Philosophy and Mental

Health in the Age

of Nihilism
Philosophy and Mental
Health in the Age
of Nihilism:

Nothing Really Matters

By

Lehel Balogh
Philosophy and Mental Health in the Age of Nihilism:
Nothing Really Matters

Series: Studies in Modern East Asian Religion and Culture

By Lehel Balogh

This book first published 2025

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2025 by Lehel Balogh

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without
the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN: 978-1-0364-1918-9
ISBN (Ebook): 978-1-0364-1919-6
 In loving memory of my Father

May your worries dissolve into Nothingness

May you emerge again on the near side of Emptiness
The Series for East Asian Religion and Culture (SEARAC) devotes itself
to publishing creative and innovative editions of texts as well as outcomes
of theoretical interpretation belonging to the field of History, Religion,
Sociology, Cultural Anthropology, Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism, New
Religions, Culture, Heritage, Society, Philosophy, Colonialism, and regional
traditions.

Series Editor
David W. Kim (Harvard University, Australian National University/
Kookmin University, Seoul)

Editorial Board
Akira Nishimura (University of Tokyo, Japan),
Song-Chong Lee (Seoul National University, Korea),
Bart Dessein (Ghent University, Belgium),
Christopher Hartney (University of Sydney, Australia),
Chris White (Purdue University, USA),
George D. Chryssides (York St John University, United Kingdom),
John Powers (Melbourne University/ Deakin University, Australia),
Joseph Tse-Hei Lee (Pace University, USA),
Kevin Cawley (University College Cork, Ireland),
Andrew Eungi Kim (Korea University, Korea),
Midori Horiuchi (Tenri University, Japan),
Thomas Michael (Beijing Normal University, China),
Won-il Bang (Soongsil University/ Seoul National University, Korea), and
Yuet Keung Lo (National University of Singapore).

Book Series
The Rise of Protestantism in Modern Korea: A Sociological
Perspective
Andrew Eungi Kim
Nothing Really Matters: Philosophy and Mental Health in the Age of
Nihilism
Lehel Balogh
 CONTENTS

Acknowledgments .................................................................................... ix

Preface ....................................................................................................... xi

Introduction ............................................................................................. xiv

Part One: Nothing Really Matters

Chapter One ................................................................................................ 2

Nihilism, Nothingness, and Anxiety in the Age of Authenticity

Chapter Two ............................................................................................. 19

The Movement of Nihilism and the Pathologies of the Self

Chapter Three ........................................................................................... 44

The Concept of Authenticity in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche

Chapter Four ............................................................................................. 72

The Concept of Authenticity in Heidegger and Sartre

Chapter Five ........................................................................................... 102

The Postmodern Situation, Nihilism, Authenticity, Pathologies

Part Two: Nothing Really Matters

Chapter Six ............................................................................................. 126

Nothingness, Emptiness, and Self-Cultivation in East Asian Traditions

Chapter Seven ......................................................................................... 144

Self-Transformation in Japanese Philosophies and Psychotherapies

Chapter Eight .......................................................................................... 168

Nothingness and Emptiness in Therapeutic Practice

Chapter Nine ........................................................................................... 193

The Reinstallation of the Self into Its Natural Habitat
viii Contents

Epilogue.................................................................................................. 207
The Floating Point of an Authentic No-Self

Bibliography ........................................................................................... 219

Index ....................................................................................................... 234

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The idea of and the motivation for writing this book came to me
approximately at one o’clock in the afternoon on the tenth of November,
2017; a day that held special importance for a close friend of mine, István
Zoltán Szabó (“Steve”). During the course of this notable day, my friend
was, for the most part, in the arduous process of defending his doctoral
thesis at the University of Szeged, Hungary. While listening to his assured
voice meticulously articulating a number of elegant arguments in front on
an esteemed academic jury on literature, technology, William Gibson, and
Martin Heidegger, I observed in my mind’s eye the gradual emergence of a
promising idea concerning the positive, practical aspects of the abstract
philosophical notions of nothingness, emptiness, and no-self. My friend
must have elaborated inspiring ideas that triggered in me this particular line
of thought; I cannot recall, however, precisely which one of his utterances
had launched the distinct series of notions that led to my determination to
proceed doggedly with the pursuit of my initial ideas. In any case, as always,
I feel indebted to him for inspiring me to chart new waters, and to think
farther on than I ever dared to venture before.

To pursue the line of thought that came to me on that day, I shortly set out
to put together a proposal for a research project on the applications of the
above philosophical concepts in East Asian psychotherapeutic practices to
be conducted on Japanese soil. That proposal earned the kind support of
Professor Dezső Csejtei of the Philosophy Department at the University of
Szeged, who had been my long-time mentor, and for whose wise pieces of
advice over the years I feel nothing but sincere gratitude. On the receiving
end of the research project was Professor Shigeru Taguchi, renowned expert
of both Japanese and European traditions of philosophical reflection. After
successfully securing a JSPS Postdoctoral Fellowship (P18785), I moved to
Sapporo, Japan in 2018 October, upon which Professor Taguchi became my
host professor for over three years during my tenure at Hokkaido University.
His generous help proved to be invaluable in connecting me to diverse
academic circles and professionals in Japan and South Korea as well. The
abundant assistance of these experts significantly increased my
understanding of ideas and practices related to self-cultivation and the
therapeutic uses of emptiness and nothingness. Among the researchers and
x Acknowledgements

experts that I had the great fortune to learn from and share ideas with, I shall
express my appreciation especially to the following individuals for their
continuous encouragement and guidance: Rev. Mari Sengoku, Prof. Lukas
Pokorny, Prof. Shigenori Tadokoro, Rev. Gasho Shibata, Rev. Fuu Miyatani
French, Prof. Halla Kim, Prof. Nobuo Kurata, Prof. Yuko Ishihara, Dr. Erol
Čopelj, Prof. Masahiro Morioka, and Prof. Jin Y. Park. Among my friends
and family there were many who kept spurring me on over the years and for
whose moral support I feel unreservedly grateful. Two of my good friends,
Yuki Toyama and Kou Obinata, went out of their way to accompany me
during my research trips in Japan and had not only been generous with their
time but also provided me with precious insights regarding Japanese culture,
customs, and religion. I am also thankful to Professor David W. Kim who,
as the editor of the current Series in Modern East Asian Religion and
Culture, found my book project sufficiently appealing to be included in this
series.

