UNIT-3

A) CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL

INTERPRETATION

The formal process leading to the Constituent Assembly's creation began with the Swaraj Bill of 1895, an
early attempt to draft a constitution envisioning India's future. Although unofficial and containing just 110
articles, it highlighted fundamental rights such as equality before law and free speech, forming the
foundation for later constitutional developments. Progress toward Indian representation advanced with the
Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909, which introduced separate electorates for Muslims but also sowed seeds
for India's eventual partition.

The Congress-League Scheme of 1916 marked cooperation between the Indian National Congress and the
Muslim League, advocating self-governance but failing to address rights. Subsequently, the Montagu-
Chelmsford Reforms culminated in the Government of India Act of 1919, introducing diarchy and federal
elements. However, its shortcomings prompted Indian leaders to push for a truly indigenous constitution.
The Commonwealth of India Bill (1925) and the Nehru Report (1928) laid out comprehensive
frameworks for governance, with the latter advocating equal constitutional status among nations.

The movement gained momentum after Lord Irwin's Declaration of 1929, leading to the Purna Swaraj
Declaration and the Karachi Resolution of 1931, which emphasized fundamental rights and independence
as non-negotiable goals. Despite subsequent British efforts, including the Government of India Act, 1935,
Indian leaders demanded a Constituent Assembly. This became a reality through the Cabinet Mission Plan
of 1946 and the Indian Independence Act of 1947.

The Constituent Assembly convened on December 9, 1946, adopting the Constitution on November 26,
1949, after 165 sittings spread over nearly three years. Under the leadership of B.R. Ambedkar and others,
the Assembly drafted a document incorporating key rights and governance structures, reflecting India's
aspirations for justice, equality, and self-rule. It came into force on January 26, 1950, marking the birth of
the Indian Republic.

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India emphasized dignity as the cornerstone of fundamental rights
under Part III of the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court recognized that privacy, as an essential aspect
of dignity, ensures the meaningful exercise of liberty. The Court rejected the government's argument based
on Constituent Assembly debates, which purportedly dismissed the idea of a general right to privacy.

The Court analyzed exchanges between constitutional framers, such as K.M. Munshi, Dr. Ambedkar, and Sir
Alladi Krishnaswamy, which suggested that privacy provisions were narrowly debated and primarily aimed
at safeguarding criminal investigations. These debates did not conclusively reject the broader notion of
privacy, but the framers' limited understanding of privacy during that era rendered the originalist approach
problematic.

While acknowledging the framers' visionary efforts, the Court stated that the Constitution evolves with time
and contemporary conditions, much like the eventual inclusion of the "due process" concept despite initial
rejection. In light of modern realities, the Court recognized the right to privacy as a Fundamental Right,
affirming its necessity for safeguarding dignity and liberty.

In Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court referred to Constituent Assembly debates
to understand the scope of ordinance-making power under the Constitution. The debates highlighted
concerns about the misuse of this power during the colonial era, and the Constitutional advisor assured that
ordinances would only be issued on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, minimizing the
likelihood of abuse.
Prof. K.T. Shah emphasized that ordinance-making power should be exercised solely in exceptional
circumstances, as it contradicts the principle of Rule of Law. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar also asserted that such
power is designed to address emergencies when Parliament is not in session and should not function as
parallel legislative power. These views portrayed ordinances as a necessary evil, limited to extraordinary
situations.

Although the Constituent Assembly debates were referenced for context, they did not influence the
judgment's outcome. The Court relied on broader principles of constitutional governance and rule of law to
address the matter.

In Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, the Supreme Court referred to Constituent Assembly debates to clarify
that the framers never intended "domicile" or "residence" to be a criterion for election to the Council of
States (Rajya Sabha). On July 28, 1947, the Assembly debated the purpose of the upper house, emphasizing
that it was meant to enable comprehensive discussions among experts from various fields. The debates and
legislative history established that residence was not an essential constitutional requirement but a
qualification that Parliament could prescribe as needed, aligning with federal principles.

