Marlaw Module 1
Marlaw Module 1
Course This course deals with Introduction to Maritime Law, Law of the Sea, International Convention
Description: on Load Lines, 1966, 4International Convention for the Safety Of Life At Sea, International
Safety Management, International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watch keeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended (STCW), International Convention for the
Control and Management of Ship's Ballast Water and Sediments, 2004, International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), Responsibilities under the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 and Maritime Declarations of Health and the
Requirements of the International Health Regulations
Course Lecture Contact Laboratory Contact
4 Units 4 Hours 0 Hours
Credits Hours Per Week Hours Per Week
Competence/s: A-II/1.F3.C6: Monitor compliance with legislative requirements
A-II/2.F3.C2: Monitor and control compliance with legislative measures to ensure safety of life
at sea and protection of the marine environment.
A-II/1.F3.C6.KUP1: Basic working knowledge of the relevant IMO conventions concerning
KUP safety of life at sea.
A-II/2 F3.C2.KUP1: Knowledge of international maritime law embodied in international
agreements and conventions
A-II/2 F3.C2.KUP2: Regard shall be paid especially to the following subjects:
A-II/1.F3.C6.KUP1: Basic working knowledge of the relevant IMO conventions concerning
safety of life at sea.
A-II/2 F3.C2.KUP1: Knowledge of international maritime law embodied in international
agreements and conventions
A-II/2 F3.C2.KUP2: Regard shall be paid especially to the following subjects:
1. Certificates and other documents required to be carried on board ships by international
conventions, how they may be obtained and their period of validity;
2. Responsibilities under the relevant requirements of the International Convention on Load
Lines;
3. Maritime declarations of health and the requirements of the International Health Regulations;
4. Responsibilities under international instruments affecting the safety of the ship, passengers,
crew and cargo;
5. National legislation for implementing international agreements and conventions.
At the end of the course, the students shall be able to:
CO1. Identify via case analysis or tabletop scenarios evidence of
compliance with legislative requirements relating to the
Course
safety of life at sea, security, and protection of the marine
Outcome/s
environment.
There are no shortcuts to success here. The institution prepares you to face the demands
of the modern age of learning in this new standard without compromising quality education and
training in the maritime sectors. The only secret to fulfilling this module’s requirements is
commitment to the institution's mission, dream, and aim with perseverance, integrity, and
dedication.
The module has been meticulously, perceptively and independently designed to reinforce
the cornerstone of good education for you to resiliently learn the various underpinning technical
and general knowledge in maritime studies. As your facilitator, moderator and assessor in this
particular course, you will be greatly directed and trained to test your ability to meet potential
adversities in life as ship officers. The common objectives of quality learning are to ensure that
you meet the competencies mandated by the STCW 1978, as amended. Minimum criteria for
achieving both theoretical and practical aspects consistent with knowledge, understanding and
skills captured through standards assessment and evaluation. I am honing you as a
conscientious learner to conduct all of the tasks, assignments and tests in a very trustworthy
manner. Clearly remember that this module is just a learning tool with all the convenience and
complete all the tasks asynchronously to pave the way for a rigid assessment of each end of the
module. The following guides and house rules will help you sustain the course line in the midst
of the sea obstacles and eventually say, "I HAVE ARRIVE TO THE DESTINATION OF
SUCCESS."
1. Perform your time management by reading and relating every part of the module
to reach the various learning references. Do advanced research using different essential
learning kits from books, magazines, interactive apps and applications that you believe can
help you complete the tasks. Despite internet connectivity restrictions including government
quarantine policies and compliance procedures, it is your initiative to scrupulously and with
good conscience perform the institution's designed blended programs in either
synchronous or asynchronous mode.
2. You are on a distance learning cycle that manifests the classes by online, off-line
or hybrid approaches in coping with the highest level of quality education without sacrificing
other modules of the other enrolled courses. It takes flexibility and efficient time
management to reach the deadlines set by the organization and also by the facilitators.
Using the devices such as mobile phones, laptops and other automated reminders to
inform you of the production submission and alert you of the deadlines. It will help you
manage your time by putting the notices in a conspicuous location.
3. Stick to the query schedule that your facilitators have set. We are not members of the
call-center that can answer all your questions in 24/7 modes. Ask only relevant questions,
and avoid questions that are redundant.
4. Just know your status, whether you belong to almost any modalities. Remind your
facilitators of what you have done. Take the practice of logging in to the learning
and relevant updates and discussions. Any time you visit the site, check the latest updates
on your account for any related improvements and revisions. Religiously observe the
schedules of learning. Stay linked and chatwith your facilitators wherever you go.
5. Do not become a delay instrument. If you cannot complete the tasks in the set schedules,
you will find it difficult soon. Remember you can't proceed to the next module unless you
get satisfactory and passing remarks.
6. Guidance is very important to execute the tasks easily. Keep in mind that assumptions are
particularly dangerous during onboard operations. Learn to read the instructions before
attempting to carry out the assigned tasks or assessments. Never settle to a median score
but strive for the highest standards of skills.
7. Study the lessons ahead of time. Utilize all the energy and imagination effectively. Learn
how to use all the learning kits and references before doing the elements needed on your
modules. Make sure no missing links are found.
8. In all honesty, always answer the pre-test to help gauge the level of knowledge and
awareness of the topics. It is just a diagnostic test of yours.
9. All the discussions are academic for a meaning the relevant academic meetings are
applied.
a. Your performance will objectively be based on the rubrics of your tasks. Check the
notations or any assessment tool that meets the competencies.
b. As much as you can, avoid using abbreviations and acronyms unless theyare entered in
the readings and used in your introduction. Avoid writing in all capital letters if using digital
learning kit. In a paper-based approach you are expected to write without erasures and
alterations in capital and bold letters.
c. Please post corresponding and appropriate paragraphs on your production. Work
independently until your facilitators give feedback, without disturbing others for approvals
and disapprovals. Never settle inputs that you composed without reliable information and
resources. Learn to identify references or even quote other people's works even without
particular template types in your outputs. Do not post uninformed or half-cooked opinions
from scanty knowledge.
d. Read and analyze your classmates' contributions in the discussion fora. Correct and
courteous response. Never leave the forum, unless you need to.
f. Do not post lengthy posts (don't accept turning around the bush). Just
stick to the point. Keep your main point clear and express it in the shortest
possible terms. Don't let the conversation drift.
g. Secure your confidentiality. Ponder before you post so as to prevent
misinterpretation and offend other parties to your ideas. If you want to
10. Do not plagiarize, and do not write patches. Patch writing is still a plagiary
type. To assess the percentage of resemblance and remove copyright
infringement, use the plagiarism checker. The act of making small
modifications and substitutions to copied source material is referred to
(Merriam-Webster, 2020).To be more secure use a plagiarism check.
11. Do your best to remind your facilitator, by all means, of any inevitable delays
or "absences" or "silences" over the course of a week or other questions at the
specified time. No time as peek-a-boo as this moment. Be transparent
regarding your situation.
12. Notice that the platform is an area of simulated learning, not a social
networking site or a social media gossip portal. Use a recent and correct photo
ID on your profile page and fill in the details needed for proper identification.
13. Materials and other resources shall be made available to you and it is strongly
recommended that you be resourceful and imaginative.
14. The assessment will be generated hierarchically via the digital platform at the
scheduled time. When you have failed the evaluation by element, the
platform will guide you from the start to evaluate the element completely and
restart the evaluation and pass the evaluation before beginning the next
element.
15. Follow guidelines and assumptions at all times are strictly prohibited. Ask your
facilitators about their convenient class hours or appointed time for
consultation.
16. Finally, you’re the learner; therefore, you’re doing the module yourself. Your
family members and friends at home will help you but the requisite tasks
MUST be performed and undertaken entirely by you as your performance
must be orally checked and validated. The institution's core principles must be
adhered to.
EVALUATION:
In order to meet the appropriate passing grades of this module, you must:
1. Read all your course readings and respond to your diagnostic evaluation, self-
assessment and other activities, including reflections.
RESULT:
The reflective questions are designed to help you critically analyze the courses for
better understanding while the pre- and post-tests, including the tasks and exercises,
are a tool for review management to prepare you for the general evaluation at the end
of the module.