Finally, I would like to thank the following journals for allowing me to

include in this monograph abridged and revised versions of my earlier
published texts.

“Zen Buddhism, Japanese Therapies, and the Self: Philosophical and

Psychiatric Concepts of Madness and Mental Health in Modern Japan”,
Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy, Vol. 11, 2020, pp. 1– 10.

“Nothingness, the Self, and the Meaning of Life: Nishida, Nishitani, and
Japanese Psychotherapeutic Approaches to the Challenge of Nihilism”,
Journal of Philosophy of Life, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2020, pp. 98–119.

“The Moral Compatibility of Two Japanese Psychotherapies: An Appraisal

of the Ethical Principles of Morita and Naikan Methods”, Vienna Journal
of East Asian Studies, Vol. 12, 2020, pp. 124–148.

“The Evolution of Sartre’s Concept of Authenticity: From a Non-Egological

Theory of Consciousness to the Unrealized Practical Ethics of the Gift-
giving (No)-Self”, Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy, Vol. 13, 2022,
pp. 1–10.

In Gassho,
Lehel Balogh
Sapporo, Japan
 PREFACE

In our times we live in a neo-liberal world that struggles with the

increasingly difficult task of finding meaning in midst of fading values and
disintegrating inter-personal relationships. In such a globalised reality
guided by almost purely utilitarian principles, the book “Nothing Really
Matters: Nihilism, Mental Health, and the Ethical Floating Point of an
Authentic No-Self" authored by Lehel Balogh represents a significant
contribution to the essential and instrumental rethinking of our shared
predicament, offering alternative solutions to the value-driven crises of our
time. The work is grounded on adeep exploration of contemporary
existential dilemmas. It investigates the philosophical groundworks of
Nihilism and exposes its far-reaching implications that are linked to our
psychological health. These implications are based upon the existential
crises which determine the modern human being, on the one hand, and a
search for authenticity on the other. In an era defined by fear, anxiety and
the unceasing search for the meaning of life and the actual goal of our
endeavours, this work challenges us to rethink, once again, our
understanding of the human Self, freedom, and the axiology of our existence.

The author offers us a meticulous analysis of nihilism, which is often

misunderstood as (or reduced to) a kind of purely destructive power. The
book offers a different interpretation of this concept. It follows its
development from a mere philosophical idea to a widely spread cultural
phenomenon. The text investigates how the dissolution of traditional values
and the rise of secularism contributed to a collective sense of meaninglessness,
to a social alienation, which manifest itself in a vacuum of sense and values,
which can hardly be filled by modern philosophies or contemporary
therapeutic practices. Therefore, the present study is by no means solely
academic in a strict sense of this word; it resonates deeply with the
experiences of those who find themselves uprooted in an increasingly lonely
word, which is being torn apart in itself.

In this context, the exploration of the fashionable notion of authenticity is

particularly intriguing. In an age where individualism is often equated with
self-actualisation, the author questions whether the pursuit of an 'authentic'
self is truly liberating or whether it leads to greater fragmentation and
xii Preface

isolation. Drawing on the works of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and

Sartre, the book tracks the philosophical ideas that have shaped our
contemporary understanding of authenticity, challenging readers to
consider whether the ideals of self-sufficiency and independence which are
extremely valued in modern thought are not paradoxically contributing to
our existential malaise.

In my view, one of the most significant contributions of this interesting text

is its examination of East Asian philosophies, in particular the concepts of
emptiness and non-self in Daoism and Buddhism. By juxtaposing these
perspectives with Western existential thought, the author proposes a radical
re-evaluation of the self and its place in the world. The notion of an
‘authentic non-self’, as opposed to an egocentric self, offers a transformative
perspective on personal and social problems. This view not only challenges
the Western emphasis on what Henry Rosemont has called “foundational
individualism”, but also suggests alternative ways leading to a more
integrated and compassionate existence.

Particularly interesting (and definitely under researched) are in this context

the elaborations on the concept of self-transformation within the framework
of Japanese philosophies and psychotherapies, particularly focusing on the
notions of nothingness and emptiness (N/E). The text critiques prejudices
and simplistic interpretations that portray the Japanese self as lacking
individuality, instead highlighting the nuanced understanding of selfhood
that incorporates a sense of interconnectedness and mutual dependence.
This perspective is central to various Japanese practices aimed at self-
cultivation, which seek to transcend ego-centric views and foster a more
holistic and integrated sense of self. The book also offers an intriguing
introduction of some specific psychotherapeutic practices like Morita and
Naikan therapies. The author argues that these therapies, though rooted in
Japanese cultural and spiritual traditions, offer valuable insights and
methods that can transcend cultural boundaries.

On this basis, the author contends that experiencing an undistorted, egoless

vision of reality is not only possible, but also very reasonable. He believes
this experience stems from what he terms the “recognised desire of
nothingness,” or the aspiration for a state of no-mind. In this state, negativity
and envy vanish, as there is no ego to harbour such feelings. This
perspective emphasises essential human values such as belongingness, unity,
altruistic compassion, and well-being. It opposes the dehumanising effects
of instrumental rationality and the pitfalls of a self-centred ego. While
acknowledging the ego's role in human consciousness, the author suggests
 Philosophy and Mental Health in the Age of Nihilism: xiii
Nothing Really Matters

that its excessive self-centeredness should be restrained. In this sense, the

crucial message of this work is that we should not strive for the elimination
of our individuality but rather recognise our ego as potentially insubstantial,
albeit not illusory. Inspired by Japanese notions of the self, the author values
an inexpressible core of the self that remains free from objectification.
Ultimately, a secure ego is still seen as essential for authentic self-esteem.

The ethical implications of these philosophical explorations are profound.

