RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Article 3, Section 14 MODULE 17

SUB-TOPIC: CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS

1.​ Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan

[G.R.Nos. L-72335-39. March 21, 1988]

Facts:​
Francisco S. Tatad, former Secretary of Public Information, was charged with five criminal cases for
alleged violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The charges arose from a 1974
complaint filed by Antonio de los Reyes, which was only formally acted upon by the Tanodbayan in
1979—after Tatad had already resigned from office. Following a preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan
filed charges before the Sandiganbayan in 1985. These included: receiving P125,000 from Amity Trading
Corporation in exchange for facilitating government payments (Criminal Case No. 10499); failure to file a
statement of assets and liabilities (SALN) for 1973 (No. 10500); giving unwarranted benefits to a
corporation owned by his brother-in-law (No. 10501); and failure to file SALNs for 1976 and 1978 (Nos.
10502 and 10503).

Tatad filed a motion to quash the charges, arguing that the excessive delay in the investigation and
prosecution violated his right to due process. He also claimed that the offenses had already prescribed,
that there was no prima facie case, that one of the charges did not constitute an offense, and that his
prosecution was discriminatory and politically motivated. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion, holding
that the delay was not unreasonable and that the prescriptive period was tolled when the complaint was
filed with the Tanodbayan. Dissatisfied, Tatad elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a petition
for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue:​
Whether or not the prolonged delay in the preliminary investigation and prosecution of the charges
against petitioner Tatad violated his constitutional right to due process and to a speedy disposition of
cases

Ruling:​
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the inordinate delay in conducting and resolving the preliminary
investigation, spanning nearly three years despite the case being ready for resolution in 1982, constituted
a violation of Tatad’s constitutional rights. The Court found the deviation from proper procedure—such as
referring the matter to the Presidential Security Command instead of following standard investigative
protocols—suggestive of political interference. It emphasized that while the ten-day resolution period
under the law may be directory, it cannot be ignored with impunity. The Court further clarified that the right
to a speedy disposition of cases is separate from the right to a speedy trial, and that delays in pre-trial
proceedings are equally covered by this guarantee. Since the prolonged delay caused prejudice to the
accused and undermined procedural due process, the Court ordered the dismissal of all five criminal
cases, making the previously issued temporary restraining order permanent.

2.​ Galman vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 72670, September 12, 1986]

Facts:​
On October 22, 1983, then President Ferdinand Marcos established a Fact-Finding Board to investigate
the assassination of Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino Jr., who was shot at the Manila International Airport
after returning from exile. The Board, composed of both majority and minority members, concluded in
their respective reports that Rolando Galman, who was also shot dead at the scene, was not the real
assassin but was merely used as a scapegoat by elements within the military. The minority report
specifically implicated 26 individuals, including high-ranking officials led by General Fabian Ver, who was
then the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and a close ally of President Marcos.

Despite the findings, President Marcos rejected the Board’s conclusions and insisted that Galman was
the lone gunman. Criminal charges were nevertheless filed against the 26 military officials and tried
before the Sandiganbayan. However, serious irregularities during the proceedings were reported.
Petitioners, including Saturnina Galman (the widow of Rolando Galman) and other concerned citizens,
alleged that the trial was merely for show—a mock proceeding designed to absolve the accused. They
claimed that the Sandiganbayan and the Tanodbayan had been instructed by the Marcos administration
to ensure an acquittal regardless of the evidence. Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera corroborated
these allegations, revealing that Malacañang had predetermined the outcome and stage-managed the
trial to result in the exoneration of the accused.

The Sandiganbayan ultimately acquitted all 26 accused, declaring them innocent and free from any civil
liability. Petitioners contended that this was not just a mistrial but a deliberate subversion of justice,
constituting a grave violation of the right to due process of law as enshrined in the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.

