G.R. No.

L-17759 December 17, 1962

ISABEL V. SAGUINSIN, petitioner-appellant, vs. DIONISIO LINDAYAG, ET AL., oppositors-

appellees.

FACTS:
Maria V. Lindayag died intestate on November 10, 1959. On May 27, 1960, her sister, Isabel
V. Saguinsin (petitioner-appellant), filed a petition for letters of administration over Maria's estate,
claiming to be an heir. She listed Maria's surviving heirs as her husband, Dionisio Lindayag, and three
sisters, including herself.
Dionisio Lindayag (oppositor-appellee), the surviving husband, moved to dismiss the petition.
He alleged that Maria V. Lindayag was survived by him and their three legally adopted minor
children: Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine Lindayag. He attached a certified copy of the adoption
decree dated July 6, 1953, arguing that Isabel V. Saguinsin was not an heir and thus had no interest in
the estate. The surviving heirs also expressed their desire to settle the estate extra-judicially.
Isabel V. Saguinsin opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that only the facts alleged in her
petition should be considered. The lower court, after a hearing where evidence (the adoption decree)
was presented, granted the motion to dismiss, finding that Isabel V. Saguinsin was not an heir and had
no interest in the estate, as the deceased was survived by her husband and legally adopted children.
Isabel V. Saguinsin's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to this appeal.

ISSUE: WON Isabel V. Saguinsin is an "interested person" in the estate of the deceased Maria V.
Lindayag, as required by Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court for filing a petition for letters of
administration.

RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's order of dismissal.

An "interested person" for purposes of letters of administration is defined as one who would
be benefited by the estate (an heir) or one who has a claim against the estate (a creditor). The interest
must be material and direct, not merely indirect or contingent. The Court clarified that while a motion
to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action generally relies only on the petition's allegations,
a motion to dismiss based on other grounds (like lack of legal capacity or interest) may involve the
presentation and consideration of evidence during the hearing. In this case, evidence (the adoption
decree) was properly introduced and considered, establishing that Maria V. Lindayag had adopted
children.
Upon the facts established, the deceased Maria V. Lindayag was survived by her husband
and three legally adopted children. Under the law, legally adopted children are considered legitimate
children for all purposes, including inheritance, thus excluding collateral relatives like a sister from
inheriting if there are direct heirs. Since Maria V. Lindayag was survived by her husband and legally
adopted children, Isabel V. Saguinsin, as a mere sister, is not an heir and therefore has no material and
direct interest in the estate.
 ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO,
respondent. G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000 VITUG, J.:

FACTS:
Teodorico Calisterio died intestate on April 24, 1992, leaving an estate valued at
P604,750.00. He was survived by his wife, Marietta Calisterio. Marietta had previously been
married to James William Bounds in 1946, who disappeared without a trace on February 11,
1947. Eleven years later, on May 8, 1958, Marietta married Teodorico without a prior court
declaration of James's presumptive death.
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, Teodorico's sister, filed a petition claiming to be the sole
surviving heir, alleging that Marietta's marriage to Teodorico was bigamous and void. She
sought to have her son appointed administrator and the inheritance adjudicated to her.
Marietta opposed, arguing her first marriage was dissolved by James's long absence and
seeking priority in administering the estate.
The RTC initially declared Antonia as the sole heir. Marietta appealed to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the Family Code, in finding her
marriage bigamous, and in not recognizing the conjugal property and her status as a legal
heir. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, declaring Marietta's marriage to
Teodorico valid, recognizing the house and lot as conjugal property, and stating that Marietta,
as a compulsory heir, was entitled to one-half of Teodorico's estate, with Antonia and her
children receiving the other half. Antonia then appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON there exist a valid marriage between Teodorico Calisterio and Marietta
Calisterio, which determines Marietta's right as a surviving spouse and heir.

