriage was still
subsisting.

The Court cited Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which establishes the "iron curtain
rule" in intestate succession. This article states that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. Since Francisca Reyes
was the legitimate grandmother of Cresenciano's alleged father, and Cresenciano was an illegitimate
child, he was barred from inheriting from her estate.

The Court emphasized that the findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are generally final and conclusive
upon the Supreme Court, and in this case, the appellate court's finding regarding Cresenciano's
illegitimate filiation was supported by the evidence.

Dispositive:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, thereby dismissing Cresenciano
Leonardo's complaint and denying his claim to inherit from the estate of Francisca Reyes.

Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427, G.R. No. L-66574, June 17, 1987

Facts:

This case involves a dispute over the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

The undisputed facts are:

• Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero was the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo
Santero.
• Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
• Pascual Santero died in 1970, Pablo Santero died in 1973, and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
died in 1976.
• At the time of his death, Pablo Santero was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six
minor natural (illegitimate) children: four with Anselma Diaz and two with Felixberta Pacursa.
• Felisa Pamuti-Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Felisa's mother, Juliana,
was the legitimate sister of Simona Pamuti.

Upon Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero's death, both Felisa Pamuti-Jardin (the niece) and the natural
children of Pablo Santero (the illegitimate grandchildren) claimed to be the rightful heirs to Simona's
intestate estate.

The petitioners (the guardians of Pablo's natural children) argued that the amendment of Articles 941
and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil
Code of the Philippines) constitutes a substantial change that grants illegitimate children certain
successional rights, including the right to inherit by representation from their legitimate grandparent.

The Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) ruled in favor of Felisa Pamuti-Jardin, holding
her to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. The
petitioners then elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero—her niece, Felisa Pamuti-Jardin, or her
grandchildren (the natural/illegitimate children of her deceased legitimate son, Pablo Santero)?
Specifically, can illegitimate children inherit by right of representation from their legitimate grandparent?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, holding that Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin is the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
The Court ruled that the natural children of Pablo Santero are barred from inheriting from their
legitimate grandmother, Simona, by virtue of Article 992 of the Civil Code.

The Court reiterated and firmly upheld the "iron curtain rule" enshrined in Article 992 of the Civil Code,
which states:

"An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child."

The Court emphasized that the term "relatives" in Article 992 should be interpreted in its general sense,
embracing all kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context clearly indicates a more restrictive
meaning. There is nothing in the Civil Code that limits the term "relatives" to only collateral relatives.
This article establishes a barrier (an "iron curtain") between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family. This means that an illegitimate child, even if recognized, cannot inherit by right of representation
from the legitimate ascendants or collateral relatives of his or her legitimate parent.

In this case, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero was a legitimate relative (grandmother) of Pablo Santero.
Since Pablo's children (the petitioners) were illegitimate, Article 992 squarely applied, preventing them
from inheriting from Simona's legitimate estate, even by representing their legitimate father, Pablo.
Conversely, Felisa Pamuti-Jardin, as a legitimate niece, was the closest legitimate collateral relative
entitled to inherit.

The Court held that the intent of the law is to keep separate the property of the legitimate family from
that of the illegitimate family, thus avoiding confusion and preserving the integrity of each line.

Dispositive:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, declaring Felisa Pamuti-
Jardin as the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Manuel v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 117246, August 21, 1995

Facts:

This case involves an inheritance dispute over the estate of Juan Manuel, who died intestate on
February 21, 1990. Juan Manuel was an illegitimate child of Antonio Manuel and Ursula Bautista. He
married Esperanza Gamba, but they had no children of their own. They took in Modesta Manuel-
Baltazar and raised her as their "daughter," though she was not formally adopted.

Juan Manuel acquired several parcels of land during his lifetime. In 1980, he executed a Deed of Sale
Con Pacto de Retro over a portion of his land in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, with a 10-year redemption
period.

Juan Manuel died intestate, and his wife Esperanza Gamba also passed away in 1992, shortly after
him.

Following Esperanza's death, Modesta Manuel-Baltazar executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication,

claiming Juan Manuel's properties as her own. This led to the cancellation of Juan Manuel's original
titles and the issuance of new titles in Modesta's name. Modesta then executed a Deed of Renunciation
and Quitclaim over the unredeemed portion of the land previously sold with pacto de retro to
Estanislaoa Manuel.

The petitioners in this case are the legitimate children of Antonio Manuel (Juan Manuel's father, but
with his legitimate wife, Beatriz Guiling). They filed a complaint seeking to nullify Modesta's Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication and the new titles issued in her name, arguing that they were the legal heirs to one-
half of Juan Manuel's intestate estate, while the other half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse,
under Article 994 of the Civil Code.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint, ruling that the petitioners, not being heirs ab
intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the
suit. The RTC also ordered the petitioners to pay moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
and litigation expenses to the respondents. The petitioners then elevated the case to the Supreme
Court.

Issue:

1. Whether the petitioners, as legitimate siblings of Juan Manuel (who was an illegitimate child),
have the legal standing to inherit from his intestate estate. This involves the interpretation and
application of Article 992 in relation to Article 994 of the Civil Code.
2. Whether Modesta Manuel-Baltazar, as a ward, acquired any inheritance rights over Juan
Manuel's estate.
3. Whether the award of damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses to the respondents
was justified.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint but deleted the award of
damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.

1. On Inheritance and Article 992 (The "Iron Curtain Rule"): The Court definitively ruled that
the petitioners, as legitimate siblings of Juan Manuel, do not have the right to inherit from his
intestate estate. The Court reiterated the strict application of Article 992 of the Civil Code,
known as the "iron curtain rule," which states:

"An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child."

The Court explained that this article establishes an "absolute separation" between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate family in intestate succession. This means that a legitimate
relative (like the petitioners, who are legitimate children of Antonio Manuel) cannot inherit ab
intestato from an illegitimate relative (like Juan Manuel), even if they share a common parent.
The law presumes an "intervening antagonism and incompatibility" between the two family lines,
which bars intestate succession between them in the collateral line.

The petitioners' argument that Article 994 (which states that if an illegitimate child's spouse
survives with "brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces," the spouse gets one-half and the
latter the other half) should apply, was rejected. The Court clarified that the "brothers and sisters,
nephews and nieces" referred to in Article 994 must be illegitimate relatives themselves to be
able to inherit from an illegitimate child. Article 992 acts as a fundamental barrier that cannot
be circumvented by Article 994 for legitimate relatives.

Since the petitioners are legitimate siblings of their father Antonio Manuel, they cannot inherit
from Juan Manuel, who is Antonio's illegitimate son. Therefore, they were not real parties-in-
interest to question the disposition of Juan Manuel's estate.
 2. On Modesta Manuel-Baltazar's Rights: The Court noted that Modesta Manuel-Baltazar,
being merely a ward ("ampon") and not judicially adopted, also did not have any legal right
to inherit from Juan Manuel's estate ab intestato. Her act of self-adjudication was therefore
legally baseless. However, since the petitioners themselves lacked standing, they could not
successfully challenge Modesta's actions.
3. On Damages: The Court found no sufficient reason to sustain the award of moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses. The mere fact that a complaint is
dismissed does not automatically warrant such awards. There was no showing that the
petitioners acted in bad faith in pursuing their claim.

