President and Vice President (1987 Philippine Constitution)  Temporary incapacity: President may declare inability in

writing to Senate Pres. & House Speaker → VP acts as

President.
1. Qualifications  If incapacity is disputed: Congress decides by 2/3 vote
President (Article VII, Sec. 2) within 10 days.

 Natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Limitations

 Registered voter.  Succession rules apply only during official incapacity, vacancy,
or death.
 Able to read and write.
 VP who assumes Presidency cannot run again if served more
 At least 40 years old on election day. than 4 years.
 Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years
immediately preceding the election.
5. Privileges and Inhibitions
Vice President (Article VII, Sec. 3)
Article VII, Sec. 6, 13, 14
 Has the same qualifications as the President.
 Official residence: Malacañang Palace.
 Elected with the President but voted separately by the
people.  Salary fixed by law (cannot be decreased during tenure).

Limitations / Exceptions  Inhibitions:

 Natural-born citizen requirement excludes naturalized o Cannot hold any other office or employment during
Filipinos, even if they meet other qualifications. tenure (except if provided in Constitution, e.g.,
President’s power to appoint Cabinet).
 Residency requirement has been subject to interpretation
(e.g., Poe v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016, where o Cannot directly or indirectly practice any profession.
foundlings were recognized as natural-born citizens).
o Cannot participate in business or financial interests.
 Literacy (“able to read and write”) is a minimal
o Cannot receive gifts, emoluments, or titles from foreign
requirement, ensuring inclusiveness.
states without Congress’ consent.

Limitations / Exceptions
2. Term of Office
 Cabinet positions may be concurrently held if essential (e.g.,
President (Article VII, Sec. 4) President as Secretary of Agriculture under Arroyo).

 Six (6) years, no re-election.  Honorary titles from foreign states allowed if with Congress
approval.
 Any person who has served as President for more than 4
years is disqualified from running again.

Vice President (Article VII, Sec. 4) 6. Executive Privilege

 Six (6) years. Definition: The President’s right to withhold certain types of
information from Congress, the courts, or the public, if disclosure
 May run for reelection (unlike the President). would harm public interest, diplomacy, national security, or
 May run for President or any other position after term. executive deliberations.

Limitations / Exceptions  Basis: Doctrine implied in separation of powers, recognized in

Senate v. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006).
 President’s term is strictly non-renewable to prevent
dictatorship (response to Marcos era).  Scope:

 VP may serve multiple terms, unless elected as President. o Presidential communications privilege (confidential
discussions).

o National security & diplomatic secrets.

3. Oath of Office
o Military or sensitive state matters.
Article VII, Sec. 5
Before entering office, the President (and by tradition, the Vice Limitations / Exceptions
President) must take the following oath:  Not absolute.
“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and  Subject to judicial review (SC can compel disclosure if public
conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Vice President) of interest outweighs privilege).
the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its
laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service  Cannot be invoked to cover-up wrongdoing or corruption.
of the Nation. So help me God.”

 May omit “So help me God” if taking an affirmation.

7. Presidential Immunity
Limitations
General Rule: While in office, the President enjoys immunity from
 The oath is mandatory for assumption of office. suit (civil or criminal).
 Failure to take oath may delay assumption but does not  Basis: Unwritten constitutional doctrine, reaffirmed in Soliven
invalidate election. v. Makasiar (G.R. No. 82585, Nov. 14, 1988) and Estrada v.
Desierto (G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001).

 Rationale: To ensure the President can discharge duties

4. Succession without distraction from litigation.
Article VII, Secs. 7–11 Limitations / Exceptions
 If President fails to qualify, VP acts as President until  Applies only during incumbency.
qualified.
 President may still be impeached for culpable constitutional
 If President dies, permanently disabled, removed, or violations, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
resigns, VP becomes President for the unexpired term. crimes, or betrayal of public trust (Art. XI, Sec. 2).
 If both President and VP are unable to serve:  Once out of office, former Presidents may be sued for acts
o Senate President, then House Speaker, act as President done during or outside official capacity (Estrada v. Desierto).
(until President or VP is elected and qualified).  Immunity does not extend to Vice President (can be sued
 Vacancy in Vice Presidency: President nominates a VP from even while in office, e.g., Binay v. Ombudsman).
Congress, subject to majority confirmation by both Houses
(Sec. 9).
 On Article VIII, Section 12