GRADING SYSTEM:
You have to meet the passing grades by referring it to the institutional grading
system and procedures.
PURE LECTURE:
ASSESSMENT (Course/s without laboratory)
Formative Assessment: -60%
-Quizzes/Hands-on Activity -30%
-Recitation/Class Participation -20%
-Project/Assignments -10%
SUMMATIVE ASSESSMENT: -40%
Periodical Examination
TOTAL - 100%
MODULE MAPPING
No.
jurisdictions.
4. Professional Competence & Career
Progression: Essential for maintaining licensure,
Course Outcome
Evaluate:
Maritime Officer Responsibilities
PRE- TEST
PRE-ASSESSMENT
Instruction: Write the word TRUE if the statement is correct and the word FALSE if the
statement is incorrect. Write your answer on the space provided before the number.
____________ 1. In the M/V "Neptune" fire incident, the primary compliance gap stems
solely from the crew's individual failure to operate fire extinguishers correctly, without
implicating the broader Safety Management System's (SMS) effectiveness as per SOLAS
Chapter IX.
____________ 2. The bulk carrier's discharge of oily bilge water in a Special Area,
combined with falsified records, only exposes the vessel to administrative fines from the
Flag State, without significant risk of Port State Control detention or criminal charges.
Best Practices
Regular safety inspections Emergency response preparation
Updated documentation Environmental protection measures
Crew training programs
Discussion of Lesson
Introduction to Maritime Law
Historical development
From the fact that the ancient Egyptians engaged in shipping on a wide scale, it can be
inferred that they had at least rudimentary laws regulating that activity, although no trace of any
has been found thus far. Nor is there anything known of any maritime laws of the Phoenicians,
who succeeded the Egyptians as commercial leaders in the Mediterranean. That Rhodes was a
major source of maritime law, however, is clearly indicated in two passages from the Digest (AD
533) of the Roman emperor Justinian. The first quotes the emperor Antoninus (reigned AD 138–
161) in a case of plunder following a shipwreck: “I am indeed lord of the world, but the Law is the
lord of the sea. This matter must be decided by the maritime law of the Rhodians, provided that
no law of ours is opposed to it.” The second is a statement of the basic law of “general average,”
which the Digest attributes to the Rhodians. “Average” here means any loss sustained by a
vessel or its cargo. When one segment of a maritime venture is sacrificed to save the others, the
average is described as general, and the owners of the property saved must help make good the
loss. Thus, if cargo is jettisoned in a successful effort to refloat a grounded vessel, the owners of
the vessel and of the cargo saved are obliged to bear proportionate shares of the loss sustained
by the owner of the cargo singled out for sacrifice.
Because the Mediterranean, under Roman control, was not only the centre of the
Western world but also its principal commercial highway, European maritime law evolved as a
uniform, supranational, comprehensive body of law—a characteristic which, though sometimes
threatened by the spread of nationalism, has never been lost completely. The barbarian invaders
who moved south were not seafarers, and the principal Mediterranean seaports were thus able to
maintain their independence. Moreover, the conquered peoples were permitted to keep the
Roman law to which they had become accustomed, and in the field of maritime jurisprudence the
transition into the Middle Ages were therefore gradual. As certain Italian cities began to outstrip
the Eastern Byzantine Empire commercially, they formulated their own maritime laws, some
dating as early as 1063. Trani, Amalfi, Venice, and other Italian port cities all offered their own
collections of laws. Nevertheless, the next widely accepted body of sea laws was the Consolat de
Mar, or “Consulate of the Sea,” originally compiled at Barcelona in the 13th century. More
elaborate than the earlier codes, the Consolat was followed in Spain, Provence, and the Italian
cities and had a significant effect on the development of modern maritime law. The earliest code
to emerge beyond the Mediterranean was the “Rolls of Oléron,” named for an island in the Bay of
Biscay and apparently dating from the 12th century. Whether the Rolls were of French or of
Anglo-Norman origin, they became the nucleus of the maritime law not only of England and
France but also of Scotland, Flanders, Prussia, and Castile; and they are still occasionally cited
as authority, even by U.S. courts. The Rolls were closely followed in the Laws of Wisby,
headquarters of the Hanseatic League until 1361.
In continental Europe, loss of uniformity in the maritime law began with the late
Renaissance and accelerated with the rise of nationalism in the 17th century, which witnessed
adoption of the Maritime Code of Christian XI of Sweden (1667), the Marine Ordinances of Louis
XIV of France (1681), and the Code of Christian V of Denmark (1683). Of these, the most
significant were the Ordinances, prepared under Louis XIV’s finance minister, Jean-Baptiste
Colbert, as part of his comprehensive though unfulfilled plan for the codification of all French law.
Established customs of the sea, revised to suit the times, were made part of the national law,
enforceable in the French Admiralty Court, which was granted maritime jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the old consular courts, whose judges had been elected by the mariners themselves.
The individuality of the maritime law—its “separation” from other types of law—was
accentuated by the Ordinances, which gathered together in one code all of the criminal, private,
procedural, and public laws relating to the sea. Although the French Admiralty Court failed to
survive the Revolution that began in 1789, the substantive law embodied in the Ordinances was
very closely followed in the Code de Commerce, whose adoption in 1807 meant that the maritime
law was thereafter considered simply as a branch of commercial law, with consequent diminution
of the weight previously given to custom and usage. Furthermore, abolition of the Admiralty Court
resulted in the trial of maritime cases by the commercial courts, on which, in the smaller ports,
maritime interests might not be represented. In countries with codes based directly or indirectly
on the French commercial code, civil maritime cases, as well as nonmaritime commercial
disputes, are heard and decided by commercial courts.
Although the Code de Commerce was widely adopted in the first half of the 19th century,
in some cases by choice and in others by conquest, the German Commercial Code of 1861,
Although the “Pied Poudre” courts, held primarily for the settlement of disputes at English
fairs and markets, also had special jurisdiction of seamen’s cases, it is probable that the first
English tribunals to apply maritime law, with the Rolls of Oléron as a basis, were the courts of the
Cinque Ports. The High Court of Admiralty, which sat at London, and the Vice Admiralty Courts,
set up in the other ports, were a later development. They were named after the admiral, an officer
whose duties were at first solely administrative and military but were broadened early in the 14th
century to include disciplinary proceedings in such matters as piracy. The Admiralty Court is
considered as dating from 1360, when for the first time the admiral was expressly granted
jurisdiction in civil maritime cases. By the end of the 16th century the admiralty courts had come
to exercise an extremely wide jurisdiction, reaching far beyond saltwater transportation into many
areas of commercial law. But during the first half of the 17th century, the judges of the common-
law courts succeeded in divesting their competitors in the Admiralty of their commercial
jurisdiction and in restricting them to the adjudication of “things done upon the sea.”
The Admiralty was a royal court with valuable emoluments. It functioned without the aid of
juries, following procedures borrowed from the Continent that were somewhat less dilatory and
cumbersome than those of the common-law courts, and applied the laws and customs of the sea
to the maritime controversies that came before it. For these reasons it was preferred by the
merchants and favoured by the Crown, which depended to a considerable extent on taxation of
the merchants for its revenues. Its jurisdiction therefore waxed and waned with the strength or
weakness of the reigning sovereign. Thus, it enjoyed wide jurisdiction under the Tudors, but its
powers were severely curtailed under succeeding monarchs and governments, and were never
fully restored until the passage of the first of the Admiralty Court Acts in the 19th century.
Although the powers of the English Admiralty are today quite broad, in practice it is rare
for cases other than those involving marine collisions and salvage to be brought before it.
Controversies respecting charter parties, ocean bills of lading, and marine insurance, for
example, are more generally brought before the Commercial Court.
In the United States, the federal district courts are by statute granted original jurisdiction,
“exclusive of the courts of the States,” of “Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.” This means,
essentially, that if a maritime claimant wishes to have his claim litigated in accordance with
admiralty procedure he must invoke the admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts. However, he is
free to sue in a state court, unless the defendant is a citizen of another state, in which case the
suit may be tried as an ordinary civil action in the district court.