Issue:​
Whether or not the trial was a mock trial and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful
and void ab initio

Ruling:​
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the trial was a sham and a gross violation of due process under
Section 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees the rights of the accused and the public to a fair,
impartial, and independent trial. The Court found that political interference from Malacañang dictated the
outcome, turning the court into a mere instrument of injustice. Such manipulation deprived the accused
and the sovereign Filipino people of their right to a legitimate adjudication of the case. It emphasized that
courts must be independent and serve justice, not political interests. A trial controlled by external powers
cannot be considered valid. Therefore, the Court declared the trial a mockery of justice and ruled the
judgment of acquittal void ab initio, reaffirming that judicial integrity must be preserved and protected at all
costs. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the
century-and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.

3.​ Alonte vs. Savellano

[G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998]

Facts​
Petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent mayor, and Buenaventura Concepcion were charged with
rape based on the complaint of Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. The case was initially filed in Biñan, Laguna, but
the petitioners filed a motion to transfer the venue to Metro Manila, citing threats and undue pressure on
the complainant. While the petition for change of venue was pending, the complainant executed an
affidavit of desistance, claiming the legal process was slow and wishing to resume a normal life. The
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, but the prosecution opposed, arguing that the desistance had no
legal effect, as the prosecution is under the control of the public prosecutor. The Supreme Court granted
the change of venue, citing the possibility of illicit influence, and ordered the Manila RTC to determine the
voluntariness of the desistance. The case was assigned to Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., and after the
petitioners were arraigned and pleaded not guilty, a hearing was held where the prosecution affirmed the
complainant’s desistance. Despite this, the trial court convicted the petitioners of rape and sentenced
them to reclusion perpetua. The petitioners appealed, claiming a grave violation of their right to due
process.
Issue​
Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when they rendered a decision finding
the petitioners guilty without affording them the right to a proper trial

Ruling:

Yes, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
rendered a decision finding the petitioners guilty without affording them their constitutional right to due
process of law, specifically the right to a proper trial. The conviction was set aside for patent violation of
their right to due process of law. The proceedings on November 7, 1997, which the respondent judge
claimed was a trial on the merits, could not have been considered a trial on the merits because they did
not conform with the procedure for trial as provided in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Specifically,
the petitioners were never instructed to present evidence to prove their defenses and were never given
the opportunity to present their respective evidence rebutting the testimony of the private complainant.

There was no admission of the charge by the petitioners that would justify a change in the order of trial.
The judge also improperly relied on the private complainant's affidavit of October 21, 1996, which was
used to convict the petitioners, even though it was not marked nor formally offered before the court.
Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, "[t]he court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered". Furthermore, petitioners were never afforded their right to confront and cross-examine
the witness with respect to her affidavit, and they were not even asked if they wanted to cross-examine
her. Denying petitioners a proper trial effectively denied them due process and all the other rights of an
accused under the Bill of Rights and the Rules in Criminal Procedure. The doubt as to the nature of the
proceedings should have been resolved in favor of the accused.

The Court emphasized that a trial must follow the prescribed steps, including the right to confront
witnesses, present evidence, and offer rebuttal. Since these rights were not provided, the judgment of the
trial court was declared null and void. The case was remanded to a different trial court for further
proceedings, including a resolution of the petition for bail, and Judge Savellano was prohibited from
hearing the case further to ensure impartiality.

Nachura: the Supreme Court held that the accused were denied due process of law when the trial
court convicted them (after having declared that they had waived their right to present evidence),
but it was shown that there were deviations from the regular course of trial, e.g., petitioners were
not directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor dates set for that purpose, petitioners
were not given an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence ner dates set for that purpose, and
petitioners had not admitted the offense charged in the information which would have justified
any modification in the order of the trial.

SUB-TOPIC: PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

4.​ People vs. Dramayo

[G.R. No. L-21325, October 29, 1971]

Facts:

In the morning of January 9, 1964, Pablo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, in the company of the deceased
Estelito Nogaliza, all of Barrio Magsaysay, Municipality of Sapao, Surigao del Norte, saw the chief of
police to shed light on a robbery committed in Nogaliza's house five days earlier. The response was
decidedly in the negative, as they themselves were prime suspects, having been implicated by at least
two individuals who had confessed.