Dispositive:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court dismissing the petitioners' complaint for lack
of standing. However, the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation
expenses to the respondents was deleted.

Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, G.R. No. 84240, March 25, 1992

Facts:

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973, without any legitimate, acknowledged natural,
adopted, or spurious children. He was survived by his widow, Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, and the
children of his full-blood and half-blood siblings.

Among those who claimed to be heirs were Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual (petitioners).
They were the acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, who was a full-blood brother of the
deceased Don Andres Pascual. In other words, the petitioners were the illegitimate nephews and niece
of Don Andres Pascual.

Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse, initially filed a supplemental petition for letters of
administration, expressly including Olivia and Hermes among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual.
However, later, the other legitimate heirs of Don Andres Pascual (his legitimate nephews and nieces)
entered into a compromise agreement for the settlement of the estate, effectively excluding Olivia and
Hermes. The compromise agreement did include a reservation preserving Olivia's and Hermes' claims.

Despite this reservation, Olivia and Hermes filed a "Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights" in the
intestate proceedings, asserting their right to inherit from Don Andres Pascual. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) denied their motion, finding that they had no right to inherit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTC's decision, prompting the petitioners to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, as acknowledged natural children (illegitimate) of
Eligio Pascual (the full-blood brother of the deceased), have the right to inherit ab intestato from their
legitimate uncle, Don Andres Pascual. This specifically involves the interpretation and application of
Article 992 of the Civil Code.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that Olivia S. Pascual and
Hermes S. Pascual, being illegitimate, cannot inherit ab intestato from Don Andres Pascual, who was
a legitimate relative.

The Court firmly relied on Article 992 of the Civil Code, which states:
"An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child."

The petitioners argued that, as "acknowledged natural children," they should not be included in the term
"illegitimate child" under Article 992, suggesting that the prohibition should only apply to spurious
children (those born of incestuous or adulterous relations). They contended that "natural children" are
in a better legal standing and should be allowed to inherit from their legitimate relatives.

However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument. Citing its previous ruling in Diaz v. Intermediate
Appellate Court (1987), the Court reiterated that Article 992 creates a "barrier" or "iron
curtain" between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family. This "absolute separation" means
that there can be no intestate succession between them in the collateral line, regardless of the type of
illegitimacy (whether natural or spurious).

The Court emphasized that the law recognizes a presumed "antagonism and incompatibility" between
the legitimate and illegitimate family lines, and Article 992 simply codifies this reality by avoiding further
grounds for resentment and discord over inheritance. The natural tie of blood is not recognized by law
for the purposes of intestate succession across this divide.

Therefore, applying the "iron curtain rule," the illegitimate nephews and niece (petitioners) were barred
from inheriting from their legitimate uncle (Don Andres Pascual).

Dispositive:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for review on certiorari and affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals, thereby upholding the exclusion of Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual from
the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.

Tolentino v. Paras, G.R. No. L-43905, May 30, 1983

Facts:

Petitioner Serafia G. Tolentino was lawfully married to Amado Tolentino on July 31, 1943. While this
first marriage was still subsisting, Amado Tolentino contracted a second marriage with Maria Clemente
on November 1, 1948, in Paombong, Bulacan.

Serafia G. Tolentino subsequently filed a criminal case for bigamy against Amado Tolentino in the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan. Amado Tolentino pleaded guilty to the charge and was duly sentenced.

After serving his prison sentence, Amado Tolentino continued to live with Maria Clemente until his death
on July 25, 1974. Upon his death, Amado's death certificate erroneously listed "Maria Clemente" as the
"Name of Surviving Spouse."

Serafia G. Tolentino then filed Special Proceedings No. 1587-M to correct the entry in the death
certificate, seeking to change the name of the surviving spouse from Maria Clemente to Serafia G.
Tolentino. The lower court dismissed this petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law" and
indicated the need for a more detailed proceeding.

Subsequently, Serafia Tolentino filed a new action against Maria Clemente and the Local Civil Registrar
of Paombong, Bulacan, seeking: 1) a judicial declaration that she is the lawful surviving spouse of
Amado Tolentino, and 2) the correction of Amado's death certificate.

The respondent court (Court of First Instance) dismissed this second action, reiterating that: 1)
correction of an entry in the Local Civil Registrar's office is not the proper remedy as it involves a marital
relationship; 2) the court had not acquired proper jurisdiction due to the absence of mandatory
publication as prescribed under Article 108 read with Article 412 of the Civil Code; and 3) the subject
matter had been previously addressed in the earlier dismissed special proceeding.

Serafia Tolentino then appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Whether the petitioner's suit, seeking a judicial declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and
subsequent correction of the death certificate, is a proper and appropriate remedy.
2. Whether the lack of publication, as required by Rule 108 (in conjunction with Article 412 of the
Civil Code) in the previous special proceeding, deprived the court of jurisdiction in the present
proceeding.
3. Whether Amado Tolentino's conviction for bigamy serves as conclusive evidence to establish
the nullity of his second marriage and the validity of his first marriage.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the respondent court, ruling in favor of Serafia G. Tolentino.

1. Proper Remedy: The Court held that Serafia's suit was indeed a proper remedy. While her
ultimate objective was the correction of an entry in the civil register, she primarily sought a
judicial declaration of her marital status as the lawful surviving spouse. This type of action is of
an adversary character, not merely a summary proceeding. It asserts a right against parties
who have an interest in contesting it (Maria Clemente and the Local Civil Registrar were made
party defendants and appeared). Therefore, it was the appropriate legal action to resolve the
substantive issue of marital status.
2. Necessity of Publication: The Court ruled that the publication required under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court was not absolutely necessary in this specific case. Publication is typically
required to bar all who might object to a right sought to be established. However, here, all
directly affected parties (Serafia, Maria Clemente, and the Civil Registrar) were impleaded and
properly represented in court. The controversy was squarely between them. Furthermore, even
if it were a Rule 108 proceeding, it was the court's duty to order publication, which it failed to
do. The Court emphasized that courts are more concerned with the substance of actions rather
than mere form.
3. Conclusive Evidence of Marital Status: The Court found that Amado Tolentino's conviction
for bigamy, based on his plea of guilty, furnished conclusive proof of the marital
status of Serafia and Amado. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission by the
accused of its existence. The Court reiterated that the second marriage contracted by Amado
with Maria Clemente during the lifetime of his first spouse was null and void from the
beginning and of no force and effect. Crucially, no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage. Thus, it was unequivocally established that Maria
Clemente was not the surviving spouse, but Serafia G. Tolentino was. Rectification of the
erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar could therefore be validly made.
While entries in public documents are presumed correct, this is a disputable presumption that
must yield to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy.

