Contents

8. Cargo and Ballast Systems .................................................................................................... 3

8.1. Oil .................................................................................................................................... 3
8.2. Chemicals.......................................................................................................................20
8.3. Oil and Chemical ............................................................................................................56
8.4. LPG ..............................................................................................................................154
8.5. LNG ..............................................................................................................................185
8.6. Gas (common to all vessels under IGC Code) ..............................................................202
8.7. Shuttle Tanker Cargo Operations .................................................................................294
8.8. OBO / Combination Carriers .........................................................................................328
8.99. All types ......................................................................................................................334
9. Mooring and Anchoring .......................................................................................................377
9.1. Mooring Equipment Management .................................................................................377
9.2. Emergency Towing Arrangement..................................................................................390
9.3. Mooring and Anchoring Procedures..............................................................................392
9.4. Mooring and Anchoring Team Management .................................................................397
9.5. STS Operation Management ........................................................................................404
9.6. Single Point Mooring.....................................................................................................413
9.7. Shuttle Tanker Mooring Systems ..................................................................................418
10. Machinery Spaces.............................................................................................................422
10.1. Engineering Procedures .............................................................................................422
10.2. Machinery Status ........................................................................................................437
10.3. Safety Management....................................................................................................456
10.4. Planned Maintenance Systems ..................................................................................483
10.5. Conventional Bunkering Management ........................................................................489
10.6. LNG Bunkering Management .....................................................................................498
10.7. Fire Protection Measures ............................................................................................517
11. General Appearance and Condition – Photograph Comparison ........................................532
11.1.1 to 11.1.36: All vessels ...............................................................................................532
11.1.40 to 11.1.42: Addition for Crude / Product / Chemical / Shuttle / OBO ........................542
11.1.50 to 11.1.52: Additional for LPG Pressurised .............................................................543
11.1.60 to 11.1.62: Additional for LPG Refrigerated.............................................................544
11.1.70 to 11.1.72: Additional for LNG Membrane Type ......................................................545
11.1.80 to 11.1.82: Additional for LNG Moss Type ..............................................................546

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9. Mooring and Anchoring
9.1. Mooring Equipment Management
9.1.1. Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company procedures for the
testing and correct operation of the mooring winch brakes, and were records available to
demonstrate that brakes had been tested periodically, after maintenance or when there
was evidence of premature brake slippage?
Short Question Text
Testing and correct operation of the mooring winch brakes

Vessel Types
Oil, Chemical, LPG, LNG

ROVIQ Sequence
Documentation, Cargo Control Room, Mooring Decks

Publications
IMO SOLAS
OCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)
IMO: ISM Code

Objective

To ensure that mooring winches function as designed, shedding excess load at a defined value in
accordance with the Ship Design MBL.

Industry Guidance

OCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)

6.3.4.1 Brake holding load

OCIMF recommends that the primary brake should be set to hold 60% of the ship design MBL on the first layer.

Split drum winches should not have more than one layer of mooring line on the tension section of the drum because it
can reduce the brake holding capacity of the mooring winch.

6.4.5.1 Effect of layers of mooring line on brake holding load

Undivided drum winch

For undivided winch drums, it is recommended to ask the manufacturer for guidance on maintaining the OCIMF
recommended value for brake rendering. This may require ship operational experience to identify the normal layer in
use for most mooring operations.

6.4.6 Winch brake testing

6.4.6.4 Supervision of testing

Winch testing should be carried out under the supervision or in the presence of a responsible person familiar with the
operation of the winches, the test procedure and the ship’s safety management system. This may be a person
designated by the Master, Chief Engineer or a repair superintendent.

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6.4.6.5 Method of testing

Once the brakes are tested and calibrated, the torque setting should be recorded. For conventional screw brakes, a
tag should be attached stating the torque value. For spring applied brakes the spring compression distance should be
recorded and the mechanism secured with a seal.

A stopper arrangement, e.g. locking nut on the threaded end, should not be used on the tightening screw. Stopper
arrangements can impede the brake setting and reduce the brake holding load.

TMSA KPI 6A.1.2 requires that maintenance, testing and routine inspections of mooring and anchoring equipment is
included in the planned maintenance system. The planned maintenance system covers all mooring equipment. This
equipment may include:

• Winches and windlasses.

Winch and windlass brake testing is conducted according to industry guidelines or local regulations.

IMO: ISM Code

10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the
provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the
Company.

IMO: SOLAS

Chapter II-1 Regulation 3-8

Towing and Mooring Equipment

1 This regulation applies to ships constructed on or after 1 January 2007 but does not apply to emergency towing
arrangements provided in accordance with regulation 3-4.

2 Ships shall be provided with arrangements, equipment and fittings of sufficient safe working load to enable the safe
conduct of all towing and mooring operations associated with the normal operation of the ship.

3 Arrangements, equipment and fittings provided in accordance with paragraph 2 shall meet the appropriate
requirements of the Administration or an organization recognized by the Administration under regulation I/6*.

4 Each fitting or item of equipment provided under this regulation shall be clearly marked with any restrictions
associated with its safe operation, taking into account the strength of its attachment to the ship’s structure.

Inspection Guidance

The vessel operator should have developed mooring procedures which are in alignment with MEG4 and the
information recommended for inclusion within the Mooring System Management Plan (MSMP). The procedures
should provide guidance on:

• The frequency of winch brake testing (MEG4 6.4.6.1).

• The method of winch brake testing (MEG4 6.4.6.2).
• The method of ensuring the correct torque is applied (MEG4 6.4.6.5).
• The primary brake holding load – adjusted to 60% of the Ship Design MBL (MEG4 6.3.4.1).
• The use of split drum winches – not more than one layer of mooring line on the tension side (MEG4 6.3.4.1),
and/or
• The use of undivided drum winches (6.4.5.1)

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 • The reeling of lines onto drums – band brakes are designed to work effectively in only one direction (MEG4
6.3.4.2).

It is recognised that the testing of mooring winch brakes is often completed by engineer officers or shore-based
contractors. The intent of the question is to establish that the Master and deck officers are familiar with the
requirement for brake testing, the operation of the mooring winch brake systems and, the indicators during operation
when maintenance and further testing is required.

The vessel operator should have uploaded one photograph relating to the brake mechanism for a representative
mooring winch to the document portal prior to the inspection. This will be linked to this question within the inspection
editor.

Suggested Inspector Actions

• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for the testing and operation of the vessel’s
mooring winch brakes.
• Review the Mooring System Management Plan and verify that it contained the mooring winch brake testing
records or, where records were integrated within the ships document control system, that the location of the
mooring winch brake testing records was identified.
• Review the mooring winch brake testing records and verify that the brakes had been tested and adjusted to
render at 60% of the ship’s design MBL at least annually and after completion of any modification or
maintenance, or where there had been evidence of premature brake slippage or related malfunctions.
• During the physical inspection of the vessel verify that winches were marked with:
o The correct reeling direction (MEG4 6.3.4.2).
o The date of the last brake test ((MEG 6.4.6.1).
o The primary brake holding load value as set (MEG4 6.3.6).
o The torque setting value where a brake is set with a torque wrench (MEG4 6.4.6.5).
o The pressure gauge setting value where a brake is initially applied by a hydraulic assist (MEG4
6.4.6.5).
o Where applicable, an indicator to show that a brake was set to the correct value.
• During the physical inspection of the vessel verify that:
o The lines were reeled on the winch drums in the correct direction (MEG4 6.3.4.2).
o Where winches were provided with split drums, that there was no more than a single layer of line
on the tension side of a drum (MEG4 6.3.4.1).
o Where winches were provided with split drums, that the number of turns of mooring line on the
tension side of a drum were at least the minimum number as indicated within the Line Management
Plan (MEG4 6.3.3.1).
o The winch brakes were set in accordance with any instructions or indicators provided.
o The winch drum brake assemblies including brake lining material and brake drum surface were in
apparent good order and well maintained.
o The brake test equipment was safely stored as per manufacturer’s instructions, if kept onboard.

• Where safe to do so and the appropriate personnel are available during the physical inspection, observe the
adjustment of a mooring line.

Expected Evidence

• The company mooring procedures which included the use and testing of mooring winches fitted to the
vessel.
• The Mooring System Management Plan, where provided.
• The Line Management Plan.
• The mooring winch brake testing records.
• The calibration test certificate for the brake testing equipment pressure gauge where testing equipment
carried.
• The winch manufacturer’s instructions for the testing of the mooring winch brakes.

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 • Mooring winch maintenance records since the last annual winch test where repairs or component
replacement had been performed on any part of a winch drum brake assembly or mechanism.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no company procedure which provided instructions for the use and testing of the mooring
winches brakes fitted to the vessel.
• The vessel was not provided with a Mooring System Management Plan (MSMP) which was in alignment
with MEG4.
• The accompanying deck officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation, setting and
testing of the mooring winch brakes.
• The accompanying deck officer or observed crew were not familiar with the operation and setting of the
mooring winch brakes.
• The brake testing equipment was not maintained in good condition, or the hydraulic jack pressure gauge
had not been calibrated before use where brake testing equipment was carried.
• The mooring winch brakes had not been periodically tested in accordance with the company procedure or
the Mooring System Management Plan requirements.
• The mooring winch brakes had not been tested on completion of any repairs or maintenance which affected
the mooring winch brake mechanism assembly.
• The mooring winch brakes had not been retested where there had been evidence of premature brake
slippage or related malfunctions.
• The mooring winch drums were not marked with the date of the previous test, the primary brake load
capacity, the reeling direction or the brake setting torque or hydraulic brake assist setting pressure (as
applicable to the brake type).
• The brake on any single mooring drum in active mooring service was observed to be incorrectly set.
• A stopper arrangement, e.g. a locking nut on the threaded end, was used on the tightening screw of the
brake to set the brake torque.
• A mooring line was reeled onto a mooring drum in the wrong direction for the correct operation of the brake
mechanism.
• Where the vessel was provided with split drums there was more than one layer of line on the tension side of
a drum.
• Where the vessel was provided with split drums there were insufficient turns of line, as determined by the
company procedure or MSMP, on the tension side of the drum.
• The mooring winch drum brake mechanisms, brake drums or brake band linings were apparently defective
on any mooring winch. This would include where brake drums had more than a light layer of superficial
surface rust.

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9.1.2. Was the vessel satisfactorily moored in accordance with both the terminal mooring
plan and the mooring configurations permitted by the vessel’s Mooring System
Management Plan?
Short Question Text
Was the vessel satisfactorily moored

Vessel Types
Oil, Chemical, LPG, LNG

ROVIQ Sequence
Documentation, Cargo Control Room, Mooring Decks

Publications
OCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)
IMO: ISM Code

Objective

To ensure that the vessel is always moored safely in accordance with a terminal’s published mooring plan
and the acceptable mooring line configurations identified within the vessel’s Mooring System Management
Plan.

Industry Guidance

OCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)

Section 1.9.2 Mooring System Management Plan Structure.