Maritime liens
Under American maritime law, the ship is personified to the extent that it may sometimes
be held responsible under circumstances in which the shipowner himself is under no liability. The
Maritime liens can arise not only when the personified ship is charged with a maritime
tort, such as a negligent collision or personal injury, but also for salvage services, for general
average contributions, and for breach of certain maritime contracts.
In a proceeding in rem, the vessel, cargo, or freight can be arrested and kept in the
custody of the court unless the owner obtains its release by posting a bond or such other security
as may be required under the applicable law or as may be acceptable to the plaintiff. More
frequently, however, the owner will post security to avoid a threatened arrest, and the property
never has to be taken into custody. When the judgment is for the plaintiff in a proceeding in rem,
there will be a recovery on the bond or other security if the owner of the property does not pay; or,
if security has not been posted, the court will order the property sold, or the freight released, in
order to satisfy the judgment. The sale of a ship by an admiralty court following a judgment in rem
divests the ship of all pre-existing liens—and not merely those liens sought to be enforced in the
proceeding in rem. By way of contrast, the holder of an in personam judgment against a
shipowner can, like any judgment creditor, have the ship sold in execution of the judgment; but
such a sale, unlike the sale under an admiralty judgment in rem, does not divest existing liens;
the purchaser at the execution sale takes the ship subject to all such liens. Thus, an in rem
proceeding has decided advantages over a proceeding in personam in a case in which the
shipowner is insolvent.
Efforts have been made from time to time to increase the security value of ship
mortgages, in order to encourage lending institutions to finance vessel construction, but these
efforts have not been very successful, largely because of differences in national laws respecting
the relative priorities of mortgages and maritime liens. (Under general maritime law there is a
complex hierarchy of maritime liens; that is to say, in a proceeding that involves distribution of an
inadequate fund to a number of lien claimants, liens of a higher rank will be paid in full in priority
over liens of a lower rank; and in most countries a ship mortgage ranks lower than a number of
maritime liens.) Attempts were made to harmonize some of these conflicts by international
conventions signed in 1926 and 1976, but the first failed to win widespread support and, as of the
end of 1983, the second had been ratified by only half of the signatories required for the
convention to enter into force.
Shipping charters
The function of ships, other than warships, pleasure craft, and service vessels of various
types is of course transportation of cargoes and passengers. In the “jet age” the passenger-
carrying segment of the shipping industry has lost much of its former importance, but the quantity
of goods transported by water continues to grow as the world economy expands.
The great majority of the contracts governing the carriage of goods by water are
evidenced either by charter parties or by bills of lading. The term charter party (a corruption of the
Latin carta partita, or “divided charter”) is employed to describe three widely differing types of
contracts relating to the use of vessels owned or controlled by others. Under a “demise” or
“bareboat” charter, the shipowner delivers possession of the vessel to the charterer, who
engages the master and crew, arranges for repairs and supplies, and, in general, functions in
The third type is the “voyage” charter, which is essentially a contract of affreightment, or
carriage. Most voyage charters provide for the carriage of full cargoes on one voyage or a series
of voyages, but occasionally a charterer contracts for the use of only a portion of the carrying
capacity of the vessel, in which case the governing contract is described as a “space” charter.
Under a voyage charter, it is customary for the master or his agent to issue a bill of lading to the
shipper, who is usually the charterer, although as between shipowner and charterer the voyage
charter remains the governing contract of carriage; the bill of lading serves only as a receipt and
as a document of title to the goods. Ocean bills of lading are usually in order form; that is, they
call for delivery to the order of the shipper or of some other designated party. Such a bill of lading
may be negotiated in much the same way as a check, draft, or other negotiable instrument, which
means that a bona fide purchaser of the bill of lading takes it free and clear of any defects not
appearing on its face. Thus, if cargo is externally damaged on shipment but the damage is not
noted on the bill of lading, the carrier will be barred from establishing that the cargo was in fact
damaged before it came into the carrier’s custody. Once a bill of lading issued under a voyage
charter is negotiated to a bona fide purchaser, it becomes the governing contract between the
carrier and the holder of the bill.
When a ship strands or collides with another vessel, substantial cargo loss or damage
may result. If the casualty is found to have been caused by a sea peril or an error in navigation,
there will be no liability if the goods are being carried under a statutory or contractual provision
based upon the Brussels Convention on Limitation of Liability (1923), which incorporated the so-
called “Hague Rules.” If, however, the casualty was the result of the carrier’s failure to exercise
due diligence to make the ship seaworthy and to see that it was properly manned, equipped, and
supplied, the carrier will be held responsible.
Limitation of liability
A distinctive feature of maritime law is the privilege accorded to a shipowner and certain
other persons (such as charterers in some instances) to limit the amount of their liability, under
certain circumstances, in respect of tort and some contract claims. In some countries, including
the United States, the limit, except as to claims for personal injury and wrongful death, is the
value of the ship and the earnings of the voyage on which it was engaged at the time of the
casualty. On the other hand, in the United Kingdom and the other countries that have ratified the
Brussels limitation of liability convention of 1957 or enacted domestic legislation embracing its
terms, the limit is £28, or its equivalent, multiplied by the adjusted net tonnage of the vessel,
regardless of its actual value. The basic condition of the privilege is that the party asserting it
must be free from “privity or knowledge,” in the words of the United States statute, or “actual fault
or privity,” in the words of the convention. This formula means, generally speaking, that the
shipowner is entitled to limit his liability for the negligence of the master or crew, but not for his
own personal negligence or that of his managerial personnel. In a sense the limited liability of
shipowners may be compared to the limited liability that any investor may now achieve by
incorporating his enterprise. The limited-liability idea in maritime law, however, long antedates the
emergence or invention of the modern corporation or limited company; its early appearance in
maritime law may be taken as a recognition of the extraordinary hazards of seaborne commerce
and the need to protect the adventurous shipowner from the crushing burden of liability—that is,
Great Britain and the United States were once the only maritime countries that refused to
admit the principle of limitation as part of the general maritime law. In both countries, however,
the competitive needs of the shipping industry compelled its introduction by statute.
In general, the limitation law of any country will be applied by its own courts in favour of
foreign shipowners as well as of citizens. From the point of view of shipowning interests,
however, a major weakness of limitation law has been the fact that limitation proceedings were
not given international recognition. That has meant that a shipowner whose ships moved in
international trade could find himself sued in several countries as a result of one disaster and
forced to set up limitation funds in each country. The Brussels convention of 1957 makes
limitation decrees delivered by admiralty courts in ratifying countries internationally effective; that
is, a shipowner is required to set up only one limitation fund, out of which all claims are paid, no
matter in how many countries proceedings might be instituted against him. Thus, the convention,
which increases the liability of shipowners in most countries, does offer in return this considerable
advantage to shipowners.
Collision liability
Under maritime law responsibility for collision damage is based upon the fault principle: a
colliding vessel will not be held responsible for damage to another ship or to a fixed object such
as a bridge, wharf, or jetty unless the collision is caused by a deficiency in the colliding vessel or
by negligence or a willful act on the part of its navigators. It is not always necessary, however, to
establish fault by positive evidence; there is a presumption of fault when a moving vessel collides
with a fixed object or with another vessel that is properly moored or anchored, and the burden of
proving freedom from fault will lie with the moving vessel.
In countries that have adopted the International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to Collisions between Vessels, signed at Brussels in 1910, the rule of
“comparative negligence” governs: if each of two colliding vessels is to blame, the total damages
will be divided between their owners or operators in proportion to the respective degrees of fault.
In certain countries that have not ratified the Convention, such as the United States, the law is
such that, if both vessels are to blame, the total damages are equally divided, regardless of the
respective degrees of fault. In certain other countries that have not ratified the Convention,
including most of the Latin American states, the principle of “contributory fault” governs: if both
vessels are to blame, each owner or operator bears his own damages.
Salvage and general average are doctrines peculiar to maritime law. Under the law of
salvage, strangers to the maritime venture who succeed in saving maritime property from loss or
damage from perils of the sea or other waters are entitled to an award for their efforts and have a
maritime lien on the salvaged property therefore. Several elements will be taken into account in
fixing the amount of the award, including the extent of the efforts required; the skill and energy
displayed by the salvors, the amounts involved, including both the value of the vessel or other
property employed by the salvors in rendering the service and the value of the vessel, cargo, or
other property salvaged; the risks incurred by the salvors; and the degree of danger from which
the property was rescued. General average (defined at the beginning of this article) is a principle
still universally accepted, although there is some agitation for its abolition, principally because the
accounting and other expenses incurred in administering a general average are often quite out of
proportion to the amounts involved and because the same underwriters sometimes insure both
hull and cargo.