Unlike the American Constitution, the Indian Constitution does not mandate residence as a fundamental
qualification. Addressing concerns about centralization, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar reiterated that the Constitution
is federal in character, with clearly demarcated legislative and executive powers between the Union and the
States. The Court used these debates to decisively conclude that residence was never intended as a
foundational element for elections to the Council of States, and the citation of debates significantly
influenced the outcome of this case.

In Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, the Supreme Court referred to Constituent Assembly debates to
understand the scope of the term "other authority" under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution. Dr. B.R.
Ambedkar clarified that "other authority" includes statutory bodies empowered to make and enforce laws,
advocating for an expansive definition of "State" to economize the use of terminology.

The debates emphasized the framers' intention to provide a comprehensive understanding of "State," beyond
terms like "Central or State Government." However, as existing case law on the matter was available, the
citation of debates served only to refine conceptual understanding and did not influence the case's outcome.

B) CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

The letters of the constitution are fairly static and not very easy to change but the laws enacted by the
legislature reflect the current state of people and are very dynamic. To ensure that the new laws are
consistent with the basic structure of the constitution, the constitution must be interpreted in a broad and
liberal manner giving effect to all its parts and the presumption must be that no conflict or repugnancy was
intended by its framers. Applying the same logic, the provisions relating to fundamental rights have been
interpreted broadly and liberally in favor of the subject. Similarly, various legislative entries mentioned in
the Union, State, and Concurrent list have been construed liberally and widely. There are basically three
types of interpretation of the constitution.

Historical interpretation

Ambiguities and uncertainties while interpreting the constitutional provisions can be clarified by referring
to earlier interpretative decisions.

Contemporary interpretation
The Constitution must be interpreted in the light of the present scenario. The situation and circumstances
prevalent today must be considered.

Harmonious Construction
It is a cardinal rule of construction that when there are in a statute two provisions which are in such conflict
with each other, that both of them cannot stand together, they should possibly be so interpreted that effect
can be given to both. And that a construction which renders either of them inoperative and useless should
not be adopted except in the last resort.

The Supreme Court held in Re Kerala Education Bill that in deciding the fundamental rights, the court
must consider the directive principles and adopt the principle of harmonious construction so two
possibilities are given effect as much as possible by striking a balance.

In Qureshi v. State of Bihar, The Supreme Court held that while the state should implement the directive
principles, it should be done in such a way so as not to violate the fundamental rights.

In Bhatia International v Bulk trading SA, it was held that if more than one interpretation is possible for
a statute, then the court has to choose the interpretation which depicts the intention of the legislature.

Interpretation of the preamble of the Constitution

The preamble cannot override the provisions of the constitution. In Re Berubari, the Supreme Court held
that the Preamble was not a part of the constitution and therefore it could not be regarded as a source of any
substantive power.

In Keshavananda Bharati’s case, the Supreme Court rejected the above view and held the preamble to
be a part of the constitution. The constitution must be read in the light of the preamble. The preamble could
be used for the amendment power of the parliament under Art.368 but basic elements cannot be amended.

The 42nd Amendment has inserted the words “Secularism, Socialism, and Integrity” in the preamble.
General rules of interpretation of the Constitution
1. If the words are clear and unambiguous, they must be given the full effect.
2. The constitution must be read as a whole.
3. Principles of harmonious construction must be applied.
4. The Constitution must be interpreted in a broad and literal sense.
5. The court has to infer the spirit of the Constitution from the language.
6. Internal and External aids may be used while interpreting.
7. The Constitution prevails over other statutes.

Principles of Constitutional Interpretation

The following principles have frequently been discussed by the courts while interpreting the Constitution:
1. Principle of colourable legislation
2. Principle of pith and substance
3. Principle of eclipse
4. Principle of Severability
5. Principle of territorial nexus
6. Principle of implied powers

Principle of Colourable Legislation

The doctrine of colourability is the idea that when the legislature wants to do something that it cannot do
within the constraints of the constitution, it colours the law with a substitute purpose which will still allow
it to accomplish its original goal.