Part B – Mooring equipment design philosophy

• 5. Assumptions on the standard mooring pattern and considerations for redundancy provisions, including
sub-optimal line distribution to cover unpredicted events (e.g. storm surges, shore mooring hooks out of
service).
• 8. Alternate mooring patterns to meet the standard environmental criteria assessment and designed-in
options when the optimal mooring pattern is unachievable in some real-world scenarios (e.g. hooks,
dolphins or mooring winches out of service, breast lines not in an optimal perpendicular lead, etc.).

TMSA KPI 6A.2.1 requires that detailed procedures address each different type of mooring operation likely to be
undertaken by fleet vessels.

Procedures have been developed following risk assessments for each type of mooring operation, which may include;

• Conventional berths.
• Conventional buoy moorings.
• Double-banking at berths.

IMO: ISM Code

7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key
shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various
tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.

Inspection Guidance

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The vessel operator should have developed the Mooring System Management Plan to include optimal, sub-optimal
and alternate mooring patterns permissible to assist vessel staff in evaluating a terminal’s published or proposed
mooring plan prior to mooring.

The mooring patterns should identify:

• The minimum number of lines that must be deployed in each service (spring, breast, head and stern) to
meet the design mooring constraint requirement for the standard environmental criteria at a conventional
tanker jetty.
• The minimum number of lines that must be deployed in each service (breast, quarter and stern) to meet the
design mooring constraint requirement for the standard environmental criteria at a conventional buoy
mooring (multi-buoy mooring).
• Environmental conditions where additional mooring lines are required to be utilised and in what service.
• The permissible alternative mooring configurations where shore hooks or bollards are not in the optimal
position or are out of service.
• The horizontal angles of lines to the perpendicular of the ship’s fore and aft axis and vertical angles of lines
(in true elevation) with the vessel in the least favourable load state that are permitted for mooring lines in
each service in the standard or alternative mooring patterns.

The vessel operator should have developed a procedure for evaluating proposed mooring configurations which do
not conform to, or modify, the criteria upon which the Mooring System Management Plan was developed. This should
include double banking operations at a berth.

Suggested Inspector Actions

• Review the Mooring System Management Plan and identify the permissible mooring configurations that may
be used by the vessel to meet optimal, sub-optimal and alternate mooring arrangements.
• Review the published terminal mooring plans for recent terminal visits and verify that there was a process to
confirm that the vessel could comply with both the terminal mooring layout and the mooring patterns
permitted by the Mooring System Management Plan.
• Where the vessel was moored at the time of the inspection, verify that the mooring pattern employed was in
accordance with both the mooring plan published by the terminal and the Mooring System Management
Plan. (Where the number of mooring lines required to be utilised between the terminal and vessel mooring
plans was different, the plan requiring the higher number of lines should be followed.)
• Where the terminal mooring plan required the use of swamp lines or other shore-lines to supplement the
vessel’s mooring system, verify that these lines had been utilised.
• Verify that the vessel’s mooring lines were deployed within the permitted horizontal angles to the
perpendicular of ships fore and aft axis and vertical angles of lines as documented within the Mooring
System Management Plan.
• Where the vessel was required to undertake a mooring analysis as part of the terminal acceptance process,
verify that the vessel had moored in accordance with the mooring analysis provided to the vessel.
• Where the vessel was involved in a double banking operation* verify that;
o A mooring analysis was available to confirm that both the inside and outside vessel were provided
with adequate restraint,
o That the inside vessel was not bearing the load of both vessels on its own moorings unless the
mooring analysis determined that the moorings deployed were sufficient for the forces of both
vessels,
o That both the inside and outside vessels were moored in accordance with the agreed mooring plan.

The mooring of a bunker barge or small coastal tanker to the outboard side does not constitute a double banking
operation*.

Expected Evidence

• The Mooring System Management Plan.

• The terminal mooring plan, showing the positioning of a similar sized vessel in relationship to the terminal
mooring fittings, published in either the terminal handbook or an industry standard publication.

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 • The passage plan, pilot card, cargo plan or risk assessment which showed the specific mooring layout that
was used at the terminal or berth.
• Where the vessel was required to be subject to a terminal compatibility assessment prior to berthing, the
mooring plan determined during the mooring assessment.
• Where the vessel was engaged in a double-banking alongside a berth, the agreed mooring plan for both the
inside and outside vessels.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The vessel was not provided with a Mooring System Management Plan (MSMP) which was in alignment
with MEG4.
• The Mooring System Management Plan was not developed to include the permissible mooring
configurations for optimal, sub-optimal and alternative mooring arrangements for conventional tanker berths
and, where used, conventional buoy moorings.
• The Mooring System Management Plan was not developed to show the maximum permitted deviation from
the horizontal angles of lines to the perpendicular of the ships fore and aft axis and vertical angles of lines.
• The accompanying deck officer was unfamiliar with the process for comparing the published or proposed
terminal mooring plan with the mooring configurations permitted within the Mooring System Management
Plan.
• The vessel was moored in a pattern that was not in accordance with the published terminal mooring plan.
• The vessel was moored in a pattern that was not in accordance with the mooring configurations permitted by
the Mooring System Management Plan.
• The vertical angle (in true elevation) of any mooring line exceeded the limit identified within the Mooring
System Management Plan.
• The vessel had deployed fewer lines than required by either the published terminal mooring plan or the
mooring configurations permitted by the Mooring System Management Plan.
• The vessel had not utilised supplementary shore-lines required by the terminal mooring plan.
• Where the vessel had been subject to a mooring analysis for the terminal or berth, the actual mooring
configuration was not in accordance with the plan developed through the mooring analysis.
• Where the vessel was double banked there was no analysis available to demonstrate that the mooring plan
had been verified as providing sufficient restraint for both the inside and outside vessels.

Where the terminal had not published a mooring plan and the vessel could demonstrate that it had made efforts to
obtain the plan through its operator or agent then make a comment under the Process response tool.

Where the vessel is not moored at the time of inspection, the inspector should follow the Suggested Inspector Actions
as far as possible, reviewing the Mooring System Management Plan and recent/planned mooring layouts against
terminal mooring plans.

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9.1.3. Were the Master, deck officers, and ratings involved with mooring operations,
familiar with the content of the Line Management Plan and was the plan maintained in
accordance with company instructions with mooring line, mooring tail and joining
shackle certificates available for each item included within the Line Management Plan?
Short Question Text
Line Management Plan (LMP) implementation.

Vessel Types
Oil, Chemical, LPG, LNG

ROVIQ Sequence
Documentation, Cargo Control Room, Mooring Decks

Publications
OCIMF: Effective Mooring. Fourth Edition 2019
OCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)

Objective

To ensure that mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles are always in serviceable condition and
managed to avoid failure in service.

Industry Guidance:

OCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)

Chapter 5.4.2 Line Management Plans.

OCIMF: Effective Mooring. Fourth Edition 2019

2.6 Taking care of mooring equipment

Line and tail certificates

You need to know what kinds of lines are on board, where they are, and how to find their service records in the line
management plan. All lines and tails used for mooring need a certificate.

• Label certificates clearly.

• Regularly check their condition.
• Keep certificates/inspection records in an easily accessible file.

Section 3.4 Synthetic fibre tails

• Keep a record of which tail is fitted to each mooring line, and when, and give this data to your supervisor so
that the line management plan can be updated.

3.8 Care of mooring lines

• Guidance on mooring line care, use and replacement can be found in your line management plan.
• Do not move lines or tails from one winch to another without approval. Make sure records in the line
management plan are updated with any approved change of position. Tracking a line’s history is critical to
know how used it is, as required by the line management plan.

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 TMSA KPI 6A.2.4 requires that procedures are in place for the inspection, maintenance and replacement of wires,
ropes, tails and ancillary equipment. The procedures may include:

• Inspection methods and frequency

• Maintenance requirements.
• Retirement criteria
• Minimum spares
• Stowage requirements
• Record keeping

The records may include:

• Date of bringing rope/wires into service.

• Identification and tagging of all equipment.
• Certification for all ropes/wires/tails/joining shackles.
• Dates of end for ending.

IMO: ISM Code

10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the
provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the
Company.

Inspection Guidance

The vessel operator should have developed a Line Management Plan (LMP) in alignment with MEG4 Table 5.2 which
should give guidance on:

• Maintenance; including line installation, storage, repair, line maintenance and wear zone management.
• Inspection; including routine inspection and detailed inspection. (detailed in MEG4 5.4.3)
• Service life and retirement criteria; including determination of expected service life and planned retirement
criteria policy. (it may also include residual strength testing, but this is not a required aspect of an LMP)
• General; including hazards and precautions, operator’s SMS and ship HSE procedures, training and
competence requirements, and roles and responsibilities.

The LMP can be a standalone tool, or it may be integrated into existing safety or maintenance management systems.
It can be available as hard or electronic copy, or both. LMP information should be stored in a location that is easy for
all users to access, e.g. on a computer system that can be accessed from both the ship and shore or compiled in a
single physical location. It should be easy for the system users to access the LMP information from a single physical
or virtual location. This is necessary for access by all officers and crew who will be involved in mooring operations.

The vessel should retain manufacturer’s product certificates onboard which will be referenced to the location of each
mooring line, mooring tail and joining shackle onboard, both in use and available as spares.

Suggested Inspector Actions

• Review the mooring line, mooring tail and joining shackle certificates and verify that the vessel has an
effective process in place to identify each individual item and associate it with its location onboard and its
manufacturer’s product certificate.
• Review the Line Management Plan (LMP) and verify that, as a minimum, the four key categories and their
subcategories identified in table 5.2 (MEG4) had been addressed and populated with the relevant
information.
• Identify the stated service life criteria for mooring lines and mooring tails and verify that the lines and tails in
service were within the company’s stated service life criteria. This may be elapsed time or hours in service
since being brought into service and will be defined within the LMP.

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 • Review the inspection history for the mooring lines and mooring tails and verify that inspections had been
carried out as required by the inspection intervals defined within the LMP.
• Review the inspection history and where a line had parted in service verify that an incident investigation
report was onboard that identified the causes of the line failure.
• Review the maintenance records and verify that mooring lines had been “end for ended” or moved to a
different service in accordance with the LMP to meet the wear zone management expectations.
• Identify whether the vessel operator permitted the splicing of mooring lines and if so verify that the persons
permitted to conduct the splicing had been identified within the LMP. Where specialist training was required
verify that the identified persons had received the training.

• During the physical inspection:

o Randomly inspect several accessible mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles and verify
that they were in apparent good order and that they were tagged or marked to permit identification
within the LMP and the associated retained product certificate.
o Where the vessel was provided with mooring tails connected to the mooring lines verify that the
connection method was in accordance with the LMP and MEG4 5.8.4, connection devices (MEG4
figure 5.20) or cow hitch (MEG4 Figure 5.21) and that these were correctly fitted.
o Interview at least one rating involved in mooring operations and verify that they were familiar with
the location of the LMP and, who was responsible for the splicing of the mooring lines or any other
relevant item that would confirm familiarity with the LMP and its content.

Expected Evidence

• The Line Management Plan.