Dispositive:

The Supreme Court set aside the Order of the respondent court dated October 21, 1975, and declared
Serafia G. Tolentino the lawful surviving spouse of the deceased Amado Tolentino. It ordered the
rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar to reflect Serafia G.
Tolentino as the surviving spouse instead of Maria Clemente.

Zosima Verdad v. The Hon. Court of Appeals and Socorro C. Rosales, et al.

G.R. No. 109972, April 29, 1996

Ponente: Vitug, J.
Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the right of legal redemption of a residential lot in Butuan City. The lot
originally belonged to Macaria Atega, who died intestate in 1956. Macaria had children from two
marriages. One of her children from her second marriage was David Rosales. Upon Macaria's death,
her estate, including the subject lot, passed on to her surviving children, among them David Rosales,
who became a co-owner of the property.

David Rosales later died, and his undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria passed
on to his widow, private respondent Socorro C. Rosales, and her co-heirs, pursuant to the law on
succession.

In 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos (a son from Macaria's first marriage), namely his widow and
children, sold their interest in the disputed lot to petitioner Zosima Verdad. There were two deeds of
sale with differing prices (P55,460.00 and P23,000.00), with the petitioner explaining the second deed
was to save on capital gains tax.

Socorro C. Rosales discovered the sale on March 30, 1987, while at the City Treasurer's Office. The
very next day, March 31, 1987, she sought the intervention of the Lupong Tagapayapa (barangay
conciliation body) to redeem the property and tendered the sum of P23,000.00 to Zosima Verdad.
Zosima refused the tender, claiming it was much less than the lot's current value.

No settlement was reached, so on October 16, 1987, Socorro and the other private
respondents initiated an action for "Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction" before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City. The RTC ruled that the private respondents' right to redeem had
lapsed. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, holding that Socorro was entitled to
redeem the property. Zosima Verdad then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Whether Socorro C. Rosales, as the widow of a co-owner, had the right of legal redemption.
2. Whether the right of legal redemption was timely exercised despite the lapse of several years
since the sale, considering the absence of written notice.
3. Whether the tender of payment made by Socorro C. Rosales was valid.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, upholding
Socorro C. Rosales' right to redeem the property.

1. Right of Legal Redemption: The Court clarified that while Socorro, as a daughter-in-law, is
not a direct intestate heir of her mother-in-law Macaria, her right to the property stems from
being a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales. David Rosales undeniably became a co-
owner of the property upon Macaria's death. When David died, his undivided interest in the
property passed to his widow, Socorro, and her co-heirs. Thus, Socorro became a co-owner of
the property, which then gave rise to her right of legal redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil
Code when the interest of the other co-owners was sold to a third person (Zosima Verdad).
2. Timeliness of Redemption and Necessity of Written Notice: The Court held that the right of
redemption was timely exercised by the private respondents. Crucially, no written notice of
the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-owners, as required under
Article 1623 of the Civil Code. The Court reiterated its long-established rule
that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written
notice from the selling co-owner to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and
conditions, efficacy, and status. Since no written notice was provided, the 30-day period for
redemption had yet to commence when Socorro sought to exercise the right of redemption on
March 31, 1987. The Court distinguished this case from Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
where the right of redemption was invoked after a significantly long period (thirteen years),
implying bad faith. Here, Socorro acted immediately upon learning of the sale.
 3. Validity of Tender of Payment: The Court found the tender of payment made by Socorro to
be valid. The attempt to redeem through the barangay conciliation proceedings, and the actual
tender of the price (P23,000.00, which was the price stated in the notarized deed of sale),
indicated a bona fide intention to redeem. The fact that Zosima refused the amount did not
invalidate the tender, as it was made in good faith and in accordance with the stipulated price.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, recognizing Socorro C. Rosales' right to
legal redemption. The case highlights the importance of the mandatory written notice under Article
1623 of the Civil Code for the commencement of the redemption period in co-ownership, emphasizing
that actual knowledge alone is not sufficient to trigger the running of the period. It also underscores the
protection afforded to co-owners in exercising their right of legal redemption.

Intestate Estate of Pedro Santillon, Claro Santillon v. Perfecta Miranda, et al.

G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965

Ponente: Bengzon, C.J.

Facts:

Pedro Santillon died intestate on November 21, 1953, in Tayug, Pangasinan. He was survived by his
wife, Perfecta Miranda, and their only legitimate son, Claro Santillon. During their marriage, Pedro
acquired several parcels of land.

Approximately four years after Pedro's death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration.
This petition was opposed by Perfecta Miranda and spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales.
The oppositors argued, among other things, that most of the properties were conjugal, with some being
Perfecta's exclusive property, and that Perfecta had already conveyed a portion of her undivided share
to Benito and Rosario. They also contended that administration was unnecessary due to a pending
partition case and that Perfecta was more qualified to administer the estate.

Perfecta Miranda was subsequently appointed administratrix. The court later appointed commissioners
to draft a project of partition and distribution of all properties.

Claro Santillon then filed a motion seeking to declare the shares of the heirs and resolve conflicting
claims. He invoked Article 892 of the New Civil Code, arguing that after deducting Perfecta's conjugal
half, the remaining half of Pedro's estate should be divided such that Perfecta gets 1/4 and he gets 3/4.

Perfecta, on the other hand, contended that under Article 996 of the New Civil Code, she was entitled
to an additional 1/2 share of the remaining half, besides her conjugal half.

The lower court ruled that in the intestate succession of Pedro Santillon, Perfecta Miranda shall inherit
one-half (1/2) share and Claro Santillon shall inherit the remaining one-half (1/2) share, after deducting
the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties. Claro Santillon appealed this order to
the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Whether the lower court's order determining the distributive shares of the estate was
appealable.
2. How the estate of a person who dies intestate should be divided when the only survivors are
the surviving spouse and one legitimate child.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the lower court.

1. Appealability of the Order: The Court held that the order of the lower court, which determined
the distributive shares of the heirs, was final and therefore appealable to the Supreme Court.
This is clearly allowed under Rule 109, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which permits appeals
in special proceedings from an order that determines "the distributive share of the estate to
which such person is entitled."
2. Division of Intestate Estate: The core of the dispute revolved around the interpretation of
Articles 892 and 996 of the Civil Code.
o Claro's argument (Article 892): Claro insisted on applying Article 892, which
states: "If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives, the widow
or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate." He interpreted this
to mean that the surviving spouse gets 1/4 and the child gets 3/4.
o Perfecta's argument (Article 996): Perfecta invoked Article 996, which governs
intestate succession and provides: "If a widow or widower and legitimate children or
descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as
that of each of the children."

The Supreme Court clarified that Article 892 pertains to testamentary succession and
merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse when concurring with a legitimate
child. It does not govern the entire distribution in intestate succession.

The Court ruled that Article 996 is the applicable provision for intestate succession when
a surviving spouse concurs with one legitimate child. It emphasized that the word "children" in
Article 996 should be understood to include the singular "child" under the rule of statutory
construction that the plural includes the singular.

