NAVAL

POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN PAKISTAN

by

Hamid S. Lillah

December 2014

Thesis Advisor: Anshu Chatterjee

Second Reader: Hafez Mohammed

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RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN PAKISTAN
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

Religious organizations (ROs) in Pakistan have a socio-economic link with society because these institutions provide
public goods and welfare to society. Members of society who benefit from the welfare activities of the ROs become
supporters of these institutions. Moreover, some selected ROs in Pakistan have adopted extreme views due to the
political and social context in the country. They then use this socio-economic link to indoctrinate citizens with
extremist ideologies, thus creating a foundational acceptance of terrorism as a justified activity. Further, this link
enables ROs to mobilize society for their interests, such as to pressure the state to gain concessions or compel the
state to pass extremist laws. The state responds to ROs because of their influence over a considerable segment of
society. At times, the state also needs the ROs to mobilize the population for the state’s interest. Therefore, the state
accepts the demands of ROs—including those that require adoption and implementation of extremist laws, which
further contribute to extremism.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF

religious extremism, religious organizations in Pakistan, links between religious organizations and PAGES
poor, welfare by religious organizations, use of religion by state. 95
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 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN PAKISTAN

Hamid S. Lillah
Commander, Pakistan Navy
B Sc., University of Karachi
M.S., National Defense University Pakistan, 2008

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES

(STRATEGIC STUDIES)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

December 2014

Author: Hamid S. Lillah

Approved by: Anshu Chatterjee

Thesis Advisor

Hafez Mohammed
Second Reader

Hafez Mohammed, Ph.D.

Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

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 ABSTRACT

Religious organizations (ROs) in Pakistan have a socio-economic link with society

because these institutions provide public goods and welfare to society. Members of
society who benefit from the welfare activities of the ROs become supporters of these
institutions. Moreover, some selected ROs in Pakistan have adopted extreme views due to
the political and social context in the country. They then use this socio-economic link to
indoctrinate citizens with extremist ideologies, thus creating a foundational acceptance of
terrorism as a justified activity. Further, this link enables ROs to mobilize society for
their interests, such as to pressure the state to gain concessions or compel the state to pass
extremist laws. The state responds to ROs because of their influence over a considerable
segment of society. At times, the state also needs the ROs to mobilize the population for
the state’s interest. Therefore, the state accepts the demands of ROs—including those that
require adoption and implementation of extremist laws, which further contribute to
extremism.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN PAKISTAN............................................................1

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................2
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION.................................3
C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................7
1. Rational Choice Approach as a Foundation......................................7
2. Religious Extremism ............................................................................9
3. Religious Extremism in Pakistan ......................................................10
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES ...........................14
E. RESEARCH DESIGN ...................................................................................16
F. THESIS OVERVIEW ...................................................................................18
II. LINKAGE BETWEEN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN PAKISTAN
AND THE POOR .......................................................................................................21
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................21
B. HISTORICAL LEGACY OF CHARITY WORK BY ROs IN
PAKISTAN .....................................................................................................22
C. CASE OF JI AND JUD .................................................................................26
1. Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)...........................................................................26
2. Jamaat ud Dawa (JUD) .....................................................................29
D. WHY ROs CONDUCT WELFARE ACTIVITIES ....................................32
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................34
III. EXTREMISM IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS ............................................35
A. LINK BETWEEN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND
EXTREMISM ................................................................................................38
B. EXTREMIST RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN PAKISTAN ...........39
1. Rise of Religious Extremism in Pakistan .........................................40
2. Alliance between the State and ROs.................................................43
3. Religious Extremism as a Rational Behavior ..................................44
C. THE USE OF MADRASAS ...........................................................................45
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................48
IV. THE ROLE OF STATE IN RELATION TO ROS .................................................51
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................51
B. USE OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS AND ROs FOR POLITICAL
PURPOSE .......................................................................................................51
1. Pre-independence Era: 1937–1947 ...................................................51
2. Formative Years of Pakistan.............................................................53
3. The Constitution of 1973 ...................................................................55
4. 1974 Constitutional Amendment Declaring Ahmedis as Non-
Muslims ...............................................................................................57
5. Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization of the Country .......................................57
6. General Pervez Musharraf and ROs................................................60
C. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................61
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V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................63
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................67
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................79

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 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. State, Society, and ROs’ Relation. ...................................................................15

Figure 2. Major Sects and Subsects in Pakistan. .............................................................36

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 LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Institutions Run by the Al-Khidmat Foundation. ............................................27

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 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIML All India Muslim League

ASWJ Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat
JEM Jaish-e-Muhammed
JI Jamat-i-Islami
JUD Jam’at ud Dawa
JUH Jamiat-Ulamai-Hind
JUI Jamiat-Ulama-i- Pakistan
LeJ Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba
ML Muslim League
NAP National Awami Party
NWFP North West Frontier Province
PIMA Pakistan Islamic Medical Association
PML Pakistan Muslim League
PNA Pakistan National Alliance
PNC Pakistan National Congress
PPP Pakistan People’s Party
RaD Religion and Development
READ Rural Education and Development
ROs religious organizations
SMP Sipah-e-Mohammadi Pakistan
ST Sunni Tehrik
TJP Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan
TTP Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
USAID United States Agency for International Development

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 I. RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN PAKISTAN

On 15 October 2005, within a week after the devastating earthquake that killed
approximately 73,000 1 people in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) 2 and Azad
Kashmir, Jama’at ud Dawa (JUD), a religious organization banned by the United States
in 2003 as operating as an organized group with links to terrorists in Pakistan, had
established relief camps and field hospitals equipped with X-ray machines and makeshift
operation theaters. 3 The organization was also effective in relief work during the refugee
crisis emerging from Pakistan’s counterterrorism operations in Swat and humanitarian
disaster after the floods in 2009 and 2010, respectively. 4 Despite being declared a
terrorist organization by the international community, the Pakistani government
supported and continues to support such extremist religious organizations.

JUD is an extremist organization, which was identified by the United States in

2003 as having links with terrorist organizations. Pakistan also placed the organization on
its terrorism watchlist in late 2003. 5 In 2009, the Pakistan government put a ban on JUD
after the United Nations declared it as a terrorist group. 6 At the same time, the
organization was able to receive millions of rupees in funding from the provincial
government in Punjab. 7 State support for such organizations often raises the question of

1 UNICEF, “UNICEF Pakistan Support to Recovery and Rehabilitation of Basic Social Services for
the Earthquake-Affected Population 2007‒2008,” UNICEF, 1 September 2007, www.unicef.org/pakistan/
Overview-Updated-September-2007-1_(2).pdf.
2 The province of NWFP has been renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) in April 2010, see Sama
TV, “Senate Approved Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa Name of NWFP,” Sama TV, 15 April 2010,
http://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/15-Apr-2010/senate-approved-khyber-pakhtoonkhwa-name-of-nwfp.
3 John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, “Extremists Fill Aid Chasm after Quake,” Washington Post, 16
October 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/15/
AR2005101501392.html.
4 Rob Crilly, “Pakistan Flood Aid from Islamic Extremists,” Telegraph, 21 August 2010,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/7957988/Pakistan-flood-aid-from-Islamic-
extremists.html; Declan Walsh, “Banned Jihadi Group is Running Aid Programme for Swat Refugees,”
Guardian, 13 May 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/13/pakistan-aid-terrorism.
5 Ibid.
6 Bill Roggio, “UN Declares Jamaat-ud-Dawa a Terrorist Front Group,” Long War Journal (11
December 2008), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/12/un_declares_jamaatud.php#.
7 News report, “Sherry Rehman Resents Grant Given to Jamaat ud Dawa,” Express Tribune, 18 June
2010, http://tribune.com.pk/story/22210/sherry-rehman-resents-grant-given-to-jamaat-ud-dawa/.
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the government’s intentions and “double faced” policy. Yet very little research has been
done on why that is the case. Understanding the imperatives that push the state into
supporting these groups at times is critical for understanding religious extremism in
Pakistan, which is the foundation of terrorism in Pakistan. How and why are these
organizations spreading extremism despite state attempts to control them?

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis intends to answer the question of how religious organizations in

Pakistan contribute to extremism in society. In doing so, it will focus on selective
religious organizations (ROs), how and why these institutions have become more extreme
in their ideology, and what is the historical context, including external and internal
influences, that has led to extremism. Moreover, this thesis will examine the ROs’
influence on and connections to civil society. It is also important to understand the state’s
relationship with the ROs in order to see what kind of leverage it exercises on the ROs,
and vice versa, as well how the ROs’ demands shape the state’s responses. Such a study
will enable an understanding of ROs’ influence on Pakistani national politics.

Religious organizations in Pakistan have a significant influence over particular

segments of society, which they can mobilize for their objectives, and at times, this
mobilization is quite violent, as shown by anti-Musharraf protests and others in 2005 and
2008. 8 This influence is due to the fact that the ROs in Pakistan have extensive socio-
economic welfare programs through which they offer free education along with free
boarding and lodging in madrasas (religious schools). 9 Some ROs also organize
weddings and arrange for burials for the poor. 10 Moreover, a few ROs run charity

8 News report, “Thousands Protest in Pakistan,” Guardian, 19 December 2004,

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/dec/20/pakistan.
9 Christopher M. Blanchard, Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background (CRS Report No.
RS21654) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 23 January 2007): 4, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/RS21654.pdf.
10 Masooda Bano, “Marker of Identity: Religious Political Parties and Welfare Work—The Case of
Jama’at-i-Islami in Pakistan and Bangladesh,” Research and Development Research Program, Working
Paper 34, University of Oxford (2009): 19, http://www.religionsanddevelopment.org/files/
resourcesmodule/@random454f80f60b3f4/1254137609_working_paper_34.pdf.
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hospitals and pay for healthcare for those who cannot afford it. Laurence R. Iannaccone
and Eli Berman observe that:

From Egypt and Palestine to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Indonesia, radical

Islamist groups have enjoyed broad support—especially among the poorer
segments of society—because they are major suppliers of mutual aid and
social service. 11

There appear to be several such socio-economic linkages between the ROs and
the poor in Pakistan, because the poor often rely on ROs for education and aid at times of
crisis. There is, however, not much empirical research done on this linkage. This
relationship is critical for understanding politics in Pakistan. According to a report on
Islamic parties in Pakistan published by the International Crisis Group, “they [the ROs]
have disproportionately influenced domestic policy … through the use of street power
and violence, often successfully pressuring civilian governments into abandoning
promised reforms or making concessions that forward an Islamist agenda.” 12 This thesis
will explain how the ROs in Pakistan are linked to the society and have been able to rally
public support. It also aims to cover the socio-economic aspects of the ROs—a neglected
subject in the field of research—to find out how they impact the society.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, a considerable amount of literature has emerged
to understand Islamic radicalism and to find remedies that can effectively counter this
threat to global security. A lot of literature has focused on the character of Islam as a
religion and Islamic radical groups, yet very few have actually focused on the Islamic
organizations that people come across in their daily lives. This paper proposes to fill that
gap by looking at some of the organizations that interact with society and studying how
they have evolved and become connected to extremists’ ideas.

11 Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman, “Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad, and the
Deadly,” Public Choice 128, no. 1/2 (July 2006): 119.
12 International Crisis Group, “Islamic Parties in Pakistan” International Crisis Group, 25,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/216-islamic-parties-in-pakistan.aspx.
3
 This question will also allow us to focus on extremism, which is the root of the
problem, versus the religion itself. In the past thirteen years, scholars generally agree that
Islam as a religion does not promote terrorism, though terrorists use religious symbols to
link terrorism with Islam. 13 Thomas J. Badey argues that “as ideologies, religions do not
cause violence. They are systems of belief that mobilize populations toward common
objectives and justify their behavior in the pursuit of these objectives.” 14 Adam L.
Silverman, a social science advisor to the U.S. Army, notes that, “it is clear that much of
the so-called Islamic behavior that the West terms terrorism is outside the norms that
Islam holds for political violence.” 15 However, Islamic radicals often justify their acts of
terrorism by propagating the idea that the fight against the West and its allied
governments in Muslim countries is jihad. 16 They argue that it is incumbent on all
Muslims to participate in this jihad in order to be good Muslims. Most of the scholars and
policy makers have focused on terrorism as a threat to international peace; however, it
can be argued that terrorism is only a symptom of the deep-rooted problems of
extremism. 17 Extremist religious organizations provide the “supporting environment” to
terrorists that provides “support and sympathy” to the terrorists. 18 Emma Hooper notes
that, “it is the failure to address extremism, militant and sectarian violence that has led to
a vicious cycle of creeping radicalism, to a deeply disturbing extent.” 19 Therefore, this

13 Rodney Wilson, “Islam and Terrorism,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 34, no. 2 (August
2007): 203‒213, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20455506.
14 Thomas J. Badey, “The Role of Religion in International Terrorism,” Sociological Focus 35, no. 1
(February 2002): 84.
15 Adam L. Silverman, “Just War, Jihad, and Terrorism: A Comparison of Western and Islamic Norms
for the Use of Political Violence,” Journal of Church and State 44, no.1 (Winter 2002): 91,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/59878360?accountid=12702.
16 Bernard Lewis, Foreign Affairs 77, no. 6 (November‒December 1998): 14‒15,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049126.
17 Todd Sandler, “New Frontiers of Terrorism Research: An Introduction,” Journal of Peace Research
48, no. 3, Special Issue: New Frontiers of Terrorism Research (May 2011): 279‒286, http://www.jstor.org/
stable/23035427.
18 Peter Waldmann, “Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures,”
International Social Movement Research 4 (1992): 243.
19 Emma Hooper, “Pakistan: Back to the Future?” Notes International CIDOB 91 (June 2014),
http://www.cidob.org/en/content/download/39500/608345/file/NOTES+91_HOOPER_ANG%282%29.pdf.
4
thesis proposes to expand our understanding of the causes of extremism and
organizations that then transfer it to society.

In the studies of terrorism and extremism, Pakistan has gained special attention
because of its “frontline” position and proximity to Afghanistan, and its involvement in
the Soviet-Afghan War, which produced some of the extremists the world is confronting
today. 20 Terrorists continue to use Pakistan’s porous borders to move between the local
population of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which undermines the U.S. and Pakistan’s
efforts to combat these terrorists. 21 It is therefore important to understand how these
terrorists get support from society. A detailed study of selected ROs in Pakistan will
broaden our understanding of what is occurring at the grassroots societal level in
Pakistan.

A study conducted by the Pew Research Center finds Pakistan among the top ten
countries with very high social hostilities involving religion. 22 While ROs might not
agree with the use of violent tactics by the terrorists, they do, however, support the
overarching agenda of enforcing Sharia law in the country because they believe that
religious laws will alleviate poverty and injustice. This thesis will attempt to make that
connection clear and show that a society that supports the ROs also ends up supporting
terrorist organizations that are involved in anti-state activities. Thomas J. Badey
comments that religious ideologies can become a way of organizing hatred against
existing social and political systems. 23

Religious extremism also leads to sectarian violence, which has claimed

thousands of lives in Pakistan. A report by the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre
notes that up to 4000 people have died in sectarian violence between mid-1980s and early

20 Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm,” Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 618, Terrorism: What the Next President Will Face (July 2008): 32.
21 Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (New
York: Viking, 2012).
22 Brian J. Grim, “Rising Restrictions on Religion: One-third of the World’s Population Experiences
an Increase,” Pew Research Center (August 2011): 16‒17, http://pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/
Issues/Government/RisingRestrictions-web.pdf.
23 Badey, “The Role of Religion in International Terrorism,” 84.

5
2000s. 24 Between 2007 and 2011, there was a sharp increase in sectarian terrorism, which
claimed the lives of 1,649 people. 25 Therefore, religious extremism is a serious threat to
Pakistan’s internal security.