Maxim: “Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliqum” which means what cannot be
done directly cannot also be done indirectly.

The rule relates to the question of legislative competence to enact a law. Colourable Legislation does not
involve the question of bonafides or malfides. A legislative transgression may be patent, manifest or direct
or may be disguised, covert or indirect. It is also applied to the fraud of Constitution.
In India ‘the doctrine of colourable legislation’ signifies only a limitation of the law- making power of the
legislature. It comes into picture while the legislature purporting to act within its power but in reality, it has
transgressed those powers. So the doctrine becomes applicable whenever legislation seeks to do in an
indirect manner what it cannot do directly. If the impugned legislation falls within the competence of
legislature, the question of doing something indirectly which cannot be done directly does not arise.

In our Constitution, this doctrine is usually applied to Article 246 which has demarcated the Legislative
competence of the Parliament and the State Legislative Assemblies by outlining the different subjects under
list I for the Union, List II for the States and List III for the both as mentioned in the seventh schedule.

This doctrine comes into play when a legislature does not possess the power to make law upon a particular
subject but nonetheless indirectly makes one. By applying this principle the fate of the Impugned
Legislation is decided.

Principle of pith and substance

Pith means ‘true nature’ or essence of something’ and substance means ‘the most important or essential part
of something’. The basic purpose of this doctrine is to determine under which head of power or field i.e.
under which list (given in the seventh schedule) a given piece of legislation falls.

Union & State Legislatures are supreme within their respective fields. They should not encroach/ trespass
into the field reserved to the other. If a law passed by one trespass upon the field assigned to the other—the
Court by applying Pith & Substance doctrine, resolve the difficulty &declare whether the legislature
concerned was competent to make the law.

If the pith & substance of the law (i.e. the true object of the legislation) relates to a matter within the
competence of the legislature which enacted it, it should be held intra vires—though the legislature might
incidentally trespass into matters, not within its competence. The true character of the legislation can be
ascertained by having regard—to the enactment as a whole — to its object – to the scope and effect of its
provisions.

Case: State of Bombay v. FN Balsara

Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 which prohibited sale & possession of liquors in the State, was challenged
on the ground that it incidentally encroached upon Imports & Exports of liquors across custom frontier – a
Central subject. It was contended that the prohibition, purchase, use, possession, and sale of liquor will
affect its import. The court held that act valid because the pith & substance fell under Entry 8 of State List
and not under Entry 41 of Union List.

Principle of eclipse
The Doctrine of Eclipse says that any law inconsistent with Fundamental Rights is not invalid. It is not
dead totally but overshadowed by the fundamental right. The inconsistency (conflict) can be removed by a
constitutional amendment to the relevant fundamental right so that eclipse vanishes and the entire law
becomes valid.

All laws in force in India before the commencement of the Constitution shall be void in so far they are
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution. Any law existing before the commencement of the
Constitution and inconsistent with the provision of Constitution becomes inoperative on commencement of
Constitution. But the law does not become dead. The law remains a valid law in order to determine any
question of law incurred before the commencement of the Constitution. An existing law only becomes
eclipsed to the extent it comes under the shadow of the FR.

Case: Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay

In this case, the law in question was an existing law at the time when the Constitution came into force. That
existing law imposed on the exercise of the right guaranteed to the citizens of India by article 19(1)(g)
restrictions which could not be justified as reasonable under clause (6) as it then stood and consequently
under article 13(1)[8] that existing law became void “to the extent of such inconsistency”.
The court said that the law became void not in to or for all purposes or for all times or for all persons but
only “to the extent of such inconsistency”, that is to say, to the extent it became inconsistent with the
provisions of Part III which conferred the fundamental rights of the citizens.

