People vs. Llobera, G.R. No.
203066, 05 August 2015
People of the Philippines vs. Rodelio Llobera (765 SCRA 379) GR no. 203066 | August 5,
2015 | Ponente: Perez, J.;
FACTS: Accused Rodelio, armed with an improvised shotgun (sumpak) shoot Cristituto Biona,
Jr., hitting his abdomen, inflicting him mortal wound which caused his death. Upon arraignment,
Rodelio pleaded not guilty and the trial ensured. The RTC find him guilty of murder and did not
accept his reason of alibi. Treachery attended the killing of the victim Cristituto. Upon appeal to
the CA, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but modified the award of damages.
ISSUE: W/N Treachery is present in the crime committed by Accused Rodelio.
HELD: YES, treachery is the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of
the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk
to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. There are two
conditions that must occur; a) the employment of means of execution gave the person attacked
no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and b) the means or method of execution was
deliberately and consciously adopted. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and
without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim with no chance to resist or escape. In the case at bar, treachery is evident.
The use of a shot gun against an unarmed victim is undoubtedly treacherous, as it denies the
victim the chance to fend off the offender.
People vs. Ofiza
G.R. No. 203066, August 5, 2015
Facts:
The accused Llobera filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
The accused-appellant was charged murder of Biona, Jr. He was armed with
an improvised shotgun and with intent to kill, with evident premeditation
and treachery, attacked the victim hitting his abdomen, inflicting mortal
wound causing his death.
Upon arraignment, the accused Llobera pleaded not guilty of charge.The
prosecution presented that Betty witnessed the shooting incident.
She’s the aunt by affinity of the victim. There’s a commotion and the three
of them, her kin, and the victim went outside to see what’s going on.
Suddenly, the accused pulled out the gun and shot the left side of the body
of the victim. Betty is familiar with the accused because he is a barangay
mate that he often sees passing by her house.
This was supported by the victim’s cousin, Rosebert.He was beside the
victim when the accused suddenly appeared. The place was well-lit.
The defense was that the accused-appellant together with her family and his
cousin were at a swimming event on another barangay.
It’s impossible that he is at the crime scene because it takes more than an
hour and a half to get there.
The RTC rendered that the accused is guilty of Murder. The RTC ruled that
there was treachery in the killing.
The accused-appellant appealed before the CA but the CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision modifying award of damages. Hence, this present petition.
He contended that they were barangay mates and Rosebert is not familiar
with the residents since he is just a vacationist.
Issue:
WON the accused-appellant is guilty for the crime of murder.
Ruling:
Yes, the accused-appellant is guilty for the crime of murder.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), that any person killing
another, who does not fall under parricide or infanticide, shall be guilty of
murder given that there is a qualifying circumstance of treachery.
In the case at bar, the Victim and the accused are not related to each other,
which could be parricide. The victim is not also an infant which could not be
infanticide. Evidence shows that Betty and Rosebert clearly identified the
accused in the crime scene doing the treacherous act.
15 People vs. Orita, 184 SCRA 114
Facts: On March 20, 1983, early morning, Cristina S. Abayan, a 19-year-old freshman at St.
Joseph’s College, was attacked outside her boarding house after returning from a party. A
frequent visitor to the house held her at knifepoint, forced her inside through the back door, and
led her to her room. Threatened with the knife, she was coerced into undressing and attempting
sexual acts, but he was unable to fully penetrate her due to her resistance. When he momentarily
released her, Cristina escaped, running naked to the nearby municipal building where police
found her in distress and covered her with a jacket. Police pursued but lost sight of the attacker.
She was later examined at a hospital, which found no physical signs of sexual trauma. The
Regional Trial Court classified the case as frustrated rape.
Issue: W/N there is frustrated rape
Ruling: NO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000
• Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages
apply to the crime of rape.
• Requisites of a frustrated felony are:
o (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony.
o (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will.
• attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency
which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the
acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to performIf
he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the crime and
voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it cannot be an attempt.
• In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he
actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense
have been accomplished. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient.
Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the
vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration
of the female organ
• The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis
of the victim's testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the genital organ
of the victim.
25 Ty vs. People, 439 SCRA 220
Facts: Ty's mother and sister were hospitalized at Manila Doctors Hospital, resulting in a P1-
million medical bill. To cover these expenses, Ty signed a responsibility contract with the
hospital and issued seven checks. However, these checks were later dishonored because they
were drawn from a closed account, leading the hospital to file a case against Ty for violating BP
22. In her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks out of an "uncontrollable fear of a
greater injury," stating that her mother had threatened to commit suicide due to alleged
mistreatment she experienced while in the hospital. Despite her defense, the trial court found Ty
guilty. Ty appealed, once again asserting that she issued the checks to avoid a greater harm or
injury.