Religious organizations in Pakistan have become more extreme in their ideology

while maintaining considerable influence in society. They draw their strength from their
connection to a sizeable segment of society through which they exert pressure on the state
to adopt extremist policies. The role of ROs in making Pakistan an Islamic state is well
known; their subsequent success in pressurizing Z.A. Bhutto to declare Ahmedis as non-
Muslims and include clauses in 1973 constitution to enforce Sharia law is also widely
known. 26 Later, in 1983, General Zia accepted their demand of passing Hudood
Ordinance, which restricts women’s rights. 27 ROs in Pakistan are a significant factor,
which have compelled the state to adopt extremist policies and influence society. This
thesis will demonstrate that these ROs, over a period-of-time, have become more extreme
in their ideology because of specific external and internal reasons, such as the Soviet-
Afghan War and hyper competition among the Pakistani elite. This thesis will then
illustrate their social links that propagate extremism in society, as well as their influence
in state activities.

The socio-economic link between ROs and society is understudied in academia,

as is the reason some organizations promote extreme ideas. This gap in research restricts
our understanding of how some ROs contribute to expanding extremism in society and
how the state then responds to this. This thesis will try to cover the gap by establishing
the socio-economic link between ROs and society and how that contributes to overall
extremism.

24 Huma Yusuf, “Sectarian Violence: Pakistan’s Greatest Security Threat,” Norwegian Peacebuilding
Resource Centre (July 2012): 3, www.peacebuilding.no/.../949e7f9b2db9f947c95656e5b54e389e.pdf.
25 Ibid.
26 Riaz Hassan, “Islamization: An Analysis of Religious, Political and Social Change in Pakistan,”
Middle Eastern Studies 21, no. 3 (July 1985): 264, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283071?origin=JSTOR-
pdf.
27 Ibid., 268.

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C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Since the beginning of the American-led Global War on Terror, there has been a
lot of research on terrorism, particularly Islamic terrorism. 28 Yet, most of it can be put in
the category of research on political groups that are fighting the state or the U.S. (for
example, Al Qaida and Taliban). Such research does not, however, answer the very
important question of how society is connected to the ROs, which is essential for
understanding the constraints on the state as well shaping state behavior. Without
understanding what connects terrorists and Pakistani society, we may not understand
what the Pakistani state can do and what it cannot. This literature review therefore will
first review literature on terrorism and extremism, and then specifically on Pakistan and
its society, in order to understand what is needed in terms of further research.

1. Rational Choice Approach as a Foundation

This thesis will use the rational choice approach to explain the link between ROs
and the society. The rational choice approach is based on the premise that “within the
limits of their information and understanding, restricted by available options, guided by their
preferences and tastes, humans attempt to make rational choices.” 29 This thesis will see ROs
as rational actors who try to maximize their benefits by increasing their membership. The
religious organizations operate in a mutually competitive environment and strive for
monopoly over religion because the group that will have the monopoly would be the
legitimate representative of religion in the country. This will also give that group the
authority and legitimacy to influence the state to pass policies in favor of the RO. The
rational choice approach explains that the mutually competitive environment causes ROs to
promote extremism. 30

It can be argued that all organizations behave rationally, but it is important to

contextualize the ROs through the rational choice approach because this will explain why

28 Sandler, “New Frontiers of Terrorism.”

29 Stephen Sharot, “Beyond Christianity: A Critique of the Rational Choice Theory of Religion from a
Weberian and Comparative Religions Perspective,” Sociology of Religion 63, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 429,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/57145309?accountid=12702.
30 Kent D. Miller, “Competitive Strategies of Religious Organizations,” Strategic Management
Journal 23, no. 5 (May 2002): 438, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3094476?origin=JSTOR-pdf.
7
the ROs behave in a certain way. For example, rational choice explains why some of the
ROs promote extremism and why they strive to increase their support. Other social
theories about religious extremism are also important to understand why individuals
adopt a particular religion or sect, but this thesis is focused on organizations rather than
individuals, and therefore it will be appropriate to view the ROs as rational actors in a
market place of ideologies. This will help in an objective understanding of ROs to
explain how some extremist ROs contribute to extremism.

Laurence R. Iannaccone, who took the rational choice theory beyond individuals
to organizations, proposes that “religious ‘producers’ are also viewed as optimizers—
maximizing members, net resources, government support, or some other basic
determinant of institutional success.” 31 Therefore, the ROs will be discussed in terms of
producers, which aim to maximize benefits to achieve their objectives. Similarly, society
and state will also be depicted as rational actors trying to maximize their gains. It may be
noted that this thesis will not contextualize religion, per se, as an economic commodity as
some proponents of the Rational Choice Theory of Religion suggest. 32 Rather, this argues
that ROs, society and the state operate in a competing market place and that the ROs
struggle among each other to be the most profitable producer. In doing so, they compete
for more support from society and thus become an attractive commodity for the state to
reach out to the general masses. ROs in Pakistan can be explained under this framework
as they compete to be relevant to the state by expanding their influence over society. In
doing so, they promote exclusionary ideologies and contribute to extremism. This
research will further show how the competition among the ROs leads to promoting
extremism in society, how much influence these ROs have on Pakistani society, and what
segment or class of society supports ROs and why. What leverage do these institutions

31 Laurence R. Iannaccone, “Voodoo Economics? Reviewing the Rational Choice Approach to

Religion,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 34, no. 1 (March 1995): 77, http://www.jstor.org/
stable/1386524.
32 See, for example, Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. and Robert F. Hébert, “Interest Groups, Public Choice and
the Economics of Religion,” Public Choice 142, no. 3/4, Essays in Honor of Robert D. Tollison (March
2010): 429‒436, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40541978; see also Steve Bruce, “Religion and Rational
Choice: A Critique of Economic Explanations of Religious Behavior,” Sociology of Religion 54, no. 2,
Theory and History in the Study of Religion (Summer 1993): 193‒205; and Roger Finke and Laurence R.
lannaccone, “Supply Side Explanations for Religious Change,” The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 527 (May 1993): 27–39.
8
have on the state policies? Why does the state respond to the demands of these socially
influential institutions to make extremist legislation? Answers to these questions will
explain how the ROs in Pakistan have been able to promote extremism.

2. Religious Extremism

Most of the literature uses religious extremism and fundamentalism

interchangeably; however, Douglas Pratt argues that there is an important distinction
between these two concepts. 33 According to Pratt, “extremism suggests fanaticism”
whereas fundamentalism relates to religio-political perspective found in many—if not
all—major religions in the contemporary world. 34 The difference between extremism and
terrorism is also evident from a poll conducted by the International Republican Institute
whereby 10 percent of Pakistanis believed that terrorism was the most important issue,
whereas 74 percent said that extremism was the most serious issue. 35 Lynn Davies
observes that extremism is a derivative of fundamentalism, and that “the extremist’s
mindset revolves around an absolutist claim to an authentic truth, coupled with the steady
rejection of opposing opinions and beliefs.” 36 A better definition of extremism, attributed
to Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s debate in Doha, Qatar, defines extremism as “when you
do not allow for a different point of view; when you hold your own views as being quite
exclusive, when you don’t allow for the possibility of difference.” 37 This definition
describes a broader conception of religious intolerance that leads to violence and poses a
security challenge. This thesis will use the aforementioned definition given by
Archbishop Desmond Tutu because not all ROs are extremist organizations; some of
them are just merely fundamentalists and this thesis will specifically focus on those.

33 Douglas Pratt, “Religion and Terrorism: Christian Fundamentalism and Extremism,” Terrorism and
Political Violence 22, no.3 (2010): 438‒456, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546551003689399.
34 Ibid.
35 International Republican Institute, “IRI Releases Survey of Pakistan Public Opinion International
Republican Institute (IRI),” http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/iri-releases-survey-pakistan-
public-opinion-7.
36 Dina Al Raffie, “Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the Diaspora,”
Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 4 (2013): 69, http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss4/4.
37 Lynn Davies, Education against Extremism (Stoke on Trent, UK: Trentham Books, 2008).

9
 3. Religious Extremism in Pakistan

Various scholars have approached religious extremism in Pakistan since

September 11. Some of the scholars explain religious extremism in Pakistan because of
military rule and an alliance between the military and religious militants to pursue
security objectives and to legitimize the military’s rule. Vali Nasr argues that military
rulers made alliances with the ROs to legitimize their rule. 38 Hussain Haqqani also
highlights the role of military in supporting religious groups for its own interests. 39 S.
Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly support Haqqani’s findings and argue that the use of
militancy “is the centerpiece of a sophisticated asymmetric warfare campaign.” 40 These
scholars argue that because the military regime needs legitimization, they make alliances
with the ROs to grant themselves divine legitimacy. The military in Pakistan trained
militants to fight against the Soviets during Soviet-Afghan War. To accomplish that, the
military used the ROs as recruitment agencies. This thesis acknowledges that the state has
been using ROs to promote jihad against the infidel communists in Afghanistan. This
thesis will explore why the state needs ROs to legitimize its rule and pursue security
objectives through them. While these scholars point to an important factor that elevated
these organizations and even made them extreme, it does not really explain the societal
support for these organizations, which then translates into extremism at the home front.

Another explanation of religious extremism relating it to foreign interventions and

influences come from scholars like Aburish Said and Noam Chomsky. 41 These scholars
argue that militant extremism is partially a response to foreign occupation and influences
in Muslim countries. This thesis builds on this explanation, because of the prevalent
militant struggle against occupation in Palestine, Kashmir, Iraq, and Afghanistan. They

38 Vali Nasr, “Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan,” Middle East Journal 58, no. 2
(Spring 2004): 196, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4330001?origin=JSTOR-pdf.
39 Hussain Ḥaqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 2005).
40 Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly,”The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia.”
International Security 37, no. 1 (2012): 111‒141, http://muse.jhu.edu/.
41 Said Aburish, A Brutal Friendship: The West and the Arab Elite (London: Indigo, 1997); Noam
Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians (Boston: South End Press,
1983); and Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random
House, 2005).
10
further argue that the extremist ROs in other countries use the sentiments of their
population against occupation in other countries to mobilize support for themselves. For
example, ROs in Pakistan ask for donations for jihad in other countries. Interestingly,
their expenditure is not auditable and there is no proof that whether such funds were used
for supporting jihad against foreign interventions or were consumed by the ROs to spread
extreme views in their own country. This thesis argues that such ROs strive to acquire
resources to increase their strength and support from society so that they can get
concessions from the state. It will further demonstrate that such ROs promote extremism
by calling for jihad in other countries and recruiting militants who can be used by these
extremist ROs for their own purposes.

Significant research on extremism in Pakistan is focused on the role of madrasas

(religious schools) in promoting extremism. Commentators such as Jessica Stern, Alan
Richards, Hussain Haqqani, Ahmed Rashid, and Ali Riaz are a few of the scholars who
draw a causal link between madrasas and extremism in Pakistan. 42 This school of
thought argues that madrasas have been indoctrinating young students with radical Islam.
However, such claims have been refuted by scholars like Tahir Andarabi et al., Tariq
Rahman, and Christine Fair who argue that madrasas have been unfairly blamed for
promoting extremism and that these religious schools instead provide social services by
educating the underprivileged. 43 Tahir Andrabi et al. have collected data on madrasas
and students who enroll in these seminaries. The data shows that the numbers of

42 Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 6 (November–December 2000):
115‒126, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049971; see also Jessica Stern, “Preparing for a War on
Terrorism,” Current History 100, no. 649 (2001): 355‒357; Alan Richards, “At War with Utopian
Fanatics,” Middle East Policy 8, no. 4 (2001); Hussain Haqqani, “Islam’s Medieval Outposts,” Foreign
Policy 133 (November–December 2002): 58‒64, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3183558; See also Ahmed
Rashid, Descent Into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 2008); and Ali Riaz, “Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Teaching
the Alphabets of Jihad,” Working Paper No. 85, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore,
www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP85.pdf.
43 Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das, Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Tristan Zajonc, “Religious School Enrollment in
Pakistan: A Look at the Data.” Comparative Education Review 50, no. 3, Special Issue on Islam and
Education—Myths and Truths, ed. Wadad Kadi and Victor Billeh (August, 2006): 446‒477,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/503885; Tariq Rahman, “Madrassas: Religion, Poverty, and the
Potential for Violence in Pakistan,” Islamabad Policy Research Institute 5 no. 1 (Winter 2005),
http://www.ipripak.org/journal/winter2005/madrassas.shtml; Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair,
“Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,” International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/
10): 79‒118, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ins/summary/v034/34.3.shapiro.html.
11
madrasas in Pakistan are not significant and that empirical data disproves a link between
poverty and enrollment in madrasas. 44 Based on these statistics, Christine Fair argues
that “commonly suggested palliatives intended to reduce generalized support for
militancy—economic development, greater democratization, alternatives to religious
education, and so on—is unlikely to be effective.” 45 Andrabi and Fair’s findings have
been challenged by scholars like Christopher Candland who observes that the number of
madrasas in Pakistan are much more—19,104—than reported by Andrabi. 46 Candland
further argues that madrasas have played a significant role in promoting extremism.47
But madrasas are only one aspect of charity work by ROs. Arguably, while there is no
doubt that madrasas have played an important role in producing radical “students” such
as the Taliban, the focus on madrasas has detracted from other links between society and
ROs. This thesis will explore other societal links that are as critical but also hidden to
some extent.

Social welfare projects being run by ROs also need attention. However, little
direct empirical data is available that can ascertain a correlation between ROs’ welfare
work and society’s support. Jamat-i-Islami, for example, runs a welfare organization
named Al-Khidmat that “runs hospitals, schools, women’s vocational centers, and
emergency response units.” 48 Masooda Bano argues that “converting beneficiaries
(through welfare programs) into voters is at most a secondary concern; instead the
primary motive for the engagement in welfare work is to win the trust of party members
by establishing the party’s commitment to the implementation of religious precepts.”49
This claim by Bano, however, cannot be substantiated through empirical evidence, but at
the same time, there is no empirical research available to justify that welfare work by

44 Andrabi, “Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan.”

45 Jacob N. Shapiro, and C. Christine Fair, “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in
Pakistan,” International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009): 116, http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu/
journals/international_security/v034/34.3.shapiro.pdf.
46 Christopher Candland, “Pakistan’s Recent Experience in Reforming Islamic Education” in Madrasa
in South Asia: Teaching Terror? ed. Jamal Malik (New York: Routledge, 2008): 102.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., 10.
49 Bano, “Marker of Identity,” 12.

12
ROs is intended to increase the support for ROs. Therefore, there remains a gap in
research to understand the socio-economic influence of the welfare activities of the ROs.
This thesis intends to cover this gap by showing that the ROs increase their support
through welfare activities.

A seminal work in this regard has been undertaken by the Religions and
Development Research Program Consortium (RaD), sponsored by the UK Department of
International Development (DFID). RaD has carried out research on Jama’at-i-Islami (JI)
in Pakistan and Bangladesh; the aim of this research is to understand the influence of
welfare work by ROs in society. RaD’s research explores whether the ROs perform
welfare work to secure loyalty of its members to benefit in elections. The research is
based on interviews with JIs’ leadership, and thus lacks empirical evidence; nonetheless,
RaD’s study suggests that exploring the influence of welfare work by ROs is worthy of
dedicated research on the topic. 50 This thesis will establish the link between ROs’ welfare
work and support from society.

Unfortunately, establishing links between ROs and society through empirical data
may not be possible because it is difficult to engage in direct field work. However, there
is indirect evidence available through data from primary and secondary sources that was
not intended specifically for understanding the link between ROs and society. For
instance, newspaper articles connect ROs to charity work in regions where they have a
stronghold. This thesis will also use data mostly from RaD’s study, polls conducted by
the International Republican Institute, earlier work done by scholars like Andrabi et al.,
Christine Fair, Jessica Stern, and P. W. Singer. 51 The data will be analyzed to understand
the social base of ROs and to demonstrate that the welfare work by ROs significantly
contributes to maintaining their social base.

