Crim Law
Crim Law
1. Theories of Punishment
I. Utilitarianism: forward-looking; justifies punishment because it has positive consequences to
society, either through deterrence, incapacitation of the offender, or rehabilitation of the offender.
A. Deterrence: society benefits because would-be criminals will be dissuaded from their
misbehavior because they fear punishment.
i. General: deter society as a whole from committing that crime
ii. Specific: deter that specific individual from committing that crime again
B. Incapacitation: purpose is to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant
C. Rehabilitation: purpose is to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner
II. Retributivism: backward-looking; holds that defendants deserve to suffer for their wrongdoings.
A. Lex Talionis – eye for an eye; punishment needs to be proportional to the crime
B. It is the moral duty of a just society to inflict pain upon evil doers
C. Example: US v. Madoff
III. Expressivism
A. The process of punishment – the imposition of harm – expresses society’s moral condemnation
of the offender’s behavior
B. Example: US v. Gementera – ∆ stole mail and had to wear a sandwich board. Also deals with
“shaming principles”
5. Act Requirements
I. Actus Reus
A. Defined: an offense is the physical, or external, component of the crime that society does not
want to occur
II. Culpable mental states need action but most criminal statutes are silent on what constitutes an act
A. But, an act is usually considered CONDUCT and RESULT
i. This requires a voluntary physical requirement
ii. Conduct crime: some crimes prohibit specific conduct whether or not tangible harm results
(example would be drunk driving)
iii. Result crime: some crimes prohibit specific results, such as a death of another human being
V. Omissions
A. Defined: failure to act or the absence of an act
B. Conviction can be based on an omission only when the ∆ had a legal duty to act, which can be
established by:
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i. Statute
a. Example: a statute might impose an affirmative obligation on all individuals to pay
taxes, with criminal penalties for non-compliance
ii. Relationship Between ∆ and Victim
a. Example: parent/child relationship
iii. Contract/Legal Duty
a. Example: contract to care
b. Commonwealth v. Pestinikas: ∆s omission to act satisfied the physical act because
they had to duty to Kly that was imposed via the contract.
iv. Voluntary Assumption of Care
a. Example: lifeguards have duty to swimmers; doctors have duty to patients
v. Creation of Risk
a. Example: someone who causes harm has duty to mitigate the harm (intentionally or
negligently)
C. As a general rule, omissions are never criminalized.
VI. Bystander
A. If a bystander witnesses a crime, she has no general legal obligation to intervene to stop the
crime, unless she bears a legal duty to act under one of the categories described above.
B. Bystanders can be prosecuted if they encouraged, incited, or assisted the crime in some way
that transformed them from “mere” bystanders into actual accomplices or conspirators.
6. Mental States
I. Mens Rea
A. The particular mental state that accompanied the defendant’s actions
B. Provide a scheme for distinguishing between levels of culpability
IV. Malice
A. Acting with a “wicked” motive or with an “evil” intent
V. Strict Liability
A. Defined: The ∆ is responsible simply for committing a particular action or causing a particular
result, regardless of their state of mind.
B. Most often found in regulatory offenses that have a public welfare rationale
C. Can be controversial since the ∆’s awareness of the situation
D. Conflicts with:
i. A need for deterrence and retribution
E. Under 2.02, the mental states that apply are purposefully, knowingly, recklessly but when
there is no mental state/statute is silent, SL can be read into it but is usually disfavored.
i. Guns/registering is an exception
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ii. Public welfare / regulatory exception – there are some things that are so bad or
dangerous that congress can regulate them without a mens rea
a. Grenades, narcotics
b. Usually incredibly dangerous activities
iii. A non-public welfare offense could be considered a SL offense but this is rare. Example
would be statutory rape.
F. Mistake of Fact defense is not available because no mens rea is required
G. CANNOT attempt a SL result crime; CAN attempt a SL conduct crime
7. Mistakes
I. Defined:
A. A mistake is relevant if it negates a required mental element of the offense
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B. Burden of persuasion falls to the prosecution to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
∆ acted with the required mens rea, that it was not a mistake
i. As an elemental approach, no burden shifting. Nothing specific you have to prove;
prosecution just has to establish what mental state. For example, theft requires knowledge
that it property of another.
ii. Under common law, specific intent- prosecution just has to show the ∆ they did not have a
sincere belief. For larceny, prosecution just has to show ∆ knew it was someone else’s
property.
iii. Some states view mistake as an affirmative defense; the burden would then be on the
defendant.
iv. Usually, burden is always on prosecution.