At about 7:00 p.m. of the same day, while they were in the house of Priolo Billona, Dramayo invited those
present—including Francisco Billona, Modesto Ronquilla, and Crescencio and Severo Savandal—for a
drinking session behind the schoolhouse. During this gathering, Dramayo brought up the idea of killing
Estelito Nogaliza to prevent him from testifying in the robbery case. The plan was for Dramayo and
Ecubin to ambush Nogaliza, who was returning from Sapao, while the others were to station themselves
nearby.

When Nogaliza appeared, Dramayo accosted him, asking for a cigarette. Ecubin then struck him on the
side of the head with a piece of wood near the right ear. As Nogaliza lay prostrate, Dramayo stabbed him
repeatedly with a short pointed bolo. Dramayo warned the others to remain silent about the incident.

The next morning, Dramayo calmly went to the house of the deceased and informed Nogaliza’s widow,
Corazon, that he had seen her husband’s cadaver. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of police were
notified. The chief noticed bloodstains on Dramayo's trousers, to which Dramayo explained that the stains
were due to a skin ailment of his daughter.

Dramayo and others were charged with the murder of Estelito Nogaliza. The lower court found Pablo
Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, qualified by evident
premeditation and aggravated by nighttime, and imposed on each of them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The other accused were not convicted—Crescencio Savandal and Severo Savandal were
utilized as state witnesses, while Priolo Billona, Francisco Billona, and Modesto Ronquilla were acquitted.
Dramayo and Ecubin appealed.

​
Issue​
Whether or not the presumption of innocence applies to the accused despite the prosecution’s evidence
against them.

Ruling​
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed that the presumption of innocence is a constitutional right under
Section 14, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. It emphasized that mere accusation is not
equivalent to guilt and that it is the prosecution’s burden to prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt before any obligation arises for the defense to present evidence. However, the Court ruled that in
this case, the prosecution successfully discharged this burden. The testimonies presented were credible,
consistent, and established a moral certainty of guilt that overcame the presumption of innocence. The
defense of alibi was weak, uncorroborated, and could not stand against the positive identification of the
accused. The Court held that the trial court did not err in its conviction of Dramayo and Ecubin, as the
constitutional safeguard of presumption of innocence had been duly overcome by the strength of the
evidence presented. Conversely, the Court upheld the acquittal of the other accused due to the lack of
sufficient proof against them, underscoring that when reasonable doubt exists, it must be resolved in favor
of the accused.

5.​ Dumlao vs. COMELEC

[G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980]

Facts:​
Patricio Dumlao, a former governor of Nueva Vizcaya, along with other petitioners including Romeo Igot
and Alfredo Salapantan, filed a petition before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, which amended the Election Code of 1978. One key
provision under scrutiny was Section 4 of B.P. Blg. 52, which disqualified candidates from running for
elective office if they had merely been charged with crimes involving disloyalty to the State, such as
rebellion, sedition, or subversion—even without a conviction.

The petitioners contended that this provision was unconstitutional because it punished individuals by
depriving them of their right to run for public office solely on the basis of a criminal charge, without
affording them the full process of a trial and conviction. They argued that such a provision undermines the
fundamental right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, as enshrined in Article III, Section 14(2) of
the 1987 Constitution.

The Solicitor General defended the law by asserting that the state has the power to impose reasonable
qualifications and disqualifications for candidates for public office, and that preventing individuals with
pending criminal charges from running helps protect public interest and the integrity of the electoral
process.

Issue:​
Whether or not the disqualification of candidates based solely on the mere filing of criminal
charges—without conviction—violates the constitutional right to be presumed innocent under Article III,
Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling:​
Yes. The Supreme Court declared the challenged provision unconstitutional. It held that disqualifying a
person from running for elective office merely on the basis of a pending criminal charge—without final
conviction—violates the constitutional guarantee of the presumption of innocence. The Court emphasized
that under the Constitution, a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt
by a court of law. The mere filing of an information or a criminal charge is not proof of guilt and cannot be
equated with a finding of guilt that would warrant the deprivation of a constitutional or civil right.