50 Ibid., 12.
51 Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 6 (November‒December 2000):
115‒126, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049971; Religions and Development (RaD),
http://www.religionsanddevelopment.org; The International Republican Institute, http://www.iri.org/
countries-and-programs/middle-east-and-north-africa/pakistan; Peter Warren Singer, “Pakistan’s
Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education not Jihad,” Brookings Institution (November 2001),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2001/11/pakistan-singer.
13
 Due to limited available data, this thesis will use the case study method by
looking at selected ROs. Both JI and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) are important organizations
that are active in Pakistan and are well documented in the media. Moreover, JI and JUD
have extensive networks of welfare activities through their welfare wings. Haroon K.
Ullah, Humeira Iqtidar, Nasr, Bano, RaD, and the International Crisis Group have studied
these two ROs in much detail and provided useful statistics that can be used for analysis
in this thesis. 52

This thesis has academic and practical benefits. From an academic perspective,
this work will demonstrate that the socio-economic link between ROs and the society is
significant to understand how some of the extremist ROs garner support from society.
This thesis will highlight the gaps in research work, which, if addressed, will broaden our
understanding of religious extremism. From a practical perspective, this understanding
can help in implementing sound policies aimed at minimizing the support for extremist
ROs. In this regard, this paper can lead to better implementation of Pakistan’s recently
formulated National Policy on counterterrorism. 53

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Islamic extremism is one of the most serious security challenges facing Pakistan
and the world. Promoting extremism in society leads to the use of violence. Sectarian
violence and other acts of terrorism have claimed thousands of lives in Pakistan. It is
therefore important to understand how extremism is being propagated in society. The
causes of extremism in Pakistan have been attributed to regional wars and rivalries,
natural sectarian divides in the country, state weakness (especially in tribal regions),
Pakistan’s support for anti-India militants in Kashmir, and Pakistan’s co-operation with
the United States in the War on Terror. While all of these factors contribute to extremism,

52 Haroon K. Ullah, Vying for Allah’s Vote: Understanding Islamic Parties, Political Violence, and
Extremism in Pakistan (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014); Humeira Iqtidar,
Secularizing Islamists? Jama’at-e-Islami and Jama’at-ud-Dawa in Urban Pakistan (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2011); Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Vanguard of Islamic Revolution The Jama’at-i-Islami of
Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Religions and Development (RaD),
http://www.religionsanddevelopment.org; and “Islamic Parties in Pakistan,” International Crisis Group,
Working Paper No. 216.
53 Government of Pakistan, “National Internal Security Policy 2014‒18,” http://nacta.gov.pk/#NISP.

14
this thesis hypothesizes that the supporting environment for extremism is located in the
local ROs. This thesis shows that the abovementioned factors can motivate individuals,
but an organized base to mobilize these individuals is essential for terrorism.

This thesis emphasizes the role of ROs as providers of organized bases and a
supporting environment to the disenfranchised masses, which mobilizes them as groups.
It will be argued that the ROs capitalize on people’s grievances and fill the void created
by the state’s ineffective social welfare programs to muster support from society. The
ROs do so in a competitive environment to claim their monopoly over religion because
the RO that has the monopoly over religion would be the legitimate beneficiary of the
state’s resources. This monopoly and legitimacy will also provide that RO with an
influence over state policy. 54 Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of this
relationship.

Figure 1. State, Society, and ROs’ Relation.

This thesis hypothesizes that the ROs in Pakistan have a socio-economic linkage
with society because these institutions provide public goods and welfare to society.
Members of society who benefit from the welfare activities of the ROs become
supporters of these institutions. Moreover, some selected ROs in Pakistan have adopted
extreme views due to the political and social context in the country. They then use this
socio-economic link to indoctrinate citizens with extremist ideologies, thus creating a
foundational acceptance of terrorism as a justified activity. Further, this link enables ROs

54 Iannaccone, “Voodoo Economics?” 77.

15
to mobilize society for their interests, such as to pressure the state to gain concessions or
compel the state to pass extremist laws. The state responds to ROs because of their
influence over a considerable segment of society. At times, the state also needs the ROs
to mobilize the population for the state’s interest. Therefore, the state accepts the
demands of ROs—including those that require adoption and implementation of extremist
laws. The following model explains the links among ROs, society, and the state:

Religious extremism is one of the most serious security challenges for Pakistan.
Extremism in society allows for more radicalization that leads to the use of violence. It is
therefore important to understand how extremism is being propagated in society.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis will use JI and JUD as a case study to demonstrate that ROs in
Pakistan have considerable influence on society because of their socio-economic links. At
the time of independence, JI was the most prominent religious organization in Pakistan.
JI was founded by Mawlana Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawwdudi in 1941, and since then it has
maintained substantial support in terms of street power. 55 Meanwhile, JUD is known to
be the new front for the Lashkar-e-Taiba. 56 Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, the founder of the
organization, started Jamaat-ud-Dawa in 2002 after Lashkar was banned by the Pakistani
government. 57 JUD also enjoys significant support from society and runs many charity
works, which will be discussed in later chapters. This study of JI and JUD will illustrate
the influence of ROs on society because they have been instrumental in compelling the
state to adopt extremist policies, such as the declaration of Ahmedis as non-Muslims in
1974, and the passing of the Hudood Ordinance in 1983. 58 JI is also the largest and the

55 Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, 3.

56 “Pakistan Gave Funds to Group on UN Terror Blacklist,” BBC South Asia, http://www.bbc.com/
news/10334914.
57 Roggio, “UN Declares Jamaat-ud-Dawa a Terrorist Front Group.”
58 The Objectives Resolution of 1948 provided basic guidelines for formulating the constitution of the
newly created state of Pakistan. The Objectives Resolution demanded that all laws of the country must be
made in accordance with the teachings of Islam. The 1973 constitution was formulated under these broad
guidelines, but it explicitly included clauses related to the Islamic character of the state and declared that
Sharia laws were to be implemented in the country. The Hudood Ordinance of 1983 implemented Sharia
law as interpreted by the Sunni Sect. See James Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Pakistan (New York:
Infobase Publishing, 2009), 171, 207, 216.
16
most organized RO with an expansive network of welfare activities throughout the
country.

The social welfare work being done by these organizations will be studied to
understand the economic link between these ROs and society. The geographical location
of welfare activities will be connected to social support for JI and JUD from these areas.
This thesis will demonstrate that the areas where these ROs provide welfare goods are
more prone to accept their ideology. Surveys conducted by RaD and Fair will be
analyzed to make such a correlation, which will show how ROs influence society. 59

The evolution of JI and JUD into more hardline ideological organizations will
also be examined. This thesis will explore why these ROs became more extreme in their
ideology. Was it because of the demand from the society or a response to state policies?
It will be argued that ulema (religious clerics) and religious organizations had co-existed
with other religious communities in the subcontinent for centuries, but during the latter
half of the twentieth century, they have increasingly become intolerant of other religions
and sects. This thesis will explore the reasons why these ROs have changed their
ideologies from relative tolerance to extremism. 60

The thesis will also attempt to understand the relationship between JI, JUD and
the state. It will be demonstrated that the state has provided significant concessions to the
demands by these ROs, such as adopting an Islamic constitution, declaring Ahmedis as
non-Muslims and implementing Sharia law through the Hudood Ordinance. This thesis
will argue that such intolerant policies by the state add to the overall environment of
extremism because exclusionary policies can lead to violent responses from minorities. 61

59 C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Faith or Doctrine? Religion and Support
for Political Violence in Pakistan.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 76, no. 4 (Winter 2012): 712,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41684595; Bano, “Marker of Identity.”
60 Kfir, “Sectarian Violence”; Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman, “Religious Extremism”; and
Miller, “Competitive Strategies of Religious Organizations.”
61 Alan B. Krueger, What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2007); Ashutosh Misra, “Rise of Religious Parties in Pakistan: Causes and
Prospects,” Strategic Analysis 27, no. 2 (2003), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160308450083; and Vali R.
Nasr, “International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization: Sectarianism in Pakistan,
1979–1998,” Comparative Politics 32, no.2 (2000).
17
F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis will focus on JI and JUD to demonstrate the role of ROs in
contributing toward extremism in Pakistan. The paper will be divided in five chapters to
answer these three essential questions: How are ROs linked with society? Why have ROs
become more extreme in their ideology? How does the state respond to ROs?

Chapter II examines historical links between the religious organizations and

society. This chapter will demonstrate the ROs (specifically, JI and JUD) that have
maintained socio-economic links with a segment of society through welfare activities.
Since the state has failed to provide basic social necessities, the ROs fill the void, which
enables them to maintain influence over parts of society. Hence, they are able to
influence groups and have support among the people, which affects state-society
relations.

Chapter III investigates reasons for increasing extremism in religious

organizations in Pakistan. It will be argued that the ROs had been relatively tolerant
organizations and had co-existed with other religious communities in the subcontinent.
After Pakistan gained Independence, the ROs saw an opportunity to establish influence
over the state to make it a purely Islamic country. Despite the existence of these religious
organizations since Independence, Pakistan did not see much religious terrorism until the
end of the Soviet-Afghan War in 1980s. This chapter will examine the reasons for
extremism in ROs, which come from domestic and foreign sources.

Chapter IV looks at the relations between the state and the ROs. This chapter
illustrates that the state has needed the ROs to mobilize support in society. Since ROs
have the power to garner street support from the society, they have been able to bargain
with the state, which needs their support. This chapter will draw upon four significant
events that demonstrate the state’s acquiescence to the demands of ROs. These events
include the Islamic character of the 1973 constitution, the passing of legislation to declare
Ahmedis as non-Muslims, the implementation of Sharia law through the Hudood
Ordinance, and the Afghan-Soviet war. This chapter explains that the state’s acceptance
of extremist policies also contributes to extremism because such policies exclude

18
minority religions and sects that make these groups feel marginalized and forces them to
resort to violence to fight for their rights.

19
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20
 II. LINKAGE BETWEEN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN
PAKISTAN AND THE POOR

A. INTRODUCTION

In order to understand the role of ROs in Pakistan, it is important to explain how

the ROs in Pakistan have maintained links to the society. This chapter will explain how
the ROs in Pakistan are linked to the society and how they have been able to rally public
support. Furthermore, this chapter will demonstrate that the ROs in Pakistan are linked to
the poor through their social services and welfare activities. Their influence on the poor
makes them politically important for the state because the state needs these religious
groups to mobilize the poor. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section
discusses the historical legacies of charity work by the ROs. ROs in Pakistan have a
legacy of conducting social welfare activities, which connects them with the poor. The
second section will use JUD and JI to describe how these organizations are linked to the
poor through their welfare programs. The third section explains that the ROs maintain
their links to the poor to expand their influence by increasing the number of their
members. This, in turn, increases their significance and their influence over the state.

The ROs in Pakistan have extensive socio-economic welfare programs through

which they offer free education, along with room and board in madrasas. 62 Some ROs
also organize weddings and arrange for burials for the poor. 63 Finally, a few ROs run
charity hospitals. There appear to be several such socio-economic links between ROs and
the poor in Pakistan because the poor often rely on ROs for education and for aid during
times of crisis. There is, however, not much empirical research done on this link. This
relationship is critical for understanding politics in Pakistan. According to a report on
Islamic parties in Pakistan published by the International Crisis Group, “they (the ROs)
have disproportionately influenced domestic policy…through the use of street power and
violence, often successfully pressuring civilian governments into abandoning promised

62 Blanchard, Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background (CRS Report No. RS21654)
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated January 23, 2007).
63 Bano, “Marker of Identity,” 19.

21
reforms or making concessions that forward an Islamist agenda.” 64 According to Zahid
Hussain, a journalist, “the disturbing reality is that radical Islamic elements have as
much—if not more—power over Pakistani society than the state.” 65 It is therefore
important to explore how ROs in Pakistan have maintained their influence over society.

Pakistan is facing an internal security threat from religious extremism in the shape
of sectarian violence and the struggle by some religious groups to establish control over
the state. This struggle has been violent and has claimed thousands of lives. 66 It is
therefore important to understand the historical context of religious groups in Pakistan
and their connection to the population to better understand where these religious groups
draw their support from and why. Such understanding can persuade policy makers to
provide welfare to the poor, thereby cutting off the support for extremist religious groups.

B. HISTORICAL LEGACY OF CHARITY WORK BY ROs IN PAKISTAN

A study conducted by the Religion and Development Research Program notes that
there is a historical link between religion and welfare activities in the subcontinent. 67
Religions in the area now called Pakistan have influenced charity work for over five
centuries. 68 Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Sikhism, and Islam have influenced their
followers to take care of the poor, sick, and under-privileged populations of society.69
Specifically, in the Muslim dominated areas of the subcontinent—from the eighth to the
eighteenth century—mosques, madrasas, and khanqahs (Sufi monasteries) were

64 International Crisis Group, “Islamic Parties in Pakistan” International Crisis Group, i,

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/216-islamic-parties-in-pakistan.aspx, 25.
65 Zahid Hussain, “The Construction and Deconstruction of Pakistan: The Institutional Writ of the
State,” CIDOB Policy Research Project (June 2014): 10, http://www.cidob.org/en/content/download/
39741/609867/file/JUNE+2014_ZAHID+HUSSAIN.pdf.
66 Yusuf, “Sectarian Violence: Pakistan’s Greatest Security Threat,” 3.
67 Muhammed Asif Iqbal and Saima Siddiqui, “Mapping the Terrain: The Activities of Faith-Based
Organizations in Development in Pakistan,” Religion and Development (RaD) Working Paper 24 (2008):
15, http://www.religionsanddevelopment.org/files/resourcesmodule/@random454f80f60b3f4/
1229940021_working_paper_24___web_file.pdf.
68 Muhammad Asif Iqbal, Hina Khan, and Surkhab Javed, “Nonprofit Sector in Pakistan: Historical
Background,” The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project Pakistan, SPDC Working Paper
no. 4 (2004): 5, http://www.adm-cf.com/jhu/pdfs/CNP/CNP_NPS4_Pakistan.pdf.
69 Ibid.

22
established as philanthropic institutions. 70 Asif Iqbal et al. comment that “the most
striking trend in the field of charity and social welfare emerges from a mystical
movement within Muslims called Sufism,” which entered the subcontinent from West
and Central Asia during the eleventh century. 71 Iqbal and Siddiqui note that the Sufi
khanqahs provided social services, such as food, for both their inhabitants and the local
population, regardless of caste, creed, or race. 72 ROs therefore have maintained a link
with the poor through their social work.

In 1894, the British Raj in the subcontinent tried to limit the work of Islamic
charities and brought the waqf (religious endowments) under the control of central
government. 73 Dr. Jennifer Bremer, Director of the Washington Center of the Frank
Hawkins Kennan Institute of Private Enterprise, argues that these moves by the British
“challenged local elites and reduced their social and economic power relative to that of
colonial powers.” 74 It can be argued that the British colonizers were aware of the social
influence of the religious welfare organizations and wanted to limit it, but the local
Muslim elites fought against these limitations imposed on their social support base.