Thus the Doctrine of Eclipse provides for the validation of Pre-Constitution Laws that violate fundamental
rights upon the premise that such laws are not null and void ab initio but become unenforceable only to the
extent of such inconsistency with the fundamental rights. If any subsequent amendment to the Constitution
removes the inconsistency or the conflict of the existing law with the fundamental rights, then the Eclipse
vanishes and that particular law again becomes active again.

Principle of Severability
The doctrine of severability provides that if an enactment cannot be saved by construing it consistent with
its constitutionality, it may be seen whether it can be partly saved. Article 13 of the Constitution of India
provides for Doctrine of severability which states that all laws in force in India before the commencement
of Constitution shall be void in so far they are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution.

The State shall not make any law which takes away/ shortens the rights conferred by Part III of the
Constitution i.e. Fundamental Rights. Any law made in contravention of the provisions of the Constitution
shall be void and invalid. The invalid part shall be severed and declared invalid if it is really severable.
(That is, if the part which is not severed can meaningfully exist without the severed part.) Sometimes the
valid and invalid parts of the Act are so mixed up that they cannot be separated from each other. In such
cases, the entire Act will be invalid.

Case: AK Gopalan v. State of Madras

In this case, the Supreme Court said that in case of repugnancy to the Constitution, only the repugnant
provision of the impugned Act will be void and not the whole of it, and every attempt should be made to
save as much as possible of the Act. If the omission of the invalid part will not change the nature or the
structure of the object of the legislature, it is severable. It was held that except Section 14 all other sections
of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 were valid, and since Section 14 could be severed from the rest of
the Act, the detention of the petitioner was not illegal.

Principle of Territorial Nexus

Article 245 (2) of the Constitution of India makes it amply clear that ‘No law made by Parliament shall be
deemed to be invalid on the ground that it would have extra-territorial operation’. Thus a legislation cannot
be questioned on the ground that it has extra-territorial operation. It is well-established that the Courts of
our country must enforce the law with the machinery available to them, and they are not entitled to question
the authority of the Legislature in making a law which is extra-territorial. The extra-territorial operation
does not invalidate a law. But some nexus with India may still be necessary in some of the cases such as
those involving taxation statutes.

The Doctrine of Territorial Nexus can be invoked under the following circumstances-
 Whether a particular state has extra-territorial operation.
 If there is a territorial nexus between the subject- matter of the Act and the state making the law

It signifies that the object to which the law applies need not be physically located within the territorial
boundaries of the state, but must have a sufficient territorial connection with the state. A state may levy a
tax on a person, property, object or transaction not only when it is situated within its territorial limits, but
also when it has a sufficient and real territorial connection with it. Nexus test was applied to the state
legislation also

Case: Tata Iron & Steel Company v. Bihar State

The State of Bihar passed a Sales Tax Act for levy of sales tax whether the sale was concluded within the
state or outside if the goods were produced, found and manufactured in the state. The court held there was
sufficient territorial nexus and upheld the Act as valid. Whether there is sufficient nexus between the law
and the object sought to be taxed will depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case.
It was pointed out that sufficiency of the territorial connection involved a consideration of two elements- a)
the connection must be real and not illusory b) the liability sought to be imposed must be pertinent to that
connection.

Principle of Implied powers

Laws which are necessary and proper for the execution of the power or incidental to such power are called
implied powers and these laws are presumed to be constitutional. In other words, constitutional powers are
granted in general terms out of which implied powers must necessarily arise. Likewise, constitutional
restraints are put in general terms out of which implied restraints must also necessarily establish.

This is a Legal principle which states that, in general, the rights and duties of a legislative body or
organization are determined from its functions and purposes as specified in its constitution or charter and
developed in practice.

C) LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: LEGISLATIVE INTENTION

Legislative history refers to the record of materials and documents related to the passage of a law. It includes
government statements explaining the reasons for a bill, previous versions of the statutory provisions,
committee reports, debates in the legislature, and other parliamentary materials. These elements help in
understanding the development and context of the statute.

Legislative history is an important tool for statutory interpretation because it assists judges in determining
the intent behind a law. Courts may refer to legislative history when the language of a statute is unclear,
ambiguous, or leads to an unreasonable result. It provides insight into the problems the legislation aimed to
address, helping to resolve uncertainties in meaning. However, its use varies across legal systems—common
law jurisdictions tend to be more cautious, while civil law systems adopt a broader interpretative approach.

While legislative history can confirm the interpretation of a statute, courts generally do not treat it as
authoritative in the same way as the statutory text itself. Instead, it serves as supporting evidence for
understanding the legislature’s intention. English courts have traditionally restricted its use, although
modern interpretations allow reference in cases of ambiguity or absurdity. In India, legislative history is
sometimes used to determine the purpose of an enactment, but courts maintain a distinction between using it
to understand the mischief the statute seeks to address and using it for direct construction of the law.

Here are brief facts and court reasoning for two cases where legislative history was used in statutory
interpretation:

In Pepper v. Hart, the issue was whether teachers at a private school had to pay tax on a concessionary fee
they received for their children's education. The wording of the tax law was ambiguous, leading to confusion
about its intended application. The taxpayers argued that legislative debates in Parliament indicated that the
provision was not meant to impose tax on them. The House of Lords ruled that when statutory language is
ambiguous or leads to an absurd result, courts may refer to parliamentary materials, including ministerial
statements made during legislative debates. This case marked a shift in English law, allowing courts to use
legislative history as an aid in interpretation if clear statements existed that explained legislative intent.

In Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, the case challenged constitutional amendments that affected
property rights and the basic structure of the Constitution. The petitioner argued that certain amendments
went beyond the authority of Parliament. The court had to determine whether there were implied limitations
on Parliament's power to amend the Constitution. The Supreme Court of India referred to debates in the
Constituent Assembly to understand the historical context of the constitutional provisions and the framers'
intent. While the court acknowledged that such debates were not conclusive in interpreting the law, they
provided valuable insight into the mischief the constitutional provision sought to remedy and the objectives
it aimed to achieve. The court ultimately formulated the Basic Structure Doctrine, limiting Parliament’s
power to alter fundamental aspects of the Constitution.

In Lok Sikshana Trust v. CIT, the case involved the interpretation of the phrase "charitable purpose" under
the Income Tax Act. The appellant, Lok Sikshana Trust, claimed tax exemption, arguing that its objective of
spreading knowledge constituted a charitable purpose. The tax authorities contended that the term should be
narrowly construed and include only activities directly benefiting the poor or disadvantaged. The Supreme
Court referred to the history of legislation and parliamentary debates to understand the real meaning and
legislative intent behind the phrase "charitable purpose" in tax law. The court analyzed past legislative
developments and the speech of the mover of the amendment, who was in the best position to explain the
defect that the amendment sought to remove. By using legislative history, the court interpreted "charitable
purpose" broadly to include activities promoting education and knowledge, thereby ruling in favor of the
trust.

In Gujarat Assembly Election Matter, the case revolved around electoral laws and the interpretation of
certain provisions related to assembly elections in Gujarat. The petitioners questioned whether certain
election procedures adhered to constitutional requirements, particularly regarding representation and
conduct of elections. The Supreme Court referred to Constituent Assembly Debates to interpret
constitutional provisions related to elections. It emphasized that reviewing historical legislative
developments, debates, and preceding enactments helps in understanding the intent behind enacting a
provision. The court ruled that Constituent Assembly Debates could serve as valid interpretative aids,
reaffirming that legislative history is useful in cases where a statute's meaning is unclear or contested.

D) STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS

The Statement of Objects and Reasons serves as an important tool in the interpretation of statutes in India. It
is a document that accompanies a bill when introduced in the legislature, explaining the purpose behind the
proposed law, the issues it seeks to address, and the legislative intent. While courts in India generally do not
use it as a direct tool for statutory construction, they do refer to it to understand the historical context and the
mischief the legislation intends to remedy.

Role in statutory interpretation:

 Courts may refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons to determine the aim of a statute, especially
when its wording is ambiguous or unclear. It provides insight into the underlying issues that prompted
the legislation.
 When statutory provisions are susceptible to multiple interpretations, courts sometimes use the
statement to ascertain the correct meaning. It helps to identify the problem that legislators aimed to
resolve.
 The statement often refers to previous laws, highlighting deficiencies in existing legal provisions. This
allows courts to interpret provisions in light of earlier legal frameworks.
 Courts have frequently acknowledged its utility but limit its use to contextual clarification rather than
direct statutory construction. In cases like Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, the Supreme Court
referred to debates and background documents to understand constitutional provisions but did not use
them for interpretation.

Limitations:

The statement cannot override the plain meaning of statutory provisions if the wording is clear. It does not
represent the final enacted law but only the legislative intent at the time of drafting. Courts rely on it as an
interpretative aid rather than a binding legal text.
Thus, while the Statement of Objects and Reasons is helpful in statutory interpretation, it is generally used to
understand legislative intent rather than directly construct legal provisions.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Hari Ram involved the interpretation of land acquisition laws and whether
certain provisions applied retrospectively. The petitioner argued that the Statement of Objects and Reasons
clarified the legislative intent behind the amendments. The Supreme Court referred to the Statement of
Objects and Reasons to understand the legislative purpose and the mischief the amendment sought to
address. The court ruled that the provision should be interpreted in line with the stated objectives of the
legislation.

I. Ismail Kutty v. Assistant Collector Central Excise dealt with the repeal of the Gold Control Act, 1968,
and whether certain restrictions continued to apply after its repeal. The petitioner argued that the Statement
of Objects and Reasons of the repealing bill indicated the legislature’s intent to remove all restrictions. The
Kerala High Court examined the Statement of Objects and Reasons to determine whether the repeal was
intended to completely eliminate the regulatory framework. The court found that the legislative history
supported the petitioner’s argument and ruled accordingly.

Ram Chandra Lohar v. State of Odisha involved the applicability of the Real Estate (Regulation and
Development) Act, 2016, to certain transactions. The petitioner claimed that the Statement of Objects and
Reasons clarified the scope of the Act. The Orissa High Court referred to the Statement of Objects and
Reasons to understand the legislative intent behind the Act. The court ruled that the Act was designed to
protect consumer interests and should be interpreted accordingly.

E) LEGISLATIVE DEBATES

Same as Legislative history.

F) COMMITTEE REPORTS, LAW COMMISSION REPORTS

Before a bill is framed and introduced in the legislature, the matter of the bill is often referred to the Law
Commission or committees for getting with a view to ascertain their observation and suggestions on the
matter which is to be introduced in the legislature in the form of a bill. The commission or committee on
such reference conduct a critical examination or a detailed study of the matter and subsequently give their
report on that particular matter.

These reports may act as a great source to for the courts to ascertain the true meaning of the provision or a
phrase of a statute which is in question before such court. The courts often refer to the commissions’
report in the case there is a confusion or ambiguity in the meaning of a provision of an Statute.

In the case of Shriram Chits Ltd. v. U.O.I reference was made to the report of the Banking Committee
prepared in 1972, the report of the Select Committee of the Parliament, the report of the study group on
Non-Banking Finance Commission, in upholding the reasonableness and validity of the Chit Funds Act.
1982.

In the case of Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Bihari Khare the report of the Law Commission preceding the
enactment of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 was referred to and relied upon. It was
observed that where a particular enactment or amendment is the result of the recommendation of the Law
Commission of India, it may be permissible to refer to the relevant provision.