Therefore, applying Article 996, the surviving spouse and the legitimate child shall share
the estate equally.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court affirmed that in intestate succession, when the deceased is survived by a legitimate
spouse and one legitimate child, the surviving spouse and the child shall inherit equal shares (one-half
each) of the decedent's estate, after the deduction of the surviving spouse's share in the conjugal
partnership.

Spouses Charlito Coja and Annie Mesa Coja v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Feliciano Aquillo,
Sr.

G.R. No. 151153, December 10, 2007

Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.

Facts:

The dispute involves a 120-square meter lot in Poblacion, Mandaon, Masbate, which was originally
acquired by spouses Feliciano Aquillo, Sr. and Lorenza Mangarin Aquillo during their marriage. Upon
Lorenza's death in 1956, her heirs, including her husband Feliciano Sr., and their children Luz and
Feliciano Jr., inherited her share of the conjugal property. No partition of the estate was effected.

Feliciano Sr. later cohabited with Paz Lachica and eventually married her two days before his death in
1965. After Feliciano Sr.'s death, his heirs (Luz, Feliciano Jr., and his widow Paz Lachica) also did not
partition his estate. This meant that Paz Lachica became a co-owner of the 120-sqm lot to the extent
of her hereditary share as a surviving spouse concurring with legitimate children.
On December 18, 1986, Paz Lachica sold the entire 336-square meter property (which included the
120-sqm lot) to petitioners Spouses Charlito Coja and Annie Mesa Coja through a Deed of Absolute
Sale. A new Tax Declaration was issued in the Cojas' names, canceling the previous one.

Subsequently, Charlito Coja filed an application for the issuance of title over the property with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). This was opposed by Luz Aquillo Victor (one of Feliciano Sr.'s children)
and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), arguing that the Cojas or their predecessors-in-interest
had not been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession for the period required by law,
and that Paz Lachica was not the sole owner.

The heirs of Feliciano Aquillo, Sr. (respondents herein, including Luz's substituted heirs) also filed an
action for recovery of possession and ownership with damages against the Spouses Coja and Paz
Lachica. They claimed to be the true and lawful heirs of the original spouses.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Spouses Coja, confirming and registering their title, believing they
purchased the property in good faith from Paz Lachica, who they thought was the sole owner. The RTC
opined that since the tax declaration was in Paz Lachica's name alone, it implied it was not part of the
conjugal partnership of Feliciano Sr. and Lorenza.

The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision. It held that the 120-sqm lot was indeed conjugal
property of Feliciano Sr. and Lorenza, as it was acquired during their marriage. Upon Lorenza's death,
her half of the conjugal property (60 sqm) was transmitted to her heirs (Feliciano Sr., Feliciano Jr., and
Luz, each getting 20 sqm). The remaining half (60 sqm) pertained to Feliciano Sr. as his share in the
conjugal partnership. Upon Feliciano Sr.'s death, his total share of 80 sqm (60 sqm from his conjugal
share + 20 sqm from Lorenza's inheritance) was transmitted to his heirs: Feliciano Jr., Luz, and his
widow Paz Lachica. Applying Article 996 of the Civil Code (surviving spouse has the same share as
each child in intestate succession), Paz Lachica's share in this 80 sqm portion was 26.6666 sqm (1/3
of 80 sqm), while Feliciano Jr. and Luz each got 26.6666 sqm.

Thus, the CA concluded that Paz Lachica could only validly sell her 26.6666 sqm share of the 120-sqm
property, and the sale of the remaining 93.3333 sqm (belonging to the heirs of Feliciano Sr. and Lorenza)
to the Cojas was null and void. The CA ordered the nullification of the sale insofar as the heirs' shares
were concerned and ordered the Cojas to deliver possession of those portions.

The Spouses Coja appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Whether the 120-square meter lot was conjugal property of Feliciano Aquillo, Sr. and Lorenza
Mangarin Aquillo.
2. Whether Paz Lachica had the right to sell the entire 120-square meter lot to the petitioners.
3. Whether the petitioners were buyers in good faith and whether their title should be confirmed
and registered.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court partially granted the petition, affirming the Court of Appeals' decision with
modifications as to the specific portions.

1. Nature of the Property: The Court affirmed the CA's finding that the 120-square meter lot
was conjugal propertyof Feliciano Sr. and Lorenza. This is based on Article 160 of the Civil
Code, which presumes all property of the marriage to belong to the conjugal partnership unless
proven to pertain exclusively to the husband or the wife. The lot was acquired during their
marriage, and the petitioners failed to present strong, clear, categorical, and convincing
evidence to rebut this presumption. Tax declarations in a single spouse's name, especially
when not updated, are not conclusive proof of exclusive ownership.
2. Paz Lachica's Right to Sell: As a consequence of the lot being conjugal property of Feliciano
Sr. and Lorenza, and upon their respective deaths, a co-ownership was established among
 their heirs. Paz Lachica, as the surviving spouse of Feliciano Sr., was a co-owner, but only to
the extent of her hereditary share (26.6666 sqm out of the 120 sqm). The Court reiterated the
principle that a co-owner can only dispose of his or her aliquot share, and the sale of the entire
property by one co-owner without the consent of the others is valid only as to the seller's
proportionate share, but void as to the shares of the other co-owners. Thus, Paz Lachica could
only validly sell her 26.6666 sqm share.
3. Good Faith and Registration of Title: The Court found that the petitioners, the Spouses
Coja, were not buyers in good faith with respect to the entire 120-square meter lot. While
they may have believed Paz Lachica to be the sole owner, the surrounding circumstances (e.g.,
the original tax declaration being in Feliciano Sr.'s name, and the fact that they were dealing
with the second wife selling a property acquired during the first marriage) should have prompted
them to make further inquiries. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a
reasonable man on guard. Furthermore, the property was not yet titled land under the Torrens
system, meaning that the principle of "innocent purchaser for value" applies with less rigor.

However, the Court clarified that while the sale was void as to the shares of the other co-owners,
the sale was valid with respect to Paz Lachica's proportionate share (26.6666 sqm).
Therefore, the petitioners acquired ownership over this portion. The Court modified the CA's
order by recognizing the co-ownership between the respondents (heirs of Feliciano Sr. and
Lorenza, with 93.3333 sqm) and the petitioners (who acquired Paz Lachica's 26.6666 sqm
share). Given that the property has not yet been partitioned, the Court cannot order the physical
delivery of specific portions.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court affirmed the co-ownership of the 120-square meter property between the heirs of
Feliciano Aquillo, Sr. (respondents) and the Spouses Coja (petitioners). The sale executed by Paz
Lachica was declared valid only as to her 26.6666 square meter undivided share, making the Spouses
Coja co-owners with the heirs of Feliciano Aquillo, Sr. The case was remanded for proper partition of
the property. This decision underscores the importance of the presumption of conjugal partnership, the
limits of a co-owner's right to dispose of common property, and the vigilance required of purchasers,
especially in untitled properties.

Jovencio Arcenas, et al. v. Hon. Antonio D. Cinco, et al.