The book argues in favour of a ‘floating’ ethics, a flexible and context-
sensitive approach to moral decision-making. This ethical framework
rejects rigid principles and instead advocates an adaptive, compassionate
stance that recognises the complexity of human experience. It invites
readers to reflect on how embracing emptiness and non-self can lead to
greater compassion, reduced anxiety, and a more authentic connection with
others. Throughout the book, it becomes clear that the development from
nihilism to an authentic no-self is not just a philosophical exercise, but a
practical path to healing and wholeness. The author suggests that by
confronting emptiness and embracing the fluidity of existence, individuals
can overcome the despair that often accompanies nihilism. Here, it is
important to note that such transcendence is by no means an escape from
reality, but a deeper engagement with it that allows for a more meaningful
and fulfilling life.

In conclusion, Nothing Really Matters is a timely and thought-provoking

work that questions conventional wisdom about self, authenticity, and ethics.
It engages us with deep philosophical insights and highlights their practical
implications for mental health and social well-being. This book is not just
for philosophy or psychology students but for anyone dealing with the
fundamental questions of existence in an uncertain world. It serves as a
resource for those seeking to approach the complexities of modern life with
wisdom, compassion, and a renewed sense of purpose.

Jana S. Rošker
University of Ljubljana
 INTRODUCTION

Different ages call for different values. Achilles, in the pre-Homeric times
of ancient Hellas, could pompously hold up his heroic pride as the foremost
value which dictated his actions. Some eight centuries later, in the
blossoming Classical Period of Greece, Socrates could, with equally strong
conviction, maintain that ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’. When
he found that the only way to remain loyal to his moral ideals was to choose
death over life, he did not hesitate to take the hemlock which, naturally,
necessitated considerable courage on his part. In other words, Achilles, a
hero often considered to be the most courageous Greek warrior that has ever
lived, the par excellence embodiment of the Homeric heroic virtues
(Ahrensdorf 2014, 134 ff.), did, in fact, refuse to exercise his defining
virtue— courage—in the name of what he regarded as central to his
morality: his pride. On the other hand, Socrates, the prototype of the rational,
dispassionately reasoning philosopher had, indeed, evinced extraordinary
courage by following, to the very end, the value he thought indispensable to
good life: the love of wisdom. Since philosophy was of utmost importance
to him, he sacrificed his own life on the altar of the pursuit for wisdom.

Let us consider two other major historical figures, but this time from another
tradition: India. Siddhārtha Gautama, who has come to be known as the
‘Awakened One’ or the Buddha, viewed life as an endless cycle of suffering
whose goal, and therefore central value, was the cessation of the origin of
suffering. The cessation could be reached through several means, but
essentially it entailed the realisation of one ultimate insight: that the higher
self of the individual called atman did not, in actual fact, exist. 1 The
Buddha’s teachings went against the grain of the Hindu Upanishads which
maintained that the atman—the innermost, essential core of one’s being—
is either identical with the Brahman (the Ultimate Reality) or is a crucial
part of it; consequently, it was posited to be imperishable (Brazier 1995,
35.). For the Buddha, the atman was not only perishable but utterly non-
substantial to begin with. If we take a look at another prominent Indian
spiritual thinker, however, we find a different idea in operation. The Hindu

1 The atman had been previously postulated by the teachings of the priestly classes
in India to operate beyond the everyday self of the individual as though it were an
immortal soul substance.
 Philosophy and Mental Health in the Age of Nihilism: xv
Nothing Really Matters

thinker Shankara of the eighth century CE is arguably the most famous

proponent of the Advaita Vedānta (‘non-duality’) school of Hindu
philosophy. He taught that the realisation of the unity of atman and
Brahman was the principal purpose of human life. Over the centuries, down
to our present days, Shankara’s teachings have influenced innumerable
advocates of the idea of unifying the individual’s supposedly immortal soul
with the ‘world soul’ of Brahman. These two teachings—the one which sees
the substantiality of atman as illusory (Buddha), and the one which claims
that atman and Brahman are, in fact, neither illusory, nor separate
(Shankara)—represent two metaphysical extremes which conceive different
life goals for the individual and which, as a consequence, value different—
albeit somewhat similar—attitudes and behaviors to reach those goals.

Having lived approximately in the same historical period, Socrates and the
Buddha had radically challenged the mores of their respective communities
and had instigated transformations in human history whose magnitude could
only be defined as epoch-making. Their landslide impact swept away and
buried some crucial aspects of the ethos of their contemporary cultures,
while seriously challenging some others. Moreover, they have had a lasting
impact on the axiological landscapes of the ages that had followed them.
There have been only a handful of ethical reformers of similar caliber who
could alter the cultural development of humankind to an equally colossal
degree: only the likes of Jesus Christ or Confucius, Muhammad or Luther
could be counted among these select few. Was there, however, anything in
common in the values that these illustrious innovators of human behavior
and morality held dear? In other words, could one conceivably detect a
common core among the central values of different ages and different
cultures?

Different ages may call for different values, but—as Hegel maintained—
there has been, throughout human history, a single prominent concept
whose gradual actualisation carried within itself the blueprint to all true
morality: the concept of freedom. Hegel saw the progress of human history
as the ever-advancing liberation of the human spirit. In his view, this
continuously unfolding event was essentially responsible for propelling
human history forward (Little 2020). Although Socrates and the Buddha
appear to be remarkably different in a number of ways, yet, from a Hegelian
vantage point, these two thinkers could be understood as a pair of
extraordinarily proactive historical agents that had helped setting the
liberation of human spirit into an ever-accelerating motion. Albeit their
contexts and approaches to the challenges of their times and places destined
them to become dissimilar in several non-negligible ways, their central
xvi Introduction

philosophical and ethical messages are, arguably, nearly identical: the

liberation of the human mind from its ignorance, and the uncompromising
pursuit of understanding reality as it is. The now widespread ethical tenet
that emphasises the seeking of the truth and the doing away with untruth,
no matter how unsettling or unpleasant the consequences of this may be,
can be traced back, I believe, to the teachings of the Buddha 2 and Socrates.
This tenet has as its premise the conviction that it is morally better, under
all circumstances, to be aware of the identified and acknowledged truths of
life, and consequently to live according to them, than to live under illusions
and false pretenses (Griffin 2018). The famous Jesusian proverb, which
serves as the motto of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the US, as
well as a number of universities all over the world today, appropriately
expresses this belief: “the truth will set you free” (John 8:32). Truth implies
the possibility for liberation and genuine human freedom which are widely
seen as the cornerstones of any moral agency; conversely, untruth is
believed to give rise to slavery to one’s passions as well as an evident
decrease in ethicality and human dignity.