Furthermore, the Court explained that allowing such a disqualification based on pending charges would
be susceptible to abuse and manipulation, as political opponents could use the mere filing of cases to
harass or eliminate rivals from running for public office. This would effectively allow prosecutorial
discretion to determine a person’s eligibility for office, which is contrary to the principles of due process,
fairness, and electoral integrity. In striking down the provision, the Court reinforced the constitutional
protection that ensures every person enjoys equal protection under the law and that a person’s liberty or
right to seek public office cannot be curtailed without due process.

Nachura: Provision of an election statute which disqualified from running for public office any
person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State "provided that the filing of charges
for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal shall be prima facie
evidence of such fact", was declared unconstitutional for being violative of the presumption of
innocence clause.

6.​ Marquez vs. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995]

Facts:​
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the 1992 elections for the Governor position of Quezon,
filed a petition for quo warranto against Eduardo Rodriguez, the winning candidate, claiming that
Rodriguez was disqualified under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code of 1991. Marquez alleged
that Rodriguez was a "fugitive from justice" because he was facing ten criminal charges for insurance
fraud in California, United States, and had a pending arrest warrant. Marquez contended that Rodriguez
had fled from the jurisdiction to avoid prosecution.

The COMELEC, however, dismissed the petition, applying Article 73 of its implementing rules, which
defines "fugitive from justice" as a person convicted by final judgment. Marquez contested this narrow
definition, arguing that the law did not require a conviction but merely the existence of criminal charges
and an unserved arrest warrant. The COMELEC’s ruling was based on a restrictive interpretation of the
term “fugitive from justice,” which, according to Marquez, violated the clear intent of the law. He then
brought the issue to the Supreme Court, which was asked to clarify whether this interpretation was
consistent with the principles of justice and fairness.
ISSUE:​
Whether or not the COMELEC’s reliance on a definition of “fugitive from justice” that requires conviction
by final judgment violates the accused’s constitutional right to be presumed innocent under Article III,
Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:​
No. The Supreme Court held that the presumption of innocence does not preclude the application of
disqualifications for being a "fugitive from justice" under the Local Government Code. While the
presumption of innocence is a fundamental right protecting individuals from being treated as guilty before
being proven so in a court of law, the Court found that the term “fugitive from justice” in the context of the
Local Government Code can encompass individuals who flee to avoid prosecution, not just those who
have been convicted. The Court noted that the law’s intent was to prevent individuals evading the justice
system from holding public office, which is a matter of public policy rather than a criminal conviction per
se. However, the Court also found that the COMELEC had failed to properly determine whether
Rodriguez, in this specific case, could be considered a fugitive under the broader interpretation of the law.
As the factual question was not adequately addressed by the COMELEC, the Court remanded the case
for further proceedings. The Court emphasized that while the right to be presumed innocent is a
constitutional guarantee, it does not override legal provisions concerning disqualification for evading the
law.

7.​ Corpus vs. People

[G.R. No. 74259, February 14, 1991]

Facts​
Generoso P. Corpuz, a Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva
Vizcaya, was accused of malversation of public funds after a shortage of P50,596.07 was discovered
following his termination in 1981. Despite being asked to settle the amount, Corpuz only paid a fraction
and did not provide an adequate explanation for the missing funds. He claimed the shortage was due to
mismanagement by others, but evidence showed that checks were issued, encashed, and properly
liquidated. The prosecution argued that Corpuz failed to record the missing funds in his cashbook in a
timely manner and did not take any legal action against those he accused of misappropriating the funds.

Issue​
Whether or not the conviction of Generoso P. Corpuz for malversation of public funds violated his
constitutional right to the presumption of innocence

Ruling​
No, the conviction of Generoso P. Corpuz did not violate his right to the presumption of innocence. The
Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan's decision, noting that the evidence against Corpuz was
overwhelming. His claim of innocence was unconvincing, as there was no substantial explanation for the
shortage of funds, and the evidence pointed to his responsibility for the misappropriation. The
presumption of innocence was not upheld due to the positive findings of guilt based on substantial
evidence. The petition was denied.