• The manufacturer’s product certificates for all mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles onboard.
• The SMS procedures that were referenced in the general section of the Line Management Plan.
• Incident investigation reports for any in service mooring line, mooring tail or joining shackle failures.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The vessel was not provided with a Line Management Plan (LMP).
• The vessel had not retained manufacturer’s product certificates for all mooring lines, mooring tails and
joining shackles onboard referenced against each item’s location.
• The LMP was not developed in alignment with the sections and subsections of MEG4 table 5.2, as a
minimum.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the content of the LMP and how the information was to be
recorded and managed within it.
• An interviewed rating who was involved with mooring operations was unfamiliar with the existence of the
LMP or content relevant to their role onboard.
• The LMP had not been maintained accurately. (Inspection determined that lines, tails or shackles were in
the wrong location or items were onboard which were not included in the LMP).
• Mooring line, mooring tail and joining shackle inspections had not been completed and documented in
accordance with the LMP.
• Mooring lines, mooring tails or joining shackles in use or provided as spares were in a condition that
indicated the inspection processes required under the LMP were ineffective.
• Joining shackles were fitted the wrong way around according to the shackle design.
• Mooring wires were connected to mooring tails using a cow hitch or an inappropriate shackle.
• A mooring line or mooring tail was in service beyond the stated company retirement criteria.
• A mooring line or mooring tail was in service which had suffered damage to such an extent that it should
have been taken out of service for repair or retirement.
• Splicing of mooring lines had been undertaken onboard but the resulting splices were not in accordance with
the line manufacturer’s instructions.
• Mooring lines had not been “end for ended” or rotated in service in accordance with the line management
plan wear zone management process.

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 • A mooring line, mooring tail or joining shackle had parted in service during the previous six months but there
was no incident investigation report onboard to document the causes of the failure.

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9.1.4. Did all mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles, including those carried as
spares, meet industry guidelines?
Short Question Text
Mooring lines, tails and mooring shackles.

Vessel Types
Oil, Chemical, LPG, LNG

ROVIQ Sequence
Documentation

Publications
OCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)

Objective

To ensure that mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles are fit for the intended purpose to prevent
line failure in service.

Industry Guidance

OCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)

Chapter 5.2 – Mooring system design and line selection

TMSA KPI 6A.2.4 requires that procedures are in place for the inspection, maintenance and replacement of wires,
ropes, tails and ancillary equipment.

IMO: ISM Code

10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the
provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the
Company.

Inspection Guidance

The vessel operator should have provided the vessel with a Mooring System Management Plan (MEG4 1.9) which
consisted of the following:

• Part A – General ship particulars

• Part B -Mooring equipment design philosophy (MEG4 1.9.2.2).
o 4. Design loads, safety factors and strength for required mooring lines and fixed equipment.
• Part C – Detailed list of mooring equipment (MEG4 1.9.2.3).
o 3. Loose equipment (mooring lines, tails, pennants, joining shackles etc.).
• Part D – Inspection, maintenance and retirement strategies/principles.(MEG4 1.9.2.4)
o 4. A Mooring Line Management Plan covering all mooring ropes and wires in use including joining
shackles.
• Part E – Risk and change management, safety of personnel and human factors
• Part F – Records and documentation
• Part G – Mooring System Management Plan Register

Mooring lines shall have a Line Design Break Force (LDBF) of 100-105% of the Ship Design MBL (MEG4 5.2.1).

Synthetic mooring tails shall have a Tail Design Break Force (TDBF) of 125-130% of the Ship Design MBL (MEG4
5.8.2).

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The LDBF for nylon (polyamide) mooring lines should be specified as break tested wet, because nylon lines change
strength characteristics once exposed to water and generally do not fully dry to their original construction state.

Connection devices (joining shackles) should have a safety factor of three, i.e. the breaking load is three times the
safe working load (SWL). The safe working load of the joining shackle should always be equal to, or greater than, the
working load limit (WLL) of the lines in the mooring system. (MEG4 5.8.4.1).

Suggested Inspector Actions

• Review the Mooring System Management Plan and identify the values for Ship Design MBL and the working
load limit (WLL) of the lines.
• Review the detailed list of mooring equipment and loose equipment and verify that;
o The mooring lines had a Line Design Break Force (LDBF) in the range of 100-105% of the Ship
Design MBL.
o The mooring tails, where provided, had a Tail Design Break Force (TDBF) in the range 125-130%
of the Ship Design MBL.
o The joining shackles, where provided, had a Safe Working Load (SWL) equal to, or greater than,
the working load limit (WLL) of the mooring lines in the system. (it is not expected that the SWL and
WLL exactly match).
• Where the vessel had a summary list of all mooring system loose equipment with the values of LDBF and
TDBF tabulated, verify that the values for the components were accurate by spot-checking the values
against several manufacturer’s product certificates.

Expected Evidence

• The Mooring System Management Plan.

• The list of loose equipment (mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles)
• The file of manufacturer product certificates for all mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The vessel was not provided with a Mooring Systems Management Plan (MSMP).
• The vessel did not have a file containing the manufacturer’s product certificates for all mooring lines,
mooring tails and joining shackles carried onboard.
• One or more mooring lines onboard, in service mounted on a winch, or loose or carried as a spare, had a
Line Design Break Force (LDBF) that was lower than 100% of the Ship Design MBL.
• One or more mooring tails carried onboard, either in service or carried as a spare, had a Tail Design Break
Force (TDBF) that was lower than 125% of the Ship Design MBL.
• One or more of the mooring joining shackles carried onboard, either in use or carried as a spare, had a Safe
Working Load (SWL) that was less than Working Load Limit (WLL) for the mooring lines in use onboard.

• Where one or more mooring lines carried onboard, either in service or carried as a spare, had a LDBF of
greater than 105% of the ship design MBL, make a comment in the Hardware response tool describing how
many lines were affected and what the actual LDBF was as a percentage of the ship design MBL.
• Where one or more mooring tails carried onboard, either in service or carried as a spare, had a TDBF of
greater than 130% of the ship design MBL, make a comment in the Hardware response tool describing how
many tails were affected and what the actual TDBF was as a percentage of the ship design MBL.

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9.2. Emergency Towing Arrangement
9.2.1. Were the Master and all officers familiar with the vessel specific emergency towing
procedure, and was the emergency towing equipment, where fitted, in satisfactory
condition and ready for immediate use?
Short Question Text
Emergency towing procedure and equipment

Vessel Types
Oil, Chemical, LPG, LNG

ROVIQ Sequence
Aft Mooring Deck, Bridge, Forecastle, Cargo Control Room

Publications
IMO SOLAS
IMO: MSC.1/Circ.1255 Guidelines for Owners/Operators on Preparing Emergency Towing Procedures
IMO: ISM Code

Objective

To ensure that the vessel crew are familiar with the emergency towing procedure, and that the emergency
towing equipment, where required to be fitted, is ready for immediate use.

Industry Guidance

IMO: MSC.1/Circ.1255 Guidelines for Owners/Operators on Preparing Emergency Towing Procedures.

4.1 The Emergency Towing Booklet (ETB) should be ship specific and be presented in a clear, concise and ready-to-
use format (booklet, plan, poster, etc.).

4.6 A minimum of three copies should be kept on board and located in:

1. the bridge;
2. a forecastle space; and
3. the ship’s office or cargo control room.

TMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and
cover all credible emergency scenarios.

IMO: ISM Code

8.1 The Company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to
them.

IMO: SOLAS

Chapter II – I Regulation 3-4

1 Emergency towing arrangements on tankers.

1.1 Emergency towing arrangements shall be fitted at both ends on every tanker of not less than 20,000 tonnes
deadweight.

2 Emergency towing procedures on ships.

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2.2 ships shall be provided with a ship-specific emergency towing procedure. Such a procedure shall be carried
onboard the ship for use in emergency situations and shall be based on existing arrangements and equipment
available on board the ship.

Inspection Guidance

The vessel operator should have provided the vessel with an emergency towing procedure in the form of an
Emergency Towing Booklet (ETB) in accordance with SOLAS regulation and supporting IMO Marine Safety Circulars.

Suggested Inspector Actions

• Review the vessel specific emergency towing procedure (Emergency Towing Booklet - ETB).
• Verify a copy of the ETB was available on the bridge, in the ship’s office or cargo control room and in the
forecastle space.
• Where fitted, inspect the emergency towing arrangements fitted to the vessel and verify that the emergency
towing procedure (ETB) is aligned with the equipment provided.
• Inspect the physical condition of the emergency towing equipment and confirm that all visible and accessible
parts are functional with evidence of recent maintenance.
• Verify, by sampling, that the ancillary equipment listed in the emergency towing procedure (ETB) is present
in the correct location.

• Interview the accompanying officer to verify they understand how to deploy the emergency towing
equipment.

Expected Evidence

• Vessel specific emergency towing procedure (Emergency Towing Booklet - ETB).

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The emergency towing procedure (ETB) was not based on the existing arrangements and equipment fitted
on board.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the vessel specific emergency towing procedure (ETB).
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the emergency towing equipment fitted to the vessel.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the process of deploying the emergency towing equipment
fitted to the vessel.
• The emergency towing procedure (ETB) was not available on the bridge, in the ship’s office or cargo control
room and in the forecastle space.
• The emergency towing arrangements were defective in any respect.
• The ancillary equipment listed in the emergency towing procedure (ETB) was missing, in the wrong location
or defective in any way.
• The emergency towing equipment was not ready for immediate use in any respect.

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9.3. Mooring and Anchoring Procedures
9.3.1. Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company procedures for
anchoring operations, and were records available to confirm that recent anchoring
operations had been conducted in compliance with company expectations?
Short Question Text
Anchoring operations

Vessel Types
Oil, Chemical, LPG, LNG

ROVIQ Sequence
Bridge, Forecastle

Publications
OCIMF Anchoring Systems and Procedures 2010 edition
IACS Unified Requirements A: Requirements concerning Mooring
Anchoring and Towing
IACS: UR A3 Anchor Windlass Design and Testing
ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition
IMO: ISM Code
INTERTANKO: Anchoring Guidelines: A Risk-Based Approach v.3 June 2020

Objective

To ensure that anchoring operations are conducted within the limitations of the equipment fitted to the
vessel

Industry Guidance

Intertanko: Anchoring Guidelines: A Risk-Based Approach v.3 June 2020

Appendix 2

Planning of the anchoring operation

There are procedures for:

• Selection of anchoring position

• Planning including toolbox talk
• Methods of anchoring
• Equipment design limitations and characteristics
• Emergency anchoring
• Roles and responsibilities
• Requirements for risk assessments for anchoring
• Use of main engine (and thrusters if fitted)

Anchoring

There are procedures for:

• Anchoring in extreme depths (beyond 82.5 metres)

• Anchoring in deep waters
• Anchoring methods

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 • Protection of personnel and safe operation of equipment

At anchor

There are procedures for:

• Anchor watches, including actions to be taken when dragging or action to be taken when bad weather is
expected

Heaving up the anchor

There are procedures for:

• Emergency departure from an anchorage

• Heaving up anchor in extreme depth
• Protection of personnel and safe operation of equipment

ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.

2.4.10 Planning an anchorage

Checklist B12 Anchoring and Anchor Watch.

OCIMF: Anchoring Systems and Procedures 2010 edition

3.1.3 Limitations of the Anchoring System.

Typically, a windlass is required to heave in the weight of an anchor and chain from a depth of between 82.5 and
100m, depending upon individual Class requirements. The windlass is not designed to break out the anchor from the
seabed and may not be designed to lift chain lengths in excess of Class minimum requirements.