Issue: Is the defense of uncontrollable fear or avoidance of a greater evil or injury tenable to
warrant Ty's exemption from criminal liability?
Ruling: NO. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following
requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and
imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims
that she was compelled to issue the checks a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her
before her mother could be discharged for fear that her mother’s health might deteriorate further
due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is
speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so life-threatening such that
her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a
well-grounded apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the laws intent to say that any fear
exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her mother might
commit suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to
deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by
the hospitals threats or demands.
35 People vs. Gonzalez, 359 SCRA 220
Facts: Gonzalez was convicted of the complex crime of murder for the death of Feliber Andres,
double frustrated murder for the injuries to John Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez, and
attempted murder against Noel Andres. The trial court rejected Gonzalez's argument that the
shooting was accidental and that he did not intend to harm Noel Andres, his wife, or children.
Gonzalez was sentenced to death and ordered to pay civil liabilities.
The incident began with an altercation between Gonzalez and Andres after their vehicles nearly
collided at the exit of Loyola Memorial Park. Andres, who was with his pregnant wife and child,
followed Gonzalez’s car to the exit and eventually cut him off to confront him about traffic rules.
When Andres saw that Gonzalez was becoming enraged, he began walking back to his vehicle
but encountered Gonzalez’s son, Dino, leading to another heated exchange. Moments later,
Gonzalez exited his car and fired a shot aimed at the left rear window of Andres' vehicle, away
from Noel Andres. The bullet struck Feliber Andres in the forehead, killing her, and injured the
two children with metallic fragments on their faces—one in the cheek and the other below the
left eye. Gonzalez argued that the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit a serious
offense should be considered in his favor, citing that he attempted to help those injured.
Issue: Whether the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave
a wrong as that committed should be appreciated.
Ruling: No. The Court, speaking through Justice Gonzaga-Reyes, held that the plea for the
appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is
devoid of merit. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity
between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime
committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested
from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim. The
appellant's use of a gun, although not deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should
have reasonably placed the appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his act. The use of
a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed.
45 People vs. De Mesa, 354 SCRA 397
Facts: On October 15, 1996, Barangay Chairman Patricio Motas was shot dead while playing a
card game with some townmates at a neighborhood store. One of those implicated in the killing
was Hernando de Mesa, the appellant in this case.
For his defense, accused-appellant recounted his activities on October 15, 1996. Accused-
appellant said that he was not aware of any unusual incident that could have disturbed his sleep
that night. The next day, October 16, he learned from his neighbors that their barangay chairman
had been killed. He did not know who was responsible for the killing. He said that he and his
wife attended the wake of their barangay chairman.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
with the aggravating circumstances of commission of the crime in contempt of or assault to
public authorities and at nighttime.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in determining the nature of the crime committed and
the corresponding penalty to be imposed?
Ruling: The SC found that the prosecution failed to prove the presence of treachery. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means,
methods or forms of attack which tend directly and especially to insure the execution of the
crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. For
treachery to exist, two essential elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (2)
the said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proven positively. The circumstantial evidence on
record does not prove that there was any conscious and deliberate effort on the part of the
accused-appellant to adopt any particular means, method or form of attack to ensure the
commission of the crime without affording the victim any means to defend himself. Absent any
particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act which resulted in
the death of the victim unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated. The mere fact that the wounds
were found at the back of the victim does not by itself prove that there was treachery. An attack
from behind is not necessarily treacherous unless it appears that the method of attack was
adopted by the accused deliberately with a special view to the accomplishment of the act without
any risk to the assailant from the defense that the party assaulted may make. Hence, treachery
cannot be considered an aggravating circumstance in the case at bar, there being no eyewitnesses
to the killing or evidence on the manner of its execution.
The trial court also erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nighttime. By and of
itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. The fact that the offense was committed at
night will not suffice to sustain such aggravating circumstance. For nocturnity to properly attend
the commission of a crime, it must be shown that it facilitated the commission and that it was
purposely sought by the offender. These facts were not proved in the case at bar.
Finally, the trial court also erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance that the
commission of the crime was in contempt of or with assault to public authorities. The requisites
of this circumstance are: (1) the public authority is engaged in the discharge of his duties and (2)
he is not the person against whom the crime is committed. None of these circumstances are
present in this case. In the first place, the crime was committed against the barangay chairman
himself. At the time that he was killed, he was not engaged in the discharge of his duties as he
was in fact playing a card game with his neighbors.
55 r
Facts: The accused-appellant was charged with murder, as it was alleged that he attacked Danilo
Estrella y Sanchez with treachery by shooting him with an Armalite rifle while Danilo was
walking home. The gunfire struck Danilo multiple times, leaving him no chance to defend
himself and causing fatal wounds that led to his immediate death.