Marine insurance
Marine insurance is the oldest known form of insurance. Indeed, the institution of general
average, under which the participants in a maritime venture contribute to losses incurred by some
for the benefit of all, may itself be looked on as a primitive form of mutual insurance. Hull and
cargo insurance today, in fact, is usually written on forms whose wording has changed little since
the 18th century. The so-called “perils” clause, enumerating the risks insured against, customarily
includes not only the natural hazards to which a vessel is exposed but man-made perils such as
capture or destruction by enemy forces as well. In 1898, however, Lloyd’s of London underwriters
inaugurated the practice of adding “Free of Capture and Seizure” (F.C.&S.) clauses to the basic
policy forms, the effect of which was to remove war and similar risks from coverage. The practice
has since become universal, with the result that the owner of a ship or cargo must either
purchase separate war-risk insurance or else pay his marine underwriters an additional premium
in return for deletion of the F.C.&S. clause.
An early type of marine liability insurance was against liability for damage that the insured
vessel caused to other vessels. Such insurance was affected by the addition of a “running down”
or “collision” clause to the basic hull policy insuring the owner or operator of a vessel against its
loss or damage. On the theory that, if given full protection, owners and operators would not be
encouraged to exercise proper care in the maintenance of their vessels and the selection of their
masters and crews, hull underwriters at first refused to insure against more than 75 percent of the
collision liability.
vessels against which the hull underwriters refused to insure. Foreign owners soon found the P.
and I. Clubs attractive, and as of 1973 the operators of about 80 percent of the world’s ocean
tonnage were insured with the British clubs and their Scandinavian and Japanese affiliates.
International Regulation
Maritime law is often thought of as being a species of international law rather than a
branch of domestic or municipal law. It should not be denied that the international aspect of
maritime law gives it a distinctive flavour; in doubtful cases courts of one country will often look to
the precedents or statutes of another country for inspiration or guidance. Except to the extent that
it may have bound itself by international conventions, however, each country has the right to
adopt such maritime laws as it sees fit. Although many such laws are common to most maritime
countries, others are not, though there is a growing tendency to restore the international
uniformity in the maritime law achieved during the Middle Ages. In many areas, the lead has been
taken by the International Maritime Committee, more commonly known by its French name,
Comité Maritime International (CMI), which is composed of the maritime law associations of more
than 30 nations. The work of the Comité consists principally of drafting international conventions
relating to subjects of maritime law. When such a draft is prepared, it is submitted to the Belgian
government, which then convenes a diplomatic conference at which the CMI draft is discussed
and amended as the official delegates may decide. If the revised draft wins approval at the
conference, it is then submitted to the national governments for possible ratification. Although
many of these conventions have failed to be widely ratified, others have been highly successful.
The international regulations for the prevention of collisions at sea, first adopted at an
international conference held in Washington in 1889 and revised at maritime safety conferences
held in London from time to time since 1914, are recognized by all of the maritime countries. The
regulations are, in effect, an international code of navigation. In other fields much has been
accomplished to ensure international uniformity through private agreements voluntarily adhered
to by affected interests; the York-Antwerp Rules of General Average, first promulgated in 1890
and most recently amended in 1950, are the best known example of such agreements; although
they do not technically have the force of law, nevertheless, by incorporation in charter parties and
bills of lading, they determine the rights and obligations of the parties as effectively as any
statute.
Ship: Regulation
Ships historically made untrammeled use of the vast ocean surface. The necessity of
coming into port gave shore authorities the opportunity to exact certain payments, but, until
regulation began to appear in the middle of the 19th century, owners and captains were…
The sovereign territory of a state extends to its recognized land boundaries and to the
border of airspace and outer space above them. A state that has a coastal boundary also
possesses certain areas of the sea.
POST-TEST
POST-ASSESSMENT:
Instruction: Write the word TRUE if the statement is correct and the word FALSE if the
statement is incorrect. Write your answer on the space provided before the number.
____________ 3. The most effective method for assessing a ship's adherence to ISPS
Code security requirements primarily relies on observing the crew's actual security
practices and the functionality of security equipment, supplementing a review of the Ship
Security Plan.
LEARNING OUTCOME1.2:
At the end of this topic, the students should be able to:
Compare and contrast the degree of jurisdiction provided to the flag state,
coastal state, and port state by the UNCLOS Ill with respect to the
implementation and verification of international conventions and
agreements that form part of the maritime law
PRE-TEST
Instruction: Write the word TRUE if the statement is correct and the word FALSE if the
statement is incorrect. Write your answer on the space provided before the number.
_____________ 1. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)
is designed to clarify the rights and responsibilities of flag states, coastal states, and port
states regarding maritime activities.
_____________ 3. A Coastal State's jurisdiction extends to sovereign rights over both its
territorial waters (up to 12 nautical miles) and special rights over resources within its
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ, up to 200 nautical miles).
Introduction
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) is a comprehensive
framework governing maritime activities. It delineates the rights and responsibilities of
various states, specifically the flag state, coastal state, and port state. This module aims to
provide maritime students with a clear understanding of the jurisdictional authorities
granted to these states and how they implement and verify international maritime law.
Degree of Jurisdiction
Primary Authority: The flag state holds primary responsibility for the vessel, particularly
when it is on the high seas. This authority includes enforcing international conventions
related to safety, pollution, and labor standards.
Implementation of International Conventions: The flag state must ensure compliance with
various international agreements, such as:
Enforcement: If a vessel is found violating international laws, the flag state has the duty
to investigate and take appropriate actions.
Example: If a Liberian-flagged tanker is caught discharging oil illegally into the ocean,
Liberia is responsible for investigating the incident and enforcing relevant penalties.
Degree of Jurisdiction
Sovereign Rights: The coastal state exercises sovereignty over its territorial waters (up to
12 nautical miles) and has special rights over resources within its EEZ (up to 200 nautical
miles).
Enforcement: The coastal state can take action against foreign vessels violating its laws
within its jurisdiction.
Example: If a foreign fishing vessel is detected fishing without a permit in the EEZ of
Canada, Canadian authorities can enforce international fisheries agreements to protect
marine resources.
Degree of Jurisdiction
Inspection and Compliance: The port state has the authority to inspect vessels in its ports
to ensure they adhere to international regulations.
Verification of International Conventions: The port state can enforce compliance with
conventions like:
Enforcement: The port state can take action against vessels that do not meet required
standards, even if they are flagged in another country.
Enforces
Enforces agreements Inspects vessels for
international
Implementation related to resources and compliance with
conventions on
environmental protection regulations
the high seas
POST-TEST
POST-ASSESSMENT:
Instruction: Write the word TRUE if the statement is correct and the word FALSE if the
statement is incorrect. Write your answer on the space provided before the number.
____________ 2. The Coastal State's "special rights" within its Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) grant it full sovereignty to implement and enforce any national law on
foreign vessels, regardless of whether those laws relate to resource exploitation or
environmental protection.
____________ 4. The UNCLOS III framework implies that a Coastal State's ability to
enforce international fisheries agreements on foreign vessels within its EEZ is entirely
dependent on the Flag State's prior consent for each individual enforcement action.
LEARNING OUTCOME1.3:
At the end of this topic, the students should be able to:
Relate the concept of the No More Favourable Treatment Clause to resolving
compliance issues involving a ship registered under a flag that has not agreed to a
certain convention.
PRE-TEST
Instruction: Write the word TRUE if the statement is correct and the word FALSE if the
statement is incorrect. Write your answer on the space provided before the number.
____________ 2. According to the NMFTC, a cargo ship registered in a country that has
not ratified SOLAS can still claim full protections and benefits under SOLAS if it
experiences a fire at sea.
____________ 3. One of the key impacts of the NMFTC is that it encourages flag states
to ratify international conventions by denying favorable treatment to their non-compliant
vessels.
____________ 5. The NMFTC aims to create a level playing field by preventing ships
from exploiting weaknesses in international law due to their flag state's non-compliance.