One of the most enduring successors of this basic moral stance in our time
is a core ethical value—a philosophical concept which has gradually come
to be an ideal of considerable practical consequences—that has been, to a
great extent, governing the ways in which we see ourselves and the ways in
which we live our lives. The spread and solidification of this core value
within our cultures and societies has clearly been a success story akin to
those other historical instances when a revolution in morality took place—
one has in mind, for instance, the Zoroastrian depiction of life as a cosmic
struggle of good and evil forces among which man must take a stand. This
metaphysical and moral vision has left an indelible mark on the ensuing
formations of western ethical thought. Or perhaps one might consider the
moral-philosophical innovations of Confucius that had distinctly reformed
the socio-cultural arrangements of East Asian civilisations. This contemporary
core ethical value that we are to thoroughly analyse in this book knows
almost no competitor as a moral compass for the majority of mankind in late
modernity and postmodernity; it has dug itself so deeply into the
foundations of our cultural structures that, for many, it would be practically
impossible to question its primacy or raison d'être. What this ethical value
effectively does is that it provides us with the drive and motivation for
turning to and looking upon our very selves as a legitimate guiding light
which may—ostensibly—illuminate the proper way for personal actions

2 See especially the Kesamutti Sutta (also known as Kālāma Sutta) which can be
found in the AnguttaraNikaya.
 Philosophy and Mental Health in the Age of Nihilism: xvii
Nothing Really Matters

and genuine ethical behavior. Furthermore, the ideal has also come to be
seen as a guarantor of our mental sanity. This value prompts us, first, to
become ourselves, and then, in a second step, to stay true to ourselves. At
the same time, it successfully undergirds and justifies our right as well to
pledge allegiance to it. In effect, this ideal creates and upholds a hegemony
which favors the transformation, realisation, oractualisation of one’s
personal self—over and above anything else. This core value of modernity,
which is known by a number of names—self-actualisation, self-realisation,
even self-fulfillment—is the ideal of authenticity.

One might wonder what reason there could be for the remarkable potency
of this ideal— whether it differs from the core values of prior times and if
so, to what extent. As it is widely recognised, at earlier stages of human
history, ethical values were grounded, as a norm, in transcendent or divine
entities: in god(s) and other supreme beings, in Nature or the Universe.
Knowing one’s proper place in the universe of cultural symbols automatically
created ample meaning for the individual to live ontologically securely and
to thrive on the feeling of this metaphysical/spiritual security. Cross-cultural
philosopher Leah Kalmanson cites a pertinent example: “Ruists [Confucians]
worry not so much over whether life is meaningful but over the place of
human beings within a value-laden universe” (Kalmanson 2021, 111). What
was common in pre-modern axiological groundings was that the values that
were supposed to decide the rules by which various folks were to live their
lives had been claimed to derive from sources other than humanity itself.
Owing no small degree to the stupendous accomplishments in the arts and
thought of Italian Renaissance which extolled the unique place and
significance of the human being in the hierarchical order of the Divine
Creation—also called as the ‘Great Chain of Being’—, this familiar formula
for finding ethical values commenced to undergo a momentous shift in early
modernity.

This significant change was also reinforced by early European humanist

thought which creatively reappropriated the intellectual legacy of Greek and
Roman antiquity. Although the Renaissance of the fourteenth to sixteenth
centuries was by no means an antireligious movement, still, in retrospect, it
became manifestly instrumental in the later developments of atheistic
humanism. With the advancement of the age of modernity (from the
seventeenth century onwards), people, especially from the educated
echelons of western societies, began to look upon themselves with a
growing sense of self-pride, and were less keen on giving credit for their
own achievements to external metaphysical forces. In parallel with this
process—mankind’s rising awakening to its autonomous powers and its
xviii Introduction

mounting potential for self-reliance—came along that particular development

which boosted the individual’s confidence, and sometimes even arrogance,
against the demands of the community out of which it originally sprang: the
invention of the modern self (Lyons 1978). Against this background did
what I called the core value of modernity emerge during the eighteenth to
nineteenth centuries, owing to the works of a number of exceptional minds
of the age: the French philosophes and the British thinkers of the
Enlightenment, the artists and intellectuals of German Romanticism, the
radical literati of Russia, and especially such uncompromising individualist
philosophers as Arthur Schopenhauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, SørenKierkegaard,
and Friedrich Nietzsche.

But what is this ‘ideal of authenticity’ and where does it actually come
from? If one leaves aside for a moment the historical prefigurations of the
concept, it will be readily noticeable that the modern-day philosophical
origins of the ideal are inseparably entangled with that of existentialism.
Stemming from Kierkegaard’s fierce anti-Hegelian philosophy of subjectivity,
blossoming in the onto-phenomenological elaborations of Heidegger and
Sartre, existentialism as a cultural movement came to the fore in the early
to mid-twentieth century, having problematised such existential—that is,
pertaining to the individual’s personal existence, subjectivity, and
inwardness—concerns as death, anxiety, consciousness, choice, freedom,
and, notably, authenticity. In the Historical Dictionary of Existentialismthe
following description introduces the article, ‘Authenticity and Inauthenticity’:
A central tenet of existentialism is that selfhood is not naturally given but
must be “won over” from a state of complacency, conformity, and self-
forgetfulness. Winning oneself, or authenticity, amounts to accepting one’s
essential finitude, freedom, and responsibility and applying this insight in
one’s actions. Losing oneself, or inauthenticity, amounts to “fleeing from”
one’s freedom and continuing to regard one’s existence impersonally, as
something for which one is not ultimately responsible. (Michelman 2008,
43)

