NAME: GERALDINE BANTILAN CONSTI 1 – TUESDAY / FRIDAY

ATTY GONZALO MALIG - ON

NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., PATERIO TORRES and ARTURO

FACTS:

Assailed is the validity of a subpoena dated October 25, 1985 (Annex "A", Petition) sent by the
respondent Committee to the petitioners Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac, Chairman of the Board
of Directors and the General Manager, respectively, of petitioner Negros Oriental II Electric
Cooperative NORECO II), requiring their attendance and testimony at the Committee's
investigation on October 29, 1985. Similarly, under fire is the Order issued by the same
Committee on the latter date, (Annex "D", Petition) directing said petitioners to show cause why
they should not be punished for legislative contempt due to their failure to appear at said
investigation.

Petitioners contend that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is bereft of the
power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to order the arrest of
witnesses who fail to obey its subpoena. It is further argued that assuming the power to compel
the attendance and testimony of witnesses to be lodged in said body, it cannot be exercised in
the investigation of matters affecting the terms and conditions of the franchise granted to
NORECO II which are beyond the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.

ISSUE:

May the LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT issue a contempt?

HELD: The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or
incidental to the exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge
and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the
disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power
and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of
powers, making each branch supreme within the real of its respective authority, it must have
intended each department's authority to be full and complete, independently of the other's
authority or power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of
refusal every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort
to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish
or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or dignity.

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 LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondent

FACTS:

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The
view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly
affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in
question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court

Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is
to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their
petition to be given due course

ISSUE: WHETHER THOSE STATUTES REGARDLESS OF DATE BE PUBLISHED?

HELD:

section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes
of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes
of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have
general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.

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 ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and
ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO

FACTS:

Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII,
Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the
Constitution.

Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the
latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into
two separate districts.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7675 is constitutional?

HELD:

Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is
no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each
attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two
legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The
said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes,
including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws
emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the
enactment of said laws.

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G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN; JUDY M.
TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON,
PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN, CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ ILAGAN, GABRIELA
WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE, BAY AN MUNA PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT,
CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN;
VICTOR VILLANUEVA, CONVENOR, YOUTH ACT NOW, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,

FACTS:

On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate
of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional
₱50 Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona.

Petitioners, which included public officials and concerned citizens, raised issues regarding the
constitutionality of the DAP, asserting that the use of savings and unprogrammed funds did not
conform to the explicit provisions of the Constitution. They alleged that the respondent officials
gravely abused their discretion in implementing DAP.

ISSUE:

Whether the utilization of savings and unprogrammed funds by the respondents under the DAP
was unconstitutional

HELD:

The respondents submit that there is no actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication in the
absence of adverse claims between the parties; 19 that the petitioners lacked legal standing to
sue because no allegations were made to the effect that they had suffered any injury as a result
of the adoption of the DAP and issuance of NBC No. 541; that their being taxpayers did not
immediately confer upon the petitioners the legal standing to sue considering that the adoption
and implementation of the DAP and the issuance of NBC No. 541 were not in the exercise of the
taxing or spending power of Congress; 20 and that even if the petitioners had suffered injury, there
were plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law available to them, like
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assailing the regularity of the DAP and related issuances before the Commission on Audit (COA)
or in the trial courts.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

G.R. No. L-68159 March 18, 1985

FACTS:

Petitioner Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the
January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as
provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Elected vice-governor for said province in the same
elections was respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., who likewise qualified for and assumed said office
on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986.

On March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984
Batasan Pambansa elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing
elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while respondent lost.

Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be considered to have abandoned or
resigned from the position of vice-governor when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the
1984 Batas Pambansa elections; and since respondent had reverted to the status of a mere
private citizen after he lost in the Batas Pambansa elections, he could no longer continue to
serve as vice-governor, much less assume the office of governor.

ISSUE:

Can a provincial governor who is elected as a Mambabatas Pambansa serve concurrently both
positions?

HELD:

No, a provincial governor who is elected as a Mambabatas Pambansa cannot hold both offices
simultaneously. Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution explicitly prohibits members of
the National Assembly from holding any other government office during their tenure, excluding

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positions of Prime Minister or member of the Cabinet. Once Adaza assumed office as
Mambabatas Pambansa, this fact vacated his previous post as governor.

A public office is a public trust. 3 It is created for the interest and the benefit of the people. As
such, a holder thereof "is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose" and
"he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more
than one office." 4 It is therefore of no avail to petitioner that the system of government in other
states allows a local elective official to act as an elected member of the parliament at the same
time.