Nachura: The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence
adduced by the paties are evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of
innocence should titt the scales in favor of the accused

Court ruled that the equipoise rule is not applicable in this case. The equipoise rule, which provides
that if the evidence for the prosecution and the defense is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption
of innocence must tilt the scales in favor of the accused, applies only when there is genuine doubt or
parity in the evidence presented by both sides. However, in this case, the Court found that the evidence
against the petitioner was substantial and convincing, clearly establishing his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of malversation of public funds.
The Court noted several critical factors: (1) the petitioner’s entry of the P50,000.00 in his cashbook
without annotation that it was not received; (2) his failure to note any objection in the certificate of
turnover; and (3) his failure to file any case against the individuals he claimed were responsible for the
alleged shortage. Testimony from prosecution witnesses contradicted his defense and indicated that the
missing funds were liquidated and returned to him for proper accounting. Moreover, the petitioner’s
alleged absences during the relevant period were not convincingly established, and evidence suggested
he was present and in control of the funds. These findings, grounded in facts and supported by
substantial evidence, justified the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that the petitioner was guilty. Thus, the
equipoise rule did not apply because the evidence was not evenly balanced, but instead, weighed heavily
in favor of the prosecution.

8.​ Feeder International Line vs. CA

[G.R. No. 94262 May 31, 1991]

Facts:​
M/T "ULU WAI," a foreign vessel of Honduran registry owned by Feeder International Shipping Lines of
Singapore, left Singapore with a cargo of 2,100 metric tons of gas oil and fuel. On May 14, 1986, the
vessel anchored at Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the customs authorities. Upon inspection,
the ship lacked the required documents, except for a clearance from Singapore. A Warrant of Seizure and
Detention was issued by the District Collector. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and Quash the
Warrants, but the District Collector denied it. The customs authorities found that the vessel violated
Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs Code. The cargo was forfeited in favor of the government.
Petitioner appealed the decision, but the Commissioner of Customs affirmed the forfeiture. The Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) and the Court of Appeals also affirmed the forfeiture, ruling that sufficient evidence
supported the illegal importation. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court,
questioning whether its rights were violated during the forfeiture proceedings.

Issue:​
Whether petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law in that its right to be presumed
innocent was not recognized and the decision was not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:​
No, the petitioner was not deprived of property without due process of law. The right to be presumed
innocent applies to individuals accused of criminal offenses, not to corporate entities involved in civil or
administrative proceedings. In this case, the forfeiture proceedings were civil and administrative, aimed at
enforcing fines or forfeitures related to unlawful importation.

The court clarified that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required in such cases; instead,
substantial evidence, meaning relevant evidence sufficient to support a reasonable conclusion, is
sufficient. The government provided enough circumstantial evidence, including the failure to notify
customs authorities, lack of required documents, and other inconsistencies in the vessel’s conduct, to
support the forfeiture. Furthermore, the fact that the sworn statements of the ship's captain and owner's
representative were made without counsel did not violate their constitutional rights because the right to
counsel is not indispensable in non-criminal proceedings. The absence of counsel did not invalidate the
statements, and petitioner failed to challenge them appropriately during the proceedings.

Nachura: The right to presumption of innocence can be invoked only by an individual accused of
a criminal offense; a corporate entity has no personality to invoke the same
SUB-TOPIC: RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL

9.​ People vs. Holgado

[G.R. No. L-2809, March 22, 1950]

Facts​
Frisco Holgado was charged with slight illegal detention for allegedly kidnapping and detaining Artemia
Fabreag for approximately eight hours. On May 8, 1948, during the trial, Holgado appeared without legal
representation and was asked whether he had an attorney or if he intended to plead guilty. He responded
that he had no lawyer and wished to plead guilty. However, he also made a qualification, stating that he
had been instructed by one Mr. Ocampo. The court failed to inquire further about the circumstances
surrounding Mr. Ocampo’s involvement or the nature of the qualified plea. Despite this, the trial court
proceeded with the arraignment and failed to inform Holgado of his constitutional right to counsel. The
court did not assign counsel de oficio, nor did it grant him reasonable time to procure legal assistance.
After the guilty plea, the court convicted Holgado of serious illegal detention, a capital offense, instead of
the lesser offense of slight illegal detention originally charged. The court imposed a sentence of ten years
and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, which was much harsher than the penalty for slight illegal
detention. Additionally, the court did not investigate the potential relevance of Mr. Ocampo's statement in
the plea or whether Holgado was coerced or misunderstood the charges.