Now, what is apparent from this account is that the self and authenticity are
intimately bound together, and that authenticity is not a natural state of the
self: it is something that must be achieved. According to existentialists,
when one is not in the state of authenticity, then, inevitably, one is in the
state of inauthenticity. Inauthentic modes of being characterise an individual
when one is currently not being oneself, when—either unintentionally or
deliberately—one avoids coinciding with one’s uniquely own, singularly
personal way of being. Becoming and being authentic, conversely, imply
that the individual has learned to find (or create) their singularly personal
 Philosophy and Mental Health in the Age of Nihilism: xix
Nothing Really Matters

mode of existence, sticking to it even in the face of society’s external

leveling demands and despite their own recurring tendencies urging them to
forgo their hard-earned authentic selfhood. In the first approach, then, from
an existentialist perspective, it can be confidently asserted that the ideal of
authenticity—being true to oneself—is held in high regard because it helps
one to recognise one’s way of existence as it is, without self-deceit and
illusions. In this way, it should remind us of the Socratic and Buddhic core
ethical values that maintain that knowing the truth and acting in accordance
with it are always the morally correct things to do. Furthermore, authenticity
in existentialism is construed in a manner which underscores the inherent
valuableness of being realistic and sensible with regard to one’s unavoidable
human limitations. No matter what one’s psychological boundaries are, no
matter what bodily constraints one might have, one must consciously own
them and see them for what they are, without self-pity or a will to disguise
them. At the same time, to possess the courage and poise to comport oneself
with one’s essential—inescapable—freedom in mind, and to freely
acknowledge one’s responsibility for one’s actions are also of paramount
import. Freedom and responsibility are thus inseparable in the existentialist
understanding of authenticity.

What do we find, however, if we move to the less philosophical and more

popular contemporary portrayals of authenticity in which our culture
abounds? How is this somewhat obscure and elusive, yet ever-present ideal
represented in the multifaceted outlets of our cultures? Indeed, authenticity
can be found virtually everywhere: from mainstream pop culture to niche or
highbrow arts, from mental health care to aesthetic pleasure seeking, from
motivational speeches to recommended parenting styles, from self-help
ideology to leadership. The concept of authenticity is extraordinarily
versatile and is highly valued in our contemporary globalised societies. In
fact, being authentic is frequently contrasted with being insincere or
artificial: an inauthentic person is considered to be a fake, a counterfeit, a
phony, a pseudo-entity, an imitation, an ersatz, a mock-, or simply: a copy
(Varga 2012, 4). To this trend the following brief passage from Carey
Scott’s popular recent book Unafraid: Be you. Be authentic. Find the grit
and grace to shine faithfully testifies:
Most of my life, it felt safer to live fake. In my insecurities, I chose to be
phony. Fear told me to be deceptive, hiding the truth of who I really was
instead of shining (…) To live the authentic life means we choose to believe
we are who God says we are, not who we’ve been told we should be by
other people or cultural standards. It means our words and actions mirror
our beliefs and values. (Scott 2018)
xx Introduction

Scott’s book is essentially a religious account in the manner of Kierkegaard

that supplies personal testimony to the importance of the value of being
authentic and genuine in one’s search for God. If we take another example
from contemporary popular culture though, we might come to find
somewhat different attributes regarding the essence of authentic selfhood.
Consider for instance Sara Tasker’s book titled Hashtag Authentic which
was written for Instagram users in order to help them find their unique selves
and their distinctive creativity:
Of course, there are no ways to guarantee anything in life, but by staying
authentic and connected to our passions, we stand the best chance of keeping
momentum, interest and relevance in our work, long into the future. (Tasker
2019, 184)

Tasker’s account, in contrast to Scott’s, is less concerned with religious

truth-seeking and more with authentic self-expression; it promotes finding
one’s ‘true voice’ both in everyday life and when creating art. Yet, Tasker’s
emphasis on ‘staying connected to our passions’, as we will see shortly, is
no less Kierkegaardian than in Scott’s case the idea that one should become
who one is in the presence of God. Yet another revealing recent pop-culture
example is Greg Strattner, Jr.’s volume on the dangers of pornography titled,
A Brand New You. This book also refers to the superior moral guidance that
the ideal of authenticity may provide in dealing, this time, with sexual
addictions.
I believe that each of us, through much mining and searching, have the
ability [to] discover our own set of truths. I believe that the only way to
make this discovery is to go deep within ourselves, and to seek them out
(…) becoming A Brand New You is becoming a person who lives life in full
expression of their authentic self. This means that you live every moment
of every day to the best of your ability, as an expression of who you are at
your deepest level. (Strattner 2018, 11–13)

Whether with regard to religious path-seeking, artistic self-expression, or

wanting to get rid of deleterious behavioral patterns, the ideal of authenticity
is being invoked nowadays virtually as frequently as God was in the olden
days. And it does not stop just here. As Guignon reminds us in his excellent
little book, On Being Authentic, a “burgeoning industry has grown up in
recent years with the aim of reforming and transforming people in order to
make them authentic” (Guignon 2004, 3). This burgeoning industry is the
self-help movement which offers ‘unfailing’ methods for becoming
authentic and a chance to live in harmony with ourselves. ‘Self’-help may
equally refer to the fact that the self is supposedly in need of help—for it
 Philosophy and Mental Health in the Age of Nihilism: xxi
Nothing Really Matters

evidently lacks in authenticity—but it can also mean that this assistance will
be given to the self by the self: that is, in order to become a better, an
authentic self, the self undertakes the enterprise of assisting itself. Even so,
what can be deemed or defined to be authentic or inauthentic is not such a
simple matter. Likewise, whether one actually needs to be assisted to
become more ‘real’ and more ‘true’ to begin with is as dubious a claim as
some of the self-help genre authors’ true intentions and motivations are. In
fact, as professional philosophers have recently pointed out, there is a
danger that the unscientific theories of self-help books actually create vague
and ill-defined concepts that can be misused and abused for political,
religious, or commercial reasons (Altobrando et al. 2018).