RULING:
The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the decision of the Court of Appeals, with a
modification regarding the distribution of the other half of the inheritance.
The marriage between Teodorico and Marietta was solemnized on May 8, 1958, thus
the Civil Code was the law in force, not the Family Code (which took effect on August 3,
1988). Article 256 of the Family Code limits its retroactive application to cases where it
would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights under the Civil Code.
Article 83 of the New Civil Code governs. It states that a subsequent marriage during
the lifetime of a first spouse is illegal and void ab initio, unless certain exceptions apply. One
exception is when the first spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of
the second marriage, without news of being alive, or is generally considered dead and
believed to be so by the present spouse. In such cases, the marriage "shall be valid in any of
the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court."
Under the Civil Code (unlike the Family Code), a judicial declaration of absence of
the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. The
burden of proof to assail the second marriage lies with the party challenging its validity.
Marietta's first husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or disappeared for more
than eleven years before she married Teodorico in 1958. Therefore, under the Civil Code, this
second marriage is deemed valid despite the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of James Bounds. The Court found no evidence of bad faith on Marietta's part.
No evidence was presented to indicate a different property regime, thus the conjugal
property of Teodorico and Marietta pertained to them in common. Upon Teodorico's death,
the conjugal property should be divided equally, with one portion going to Marietta as the
surviving spouse and the other to Teodorico's estate.
As Teodorico's surviving spouse, Marietta is a compulsory heir entitled to one-half of
his net estate. The other half goes to Teodorico's legitimate brothers and sisters (Antonia, in
this case). The appellate court erred in including Antonia's children (Teodorico's nephews and
nieces) in the successional rights along with their mother, as nephews and nieces only
succeed by right of representation in the presence of uncles and aunts when their parents
predecease or are incapacitated to succeed. Antonia, as the surviving sister, inherits in her
own right, excluding her children.
The assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals was AFFIRMED, except insofar as it
decreed in paragraph (c) of its dispositive portion that the children of petitioner Antonia
Armas were likewise entitled, along with her, to the other half of the inheritance. The Court
DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains solely to petitioner
Antonia Armas to the exclusion of her own children.
 G.R. No. L-24750 May 16, 1980

DOROTEO BANAWA, JULIANA MENDOZA, CASIANO AMPONIN and

GLICERIA ABRENICA, petitioners, vs. PRIMITIVA MIRANO, GREGORIA
MIRANO, JUANA MIRANO and MARCIANO MIRANO, respondents.

FACTS:
Maria Mirano, a niece of Juliana Mendoza (one of the petitioners), was taken in by
the childless spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza (petitioners) in 1911 when she
was about nine years old. They reared and supported her like their own child. Maria Mirano
died in 1949, still living with the spouses, leaving as her only nearest relatives the
respondents: Primitiva Mirano (sister) and Gregoria, Juana, and Marciano Mirano (children
of a deceased brother). The dispute concerns two parcels of land: the "Iba Property" and the
"Carsuche Property."
Plaintiffs (respondents) claim that the Iba property was sold to Maria Mirano for
P2,000.00, evidenced by a public instrument (Exhibit 'A'). Defendants (petitioners) contend
that the money used to buy the land belonged to them, lent to Punzalan. They claim the sale
was made to appear in Maria Mirano's name because they were old and wanted her to have
something for her maintenance after their death, but with the understanding that they would
remain owners and administer the land during their lifetime. Maria Mirano was 19 years old
at the time of the sale. The trial court and Court of Appeals found that the money for the
purchase was donated by the Banawa spouses to Maria Mirano, making her the true owner of
the land.
Carsuche Property, on the other hand, (Parcel 2), was acquired by purchase from
Roman Biscocho, Paula Biscocho, and Carmen Mendoza in December 1935. Plaintiffs
(respondents) claim it was sold to Maria Mirano via a public instrument. Defendants
(petitioners) claim it was sold to them via a private writing, and they later caused it to be
declared in Maria Mirano's name for tax purposes. In 1940, the same Carsuche property was
explicitly sold to Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza through a duly registered deed of
sale. They immediately took possession. The trial court and Court of Appeals found that
Maria Mirano was the owner based on the 1935 sale.
Petitioners filed a petition for review by certiorari, assigning errors regarding the
nature of the transaction for the Iba property (donation inter vivos vs. mortis causa, simulated
contract, implied trust, prescription) and the ownership of the Carsuche property.