G.R. No. L-29288, November 29, 1976

Ponente: Antonio, J.

Facts:

This case originated from Civil Case No. P-118, an action filed by Teodora Vda. de Arcenas (private
respondent and widow of Alfonso Arcenas) against her son Jovencio Arcenas (petitioner) and spouses
Nemesio Acain and Rosa Diongson (also petitioners). Teodora sought partial annulment of deeds of
sale, return of property possession, accounting of produce, and partition of properties.

The parties submitted a "Stipulation of Facts" on February 24, 1967, establishing that Alfonso Arcenas
died intestate on March 4, 1962, leaving as heirs his wife Teodora and their only son Jovencio. The
deceased left three real properties: two agricultural lands (Cabangbang and Sillon) and a residential lot.
It was further stipulated that Jovencio had sold the Cabangbang and Sillon properties to the Acain and
Diongson spouses without his mother's knowledge. The "Stipulation of Facts" also noted that the parties
agreed "to Partition the properties" and submitted "for the decision of the Court the issue in the
interpretation of Article 996, New Civil Code, as to the share of the surviving spouse de Arcenas."
All parties waived claims for accounting, reimbursement for improvements, damages, attorney's fees,
or costs.

On June 9, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision, declaring Teodora Vda. de Arcenas entitled to an
undivided one-half share in the Cabangbang and Sillon properties, and awarding the residential lot
solely to Jovencio. The court then ordered the physical partition of the properties, stating that it would
appoint a commissioner if the parties failed to submit a deed of partition.

Subsequent proceedings involved the appointment of a commissioner and the submission of reports
on the physical division, which considered existing improvements (like coconut trees on the Sillon
property) and encumbrances (a mortgage on the Cabangbang lot).

Petitioners Jovencio Arcenas, Nemesio Acain, and Rosa Diongson attempted to appeal the trial court's
orders. However, on May 18, 1968, the respondent Judge dismissed their appeal, ruling that the June
9, 1967 decision had become final and executory and that the subsequent orders sought to be reviewed
were merely orders to implement it.

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court, seeking
to nullify the dismissal of their appeal and to compel the approval of their Record on Appeal.

Issues:

1. Whether the decision of June 9, 1967, was a final and executory judgment, thereby rendering
the appeal unmeritorious.
2. What is the proper share of a surviving spouse in an intestate estate when there is only one
legitimate child, applying Article 996 of the Civil Code?
3. How should improvements made by co-owners be considered in a partition.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, set aside the respondent Court's Order
dismissing the appeal, and provided guidance on the partition.

1. Nature of the June 9, 1967 Decision (Appealability): The Supreme Court ruled that the June
9, 1967 decision was not a final and executory judgment but rather interlocutory (meaning
it did not completely dispose of the case). The Court clarified that the decision was based on a
"Stipulation of Facts," not a judicial compromise. A compromise implies reciprocal concessions,
which was not the case here as the parties still submitted an "issue" (interpretation of Article
996) for the court's decision. More importantly, the decision ordered the partition of properties
and required the parties "to submit the corresponding deed of partition to the Court for its
approval." This meant that something more had to be done in the trial court for the complete
disposition of the case, such as the actual physical division, the appointment of commissioners
if needed, and the court's approval of the final partition. Thus, the decision was not yet ripe for
execution and was therefore appealable.
2. Share of Surviving Spouse (Article 996 Civil Code): While not the primary issue for certiorari,
the Court addressed the underlying question of the shares for proper guidance during partition.
It reiterated the ruling in Santillon v. Miranda (G.R. No. L-19281), which clarified Article 996 of
the Civil Code. The Court held that in intestate succession, if a widow or widower and legitimate
children (or a child) are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share
as that of each of the legitimate children. Therefore, in this case, Teodora Vda. de Arcenas
and her son Jovencio Arcenas should each receive an equal share (one-half) of the estate of
the deceased Alfonso Arcenas, after the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
3. Equitable Partition and Improvements: The Court emphasized the general rule in actions for
partition that when one of two or more tenants in common has made permanent and valuable
improvements on the common property, the court will, in dividing the property, allot to him
that part on which the improvements have been made, or so much thereof as will include
his improvements, provided it can be done without prejudice to the rights of the other
co-tenants. If not, then the improver should be compensated for the value of the improvements.
This principle of equity aims to prevent unjust enrichment. The Court noted that the
commissioner's report, which considered the improvements made by the Acain spouses on the
Sillon property (planting of coconut trees) and the mortgage on the Cabangbang property,
should be taken into account to achieve an equitable partition.
Conclusion:

The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in dismissing the appeal as the initial judgment
ordering partition was interlocutory. It set aside the dismissal order and remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with its pronouncements, specifically: (1) allowing the appeal,
(2) ensuring Teodora Vda. de Arcenas gets an equal share with her son Jovencio Arcenas, and (3)
taking into account the improvements and other equitable considerations in the physical partition of the
properties.

Wencesla Cacho v. John G. Udan, et al.

G.R. No. L-19996, April 30, 1965

Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L.

Facts:

Silvina G. Udan died single, leaving a purported will. In her will, she named her son, Francisco G. Udan,
and Wencesla Cacho as her sole heirs, share and share alike. Francisco G. Udan was presumed to be
an illegitimate son as he was simply identified as "son" in the will and born out of wedlock.

Wencesla Cacho filed a petition for the probate of Silvina's will. Initially, Rustico G. Udan, Silvina's
legitimate brother, opposed the probate. Francisco G. Udan also filed his own opposition. Later, Rustico
withdrew his opposition.

Subsequently, Francisco G. Udan died during the pendency of the probate proceedings. After
Francisco's death, John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan, both legitimate brothers of the testatrix Silvina,
refiled their oppositions to the probate. They argued that the will was not properly executed, that Silvina
lacked testamentary capacity, and that the will was procured by fraud or undue influence.

The Court of First Instance of Zambales disallowed the oppositions of John and Rustico Udan on the
ground that they lacked interest in the estate, thereby having no standing to oppose the will's probate.
The court reasoned that even if the will were denied probate, Silvina's illegitimate son Francisco (whose
rights, upon his death, passed to his own heirs) would still inherit to the exclusion of his mother's
legitimate brothers. John and Rustico Udan appealed this decision directly to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Whether the legitimate brothers of the deceased (John and Rustico Udan) have standing to
oppose the probate of her will when she has an illegitimate son who would inherit in intestacy.
2. Whether the death of the illegitimate son during the pendency of the probate proceedings
affects the standing of the legitimate brothers.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's order disallowing the opposition of John and Rustico
Udan.