The weakest component in most anchoring systems is the windlass motor. The two main failure modes of motors are
associated with heaving when there is too much weight on the cable and walking out the cable with excessive way on
the vessel.

When attempting to recover anchors in extreme conditions, the windlass will heave until its pulling force is exceeded
by the tension in the chain. At this time, the windlass may start to render and such rendering may lead to damage to
the motor’s components. This could lead to catastrophic failure and the associated risk of personal injury.

5.1 Anchoring Procedures

It is recommended that the procedures used for anchoring operations are developed by shore and vessel
management using risk assessment methodology and that these are included within the SMS. As a minimum, the
procedures should:

• Include the use of checklists to ensure that all bridge and forecastle preparations are correctly made.
• Identify any precautions to be taken with a particular vessel and describe the distinctive features of the
equipment fitted.
• Prescribe the use of appropriate PPE by the anchor party.

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TMSA KPI 6A.2.2 requires that procedures address all aspects of anchoring operations likely to be undertaken by
fleet vessels. Procedures for anchoring operations have been developed, following risk assessments, which address:

• Selection of anchoring position.

• Methods of anchoring.
• Equipment design limitations and characteristics.
• Emergency anchoring.
• Anchor watches, including actions to be taken when dragging or at onset of bad weather.
• Emergency departure from an anchorage.

IMO: ISM Code

7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key
shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various
tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.

IACS Unified Requirements A: Requirements Concerning Mooring

IACS: UR A3 Anchor Windlass Design and Testing

Note

1. This UR is to be uniformly implemented by IACS Societies:

i) when an application for certification of an anchor windlass is dated on or after 1 July 2018; or

ii) installed in new ships for which the date of contract for construction is on or after 1 July 2018.

6. Marking

Windlass shall be permanently marked with the following information:

(a) Nominal size of chain (e.g. 100/3/45 means chain dia./grade/breaking load)

(b) Maximum anchorage depth, in metres.

Inspection Guidance

The vessel operator should have developed anchoring procedures and supporting checklists in alignment with

• TMSA KPI 6A.2.2 and its best practice guidance.

• OCIMF Anchoring Systems and Procedures First Edition 2010:
o 5.1 Anchoring Procedures.
o 5.1.1 General.
o 5.1.2 Preparations for anchoring.
o 5.1.3 Methods of anchoring.
o 5.1.4 Commonly used anchoring procedures.
o 5.2.1 Watchkeeping Responsibilities.
o 5.2.2 Securing the Cable at Anchor.

The procedures should provide specific guidance on the environmental limits for:

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 • Safe anchoring operations as determined by company risk assessment processes.
• Remaining at anchor.
• Recovering the anchor and proceeding to sea.

Suggested Inspector Actions

• Review the company procedures for anchoring operations.

• Verify that the anchoring procedures gave guidance relating to:
o The maximum depth of water for normal anchoring operations.
o The maximum recommended wind strength and wave height for anchoring.
o The weather conditions when the company requires the vessel to depart an anchorage.
o The required level of supervision for the anchoring party.
o The minimum composition of the anchoring party.
o The required checks on the windlass, anchors, stoppers and power systems prior to use.
• Review a recent anchoring operation to:
o Verify that the necessary appraisal and planning checklists were completed prior to the operation.
o Verify that checks on the windlass, anchor, stopper and power systems had been completed prior
to the operation.
o Verify that the weather conditions during the time at anchor were within the company guidelines for
remaining at anchor.
o Verify that the depth of water at the anchoring location was within the limits provided by the
company.

During the physical inspection:

• Inspect the windlass, anchors, chain and stoppers and verify that they were in satisfactory condition.
• Verify that the accompanying officer was familiar with the anchor brake adjustment setting and other checks
on equipment required to be completed prior to and after anchoring.
• Verify that the anchors were free to be used in an emergency – anchor chain not hard up against the
stopper bar when in port or at sea.
• Verify that, when the vessel was in port, the anchor lashings were removed unless specifically required to be
in place in accordance with terminal regulations.

Expected Evidence

• The company procedures for anchoring operations.

• Records and checklists for recent anchoring operations.
• Recent checklist and/or maintenance record to demonstrate that the windlass brake setting had been
checked.
• Bridge Log Book and bell book.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures with supporting checklists which covered the process of anchoring and
included:
o The selection of an anchorage taking into account the proximity and density of other vessels at
anchor, the quality of the seabed and the proximity of navigational dangers.
o The maximum depth of water permitted for normal anchoring operations.
o The required level of supervision of the anchoring party.
o The minimum composition of the anchoring party.
o The maximum environmental conditions permitted for anchoring.
o The environmental conditions at which the vessel would be expected to have departed an
anchorage.
o The checks required to be carried out for the anchoring equipment and power system prior to, and
upon completion of, anchoring operations.

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 • The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedures for anchoring operations.
• The vessel had anchored, or remained at anchor, with environmental conditions in excess of the limits
provided by the company.
• The vessel had anchored in a water depth that exceeded the limit set by the company.
• The maximum anchorage depth in metres was not either marked on the windlass or posted on the bridge.
• The checks required to be completed prior to and during anchoring operations had not been completed as
required.
• The anchoring systems (windlass, anchor, chain, stoppers, power system) were defective in any respect.
• The accompanying officer was unable to demonstrate how to verify that the windlass brake was correctly
adjusted.
• When in coastal waters and port the anchors were not free to use in an emergency – the chain was resting
against the stopper bar preventing it being lifted without the use of the windlass.

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9.4. Mooring and Anchoring Team Management
9.4.1. Were the Master, deck officers and deck ratings familiar with the company
procedure that defined mooring team supervision and composition for the various
mooring and anchoring operations likely to be undertaken, and was evidence available
that each mooring work space had been supervised and manned in accordance with
company expectations?
Short Question Text
Mooring team supervision and composition

Vessel Types
Oil, Chemical, LPG, LNG

ROVIQ Sequence
Documentation, Cargo Control Room, Mooring Decks

Publications
OCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)
IMO: STCW Code
OCIMF: Effective Mooring. Fourth Edition 2019
INTERTANKO: Anchoring Guidelines: A Risk-Based Approach v.3 June 2020
IMO: ISM Code

Objective

To ensure that mooring and anchoring operations are always properly supervised with enough personnel
assigned to conduct the operations safely and efficiently at each mooring or anchoring workspace.

Industry Guidance

OCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)

1.9 Mooring System Management Plan

1.9.2.5 Part E – Risk and change management, safety of personnel and human factors

E.3 Manning and Training

• Safe manning levels including minimum required by Class, Flag and/or the ship’s SMS.
• Manufacturer’s instructions and standard operating procedures.
• Outline competency requirements for undertaking mooring operations and operating mooring machinery
operator and/or industry).
• Induction, familiarisation and training requirements necessary before personnel undertake mooring
operations, including any ship-specific requirements and periodic refresher training.

E.5 Mooring operations plans and procedures

• Risk-based mooring operations plans and procedures should be detailed and include pre-arrival briefings,
ship/shore mooring arrangements, safety and occupational health issues and required crew resources.
• Contingency plans for mooring operations with appropriate control measures and operational procedures.
• Requirements for operations supervision at each mooring work space and overall control of mooring
operations (e.g. Master/Pilot) are to be detailed.
• Communications methods both primary and secondary should form a part of the operations plans.

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OCIMF: Effective Mooring. Fourth Edition 2019.

Chapter 2.5 Common risks and hazards (list not complete)

• Lack of communications and planning.

• No risk assessment before mooring operations.
• Not enough crew.
• Ineffective training on the hazards of the job.
• Inadequate information or unclear instructions.
• Poor supervision.

OCIMF Anchoring Systems and Procedures 2010 edition

5.1.2 Preparation for Anchoring

It is recommended that a certificated/licensed deck officer supervises anchoring operations and that only experienced
crew members are assigned to anchor work.

Intertanko: Anchoring Guidelines: A Risk-Based Approach v.3 June 2020

Appendix 3- Worked example on risk-based approach – Hazid technique

Description of Identified Hazards

– Inadequate supervision / communication

Possible Consequences

– Personnel injury, equipment damage

Control Measures to Protect: Personnel – Environment – Company – Asset from Harm

1. Anchoring operations shall be planned, co-ordinated and supervised by the Master.

2. A responsible and qualified Officer should be in charge of the anchor party.
3. Efficient communication between the Bridge and the anchoring team should be tested before the operation
and a backup system (i.e. availability of a second UHF, talk-back system) should be ensured.
Communications procedures should be familiar to all personnel that will participate in the task (Working
channels and reporting methods).

TMSA KPI 6A.3.1 requires that procedures identify requirements for personnel involved in mooring operations. The
requirements may include:

• Designated person in charge at each location.

• Minimum numbers of people required at each station.
• Toolbox talk prior to mooring operations.
• Minimum training and experience requirements.
• Supervision of third-party personnel.

IMO: ISM Code

6.2 The Company should ensure that each ship is:

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 1. manned with qualified, certificated and medically fit seafarers in accordance with national and international
requirements; and
2. appropriately manned in order to encompass all aspects of maintaining safe operations on board.

IMO: STCW Code

Table A-II/1 – Specification of minimum standards of competence for officers in charge of a navigational watch on
ships of 500 gross tonnage or more.

• Function - Navigation at the operational level

• Competence - Manoeuvre the ship
• Knowledge, understanding and proficiency - Ship manoeuvring and handling - .5 proper procedures for
anchoring and mooring.

• Function - Controlling the operation of the ship and care for persons on board at operational level.
• Competence - Application of teamworking and leadership skills
• Knowledge, understanding and proficiency - Knowledge and ability to apply effective resource management.

Table A-II/5 – Specification of minimum standards of competence of ratings as able seafarer deck

• Function - Navigation at the support level

• Competence - Contribute to berthing, anchoring and other mooring operations
• Knowledge, understanding and proficiency - Working knowledge of the mooring system and related
procedures…

Inspection Guidance

The vessel operator should have developed procedures aligned with the Mooring System Management Plan (MSMP)
which described:

• The onboard roles permitted to supervise mooring and anchoring teams.

• Where the identified supervisor was not a licenced officer, the additional training and competency
evaluations that an individual must have undertaken prior to undertaking a supervisory role.
• The minimum number of ratings that must form part of the mooring team(s) for the various types of mooring
and anchoring activities expected to be conducted onboard the vessel.
• The roles and responsibilities of the mooring and anchoring team members.
• How the mooring team will be informed of expectations around the mooring or anchoring operation, for
example, though the use of toolbox talks or risk assessment review.

Suggested Inspector Actions

• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which defined the supervision and composition
of mooring and anchoring teams.
• Review the sections of MSMP relating to Manning and Training, and Mooring Operations Plans and
Procedures and verify that they had been developed to include detail of the mooring team composition and
workspace supervisor.
• Where the company procedure required the review of a risk assessment prior to a mooring or anchoring
operation, review the risk assessment for a recent operation and verify that it reflected the operation
undertaken.

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 • Interview one deck officer and one rating involved in mooring operations to understand who supervised
mooring and anchoring operations during recent operations and whether there was a clear understanding of
the company expectations around mooring team composition, supervision and toolbox talks prior to each
operation.