ISSUE: WON Maria Mirano or the Banawa spouses (and their successors) were the rightful
owners.
RULING: The Supreme Court partially affirmed and partially reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

1. Iba Property (Parcel 1): The Court agreed with the lower courts that the Banawa spouses
had donated the money (or the pre-existing credits/indebtedness) to Maria Mirano, who then
used it to purchase the Iba property. This was an oral donation of personal property
(money/credits) with simultaneous constructive delivery, as evidenced by the spouses'
consent to the execution of the deed of sale in Maria Mirano's favor.
The Court found no simulation. The transaction was a direct sale from Punzalan to
Maria Mirano, facilitated by the donation of funds from the spouses. There was no intent to
conceal or defraud. The spouses' conduct at the time of the sale, including their inquiry about
the document's validity for Maria, showed their clear intention for Maria Mirano to be the
owner. They were estopped from denying this intent.
Implied Trust (Art. 1448 NCC): Article 1448 of the New Civil Code (on implied trust
when one pays for property titled to another, with an exception for children where a gift is
presumed) was held inapplicable because the transactions occurred before the New Civil
Code's effectivity (August 30, 1950). Furthermore, there was no showing that Maria Mirano
bought the land in trust for the petitioners.
The petitioners' claim of acquisitive prescription for the Iba property failed.
Petitioners had no "just title" to the Iba property, and a just title cannot be presumed. Under
Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure (requiring 10 years actual, open, public,
continuous, adverse possession under claim of title): While Maria Mirano was alive, she
possessed the property as the owner. The Banawa spouses' possession only became adverse
after Maria Mirano's death in July 1949. From 1949 to the filing of the action in 1957, only
eight years had elapsed, which was insufficient for the prescription of 10 years.

2. Carsuche Property (Parcel 2): The Court found the petitioners' claim of acquisitive
prescription over the Carsuche property meritorious. The 1940 sale to the Banawa spouses
was duly registered. The prescriptive period for recovery of title or possession under Section
40 of the Code of Civil Procedure (governing actions before the New Civil Code) is 10 years.
The cause of action accrued in 1940 when the sale to the Banawas was registered and they
entered possession. The action by the respondents was filed only in 1957, seventeen years
later, which is beyond the 10-year prescriptive period. Section 41 of the Code of Civil
Procedure states that title by prescription can be acquired "in whatever way such occupancy
may have commenced or continued" as long as it's actual, open, public, continuous, and
under a claim of title for over 10 years. The alleged bad faith of the petitioners in knowing
about the prior sale to Maria Mirano was deemed irrelevant under this provision.

CONCLUSION: The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision

regarding the Iba property (Lot No. 1), confirming Maria Mirano's ownership through
donation of funds for its purchase. However, it reversed the decision regarding the Carsuche
property (Lot No. 2), finding that the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza acquired
ownership by acquisitive prescription, and thus could validly donate it to Casiano Amponin
and Gliceria Abrenica. Petitioners were ordered to pay respondents P6,975.00 in actual
damages and P1,000.00 in attorney's fees.
 CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA
CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL and RURAL BANK OF PARAÑAQUE, INC.,
respondents. G.R. No. L-51263, February 28, 1983 DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
Francisca Reyes died intestate on July 12, 1942, survived by two daughters, Maria
and Silvestra Cailles, and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo (son of her predeceased daughter,
Pascuala Cailles). Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, and Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without
issue. On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of
Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint seeking to be declared an heir of Francisca Reyes, entitled
to one-half of her estate jointly with Maria Cailles. He also sought partition of the properties
and an accounting of income.
Private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership of the properties,
alleging that Cresenciano was an illegitimate child and thus could not succeed by right of
representation. James Bracewell, another respondent, claimed ownership of the properties
through a sale from Maria Cailles, who had allegedly mortgaged them to Rural Bank of
Parañaque, Inc.
The trial court ruled in favor of Cresenciano, finding him an heir and ordering
partition. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, dismissing
Cresenciano's complaint. The Court of Appeals found that the properties in question were the
exclusive properties of Maria Cailles and James Bracewell, and that Cresenciano had not
sufficiently established his filiation. Cresenciano appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES: 1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the properties in question are
the exclusive properties of private respondents; 2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that petitioner has not established his filiation; 3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that petitioner, as the great-grandson of Francisca Reyes, has no legal right to
inherit by representation.