The Model Penal Code takes a more lenient view of mistake of fact defenses in those situations in
which the defendant intended to commit an offense, but ended up committing a worse offense
than the one she intended. Unlike the common law approach, the defendant is only punished at
the level of the intended offense
8. Causation
I. Two-step process for evaluating causation in criminal law:
A. (1) Establish whether there is any causal connection
B. (2) Ask whether the connection is sufficiently close to hold the ∆ responsible for the resulting
harm.
OFFENSES
1. Murder with Malice Aforethought
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I. Express v. Implied Malice
A. Express Malice: intentional killing – an unlawful killing in which the actor desired the death of
the victim.
i. Under old common law, extreme bodily harm was express malice
B. Implied Malice: involves reckless killings that demonstrate a depraved indifference to human
life
i. Under old common law included felony murder
C. MPC does not use the concept of malice
i. § 210.12: defines intentional murder as a killing performed purposely or knowingly, and
makes no attempt to distinguish between more or less blameworthy types of intentional
murder
*second degree, test is extreme indifference to human life
2. Voluntary Manslaughter
I. Manslaughter defined (Castagna) – homicide, which would otherwise be murder, is committed in the
heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation
A. Required mental state is intentional
II. Is basically intentional murder with the existence of certain mitigating circumstances
A. Common Law Approach (adequate provocation)
i. Older, specified circumstances (Girouard)
a. (1) Extreme assault on the ∆
b. (2) Mutual combat
c. (3) Illegal assert of the ∆
d. (4) Injury of serious abuse of close relative (or friend)
e. (5) Sudden discovery of spouse
ii. if someone punches you and you kill him in return, that’s voluntary manslaughter. An
intentional murder for which there’s a special excuse – extreme assault
B. Generalized Common Law Conditions
i. (1) Adequate provocation – defined as calculated to inflame a reasonable man and to cause him
to act through passion rather than reason
a. Words are not enough
§ Lang court: words can constitute adequate provocation if they are accompanied by
conduct indicating a present intention and ability to cause the defendant bodily
harm
b. Threats depend on the context
c. Pets are not adequate provocation (has to be friend or relative) but can also be a
question for the jury
d. In Morales, court said the learning of assault could be enough to constitute provocation,
but what matters is that the D lost control immediately upon learning
ii. (2) Killing in the heat of passion.
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iii. (3) Performed suddenly before reasonable opportunity for passions to cool
a. Exceptions: doctrines of rekindling and long-smoldering passions
iv. (4) Causal connection between provocation, passion, and killing
C. MPC (extreme emotional distress)
i. A broader standard: killing is manslaughter when it is committed under the influence of
extreme emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.
ii. it is an affirmative defense
iii. No heat of passion/cooling off period.
iv. MPC: 210.1(b)
3. Reckless Killings
I. Involuntary Manslaughter
A. Defined: an unintentional killing based on the defendant’s unjustified risk-taking behavior.
(aware of and disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk)
i. Required mental state is recklessness
ii. MPC § 2.02(2)- disregarding the risk “involves a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.
a. MPC does not have a separate category for involuntary manslaughter; all reckless
killings are manslaughter
B. Implied malice (common law) and extreme indifference murder (MPC)
C. The crime of involuntary manslaughter requires (1) that the defendant's gross negligence result
in the accidental death of another (or, under the Model Penal Code, that the defendant act
recklessly) or (2) that the death occur unintentionally during the commission of a misdemeanor
or other unlawful act.
i. necessary for the prosecution to show that the defendant's actions were the proximate
cause of the victim's death.
