IN THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL,
PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
O.A. NO. ____________ OF 2024
IN THE MATTER OF:
DR. MANJULA JAIN …APPLICANT
VERSUS
SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND
FAMILY WELFARE & Ors. …
RESPONDENTS
APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 21 (3) OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS ACT, 1985 FOR CONDONATION
OF DELAY IN THE FILING OF ORIGINAL APPLICATION.
MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:
1. That the present Application is being filed by the Applicant before
this Hon'ble Tribunal for condonation of delay of 1822 days in the
filing of the Original Application u/s 21(3) of the Administrative
Tribunal Act, 1985.
2. That the contents of OA, its grounds and documents annexed
therewith, prima facie establish that the Applicant has a plausible
case in her favour. Besides, the balance of convenience is also in
favour of the Applicant and, therefore, the OA is most likely to
succeed in the light of the case laws cited in the OA.
3. That even though the facts of the case have been submitted in
some detail in the OA and, therefore, need not be repeated in this
Application, even so, the Applicant would like to submit that she
honourably retired from service on 31.10.2018 after attaining the
age of 65 and presently is about 71 years of age.
4. That after retirement, the Applicant got busy with re-settlement
issues as also in looking after her aged parents, being the eldest
daughter in the family, besides, being a Doctor. As the Applicant’s
family and her aged parents were living together, she had to devote
considerable time and attention to them. Then, Corona epidemic
devastated Delhi and other parts of the country, immobilising the
whole system. It was the Applicant’s misfortune that she developed
CSF RHINORRHEA, a brain related ailment, in 2020 which
disrupted in the even tone of her life. She was, ultimately, operated
upon for the same in Max Super Speciality Hospital, Saket, New
Delhi, on 14.02.2022. As the Applicant’s father, Prof. Mohinder Singh
was bed ridden, he had to be looked after by her. After the expiry of
her father, the Applicant continues to look after her aged mother
who is about 94 years of age.
(Copy of the discharge summary is enclosed herewith for ready
reference).
5. That due to the reasons aforesaid, the Applicant could not file this
OA before this Hon'ble Tribunal within the stipulated period of one
year of the Cause of Action i.e. deduction of Rs. 6,21,195/- from her
Earned Leave / HPL encashment by Director, Lady Hardinge Medical
College (LHMC), vide 19.11.2018/27.11.2018.
6. That without prejudice to what has been submitted above, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Collector Land Acquisition, Anant Nang
vs. MST Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107, had expostulated that the
courts/tribunals must interpret the provisions relating to the
limitation period in a liberal manner with a view to doing substantial
justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits and laid
down parameters in regard thereto. Para 3 of the judgment merits
extraction here in extenso:
“3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone
delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of
1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice
to parties by disposing of matters on “merits”. The
expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature
is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law
in a meaningful manner which subserves the end of justice
— that being the life-purpose for the existence of the
institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this
Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in
matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not
appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in
the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on
principle as it is realized that:
“1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by
lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious
matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of
justice being defeated. As against this when delay is
condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause
would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does not mean
that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every
hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be
applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations
are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to
have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-
deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on
account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit
by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on
account of its power to legalize injustice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice
and is expected to do so. ……..”
7. That the above principle was reiterated by the Apex Court in
Perumon Bhagvathy Devasvom vs. Bhargavi Amma (2008) 8 SCC
321, in the following words:
13. The principles applicable in considering applications for
setting aside abatement may thus be summarised as fol-
lows:
(i) The words “sufficient cause for not making the
application within the period of limitation” should
be understood and applied in a reasonable, prag-
matic, practical and liberal manner, depending
upon the facts and circumstances of the case,
and the type of case. The words “sufficient
cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should
receive a liberal construction so as to advance
substantial justice, when the delay is not on ac-
count of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides,
deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of
the appellant……..”
8. That the Applicant’s case is also exempted from the applicability of
limitation period prescribed in section 20(3) of the Administrative Tribunal
Act, 1985, in terms of the Supreme Court judgment in Balakrishna
Savalram Pujari Waghmare vs. Shri Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan (AIR
1959 Supreme Court 798), wherein the Apex Court has explained the
concept of continuing wrong (in the context of section 23 of the Limitation
Act, 1908 corresponding to section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963) and
opined as under:
“31. … It is the very essence of a continuing wrong
that it is an act which creates a continuing source of
injury and renders the doer of the act responsible
and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If
the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete,
there is no continuing wrong even though the
damage resulting from the act may continue. If,
however, a wrongful act is of such a character that
the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act
constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection, it
is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury
caused by the wrongful act and what may be
described as the effect of the said injury.”
9. That in Union of India vs. Tarsem Singh (2008) 8 SCC 648, a three Judge
Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, relying upon the aforesaid
judgment, came to the following conclusion:
“7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related
claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches
(where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or
limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the
Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said
rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a
service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief
can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking
remedy, with reference to the date on which the
continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong
creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an
exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of
any order or administrative decision which related to or
affected several others also, and if the reopening of the
issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then
the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue
relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief
may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the
rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues
relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others,
delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of
laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the
consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period
is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive
wrongs will apply. ……….”
10. That the Applicant’s case is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgments
of the Apex Court as there is recurring cause of action thereby
justifying condonation of delay.
11. That it is, therefore, most humbly prayed that the present application may
kindly be allowed and the delay in filing of the OA condoned in the interest
of justice, equity and fair play.
APPLICANT
FILED BY
M.L. Sharma, Gaurang Vardhan,
Aamir Raza Khan, Kajal Joon,
Advocates for Applicant
Email: ml.sharma1965@yahoo.com
Mob.: 9871712220
Date: ________
Place: New Delhi
IN THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL,
PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
O.A. NO. ____________ OF 2024
IN THE MATTER OF:
DR. MANJULA JAIN …APPLICANT
VERSUS
SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND
FAMILY WELFARE & Ors. …Respondents
AFFIDAVIT
I, Dr. Manjula Jain, aged about 71 years, w/o Dr. Trilochan Singh Jain r/o D-
37, Hauz Khas, New Delhi, do hereby solemnly affirm and declare as
under:-
1. That the accompanying condonation application has been prepared
under my instructions.
2. That the contents of the accompanying condonation application are
correct and true to the best of my knowledge.
3. That I further solemnly affirm and declare that this affidavit of mine
is correct and true and no part of it is false and nothing material has
been concealed therein.
DEPONENT
VERIFICATION
Verified at New Delhi on ______ day______ of 2024, I state that the contents
of the above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
DEPONENT