RULING:
The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the decision of the Court of Appeals, dismissing
Cresenciano Leonardo's petition.

1. On the ownership of the properties (First Assignment of Error):

The Supreme Court reiterated the well-established rule that findings of fact by the
Court of Appeals are generally final and conclusive upon the Supreme Court in a petition
for review on certiorari. The Court found no exceptions (such as findings grounded entirely
on speculation, manifestly mistaken inferences, grave abuse of discretion, misapprehension
of facts, or findings contrary to the issues presented) that would warrant disturbing the
appellate court's factual findings. The Court of Appeals had carefully scrutinized the evidence
regarding the two parcels of land, finding that the descriptions and tax payment records
supported Maria Cailles's ownership.

2. On the petitioner's filiation (Second Assignment of Error):

The Court likewise upheld the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that
Cresenciano Leonardo failed to establish his filiation. The only evidence presented was a
birth certificate for an "Alfredo Leonardo," not Cresenciano, born to Sotero Leonardo and
Socorro Timbol. The Court of Appeals found no "durable evidence" connecting "Alfredo
Leonardo" to the petitioner. This is a factual finding that cannot be disturbed in a petition for
review absent a clear showing that it is not supported by substantial evidence or that there
was grave abuse of discretion.

3. On the right to inherit by representation (Third Assignment of Error):

Even assuming, arguendo, that Cresenciano was the son of Sotero Leonardo, the
Court held that he still cannot inherit by right of representation from Francisca Reyes.
The Court of Appeals found that Cresenciano was born on September 13, 1938, at a time
when his alleged putative father, Sotero Leonardo, and mother, Socorro Timbol, were not yet
married, and Sotero's first marriage was still subsisting. This renders Cresenciano an
illegitimate child. Under Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an illegitimate
child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father, which includes Francisca Reyes. This provision establishes a "barrier" between the
legitimate and illegitimate families.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this

petition is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
 G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995

BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA

MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL,
BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL, petitioners,
vs. HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL,
respondents.

FACTS:
Antonio Manuel, during his marriage with Beatriz Guiling, had an illegitimate son
named Juan Manuel with Ursula Bautista. Antonio died in 1960, Beatriz in 1981, and Ursula
in 1976.
Juan Manuel married Esperanza Gamba. They had no natural children but raised
Modesta Manuel-Baltazar as their "daughter" (though without formal adoption). Juan Manuel
acquired three parcels of land. In 1980, he sold one-half of a parcel (TCT No. 41134) con
pacto de retro to Estanislaoa Manuel, with a 10-year redemption period.

Juan Manuel died intestate on February 21, 1990, without any surviving descendant or
ascendant (his father Antonio and mother Ursula predeceased him). His wife, Esperanza
Gamba, died two years later, on February 4, 1992. On March 5, 1992, Modesta Manuel-
Baltazar executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, claiming all three parcels of land owned
by Juan Manuel. New TCTs were issued in her name. On October 19, 1992, Modesta also
executed a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed portion of the land sold
con pacto de retro to Estanislaoa Manuel.
Petitioners, who are the legitimate children of Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling
(making them the legitimate half-siblings of Juan Manuel), filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, seeking to nullify Modesta's instruments,
claiming to be legal heirs of Juan Manuel.
The trial court dismissed the complaint via summary judgment, ruling that petitioners,
not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real
parties-in-interest. It also awarded moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and
litigation expenses to the respondents. Petitioners sought a review.

ISSUE: WON the legitimate siblings (half-siblings) of an illegitimate child (Juan Manuel) is
considered legal heirs to the latter's intestate estate when the illegitimate child dies without
any surviving descendants or ascendants.
RULING: The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the dismissal of the complaint but DELETED
the award of damages.