II. Implied malice killing – some courts refer to reckless murder as implied malice murder (malice
aforethought)
A. Extreme indifference to the value of human life
B. Basically: the ∆’s depravity can be shown as severe or through an “abandoned or malignant
heart”
C. Implied malice killings and extreme indifference murder are synonymous and face-dependent
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§ if the killing committed by a non-felon is the result of a sequence of
events set forth by the defendant, the defendant is ultimately
responsible. Therefore, the killing by a non-felon should be
attributable to the felon and should serve as the basis of a felony-
murder charge.
§ Agency Test: Performed by ∆’s agent
o Provocative act doctrine: To hold the felons guilty of murder for deaths
caused at the hands of third parties, prosecutors have to show malice by
using the provocative act doctrine.
o ∆ starts shooting at police, police shoot and kill an innocent person on
accident - Provocative acts of one felon create malice for all co-felons
o Police killings normally do not count
b. Question is whether someone on your side is the one who is committing the act?
D. MPC Approach
i. MPC does/not have felony murder
ii. MPC 210.2(1)(b) – does not explicitly state felony murder but lists felonies and if a ∆
commits one of these felonies then recklessness is presumed and ∆ can be convicted under
this statute
iii. MPC creates a statutory presumption that a killing performed during a felony constitutes
murder under the category of extreme indifference to human life
a. Instead of requiring a jury to find that the ∆’s behavior rose to a level of indifference,
a court may simply presume that the required indifference is satisfied since the
killing occurred during the course of a felony
4. Negligent Homicide
I. Requires only negligence
A. No state of awareness is required
B. ∆ is punished for his carelessness essentially
C. Negligence requires a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person
would follow under the circumstances
D. MPC only classifies negligent deaths as negligent homicide.
IV. Analysis
A. If the negligence created an emergency, then ∆ is responsible
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B. However, must look at whether something was a mere accidence (Traughber)
i. If ∆ responded to emergency, then “reasonableness” is a lower bar
C. Negligent behavior often involves not doing something that a person should be doing
5. Rape
I. Rape = sexual intercourse + (force OR threat of force) + no consent
A. general intent crime because you intend to have sex – have to intend the act
II. Consent:
A. At common law, victim was resistant to their utmost
i. Part of rape reform was to remove consent to focus on force
ii. Heavy focus on consent was a disincentive for victims to come forward because defense
would focus on history of sexual relations to prove consent– victim would get on the stand
and their sexual history would be out there for everyone to know
a. Rape shield law: ∆ is barred from bringing evidence concerning the woman’s past
sexual history that does not involve him
B. Modern Focus is on Force
i. Attention put on the aggressor
ii. Victim is not required to actively resist if she reasonably believes resistance would be
useless and would result in serious bodily injury
iii. What does force mean?
a. Resistance is defined as reasonable under the circumstances and does not have to be
strictly physical and because resistance does not have to be just physical; verbal means
lack of consent
b. Extrinsic vs. intrinsic
b. Extrinsic – force beyond the actual act itself
o State v. Jones is an example
• Case where the ∆ and victim had been having an affair for a while and
she wanted to end it but he raped her twice after the affair had
ended
• Scale berkowitz/jacques
o Ordinarily required proof of force or threat of force beyond the inherent act
of non-consensual intercourse
c. Intrinsic – penetration; the force is equal to the act itself
o Lack of consent + force inherent in sexual intercourse
o Move toward modern trend of eradicating element of force
C. Consent and Mistake of Fact
i. Traditionally, lack of consent was not an issue because if there was force, then of course
there was no consent. But if limited force is required, then question of whether ∆ knew there
was consent. (mistake of fact)
ii. How does consent become an issue?