Definition
The NMFTC stipulates that a ship cannot receive benefits or lenient treatment based on
international conventions if its flag state has not agreed to those conventions. This
principle is designed to prevent any unfair advantages that might arise from non-
compliance, ensuring all vessels operate under the same legal framework.
Importance
Equity in Treatment: Ensures that no ship can exploit weaknesses in international law due
to its flag state’s non-compliance, promoting a level playing field.
Global Standards: Encourages adherence to international standards for safety,
environmental protection, and labor rights, which are essential for maintaining a
sustainable maritime industry.
In-Depth Examples
The No More Favourable Treatment Clause (NMFTC) plays a pivotal role in shaping
international maritime safety standards by ensuring that all vessels, regardless of their
flag state, adhere to established conventions. This module explains how the NMFTC
influences safety protocols and compliance within the maritime industry.
*The NMFTC significantly influences several key maritime safety conventions, including
SOLAS, ICLL, MARPOL, STCW, and SAR. By ensuring that ships flagged by non-
compliant states do not receive favorable treatment, the NMFTC reinforces the
importance of adhering to international safety standards, promoting a safer maritime
environment for all.
Overview
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) sets vital safety
standards for ships to ensure the safety of passengers and crew. The NMFTC influences
Example Scenario
Situation
A cargo ship, the MV Ocean Trader, is registered under the flag of a country that has not
ratified SOLAS. While the ship operates internationally, it does not adhere to the
mandatory safety regulations outlined in SOLAS, such as:
Compliance Challenge
During a routine inspection in a port state that is a party to SOLAS, the inspectors
discover that the MV Ocean Trader lacks several safety features mandated by the
convention. Because the ship is flagged by a non-compliant country, the following
consequences arise due to the NMFTC:
*No Favorable Treatment: The MV Ocean Trader cannot argue for leniency or additional
time to comply with SOLAS requirements, as it is not eligible for any exceptions that
might apply to compliant vessels.
Legal Repercussions: The ship may face detention by port authorities. The NMFTC
ensures that ships from non-compliant flag states are treated the same as those without
compliance, and they are not afforded protections that ships from compliant states would
receive.
Financial Consequences: The shipowner may incur significant fines and costs related to
the detention and necessary retrofitting to meet SOLAS standards.
Increased Risk: The lack of adherence to SOLAS not only puts the crew and cargo at
risk but also affects the safety of other vessels in the vicinity, highlighting the broader
implications of non-compliance.
*In this example, the NMFTC directly impacts the compliance of the MV Ocean Trader
with SOLAS by ensuring that it cannot receive any favorable treatment despite its
substandard safety measures. This mechanism reinforces the importance of adhering to
international safety conventions and promotes a safer maritime environment overall.
POST-ASSESSMENT:
Instruction: Write the word TRUE if the statement is correct and the word FALSE if the
statement is incorrect. Write your answer on the space provided before the number.
____________ 1. A Port State's decision to detain a vessel, such as the MV Ocean Trader
for SOLAS non-compliance despite its flag state not being a party to SOLAS, is a direct
application of the NMFTC to promote uniform global safety standards.
____________ 4. The principle of "equity in treatment" under the NMFTC implies that a
vessel from a flag state that has ratified MARPOL will consistently face more lenient
penalties for pollution incidents than a vessel from a non-ratifying flag state.
LEARNING OUTCOME1.4:
At the end of this topic, the students should be able to:
Sketch the five (5) maritime zones including the continental shelf and seabed and
explain
a. The power exercised by the Coastal State in each zone or shelf
b The rights and responsibilities that a ship may exercise in each zone or shelf.
PRE-TEST
PRE-ASSESSMENT:
Instruction: Write the word TRUE if the statement is correct and the word FALSE if the
statement is incorrect. Write your answer on the space provided before the number.
__________ 1. The South China Sea disputes involve only island claims within the region by
several sovereign states,
__________ 2. In 2020, the PRC began island building in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel
Islands region.
__________ 3. In July 2016, an arbitration tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruled against the PRC's maritime claims
in Philippines v. China.
__________ 4. "Length" means 100 per cent of the total length on a waterline at 85 per cent of
the least moulded depth measured from the top of the keel, or the length from the fore side of
the stem to the axis of the rudder stock on that waterline, if that be greater.
The South China Sea disputes involve both island and maritime claims within the region by
several sovereign states, namely Brunei, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan
(Republic of China/ROC), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. An estimated
US$3.37 trillion worth of global trade passes through the South China Sea annually, which
accounts for a third of the global maritime trade. 80 percent of China's energy imports and 39.5
percent of China's total trade passes through the South China Sea.
The disputes involve the islands, reefs, banks, and other features of the South China Sea,
including the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal, and various boundaries in
the Gulf of Tonkin. There are further disputes, such as the waters near the Indonesian Natuna
Islands, which many do not regard as part of the South China Sea. Claimant states are
interested in retaining or acquiring the rights to fishing stocks, the exploration and potential
exploitation of crude oil and natural gas in the seabed of various parts of the South China Sea,
and the strategic control of important shipping lanes. Maritime security is also an issue, as the
ongoing disputes present challenges for shipping.
In 2013, the PRC began island building in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands region.
According to Reuters, island building in the South China Sea primarily by Vietnam and the
Philippines has been going on for decades; while China has come late to the island building
game, its efforts have been on an unprecedented scale as it had from 2014 to 2016
constructed more new island surface than all other nations have constructed throughout history
and as of 2016 placed military equipment on one of its artificial islands unlike the other
claimants. A 2019 article in Voice of America that compared China and Vietnam's island
building campaign in the South China Sea similarly noted that the reason why Vietnam in
contradistinction to China has been subject to little international criticism and even support was
because of the slower speed and widely perceived defensive nature of its island-building
project.
China's actions in the South China Sea have been described as part of its "salami
slicing"/"cabbage wrapping" strategies, and since 2015 the United States and other states such
as France and the United Kingdom have conducted freedom of navigation operations (FONOP)
in the region. In July 2016, an arbitration tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruled against the PRC's maritime claims
in Philippines v. China. The tribunal did not rule on the ownership of the islands or delimit
maritime boundaries. Both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan stated that they did not
recognize the tribunal and insisted that the matter should be resolved through bilateral
negotiations with other claimants. On 17 September 2020, France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom issued a joint note verbale recognizing the PCA ruling and challenging China's claims.
The disputes involve both maritime boundaries and islands. There are several disputes, each of
which involves a different collection of countries:
History
By May 1939, the Japanese had laid claim and occupied the
Paracel and Spratly Islands. During World War II, the Empire of Japan used the islands in the
South China Sea for various military purposes and asserted that the islands were not claimed
by anyone when the Imperial Japanese Navy took control of them. Historical accounts note that
at least France had controlled some of the features in the region during the 1930s.After the
war, Imperial Japan had to relinquish control of the islands in the South China Sea in the 1951
Treaty of San Francisco which, however, did not specify the new status of the islands.The
People's Republic of China made various claims to the islands during the 1951 treaty
negotiations and the 1958 First Taiwan Strait Crisis.
In the later half of 1970s, the Philippines and Malaysia began referring to the Spratly Islands as
included in their own territory. On 11 June 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines
issued Presidential Decree No. 1596, declaring the north-western part of the Spratly Islands
(referred to therein as the Kalayaan Island Group) as Philippine territory.
In 1988, the PRC and Vietnam fought each other near the Johnson Reef.The PRC had
obtained a permit from the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission to build five
observation posts for the conduction of ocean surveys, and one of the permitted observation
posts was allowed to be located in the Spratly islands region.The PRC chose to built its
observation post on the Fiery Cross Reef, which was isolated from the other islands in the
region and was not occupied by any state at the time. When it started to build the observation
post in the terra nullius Fiery Cross Reef, Vietnam sent its navy to the area to monitor the
situation.The two states clashed near the Johnson Reef, and after the clash, China occupied
the Johnson Reef.
In 1994, the PRC occupied Mischief Reef, located some 250 miles from the Philippine coast.
Occupation was made in the middle of an energy resources race in the Spratlys, where China
lacked a presence while the other countries were starting their oil exploration businesses.