After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the waqf system remained intact, but the
first military regime felt threatened by the potential of ROs to use shrines and
endowments to mobilize support against military rule. Bremer observes that

70 Ibid., 7; Khanqahs are Sufi monasteries where disciples of the Pirs (spiritual leaders in Sufism) live
and study religion. Khanqahs are similar to madrasas, but follow the Sufi doctrine of mystic beliefs.
71 Ibid., 8–9; Sufism is a mystical movement within Islam that seeks to find divine love and
knowledge through direct personal experience of God. It consists of a variety of mystical paths that are
designed to ascertain the nature of mankind and God and to facilitate the experience of divine love and
wisdom in the world. Sufism arose as an organized movement among different groups who found orthodox
Islam to be spiritually stifling. The practices of contemporary Sufi orders and suborders vary, but most
include the recitation of the name of God or of certain phrases from the Quran as a way to enable the soul
to experience the higher reality. Though Sufi practitioners have often been at odds with the mainstream of
Islamic theology and law, the importance of Sufism in the history of Islam is incalculable. Sufi literature,
especially poetry depicting the love of God, represents a golden age in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu
languages. See Britannica Concise Encyclopedia, 1839, www.books.google.com/books?isbn=1593394926.
72 Iqbal and Siddiqui, “Mapping Terrain,” 16.
73 Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan (New
Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 1998), 56.
74 Jennifer Bremer “Islamic Philanthropy: Reviving Traditional Forms of Building Social Justice,”
paper presented at The Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy presented at the annual conference at
Washington, DC, May 2004, 14, https://www.csidonline.org/documents/pdf/5th_Annual_Conference-
Bremer_paper.pdf.
23
“Pakistan…entered independence with its Islamic endowment system largely intact.”75
After the independence of Pakistan, ROs continued their charity work by delivering
social goods to the poor and needy people in society. But during the first military rule
(1958–1971), the Sufi shrines and associated waqf were placed under the control of the
Federal Ministry of Religious Affairs. 76 Iqbal and Siddiqui argue that:

This may have been a means of controlling any possible threats to the
military establishment that could have developed through the congregation
of large group of people at the shrines, as these gatherings provided
politicians with opportunities to muster support. 77

Katherine Ewing, a scholar on religious practices in Islam, notes that “leaders of

Pakistan have found that the organizational structure of the shrines, traditionally
maintained by hereditary living pirs, is a force that hampers their efforts to control the
political and social organization of the country.” 78 Pir in Sufi tradition is a spiritual
leader who is believed to be closer to the God by virtue of his piety. Pir Pagaro in Sind is
an example of how influential his followers can be. Pir Pagaro has traditionally had a
large following in Sind and its surrounding areas. The followers of Pir Pagaro are called
Hurs; they are willing to lay down their lives for him. 79 The Hurs, under the leadership of
Pir Pagaro, staged two rebellions against the British, one in the 1890s and again in the
1940s; during the second rebellion, Sabghatullah Shah was the Pir Pagaro. 80 The British
executed him in 1943 because they saw him as a threat to their administration. 81 It can be
argued that the religious leaders such as pirs can influence the population through socio-
welfare networks of shrines or kahnqahs to rally support against the ruling regime.
Therefore, ROs have the potential to mobilize masses through their socio-welfare linkage
with society.

75 Ibid.
76 Iqbal and Siddiqui, “Mapping the Terrain,” 18.
77 Ibid.
78 Katherine Ewing, “The Politics of Sufism: Redefining the Saints of Pakistan,” Journal of Asian
Studies 42, no. 2 (February 1983): 251, doi: 10.2307/2055113.
79 Ibid., 256.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.

24
 During the military rule of General Zia ul Haq (1977–1988), the ROs increased in
numbers and expanded their scope. Iqbal and Siddiqui observe that, “against the
backdrop of Zia’s Islamization drive, alongside the Afghan War (1979–1989), and the
liberal flow of foreign funds, the ROs flourished.” 82 This period also saw an increase in
sectarian ROs with a military outlook, which can be attributed to the growing influence
of Saudi funding to check the spread of Iranian influence after the Iranian Revolution.83
The increase in sectarian competition is also attributed to the phenomenon of the state’s
support of the sect of Deobandi. 84 Zia had a personal inclination toward the hardliner
Deobandi ideology, which was not very popular in Pakistan at the time. The majority of
the people followed the rather moderate ideology of mystic Sufism, Barelvi. 85 In 2011, a
website on global security estimated that 50 percent of the Muslim population in Pakistan
is Barelvi, whereas 20 percent belong to the Deobandi sect. 86 During the Soviet-Afghan
War, military regime under Zia supported the Deobandis and provided them with
substantial funds to promote jihad in Afghanistan. The funds were used to establish
madrasas, which changed the sectarian landscape of Pakistan. 87 The Deobandis, which
have been a minority population (20 percent) as compared to the Barelvis (50 percent),
have managed to outnumber the madrasas run by the latter. 88 Moreover, Zia also
followed the advice of JI and ulema from Deobandi ideology in formulating Islamic laws
(such as the Hudood Ordinance), of which the minority sects did not approve.89

82 Iqbal and Siddiqui, “Mapping the Terrain,” 19.

83 Jon B. Alternan, “Saudi Charities and Support for Terror,” in Understanding Islamic Charities, ed.
Jon B. Alterman and Karin Von Hippel (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies
(2007), 64, http://books.google.com/books?id=1QbC2rFxr24C&printsec=
frontcover#v=onepage&q=pakistan&f=false.
84 Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: United Book Press,
2008), 151.
85 Ismail Khan, “The Assertion of Barelvi Extremism,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 12, no. 56,
https://hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1283/kahn_vol12.pdf.
86 Global Security, “Barelvi Islam,” Global Security, last modified on 7 May 2011,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-barelvi.htm.
87 Khan, “Assertion of Barelvi Extremism,” 56.
88 Ashok K. Behuria, “Sects within Sect: The Case of Deobandi-Barelvi Encounter in Pakistan,”
Strategic Analysis 32, No.1 (January 2008).
89 Hussain Haqqani, “Weeding Out the Heretics: Sectarianism in Pakistan,” 79,
http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1352/haqqani_vol4.pdf.
25
Therefore, through state patronage, a sect that is in minority in terms of population has
become more influential. It can be argued that this patronage of a particular sect by the
state marginalized the other sects and demonstrated that the religious group that receives
the state’s patronage would be the beneficiary of state resources and could influence state
policies.

It is clear from the previous discussion that ROs in Pakistan have a legacy of
carrying out socio-economic services. Dr. Quintan Wiktorowicz, an architect of the U.S.
counterterrorism policy, puts it neatly:

Throughout history, Islamic movements have used social movement

organizations, like charities and mosques, which give them critical
structures around which to build broadly-based support. Charities can
provide critical financial resources as well as logistical support for the
society, often filling the void created by weak state structures. 90

C. CASE OF JI AND JUD

The ROs in Pakistan have become more organized in their welfare activities in the
last three decades. ROs such as JI and JUD were among the key relief providers during
the devastation caused by the 2005 earthquake and the colossal damage caused by the
floods in 2010. 91 This section will look at the welfare work done by these ROs.

1. Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)

Jamaat-e-Islami was founded by Mawlana Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawwdudi in 1941

and has a substantial support in terms of street power. 92 JI claims to have 4.5 million

90 Dr. Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Terrorism and Islamic Extremism in the Middle East Conference
Report,” in Conference Report on Terrorism and Islamic Extremism in the Middle East: Perspectives and
Possibilities, ed. Lashley Pulsipher (Alexandria, VA: 22 February 2005), http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/
bitstream/handle/10945/30502/2005-
02_Terrorism_and_Islamic_Extremism_in_the_Middle_East_Perspectives_and_Possibilities.pdf?sequence
=1.
91 Bill Roggio, “USAID Leader in Pakistan Supports Jamaat-ud-Dawa Front,” Long War Journal (26
August 2010), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/08/usaid_leader_in_paki.php#; Deutsche
Welle, “Pakistani Islamist Groups Very Visible in the Flood-Affected Regions,” DW, 20 September 2010,
http://www.dw.de/pakistani-islamist-groups-very-visible-in-the-flood-affected-regions/a-6023914.
92 Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, 3.

26
members. 93 Ullah notes that, “currently JI has roughly ten thousand affiliate members in
Lahore and fifteen thousand affiliate members in Karachi with a goal of five million
affiliates throughout Pakistan.” 94 He also comments that “the JI’s most important
connection to the lower classes and the rural poor comes through its charitable work.” 95
Christopher Candland argues that the welfare wing of JI, the Al-Khidmat Foundation,
“runs approximately 90 madaris [Islamic boarding schools], provides stipends to poor
students and funds for the marriage of daughters from poor families, and operates
homeopathic clinics, allopathic dispensaries, and a coffin carrying service for families in
poor areas.” 96 Humeira Iqtidar argues that “no…national political party (save JI) has
institutional links, however tenuous, with peasants or small farmers.” 97 A study
conducted by RaD shows that JI has an expansive welfare network all over Pakistan
(Table 1). Ullah argues that this is “a result of JI’s careful organization and highly
motivated membership.” 98

Table 1. Institutions Run by the Al-Khidmat Foundation. 99

93 Christopher Candland, “Faith as Social Capital: Religion and Community Development in Southern
Asia,” Policy Sciences 33, no. 3/4, Social Capital as a Policy Resource (2000): 362, http://www.jstor.org/
stable/4532509.
94 Ullah, Vying for Allah’s Vote, 84.
95 Ibid., 85.
96 Candland, “Faith as Social Capital,” 362.
97 Humeira Iqtidar, Secularizing Islamists? Jama’at-e-Islami and Jama’at-ud-Dawa in Urban
Pakistan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011): 79.
98 Ullah, Vying for Allah’s Vote, 85.
99 Iqbal and Siddiqui, “Mapping the Terrain,” 30.

27
 Al-Khidmat also works with its sister organizations to provide mainstream
education and organize professional associations such as the Ghazali Education Trust
with 267 school education 60,000 students, the Rural Education and Development
(READ) foundation, which provides education to 60,000 children through 323 schools in
rural areas, the Al-Khidmat Khawateen (women) Trust, which provides various social
services to women, and the Pakistan Islamic Medical Association (PIMA) with a
membership of 3,500 doctors. 100 Candland observes that JI “emphasizes education of
young people so as to favorably influence them toward Jamaat-i-Islami thinking.” 101 It
can therefore be argued that the social work by JI is aimed at expanding their ideology
and broadening their support.

Al-Khidmat has also been prominent in providing relief goods and services during
times of crisis. Ullah notes that the foundation “was widely praised for its relief efforts
following the devastating 2010 floods, when it deployed thousands of relief workers
across some of the hardest-hit areas of Pakistan.” 102 As Candland and Qazi state:

It appears that the Jamaat i Islami set up Al Khidmat Foundation with

political objectives. The failure of state institutions to respond to the
victims of natural disasters and civil strife or lack of government
commitment to the educational and health needs of the population allows
Al Khidmat, run by accomplished Jamaat i Islami leaders, or to win public
sympathy. 103

According to Al-Khidmat’s website, the foundation runs 163 hospitals and clinics
all over the country, which have provided health care to more than 3.5 million people.104
The foundation claims that the government has been unable to provide basic health care
to the poor, but the “Alkhidmat foundation has always served the poorest and neediest

100 Ibid., 31.

101 Ibid.
102 Ullah, Vying for Allah’s Vote, 85.
103 Christopher Candland and Raza Khan Qazi, The Cup, the Gun and the Crescent: Social Welfare
and Civil Unrest in Muslim Societies, ed. Sara Ashencaen Crabtree, Jonathan Parker, and Azlinda Azman
(New York: Whiting & Birch, 2012), 112.
104 Al-Khidmat Foundation Pakistan, official website, http://al-khidmatfoundation.org/
health/#sthash.YvE6oO2C.dpbs.
28
segment of Pakistan’s society.” 105 Moreover, the website claims to have been quite
effective in disaster relief by having provided assistance to a population of 10 million
affected people. 106 A senior Pakistani journalist, Shahzada Irfan Ahmed, and a prominent
defense analyst, Ayesha Sidiqa note that

The government’s inefficiency and lack of capacity to provide relief to all

affected areas has allowed for many religious parties to spring into action
and exploit the situation by helping victims and thereby gaining their
confidence. 107

JI is one such religious organization that fills in the void created by the inability
of the government to look after the needs of its population. The expansive network of
welfare activities conducted by the welfare wing of JI allows it to increases its influence
over society.

2. Jamaat ud Dawa (JUD)

JUD has a widespread welfare network through which it provides education and
social welfare to the poor and needy. The organization has been particularly effective in
relief work after natural disasters. Within a week after the devastating earthquake of 2005
that killed approximately 73,000 people 108 in the NWFP 109 and Azad Kashmir, JUD had
established relief camps and field hospitals equipped with X-ray machines and a
makeshift operation theater. 110 According to Samaa TV, a Pakistani news channel, “It has

105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Shahzada Irfan Ahmed and Ayesha Siddiqa, “Religious Mission or Political Ambition?” Newsline,
30 September 2010, http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2010/09/religious-mission-or-political-ambition/.
108 UNICEF, “UNICEF Pakistan Support to Recovery and Rehabilitation of Basic Social Services for
the Earthquake-Affected Population 2007–2008,” www.unicef.org/pakistan/Overview-Updated-September-
2007-1_(2).pdf.
109 The province of NWFP has been renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) in April 2010, see Sama
TV, “Senate Approved Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa Name of NWFP,” Sama TV, http://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/
15-Apr-2010/senate-approved-khyber-pakhtoonkhwa-name-of-nwfp.
110 John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, “Extremists Fill Aid Chasm after Quake,” Washington Post, 16
October 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/15/
AR2005101501392.html.
29
since built 5,000 homes, 39 schools and 59 mosques there.” 111 The organization was also
effective in carrying out relief work during the refugee crisis, which emerged from both
Pakistan’s counterterrorism operations in Swat and the humanitarian disasters after the
floods in 2005 and 2010. 112 According to Thomas K. Gugler, a German scholar who has
written extensively on ROs in Pakistan:

As government agencies in Pakistan cannot organize basic aid for most

needy after catastrophes like the earthquake in October 2005 or the flood
in July 2010, health services, relief and reconstruction work as well as
managing displacement camps is increasingly conducted by Islamist
organizations and the JD has become the most prominent militant outfit in
Pakistan engaging in humanitarian work. 113

Commenting on the relief work of JUD, the Pakistani interior minister said that
the “work of Jamaat and other Islamic groups is ‘the lifeline of our rescue and relief
work.’” 114 According to Jonathan Benthal, an anthropologist, “hard-line groups proved
helpful not only in leveraging the response efforts of the others, but in mobilizing relief
work through networks of madrassas and mosques.” 115 Benthal notes that during the
earthquake relief operations, JUD had supplied medicine to the army and even helped
transport NATO soldiers across rivers in remote areas. 116

111 Samaa TV, “Pakistan to Crack Down on Jamaat-ud-Dawa,” Samaa TV, 5 December 2008,
http://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/05-Dec-2008/pakistan-to-crack-down-on-jamaat-ud-dawa.
112 Rob Crilly, “Pakistan Flood Aid From Islamic Extremists,” Telegraph, 21 August 2010,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/7957988/Pakistan-flood-aid-from-Islamic-
extremists.html; Declan Walsh, “Banned Jihadi Group is Running Aid Programme for Swat Refugees,”
Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/13/pakistan-aid-terrorism.
113 Thomas K. Gugler, “From Kalashnikov to Keyboard: Pakistan’s Jihadscapes and the
Transformation of Lashkar-e-Tayba,” in New Approaches to Analysis of Jihadism Online and Offline, ed.
Rudiger Lohlker (Goettingen, Germany: V&R Unipress GmbH, 2012): 54, http://books.google.com/
books?hl=en&lr=&id=vyOmLj1DMQEC&oi=fnd&pg=PA37&dq=jamaat+ud+dawa&ots=VD0dYntSh8&s
ig=mkY3Cd8shJhdflfb4g5G0SHAU64#v=onepage&q=jamaat%20ud%20dawa&f=false.
114 Declan Walsh, “Extremist Measures,” Guardian, 18 October 2005, http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2005/oct/18/pakistan.worlddispatch.
115 Jonathan Benthal, “Islamic Charities, Faith-Based Organizations, and The International Aid
System,” in Understanding Islamic Charities, ed. Jon B. Alterman and Karin Von Hippel (Washington,
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007): 57, http://books.google.com/
books?id=1QbC2rFxr24C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=pakistan&f=false.
116 Benthal, “Islamic Charities,” 57.