Issue​
Whether or not the accused was deprived of his right to be heard by himself and counse in the absence
of an informed waiver of his right to counsel and the failure of the court to provide proper legal assistance
during the trial.

Ruling​
Yes, the accused was deprived of his right to be heard by himself and counsel. The trial court’s failure to
inform Holgado of his right to counsel and its failure to assign counsel de oficio directly violated his
constitutional rights. Holgado was not given the opportunity to be adequately represented, nor was he
granted time to secure legal assistance. His qualified plea, which mentioned instructions from Mr.
Ocampo, should have prompted further investigation, but the court dismissed it based solely on the
prosecutor’s statement that Mr. Ocampo had no involvement. The court's failure to ensure that Holgado
was properly advised and assisted by counsel undermined his right to a fair hearing. Consequently, the
judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial, with the court required to inform
Holgado of his right to counsel and ensure that his right to a fair trial was fully protected.

Nachura: The right to counsel during the trial is not subject to waiver, because "even the most
intelligent or educated man, may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence":

10.​ People vs. Agbayani

[G.R. No. 122770, January 16, 1998]

Facts:​
On 12 September 1994, Eden Agbayani filed a complaint of rape against her father, Eduardo Agbayani,
accusing him of raping her on 19 July 1994. In his defense, the accused claimed alibi, stating that he was
in Barangay Victoria, Sual, Pangasinan, visiting his eldest daughter at the time of the alleged offense. He
further claimed that Eden filed the rape charges because he had disciplined her by hitting her with a belt
after catching her lying about her whereabouts. He stated that Eden left their apartment on 24 July 1994
and never returned. To support his alibi, Adoracion Cruz testified that on 17 July 1994, the accused asked
her to care for his children as he was going to visit his sick father in Pangasinan, returning only on 21 July
1994. The trial court gave more weight to Eden's testimony and found the defense's alibi to be
self-serving and unconvincing. The trial court also rejected the claim that Eden fabricated the charges due
to a grudge. After his conviction, the accused's new counsel filed a motion for a new trial, citing two main
issues: the trial court’s failure to inform the accused of his right to choose his own counsel and the
violation of his right to a two-day period to prepare for trial.

Issue:​
Whether or not failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of the
right to have counsel is a violation of his rights, and sufficient to reverse the decision

Ruling:​
No. The Court ruled that the trial court is presumed to have complied with the law, specifically in
informing the accused of his right to counsel, unless proven otherwise. The record did not explicitly state
that the trial judge informed the accused of his right to counsel of his own choice, but the Court held that
the mere absence of this detail in the record does not negate the presumption that the trial court followed
proper procedure. The Court further explained that unless there is a positive and affirmative showing that
the accused was not informed of this right, it must be presumed that the trial court did so. Regarding the
right to a two-day preparation period for trial, the Court ruled that such a right must be expressly
demanded by the accused. In this case, since the accused did not ask for additional time to prepare for
trial, he effectively waived this right. Therefore, the failure to grant the two-day preparation period did not
constitute reversible error.

Nachura: The failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial court advised the accused
of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The trial court must be
presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of
cases, and such presumption can be overcome only by an affirmative showing to the contrary

11.​ Amion vs. Judge Chiongson

[A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999]

Facts​
Baltazar Amion filed an administrative complaint against Judge Roberto Chiongson of the RTC, Branch
50, Bacolod City, alleging gross ignorance of the law and oppression. The complaint arose from Criminal
Case No. 94-15772, where Amion was the accused in a homicide case. He objected to the judge's
appointment of a counsel de oficio, Atty. Manuel Lao Ong, despite having a retained counsel, Atty.
Reynaldo Depasucat. On March 28, 1996, the hearing proceeded with Atty. Ong representing Amion after
Atty. Depasucat failed to appear due to illness. Amion argued that this appointment violated his
constitutional right to be heard by counsel of his own choice, especially since Atty. Ong had no prior
consultation with him. The trial court continued with multiple hearings despite repeated postponement
requests and the frequent absence or withdrawal of Amion’s chosen lawyers. Judge Chiongson asserted
that these repeated absences were part of a dilatory tactic to delay the proceedings. The judge
emphasized that the counsel de oficio appointment was a temporary measure to ensure the progress of
the trial and not a permanent replacement of Amion’s chosen lawyer.