• While conducting the review of hours of rest records, consider the required mooring and anchoring team
composition and verify that vessel records gave an accurate representation of the vessel complement
involvement in mooring and anchoring operations.

Expected Evidence

• The company procedure which defined the mooring and anchoring team composition and workspace
supervision expectations.
• The hours of rest records for the previous full month.
• The vessel’s Mooring System Management Plan sections:
o Manning and Training – Safe manning levels required by the ship’s SMS,
o Mooring Operations Plans and Procedures - Requirements for operations supervision at each
mooring workspace.
• Where an unlicenced crewmember was nominated as an acceptable mooring or anchoring workspace
supervisor, the records of the training courses and competency assessment required by the relevant
sections of the MSMP.
• Where required to be reviewed prior to an operation by company procedures, the risk assessments for
recent mooring and anchoring operations.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• MSMP sections, relating to Manning and Training and Mooring Operations Plans and Procedures, had not
been developed to specify the mooring or anchoring team composition or identified the required level of
supervision at each mooring workspace.
• The accompanying deck officer was unable to identify the company procedure defining who should
supervise each mooring and anchoring workspace and the minimum workspace composition when
requested to do so.
• An interviewed deck officer or rating involved in mooring operations was unfamiliar with the company
expectations with regards to mooring or anchoring team composition or workspace supervision.
• Review of hours of rest or other records determined that the company expectations relating to mooring or
anchoring team composition or supervision had not been complied with.
• Where an unlicenced crew member was permitted to supervise an anchoring or mooring workstation there
was no evidence that they had completed the training courses or the competency assessment as required
by the company for fulfilling the role.

• Where the company procedure permitted an unlicenced crewmember to supervise a mooring or anchoring
workspace enter a comment in the Process response tool and describe the circumstances in which this was
permitted.

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9.4.2. Were the deck officers and ratings involved with mooring operations familiar with
the safe operation of the mooring winches and the dangers of working with and around
mooring lines during mooring operations and while under tension?
Short Question Text
Dangers of working with and around mooring lines

Vessel Types
Oil, Chemical, LPG, LNG

ROVIQ Sequence
Cargo Control Room, Mooring Decks

Publications
IMO: ISM Code
OCIMF: Effective Mooring. Fourth Edition 2019

Objective

To ensure that vessel personnel are aware of the dangers of working with mooring equipment and near lines
under tension.

Industry Guidance:

OCIMF: Effective Mooring. Fourth Edition 2019.

Section two- General mooring safety practices.

Section three- Mooring lines

3.5 Stoppers for wires not mounted on winch drums

3.6 Stoppers for synthetic fibre mooring lines

3.7 Snap-back.

Section four- Mooring winches

4.7 Winch safety reminders.

TMSA KPI 6A.1.1 requires that procedures for mooring and anchoring operations are in place for all vessel types
within the fleet which include:

• Roles and responsibilities.

• Planning including toolbox talk.
• Requirements for risk assessments.
• Mooring arrangement and layout.

IMO: ISM Code

7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key
shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various
tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.

Inspection Guidance

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The vessel operator should have developed mooring procedures which include:

• The role of the supervisor and their responsibilities.

• The role of the supporting ratings and their responsibilities.
• The hand signals that should be used during mooring operations.
• The requirement for a toolbox talk or risk assessment review prior to commencing mooring operations.
• The areas that should be considered as hazardous due to potential snap-back from parted mooring lines.
• The safety features of a mooring winch that must be tested prior to use and be consistently used during
winch operation.
• Where stoppers are to be used, the correct type and application for the lines in use.

Procedures may reference industry guidance such as OCIMF: Effective Mooring.

Suggested Inspector Actions

• Sight, and where necessary review, the mooring procedure which included operational safety during
mooring operations and in areas where mooring lines were under tension.

During the physical inspection verify that:

• The winch drums were out of gear and pins were available to lock the clutch in position while engaged and
disengaged.
• The mooring winch control levers were free to move and returned to the neutral position when released.
• The mooring winch control levers were clearly marked with the direction of heave and slack.
• That there was no evidence that the mooring winch controls had been tied or secured to permit unmanned
operation.
• The winch controls were mounted to give the operator a clear sight of the operational working area and
other mooring team members.
• The working platforms around the winches gave uninterrupted safe access to mooring drums and winch
controls.
• The winch controls were sited to make sure that the operator was not at risk from moving parts.
• Stoppers in use were appropriate for the types of mooring line in service and were of sufficient strength.
• Warning signs and barriers were in place to warn personnel of the dangers posed by mooring operations
and mooring lines under tension.

• Interview one deck officer and one rating who had been involved in mooring operations to establish how
they had been informed of the dangers of snap-back and how to keep safe during mooring operations.

Expected Evidence

• The company mooring procedure which defined operational safety during mooring operations or in areas
where mooring lines were under tension.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no company procedure which included the considerations for operational safety during mooring
operations or in areas where mooring lines were under tension.
• A deck officer or rating involved in mooring operations was unfamiliar with the company mooring procedure
which defined the considerations for operational safety during mooring operations and in areas where there
were mooring lines under tension.
• A deck officer or rating involved in mooring operations was unfamiliar with the danger of snap-back and how
this was communicated onboard the vessel prior to and after mooring operations.

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 • Interviews with deck officers or ratings involved in mooring operations indicated that toolbox talks were not
taking place prior to each mooring operation.
• Ship’s personnel or visitors were observed stepping over lines under tension when there was a route which
avoided the need to do so.
• There were no warning signs or barriers to prevent personnel from approaching a mooring line under
tension.
• The mooring drums were left in gear while the drum was in active mooring service with the brake applied.
• The safety locking pins for the winch drum clutch mechanisms were missing or not used.
• The mooring winch control levers were stiff and did not return to the neutral position when released.
• The mooring winch controls were not clearly marked with the direction of heave and slack.
• There was evidence that mooring winch controls had been fastened in the heave or slack position at some
point in the past.
• The winch control and drum access platforms were damaged, uneven or had missing plates.

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9.5. STS Operation Management
9.5.1. Were the appropriate industry checklists used during STS operations, and were
comprehensive records of these operations maintained?
Short Question Text
STS operations checklists

Vessel Types
Oil, Chemical, LPG, LNG

ROVIQ Sequence
Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Mooring Decks

Publications
OCIMF: Ship to Ship Transfer Guide for Petroleum
Chemicals and Liquefied Gases. First Edition.
IMO: ISM Code

Objective

To ensure that all stages of an STS operation are conducted in accordance with industry best practice
guidance.

Industry Guidance

OCIMF: Ship to Ship Transfer Guide for Petroleum, Chemicals and Liquefied Gases. First Edition. *

"At sea" Indicates offshore waters or partially sheltered waters where transfers may be undertaken between vessels
underway or at anchor.

"In Port" Used to indicate where STS operations are conducted under the jurisdiction of a port or harbour authority
and includes operations that may involve berthing alongside a Discharging ship or Mother ship at anchor or alongside
a terminal.

3.4 Use of checklists

Checklists are an important risk management tool aimed at ensuring that operations are conducted in a safe manner.
They are essential reminders of the principal safety factors to be considered, but they should be supplemented by
continuous vigilance throughout the whole operation.

It should be noted that the checklists have been developed to specifically address factors that are relevant to the STS
operation and the questions are supplementary to those contained in standard pre-transfer checklists, such as the
International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals (ISGOTT) Ship/Shore Safety Checklist.

Appendix E: Operational/safety checklists

• At sea ship to ship operations:

o Checklist 1 - Pre-fixture information (for each ship)
o Checklist 2 - Before operations commence
o Checklist 3 - Before run-in and mooring
o Checklist 4 - Before cargo transfer
o Checklist 5 - Before unmooring
• In port STS operations:
o Checklist 6 – An example of a Pre-transfer checklist
o Checklist 6A – An example of Checks during transfer

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Appendix G: Example checklist for transfers involving vapour balancing

Appendix L: Example liquefied natural gas ship to ship transfer compatibility questionnaire

* a joint publication by OCIMF, CDI, ICS & SIGTTO.

TMSA KPI 6A.2.1 requires that detailed procedures address each different type of mooring operation likely to be
undertaken by fleet vessels.

Procedures have been developed following risk assessments for each type of mooring operation which may include:

• STS operations (including reverse STS).

IMO: ISM Code

7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key
shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various
tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.

Inspection Guidance

The vessel operator should have developed procedures to requiring:

• Checklists identified by the OCIMF* STS Transfer Guide for “at sea” or “in port” cargo specific operations
are completed before, during and after each relevant STS operation and, as required by an individual
checklist.
• Checklists are retained onboard along with other STS related records applicable to the type of STS
operation, which may include;
o The JPO (Joint Plan of Operations) as provided by the service provider.
o Risk assessment as submitted by the Service Provider.
o Detailed Mooring Plan of participating vessels.
o Copies of certificates of fenders and hoses.
o Notification to coastal authorities.
o Details of Drills associated with the specific STS Operation.
o Records of Crew Experience.
o Post operation feedback/ assessment by the Master.

Suggested Inspector Actions

• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which required the vessel to use the checklists
identified by the OCIMF* STS Transfer Guide.
• Where the vessel was involved in an STS operation, review the STS checklists completed during the
operation thus far and verify that the correct checklists, including a standard pre-transfer checklist, had been
utilised and that they had been completed appropriately.
• Where the vessel had conducted STS operations during the previous twelve months, select the records for
an STS operation at random and verify that the following records were available as applicable to the
operation:
o The JPO (Joint Plan of operations) as provided by the service provider,
o Risk assessment as submitted by the Service Provider,
o Detailed Mooring Plan of participating vessels.
o Copies of certificates of fenders and hoses,
o Notification to coastal authorities,
o Details of Drills associated with the specific STS Operation,
o Records of Crew Experience,
o Post operation feedback/ assessment by the Master.

Expected Evidence

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 • The company procedure which required the vessel to use the checklists identified by the OCIMF* STS
Transfer Guide.
• The company procedure which required the retention of STS checklists and records.
• Where the vessel was undertaking an STS operation at the time of the inspection, the STS checklists,
standard pre-transfer checklist and, vapour balancing checklist where this was taking place.
• The records for STS operations completed during the previous twelve months or, where numerous
operations had been undertaken, records for the previous six operations.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no company procedure which required the vessel to use the checklists identified by the OCIMF*
STS Transfer Guide.
• There was no company procedure which required that comprehensive STS records were maintained
onboard.
• The accompanying deck officer was not familiar with the company procedure for the use of checklists during
STS operations.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedure for the retention of records relating
to STS operations.
• Review of checklists in use at the time of the inspection or from past STS operations indicated that the
wrong STS checklists were used i.e. “at sea” checklists were used for “in port” operations or vice-versa.
• Individual STS checklists were either not used or missing.
• Review of individual STS checklists identified that items had been checked off, but the required evidence
was missing.
• Standard pre-transfer checklists had not been used to supplement the STS checklists.
• Where vapour balancing had been conducted there was no vapour balancing checklist used.
• Physical inspection of the vessel during an STS operation determined that checks required by the STS
checklists had not been accomplished.
• Repetitive checks required by the STS checklists had not been completed.
• Review of records for past STS operations identified that checklists or required records were missing.
• Review of completed “in port” pre -transfer STS checklists indicated that the confirmation of checks and
signatures required from the second vessel, and the terminal where applicable, involved in the STS
operation had not been completed.