30
 Apart from disaster-relief activities, the organization also runs many social
welfare projects all over the country. Aoun Sahi, a Pakistani journalist, states that:

The foundation has its charity operations in almost all parts of the country.
They include five hospitals, 126 dispensaries, 152 blood donor societies,
139 ambulances in 73 cities of the country, 140 schools, 40 madrassas and
three colleges. More than 60,000 students are enrolled in the educational
institutions of the organization. 117

JUD also organizes free medical camps in places where the government has not
been able to provide health facilities. In February 2013, JUD organized 50 camps in
various areas and vaccinated around 22,000 children against measles. 118 According to the
JUD website, in June 2013, “it has treated more than 20,000 patients over a period of
three days through its free medical camps set up in various parts of Baluchistan where
they also distributed free medicine.” 119 The website also claims that JUD would reach the
far-off areas like Tahrparkar in Sindh to provide necessities to the deprived inhabitants of
the area. 120 Such welfare activities enhance the support base for this RO, which not only
comes from the people following their ideology, but also from the people of other
religions who benefit from their services. This is evident from Humeira Iqtidar’s
observation that “Hindus from inner Sindh demonstrated after the JUD was implicated in
the Mumbai attack in 2008, protesting that the organization was a charity that helped
them by providing food and water, and that any clamping down would have a negative
impact.” 121

It is evident from the above discourse that JUD has an effective welfare network
that provides the organization with leverage to connect to the poor through filling in the

117 Aoun Sahi, “Dawa, Jihad, Charity or All? News, 15 April 2012, http://jang.com.pk/thenews/
apr2012-weekly/nos-15-04-2012/spr.htm#4.
118 M. Waqar Bhatti, “Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Other Charities Vaccinating Children against Measles,”
News, 15 February 2013, http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-4-160041-Jamaat-ud-Dawa-other-
charities-vaccinating-children-against-measles.
119 Jamat ud Dawa official website, http://judofficial.wordpress.com/2013/06/20/jamat-ud-dawah-has-
treated-more-than-20000-patients-over-a-period-of-three-days-through-its-free-medical-camps-set-up-in-
various-parts-of-baluchistan-where-they-also-distributed-free-medicines/.
120 Bhatti, “Jamaat-ud-Dawa.”
121 Humeira Iqtidar, Middle East Report, no. 251, Pakistan under Pressure (Summer 2009): 29‒30,
Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), http://www.jstor.org/stable/27735298.
31
void created by the government’s inability to provide social services to the masses. There
is no surprise, then, that the JUD’s “annual congregation had attracted around one million
visitors in 2001, most of them from lower-middle class background.” 122

D. WHY ROs CONDUCT WELFARE ACTIVITIES

There are two explanations about the motives of ROs to carry out welfare
activities: to fulfill a religious obligation of helping the poor or to increase their influence
in society by attracting more members. More membership gives them influence over the
state’s power structure. Helping the poor and the needy is obligatory for Muslims who
have the ability to do so. Zakat, an annual subscription of 2.5 percent of accumulated
wealth, is the mandatory donation for Muslims of a particular financial stratum. It can be
argued that the ROs provide social welfare to meet their religious obligation. There is,
however, a powerful benefit from providing social services, which can expand their
influence through increase in membership. It can be argued that the poor who benefit
from the social services of ROs are prone to support them. Gunther and Diamond argue
that:

Religious fundamentalist parties mobilize support not only by invoking

religious doctrine and identity, and by proposing policies derived from
those principles, but also through selective incentives; they often perform
a wide range of social welfare functions which aid in recruiting and
solidifying the loyalty of members. This web of organized activities and
services encapsulates members within a distinct subculture. Although
these are not class-based parties, they disproportionately attract support
from the poor and downtrodden and the marginalized middle class, among
whom denunciations of injustice and corruption have a particular
resonance. 123

Similarly, Luca Ozzano, an Italian political scientist, notes that fundamentalist

parties can be connected to ROs with a broader appeal in society. 124 As a consequence of
their social services, “they usually find their militants among frustrated and deprived

122 Gugler, “From Kalashnikov to Keyboard.”

123 Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties: A New Typology,” Party
Politics 9, no. 2 (2003): 183, http://ppq.sagepub.com/content/9/2/167.full.pdf+html.
124 Luca Ozzano, “The Many Faces of the Political God: A Typology of Religiously Oriented Parties,”
Democratization 20, no. 5 (2013): 817, doi:10.1080/13510347.2013.801253.
32
people from middle-lower classes—usually living in rural areas and urban shantytowns—
but sometimes also among highly ideologized middle-class people.” 125 Moreover,
Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman observe that:

From Egypt and Palestine to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Indonesia, radical

Islamist groups have enjoyed broad support—especially among the poorer
segments of society—because they are major suppliers of mutual aid and
social service. 126

Therefore, it can be argued that the ROs’ social welfare activities help them in
expanding their influence over the poor. This increases their influence in society, which
allows them to promote their ideology and mobilize segments of society for their
objectives, such as demanding concessions or resources from the state.

In Pakistan, where religion has been politicized, the ROs compete to establish a
monopoly over religion because the RO that has the most control over religion would be
the legitimate beneficiary of the state’s resources. This monopoly and legitimacy will
also provide that RO with an influence over state policy. 127 Collin J. Beck, an Assistant
Professor of Sociology at Pomona College, argues that “state incorporation of religion
creates religious movements through the construction of Islam as a legitimate mobilizing
frame for political action.” 128 He further comments that “a regime’s maintenance of a
public role for Islam also allows increased access to mobilizing resources for religious
political organizations, and the creation of a site of mobilization that is sheltered from
political exclusion and state repression.” 129 Candland argues that “in an environment in
which religion has been highly politicized, however, it is not surprising that few
development organizations have made use of Islamic values to generate cooperation or
trust within the communities in which they work.” 130 It can be argued that where the state

125 Ibid.
126 Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman, “Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad, and the
Deadly,” Public Choice 128, no. 1/2, The Political Economy of Terrorism (July 2006): 119.
127 Iannaccone, “Voodoo Economics?” 77.
128 Colin J. Beck, “State Building as a Source of Islamic Political Organization,” Sociological Forum
24, no. 2 (June 2009): 342, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40210404.
129 Ibid.
130 Candland, “Faith as Social Capital,” 363.

33
uses religion for political purposes, the ROs compete for a monopoly on the religion to
acquire more resources. The role of state in politicizing ROs is discussed in Chapter IV of
this paper.

E. CONCLUSION

Religious organizations in Pakistan have a history of carrying out social services

and helping the poor. During the Soviet-Afghan War, the state sponsored a particular
sect, which marginalized other sects. This action had a profound effect on the conduct of
ROs, who thus became competitive in expanding their influence on society. The case of
JI and JUD are instructive, for in order to increase their influence, the ROs engaged in
social services. JI and JUD have expansive welfare networks all over the country. They
have been able to provide social and welfare services in the areas where the government
has been unable to provide such services. Therefore, these ROs have maintained their
link with the poor. Their influence on the poor provides them with the leverage necessary
to gain concessions and resources from the state. Therefore, the ROs remain engaged in
competitive welfare activities to increase their influence over segments of society
belonging to lower and lower-middle classes. It is important to understand the link
between religious organizations and the poor to further our understanding of the
dependence of the state on religious groups to mobilize the poor. The state has been
unable to meet the basic social needs of the poor and therefore, the poor have become
disenfranchised by the state and come under the influence of religious organizations. This
situation benefits religious organizations, for they can bargain for compensation from the
state. By realizing the link between the poor and religious organizations, the state can
form policies to address the social requisites of the poor in order to weaken the power
base of religious organizations. Some of these ROs have adopted extremist ideologies
and because they maintain influence over society through socio-welfare networks, they
promote extremism in society. Why these organizations have become extremists in their
ideology is discussed in Chapter III.

34
 III. EXTREMISM IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

Religious extremism in Pakistan is almost as old as the country itself. Pakistan

was formed in 1947 and experienced an initial manifestation of religious extremism in
1953, when Majlis e Ahrar—a religious organization—demanded the state to declare
Ahmedis as kafirs (non-Muslims). 131 Pending action on their demand, Ahrar resorted to
violent protests and riots in Punjab; they also incited killings of Ahmedis, including the
brutal murder of an army officer. 132 Incidents of such extremism through religious
symbols have since become commonplace in Pakistan; however, it was not until the late
1970s that the violence started increasing to an alarming level. 133 This increase in
violence was a manifestation of the extremist ideology propagated by some of the ROs.
The adoption of extremist ideologies by some of the ROs is mostly related to the rise of
sectarian strife during late 1970s after the Iranian Revolution and during the Afghan
War. 134 Since then, some of these religious organizations have been engaged in
promoting the polarization of society along sectarian lines, which has led to increased
violence and acts of terrorism. 135 Nasr argues that sectarianism in Pakistan can be
contextualized as “militant religio-political activism, whose specific aim is to safeguard
and promote the socio-political interests of the particular Muslim sectarian

131 Ahmedis belong to a heretic sect founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmed, who declared that “Jesus of
Nazareth had not died on the Cross, nor lifted up to the Heavens but that he was taken off the Cross in a
wounded condition by his disciples and cured of his wounds, that thereafter he escaped to Kashmir where
he died a natural death himself.” Later he proclaimed himself to be the promised Messiah. See, “Report of
the Court of Inquiry: Punjab Disturbances of 1953,” 9–10, http://www.thepersecution.org/dl/
report_1953.pdf.
132 “Report of the Court of Inquiry: Punjab Disturbances of 1953,” 13, www.thepersecution.org/dl/
report_1953.pdf.
133 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism
and the Ulama in Society and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies 34, no. 1 (February 2000): 139,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/313114?origin=JSTOR-pdf.
134 Ali Riaz, “Global Jihad, Sectarianism and The Madrassahs in Pakistan,” Working Paper No. 85,
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore (August 2005).
135 Isaac Kfir, “Sectarian Violence and Social Group Identity in Pakistan,” Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism 37, no. 6 (May 2014), 458, http://www.tandfonline.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/
1057610X.2014.903374.
35
community.” 136 He further comments that the goals of this kind of activism are achieved
through both the mobilization of the sectarian identity in question and the marginalization
of the rival sectarian community, largely through prolific use of violence. 137 Therefore, it
can be argued that the some of the ROs in Pakistan have been using violence to promote
the socio-political interests of a particular Muslim community.

Pakistan is home to some of the most diverse sectarian groups. The two main
sects are Sunni and Shia; however, there are further subsects within these sects, which are
equally exclusive and hold extreme views about each other. The graph in Figure 2 depicts
major sects and subsects in Pakistan: 138

Figure 2. Major Sects and Subsects in Pakistan.

Several sectarian groups in Pakistan promote extremism by using jihadist

ideology to motivate their followers to kill people of other sects in the name of God.
According to them, other sects are heretics that undermine Islam. This kind of idea, based
on selective selections from Quran and Islamic teachings, contributes to religious
extremism. The concept of Jihad in Islam entails a much broader perspective of struggle,

136 Vali R. Nasr, “International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization:
Sectarianism in Pakistan, 1979–1998,” Comparative Politics 32, no. 2 (January 2000):171,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/422396.
137 Ibid.
138 For more on various sects in Pakistan, see Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa, “The New Frontiers: Militancy &
Radicalism in Pakistan,” Centre for International and Strategic Analysis Report no. 2 (2013).
36
whereas some of the ROs in Pakistan have reduced the concept of jihad as militarized
struggle for vested interests. Promoting this kind of jihadist ideology as militarized
struggle through specific verses from the Quran induces extremism in society, which then
becomes supportive of militant groups. Christine Fair et al. observe that those who
believe that “jihad is a militarized struggle are 2.3–2.7 percent more supportive of
policies endorsed by militant groups.” 139 Some ROs help in broadening support for
militant groups by promoting a reductionist jihadist ideology, which thus contributes to
extremism in society.

Most scholarly research has remained focused on only one aspect of religious
organizations—madrasas—whereas the extremist religious organizations have been
understudied. This chapter will show that extremist religious organizations provide a
“supporting environment” to terrorists by promoting extremist ideologies in a competitive
setting for followers. 140 Emma Hooper notes that, “it is the failure to address extremism,
militant, and sectarian violence that has led to a vicious cycle of creeping radicalism, to a
deeply disturbing extent.” 141Therefore, there is a need to broaden our understanding of
the extremist ROs in Pakistan, which have become breeding grounds for terrorism. 142

This chapter will demonstrate that the ROs in Pakistan have become more
extreme because they want to maximize their leverage over the population by using
religious symbols to gain power and money. The ROs operate in a competitive market of
sectarian ideologies to maximize their supporters who in turn provide them with power
and money. For these goals, they have adopted extreme ideologies, which are based on
the exclusion of “others” to monopolize their position on religious matters. This chapter
is divided into three sections. The first section illustrates a link between religious
organizations and extremism. The second section discusses the religious organizations in

139 Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro, “Faith or Doctrine?”

140 Waldmann, “Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures,” 255.
141 Emma Hooper, “Pakistan: Back to the Future?” Notes International CIDOB 91 (June 2014),
http://www.cidob.org/en/content/download/39500/608345/file/NOTES+91_HOOPER_ANG%282%29.pdf.
142 Peter Warren Singer, “Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education not Jihad,”
Brookings Institution (November 2001), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2001/11/pakistan-
singer.
37
Pakistan with a theoretical approach of rational choice to demonstrate that these
organizations compete amongst each other for resources. The last section explores how
the religious organizations also use madrasas to promote militant extremism to achieve
their objectives.

A. LINK BETWEEN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND EXTREMISM

Martha Crenshaw is a scholar of social sciences at Stanford University who has

conducted extensive research on terrorism and its causes. She argues that, “in some cases,
the terrorist organization may be, in effect, a subunit of a legal organization with a large
public membership.” 143 She refers to such terrorist organizations as “extremist offshoots
of broader social movements or political parties,” which “represent communal or ethnic
constituency.” 144 Therefore, Crenshaw draws a link between some political parties and
terrorist organizations. Christine Fair observes that there are some religious political
parties in Pakistan that support terrorist organizations. 145 These political parties are:
Deobandi tanzeems that include Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkat-ul-Ansar, and Harkat-ul-
Mujahidin; Ahl-e-Hadith organizations, which include militant wings like Lashkar-e-
Taiba (now called JUD); and Jamaat-e-Islami, which is connected to the Muslim
Brotherhood and supports Al Badr and Hizbul Mujahidin. 146 Similarly, Howenstein also
points out that the jihadi organizations in Pakistan mainly operate under the aegis of these
three religious organizations: Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadith, and Muslim Brotherhood. 147
These organizations are discussed in the next section. These ROs use religious symbols
and extremist ideology to mobilize the population in support of militant struggle.

In a competitive environment where religious differences exist, each ideology can

provide distinct venues to mobilize support against the system. The disenfranchised

143 Martha Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism,” Forum 6
(Fall 1985): 467.
144 Ibid.
145 Christine Fair “Who Are Pakistan’s Militants and Their Families?” Terrorism and Political
Violence 20, no. 1, 49–65, doi: 10.1080/09546550701733996, 49.
146 Ibid., 49.
147 Nicholas Howenstein, “The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups
in Pakistan and Kashmir,” Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) Research Report 1 (February 2008).
38
population can be seen as a potential support for the ROs, who fight among each other to
include this population in their membership to increase their own support base. In other
words, no religion inherently promotes terrorism, but it can be argued that some ROs in
Pakistan use religious symbols to attract the parts of the population that are dissatisfied
with the existing system, a process that results in terrorist activities. The ROs organize
dissatisfaction among the masses to pursue their vested interests. In doing so, they
propagate extremist ideologies to radicalize their supporters, who thus develop an affinity
for terrorism as means to achieve their objectives. We see this happening in Pakistan
where extremist ROs contribute to terrorism. The following section illustrates how some
ROs in Pakistan are linked to terrorist groups.