1. Standing to Oppose Probate: The Court held that the legitimate brothers, John and Rustico
Udan, do not have standing to oppose the probate of Silvina's will. The Court cited Articles
988 and 1003 of the Civil Code, which dictate the order of intestate succession. These articles
provide that illegitimate children succeed to the entire estate in the absence of legitimate
descendants or ascendants, and they exclude collateral relatives (like brothers and sisters).
o Since Silvina had an illegitimate son, Francisco, he was her intestate heir, to the
exclusion of her legitimate brothers.
o For a party to have standing to oppose a will's probate, they must show an "interest" in
the estate. This interest usually arises from being an heir who would inherit if the will
 were not probated. In this case, even if the will were denied probate, the brothers would
not inherit, as Francisco, the illegitimate son, would still be the sole intestate heir. Their
intervention would merely result in unnecessary complication.
2. Effect of Illegitimate Son's Death: The Court further clarified that the subsequent death of
Francisco G. Udan (the illegitimate son) did not improve the standing of the legitimate
brothers. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the decedent's death (in this case, Silvina's death). Francisco, by surviving his
mother, acquired these hereditary rights. His death simply meant that these rights were then
transmitted to his own heirs (whoever they may be), not to his mother's legitimate brothers.

The Court also invoked Article 992 of the Civil Code, famously known as the "iron curtain
rule" or "barrier rule." This article establishes an absolute bar to intestate succession
between the illegitimate child and the legitimate relatives of the child's father or mother. The
Court explained the rationale for this rule: "Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility." Thus, legitimate
relatives of the mother cannot inherit from her illegitimate child, and vice versa, in intestate
succession.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court definitively ruled that legitimate brothers of a deceased person have no standing
to oppose the probate of a will if the deceased is survived by an illegitimate child, because under the
law of intestate succession (Articles 988, 1003, and especially 992 of the Civil Code), the illegitimate
child excludes the legitimate collateral relatives. This case strongly affirms the "iron curtain rule" and its
implications for hereditary succession.

Carolina Abad Gonzales, et al. v. Court of Appeals, Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia H. Abad, Marian
H. Abad and Rosemarie S. Abad

G.R. No. 117740, October 30, 1998

Ponente: Purisima, J.

Facts:

This case involves a dispute over the intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.

On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad, and Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco, claiming to be the sole heirs of their brother Ricardo (alleging he died a bachelor without
descendants or ascendants), filed a petition for the settlement of his intestate estate. They later
amended their petition, asserting that the real properties listed under Ricardo's name were actually
administered by him, and the true owner was their late mother, Lucila de Mesa. Concurrently, on May
2, 1972, the petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of Lucila de Mesa's estate in their favor,
leading to the issuance of new Torrens titles in their names.

On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia H. Abad, and Marian H. Abad filed
a motion to set aside the proceedings and to file an opposition. They alleged that Honoria Empaynado
was the common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for 27 years (1943-1971) and that their union produced two
children, Cecilia and Marian. They also disclosed the existence of a third child, Rosemarie S. Abad,
allegedly fathered by Ricardo with another woman. They argued that as the law awards the entire estate
to surviving children to the exclusion of collateral relatives, the petitioners deliberately concealed the
existence of these children to deprive them of their inheritance.

The trial court, after trial, rendered a judgment on November 2, 1973, declaring Cecilia, Marian, and
Rosemarie as the acknowledged natural children and the only surviving legal heirs of Ricardo
Abad. It denied the petition of the collateral relatives (petitioners) to the estate and administration. It
also appointed Honoria Empaynado as administratrix.
On November 19, 1974, the trial court further declared that the six parcels of land (covered by TCTs in
Ricardo's name) and a residential house were the properties of Ricardo Abad. It declared the
extrajudicial settlement of Lucila de Mesa's estate executed by the petitioners as inexistent and
void ab initio, as well as the cancellation of the original TCTs and the issuance of new ones in the
petitioners' names. It ordered the restoration of the original titles in Ricardo Abad's name and the
cancellation of related real estate mortgages.

The petitioners appealed these decisions to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, on October
19, 1994, affirmed the trial court's rulings, essentially recognizing the private respondents as the
acknowledged heirs of Ricardo Abad and denying the petitioners' claims to his estate. The petitioners
then elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari.

Petitioners' main arguments before the Supreme Court centered on challenging the factual findings of
the lower courts regarding the filiation of Cecilia, Marian, and Rosemarie. They presented evidence,
including an affidavit from a physician claiming Ricardo's sterility and information about Honoria
Empaynado's previous marriage, to argue that Ricardo could not be the father.

Issues:

1. Whether Cecilia, Marian, and Rosemarie were indeed the acknowledged natural children of
Ricardo Abad, thus entitled to inherit his entire estate.
2. Whether the petitioners, as collateral relatives, had any right to the estate of Ricardo Abad.
3. Whether the extrajudicial settlement executed by the petitioners was valid.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

1. Filiation of the Children: The Supreme Court found no compelling reason to overturn the
factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, which consistently held that Cecilia,
Marian, and Rosemarie were the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad. The Court
noted that the private respondents presented overwhelming evidence of Ricardo's
acknowledgment, including:
o Ricardo's income tax returns wherein he listed Cecilia, Marian, and Rosemarie as his
legitimate dependent children.
o Insurance policies and trust fund accounts opened by Ricardo for his daughters.
o Ricardo's continuous support and treatment of them as his children.
o The Court found the petitioners' evidence (like the physician's affidavit or claims about
Honoria's previous marriage) insufficient to discredit the overwhelming evidence of
filiation presented by the private respondents. The physician's affidavit, in particular,
was deemed inadmissible for violating the doctor-patient privilege.
2. Right of Collateral Relatives: Given that Ricardo Abad was survived by his acknowledged
natural children, the petitioners, as collateral relatives (brothers/sisters of the deceased),
were excluded from the inheritance. The Court cited:
o Article 988 of the Civil Code: "In the absence of legitimate descendants or
ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased."
o Article 1003 of the Civil Code: "If there are no illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles." These articles clearly establish the preferential
right of illegitimate children to inherit over collateral relatives in intestate succession.
3. Validity of Extrajudicial Settlement: Since Ricardo Abad was survived by compulsory heirs
(his acknowledged natural children), the extrajudicial settlement executed by the petitioners
(his collateral relatives) was declared inexistent and void ab initio. An extrajudicial
settlement can only be validly entered into by all the legal heirs of the deceased. The petitioners,
not being the rightful heirs, had no legal basis to partition the estate.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the rights of Ricardo Abad's acknowledged natural children to his entire
intestate estate, to the exclusion of his collateral relatives. The case reiterates the hierarchy of intestate
succession under the Civil Code and emphasizes that acknowledged illegitimate children are primary
heirs who preclude collateral relatives from inheriting. It also highlights the invalidity of extrajudicial
settlements made by individuals who are not the true legal heirs.

Filomena Abellana de Bacayo v. Gaudencia Ferraris de Borromeo, G.R. No. L-19382, August 31,
1965

Facts:

Melodia Ferraris was declared presumptively dead after being unheard from since 1944. She died
intestate, leaving no direct descendants, ascendants, or spouse. Her only surviving relatives were
collateral:

1. Filomena Abellana de Bacayo (petitioner-appellant): an aunt and half-sister of Melodia's

father.
2. Gaudencia Ferraris de Borromeo, Catalina Ferraris de Villegas, Juanito Ferraris, and
Conchita Ferraris(oppositors-appellees): nieces and nephew, who are the children of
Melodia's only predeceased full-blood brother, Arturo Ferraris.