a. If simply defined as intrinsic, then issue of consent becomes more important
iii. If ∆ was mistaken about consent, to analyze whether that claim is legally cognizable, look at
mens rea requirement for consent
a. Negligent = reasonable person
b. Knowledge = good faith
c. Common law rule, knowledge of consent is not part of the crime, but part of the
force of the act, so it would be a strict liability = no mental state requirement
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iv. People v. Lopez: ∆ claims rape was consensual and wanted a MOF instruction; consent is
contained in force determination so court said no
v. People v. Newton: what matters is not whether the ∆ was subjectively aware that the
victim was consenting, but whether a reasonable person in the actor’s situation would be
aware that the victim was not consenting (reasonable person test – objective test) (views
rape as more of a special intent crime)
II. 3 major elements (the act and mental state requirements combined with a result element)
A. Engage in an unlawful application of physical force
B. Resulting in either a physical (bodily) injury or an offensive touching
C. Acting with purpose, knowledge, or recklessness (or negligence under a few statues) to cause
the prohibited result
i. *content of the elements varies across jurisdictions
2. Assault
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I. MPC:
A. Eliminated the distinction between assault and battery –
i. Assault covers physical contact, attempted physical contact, reasonable apprehension of
bodily injury
3. Kidnapping
I. Defined: Confinement of victim or restriction of movement
A. The Three Basic Requirements Include:
i. (1) Confining or carrying away the victim
a. Technical name for carrying away is asportation
b. 4 elements for asportation (in Garcia) in Goolsby:
§ (1) Duration of the movement;
§ (2) Whether the movement occurred during the commission of a separate
offense;
§ (3) Whether such movement was an inherent part of that separate offense; and
§ (4) Whether the movement itself presented a significant danger to the victim
independent of the danger posed by the separate offense
ii. (2) Forcibly or by threat or fear or deception
iii. (3) For a nefarious purpose
B. Act requirement can be satisfied by “force” but the MPC also includes threat or deception
C. Cannot be incidental to another crime – Some courts say it can’t be done in furtherance of
another crime; prevents double charging
II. Movement:
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A. How much movement is needed for kidnapping?
i. Inherent movement part of a separate offense intended to isolate the victim from
protection or rescue
ii. Significant danger independent from the separate offense (rape, for example)
B. Most states see kidnapping as moving around of any kind during the commission of a crime
C. Slight movement can be enough provided you satisfy all 4 elements for asportation (in Garcia)
in Goolsby
4. Theft
*in order to complete the offense, actually have to take away the property.
I. Larceny
A. Defined: the trespassory taking and carrying away of another’s property with the intent to
permanently deprive the possessor of the property
i. “trespass” refers to the notion of a legal trespass – a violation of a legal interest by taking
the property without consent or justification
ii. Did you move another’s property and have the intent to permanently keep it?
iii. Pickpocketing falls under the crime of common law larceny, which requires only a
trespassory taking and carrying away of the property of another with intent to steal.
B. 4 Elements:
i. Trespassory taking
a. Possession does not pass
ii. Asportation
iii. Property of another
iv. Intent to deprive permanently
C. Custody versus possession
i. Consent to take something/taking with permission
ii. The idea is that if you have possession, you cannot commit larceny because it is legitimately
your own
iii. If you take it outside of the reason for which you were given permission for, then that turns
into trespassory taking
iv. Basically: custody is with a specific purpose and violation of that specific purpose turns into
larceny
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not have passed to the accused. Larceny by trick also requires that the property be taken by
fraud or deceit.
C. Four Elements:
i. Taking by ruse
ii. Asportation
iii. Intent to deprive permanently
iv. Property of another
IV. Embezzlement
A. Defined: involves an actor’s lawful possession of another’s personal property, which is then
concerted or appropriated by the actor with the intent to prematurely deprive the owner of the
property
B. Two Elements:
i. Property received voluntarily
a. Possession passes
ii. Converted to personal use
V. Extortion
A. Defined: obtaining possession of something by threat or fear and obtaining possession
B. Two Elements:
i. Threat of fear or illegal act
ii. Obtains possession or title
C. Blackmail
i. Two Elements:
a. Threat or fear of legal act
b. Obtains possession or title
VII. Robbery
A. Theft + physical force or threat of physical force
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INCHOATE OFFENSES (inchoate means incomplete)
1. Attempt
I. Why is attempt criminal?
A. Protect society from an about-to-be committed crime
B. Protect society from dangerous people
C. Punish bad actors
II. Defined:
A. Form of inchoate liability
B. Specific Intent Crime: because the ∆ must intend to engage in the conduct and also must intend
to bring about the crime
i. Heightened mens rea requirement is often thought to balance out the lower act
requirement
ii. Majority of jurisdictions require that the ∆ act with purpose
a. mens rea for murder is lower than the required mens rea for attempted murder.
b. if a defendant just wants to scare the victim or play a practical joke, there is no
attempt even if the defendant comes dangerously close to harming the victim.
c. Under the common law, the defendant must have the purpose (specific intent) to
accomplish the crime.
d. Under the Model Penal Code, knowledge of the likely harmful result is sufficient.