B. EXTREMIST RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN PAKISTAN

Sunni and Shia are the two main sects of Islam; however, there are further
subsects among Sunnis. The broad subsects of Sunnis in Pakistan are: Barelvis;
Deobandis; Ahl-e-Hadith; and revivalists such as JI. 148 Historically, sects and subsects
hold extremist views against each other. Some of them promote the killing of the others
because they believe that the other sects are following and promoting distorted beliefs,
which is punishable by death. A study conducted by the Pew Research Center finds
Pakistan among the top ten countries with very high social hostilities involving
religion. 149 Set in such a competitive ideological milieu, the religious organizations strive
for monopoly over religion because the group that has the monopoly would be the
legitimate representative of religion in the country. This will provide that group with the
authority and legitimacy to influence the state to enforce Sharia laws as interpreted by
that sect, thereby providing that RO with the leverage to gain access to power and money.

148 Ibid.
149 Brian J. Grim, “Rising Restrictions on Religion: One-third of the World’s Population Experiences
an Increase,” Pew Research Center (August 2011): 16–17, http://pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/
Issues/Government/RisingRestrictions-web.pdf.
39
 1. Rise of Religious Extremism in Pakistan

Before Pakistani Independence, Islamic religious organizations in the sub-

continent—most prominently Jamiat-Ulamai-Hind (JUH) and JI—had opposed the idea
of a separate state for Muslims. They had opposed creation of Pakistan because they
“condemned the Muslim League leaders, especially Jinnah, for their ignorance of the
fundamentals of Islam.” 150 Soon after the creation of Pakistan in August 1947, the
religious organizations suddenly abandoned their opposition of the state for an
opportunity to establish an Islamic state through enforcement of Sharia Law. This was in
contrast to the rather secular idea of Pakistan envisioned by Muhammed Ali Jinnah, the
founder of the new state and the man regarded as Quaid-e-Azam (the great leader). 151
Therefore, a competition between the secular and religious identity of the state started
with the formation of the state. At the time of Independence, JI and JUI were the two
prominent religious organizations in Pakistan. JI was founded by Mawlana Sayyid Abu’l-
A’la Mawwdudi in 1941; JUI was essentially a group of Deobandi Ulema, which split
from JUH in 1945. 152 Other religious groups included Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP),
which was formed in 1950 by Maulana Shabir Ahmad Usmani who was initially part of
Muslim League (ML), but later created his own party. 153 Moreover, various pirs—
individuals from Barelvi sect with large personal followings believing in mystic
Sufism—were also influential in the religious and political spheres. Despite these
religious organizations’ prevalence since the Independence, Pakistan did not see much
religious terrorism until the end of Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s. A report by the
Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre notes that up to 4000 people have died in
sectarian violence between the mid-1980s and early 2000s. 154 Moreover, between 2007
and 2011, there was a sharp increase in sectarian terrorism that claimed the lives of 1,649

150 Rizwan Hussain, “Pakistan,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islamic World, Oxford Islamic Studies
Online, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0616.
151 Ullah, Vying for Allah’s Vote, 61.
152 Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, 3.
153 Global Security, “Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan,” Global Security.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/world/pakistan/jup.htm.
154 Yusuf, “Sectarian Violence: Pakistan’s Greatest Security Threat,” 3.
40
people. 155 The rise in sectarian terrorism can be connected to the emergence of various
extremist sectarian organizations that are linked to the ROs mentioned above. The
following are some selected ones that have connections with some ROs: 156

a. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

TTP is a coalition of FATA based militants who aim to overthrow the Pakistani
state and enforce the Sharia law of their interpretation. This group uses various terrorist
tactics, including use of suicide bombings, against security and civilian targets since
2007. In recent years, it has provided all kinds of support to militants involved with
Deobandi sectarian organizations, such as Lashkar-e-Jhanhgvi and Ahle Sunnat Wal
Jamaat.

b. Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ)

The ASWJ is the new name of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The SSP is an
extremist Sunni (Deobandi) militant organization that has carried out attacks against
Shias, whom it believes to be infidels, since 1985. In recent years the SSP has also
targeted Barelvi groups. This group has also developed strong ties with the TTP. The
Pakistan government banned the SSP in March 2012 after the rise in sectarian violence.

c. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)

LeJ, an offshoot of SSP, was established in the 1980s. This is an extremist Sunni
organization with close links to TTP. LeJ is responsible for sectarian warfare in Karachi
and attacks against the Shia Hazaras of Baluchistan. This group is also accused of
assassinating former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007.

d. Sipah-e-Mohamadi Pakistan (SMP)

SMP was founded in 1993 to protect the Shia community from extremist Sunni
militant groups. In 2008–2009, the group resurfaced in the urban centers of Karachi and

155 Ibid.
156 Ibid., 4‒5; Dawn News, “Pakistan Bans 25 Militant Organizations,” Dawn, 6 August 2009,
http://www.dawn.com/news/963704/pakistan-bans-25-militant-organisations.
41
Lahore. SMP has been recently accused of killing prominent Sunni doctors. Allegedly,
the group receives support and funding from Iran. Four SMP militants were arrested in
2011 for involvement in a grenade attack against the Saudi Arabian consulate in Karachi.

e. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)/Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD)

LeT was founded in the late 1980s by Hafiz Mohammad Saeed with primary aim
to aid the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. After the end of the Afghan-Soviet War, this
group shifted its focus to Jihad in Kashmir. The LeT was banned by the Pakistani
government in 2002. Consequently, Hafiz Saeed established a charitable foundation
named JUD; however, it is generally believed that JUD is the new face of LeT, although
Saeed denies any links with LeT. LeT/JUD follows the Ahle Hadith ideology, which is in
sync with the Salafist ideology popular in Saudi Arabia.

f. Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP)

TJP is an offshoot of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqah Jafria, a Shia political party

founded in 1979. The TJP has been banned twice, but continues to operate under different
names. Its members claim that the organization is essentially a Shia resistance to Sunni
extremism, but TJP has also been involved in sectarian violence.

g. Sunni Tehrik (ST)

ST is a Barelvi militant organization, established in 1982 by Ilyas Qadri. This

group is believed to be a retaliatory militant wing against sectarian attacks by the ASWJ.
ST is accused of engaging in turf wars to gain control of the mosques of rival sects
through land acquisition.

h. Jandullah

Jandullah is an anti-Shia militant group, which mostly operates in Baluchistan but

has ties with LeJ, ASWJ, and TTP. Its militants were accused of killing 40 Shias in a
bomb blast at Karachi in 2009. Jandullah has also been involved in attacks against state’s
security forces.

42
 2. Alliance between the State and ROs

In the past, the Pakistani state has made considerable concessions to some ROs to
gain popular support and to secure its security interests. In return, the ROs have been
rewarded by the state with money and leeway to increase their followership. These
allowances to ROs by the state were made for political support and security concerns.157
The role of state in relation to ROs is discussed in Chapter IV. Similar concessions to
ROs were made by the state during the Soviet-Afghan War to mobilize support for the
war. 158 In return, the state provided substantial financial support to the “Sunni
fundamentalists” who had provided assistance to the state during the war, such as JI and
JUD, which remained the principle beneficiaries of the state’s support. 159 This patronage
from the state made these ROs stronger and they expanded their sphere of influence all
over the country through the expansion of their madrasas. The expansion of some ROs
through these resources provided by the state made other religious groups wary of the
former’s increasing influence. The increased power of some ROs thus created a “security
dilemma” 160 whereby the marginalized ROs felt threatened by the influence of state
supported ROs. The support provided to some ROs by the state has led to a competitive
environment among ROs that use extremist ideology to increase their membership, thus
becoming eligible for resources provided by the state.

Kfir states that “sectarian groups are quintessentially social groups albeit of a
religious nature;” furthermore, these social groups attract individuals through common
identity. 161 ROs therefore use religious identity to attract members of the population to
join them. Individuals who join an RO become eligible to receive benefits from that RO;
“those not part of the group do not receive support and protection from the group,” writes

157 Ibid., 188.

158 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Military and the Wars Within (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 373–374.
159 Ibid., 374; Ullah, Vying For Allah’s Vote, 144.
160 The term “security dilemma” is borrowed from International Relations Theory as applied to ethnic
conflicts. See Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Dynamic and
Integrative Theory of Ethnic Conflict,” Review of International Studies 37, no. 2 (2011): 530–532,
http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1017/S0260210510000616.
161 Kfir, “Sectarian Violence,” 458–459.

43
Kfir. 162 He argues that the challenge for these religious social groups is that they have to
prove to their group members that they can “extract concessions from established
political actors, who will only offer concessions as part of a bargaining process with
those that pose a threat to them and the state.” 163 It can be argued that too many religious
groups in Pakistan are trying to prove that they can gain concessions from the state. This
competition for resources and support from the state can turn violent. In Pakistan, various
ROs have turned violent against each other and against state institutions and civilian
population to demonstrate their power and influence. This demonstration of violence is
meant to attract the state’s attention and make the state believe that they are influential
factors that the state needs to consider in the distribution of resources.

3. Religious Extremism as a Rational Behavior

Iannaccone and Berman suggest that religious extremism should be viewed as

rational behavior. They argue that, “religious producers maximize membership, net
resources, government support, or some other basic determinant of institutional
wellbeing.” 164 Moreover, they comment that, “the efficiency of sectarian groups at
politics and organized violence creates the potential for a sect to capture the benefits of
political monopoly and then violently repress both political and religious opposition.”165
They conclude that the countries where civil government favors a particular form of
religious expression are more prone to violent sects because the disfavored sects will be
“strongly motivated to oppose the government despise the established religion, and covet
the privileges that come with state support.” 166

Kent D. Miller, in developing a strategic management theory of ROs, argues that

“religious organizations depend on access to resources from the external

162 Ibid., 459.

163 Kfir, “Sectarian Violence,” 459.
164 Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman, “Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad, and the
Deadly,” Public Choice 128(1/2) (2006): 109–129, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30026636?origin=JSTOR-
pdf.
165 Ibid., 123.
166 Ibid., 126.

44
environment.” 167 He further elaborates that the resources are not limited to physical and
financial assets, but also include “the number of adherents and their levels of time,
commitment, and effort.” 168 Therefore, it can be argued that the ROs endeavor to increase
their membership and get access to material resources. The competitive environment—
such as the one in Pakistan—where too many ROs are fighting to maximize their
membership and seeking material benefits, the competition leads to violent acts. Such
violence by a particular RO is meant to demonstrate to the state that it needs to
acknowledge the strength of the RO and must meet its demands. Violence assures its
followers that the RO will protect the interests of its members at any cost.

C. THE USE OF MADRASAS

The extremist ROs in Pakistan use madrasas to increase their membership. In

doing so, the extremist ROs teach their extremist ideologies to the students who mostly
take up religious positions in society after graduation from the madrasas. The link
between madrasas and terrorism has been denied by some scholars on the basis of
empirical research. This section will demonstrate that such empirical research has serious
limitations, which does not mean that this connection should not be analyzed carefully
when informing policy.

Madrasas have existed in Muslim societies for centuries. One of the first
madrasas, called Nizamiyah, was established in Baghdad in the eleventh century A.D.169
After that, it spread to other regions that came under the rule of Muslims. Christopher M.
Blanchard observes that though “their curricula varied from place to place, it was always
religious in character because these schools ultimately were intended to prepare future
Islamic religious scholars (ulama) for their work.” 170 These madrasas not only delivered
religious education, but also provided free room and board for the students. 171 Riaz notes

167 Kent D. Miller, “Competitive Strategies of Religious Organizations,” Strategic Management

Journal 23, no. 5 (May 2002): 438, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3094476?origin=JSTOR-pdf.
168 Ibid., 438–439.
169 Blanchard, “Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background.”
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid.

45
that the network of madrasas became institutionalized in 1959 under the aegis of four
ideological schools: Ahl-e-Hadith formed Wafaq-al-Madaris-al-Salafia; Deobandis
created Wafaq al-Madaris al-Arabai; Brelvis set up Tanzim-al-Madaris Arabai; and the
Shias were grouped under the Majlis-e-Nazarat-e shiah Madaris-e-Arabiah (currently
known as Wafaq-al-Madaris (Shia) Pakistan). 172 Darul Uloom Haqqania at Akora
Khattak and Jamia Binoria Town at Karachi were the earliest of established madrasas,
which belonged to Deobandi ideology. 173 The number of these Deobandi madrasas
increased over the time and it is believed that since the 1980s, Pakistan has experienced
an exponential growth in the number of madrasas.

During this time, the curricula of madrasas became more radicalized by the ROs
that ran them. Ahmed states that “a study conducted by Patrick Belton shows how
textbooks developed at the University of Nebraska-Omaha and published by the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) were used to encourage and
justify the ‘holy war’ against the Soviets.” 174 Nasr, on the other hand, argues that the
radicalization of madrasas started in mid-1970s as a consequence of the proliferation of
madrasas belonging to Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahl-i Hadith schools of Sunni Islam. 175

At the same time, under the leadership of Abul Ala Mowdudi, JI started its
venture in politics. 176 Riaz argues that the political situation of Pakistan in 1977 “created
opportunities for the marginalized ulemas (religious clerics) to return to the limelight
through the political parties.” 177 The Deobandi political party—JUD—and the
revivalists—JI—used madrasas under their influence to provide foot soldiers for street
agitation. 178 Thus, the madrasas became instruments of these religious organizations to

172 Riaz, “Global Jihad,” 14.

173 Zainab Shahab Ahmed, “Madrasa Education in the Pakistani Context: Challenges, Reforms and
Future Directions,” South Asian Journal of Peace Building 2, no. 1 (Autumn 2009): 2.
174 Ahmed, “Madrasa Education in the Pakistani Context,” 3.
175 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism
and the Ulama in Society and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies 34, no. 1 (February 2000): 139,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/313114.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid., 15.
178 Ibid.

46
achieve their religious and political objectives. During the same time, Pakistan and the
U.S. got involved in the Soviet-Afghan War and co-opted various ROs to mobilize their
madrasa students as mujahedeen to fight against the Soviet “infidels” in Afghanistan.
The leaders of these ROs competed for the resources being provided by the government.
Riaz states that:

The Government-controlled Zakat Fund and U.S. money was the prize
they (leaders of ROs) went after, but to increase their shares of the pie
they had to marginalize their opponents ideologically, dwarf them
numerically, and if necessary, annihilate them physically. All of these
required foot soldiers and the madrassahs became the recruiting centre
with these objectives in view. 179

Therefore, it can be argued that because the ROs compete for resources, they
promote extreme ideologies that lead to violence and acts of terrorism. Such ideologies
are stimulated in madrasas, but some scholars have opposed the idea that madrasas
promote extremism and terrorism. Mark Sageman, Peter Bergen, and Alan Krueger find
that most of the terrorists are educated in non-madrasa institutions.180 Their research is
based mostly on the data related to international terrorism that directly affects the West.
Therefore, they ignore the link between madrasas and extremist terrorism in Pakistan,
which is a serious security challenge not only for Pakistan, but also for the larger spheres
of regional and international security. Christine Fair, who has worked extensively on
Islamic education in Pakistan, argues that:

Prior to concluding that madaris are irrelevant to militant recruitment in

the region or otherwise unimportant, there is strong evidence that many—
but by no means all—of Pakistan’s suicide attackers and sectarian
militants do come from madaris. 181

179 Riaz, “Global Jihad,” 17.

180 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2004); Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “The Economics and the Education of Suicide
Bombers,” New Republic (June 2002); Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, “The Madrassah Scapegoat,” The
Washington Quarterly 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 117–125.
181 Christine Fair, “Who Are Pakistan’s Militants and Their Families?” Terrorism and Political
Violence 20, no.1 (2008): 58, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546550701733996.
47
 Moreover, in a study conducted by Fair in Afghanistan in 2007, she states that,
“the preponderance of suicide attackers in Afghanistan who come from Pakistan appears
to be recruited from madaris in Pakistan’s tribal belt.” 182

The role of madrasas as a breeding ground for extremism is thus evident from
above discussion. The extremist ROs, which run these madrasas, use them to mobilize
their students and teachers to demonstrate their power against rival factions. They also
use their students to fight wars and become militants because such activities provide the
extremist ROs with economic benefits from the state.