Where the ship had never been involved in an STS operation as described by the OCIMF joint industry publication
and there was no future intention to do so, select “Not Answerable” in each of the response tools then select "Not
Applicable - as instructed by question guidance".

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9.5.2. Where the vessel was involved in an “at sea” STS operation, was an accurate Joint
Plan of Operation available onboard, were the Master and deck officers familiar with its
content, and were operations being conducted in accordance with its requirements?
Short Question Text
STS Joint Plan of Operation (JPO)

Vessel Types
Oil, Chemical, LPG, LNG

ROVIQ Sequence
Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Interview - Deck Officer, Interview - Deck Rating, Documentation

Publications
OCIMF: Ship to Ship Transfer Guide for Petroleum
Chemicals and Liquefied Gases. First Edition.
IMO: ISM Code

Objective

To ensure that each “at sea” ship to ship (STS) operations is planned and executed taking into consideration
the operational and environmental requirements for the specific transfer location, vessels and cargo transfer
operations involved.

Industry Guidance

OCIMF*: Ship to Ship Transfer Guide for Petroleum, Chemicals and Liquefied Gases. First Edition.

"At sea" indicates offshore waters or partially sheltered waters where transfers may be undertaken between vessels
underway or at anchor.

"Joint plan of operation (JPO)" An operation-specific plan that includes, as appropriate, reference to ship
compatibility, manoeuvring, approach, mooring and transfer and, if applicable, references the ship-specific STS
operations plans.

3.10.4 Electrical isolation

It is necessary to ensure that electrical isolation in maintained between the ships involved in STS operations during
transfer line connection/disconnection and cargo transfer operations. This is to reduce the risk of high energy sparks
being produced due to the electrical potential difference between the hulls.

To eliminate the potential for incendive arcing between the two ships, when presenting the hose string for connection
one of the following arrangements should be used:

• A single insulating flange fitted at the manifold of one ship or within each hose string and all hoses in the
string electrically continuous; or
• A single length of electrically discontinuous hose fitted in each hose string; or
• Hoses that are specially constructed to prevent static build up and limit electrical conductance to an
inherently safe level.

5.2 Joint Plan of Operation

Prior to commencement of any STS operation a Joint Plan of Operation (JPO) should be developed to ensure that all
parties involved, including the STS service provider, are in alignment with regard to how the operation is to be
conducted.

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In all cases the person in overall advisory control (POAC), STS Superintendent or transfer organizer should establish
agreement and consensus between all parties.

The JPO should include a compilation of information from various sources.

For a particular location, a generic template may be used. Information may include the following:

• Details regarding rendezvous location and designated lightering area, including relevant risk assessment(s).
• Brief description regarding how the STS operation will be conducted, for example approach and mooring
underway or with one vessel at anchor, transfer at anchor or underway, unmooring with one vessel at
anchor or while underway.
• Details regarding any local or government regulatory requirements and mandatory notifications.
• Communication protocols.
• Security requirements.
• Procedures associated with any personnel transfers.
• Details regarding any service craft and launches.
• Environmental operating parameters/limits for each stage of the STS operation. These should include
environmental and operational limits that would trigger suspension of the transfer operation and
disconnection and unmooring of the vessels.
• Fender configuration and rigging arrangements.
• Mooring plans and arrangements and sequence of running lines, including use of any specialist mooring
equipment.
• Details of transfer and associated equipment, including the number, type and dimensions of cargo (and
where applicable vapour) hoses and method of rigging/support.
• Maximum and minimum draught and freeboard anticipated during operations, including details of the stage
of operations they relate to.
• Emergency and spill containment procedures.
• Sequence of actions in case of spillage of cargo.
• Co-ordination of plans for cargo hose connection, draining, purging and disconnection, as appropriate.
• Detailed unmooring sequence.
• For double banking operations, the suitability of the berth and strength of mooring points should be
confirmed.

In addition, the JPO should include details of the cargo transfer plan(s) or make reference to their content.

OCIMF* a joint publication by OCIMF, CDI, ICS & SIGTTO.

TMSA KPI 6A.2.1 requires that detailed procedures address each different type of mooring operation likely to be
undertaken by fleet vessels.

Procedures have been developed following risk assessments for each type of mooring operation which may include:

• STS operations (including reverse STS).

IMO: ISM Code

7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key
shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various
tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.

Inspection Guidance

The vessel operator should have developed procedures which required that a JPO is developed, available onboard
and reviewed by vessel staff prior to an STS operation commencing.

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Suggested Inspector Actions

• Review the Joint Plan of Operations for the STS operation and verify that:
o The plan contained all information required by the OCIMF* guidance.
o The risk assessment(s) had been developed to address the risks of the specific location and type of
STS operation being undertaken.
o The means for eliminating the potential for incendive sparking between the two ships had been
addressed.
o There was evidence that any mandatory notifications to comply with local or government
requirements had been made.
o That the vessel had been moored in accordance with the agreed mooring plan.
o That the vessel was complying with any environmental operating parameters.
o The unmooring sequence was documented.

• Interview one deck officer and one deck rating to gauge their level of understanding of the Joint Plan of
Operation for the STS operation being undertaken.

Expected Evidence

• The company procedures which required the development of a Joint Plan of Operation for every STS
operation.
• The vessel’s STS Operations Plan.
• The Joint Plan of Operation for the STS operation, developed by the STS service provider, the STS
organiser, the STS Superintendent or the Person in overall advisory control (POAC) depending on the
circumstances of the operation.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There was no procedure which required that a Joint Plan of Operation (JPO) was developed for every STS
operation.
• The vessel did not have onboard a JPO which reflected the specific STS operation being undertaken.
• The JPO did not include all information required by the OCIMF* STS Guide relevant to the operation being
undertaken.
• The accompanying deck officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure which required a JPO to be
developed for every STS operation.
• The accompanying deck officer was unfamiliar with the content of the JPO.
• An interviewed deck officer or deck rating had not been briefed regarding the content of the JPO prior to the
commencement of the STS operation.
• The risk assessment contained in the JPO did not reflect the location or type of STS operation that was
being undertaken.
• The JPO did not address the measures in place to eliminate the potential for incendive arcing between the
two vessels.
• The measures to eliminate incendive arcing identified within the JPO had not been implemented.
• There was no evidence that the mandatory notifications to comply with local or government regulations had
been made.
• The vessel was not moored in accordance with the JPO.
• The vessel had continued the STS operation or cargo transfer operations despite the environmental
operating parameters being exceeded.

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9.5.3. Were the Master, officers and deck ratings familiar with the vessel’s STS
Operations Plan?
Short Question Text
STS Operations Plan

Vessel Types
Oil, Chemical, LPG, LNG

ROVIQ Sequence
Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Main Deck, Engine Control Room

Publications
IMO: MARPOL
OCIMF: Ship to Ship Transfer Guide for Petroleum
Chemicals and Liquefied Gases. First Edition.
IMO: ISM Code

Objective

To ensure that ship to ship (STS) mooring & cargo operations are always planned and conducted in a
consistent manner.

Industry Guidance

OCIMF*: Ship to Ship Transfer Guide for Petroleum, Chemicals and Liquefied Gases. First Edition.

1.1 Introduction

The requirements of MARPOL Annex I, chapter 8, The Prevention of Pollution During Transfer of Oil Cargo Between
Oil Tankers at Sea, should be adhered to for all applicable operations involving oil cargoes.

The requirement for vessels to be provided with an STS operations plan should be considered for adoption by
vessels involved in the STS transfer of other cargoes as recommended best practice.

7.2 Responsibility for cargo operations

Where applicable, a copy of the ship’s approved STS operations plan should also be available on the bridge, CCR
and ECR.

OCIMF* a joint publication by OCIMF, CDI, ICS & SIGTTO.

TMSA KPI 6A.2.1 requires that detailed procedures address each different type of mooring operation likely to be
undertaken by fleet vessels.

Procedures have been developed following risk assessments for each type of mooring operation which may include:

• STS operations (including reverse STS).

IMO: ISM Code

7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key
shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various
tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.

IMO: MARPOL

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Annex 1

Chapter 8 – Prevention of pollution during transfer of oil cargo between tankers at sea.

Regulation 40

1. the regulation contained in this chapter apply to oil tankers of 150 gross tonnage and above engaged in the
transfer of oil cargo between oil tankers at sea (STS operations).
2. the regulations contained in this chapter shall not apply to oil transfer operations associated with FPSOs
used for the offshore production and storage of oil and FSUs used for the offshore storage of produced oil.
3. the regulations in this chapter shall not apply to bunkering operations.

Inspection Guidance

The vessel Operator should have developed an STS Operations Plan as follows:

• For vessels involved in transfer of MARPOL Annex 1 cargo – Administration approved.

• For vessels involved in transfers of all other liquid cargoes – As recommended best practice.

Copies should be available in the following locations:

• Bridge.
• Cargo transfer control station.
• Engine Room.

And should contain the following information:

• A step-by-step description of the entire STS operation.

• A description of the mooring and unmooring procedures and arrangements, including diagrams where
necessary, and procedures for tending the oil tankers’ moorings during the transfer of cargo.
• A description of the cargo and ballast transfer procedures, including those used while underway or anchored
and procedures for connecting and testing the integrity of cargo hoses and hose to manifold interface,
topping off cargo tanks and disconnecting cargo hoses.
• The titles, locations and duties of all persons involved in the STS operation.
• Procedures for operating the emergency shutdown and communication systems and for rapid breakaway.
• A description of the drip trays and procedures for emptying them.
• Procedures for reporting spillages of oil into the water.
• An approved contingency plan.
• A cargo and ballast plan.

The Master should ensure that the STS Operations Plan on board is current and should require all personnel on
board to follow the procedures in the plan.

Suggested Inspector Actions

• Review the STS Operations Plan and verify that:

o A copy of the STS Operations Plan is located on the bridge, in the cargo transfer station and in the
Engine room.
o Where the vessel carries MARPOL Annex 1 cargo, the STS Operations plan has been approved by
the administration.
o Where the vessel did not carry MARPOL Annex 1 cargo, the STS Operations Plan was developed
in alignment with Annex A of the OCIMF* Ship to Ship Transfer Guide.
o Where the vessel was involved in an STS operation, that the STS Operations Plan had been
updated with:
 The mooring plan for the current operation.

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  The cargo plan for the current operation.

• Where the vessel was involved in an STS operation during the inspection or had conducted an STS
operation within the previous two months, interview one rating and gauge their familiarity with the location
and content of the STS Operations Plan.