C. MPC Approach:
i. § 5.01 – requires the ∆ “purposely engages in conduct that would constitute the crime” and
when causing a result is an element of the crime, also acts with the purpose to bring about
the result
a. MPC imposes attempt liability if (1) the accused intends to commit the substantive
crime itself, and (2) the accused has taken a substantial step toward completion of
the crime. MPC §5.01(1).
§ Under the MPC, “lying in wait” constitutes a substantial step toward
accomplishment of the target crime. MPC §5.01(2)(a).
b. Purpose requirement only applies to conduct; as for other mental elements,
including attendant circumstances, the ∆ only needs to act “with the kind of
culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime.”
c. The MPC substantial step test – requires the ∆ engage in a “substantial step in a
course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime”
§ Holding in State v. Reeves: when an actor possesses materials to be used in
the commission of the crime, at or near the scene of the crime, and where
the possession of those materials can serve no lawful purpose of the actor
under the circumstances, the jury is entitled to find the actor has taken a
substantial step toward the commission of the crime if such action is strongly
corroborative of the actor’s overall criminal purpose
D. Two kinds of Attempt:
i. (1) Complete: commit act with requisite intent
a. AR for completed is the act
b. If ∆ takes the last step he believed necessary to commit a crime but still fails in his
effort
c. Example: ∆ shoots the victim and missed
ii. (2) Incomplete: commit “substantial step” with requisite act
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a. but still more I have to do to carry out intent
b. AR is substantial step
c. If ∆ starts the crime but is caught by the police before he can finish the effort
d. Example: defendant shoots the victim but is tackled before he is able to pull the
trigger
e. Can there be an incomplete attempt a conduct crime?
§ Example- if you’re going to your car drunk and someone stops you – difficult to
prove though
§ Result crimes are easier to show, like attempted murder
E. Requirements for a Punishable Attempt:
i. (1) ∆ has the specific intent or purpose (mens rea) to bring about the crime and
ii. (2) ∆ takes sufficient steps toward committing the crime to satisfy the jurisdiction’s actus
reus test
a. Then two defenses may apply of:
§ (1) Crime is impossible to complete
§ (2) Abandoned the effort
F. Court is Rizzo said that the act of searching for the victim is not enough to constitute a
substantial step under the more traditional “proximity test” used by some courts.
III. Defenses:
A. Impossibility
i. Modern approach is to disallow impossibility defenses unless they are pure legal
impossibility, so don’t worry too much about factual or hybrid impossibility
ii. Two kinds:
a. Factual
§ Occurs when the objective of the ∆ is proscribed by the criminal law but a
circumstance unknown to the actor prevents him from bringing about that
objective
§ Usually not a defense because it simply involves a factual element that
prevented the ∆ from completing the crime
o Example: if the ∆ pulls the trigger but the gun jams, still guilty of
attempted murder even though it was factually impossible to achieve the
desired result
b. Legal
§ Pure Legal Impossibility: covers the trivial circumstances where the ∆ engages in
conduct that he thinks is illegal but is not
o ∆ cannot be convicted of an attempt
§ Hybrid Legal Impossibility: exists if the ∆’s goal was illegal but commission of the
offense was impossible due to a factual mistake by her regarding the legal status
of some factor relevant to her conduct
o Includes both a factual and legal aspect
B. Abandonment
i. This defense applies if the ∆ “voluntarily and completely” renounced his criminal purpose.
ii. Abandonment must be VOLUNTARY
a. Must be truly opposed to a result of resistance from the victim or of fear of
apprehension
b. These limitations substantially limit the number of factual situations that will qualify
as abandonment
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c. Not all jurisdictions recognize the defense.
d. common law did not recognize a claim of “abandonment (renunciation)” once a
defendant had passed the point of an attempt
2. Inchoate Conspiracy
I. Defined:
A. Conspiracy – an agreement between two more individuals to commit and unlawful act
i. Since the crime in inchoate, the ultimate crime to which the conspiracy is directed need not
be performed.
ii. Once the agreement is formed and the overt act is performed, the inchoate crime of
conspiracy has been committed.