Notwithstanding authenticity’s ubiquity and unquestionable mainstream

appeal in our times, this present book asks the following, crucially important
question: why should anyone want to become authentic in the first place?
Why must we search for more genuine versions of ourselves, instead of just
staying the way we already are? The ideal of authenticity seems to suggest
that there is an inbuilt value to listening to our unique ‘inner voice’, to the
‘inner man’, our ‘innermost self’ that allegedly already knows the answers
to all our vital questions and dilemmas. This, in turn, hints at a deeper
conviction that the judgment of the supposed inner core of one’s self is
completely reliable in matters of practical importance, and can be thus
trusted to make decisions in matters of right and wrong, too. Since the
imitation of the actions of other, exemplary individuals in terms of
determining what a morally appropriate thing to do would be under given
circumstances is increasingly ruled out, and hence one is advised to listen
to the dictates of their own ‘true’ selves, it follows that trying to emulate
external ideals in general is being discouraged. However, as Guignon warns,
if one gets caught up in the pursuit of a chimerical authentic self, there is…
the risk of slipping into a life so prone to self-absorption and compulsive
self-surveillance that one becomes isolated from all but those who share this
preoccupation. There is the danger of bull-headed adherence to feelings and
beliefs whose sole justification is that one finds through introspection that
one feels that way or happens to hold these beliefs. There is the risk of being
so carried away by feelings and perceived needs that one turns to actions
that are either foolish or monstrous. (Guignon 2004, 76)

The Distinctive Approach of this Volume

This book problematises the intricate interconnections of authenticity, anxiety,
nihilism, nothingness, and emptiness in western and East Asian (Japanese
xxii Introduction

and Korean) philosophies, religions, and psychotherapies, arguing for the

importance of the elaboration of an ethical floating point of an authentic no-
self. To my knowledge, there has not been a monograph so far dedicated to
connect these very topics. Specialist works on East Asian, and in particular,
Japanese philosophy, tend to focus either on certain authors and schools (e.g.
Nishida Kitaro or the Kyoto School), or on comparative analyses that
juxtapose eastern and western trends in thought. For instance, Richard
Stone’s recent monograph The Origins of Modern Japanese Philosophy:
Nishida Kitaro and the Meiji Period (Bloomsbury Academic 2024), Takeshi
Morisato’s work Tanabe Hajime and the Kyoto School: Self, World, and
Knowledge (Bloomsbury Academic 2021), or Jason M. Wirth’sNietzsche
and Other Buddhas: Philosophy after Comparative Philosophy (Indiana
University Press 2019) faithfully follow this trend. Similarly, the works on
Eastern psychology or Japanese psychotherapy either highlight the ways in
which these approaches differ from their western counterparts, or they limit
themselves to presenting and interpreting their respective approaches within
their own disciplinary contexts. Examples for such works include Manu
Bazzano’sZen Therapy: Heretical Perspectives (Routledge 2017);
VelizaraChervenkova’sJapanese Psychotherapies: Silence and Body-Mind
Interconnectedness in Morita, Naikan and Dohsa-hou (Springer 2017);
Michael Slote’sBetween Psychology and Philosophy: East-West Themes
and Beyond (Palgrave Macmillan 2019).

This present book offers an innovative interdisciplinary study that brings

together original research in cross-cultural philosophy, psychology,
psychotherapy, and the medical humanities. It provides a methodologically
rich approach that combines the results of recent empirical research in
evidence-based sciences with theoretical speculation and philosophical
synthesisation. It draws attention to and builds upon the works of less
widely known East Asian thinkers as well as on the latest research done in
the west on philosophies and practices that originated in East Asia. The
novelty of the present endeavor lies in its synthetic quality that draws
together and contrasts positive psychology with existentialist philosophy
and psychotherapy, the mindfulness movement with Morita and Naikan
therapies, the philosophies of important Korean and Japanese thinkers with
those of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre. By doing so, the
book provides a superb ground for various players to enter into conversation
with one another concerning the problems of nihilism, nothingness, and
authenticity not only from diverse eastern and western intellectual traditions,
but also from such different disciplines and domains as philosophy, religion,
psychology, mental health care, and ethics. I believe that the volume’s
unique approach and the combination of a handful of key topics could be of
 Philosophy and Mental Health in the Age of Nihilism: xxiii
Nothing Really Matters

interest to more than just a select few readers or specialists in East Asian
and Japanese philosophy. The manner in which the material is presented
warrants interest from students and researchers who specialise either in
comparative philosophy and ethics or in the interface of philosophy and the
psy-disciplines (medical humanities, etc.) as well as from more general
audiences. By the same token, the book aims to be instructive and thought-
provoking for those clinical professionals and therapists who are motivated
to see and understand connections between eastern and western approaches
to the self and psychological healing across cultures.

Chapter Summary
The book is divided into two main parts. Part One comprises five chapters
that take the reader from the initial discussions on the ways in which
nihilism and authenticity have been inextricably tied together in our
postmodern situation of constant cultural crises to deeper analyses of the
concept of authenticity in the works of leading thinkers in the existential-
phenomenological tradition. These chapters reveal the manners in which the
ideal of authenticity in its many guises have been influencing how we live
our lives and struggle for health and a good, ethical way of living. Chapter
One: Nihilism, Nothingness, and Anxiety in the Age of Authenticity introduces
the reader to the main players and categories of the book that form the
backbone of the exposition: the historical and philosophical development of
nihilism, its various interpretations of and connections with the ideal of
authenticity as well as with anxiety, and the notion of nothingness alongside
its frequently overlooked potential for offering a way out of the nihilist
conundrum. Chapter Two: The Movement of Nihilism and the Pathologies
of Self draws on renowned Kyoto School philosopher Nishitani Keiji’s
analyses regarding the relevance of nihilism in Japan and the ways in which
a revitalised Buddhist standpoint could give new meaning not only to the
categories of emptiness and nothingness but also to their experiential basis
in transforming the ego-centered modern self into an egoless subjectivity.
The second part of the chapter connects the historical development of
nihilism with mental health, thematising the pathologies of the modern and
postmodern self, and also delineating connections between the struggle for
authenticity and the endemic mental health problems of our age.