Expected Evidence

• The vessel’s STS Operations Plan.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• The vessel did not have an STS Operations Plan. (irrespective of whether the vessel had been involved in
STS operations.)
• Where the vessel had been involved in the STS transfer of Annex 1 cargo the STS plan had not been
approved by the vessel’s Administration. (except where specifically exempted by MARPOL Annex 1
Regulation 40)
• Where the vessel was not involved in the carriage of Annex 1 cargo, the content of the STS Operations Plan
was not in alignment with Annex A of the OCIMF Ship to Ship Transfer Guide.
• The onboard STS Operations Plan were found to be outdated or incomplete.
• One or more copies of the STS Operations Plan was missing from the following locations; bridge, cargo
transfer control station or engine room.
• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the location and content of the STS Operations Plan.
• An interviewed deck rating who was onboard during a recent STS operation was unfamiliar with the location
and content of the STS Operations Plan.

Where the ship had never been involved in an STS operation as described by the OCIMF joint industry publication
and there was no future intention to do so, select “Not Answerable” in the Process and Human response tools then
select "Not Applicable - as instructed by question guidance".

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9.6. Single Point Mooring
9.6.1. Were the vapour collection system manifold arrangements suitable for hose
handling at buoy moorings?
Short Question Text
Vapour hose securing arrangement for buoy moorings.

Vessel Types
Oil

ROVIQ Sequence
Cargo Manifold

Publications
OCIMF/CDI: Recommendations for Oil and Chemical Tanker Manifolds and Associated Equipment

Objective

To ensure that vapour collection system manifolds are suitably designed and equipped to facilitate hose
handling at buoy moorings.

Industry Guidance

OCIMF/CDI: Recommendations for Oil and Chemical Tanker Manifolds and Associated Equipment

Section five

Hose support at ship’s side

A means of adequately supporting hoses in way of the ship’s side abreast of the manifolds should be provided.

Section nine

Deck fittings to facilitate hose handling at buoy moorings

Vessels likely to conduct operations at buoy moorings (SPM, CBM and tandem berthing) should follow the guidance
in this section, which is on the design of deck fittings in way of the manifold for use when hoisting and hanging-off
hoses.

Details of all deck fittings in way of the manifold should be included in the vessel’s mooring arrangement plan.

TMSA KPI 6A.2.1 requires that detailed procedures address each different type of mooring operation likely to be
undertaken by fleet vessels.

Procedures have been developed following risk assessments for each type of mooring operation, which may include:

• Conventional buoy mooring, Single Point Moorings.

• Tandem mooring to F(P)SO.

IMO: ISM Code

10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the
provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the
Company.

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Inspection Guidance

For vapour collection system manifolds on vessels likely to conduct operations at buoy moorings (SPM, CBM and
tandem berthing):

• The vapour manifolds should be supported to the same strength as the cargo manifolds.
• The hose rails should be of the same strength and construction throughout their length, extend beyond the
vapour manifolds to permit use at buoy moorings and be fitted with stopper plates at both the forward and aft
ends of the hose rails.
• A closed chock should be fitted at the ship's side in line with the vapour manifolds.
• A cruciform bollard should be fitted in line, or nearly in line with the vapour manifolds to allow securing of the
vapour hose hang-off chain.
• Two deck pad-eyes of a size sufficient to secure a 16-inch floating hose should be provided, one to either
side of the line from the closed chocks to the vapour manifolds.
• Fittings for securing the vapour hose should be permanently marked with their safe working load (SWL).
• Means to thoroughly drain the vapour manifold should be provided at the lowest point in the vapour
collection system line to avoid risk of liquid carry-over into the floating hose.

Suggested Inspector Actions

• Inspect the vapour collection system manifolds and verify that the required fittings are in place.

Expected Evidence

• The vessel’s mooring arrangement plan.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

For a vapour return system manifold (VRSM) which was designed for use at single buoy moorings:

• The vapour manifolds were not supported to the same strength as the cargo manifolds.
• Hose rails did not extend beyond the vapour manifolds.
• Hose rails serving the vapour manifolds were not:
o Of the same strength and construction throughout their length.
o Fitted with stopper plates at both the forward and aft ends of the hose rails.
• The vapour manifolds were not fitted with the necessary:
o Closed chocks.
o Cruciform bollards.
o Deck pad-eyes.
• The fittings for securing the vapour hose were not permanently marked with their safe working load (SWL).
• There were no means to drain the vapour manifold to avoid risk of liquid carry-over into the floating hose.

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9.6.2. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for mooring at
an SPM or F(P)SO and were the fittings required accurately described in the HVPQ?
Short Question Text
SPM mooring arrangements.

Vessel Types
Oil, Chemical, LPG, LNG

ROVIQ Sequence
Forecastle, Documentation

Publications
OCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations
IMO: ISM Code

Objective

To ensure the vessel is appropriately equipped and will be able to safely moor to an SPM or F(P)SO terminal.

Industry Guidance

OCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations. First Edition 2018.

5.3.2 Bow mooring equipment overview

OCIMF has published recommendations for conventional tanker bow mooring equipment in a range of earlier
publications and the current recommendations are repeated in this section…

…Conventional tankers that are likely to trade to F(P)SOs and SPM buoys should be equipped with bow chain
stopper s designed to accept 76mm chafe chain in accordance with figure 5.2.

Technical operators of conventional tankers that are expected to trade to F(P)SOs or SPM buoy terminals are
recommended to fit bow chain stoppers in accordance with table 5.1

5.3.3 Bow chain stoppers

Bow chain stoppers, foundations and supporting structure should be adequate for the expected loads. The tanker
should hold a copy of the manufacturer’s type approval certificate for the bow chain stoppers. The certificate should
confirm that the bow chain stoppers are constructed in strict compliance with a recognised standard that specifies
SWL, yield strength and safety factors. The tanker should also hold a certificate confirming the strength of the bow
chain stopper foundations and supporting structure, substantiated by detailed engineering analysis or calculations
and an inspection of the structure. An independent authority, such as a Classification Society, should issue both
certificates. Bow chain stoppers, foundations and supporting structures should be kept in good order and surveyed at
least once every five years. Bow chain stoppers should be permanently marked with the SWL and appropriate serial
numbers, so that the certificates can be easily cross-referenced.

Bow chain stopper manufacturers should provide basic operating, maintenance and inspection instructions, which
should be followed without modification. For example, wedges should not be used between the pin and tongue of
bow chain stoppers. Where appropriate, manufacturers should also provide guidance on maximum component wear
limits.

SMIT type towing bracket fittings should not be used as bow chain stoppers.

5.3.4 Bow fairleads

Bow fairleads should be of at least equivalent SWL to the bow chain stoppers.

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Bow fairleads, foundations and supporting structure should be adequate for the expected loads. The tanker should
hold a copy of the manufacturer’s type approval certificate for the bow fairleads confirming the bow fairleads are
constructed in strict compliance with a recognised standard that specifies SWL and safety factor. The tanker should
also hold a certificate confirming the strength of the bow fairlead foundations and associated supporting structure,
substantiated by detailed engineering analysis or calculations and an inspection of the structure. An independent
authority, such as a Classification Society, should issue both certificates. Bow fairleads, foundations and supporting
structure should be kept in good order and surveyed at least once every five years.

5.3.5 Position of winch stowage drums and possible pedestal rollers

There should be no obstructions or fittings (e.g. a hatch with securing dogs) close to the route of the pick-up line or
chain, to ensure that if the line is allowed to run free during letting go, it is unlikely to snag on any such structure.

On all conventional tankers, winch stowage drums used to stow the pick-up line should be capable of lifting at least
15 tonnes and be of sufficient size to accommodate 150m of 80mm diameter rope. Using winch warping drums to
handle pick-up lines is considered unsafe and should be avoided. This is because the combined weight of the pick-up
line and buoys can lead to the line slipping and jerking on the drum end if not effectively handled.

TMSA KPI 6a.2.1 requires that detailed procedures address each different type of mooring operation likely to be
undertaken by fleet vessels.

Procedures have been developed following risk assessments for each type of mooring operation, which may include:

• SPMs
• Tandem mooring to Floating, (Production), Storage and Offloading (F(P)SO).

IMO: ISM Code

7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key
shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various
tasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.

Inspection Guidance

The vessel operator should have developed procedures for mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals that included:

• Preparations for mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals.

• Instructions for safe mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals.
• Inspection and maintenance of the bow stoppers.

The vessel operator should have confirmed via the HVPQ 10.6 whether the ship meets the latest OCIMF
recommendations for equipment employed in the bow mooring of conventional tankers at single point moorings, and
supplied the following details:

• Single Point Mooring (SPM) Equipment

o Details of the bow chain stoppers.
o Details of the closed bow fairleads.
o Distance between bow fairleads.
o Distance between the bow fairlead and the bow stopper.
o Distance from the bow stopper to the roller lead or winch drum.
o The lead from the bow stopper to the winch drum.
o The capacity of the winch drum.
• Bow Mooring Arrangement Diagram.

This question will only be assigned to vessels where HVPQ question 10.6.2 (are bow chain stoppers fitted) is
answered affirmatively.

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Suggested Inspector Actions

• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals.
• Sight, and where necessary review, the certificates for the bow stoppers and closed bow fairleads,
particularly if these have been modified or retro-fitted.
• Sight, and where necessary review, the records of inspection and maintenance of the bow stoppers
• Inspect the arrangements at the bow for mooring to an SPM or F(P)SO terminal.
• During the inspection verify, as far as practicable, that the HVPQ accurately describes the arrangements for
mooring at an SPM or F(P)SO terminal.

• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for mooring at
SPM or F(P)SO terminals.

Expected Evidence

• The company procedures for mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals.

• Mooring arrangement plan(s).
• Certificates, issued by an independent authority, such as a Classification Society, for the:
o Bow stopper(s) and/or foundations and supporting structure.
o Closed bow fairlead(s) and/or foundations and supporting structure.
• Records of inspection and maintenance of the bow stoppers, which may form part of the maintenance plan.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures for mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals that included:
o Guidance on preparations for mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals.
o Instructions for safe mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals.
o Inspection and maintenance instructions for the bow stopper(s).
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for mooring at SPM or F(P)SO
terminals, as they related to their duties.
• The actual physical arrangements for mooring at an SPM or F(P)SO terminal were not as described in the
HVPQ - provide details.
• There was no certificate, issued by an independent authority, such as a Classification Society, available for
the:
o Bow stopper(s) and/or foundations and supporting structure.
o Closed bow fairlead(s) and/or foundations and supporting structure.
• The bow stopper(s) was not permanently marked with the SWL and appropriate serial number.
• The SWL of the closed bow fairlead(s) was less than the SWL of the bow stopper(s).
• There were no records of inspection and maintenance of the bow stopper(s).
• There was an obstruction or fitting (e.g. a hatch with securing dogs) close to the route of the pick-up line or
chain.
• At the SPM or FS(P)O terminal where the inspection took place:
o The winch stowage drum was not of sufficient size to accommodate the pick-up line.
o The winch warping drum had been used to handle the pick-up line.
o Wedges had been used between the pin and tongue of the bow chain stopper(s).
o A Smit type towing bracket had been used as a bow chain stopper.
• A bow stopper(s), roller lead(s) or closed bow fairlead(s) was defective in any respect.

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9.7. Shuttle Tanker Mooring Systems
9.7.1. Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the
operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the bow mooring system for offshore
terminals, and was the equipment in satisfactory condition?
Short Question Text
Shuttle tanker bow mooring system

Vessel Types
Oil

ROVIQ Sequence
Forecastle

Publications
IMO: ISM Code
Norwegian Oil and Gas recommended guidelines for offshore loading shuttle tankers Guideline No. 140
OCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations

Objective

To ensure the bow mooring system is regularly inspected, tested, and maintained, and operated safely.