Mischief Reef marked the first time when the PRC had a military confrontation with the
Philippines, an ally of the United States.
The occupation and/or control of most parts of the Spratly and Paracel islands has not changed
significantly since the middle of 1990s.The PRC controls all of the features in the Paracels. In
the Spratlys, Vietnam controls most features with 29 in total, while the Philippines has control of
eight features, Malaysia with 5, the PRC with 5, and the ROC with 1. Balance of power in the
Spratlys has greatly shifted since 2013, when the PRC started its island building activities in the
region.
In 2012, the PRC took the Scarborough Shoal as a response to the Philippine navy's actions of
stopping Chinese fishing boats in the area.
On 22 December 2020, the PRC claimed that the guided missile destroyer John S McCain had
been "expelled" after it “trespassed” into Chinese territorial waters close to the Spratly
Islands.However this claim has been disputed by the US Navy.
In March 2021, 220 Chinese fishing boats were seen moored around Whitsun Reef in the
Spratly Islands, a reef claimed by the Philippines as part of its exclusive economic zone.
Philippines Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana accused China of "provocative action of
militarizing the area".
2011 agreement
The agreement was described by the PRC's assistant foreign minister, Liu Zhenmin, as "an
important milestone document for cooperation among China and ASEAN countries".Some of
the early drafts acknowledged aspects such as "marine environmental protection, scientific
research, safety of navigation and communication, search and rescue and combating
transnational crime", although the issue of oil and natural gas drilling remains unresolved.
"Following the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
(DOC), China and ASEAN countries actively advanced the consultations on the Code of
Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea," with the forecast that the COC will be completed by
2021.
On 22 July 2011, the INS Airavat, an Indian amphibious assault vessel on a friendly visit to
Vietnam, was reportedly contacted 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast in the disputed
South China Sea by a party identifying itself as the PLA Navy and stating that the ship was
entering PRC waters. A spokesperson for the Indian Navy explained that as no ship or aircraft
was visible, the INS Airavat proceeded on her onward journey as scheduled. The Indian Navy
further clarified that "[t]here was no confrontation involving the INS Airavat. India supports
freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of
passage in accordance with accepted principles of international law. These principles should be
respected by all."
In September 2011, shortly after the PRC and Vietnam signed an agreement seeking to contain
a dispute over the South China Sea, India's state-run explorer, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
(ONGC) said that its overseas investment arm, ONGC Videsh Limited, had signed a three-year
agreement with PetroVietnam for developing long-term co-operation in the oil sector, and that it
had accepted Vietnam's offer of exploration in certain specified blocks in the South China Sea.
However, this agreement between India and Vietnam has provoked attacks from the PRC[49]
In response, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu, without referring to India by name,
stated:
"As for oil and gas exploration activities, our consistent position is that we are opposed to any
country engaging in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China's
jurisdiction. We hope the foreign countries do not get involved in South China Sea dispute."
An Indian foreign ministry spokesman responded, "The Chinese had concerns, but we are
going by what the Vietnamese authorities have told us and we have conveyed this to the
Chinese."The Indo-Vietnamese deal was also denounced by the Chinese state-run newspaper
Global Times.
In Spring 2010, PRC officials reportedly communicated to US officials that the South China Sea
was "an area of 'core interest' that is as non-negotiable" and on par with Taiwan and Tibet on
the national agenda. However, Beijing appeared to have backed away from that assertion in
2011.
In July 2014, Professor Alan Dupont of the University of New South Wales was reported as
saying that the Chinese government appeared to be directing its fishing fleet into disputed
waters as a matter of policy.
From 2013 to the beginning of 2018, China carried out land reclamation in the South China
Sea. The construction of the islands has been completed. The three island airports of Meiji
Reef, Zhubi Reef, and Yongshu Reef have been completed.
In August 2019, China's paramount leader Xi Jinping told Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte
that China would not recognise or abide by the Arbitration decision. This occurred during a visit
by Duterte to Beijing, with discussions between the two leaders.Such a stance by Beijing is in
line with the July 2019 publishing of a Chinese White Paper, "China's National Defense in the
New Era," which details China's armed strength and repeatedly mentions deployment in the
South China Sea. On 22 September 2020, in a recorded speech at the opening of the 75th
session of the UN General Assembly, the Philippine President, Rodrigo Duterte reaffirmed the
Hague ruling rejecting most of China's claims to disputed waters, and said "The award is now
part of international law, beyond compromise and beyond the reach of passing governments to
dilute, diminish, or abandon."
The area is said to be rich in oil and natural gas deposits; however, the estimates are highly
varied. The Chinese Ministry of Geological Resources and Mining estimated that the South
China Sea may contain 17.7 billion barrels of crude oil,compared to the oil rich country of
Kuwait which has 13 billion barrels. In the years following the announcement by the PRC
ministry, the claims regarding the South China Sea islands intensified. However, other sources
claim that the proven reserves of oil in the South China Sea may only be 7.5 billion barrels, or
about 1.1 billion barrels.[64] According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA)'s
profile of the South China Sea region, a US Geological Survey estimate puts the region's
discovered and undiscovered oil reserves at 11 billion barrels, as opposed to a PRC figure of
125 billion barrels.The same EIA report also points to the wide variety of natural gas resource
estimations, ranging from 190 trillion cubic feet to 500 trillion cubic feet, likely located in the
contested Reed Bank".
The state-owned China Offshore Exploration Corp. planned to spend 200 billion RMB (US$30
billion) in the next 20 years to exploit oil in the region, with the estimated production of 25
million metric tons of crude oil and natural gas per annum, at a depth of 2000 meters within the
next five years.
Competing claims in the oil and gas-rich South China Sea have stifled the development and
exploitation of these resources. To break from this, the Philippines and China agreed to a
Philippines
The Philippines began exploring the areas west of Palawan for oil in 1970. Exploration in the
area began in Reed Bank/Tablemount. In 1976, gas was discovered following the drilling of a
well. However, the PRC's complaints halted the exploration.[citation needed] On 27 March
1984, the first Philippine oil company discovered an oil field off Palawan, which is an island
province bordering the South China Sea and the Sulu Sea.These oil fields supply 15% of
annual oil consumption in the Philippines.
Vietnam
Vietnam and Japan reached an agreement early in 1978 on the development of oil in the South
China Sea.[citation needed] By 2012 Vietnam had concluded some 60 oil and gas exploration
and production contracts with various foreign companies.In 1986, the "White Tiger" oil field in
the South China Sea came into operation, producing over 2,000 tons of crude oil per year,
followed by "The Bear" and "Dragon" oil fields.Offshore exploration activities in 2011 increased
Vietnam's proven oil reserves to be the third largest in the Asia-Pacific region.However, the
country is a net importer of oil products.In 2009 petroleum accounted for 14 percent of
Vietnamese government income, down from 24 percent in 2004.
In 2017, after Chinese pressure, the Vietnamese government ordered Spain's Repsol to stop
drilling in the disputed area.A joint-venture of Japanese Inpex and Petrovietnam plans to start
drilling in the disputed area in 2021.
China
China's first independently designed and constructed oil drilling platform in the South China
Sea is the Ocean Oil 981 (海洋石油981). The major shareholders are J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
(19%), Commonwealth Bank of Australia (14%), T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. and affiliates
(6%), and BlackRock, Inc. (5%).It began operation on 9 May 2012 in the South China Sea, 320
kilometres (200 mi) southeast of Hong Kong, at a depth of 1,500 m and employing 160 people.
On 2 May 2014 the platform was moved near to the Paracel Islands, a move Vietnam stated
violated their territorial claims. Chinese officials said it was legal, stating the area lies in waters
surrounding the Paracel Islands which China occupies and militarily controls.
China has attributed a large portion of its military budget, $200 million, to the development of
CQB missiles as a demonstration of their de facto sovereignty in the South China Sea.
Prior to the territorial disputes, fishermen from involved countries tended to enter each other's
controlled islands and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) leading to conflicts with the authorities
that controlled the areas as they were unaware of the exact borders. As well, due to depletion
A Taiwanese fisherman was machine gunned to death by the coast guard of the Philippines in
May 2013.