Applicability of Article 992 (The "Iron Curtain" Rule): The Court reiterated the
"principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family"
enshrined in Article 992 of the Civil Code. Article 992 states: "An illegitimate child has no
right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother;
nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child."
This doctrine bars intestate succession in the collateral line between legitimate relatives and
illegitimate relatives, even if there is a blood tie.
Petitioners argued that Article 994, which states that "If the widow or widower
should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half
of the estate, and the latter the other half," should apply. However, the Court clarified that
when the law speaks of "brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an
illegitimate child, it refers only to illegitimate brothers and sisters (and their children). This is
because of the "barrier" established by Article 992. The rule is consistent with previous
rulings, such as Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which emphasized the presumed
antagonism and incompatibility between the two families. Since Juan Manuel was an
illegitimate child, his legitimate half-siblings (the petitioners) are barred from inheriting from
him ab intestato under Article 992.
The Court noted that Modesta Manuel-Baltazar, being merely a ward without formal
(judicial) adoption, is also neither a compulsory nor a legal heir of Juan Manuel. However,
this does not give the petitioners a right to challenge her actions. Because the petitioners are
not intestate heirs of Juan Manuel, they were not the real "parties-in-interest" to institute the
complaint, and thus, the dismissal of their complaint was proper.

CONCLUSION: The legitimate half-siblings of an illegitimate child are barred by Article

992 of the Civil Code from inheriting ab intestato from him. The dismissal of the complaint
was affirmed, but the award of damages was deleted.
 Diaz vs. IAC
[G.R. No. 66574, June 17, 1987]

DOCTRINE: “ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab

intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child. (943a) Even though illegitimate
heirs are tied by blood, the legitimate heirs will be the first priority
when it comes to succession of the deceased heir.

FACTS: Private Respondent filed with the Court of First Instance of Cavite praying that the
corresponding letters of Administration to be issued in here favor and that she be appointed
as special administratix of the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero.
However, the courts declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona
Pamuti Vda. De Santero. Petitioner Diaz, as the guardian of her minor children, filed for
Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti Jardin from further taking part or
intervening in settlement of the Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santora. With that, Felisa
Jardin was excluded and she filed an appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). The
IAC reversed the decision of the trial court and declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole
legitimate heir of the subject estate.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Felisa Pamuti Jardin is the sole legal heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero.

RULING:
Yes.

According to the Civil Code, Article 992,

“ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato

from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother;
nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child. (943a)

In this case, Pablo Santero is the legitimate child of Simona Pamuti

Vda. De Santora, however, the oppositors are the illegimate children
of his. Under the law, there is a prohibition against succession ab
intestado between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. It is
clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all
the kindred of the person spoken of. The record shows that from the
commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the
legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa
Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of
Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions
of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not
commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero.
 G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs. ESPERANZA C.

PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C.
PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR.,
INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL,
ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER,
NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-
DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of
Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.

FACTS:
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973, without any legitimate,
acknowledged natural, adopted, or spurious children. He was survived by his spouse, Adela
Soldevilla de Pascual, and several collateral relatives. Among these relatives were the
children of his full-blood brother, Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., and the children of his half-blood
brothers, Pedro-Bautista and Eleuterio T. Pascual.
Petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual are the acknowledged natural
children (illegitimate children) of Eligio Pascual, who was a full-blood brother of the
decedent Don Andres Pascual. Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, Don Andres' surviving spouse,
initiated a Special Proceeding for the administration of his intestate estate. Initially, she
included Olivia and Hermes Pascual as among the heirs. However, a Compromise Agreement
was later entered into by most of the other heirs, over the vehement objections of Olivia and
Hermes, stating that the agreement was "without prejudice to the continuation of the above-
entitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by another
compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal
heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual."
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied Olivia and Hermes Pascual's motion to
reiterate their hereditary rights, holding that they were not heirs. Their motion for
reconsideration was denied, and they appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
RTC's decision. This led to the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON an acknowledged natural children (illegitimate children) can inherit ab

intestato from the legitimate full-blood brother (uncle) of their deceased father, applying
Article 992 of the Civil Code.