B. 3 Elements:
i. (1) Agreement to do an unlawful act
a. The agreement + the overt act = inchoate crime of conspiracy
b. Often quiet implicit – not a contract/in writing (may never be reduced to explicit
terms)
ii. (2) Specific intent/purpose (like attempt) to achieve the goal or object of the conspiracy,
and
a. Typically inferred
iii. (3) Overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy
a. Most jurisdictions require a physical act, not just a meeting of the minds
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b. Statutes with an overt act requirement are often interpreted broadly.
§ It is sufficient that only one member acts
§ Doesn’t need to commit the act in question
c. Goal of this requirement is to distinguish between criminal agreements that are
purely mental and those that have been actualized
iv. *If you just agree to commit a crime, not enough, have to put the plan into motion
C. Unilateral v. Bilateral Conspiracy
i. Some jurisdictions (including most federal) adopt a bilateral approach and require two
sincere parties to the agreement
a. “takes two to tango”
ii. Some jurisdictions follow a unilateral approach, meaning a single individual can create an
agreement even if there is no true agreement with the other party
a. Often happens when informants or undercover police officers form agreements
II. Renunciation
A. ∆ must fully renounce the conspiracy by thwarting the conspiracy “under circumstances
manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.” MPC § 5.03(6)
i. Contacting the police or otherwise depriving the conspiracy of its effectiveness
B. Tougher to abandon than attempt – contacting the police or depriving the conspiracy of its
effectiveness
C. Some jurisdictions allow the defense when ∆s make a reasonable effort to stop the conspiracy
D. Some jurisdictions refuse to recognize the defense entirely, presumably on the old common law
rationale that the crime is complete once the agreement is formed and an overt act is
committed
III. Merger
A. Unlike attempts, conspiracy does not merge with its completed offense and liability does not
disappear
i. Means that liability for conspiracy does not disappear once the conspiracy is successfully
completed
B. Rationale for the non-merger rule is that conspiracy, a form of collective criminality, represents
a “distinct evil.”
C. Defense attorneys could argue double dipping, but alternative is that a conspiracy include
multiple criminals acting in concert and that is more dangerous than the same crime committed
by a single individual.
3. Solicitation
I. Defined:
A. Solicitation is both an inchoate offense and a mode of liability.
B. A ∆ who solicits another individual to commit a crime is guilty of the inchoate crime of
solicitation; if the solicited individual then carries out the crime, the solicitor is guilty of that
offense as well (at that point, the solicitation charge usually disappears because it merges with
the completed offense)
C. Elements of Solicitation:
i. (1) specific intent or purpose,
ii. (2) to solicit (hire, command, request, encourage, or invite),
iii. (3) a third party to perform a crime
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II. Solicitation v. Conspiracy:
A. As a factual matter, most cases of solicitation will qualify as a conspiracy
i. Example: hiring a hitman for money constitutes an agreement to commit an unlawful act
and hence a conspiracy.
B. As a legal matter, requirements differ – it’s possible for a defendant to be guilty of soliciting
someone to commit a crime without going the further step of forming an agreement with them
to commit the crime.
i. First- Conspiracy statutes often require an overt act performed in furtherance of the
conspiracy, while most solicitation statutes do not.
ii. Second- The focus of the two crimes is slightly different.
a. Solicitation focuses on the acts and mens rea of the defendant alone – does he ask
someone to commit the crime for him?
b. The crime of solicitation does not depend on the response that the defendant
receives from the requires.
c. Conspiracy focuses on the relationship between the parties; it requires that the
second individual agrees to the proposal, thus creating the agreement that forms
the conspiracy offense.