Both parties claimed to be the nearest intestate heirs and sought to inherit from Melodia's estate. The
Court of First Instance of Cebu ruled in favor of the nieces and nephew, holding that they excluded the
aunt from succession. Filomena Abellana de Bacayo appealed, arguing that she was of the same
degree of relationship (three degrees) as the nieces and nephew, and that under Article 975 of the New
Civil Code, nephews and nieces do not inherit by representation unless concurring with uncles or aunts.

Issue:

Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when the only surviving relatives are
collateral—namely, an aunt and the children of a predeceased brother?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, ruling that the nephews and
nieces exclude the aunt from intestate succession.

Ratio Decidendi:

The Court reasoned that while both the aunt and the nephews/nieces are in the collateral line, the Civil
Code prioritizes closer relatives in intestate succession.

1. Degrees of Relationship: Although both the aunt and the nephews/nieces are considered to
be three degrees removed from the decedent (counting from the decedent up to the common
ancestor and then down to the heir), the law on intestate succession dictates a specific order
of preference among collateral relatives.
2. Articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code: These articles, when read together,
establish that brothers, sisters, and their children (nephews and nieces) are preferred heirs over
other collateral relatives such as uncles and aunts. The Civil Code places the surviving spouse
on par with nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters, but it does not alter the preferred
position of the latter over other collaterals.
3. Exclusionary Principle: The fundamental principle in intestate succession is that the relative
nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it
properly takes place. In this case, while nephews and nieces generally inherit by right of
representation, the Court clarified that even without the concurrence of brothers or sisters of
the deceased, nephews and nieces alone still exclude all other collateral relatives from the
succession. The presence of nephews and nieces signifies that the line of the decedent's
 siblings is represented, which takes precedence over more distant collateral lines like that of
aunts and uncles.

Doctrine:

Under Philippine laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so
long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. In
cases of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles,
first cousins, etc.) from the succession.

Bicomong v. Almanza, 80 SCRA 421, G.R. No. L-37365, November 29, 1977

Facts:

Maura Bagsic died intestate (without a will), leaving behind five parcels of land that she had inherited
from her mother, Silvestra Glorioso (second wife of Simeon Bagsic). Maura Bagsic had no direct
descendants, ascendants, or a surviving spouse at the time of her death.

Simeon Bagsic had two marriages:

1. First marriage (to Sisenanda Barcenas): Children were Perpetua Bagsic, Igmedia Bagsic,
and Ignacio Bagsic. Their children (Maura Bagsic's half-nephews and half-nieces), namely the
Bicomongs (children of Perpetua), the Tolentinos (children of Igmedia), and Francisca Bagsic
(daughter of Ignacio), are the plaintiffs-appellees.
2. Second marriage (to Silvestra Glorioso): Children were Felipa Bagsic and Maura Bagsic (the
decedent).

After Maura Bagsic's death, her properties were managed by Cristeta Almanza, who also died before
the properties could be formally partitioned. The plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint for the recovery
of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.

The defendant-appellant, Florentino Cartena (substituting for Geronimo Almanza, husband of Felipa
Bagsic), contended that Felipa Bagsic, Maura's full-blood sister, should have succeeded to Maura's
estate to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees, citing the principle that "relatives nearest in degree
exclude the more distant ones" and Article 1004 of the New Civil Code. However, the plaintiffs-
appellants claimed, and it was stipulated in the trial court, that Felipa Bagsic had predeceased Maura
Bagsic.

The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees, declaring them entitled to a share
in the properties. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court as it involved a purely legal question.

Issue:

Who are the rightful intestate heirs of Maura Bagsic, specifically, whether collateral relatives of half-
blood (nephews and nieces) can inherit alongside a full-blood niece, in the absence of descendants,
ascendants, or a surviving spouse, and after the full-blood sister had predeceased the decedent?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The Court held that the plaintiffs-appellees,
as collateral relatives (nephews and nieces of the half-blood and the daughter of a sister of full-blood),
are entitled to inherit from Maura Bagsic.

Ratio Decidendi:

1. Order of Intestate Succession: The Court reiterated Article 1003 of the New Civil Code, which
provides that in the absence of descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
 spouse, collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Since Maura
Bagsic died intestate, without direct heirs, and her husband and ascendants predeceased her,
her collateral relatives were the rightful heirs.
2. Predecease of Full-Blood Sister: The key factual finding, stipulated by the parties, was that
Felipa Bagsic (Maura's full-blood sister) had predeceased Maura. This meant Felipa could not
inherit from Maura. This negated the defendant-appellant's argument that Felipa, being a full-
blood sister, would exclude the half-blood relatives.
3. Inheritance by Nephews and Nieces: The Court applied Articles 975, 1006, and 1008 of the
New Civil Code:
o Article 975: Clarifies that when children of one or more brothers or sisters of the
deceased survive, they inherit by representation if they concur with uncles or
aunts. However, if they alone survive, they inherit in equal portions (per capita).
o Article 1006: States that should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together
with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double
that of the latter.
o Article 1008: Extends the rule for brothers and sisters to their children, meaning
children of full-blood siblings receive a double share compared to children of half-blood
siblings.
4. Application: In this case, while there were no surviving brothers or sisters to inherit directly
from Maura, her estate devolved upon her nephews and nieces, who are the children of her
predeceased siblings. The Court applied the proportional shares as per Articles 1006 and 1008,
where the children of the full-blood sibling (Felipa Bagsic's daughter) would receive a share
double that of the children of the half-blood siblings (Perpetua, Igmedia, and Ignacio Bagsic's
children).

Doctrine:

In intestate succession, when there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, collateral relatives, specifically nephews and nieces, are called to the succession. If nephews
and nieces are the only surviving collateral relatives, they inherit in their own right (per capita), and the
rule of representation (per stirpes) applies only if they concur with uncles or aunts. Furthermore, the
distinction between full-blood and half-blood siblings and their children is maintained, with full-blood
relatives (or their representatives) inheriting a share double that of half-blood relatives (or their
representatives).

City of Manila v. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, G.R. No. L-10033, August 30, 1917

Facts:

This action was commenced by the City of Manila on February 15, 1913, seeking to have certain
properties (five parcels of land in Malate and Paco, Manila) declared escheated to the city. The City's
theory was that Ana Sarmiento, the original owner of the property, died in 1668 intestate and "without
leaving her or person entitled to the same."

The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila intervened, claiming administration of the property. Evidence
showed that Ana Sarmiento had, in fact, executed a will on November 17, 1668. Her will established a
"Capellania de Misas" (chaplaincy for masses) and provided for the administration of the property by
her nephew, Pedro del Castillo, as the first chaplain, and for subsequent administrators. The will clearly
defined the disposition and administration of the property for the support of the chapel. For over 200
years, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila had been administering the property according to the
terms of the will.