In the spring of 2014, China and Vietnam clashed again over China's Haiyang Shiyou oil rig in
Vietnam's EEZ. The incident left seventeen Vietnamese[clarification needed] injured and
damaged ships of both countries.
Although Indonesia is not part of claims in the South China Sea dispute, after Joko Widodo
became President of the country in 2014, he instituted a policy in 2015 that, if any foreign
fishermen were caught illegally fishing in Indonesian waters, their vessels would be destroyed.
The president wanted to make maritime resources, especially fisheries, a key component of his
administration's economic policy.Since the policy's initiation, fishing vessels drawing from many
neighbouring countries were destroyed by Indonesian authorities. On 21 May 2015, around 41
fishing vessels from China, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines were destroyed.On 19 March
2016, the China Coast Guard prevented the detention of Chinese fishermen by Indonesian
authorities after Chinese fishermen were caught fishing near the waters around Natuna, leading
to a protest by Indonesian authorities; the Chinese ambassador was subsequently summonsed
as China had considered the areas to be "Chinese traditional fishing grounds". Further
Indonesian campaigns against foreign fishermen resulted in the destruction of 23 fishing boats
from Malaysia and Vietnam on 5 April 2016.
Until late 2016, most fishing vessels blown up by Indonesian authorities were Vietnamese
fishing vessels. Although Indonesian authorities increased their patrols to detect foreign fishing
vessels, the areas in the South China Sea had already become known for Indonesian pirates,
with frequent attacks on Malaysian, Singaporean and Vietnamese vessels as well as leading to
hijacking such as the MT Orkim Harmony and MT Zafirah hijacking incidents. The continuing
war against foreign fishermen by Indonesia led to protests by Vietnam in late 2016, when a
Vietnamese fisherman was killed after being shot by Indonesian authorities.Attacks have also
come from Filipino and Moro pirates arriving from the Sulu Sea; a Vietnamese fisherman was
killed by Filipino pirates in late 2015.
Teodoro Locsin Jr., the Filipino Secretary of Foreign Affairs, said the Philippines was building a
maritime fleet that could swarm areas in the South China Sea.He said the fleet build up was
because of China which was also doing the same thing.[99] He also said if one of the vessels
got hit, the Filipino defense treaty with the United States would also be activated.
Security summits
The Shangri-La Dialogue serves as the "Track One" exchange forum on security issues
surrounding the Asia-Pacific region. The South China Sea territorial dispute has dominated
proceedings at the conference in recent years. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific is the "Track Two" forum for dialogue on security issues.
In February 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama initiated the US-ASEAN Summit at
Sunnylands in Rancho Mirage, California for closer engagement with the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea were a major topic, but its
joint statement, the "Sunnylands Declaration", did not name the South China Sea, instead
calling for "respect of each nation's sovereignty and for international law". Analysts believe it
indicates divisions within the group on how to respond to China's maritime strategy.
Third-party analysis
Sinologist Mohan Singh Malik asserts that the bulk of international experts weigh against the
validity of Chinese claims in the South China Sea.
Japanese scholar Taoka Shunji said in a journal article that when it came to China's advance in
the South China Sea and the Spratly Islands, the assumption amongst many Japanese people
that the territory of the Philippines was being invaded was incorrect. According to him, "in the
1898 Treaty of Paris in which Spain ceded the Philippines to the US, the object of cession was
east of 118 degrees longitude (116 in the South); and the Spratly Islands fall outside (West) of
that line. The US therefore did not claim these islands to be the US territory when in 1938
Japan declared them to be Japanese territory and incorporated them as connected to Taiwan
under the name of ‘Shinnan Gunto’. The Japanese government now considers the territorial
status of these islands ‘undetermined.’"
UNCLOS tribunal
In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), an internationally agreed arbitration
tribunal sitting in the Hague and constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ruled comprehensively against the Peoples Republic of
China's South China Sea maritime claims in Philippines v. China.This tribunal did not rule on
the ownership of the islands or delimit maritime boundaries.
However, both mainland China and Taiwan stated that they did not recognize the tribunal and
insisted that the matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations with other
claimants.On 17 September 2020, France, Germany and the UK issued a joint note verbale
recognizing the PCA ruling and challenging Chinese claims.
Australia
On 25 July 2020 Australia rejected China's claims to the South China Sea and filed a statement
with the United Nations that said: "Australia rejects any claims to internal waters, territorial sea,
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf based on such baselines," and there is "no legal
basis" to draw the nine-dash line around the Four Sha archipelagos, Paracel and Spratly
Islands or low-tide maritime zones. They encourage the claimants to resolve their disputes
peacefully.
Cambodia
Cambodia has backed China over the dispute in ASEAN meetings, preventing consensus over
unified ASEAN action.[114] Anti-Vietnamese sentiment due to Vietnam's conquest of previously
Cambodian lands, giving the Vietnamese a privileged status and encouragement of
Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia during French colonial rule, and the occupation of Cambodia
after the ousting of the Khmer Rouge has led to anti-Vietnamese feelings against ethnic
Vietnamese in Cambodia and against Vietnam, and in turn has led to pro-China sentiment
among the Cambodian government and the Cambodian opposition, including in the South
China Sea.
India says that the South China Sea was "part of global commons and India has an abiding
interest in peace and stability in the region... We firmly stand for the freedom of navigation and
overflight and unimpeded lawful commerce in these international waterways, in accordance
with international law, notably UNCLOS." This was seen as largely backing the US
position.[116]
Indonesia
Since early in the South China Sea dispute, Indonesia has repeatedly asserted its position as a
non-claimant state in the South China Sea dispute, and often positioned itself as an "honest
broker”. However, parts of China's unilaterally claimed nine-dash line overlap Indonesia's
exclusive economic zone near the Natuna islands. Although China has acknowledged
Indonesia's sovereignty over the Natuna islands, the PRC has argued that the waters around
the Natuna islands are Chinese "traditional fishing grounds". Indonesia quickly dismissed
China's claim, asserting that China's nine-dash line claim over parts of the Natuna islands has
no legal basis. In November 2015, Indonesia's security chief Luhut Pandjaitan said Indonesia
could take China before an international court.Indonesia filed a comment with the Permanent
Court of Arbitration regarding China's claim in the case of Philippines v. China.
Chinese fishing vessels – often escorted by Chinese coastguard ships – have repeatedly been
reported to have breached Indonesian waters near the Natuna islands. On 19 March 2016, for
example, Indonesian authorities tried to capture a Chinese trawler accused of illegal fishing in
Indonesian waters, and arrested the Chinese crew. They were prevented from towing the boat
to harbour by a Chinese coast guard vessel which reportedly "rammed" the trawler in
Indonesian waters. "To prevent anything else occurring, the Indonesian authorities let go of the
Chinese boat and then left toward Natuna, still with eight fishermen and the captain on board,"
said Arrmanatha Nasir, a spokesman for Indonesia's Foreign Ministry. Indonesia still has the
Chinese crew in custody. On 21 March 2016, minister for fisheries and maritime affairs Susi
Pudjiastuti summoned the Chinese ambassador, Xie Feng, and discussed this matter.
Indonesia insists that they have the right to prosecute the Chinese trawler crew, despite
Beijing's demand to release their eight fishermen. Arif Havas Oegroseno, the government
official of maritime security, said that the Chinese claim of "traditional fishing grounds" was not
recognised under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This incident
prompted security minister Luhut Pandjaitan to deploy more troops and patrol boats, and to
strengthen the Ranai naval base in the area.
Following the clashes, on 23 June 2016, Indonesian President Joko Widodo visited the Natuna
islands on a warship to demonstrate Indonesia's authority. He led a high-level delegation,
which included the Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and state
ministers. Security Minister Luhut Pandjaitan said it was meant to send a "clear message" that
Indonesia was "very serious in its effort to protect its sovereignty".
Following the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on 12 July 2016, Indonesia called on all
parties involved in the territorial dispute to exercise self-restraint and to respect applicable
international laws.
Indonesia challenged the Chinese nine-dash historical claim by arguing that if the historical
claims can be used on presenting the territorial naval claims, Indonesia might also use its
historical claims on the South China Sea by referring to the ancient influence of the Srivijaya
and Majapahit empires.