RULING: The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition for lack of merit and AFFIRMED
the decision of the Court of Appeals, thereby denying the petitioners hereditary rights to Don
Andres Pascual's intestate estate.
Article 992 as the "Iron Curtain" Rule: The Court reiterated the established doctrine
from Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987] and 182 SCRA 427 [1990]) which interprets
Article 992 of the Civil Code. Article 992 states: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit
ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child." This provision
establishes an "iron curtain" or barrier, absolutely prohibiting intestate succession between an
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. This rule is
based on a presumed antagonism and incompatibility between the legitimate and illegitimate
families.
Petitioners argued that since they are acknowledged natural children, their
illegitimacy is not due to a prior marriage, and thus, they should be treated differently from
"spurious" children and not fall under the prohibition of Article 992. The Court rejected this
argument. It explicitly stated that the term "illegitimate" in Article 992 refers to both natural
and spurious children. The Family Code (Article 176) further unifies all illegitimate children
under one category, negating any distinction for inheritance purposes among them.
The petitioners, as illegitimate children of Eligio Pascual (a legitimate full-blood
brother of Don Andres Pascual), cannot represent their father in the succession to Don
Andres Pascual's estate. The Court cited its reasoning in Diaz v. IAC (182 SCRA 427) that
the right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in
the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent (or in this case, a legitimate uncle). Article 982
(general rule on representation) is subject to the limitation of Article 992.
The Court emphasized the elementary rule of statutory construction that when the
words of a statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed. The courts cannot speculate on legislative intent beyond the plain
meaning of the words. The principle of dura lex sed lex (the law is harsh, but it is the law)
applies.

CONCLUSION: Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, being acknowledged natural

(illegitimate) children of Eligio Pascual (legitimate brother of the decedent), are barred by
Article 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting ab intestato from Don Andres Pascual. The
petition was dismissed, and the lower court's decision was affirmed.
 TOLENTINO v. PARAS

Doctrine: There is no better proof of marriage than the admission by the accused of the existence of
such marriage. The second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of
his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage

FACTS:
Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent herein, Maria
Clemente, at Paombong, Bulacan, on November 1, 1948, while his marriage with petitioner, Serafia
G. Tolentino, celebrated on July 31, 1943, was still subsisting. Petitioner charged Amado with
Bigamy. Amado pleaded guilty and after he had served the prison sentence imposed on him, he
continued to live with respondent until his death on July 25, 1974. His death certificate carried the
entry "Name of Surviving Spouse—Maria Clemente."
Petitioner sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse in the death certificate from
"Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her name in in a special proceeding for correction of
entry. The lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law" and
indicated the need for a more detailed proceeding. Petitioner filed a case against private respondent
and the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as the lawful surviving
spouse, and the correction of the death certificate of Amado. In an Order, dated October 21, 1975,
respondent Court, upon private respondent's instance, dismissed the case, stating: (1) the correction of
the entry in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the proper remedy because the issue involved
is marital relationship; (2) the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction because as prescribed under
Art. 108, read together with Art. 412 of the Civil Code—publication is needed in a case like this, and
up to now, there has been no such publication; and (3) in a sense, the subject matter of this case has
been aptly discussed in Special Proceeding which this Court has already dismissed, also for lack of
the proper requisites under the law.

ISSUES: WON the petitioner may validly rectify the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil
Registrar

RULING: YES.

Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the correction of entry contemplated in Article 412
of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a judicial declaration that she
is the lawful surviving spouse of the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the correction of
the entry in the death certificate of said deceased. The suit below is a proper remedy. It is of an
adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. A claim of right is asserted against
one who has an interest in contesting it. Private respondent, as the individual most affected, is a party
defendant, and has appeared to contest the petition and defend her interests. The Local Civil Registrar
is also a party defendant. The publication required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is not absolutely necessary for no other parties are involved.
Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that sentence
furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no better
proof of marriage than the admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage. The second
marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and
void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage. It can be safely concluded, then, without need of further proof nor
remand to the Court below, that private respondent is not the surviving spouse of the deceased
Amado, but petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar
may, therefore, be validly made.