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MODES OF LIABILITY
1. Accomplices
I. Defined:
A. Common Law:
i. Perpetrators were divided into two large categories: principals and accessories
ii. First degree:
a. Principals performed the actus reus
iii. Second degree:
a. Accessories there to help (holding shot gun casings, lookouts)
§ Actively assisting while the crime is being done
b. Accessories before the fact (help plan, collect instruments of crime)
c. Accessories after the fact (getaway car, nourishing bowl of broth, affirmation)
iv. Under the MPC and most states, there are just principals and accessories.
B. Today:
i. When an accomplice assists in the commission of an offense, the accomplice becomes
derivatively responsible for that crime, even though someone else (the principal
perpetrator) committed it.
ii. Mode of liability, not an inchoate offense
iii. Accomplices can be punished just as harshly as the principal perpetrators they assist
C. Two elements:
i. (1) assistance or support to the principal perpetrator
ii. (2) performed with the purpose or knowledge (depending on the jurisdiction) to facilitate
the crime
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i. Learned Hand: accomplice defined as someone who “in some sort associates himself with
the venture, that he participate in it as something that he wishes to bring about, that he
seek by his actions to make it succeed.” – US v. Peoni
ii. Purpose can be inferred from knowledge. Jury can find for purpose if it is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt the defendant acted with knowledge.
C. State courts are split
i. Some use the purpose standard but other use the knowledge requirement
ii. MPC supports the purpose standard (MPC 2.06(3)) and some state adopted this
iii. Rosemond Rule:
a. “chosen, with full knowledge, to participate in the illegal scheme, no that, if all had
been left to him, he would have planned the identical crime”
VI. Defenses
A. Possible for the principle perpetrator be found not guilty but the accomplice be found guilty
i. No need for juries to be consistent
B. More straightforward defense is withdrawal or renunciation of the crime
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2. Conspiracy Liability
I. Defined:
A. an agreement between two or more individuals to commit an unlawful act
B. Can be both an inchoate offense and a mode of liability
i. Mode of liability = conspiracy is used as a link to make the ∆ responsible for the crimes
committed by her co-conspirators
C. Three Essential Questions to Understand the Doctrine:
i. (1) how extensive is this vicarious liability?
a. Both conspiracy and accomplice liability of a form of vicarious liability
b. Liable for accomplice’s act (and natural and probable consequences)
ii. (2) how does one define the outer scope of the “conspiracy” that the ∆ is responsible for?
iii. (3) how does one withdraw from the conspiracy and terminate one’s vicarious responsibility
for the acts of co-conspirators?
IV. Renunciation
A. Acts already performed by co-conspirators cannot be disowners but the link to future acts could
be severed if ∆ successfully withdraws from the conspiracy
B. Standard for withdrawal varies from jurisdiction, but most require that the ∆ perform an
affirmative act to disavow or defeat the conspiracy
C. common law rule is that an act of withdrawal is not a defense to a conspiracy charge because
the conspiracy is complete once the agreement has been made.
D. MPC does permit a withdrawal defense, but only if (1) the accused's renunciation was
voluntary, and (2) the accused thwarts the success of the conspiracy. MPC §5.03(6)
E. Simply regarding from actively pursuing the objectives of the conspiracy is insufficient to satisfy
the requirements of withdrawal
F. Can renunciate in three ways:
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i. Informing authorities
ii. Communicating withdrawal to the co-conspirators
iii. Dissolving the underlying agreement that forms the basis of the conspiracy
a. Common element among these possibilities is insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of withdrawal
2. The defenses
I. Self-Defense
A. The law privileges an act of defensive force that would otherwise constitute a crime
B. Non-deadly force is permitted in response to a non-deadly threat
i. Example: a person faced with a physical battery could use a battery of his own to stop the
aggressor
ii. Must repel with similar force
C. Use of deadly force is permitted to repel a serious attack such as rape or kidnapping
i. ∆ must show he acted according to a reasonable belief of an imminent threat of death or
serious bodily injury
ii. Requirements:
a. Imminent Threat / Reasonable Belief
§ Reasonable belief of an imminent threat of death or bodily injury
o ∆ must believe he actually faced a threat (subjective), but the threat must
have been reasonable (objective) **it’s a mix of both.
o Didn’t have to be an actual imminent threat
o What’s reasonable?