Issue​
Whether or not the accused’s constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel of his own choice
was violated when the judge appointed a counsel de oficio despite the presence of a retained counsel.

Ruling​
No. The accused's right to be heard by counsel of his own choice was not violated. The appointment of a
counsel de oficio was a justified measure due to the repeated failure of the retained counsel to appear,
which caused undue delays in the proceedings. The court emphasized that the appointment was without
prejudice to the eventual reappearance of the accused’s chosen lawyer and was only intended to
safeguard the orderly administration of justice. The judge acted within reason to prevent further delay and
to protect the rights of the complainant and witnesses, some of whom had traveled long distances. The
Supreme Court dismissed the administrative complaint, finding that the judge did not act with bias or
ignorance but instead tried to ensure that the accused’s right to due process and the court’s duty to
administer justice were both upheld.
Nachura: An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel
will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a
person under custodial investigation rather than one who is accused in criminal prosecution. And
even if the application of the concept were to be extended to an accused in a criminal
prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of discretion so absolute and arbitrary as
would make the choice of counsei refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused.

Thus, there is no denial of the right to counsel where the counsel de oficio was appointed during
the absence of the accused's counsel de parte pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as
early as possible under the continuous trial system

SUB-TOPIC: RIGHT TO BE INFORMED TO THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION

12.​ People vs. Quitlong

[G.R. No. 121562, July 10, 1998]

Facts

On October 20, 1994, University of Baguio student Jonathan Calpito was stabbed to death near Harrison
Road in Baguio City. Eyewitnesses testified that the accused—Ronnie Quitlong, Salvador Quitlong, and
Emilio Senoto, Jr.—assisted in restraining Calpito while Ronnie stabbed him. Prior to the stabbing, a
minor altercation over a fishball purchase occurred. The accused were arrested at the scene while Jesus
Mendoza, who was also implicated, remained at large. Despite affidavits stating Mendoza was the actual
stabber, the trial court convicted the accused of murder, sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.

The amended Information filed against them included the element of abuse of superior strength, but did
not explicitly allege conspiracy. During trial, the prosecution sought to establish conspiracy based on the
accused’s coordinated acts during the assault. The trial court inferred conspiracy from the sequence of
events and convicted all three as co-principals in the crime of murder.

Issue

Whether or not right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them violated when the trial court convicted them based on conspiracy, despite its absence in the
Information?

Ruling:

Yes, the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was
violated. Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.
Conspiracy, when used as a mode of imputing criminal liability as a co-principal, must be explicitly alleged
in the Information. The absence of such an allegation in both the original and amended Informations
deprived the accused of the opportunity to adequately prepare a defense against the theory of conspiracy.

While jurisprudence (e.g., Balmadrid v. Sandiganbayan) allows conspiracy to be inferred from the
accused’s acts, this presupposes that the accused had prior notice of the conspiracy charge, either
explicitly stated in the Information or through proper amendment prior to arraignment. The court
acknowledged that the prosecution committed a lapse in failing to allege conspiracy, yet relied heavily on
it to convict the accused as co-principals.

Thus, the accused were convicted on a legal theory (conspiracy) not alleged in the Information, violating
due process and their right to be informed of the charges. The constitutional safeguard is not a mere
formality; it ensures that the accused can mount an effective defense. The accused were convicted of
murder and sentenced accordingly.
Nachura: In order that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him may not be violated, the information must state the name of
the accused, the designation given to the offense by statute, astatement of the acts or omission
so complained of as constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate
time and date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense had been
committed. The information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the
culpability and liability of the accused, so that the accused can prepare for and undertake his
defense.

One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more persons is conspiracy. Where
no such allegation is made in the information, the courts finding of conspiracy violates the
constitutional requirement.