The accused-appellant claimed self-defense, stating he had been informed by Aelardo that
Danilo and four others were plotting to kill him. Concerned for his family’s safety, he readied his
Armalite rifle. On her way to the accused-appellant’s house, Celia saw a man with a gun
approaching him from behind. When Celia shouted "Ricky," the accused-appellant turned toward
her and saw Danilo aiming a gun at him, preparing to shoot. In response, the accused-appellant
fired his rifle at Danilo, hitting him and causing him to fall to the ground.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant can validly claim self-defense.
Ruling: Self-defense cannot be validly claimed. By invoking self-defense, the burden of proof
shifted to accused-appellant to show that the killing was attended by the following
circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person invoking self-defense.
In this case, accused-appellant claimed that when Celia shouted his name, he saw Danilo who
was about to shoot him. However, based on Celia's testimony, Danilo was only approaching
accused-appellant while holding a gun. Celia did not witness any positive act showing the actual
and material unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The accused-appellant is held guilty
of murder.
75 People vs. Dacillo, 427 SCRA 528
Facts: Appellant Dacillo, along with Joselito Pacot, was charged with murder, with the crime
allegedly committed with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The case
against Pacot was provisionally dismissed due to insufficient evidence to conclusively identify
him. Dacillo was arraigned on February 21, 2001, and with legal counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty. Pre-trial took place on March 1, 2001, followed by the trial.
After the body was found on the night of February 11, 2000, Dacillo promptly left for Cebu City,
arriving on February 12, 2000, and remained there until his arrest the following year. On May
31, 2001, the trial court issued a verdict, finding Dacillo guilty of murder and sentencing him to
death. The court determined that Francisco Dacillo was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
murder of Rosemarie Tallada, as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. Given the aggravating factor of recidivism, with no mitigating circumstances to
balance it, he was sentenced to the maximum penalty of death.
Issue: Whether or not it is necessary, in recidivism as an aggravating circumstance, to be alleged
in the information?
Ruling: The Court, however, finds that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on the
ground that appellant admitted during re-cross examination that he had a prior conviction for the
death of his former live-in partner. The fact that appellant was a recidivist was appreciated by the
trial court as a generic aggravating circumstance which increased the imposable penalty from
reclusion perpetua to death. In order to appreciate recidivism as an aggravating circumstance, it
is necessary to allege it in the information and to attach certified true copies of the sentences
previously meted out to the accused. This is in accord with Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which states: SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint
or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If
there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it. The aggravating circumstance of recidivism was not alleged in the
information and therefore cannot be appreciated against appellant. Hence the imposable penalty
should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
85. Ivler vs. San Pedro, 635 SCRA 191
Facts: In August 2004, petitioner Ivler was involved in a vehicular collision and subsequently
charged with two offenses before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City: (1) reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property and (2) reckless imprudence resulting
in slight physical injuries. The arraignment dates for the two cases were scheduled separately,
with the latter case being heard first. On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82367 and received a penalty of public censure. Citing this conviction, Ivler
filed a motion to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366, arguing that it subjected
him to double jeopardy for the same offense of reckless imprudence. However, the trial court
denied his motion to quash.
Issue: Whether the conviction on the first offense of a lesser penalty constitutes double jeopardy
on the other.
Ruling: Yes. Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific
act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious
result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one
and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or
severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no
splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first
level court.
95 Recebido vs. People, 346 SCRA 881
Facts: On September 9, 1990, Caridad Dorol visited her cousin, Aniceto Recebido, at his home
in San Isidro, Bacon, Sorsogon, to redeem an agricultural property she had mortgaged to him in
April 1985. While no formal mortgage document was created, Caridad had given Recebido a
copy of the June 16, 1973 Deed of Sale, issued by her father, Juan Dorol, to show her ownership.
During their discussion, Recebido refused to allow Caridad to redeem the property, claiming that
she had sold it to him in 1979. Caridad insisted that the transaction was a mortgage, not a sale.
Caridad later verified with the Sorsogon Office of the Assessor and found a Deed of Sale, dated
August 13, 1979, showing that the property was registered in Recebido's name. However, after
comparing her known signatures with the signature on the questioned Deed of Sale, NBI
Document Examiner Antonio Magbojas concluded that the signature on the deed was falsified.
Caridad then filed a complaint against Aniceto Recebido with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in Legaspi City, where the Questioned Documents Division examined the
disputed Deed of Sale and her alleged signature.
Issue: Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribed at the time the information was
filed.
Ruling: No. Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall
"commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents, x xx." In People v. Reyes, this Court has declared that registration in
public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as
well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with
knowledge of what it contains.