§ Subjective approach – whether the ∆’s belief was reasonable to
him
§ Objective approach – (1) whether the ∆ honestly believed he
faced a threat and force was necessary to repel it? (2) whether
the belief was objectively reasonable under the circumstances
§ SD cannot be too soon or too late (reasonable person)
§ Difficult with battered women’s syndrome; some states have loosened
guidelines
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§ MPC rejected imminent threat – requires the defensive force be
“immediately necessary at the time of its deployment
b. Necessity / Duty to Escape
§ If the target can repel the attack without resorting to deadly force, then she
is required to do so
§ Castle Exception: no duty to retreat in your own home (does not
automatically mean that deadly force in justified though)
o Cannot extend the line to the yard or an alley (Peterson)
§ Stand your Ground Laws: laws that abrogate the duty to retreat in a variety
of situations
c. Proportional to the threat
D. Imperfect Self-Defense
i. Belief was not reasonable that you faced an imminent threat of death or serious bodily
injury
ii. Partial defense because it does not completely exonerate ∆
a. Without this doctrine = mistaken RB would be murder
b. If jurisdiction has this doctrine = voluntary manslaughter
iii. Mistake of fact – actor mistakenly believes that force is necessary and the belief was
unreasonable
iv. MPC Approach: a ∆ asserting this defense would succeed in using it a a defense for
intentional murder, but could still be convicted of a homicide offense based on negligence
or recklessness. (a reckless/negligent mistake about SD cannot negate the mens rea in a
crim such as manslaughter/negligent homicide)
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a. Must show the officer acted in a Willful/reckless disregard of a constitutional
requirement which has been made specific or definite – what he was doing was
wrong
4. Necessity
I. Idea is that it is better to break the law than to not break the law – criminal act was justified because
violating the law procured better results than not
A. “Choice of Evils” - Utilitarian balancing
i. Most essential part of the necessity defense is the ∆’s violation of the law produces a lesser
evil than if the ∆ had complied with the law
B. How to analyze:
i. Has to be a present and immediate threat
a. No future threat
ii. Cannot be responsible for the situation
iii. Cannot have another alternative but to violate the law
iv. Must be a causal relationship between the criminal act and the harm to be avoided
v. Defendant must not have continued the illegal conduct after the harm was averted
C. Defense to Murder
i. Common law – necessity no defense to murder
a. Can’t eat your friends to survive
ii. MPC – no restriction
a. Can eat your friends
D. Ridner Test:
i. Immediacy
ii. Violated no longer than having to
iii. Once the threat was gone, went back and did the right thing
5. Duress
I. Different from necessity because the person who issues the threat is trying to coerce an otherwise
innocent individual into committing a crime and if the innocent person succumbs, his or her crime
should be excused because the threat vitiated her autonomy
A. Is an affirmative defense
III. Contento-Pachon
A. Three specific elements
i. An immediate threat of death/serious bodily harm
ii. A well-grounded fear it will be carried out, and
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iii. No reasonable opportunity for escape
iv. (Sometimes a fourth element is required: the D must submit to proper authorities after
attaining a position of safety)
6. Insanity
I. Standards that have been introduced to determine whether a criminal was too insane to warrant
criminal punishment
A. M’Naghten cognitive test
i. To establish a defense, the defendant must not have known the quality or the nature of his act,
or if he did know, he must not have known that what he was doing was wrong
ii. A cognitive failing
iii. Two prongs sufficient to meet the standard:
a. He believes he is committing one act but is actually committing another
b. He correctly perceives the action but is unaware that it is wrongful
B. Irresistible impulse test
i. Can either satisfy M’Naghten or meet the volitional component (defect that prevents him from
complying with the law
ii. Supplements but does not replace M’Naghten
iii. Few states retain this, however
C. MPC’s “substantial capacity” test
i. M’Naghten and irresistible impulse fit within 4.01, which states that a person is not responsible
for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct is a result of a mental disease or defect that
he lacks the substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law
a. Appreciate – tracks cognitive
b. Conform – tracks volitional
§ Basically a marrying of M’Naghten and the irresistible impulse test
ii. MPC required only that the mental disease or defect negated a substantial capacity of the D to
meet of the D to meet these requirements
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