D. CONCLUSION

Islam as a religion does not promote violence; 183 however, this chapter shows that
some ROs in Pakistan use religious symbols to promote extremism. ROs in Pakistan have
existed since the creation of the country. Yet during the mid-1970s, there was an
exponential rise in creation of new ROs on the basis of sectarianism. This increase in the
number of sectarian ROs, coupled with the funding of some ROs from foreign countries
and the Pakistani government, is related to the increase in violence and terrorism within
the country. Such a relationship suggests that the ROs in Pakistan operate in a
competitive environment where each RO strives to claim monopoly over religion. The
ROs can be seen as rational actors, which want to maximize their benefits in terms of
demanding resources from the state, increase their membership, and marginalize their
competitors. To maximize their benefits, some ROs resort to extreme measures, including
the use of violence and the promotion of extremism in society. Madrasas provide foot
soldiers to the extremist ROs, which carry out acts of violence to prove that they are a
significant factor and that the state must respond to their demands. Understanding these
ROs in the context of rational actors, which are trying to compete in a market of
ideologies, is therefore necessary to comprehend why and how these ROs promote
extremism in the society. This understanding is important in formulating policies to
counter extremism in Pakistan. The role of the state in favoring one sect can exacerbate
182 Ibid., 62.
183 Sultan M. Hali, “No Place for Extremism & Religious Intolerance in Islam,” Criterion 6, no. 2
(April 2011): 121–154, http://search.proquest.com/docview/918709657?accountid=12702.
48
the situation because the other sects feel marginalized and disenfranchised. They also feel
threatened by the growing influence of the favored sect and thus take up violent measures
to protect their interests and seek resources from the state. The support for these ROs
comes from people who are dissatisfied with the existing system. Therefore, the
effectiveness of the state in providing social and economic support to its people can limit
the membership of these extremist ROs. The role of state in relation to the extremist ROs
is discussed in Chapter IV.

49
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50
 IV. THE ROLE OF STATE IN RELATION TO ROS

Once religion occupies center stage, it is indeed difficult to sideline those

who profess to be the guardians of the faith.

–Gilles Boquerat and Nazir Hussain

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will look at the relations between the state and ROs and will
illustrate that the Pakistani state has needed ROs to mobilize support from the society
from 1947 when it became independent. Since ROs have the power to garner street
support though their social organizing, they have been able to bargain with the state,
which has needed their support for political reasons. This chapter will use five examples
to illustrate use of ROs by the state since 1947: the use of religious identity to mobilize
population during creation of Pakistan; accepting the demands of ROs during the
formative years of the country; the Islamic character of 1973 Constitution and passing of
legislation in 1974 to declare Ahmedis as non-Muslims; use of ROs by General Zia-ul-
Haq to legitimize his military rule and fight a proxy war in Afghanistan against the
Soviets in 1980s, as well as implementing Sharia Law through Hudood Ordinance in
1979; and use of ROs to legitimize the rule under General Pervez Musharraf in 2002.
This chapter will illustrate that the state’s dependence on ROs for political needs has led
to the expansion of extremist policies by the state, which contribute to overall toleration
of extremism in the country. Such policies exclude minority religions and sects;
therefore, these groups feel marginalized and resort to violence in order to protect their
rights.

B. USE OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS AND ROs FOR POLITICAL PURPOSE

1. Pre-independence Era: 1937–1947

Religion has played a prominent role in the Pakistan Movement, which was led by
Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his party All India Muslim League (AIML). During the
struggle for independence from the British, leaders of AIML had used religious identity
to mobilize population. During the famous Lahore session of Muslim League in March
51
1940, Muhammad Ali Jinnah stated, “The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two
different religious philosophies, social customs, and literatures.” 184 Therefore, according
to Jinnah there was a need to create a separate homeland for the Muslims in the shape of
Pakistan.

A careful analysis of the Pakistan movement and the leaders associated with it
reveals that religious identity was used by the leaders of AIML for political reasons.
Christophe Jaffrelot, a French political scientist specializing in South Asia, notes:

Jinnah and most of his lieutenants were not religious, but they used Islam
as a focus for an evocation of nationalism, playing on its emotional power
to gain the attention of the Muslim in the streets. Thus, Islam became a
lingua franca which allowed the establishment of a front combining the
Muslims in ‘minority’ situations with those in Punjab. In the 1946
elections, the League won a majority in the province with 75 seats
compared with just ten for the Unionists. 185

Similarly, Leonard Binder, a distinguished professor of political science, notes

that “after the elections of 1936, even the greater efforts were made to win over the
‘ulemā’, this time on the Pakistan platform and the slogan of an Islamic state.” 186 Jinnah
needed support from ulema to strengthen his political position; therefore, he managed to
secure backing from JUH, an organization of Indian religious scholars. 187 JUH provided
Jinnah with requisite support against JI, which had been portraying him as secular and
un-Islamic. 188 Against the opposition from JI, Jinnah therefore needed support from
religious scholars to strengthen his political position as a leader of the Muslims. It is
therefore clear that during the Pakistan movement, religious identity had been used by the
leaders to garner support for political reasons.

184 Christophe Jaffrelot, Pakistan: Nationalism without A Nation (London: Zed Books, Ltd., 2004),
12.
185 Ibid., 14.
186 Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961),
29.
187 Farhan Mujahid Chak, Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture (New York, Routledge, 2014), 107.
188 Ibid.

52
 2. Formative Years of Pakistan

After the creation of Pakistan, the subsequent governments and political parties
have been using religious identity to amass public support. Using religious symbols and
support from the ROs provide them legitimacy to be the representatives of a
predominantly Muslim population. During the formative years of Pakistan, Pakistan
Muslim League (PML), the new face of AIML after the independence of Pakistan, was
the major representative political party. The central leaders of AIML came from Muslim
minority provinces. Khalid Bin Sayeed, a renowned Pakistani political scientist notes in
his book, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857–1948: “There was a feeling of
uneasiness, sometimes bordering on resentment among the leaders of the Muslim
majority provinces that the AIML was dominated by leaders from the Muslim minority
provinces.” 189 Therefore, the PML leadership lacked a popular base in the Muslim
majority provinces. 190 The PML leaders had to compete with the local leaders that joined
PML a decade before independence; these local leaders were significant contenders of
power having strongholds in provinces in the new country. 191 Dr. Kausar Parveen, a
lecturer at Punjab University Lahore, argues that, “being insecure and apprehensive, the
PML leadership relied on the name of Islam to save them and to unite the nation in the
face of gigantic problems.” 192 Lack of political base for the leaders of PML in the newly
created country therefore, compelled the leaders to use religious symbols to gather
support against potential contenders of power.

The PML, in an attempt to consolidate power and bring unity among the diverse
ethnic population of the newly formed country, used Islamic identity as a gelling agent.
In doing so, they had to win over ROs for their support. This was achieved by
acquiescing to the demand of ROs to declare Pakistan an Islamic state and make all laws

189 Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857–1948, 2nd ed. (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 206.
190 Hasan Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (New York: Houndmills, St. Martin’s
Press, 2000), 4.
191 Kausar Parveen, “The Role of Opposition in Constitution-Making: Debate on the Objectives
Resolution,” 144–145.
192 Ibid., 145.

53
in accordance with the teachings of Quran and Sunnah. The Objectives Resolution of
1949 was the first manifestation of state’s appeasement of the ROs. 193 The demand for
making Pakistan an Islamic state came from the Ulema in the Government (i.e., Maulana
Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, the President of the JUI, Pir of Manki Sharif in the NWFP,
Maulana Akram Khan, the President of the East Pakistan Provincial Muslim League, and
outside the government, JI. 194 The First Constituent Assembly, despite opposition by the
minorities represented by the Pakistan National Congress (PNC), accepted the demands
of ROs in the shape of the Objectives Resolution, which was approved in March 1949. 195
Tasneem Kausar, a scholar of constitutional law and political science, claims that, “in
retrospect, it can be argued that this document was the outcome of intense pressurizing by
the Ulema who started mobilizing the public to hold the government accountable for
backing off from its commitment to ‘make Pakistan a fortress of Islam.’” 196 The political
leaders accepted the demands of ROs to make Pakistan an Islamic state; this was done to
rally the support from ROs, which had the ability to mobilize population.

The provisions of Objectives Resolution, as predicted by the minority party, PNC

had the potential to marginalize the minorities and contribute toward extremism in the
society. As pointed out by Bhupendra Kumar Datta, a PNC member at the time, “the
religious clauses of Objectives Resolution would condemn the minorities ‘forever to an
inferior status.’” 197 He further argued that “without a legitimate right to share power, the
minorities would taste neither democracy, nor freedom, nor equality, nor social justice;
they would merely be tolerated.” 198 Dr. Kausar argues that “this not only resulted in the

193 The Objectives Resolution of 1949 provided the basic guidelines for formulating the constitution
of the newly created state of Pakistan. Objectives Resolution demanded that all laws of the country must be
made in accordance with the teachings of Islam. The 1973 constitution was formulated under these broad
guidelines, but it explicitly included clauses related to Islamic character of the state and declared that Sharia
laws were to be implemented in the country. The Hudood Ordinance of 1983 implemented Sharia law as
interpreted by the Sunni Sect. See James Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Pakistan (New York: Infobase
Publishing, 2009): 171, 207, 216.
194 Parveen, “The Role of Opposition in Constitution-Making,” 143.
195 Ibid.; also see Nasr, Vanguard of Islamic Revolution,
196 Tasneem Kausar, “Religion, Politics and the Dilemma of National Identity” in Islam, Law and
Identity, ed. Marinos Diamantides and Adam Gearey (New York: Routledge, 2012), 195.
197 Parveen, “The Role of Opposition in Constitution-Making,” 151.
198 Ibid.

54
increasing insecurities and anxieties of the minorities but inflamed the sectarian
differences within the Muslim community itself.” 199 It can therefore be argued that by
ceding to the demands of ROs, to include exclusionary clauses that marginalized
minorities, the government inadvertently paved the way for exclusionary politics based
on religious identity.

3. The Constitution of 1973

The Constitution of 1973 was the first constitution passed by an elected body.
Previously, the 1956 Constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly, which was
not an elected body; the 1962 Constitution was passed by the Constitution Committee
appointed by the military ruler, General Ayub Khan. Therefore, the first-ever democratic
parliament crafted the 1973 Constitution, which declared Pakistan as an Islamic republic.
Part IX, Article 227 of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan stipulates that all existing laws
shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy
Quran and Sunnah. 200 The religious clauses included in the constitution have since made
religion a politically potent force. This has allowed the political leaders in Pakistan to use
religion for political legitimacy and national integration. 201 Dr. Arshi Hashmi, a Pakistani
expert on religious radicalism and militancy, argues that “political use of religion has
heightened religious antagonism and acrimony, besides creating space for religious
militancy and extremism.202

To understand the Islamic character of 1973 Constitution, passed by a left-leaning

Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), it may be useful to review political environment of the
time. In 1970, the first-ever general elections were held in Pakistan in which PPP, led by
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was pitched against PML and JI; “the two leading political parties

199 Ibid., 157.

200 Arshi Saleem Hashmi, “Pakistan, Politics, Religion, and Extremism,” Institute of Peace and
Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi (2009), 5, https://www.academia.edu/392212/
Pakistan_Politics_Religion_and_Extremism.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid.

55
emphasizing religious identity and agendas.” 203 In the elections, Bhutto’s PPP won 81 of
the 138 seats in West Pakistan, but lost in East Pakistan where Sheikh Mujib-ur-
Rehman’s Awami League won 160 of 162 seats. 204 The subsequent power struggle
between Bhutto and Mujib led to the secession of East Pakistan in December 1971. The
separation of East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh in December 1971, came also
with an embarrassing surrender of 90,000 military troops stationed at Bangladesh.
Bhutto, however, had become the new prime minister of Pakistan, and he had to face
tremendous opposition especially from ROs that used secession of East Pakistan to
mobilize masses against him. They claimed that because of Bhutto’s wrong policies,
Pakistan had lost its eastern wing, which was a blow to the two nation theory. 205 The ROs
at the time advocated that the only way to save rest of the country was to use Islam as the
gelling agent. Bhutto, who had started his political career as a socialist, also started using
religious symbols to gain legitimacy amid growing opposition from religious parties.206
Riaz Hussain observes that “Bhutto used emotive religious phrases like Musawat-i-
Muhammad (the equality of Muhammad) and Islami Musawat (Islamic equality) as part
of his political rhetoric to justify and win mass support for the socialist policies of his
government.” He further argues that “as anti-government agitation led by the Pakistan
National Alliance (PNA)—whose leaders used Islam to mobilize people against Bhutto’s
government—flared up in the main urban centers the government sought to defuse the
situation by announcing ‘Islamic’ reforms.” 207 Asghar Ali Engineer, an Islamic scholar
from India, notes that, “though Bhutto was a modernist …, he used religion to appease
the bigoted religious leadership of Pakistan to buy time and to stabilize his regime. 208

203 Kausar, “Religion, Politics and the Dilemma of National Identity,” 196.
204 Craig Baxter, “Pakistan Votes 1970,” Asian Survey 11, no. 3 (March 1971): 211.
205 Anwar H. Syed, The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1992), 91.
206 Rubya Mehdi, The Islamization of the Law in Pakistan, 2nd ed. (London: Curzen Press, 2013), 96.
207 Riaz Hussain, “Islamization: An Analysis of Religious, Political and Social Change in Pakistan,”
Middle Eastern Studies 21, no. 3 (July 1985), 263.
208 Asghar Ali Engineer, “Pakistan: Religion, Politics, and Society,” Economic and Political Weekly
31, no. 41/42 (12–19 October 1996), http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/pdfplus/10.2307/
4404680.pdf?acceptTC=true.
56
Thus, Bhutto and his government made considerable concession to the ROs’s demands to
include religious clauses in the constitution.

4. 1974 Constitutional Amendment Declaring Ahmedis as Non-Muslims

By 1974, Bhutto was facing daunting political challenges that led him to make
concessions after concessions to the ROs. He was facing political opposition from Wali
Khan’s National Awami Party (NAP) and tribal leaders in Baluchistan such as Nawab
Akbar Bugti. The ROs had joined in with the opposition, which had increased their
strength. Bhutto, therefore, had to address the demands by ROs. One such demand, which
had remained pending since the 1950s, was to declare Ahmedis as non-Muslims. In April
1974, clashes between Ahmedis and members of ROs erupted in Rabwa, which were
used by the ROs to put further pressure on the government to declare them non-Muslims.
Bhutto referred the issue to the National Assembly, which approved the bill declaring
Ahmedis as non-Muslims. Bhutto himself did not attend the 30-day-long debate on the
bill, but during the final vote, he voted in favor of the bill. In addition to declaring
Ahmedis as non-Muslims, this bill stipulated that they could not hold higher positions in
public offices. Therefore, it was significant in way that it accepted the demands of ROs to
exclude a minority group from being an equal member of the society. The acceptance of
this bill, when viewed in correct political context of the time, suggests that the
government adopted exclusionary policies to appease the growing political opposition of
which ROs were a part.

5. Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization of the Country

General Zia-ul-Haq came to power in 1977 as a result of violent protests by the

opposition under the banner of the PNA. ROs had provided street support to PNA
through their followers. They considered Bhutto’s socialist policies as un-Islamic;
therefore, they had joined hands with the opposition political parties. Zia-ul-Haq had
understood the significance of ROs in political landscape. Being a devout religious
person himself, Zia used religion to strengthen his support base. In doing so, he made
considerable concessions to ROs, such as JI, which was the most influential RO at the
time. Hashmi states, “The Jamat-e-Islami was of critical importance to Zia. It was the
57
only party with a committed cadre of loyalists that stood in readiness to counter and blunt
any anti-Zia agitation launched by any political force.” 209 She further argues, “None of
the two sides had a purely religious goal—it was more a matter of gaining legitimacy
among the public than anything else.” 210 Support for ROs by Zia for political purpose is
thus clear.

At the same time, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in 1980, which was
considered by Zia as a security challenge to Pakistan. To address Soviet question, Zia
decided to use religiously motivated mujahideen to fight against the Soviets in
Afghanistan. In order to reach out to the religiously motivated people to fight a war in
Afghanistan, the Zia government co-opted ROs to do what was needed. This further
strengthened the ties between the state and the ROs, which were given huge amounts of
weapons and money to fight a war against communism on behalf of Pakistan and U.S. 211
While the war was going on in Afghanistan, ROs had raised their demands to enforce
Sharia Law, which was promised by the 1973 Constitution. To maintain the allegiance of
ROs, Zia set up a Federal Shariat Court, which was given “the power to strike down any
law or administrative action as un-Islamic—if it violated the fundamental laws of
Islam.” 212 Other measures to enforce Sharia laws were also taken, which included Islamic
punishments (i.e., amputation of hands for theft, stoning to death and lashing for adultery
and drinking); the revised education policy of 1979, which laid special emphasis on the
projection of Islamic teaching and ideology of Pakistan in the syllabi of various classes;
liberal funds were made available for religious education; and a compulsory tax—
Zakat—(2.5 percent annual deduction from savings accounts and other investments). 213

209 Hashmi, “Pakistan, Politics, Religion, and Extremism,” 6.

210 Ibid., 10.
211 Zahid Shahab Ahmed, “Political Islam, the Jamaat-e-Islami and Pakistan’s Role in the Afghan
Soviet War, 1979–1988,” in Religion and the Cold War, ed. Philip Emil Muehlenbeck (Nashville,
Tennessee:Vanderbilt University Press: 2012), 280, http://books.google.com/
books?id=ytEC2bOstFUC&pg=PA279&lpg=PA279&dq=Jamaat+e+Islami+and+Zia&source=bl&ots=bO
Ooparovb&sig=GlMfHz0L73z-
HXgxBChqkFBopWE&hl=en&sa=X&ei=giZnVJT3JcisogSY54GICw&ved=0CEcQ6AEwCDgU#v=onep
age&q=Jamaat%20e%20Islami%20and%20Zia&f=false.
212 Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military & Politics in Pakistan, 1947–1997 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
Publications, 2000), 248.
213 Ibid.

58
Hasan Askari Rizvi, a Pakistani political scientist and military analyst, argues, “The
Islamization process had its problems. A number of Muslim sects who did not share the
establishment’s perspective on Islam resented the lack of adequate attention to their
religious sensitivities.” 214 For example, the members of Shia sect staged a massive protest
in Islamabad in the summer of 1980 against the compulsory deduction of ‘Zakat’ by the
government. 215 “The government fearing the protest might trigger agitation in other
cities, with political parties jumping on the bandwagon, gave in and made ‘Zakat’
voluntary for the Shia sect.” 216 Askari argues that the exclusionary policies of the Zia’s
Islamization process has led to “tension between the Shias and one of the most
conservative Sunni sect—the Wahabis. Similarly the Wahabi-Barelvi differences have
become pronounced.” 217 Therefore, when Zia was trying to appease the ROs, he had to
make concessions to them in the form of implementation of Sharia law, which was based
on the interpretation by a particular sect. This created strife between the dominant
Wahabi-Deobandi sects and the rest of the sects. Husain Haqqani argues that “[o]ne
faction of the Jamiat Ulema Islam comprising clerics from the influential Deobandi
school joined in the distribution of charity received from Arab countries and in setting up
madrassas.” 218 During the period of Soviet Afghan War, Deobandi ROs received
considerable amount of financial support from the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq, which
enabled them to increase their influence in the society through charity and networks of
madrassas. It may be worth mentioning here that Zia’s personal ideology was in sync
with the Deobandi ideology, and therefore, most of the Islamization process
predominantly followed the Deobandi ideology. Hashmi observes that, “with a number of
sects and varied types of ‘Islam,’ the Deobandi school of thought became the official
school to research theoretical explanations.” 219 Zia preferred one particular sect for
interpretation and implementation of Sharia; this led to marginalization of other sects. It

214 Rizvi, Military & Politics in Pakistan, 248–49.

215 Ibid.
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid.
218 Ibid.
219 Hashmi, “Pakistan, Politics, Religion, and Extremism,” 6.

59
can be argues that Zia’s policy was exclusionary of minor sects and religions, therefore,
further aggravated the sectarian strife and promoted extremism.

6. General Pervez Musharraf and ROs

As discussed previously, the state has made concessions to ROs that led to
extremist policies adopted by the state. On the other hand, rulers like Musharraf that had
tried to marginalize ROs and propose liberal policies have resulted in strong opposition
from the influential ROs. General Pervez Musharraf came to power in 1999 because of a
bloodless coup d’état against then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Musharraf introduced
the concept of “enlightened moderation,” which demanded the “Muslim world to shun
militancy and extremism and adopt the path of socioeconomic uplift.” 220 He wanted to
de-radicalize the Pakistani society by promoting more liberal and tolerant policies. As a
first step he proposed a minor amendment in the blasphemy law. 221 He further proposed
changes in the Hudood Ordinance; these changes were aimed at providing protection to
rape victims. In addition, he banned the militant outfits and associated welfare
organizations of LeT and Jaish-e-Muhammed (JEM). 222 His efforts, however, angered the
religious groups and ROs, which successfully compelled him to retreat from the proposed
amendments. Such efforts to amend the religious laws provided the ROs with an
opportunity to increase their propaganda against the government, which was already
experiencing violent acts of terrorism for its support of the U.S. war on terror. Further
fuel to fire against Musharraf came because of operations against militants who had taken
control of Lal Masjid (red mosque) in the country’s capital city of Islamabad. 223 These

220 Pervez Musharraf, “A Plea for Enlightened Moderation,” Washington Post, 1 June 2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5081-2004May31.html.
221 The blasphemy law in Pakistan was modified during Zia-ul-Haq rule, 1980‒86, to include
minimum penalty of death for making derogatory remarks against Islam and Islamic personages and
scriptures; for more, see “What are Pakistani Blasphemy Laws,” BBC, 4 November 2014,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12621225; Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Deference to the Mullahs, Iron
Fist for the Rest: Pakistan under Musharraf,” Economic and Political Weekly 41, no. 40 (7–13 October
2006): 4232, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4418775.
222 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, P.R. Chari, and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process:
American Engagement in South Asia (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006), 168.
223 “Musharraf Cracks down Radical Islamist Terror,” Economic Times, 11 July 2007,
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2007-07-11/news/27690525_1_islamist-terror-islamist-
militants-islamabad-s-lal-masjid.
60
actions against the extremist groups weakened the political support for Musharraf, while
on the other hand strengthened the propaganda of extremist elements. His actions against
extremist outfits resulted in three attacks on his life. He survived two terrorist attacks
aimed to kill him; a third was averted. 224 Musharraf was being portrayed as a “supporting
agenda of enemies of Islam under the smart title of ‘enlightened moderation.” 225 On the
one hand, Musharraf was supported by the Western powers including the United States;
on the other hand, he lost support from a larger base that was mobilized against him by
the ROs using religion as the driving force. He could not succeed in his anti-extremist
policies. His government’s kinetic actions against militants resulted in increased terrorist
attacks and further radicalization.

C. CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated that religion has been used for political reasons
even during the creation of the country. Subsequently, most of the governments have
used religion for political gains for which they had to make concessions to the ROs. This
in turn has led the state to accept demands of ROs to adopt policies that lead to
extremism in society.

The problem of religious extremism in Pakistan has become complex. Pakistan is

an Islamic state and its constitution should reflect that; however, the constitutional role of
religion has created space for extremist ROs to prosper and promote extremism in
society. Implementation of Shariah law is contested per se; various sects have different
interpretations of Shariah law, therefore, adopting an interpretation of one sect has
resulted in violent response from others. Hashmi argues:

With a number of sects and varied types of “Islam,” the Deobandi school
of thought became the official school to look up to for theoretical
explanations. With its close resemblance to Saudi Wahabism, Saudi

224 Bill Roggio, “Assassination Attempt against Pakistan’s President,” Long War Journal, 6 July
2007, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/07/apparent_assassinati.php.
225 Abid Ullah Jan, The Musharraf Factor: Leading Pakistan to Inevitable Demise (Canada:
Pragmatic Publishing, 2005), 47.
61
 Arabia became the patronizing factor, even though a majority of
Pakistanis was and still adhere to the Brelvi/Sufi tradition of Islam. 226

The ambiguity in implementing a version of Shariah law has therefore become a

cause of extremism. Thomas Jefferson wrote, “When principles are well understood, their
application is less embarrassing,” whereas, in the case of Pakistan, the ambiguities
remain. Hasan Askari Rizvi argues, “A number of Muslim sects who did not share the
establishment’s perspective on Islam resented the lack of adequate attention to their
religious sensitivities.” 227

Attempts to change the clauses in the constitution that have the potential to be
used against minorities have been responded to with violence by extremist ROs.
Musharraf’s efforts to marginalize ROs and take action against the extremist ROs have
further increased the intensity of violence by the extremist groups. Therefore, any policy
to counter extremism in Pakistan will have to be cognizant of reactions by the ROs,
which have become a formidable challenge for the state.

226 Hashmi, “Pakistan, Politics, Religion, and Extremism,” 6.

227 Rizvi, Military & Politics in Pakistan, 248–49.

62
 V. CONCLUSION

This thesis has demonstrated that ROs in Pakistan have a socio-economic link
with society through the provision of public goods and welfare to society. Members of
society who benefit from the welfare activities of the ROs become supporters of these
institutions. Moreover, some selected ROs in Pakistan have adopted extreme views due to
the political and social context in the country that forces them to compete for resources
using Islamist extremism. They then use this socio-economic link to indoctrinate citizens
with extremist ideologies, thus creating a foundational acceptance of terrorism as a
justified activity. Further, this link enables ROs to mobilize society for their interests,
such as to pressure the state to gain concessions or compel the state to pass extremist
laws. The state responds to ROs because of their influence over a considerable segment
of society. At times, the state also needs the ROs to mobilize the population for the state’s
interest. Therefore, the state accepts the demands of ROs—including those that require
adoption and implementation of extremist laws, which further contribute to extremism.

The second chapter demonstrated that ROs in Pakistan have a history of carrying
out social services and helping the poor. During the Soviet-Afghan War, the state
sponsored a particular sect, which marginalized other sects. This action had a profound
effect on the conduct of ROs, who thus became competitive in expanding their influence
on society. The case of JI and JUD are instructive, for understanding that in order to
increase their influence, the ROs have engaged in social services. JI and JUD have
expansive welfare networks all over the country. They have been able to provide social
and welfare services in the areas where the government has been unable to provide such
services. These ROs have maintained their link with the poor. Their influence on the poor
provides them with the leverage necessary to gain concessions and resources from the
state. Therefore, the ROs remain engaged in competitive welfare activities to increase
their influence over segments of society belonging to lower and lower-middle classes. It
is important to understand the link between religious organizations and the poor to further
our understanding of the dependence of the state on religious groups to mobilize the poor.
The state has been unable to meet the basic social needs of the poor, and therefore, the
63
poor have become disenfranchised by the state and come under the influence of religious
organizations. This situation benefits ROs, for they can bargain for compensation from
the state. By realizing the link between the poor and ROs, the state can form policies to
address the social requisites of the poor in order to weaken the power base of ROs. Some
of these ROs have adopted extremist ideologies and because they maintain influence over
society through socio-welfare networks, they promote extremism in society.

Chapter III illustrated that some ROs in Pakistan use religious symbols to promote
extremism. ROs in Pakistan have existed since the creation of the country. Yet during the
mid-1970s, there was an exponential rise in creation of new ROs on the basis of
sectarianism. This increase in the number of sectarian ROs, coupled with the funding of
some ROs from foreign countries and the Pakistani government, is related to the increase
in violence and terrorism within the country. Such a relationship suggests that the ROs in
Pakistan operate in a competitive environment where each RO strives to claim a
monopoly over religion. The ROs can be seen as rational actors who want to maximize
their benefits in terms of demanding resources from the state, increase their membership,
and marginalize their competitors. To maximize their benefits, some ROs resort to
extreme measures, including the use of violence and the promotion of extremism in
society. Madrasas provide foot soldiers to the extremist ROs, which carry out acts of
violence to prove that they are a significant factor and that the state must respond to their
demands. Understanding these ROs in the context of rational actors who are trying to
compete in a market of ideologies is therefore necessary to comprehend why and how
these ROs promote extremism in the society. This understanding is important in
formulating policies to counter extremism in Pakistan. The role of the state in favoring
one sect can exacerbate the situation because the other sects feel marginalized and
disenfranchised. They also feel threatened by the growing influence of the favored sect
and thus take up violent measures to protect their interests and seek resources from the
state. The support for these ROs comes from people who are dissatisfied with the existing
system. Therefore, the effectiveness of the state in providing social and economic support
to its people can limit the membership of these extremist ROs.

64
 Chapter IV illustrated that religion has been used for political reasons even during
the creation of the country. Subsequently, most of the governments used religion for
political gains for which they had to make concessions to the ROs. This in turn has led
the state to accept demands of ROs to adopt policies that lead to extremism in society.

The problem of religious extremism in Pakistan has become complex. Pakistan is

an Islamic state and its constitution should reflect that; however, the availability of
resources for Islamist activities has created space for competition among ROs who
prosper and promote extremism in society. Implementation of Shariah law is contested
per se; various sects have different interpretations of Shariah law; therefore, adopting the
interpretation of one sect has resulted in violent responses from others. Attempts to
change the clauses in the constitution that have the potential to be used against minorities
have been responded to with violence by extremist ROs. Musharraf’s efforts to
marginalize ROs and take action against the extremist ROs further increased the intensity
of violence by the extremist groups. Therefore, any policy to counter extremism in
Pakistan will have to be cognizant of reactions by the ROs, which have become a
formidable challenge for the state.

This thesis has illustrated that when the state relies on ROs for political
expediency it contributes to extremism. ROs in Pakistan have gained considerable
influence over the society, which allows them to promote extremism. The state has
depended on ROs for political reasons, which has led it to adopt exclusionary policies to
appease ROs. Such policies marginalize minority religions and sects, which resort to
violence to attract attention of the state. Therefore, in order to get rid of extremism in
Pakistan, the state needs to adopt policies that do not provide patronage to selective ROs.
Following are recommended in this regard:
• Lack of governance provides ROs with the space to maintain links with
the poor and disenfranchised population through their socio-welfare
activities. This provides them with the influence over a sizeable
population, which enables them to bargain with the state. Therefore, the
Pakistani state needs to ensure that its citizens are provided with social
goods and services. This will eliminate the cause of influence that ROs
have over the society. On the other hand, this will provide legitimacy to
the government for which it needs support of ROs.

65
• The state needs to distance itself from patronage of selective ROs. In the
past, this has led to competition among ROs that have adopted extremist
ideologies to compete for money and power.

• Some of the ROs have links with terrorist outfits. The state needs to
closely monitor the activities of ROs to identify those ROs that have links
to the terrorists. This will be possible only if the government keeps itself
neutral and does not provide patronage to selective ROs.

• With regard to academic research, this thesis has highlighted that there is a
lack of empirical data to gauge the influence of ROs on the society.
Therefore, in order to better understand the role of ROs in promoting
extremism, an empirical research is warranted to measure the influence of
ROs over the society.

66
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