13.​ Pecho vs. People

[G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996]

Facts​
Odon Pecho and Joe Catre were charged under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for allegedly conspiring to
defraud through the use of falsified documents. The information stated that they acted in concert, with
Catre misrepresenting himself as a representative of a fictitious company. However, only Pecho was tried.
Despite the original charge, the Sandiganbayan convicted Pecho of the complex crime of attempted
estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents. Pecho challenged this, claiming it
violated his right under Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.

Issue​
Whether or not the petitioner’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was
violated by his conviction for the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification, instead of the
original charge under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.

Ruling​
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Pecho's constitutional right was not violated. The Court explained that
the true nature of the accusation is determined by the factual allegations in the information, not merely by
the legal designation of the crime. The acts described in the information—use of falsified documents and
participation in a fraudulent transaction—were sufficient to inform the accused of the nature and cause of
the offense. The complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification is necessarily included in the
original charge. Furthermore, since Pecho failed to object to the duplicity of charges before trial, he could
be lawfully convicted of either or both offenses. The Rules of Court (Rule 120, Sections 4 and 5) allow
conviction of an offense necessarily included in the charge if proven. Nonetheless, Pecho was ultimately
acquitted because the evidence failed to establish conspiracy between him and Catre beyond reasonable
doubt, which was essential to sustain the conviction.

14.​ Soriano vs. Sandiganbayan

[G.R. No. L-65952, July 31, 1984]

FACTS​
Lauro G. Soriano, an Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City, was the investigating officer in a qualified theft
complaint against Thomas Tan. During the preliminary investigation, Soriano allegedly demanded ₱4,000
from Tan in exchange for dismissing the case. Tan reported the matter to the NBI, which set up an
entrapment operation. Soriano was caught receiving ₱2,000 and was subsequently charged with violating
Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019). He was found guilty by the
Sandiganbayan and sentenced accordingly.
ISSUE​
Whether or not Soriano’s conviction violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.

RULING​
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Soriano was not deprived of his right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation. Although the Sandiganbayan erroneously convicted him under R.A. 3019, the
facts alleged in the information—particularly that he demanded and received money in exchange for
dismissing a complaint—clearly constituted direct bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court emphasized that what matters is the substance of the accusation as reflected in the
information, which must inform the accused of the offense charged. Since the information sufficiently
described the elements of bribery and enabled Soriano to prepare an adequate defense, there was no
violation of his constitutional right. The conviction was thus modified: Soriano was acquitted under R.A.
3019 but found guilty of direct bribery under the Revised Penal Code.

15.​ Borja vs. Mendoza

[G.R. No. L-45667 June 20, 1977]

Facts​
Manuel Borja was charged before the City Court of Cebu with the offense of slight physical injuries.
However, he was never arraigned—a mandatory step in criminal procedure intended to formally inform
the accused of the charges filed against him. Despite this, the trial court, presided by Judge Romulo R.
Senining, proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a decision on August 18, 1976, convicting
Borja and sentencing him to twenty days of arresto menor. Borja appealed the decision to the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, presided by Judge Rafael T. Mendoza. Again, without notice to Borja or
requiring him to file a memorandum, the CFI affirmed the lower court’s decision on November 16, 1976.
Borja argued that the entire proceeding was void for having violated his constitutional rights—specifically,
his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and his right to be heard by himself and
counsel. The Solicitor General supported Borja’s position and agreed that the absence of arraignment
constituted a grave violation of procedural due process.

Issue​
Whether or not the failure to arraign the accused violated his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Ruling​
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation—guaranteed under Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution—was blatantly violated.
Arraignment is not a mere formality; it is a fundamental requirement to ensure that an accused is made
fully aware of the criminal charge being brought against him and is given the opportunity to respond and
defend himself. Proceeding with trial and rendering a conviction in the absence of an arraignment
undermines the accused's ability to prepare an adequate defense and is a clear denial of due process.
The Court emphasized that even trial in absentia, permitted under certain circumstances, presupposes
that the accused was properly arraigned. Since this was not done, the trial and subsequent conviction
were void. The Court granted the petition, nullified both decisions, and remanded the case to the City
Court of Cebu for proper proceedings beginning with Borja’s arraignment.