Industry Guidance

OCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations

5.4.1 Bow mooring equipment overview

A typical mooring system for bow loading tankers consists of the following:

• Hydraulic power-pack.
• Traction winch.
• Stowage drum, fitted with guide rollers, for messenger line and pick-up line (may be a rope bin).
• Chain stopper (for securing the chafe chain), with on-load releasable pawl.
• Chain stopper load cell (for sensing hawser loads).
• Bow fairlead (for the mooring hawser).
• Indicators for hawser load and hydraulic oil pressure at the cargo control station.
• Maintenance crane.

The principal mooring equipment on the bow loading tanker consists of the chain stopper, (which typically has an
SWL of between 250 and 500 tonnes depending on yield factor used), and the traction winch. The traction winch may
be used not only for retrieving the mooring but also to haul the cargo hose into close proximity to the coupler. For
safe mooring operations, the chafe chain (usually 76mm diameter stud link chain) must match the size of the chain
stopper on the bow loading tanker and the traction winch must be able to safely accommodate the expected loads.

DP bow loading tankers are normally fitted with a single fairlead with slightly different shape and dimensions to
conventional tankers. The single fairlead is mounted on a raised platform at the bow and can sometimes be moved
forward and aft on hydraulic rams.

Bow loading tankers with bow mooring systems are fitted with specialised hydraulic bow chain stoppers. The mooring
equipment should be linked electronically and mechanically to the ESD system, with appropriate interlocks integral to
the BLS and the green line system.

5.4.1.1 Fairlead

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The fairlead should be fitted with a roller complete with roller bearings in the bottom of the fairlead.

The roller and all parts in contact with the chafing chain should be covered with stainless steel material (non-
sparking). The structural strength of the fairlead and its supporting structure should be based on a safety factor of 1.0
against the yield criterion when applying a load equal to MBL (typical 500 tonnes) of the corresponding chafing
chain’s weak link. The design force should be established at an angle of 90 degrees off the ship’s centreline in the
horizontal plane and ± 30 degrees in the vertical plane.

The foundation should be designed to support and guide the lower part of the Offshore Loading System (OLS)
messenger line in the transverse direction during the connection of the hose. The internal opening in the fairlead
should be minimum 500mm x 500mm. A spark-free cladding should cover the substructure of the fairlead openings
(forecastle platform deck, foundations etc.), which may be hit by the chafing chain during an ESD2 release.

To allow consideration for the widest possible range of terminals, operators of these tankers may wish to assess the
suitability of these specialised bow chain stoppers for use at conventional terminals and provide engineering
interlocks incorporated into the control systems to ensure the chafe chain cannot be accidentally released.
Procedures and crew training to prevent accidental release of the chafe chain should also be addressed.

On all bow mooring tankers, winch stowage drums used to stow the pick-up line should be capable of lifting at least
15 tonnes and be of sufficient size to accommodate 150m of 80mm diameter rope, in addition to any small
messenger line. Remotely operated winch stowage drums may give some additional snap-back injury protection to
the winch operator.

Norwegian Oil and Gas recommended guidelines for offshore loading shuttle tankers Guideline No. 140

A.2 Operation

The mooring and coupling operation should be performed as per the relevant Field Offloading Manual.

A.5.1 Fairlead

A spark-free cladding should cover the substructure of the fairlead-openings (forecastle platform deck, foundations
etc.) which may be hit by the chafing chain during an ESD 2 release.

A.5.2 Hardwood protection on deck

The deck area between the chain stopper and the fairlead should be protected by 75 mm thick hardwood. The width
of the hardwood layer should be twice the width of the fairlead, i.e., 1m.

The hardwood should be fixed to the deck by recessed stud bolts/nuts, and a hardwood plug should cover the top.

A.5.3 Chain stopper

The chain stopper should be of the self-locking type, remote operated and designed for 84 mm chain (range 76 - 89
mm). The closing/opening time of the chain stopper should not exceed 30 sec.

The structural strength of the chain stopper including the release mechanism and its supporting structure should be
based on a safety factor of 1.0 against the yield criterion when applying a load equal to MBL of 500 tonnes.

A tension meter with a minimum range 0-350 tonnes should be installed to measure the tension in the hawser during
the loading operation.

Either the fairlead or the chain stopper should have the possibility to adjust the hose handling wire/rope relative to the
loading manifold to enable the SPM-auto function.

A.5.4 Guide roller

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A guide roller with (Working Load Limit) WLL 900 kN and equipped with a 0-100 T tension meter should be installed
in front of the traction winch. The load cell should read the mooring forces during winch operations.

A.5.5 Traction winch

The traction winch should be of the twin drum type designed for 25-120 mm synthetic fibre rope.

The winch should be designed for bridge and local control. The winch should be equipped with a failsafe disc brake
system suitable for emergency release of the OLS, which requires an automatic release speed adjustable between 1
and 2 m/s. The static weight of the OLS hose should be as per field operator requirements. The “Loading Permitted”
signal should not be obtained unless the dog-clutch on the traction winch has been disengaged in OLS-mode, i.e.,
interlocked (i.e., chain stopper is open).

A manual brake release should be supplied to release the failsafe brake in the event of a power failure. This should
be placed in a safe area, which protects the operator for any possible debris during the release of the brake.

Winch capacity requirements:

Pulling force: minimum 700 kN WLL

• Speeds: minimum 2 steps; approx. 0-8 m/min. and 0-50 m/min.

• High speed, minimum: 50 m/min.
• Brake capacity, minimum: 900 kN WLL.
• Brake disc to be of stainless-steel material (NB/CC).
• Rendering function according to field specific requirements or typically, 120% of maximum dynamic hose
tension (NB/CC).

The static capacity of the foundations should be in accordance with the capacity of the traction winch. The winch
should have a bolted cover to protect the brakes. Motors, cables, valves and pipes should be properly protected from
mechanical impact. Any hydraulic piping for the traction winch motor should have a flexible configuration to reduce
stress in the pipes during pressure shock. Such pipes should have an “expansion loop” between the deck and the
hydraulic motor.

Necessary guide rollers between the traction winch and the rope pulling unit for correct entering of the rope into the
rope pulling unit should be installed.

A.5.6 Rope pulling unit

A rope pulling unit should be installed to ensure that the rope enters directly to a stowing arrangement. The rope
pulling unit should provide necessary back tension for the traction winch. The back tension should be adjustable from
0 to 4 kN.

For air driven rope pulling units dry and clean air should be provided as well as lubrication pan and water trap.

For rotating stowage arrangements, the control panel should include control of the rotation.

The following operational requirements should be fulfilled:

• The operator should be protected from accidental contact with the rotating reels and the rope.
• The operator should have a free view to the stowing tank, and it should be possible to see the entire bottom
of the tank from the operating position.
• It should be easy for the operator to reach all the controls from the operating position.
• The rope pulling may be automatically controlled via the traction winch and with the possibility of
manual/local control.

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A.5.8 Service crane

A service crane should be installed on the platform deck. The crane should be designed and installed for general
lifting operations and maintenance of the BLS equipment located on the platform deck. It should be installed as far
forward as possible, but still being able to service the rope pulling unit and all the other equipment installed on the
platform deck. The crane should fulfil the following requirements:

• WLL 50 kN at 10m working radius.

• Slewing sector of 360° (continuous).
• Self-contained type (electro/hydraulic).

G.3 Messenger line cutter

The (Offshore Loading Shuttle Tanker) OLST should have a messenger line cutter device designed to enable cutting
the line if sucked into the thruster(s) / propeller(s).

TMSA KPI 6A.2.1 requires that detailed procedures address each different type of mooring operation likely to be
undertaken by fleet vessels. Procedures have been developed following risk assessments for each type of mooring
operation, which may include:

• Tandem mooring to F(P)SO.

• DP operations.

IMO: ISM Code

7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key
shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various
tasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.

Inspection Guidance

The vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the
bow mooring system for offshore terminals. These procedures may be incorporated in Field Operations Manuals and
the vessel’s maintenance plan. In addition to routine operation, inspection, testing and maintenance, they should also
give guidance on:

• Measures to prevent accidental release of the chafe chain from the bow stopper.
• Use of the traction winch manual brake release in the event of a power failure.
• Use of the messenger line cutter device designed to enable cutting the line if sucked into the
thruster(s)/propeller(s).

Suggested Inspector Actions

• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and
maintenance of the bow mooring system for offshore terminals.
• Review the records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the bow mooring system for offshore
terminals.
• During the physical inspection of the vessel inspect the bow mooring system for offshore terminals including:
o Bow fairlead.
o Hardwood deck protection.
o Chain stopper.
o Guide roller.
o Traction winch.
o Manual brake release.
o Rope pulling unit.
o Service crane.

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 o Hydraulic power-pack.
o Messenger line cutter.
• Where necessary, compare the observed condition with the records of inspection, testing and maintenance
of the bow mooring system for offshore terminals.

• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for the operation,
inspection, testing and maintenance of the bow mooring system for offshore terminals including:
o Measures to prevent accidental release of the chafe chain from the bow stopper.
o Use of the traction winch manual brake release in the event of a power failure.
o Use of the messenger line cutter device designed to enable cutting the line if sucked into the
thruster(s) / propeller(s).

Expected Evidence

• The company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the bow mooring system
for offshore terminals.
• Records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the bow mooring system for offshore terminals.

Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the bow
mooring system for offshore terminals.
• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation, inspection,
testing and maintenance of the bow mooring system for offshore terminals including:
o Measures to prevent accidental release of the chafe chain from the bow stopper.
o Use of the traction winch manual brake release in the event of a power failure.
o Use of the messenger line cutter device designed to enable cutting the line if sucked into the
thruster(s) / propeller(s).
• There were no records, or records were incomplete, of inspection, testing and maintenance of the bow
mooring system for offshore terminals.
• There were no records to show that the time taken for the chain stopper to open and close had been tested,
and that operation was within the recommended 30 seconds.
• The chain stopper was not marked with its SWL.
• The bow fairlead was not constructed of stainless steel or was not covered with a spark free cladding.
• The deck area between the chain stopper and the fairlead was not protected by 75mm thick hardwood, or
there were sections of hardwood missing or damaged.
• Recess studs bolts/nuts, fixing the hardwood layer to the deck were not covered with hardwood plugs, or
some of the plugs were missing.
• There was no tension monitor installed to measure the tension in the hawser during the loading operation.
• The manual brake release for the traction winch for use in the event of a power failure was not located in a
safe area that would protect the operator from debris during the release of the brake.
• Traction winch motors, cables, valves and pipes were not properly protected from mechanical impact.
• The traction winch was not fitted with a bolted cover to protect the brakes.
• The rope pulling unit was not fitted with protection devices to prevent the operator from accidentally coming
into contact with the rotating reels.
• The operators view of the rope stowing area was obscured in some way.
• The bow mooring system for offshore terminals was defective in any respect.

10. Machinery Spaces

10.1. Engineering Procedures

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