Verdad vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 593, G.R. No. 109972 April 29, 1996

FACTS:
Private respondent, Socorro Rosales, seeks to exercise a right of legalredemption
over the subject property and traces her title to the late Macaria Atega, hermother-in-law,
who died intestate.Macaria contracted 2 marriages, first with Angel Burdeos and after the
latter’s deathwith Canuto Rosales.
When Macaria died she was survived by her son Ramon A.Burdeos and her 4
children of the second marriage, David Rosales and others. SocorroRosales is the widow of
David Rosales died intestate without an issue, after Macaria’sdeath.The heirs of Ramon sold
the disputed lot to Petitoner, Zosima Verdad. WhenSocorro found out, she went to the
Lupong Tagapamayapa to redeem the property. However, the parties were unable to settle
the issue, thus Socorro filed an action for“Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction” to
the Regional Trial Court.The Trial Court ruled that the right to redeem has already lapsed.
But was reversed by the Court of appeals declaring Socorro is entitled to redeem the
inheritance rights.Hence this case.

ISSUE: Whether Socorro Rosales is entitled to redeem the inheritance rights beingmerely
the spouse of David Rosales and not being a co-heir herself in the intestate ofestate of
Macaria.

HELD: Yes. While it is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or relative by affinity), is not an
intestate heir of her parents-in-law; however, Socorro’s right to the property is notbecause
she rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria’s estate but that she is a legal heirof her
husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his mother’s inheritance. When
David Rosales, survived his mother’s death. He became co-owners of the property. When
David Rosales later died, his own estate including his undivided interest of the property
inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the
law on succession.ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and
ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the
rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under article
1001.“ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters of their children to the other half.”
 G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON,

CLARO SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant, vs. PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U.
MIRANDA and ROSARIO CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.

FACTS:
Pedro Santillon died intestate on November 21, 1953, leaving behind his wife,
Perfecta Miranda, and one legitimate son, Claro Santillon. Pedro acquired several conjugal
properties during his marriage. Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration.
Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales (to whom Perfecta
had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most properties) opposed, claiming that
administration was unnecessary as a partition case was pending, and that Perfecta was better
qualified as administratrix. Perfecta was subsequently appointed administratrix.
Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs," invoking Article 892 of the New
Civil Code. He argued that after deducting Perfecta's one-half conjugal share, the remaining
half of Pedro's estate should be divided as 1/4 for Perfecta (as surviving spouse) and 3/4 for
him (as the sole legitimate child). Perfecta, on the other hand, invoked Article 996 of the New
Civil Code, claiming that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled to another 1/2 of the
remaining half (i.e., 1/2 of Pedro's inheritance), placing her share equal to that of Claro.
The lower court ruled that in the intestate succession of Pedro Santillon, the surviving
spouse Perfecta Miranda and the only son Claro Santillon shall each inherit one-half (1/2)
share of Pedro's estate (after deducting the widow's share as co-owner of the conjugal
properties). Claro Santillon appealed this order.

ISSUE: WON the provision of Art. 996 of the Civil Code applies.

RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the lower court.

The Court held that Article 996 of the New Civil Code, which falls under the chapter
on Legal or Intestate Succession, is the controlling provision. Article 996 states: "If a widow
or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the
succession the same share as that of each of the children." Claro's reliance on Article 892,
which falls under Testamentary Succession and merely fixes the legitime of the surviving
spouse and children, was incorrect.
The Court explicitly stated that the rule in statutory construction that "words in plural
include the singular" applies. Therefore, "children" in Article 996 includes the singular
"child." To hold otherwise would lead to tremendous inconsistencies in other articles of the
Civil Code (e.g., Articles 887, 888, 896, 901) that also use the plural "children" but are
understood to include a single child.
Claro argued that a 50-50 sharing is unfair because in testate succession, the widow
gets only one-fourth, while the child gets one-half. The Court rebutted this by explaining that
in testate succession, the surviving spouse may get one-half if the testator so wishes. The law
allows the testator to determine if the child gets more than the surviving spouse.
The Court inferred that the omission in Article 996 of a separate paragraph for cases
involving only one child (unlike its predecessor, Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, which
had two paragraphs: one for children generally and one for a single child) indicates the
legislator's desire for a single general rule applicable to both situations (multiple children or
only one child).

CONCLUSION: The Court ruled that in intestate succession, when the surviving heirs are
the spouse and one legitimate child, they shall share the estate in equal parts. Thus, the
surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda and the son Claro Santillon each inherited one-half of
Pedro Santillon's estate.