Japan
Japan has used "normative power" via strategic foreign aid to certain claimants in the dispute
such as the Philippines and Vietnam in order to assert its presence in the region as promoting
the "rule of law at sea."[129]
Laos
Laos has supported China by refusing to accept the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on
China's sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.[130]
Singapore
Singapore has reiterated that it is not a claimant state in the South China Sea dispute and has
offered to play a neutral role in being a constructive conduit for dialogue among the claimant
states.
Thailand
Thailand as one of the member of ASEAN played a coordinating role in facilitating China and
ASEAN members involved in the dispute in hope of reaching peaceful resolution. Despite its
domestic political turmoil, the Thai government relied on its Ministry of Foreign Affairs' expertise
on international dispute. It took the initiative to hold several meetings with parties concerned.
Thailand's first attempt was hosting the ASEAN–China Senior Officials' Meeting Retreat in
Pattaya, Thailand 2012. Via this meeting, Wang Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister called for a
joint development of resources in South China Sea. Bangkok was viewed as an South China
Sea neutral player because it is not a claimant and did not have disputes in the South China
Sea with China. After several meetings, the 6th ASEAN–China SOM on DOC was the first
official consultation on the Code of Conduct (COC) was formed with all parties agreement to
push forward the drafting of COC. Thai-China relationship was generally seen as positive.
Thailand's neutral position enabled it to act as a mediator and influence discussions among
parties involved.
United States
In 1974, the PRC got a non-involvement promise from the United States when it occupied the
Yagong Island and the Crescent Group from South Vietnam.[30] The United States officially
addressed the South China Sea dispute for the first time in 1995, when its statement focused
The 1995 policy was changed in 2010, when the administration of the President Obama felt
that even though the United States cannot take sides in the dispute, it still has to make a
statement that it is not passively accepting the assertive actions taken in the region. At the July
2010 Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi, Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton gave a speech on resolving the disputes in the region without coercion and
unequivocally stating that the South China Sea was a matter of U.S. national interest. Her
comments were countered by China's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi as "in effect an attack on
China," and he warned the United States against making the South China Sea an international
issue or multilateral issue.
In 2012, a United States State Department press statement identified the PRC as an assertive
state in the region and communicated United States concerns about the developments in the
area. Also in 2012, Secretary Clinton testified in support of congressional approval of the Law
of the Sea Convention, which would strengthen U.S. ability to support countries that oppose
Chinese claims to certain islands in the area.On 29 May 2012, a spokesman for the Chinese
Foreign Ministry expressed concern over this development, stating that "non-claimant
Association of South East Asian Nations countries and countries outside the region have
adopted a position of not getting involved into territorial disputes."In July 2012, the United
States Senate passed resolution 524, initially sponsored by Senator John Kerry, stating (among
other things) the United States' strong support for the 2002 declaration of conduct of parties in
the South China Sea, reaffirms the United States' commitment to assist the nations of
Southeast Asia to remain strong and independent, and supports enhanced operations by the
United States armed forces in the Western Pacific.
In 2014, the United States responded to China's claims over the fishing grounds of other
nations by saying that "China has not offered any explanation or basis under international law
for these extensive maritime claims."USN CNO Jonathan Greenert then pledged American
support to the Philippines in its territorial conflicts with the PRC.The Chinese Foreign Ministry
asked the United States to maintain a neutral position on the issue.In 2014 and 2015, the
United States continued freedom of navigation operations, including in the South China
Sea.Sources closer to the Pentagon have also said that the US administration is planning to
deploy some more naval assets within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands. In response to
this announcement, Beijing issued a warning and said that she would not allow any country to
violate China's territorial waters in the name of "Freedom of Navigation".In May 2015, U.S.
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter warned China to halt its rapid island-building. On 27 October
2015, the US destroyer USS Lassen navigated within 12 nautical miles of reclaimed land in the
Subi Reef as the first in a series of "Freedom of Navigation Operations".This was the first time
since 2012 that the US has directly challenged China's claims of the island's territorial limit. On
8–9 November 2015, two US B-52 strategic bombers flew near artificial Chinese-built islands in
the area of the Spratly Islands and were contacted by Chinese ground controllers but continued
their mission undeterred.
Publications by US think tanks have made recommendations for courses of actions that the
United States could take in response to PRC activities in the South China Sea.
The US Navy has conducted freedom of navigation drills in the South China Sea to counter
Vietnamese claims in the region, particularly around the Côn Đảo islands.
POST-TEST
POST-ASSESSMENT:
1-2. The South China Sea disputes involve both ___________ and ___________ claims within
the region by several sovereign states.
3-5. The disputes involve the islands, reefs, banks, and other features of the South
China Sea, including the _________________________, _____________________,
__________________________, and various boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin.
6. Chinese claims in the South China sea are delineated in part by the __________________.
7. The ____________________, which ended the First Indochina War, gave South Vietnam
control of the Vietnamese territories south of the 17th Parallel, which included the islands in the
Paracels and Spratlys.
8. China's first independently designed and constructed oil drilling platform in the South China
Sea is the _____________________.
9. In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), an internationally agreed arbitration
tribunal sitting in the Hague and constituted under __________________, ruled
comprehensively against the Peoples Republic of China's South China Sea maritime claims in
Philippines v. China.
10. The Philippines began exploring the areas west of Palawan for oil in __________________.
PRE-TEST
PRE-ASSESSMENT:
Instruction: Write the word TRUE if the statement is correct and the word FALSE if the
statement is incorrect. Write your answer on the space provided before the number.
_____________ 4. The Load Line Certificate, as described in Article 12, serves only as
proof of a vessel's maximum loading capacity and does not require accessibility for
verification by port authorities.
The Load Line Convention, established in 1966 and amended over the years,
provides guidelines for the safe loading of ships to ensure stability and safety at sea.
Articles 10 to 16 outline the responsibilities of the Master (ship captain) and crew regarding
load line regulations.
Introduction
1. Mitigation of Risks:
By establishing guidelines for safe loading practices, the Load Line
Convention significantly reduces the risk of maritime disasters
caused by instability.
2. Enhancement of Maritime Safety Culture:
The convention promotes a culture of safety within the maritime
industry, encouraging operators to prioritize compliance and
regularly assess loading practices.
3. Support for International Trade:
With standardized load line regulations, international trade can
operate more smoothly, as vessels are recognized globally for their
compliance with safety standards.
Verification of Load Lines: The Master must confirm that the ship's load lines are
marked clearly and visible.
Monitoring the Load: The Master should ensure that the cargo is distributed
evenly, maintaining the ship's stability.
Example:
If a cargo ship is loaded with containers, the Master needs to check that the
weight is balanced across the ship's deck to prevent tipping.
Cargo Operations: Crew members should follow protocols while loading and
unloading cargo.
Regular Inspections: The crew must conduct regular checks on the load
conditions.
Example:
During a loading operation, if a crew member notices that one side of the ship is
lower, they must alert the Master to adjust the cargo distribution.
Example:
Before departure, the Master must present the load line certificate to port
authorities to verify compliance with safety regulations.
Example:
If the crew observes that the load line is submerged, they must inform the
Master, who will then report it to the relevant maritime authority.
Example:
The crew must follow specific loading procedures outlined in the regulations to
avoid penalties or safety hazards.
Example:
If a ship is found overloaded during an inspection, the Master may face fines and
the crew could be questioned about their loading practices.
Cooking a Recipe:
Consider the ship’s loading process as following a recipe. The Master is the chef
ensuring that all ingredients (cargo) are measured correctly (within load line
limits). The crew acts like sous chefs, helping to prepare and ensure everything is
The Master verifies load line compliance through the following steps:
7. Emergency Procedures:
The Master prepares for potential emergencies by establishing procedures
for what to do if the ship is found to be overloaded or in violation of load
line regulations.
POST-ASSESSMENT:
Instruction: Write the word TRUE if the statement is correct and the word FALSE if the
statement is incorrect. Write your answer on the space provided before the number.
____________ 2. Crew members' duties concerning load conditions, as per Article 11,
strictly involve following loading protocols, but do not extend to proactively conducting
regular inspections of the load.
____________ 4. According to Article 14, only the Master is accountable for reporting
irregularities in loading conditions to authorities; the crew has no direct reporting
responsibility.