Chapter Three: The Concept of Authenticity in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche

proceeds to take a deeper look on the development of the ideal of
authenticity in western intellectual and cultural history through providing a
close reading of Kierkegaard’s and Nietzsche’s ideals of authenticity. These
xxiv Introduction

two prominent nineteenth century thinkers considerably influenced the

subsequent conceptualisations of authentic selfhood that had been articulated
during the twentieth century by philosophers, psychologists, and psychiatrists,
alike. Chapter Four: The Concept of Authenticity in Heidegger and Sartre
continues the deep analysis of the movement of the ideal of authenticity
through close readings of the works of Heidegger and Sartre, for it is
arguably these two towering existential-phenomenological philosophers
whose literary output and professional as well as politico-cultural influence
have shaped the ideal to the greatest degree during the last century. Finally,
in Part One, Chapter Five: The Postmodern Situation, Nihilism, Authenticity,
Pathologies summarises some of the major points regarding the
development of authenticity and describes the process by which existential-
phenomenological philosophy found its own voice in psychiatry and
psychotherapy through the works of such pioneering figures as Ludwig
Binswanger, Medard Boss, Viktor Frankl, Rollo May, Ronald D. Laing, and
Irvin Yalom. The chapter points out the crucial characteristics of their
approaches to mental illness and health, and then highlights the criticism
that may be expressed against employing the ideal of authenticity as the de
facto measuring rod of mental health as well as the central value guiding
one’s ethical life.

Part Two departs from the discussion and detailed analyses of the concepts
of nihilism and authenticity with the explicit aim of presenting an alternative
to the ideal of authenticity. This it does so by introducing the philosophical
notions of nothingness, emptiness, and no-self in East Asian traditions to
the reader, and links these to such modern-day western cultural developments
as the mindfulness movement and positive psychology. Chapter Six:
Nothingness, Emptiness, and Self-Cultivation in East Asian Traditions
familiarises the reader with the philosophical concepts of emptiness and
nothingness in Asian traditions, beginning with how Heideggerean thought
is indebted to Chinese philosophy and then moves on to Daoist and Buddhist
religious thought, along with the eastern ideal of somatic self-cultivation.
The works of two outstanding thinkers—one of medieval Korea, one of
medieval Japan—are singled here out for in-depth analyses: Dōgen’s and
Chinul’s elaborations on the role of emptiness, nothingness, and self-
cultivation are analysed in light of the final goal of Zen Buddhism: the
realisation of no-self. Chapter Seven: Self-Transformation in Japanese
Philosophies and Psychotherapiespresents the concept of self-transformation
as pivotal to the overall project of such Kyoto School philosophers as
Nishida Kitaro and Nishitani Keiji, as well as for another contemporary
Japanese thinker, Yasuo Yuasa, explaining why the transformation of the
ego-centered mode of the self has been viewed in Japan as an essential
 Philosophy and Mental Health in the Age of Nihilism: xxv
Nothing Really Matters

undertaking for philosophers, for religious seekers, and for ordinary human
beings, alike. The second part of the chapter introduces two representative
modern therapies from Japan, the Morita and Naikan methods, and
compares their therapeutic goals with the objectives of the aforementioned
philosophers and religious thinkers, thus bringing together issues of
philosophy, religion, and morality with those of health care. Chapter Eight:
Nothingness and Emptiness in Therapeutic Practicefurther details the
operative characteristics of Morita and Naikan therapies, in conjunction
with their methodological considerations and their distinct modes of
approaching mental illnesses. The chapter questions and examines the
widespread assumption whether these two therapeutic modalities are, in fact,
complementary and could be indeed brought under the same theoretical
umbrella.

Chapter Nine: The Reinstallation of the Self into Its Natural Habitat
presents and compares the most popularcurrent manifestations of the
western mindfulness movement (Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction,
Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy) with some recent developments in
positive psychology, in particular the peak experience of flow in the work
of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi. The second part of the chapter relates these to
traditional Buddhist virtues such as compassion, loving kindness,
equanimity, and sympathetic joy, pointing to the possibility for a common
ground. At the same time, the chapter also demonstrates how the idea of
nothingness and the practice of self-emptying may help overcome nihilistic
cultural tendencies by generating positive values, and how a
nothingness/emptiness based character ethics could be fostered through the
efforts of both positive psychology and the mindfulness movement. As the
conclusion of the volume stands the Epilogue: The Floating Point of an
Authentic No-Self that retraces the trajectory of the entire book, summing
up the main arguments and answering the questions that had been left open
until then regarding nihilism, nothingness, authenticity and mental health.
The summary is followed by presenting the ethical floating point of an
authentic no-self, where I argue that the ideal of authenticity needs revision
both in mental health care and in our general cultural attitudes regarding
morality. This revision, the epilogue maintains, could be brought about by
a nothingness-based life practice which could endow the individual with a
new, a more wholesome approach to reality and the self.
 PART ONE:

NOTHING REALLY MATTERS

 CHAPTER ONE

NIHILISM, NOTHINGNESS, AND ANXIETY

IN THE AGE OF AUTHENTICITY

In this first chapter I argue that the ideal of authenticity is not just one among
others but is likely to be the most impactful ideal that has been a defining
one vis-à-vis the morality of our times. The Ethics of Authenticity is
irrefutably interlinked with our prevalent culture of nihilism and narcissism
in a profound manner, and this fact has borne therather unfortunate fruit of
the proliferation of mental disorders of our period of time; an epoch that has
been termed by various authors and commentators as the Age of Anxiety.
The first section of the chapter investigates these interconnecting ideas and
points out their devastating impact on the subjectivity of modernity and
postmodernity. The second section of the chapter, conversely, moves on to
foreshadow how an entirely different approach to the self and subjectivity
could overturn the logic of nihilism by supplying new values and thus a new
way of relating to the world. The source of these new values, I propose, may
be found in an attitude that is committed to self-kenosis: that is, the
deliberate and habitual emptying of the ego-self and the cultivation of a
standpoint of a no-self that results in a mentally more balanced,
psychologically healthier and ethically more grounded position for the
struggling and confounded individuals of our times.