The Court of First Instance denied the City of Manila's petition for escheat. The City then appealed to
the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Can property be declared escheated to the state (or in this case, the City of Manila) if the owner died
testate (with a will) and designated heirs and administrators for the property, even if the original owner
died a long time ago?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, denying the petition for escheat.

Ratio Decidendi:

The Court's reasoning was straightforward:

1. Condition for Escheat: The Court referenced Section 750 of Act No. 190 (Code of Civil
Procedure), which provides for escheat "when a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal
property... leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same."
2. Ana Sarmiento Died Testate: The evidence conclusively showed that Ana Sarmiento
did not die intestate. She left a will that clearly and unequivocally designated the disposition of
her property and provided for its administration by named individuals and their successors for
a specific purpose (the Capellania de Misas).
3. Designated Heirs/Administrators: The will designated an heir (her nephew) and provided for
the subsequent administration of the property. The property had been continuously
administered in accordance with the will for over two centuries. Therefore, Ana Sarmiento did
not die "without an heir nor without persons entitled to administer her estate" or "without leaving
a person by law entitled to inherit her property."
4. No Basis for Escheat: Since the fundamental condition for escheat (dying intestate without
heirs) was not met, the property could not be declared escheated as of Ana Sarmiento's estate.
The Court noted that if escheat were to be declared, it would have to be based on a subsequent
owner dying intestate without heirs, not on Ana Sarmiento's original death.

Doctrine:

Property cannot be declared escheated to the state (or a political subdivision) if the deceased owner
died testate and designated specific heirs or administrators for the property, even if the death occurred
many years prior. The legal basis for escheat requires that a person dies intestate and without any heir
or person by law entitled to the property.

holding that they excluded the aunt from succession. Filomena Abellana de Bacayo appealed, arguing
that she was of the same degree of relationship (three degrees) as the nieces and nephew, and that
under Article 975 of the New Civil Code, nephews and nieces do not inherit by representation unless
concurring with uncles or aunts.

Amadea Angela K. Aquino v. Rodolfo C. Aquino and Abdulah C. Aquino, G.R. No. 208912 &
209018, December 7, 2021

Facts:

Miguel T. Aquino died intestate on July 5, 1999, leaving a considerable estate. He was survived by his
second wife, Enerie B. Aquino, and his sons from his first marriage, Rodolfo C. Aquino and Abdulah C.
Aquino. Miguel also had other sons from his first marriage who predeceased him, including Arturo C.
Aquino.

Amadea Angela K. Aquino (Angela) filed a motion to be included in the distribution and partition of
Miguel's estate, claiming to be the sole child of Arturo C. Aquino. Angela alleged that while her parents
(Arturo and Susan Kuan) were not married, they were planning to marry before Arturo died in 1978,
which was before Angela's birth in October 1978. She asserted that Miguel, her alleged grandfather,
supported her mother during pregnancy, and that the Aquino family continuously recognized her as
Arturo's natural child, providing for her needs and education. She presented a hospital certification and
her baptismal certificate, identifying Arturo as her father.
Rodolfo and Abdulah Aquino opposed Angela's claim, arguing that Arturo never legally recognized her
during his lifetime, she failed to sufficiently prove her filiation, and she was born more than nine months
after Arturo's death, making paternity uncertain. More crucially, they invoked Article 992 of the Civil
Code, arguing that even if Angela were Arturo's nonmarital child, she could not inherit ab intestato from
Miguel, a legitimate relative, due to the "iron curtain rule" which presumes antagonism between the
legitimate and illegitimate families.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially ruled in favor of Angela, declaring her an acknowledged natural
child and entitled to a share in Miguel's estate, applying the principle of estoppel against the Aquino
family. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC's decision, finding that Angela failed to
prove her filiation in accordance with the Family Code and upholding the applicability of Article 992.
Angela then filed a petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 208912), while Rodolfo also filed a petition
(G.R. No. 209018) assailing other procedural aspects. Both petitions were consolidated by the Supreme
Court.

Issues:

1. Whether Amadea Angela K. Aquino, as an alleged nonmarital child, can inherit from her
grandfather's (Miguel T. Aquino) intestate estate by right of representation. This primarily
involves the interpretation and applicability of Article 992 of the Civil Code.
2. Whether Amadea Angela K. Aquino sufficiently proved her filiation with Arturo C. Aquino.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court partially granted Angela's motion for reconsideration (after initially denying her
petition), reversedthe Court of Appeals' decision, and remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court
for the reception of further evidence, including DNA testing, to establish Angela's filiation.

Ratio Decidendi:

The Court delivered a significant reinterpretation of Article 992 and clarified the rights of nonmarital
children in intestate succession.

1. Reinterpretation of Article 992 (The "Iron Curtain Rule"):

o The Court critically re-examined the historical basis and contemporary relevance of
Article 992, which states: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor do such children or
relatives inherit from the illegitimate child."
o The Court held that the presumption of antagonism between the legitimate and
illegitimate families, which Article 992 is based upon, is no longer absolute or
irrebuttable, especially concerning direct ascendants (grandparents). The Court
emphasized the "best interest of the child" principle and the constitutional mandate for
the equal protection of children's rights.
o It declared that the "iron curtain rule" under Article 992 does not apply when a
nonmarital child seeks to inherit by right of representation from their direct
ascendant (grandparent).
o The Court found that Article 982 of the Civil Code, which grants grandchildren the right
of representation, makes no distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
grandchildren. To interpret Article 992 as an absolute bar in such cases would create
an inconsistency with Article 982 and would perpetuate discrimination against
nonmarital children.
o Therefore, a nonmarital child (like Angela) can inherit from her grandparent's estate by
right of representation through her predeceased parent (Arturo), provided her filiation
is duly established. The "iron curtain" is lowered in the direct ascending line for
purposes of representation.
2. Proof of Filiation:
o Despite the reinterpretation of Article 992, the Court noted that Angela still needed to
conclusively prove her filiation with Arturo C. Aquino. The existing evidence, including
 the hospital certification and baptismal certificate, was deemed insufficient, especially
given the contradictory evidence of another alleged father in her birth certificate and
the fact that she was born after Arturo's death.
o The Court recognized the advancements in science, particularly DNA testing, as a
highly reliable means of determining paternity and filiation.
o Since factual issues regarding Angela's filiation remained unresolved and were not fully
litigated at the RTC level, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to
conduct further proceedings, including the reception of DNA evidence.

Doctrine:

A nonmarital child can inherit from their grandparent's intestate estate by right of representation through
their predeceased parent. Article 992 of the Civil Code, which bars illegitimate children from
inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate relatives of their parents, is not an absolute bar when it
comes to inheritance by right of representation in the direct ascending line (e.g., from a grandparent).
The "iron curtain rule" is modified to align with the constitutional rights of children and the "best interest
of the child" principle, recognizing that presumed antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate family
lines should not extend to exclude a grandchild from their direct ascendant's inheritance by right of
representation. However, the nonmarital child must still duly prove their filiation.