Authenticity, Anxiety, Nihilism

The ideal of authenticity is not just one ideal among others, but is arguably
the most brightly shining beacon of morality for our times. It was Canadian
political philosopher Charles Taylor who first baptised our age “The Age of
Authenticity”. In his 2007 book A Secular Age, which prominent sociologist
the late Robert N. Bellah had called “one of the most important books to be
written in my lifetime” (Bellah 2007), Taylor noted that there had been a
shift, sometime in the middle of the twentieth century, “which has
profoundly altered the conditions of belief in our societies” (Taylor 2007,
473). This shift has brought about a new period, the Age of Authenticity,
wherein expressive individualism had become a mass phenomenon. The
 Nihilism, Nothingness, and Anxiety in the Age of Authenticity 3

causes of this change are, no doubt, numerous, yet they are often reduced to
only a handful: growing affluence in societies, an excessively consumerist
lifestyle, fewer working hours that resulted in more leisure time which, in
turn, induced more pleasure-seeking activities and the ensuing increased
fixation on the self: individualism, egoism, narcissism.
Everyone senses that something has changed. Often this is experienced as
loss, break-up. A majority of Americans believe that communities are
eroding, families, neighbourhoods, even the polity; they sense that people
are less willing to participate, to do their bit; and they are less trusting of
others. Scholars don’t necessarily agree with this assessment, but the
perception itself is an important fact about today’s society. No doubt there
are analogous perceptions widespread in other Western societies. (Ibid.)

In spite of the existence of otherwise noteworthy differences, Taylor’s

assessment coincides in many regards with cultural historian Christopher
Lasch’s observations who, already in his 1979 bestseller The Culture of
Narcissism, claimed that, following the economically prosperous years of
the post-World War II era, hedonistic egoism had assumed gigantic
proportions in the USA. According to Lasch, the situation had gotten to the
point that what used to be abnormal had gradually become the new norm.
This development, however, did not change the fact that, though widely
accepted, the new norm was still unhealthy. As Lasch had warned, by
reaching pathological levels, hedonistic egoism had proved to be not only
psychologically unwholesome but, in addition, ethically perverse as well.
Instead of morally edifying its members, a narcissistic society impoverishes
them, meanwhile generating a milieu that is liable to produce more
existential anxiety and insecurity than happiness and moral enrichment:
The new narcissist is haunted not by guilt but by anxiety. He seeks not to
inflict his own certainties on others but to find a meaning in life. Liberated
from the superstitions of the past, he doubts even the reality of his own
existence (…) In a narcissistic society—a society that gives increasing
prominence and encouragement to narcissistic traits—the cultural
devaluation of the past reflects not only the poverty of the prevailing
ideologies, which have lost their grip on reality and abandoned the attempt
to master it, but the poverty of the narcissist’s inner life. (Lasch 1979,
Preface)

Our current times are commonly conceived of as an age that has been
witnessing a great deal of loss in ethical values—as well as a distressing
omnipresence of existential anxiety in the human soul. For these reasons,
similarly to the epithet of ‘The Age of Authenticity,’ this present age could
be just as rightfully described ‘The Age of Anxiety’. In fact, this is precisely
4 Chapter One

how distinguished British-American poet W. A. Auden had characterised

our age in his celebrated long poem titled “The Age of Anxiety: A Baroque
Eclogue”. The poem was written shortly after the conclusion of World War
II, and was instrumental in arousing a host of inspired reactions from
receptive and likeminded thinkers, scientists and artists, alike, such as
British philosopher Alan Watts, American psychologist Rollo May,
German-American Protestant theologian Paul Tillich, and American
composer Leonard Bernstein. The poem, which won the Pulitzer Prize for
Poetry in 1948, powerfully thematised and displayed modern man’s
insecurities and search for meaning in the thick of a swiftly changing,
alarming reality. In his 1950 book The Meaning of Anxiety which quickly
became a classic in modern psychology, Rollo May cited, along with
Auden’s above-mentioned famous poem, the French existentialist
philosopher Albert Camus’s work as an inspiration for calling our times the
Age of Anxiety (May 1950/1977, ix). As May noted, “In a phrase parallel
to Auden’s, Albert Camus designated this age as ‘the century of fear,’ in
comparison with the seventeenth century as the age of mathematics, the
eighteenth as the age of the physical sciences, and the nineteenth as that of
biology” (Ibid., 7). Theologian Paul Tillich in his highly esteemed 1952
philosophical treatise The Courage to Be goes as far as to declare that
“Today it has become almost a truism to call our time an ‘age of anxiety’”
(Tillich 1952, 35).

Charles Taylor in his 1991 philosophical bestseller The Ethics of

Authenticity—originally titled ‘The Malaise of Modernity’—draws attention
to the observation that the entire project of offering the ideal of authenticity
to all of our spiritual ailments and mental dysfunctions as a sort of modern-
day panacea is, indeed, a Janus-faced solution. Whereas, on the hand, it does
provide a vague direction for the path-seeking modern individual, yet, on
the other hand, it isolates them from their community while morally
corrupting them as well. This modern or postmodern anguished self that is
utterly predisposed to overly psychologise its perceived problems, has
developed, over the years, an unhealthy habit of turning against itself in an
attempt to get rid of the unwanted parts of its psychic arsenal, thus becoming
fragmented and torn to the extreme. The vague direction that the ideal of
authenticity offers manifests itself in the insistence of the human potential
and self-help movements that ‘psychic integration’ and ‘peace of mind’ can
be achieved by using certain psychological techniques. Nevertheless, these
techniques offer scientifically unreliable ‘quick-fix’ methods that are not
only unable to reach the goals they purport to attain, but they also perpetuate
the ‘culture of narcissism’: a destructive Weltanschauung that portrays self-