The prohibition in Article VIII, Section 12 covers only assignments to

non-judicial bodies.
Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
PET’s role is purely judicial: adjudicating disputes regarding the
G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010 validity of the election, returns, and qualifications of the President
and Vice-President.
FACTS
Therefore, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices are not being
Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal filed an undesignated petition directly
“designated” to another tribunal but are simply exercising a judicial
with the Supreme Court, challenging the constitutionality of the
power conferred directly by the Constitution.
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET).
On Standing and Estoppel
He argued that PET was an “illegal progeny” of Section 4, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution. The Constitution grants the Supreme Court, Macalintal failed to show any direct, personal injury that would give
sitting en banc, the sole authority to judge contests relating to the him legal standing.
election, returns, and qualifications of the President and Vice-
President. However, according to Macalintal, the PET had been As a taxpayer and citizen, his interest was too generalized.
organized as a separate body with powers and administrative Additionally, his prior role as counsel in a PET case demonstrated
machinery not authorized by the Constitution. recognition of PET’s authority, thus barring him (via estoppel) from
He specifically challenged the 2005 Rules of the Presidential later questioning it.
Electoral Tribunal (2005 PET Rules):

Rule 3 – provides that the Chief Justice shall be the Chairman and the RULING
Associate Justices as Members of the PET.
On Standing: Petition dismissed for lack of standing. Petitioner failed
Rule 8(e) – authorizes the Chairman of the PET to appoint employees to establish personal injury and was estopped due to prior
and confidential employees of every member thereof. participation in PET proceedings.
Rule 9 – creates a separate Administrative Staff of the Tribunal, with On PET’s Authority: PET is validly created by constitutional mandate.
a Clerk and Deputy Clerk of Tribunal (who may, at PET’s discretion, The challenged provisions of the 2005 PET Rules (Rules 3, 8[e], 9,
also be the Clerk of Court en banc). and 11) are merely incidental to the SC’s performance of its
Rule 11 – establishes a seal separate and distinct from the Supreme constitutional duty.
Court seal. On Article VIII, Section 12: No violation exists because the Justices,
Macalintal argued that these provisions showed PET’s status as a sitting as PET, are not acting outside the judicial sphere.
separate tribunal—with its own membership, seal, and staff— Thus, PET is constitutional and continues to function as the Supreme
contrary to the constitutional mandate that only the SC en banc itself Court sitting en banc in a special capacity.
may act as Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

He further cited Article VIII, Section 12 of the Constitution, which

prohibits the Chief Justice and Associate Justices from being DISPOSITION
“designated” to any agency performing administrative or quasi-
The petition was DISMISSED. The Supreme Court upheld the
judicial functions. According to him, PET’s creation and its Rules
constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and ruled
effectively transferred the SC Justices to another entity.
that petitioner lacked standing to bring the case.
The Supreme Court also considered the questions of legal standing
and estoppel. Macalintal lacked standing as he showed no personal
or direct injury from PET’s existence, acting merely as a Buac and Bautista v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
taxpayer/concerned citizen. He was further estopped, having
previously appeared before PET as counsel for then President Gloria G.R. No. 155855, January 26, 2004
Macapagal-Arroyo in an electoral protest, thereby recognizing PET’s
legitimacy.
FACTS

Petitioners Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio Bautista, residents of

ISSUES Taguig, filed a petition before the Commission on Elections
1. Does the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) have constitutional (COMELEC) questioning the validity of the results of the April 1988
basis, or is it an unconstitutional entity separate from the Supreme plebiscite conducted in Taguig to ratify the conversion of the
Court? municipality into a highly urbanized city under Republic Act No.
8487.
2. Does the participation of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices in
the PET violate Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution? In the plebiscite, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBC) proclaimed
that the “NO” votes prevailed. However, this proclamation was made
3. Does petitioner have legal standing to question the without canvassing the returns from sixty-four (64) precincts.
constitutionality of PET? Petitioners alleged that irregularities, fraud, and exclusion of returns
tainted the result. They sought the annulment of the plebiscite result
and prayed for revision and recount of the ballots to determine the
HELD true will of the electorate.

Yes. PET has constitutional basis. It is not a separate tribunal but the The petition was raffled to COMELEC’s Second Division as an
Supreme Court itself, “sitting en banc,” exercising a special function electoral protest. Alan Peter Cayetano (intervenor) argued that
expressly granted by the Constitution. COMELEC had no jurisdiction to entertain such a case, claiming that
jurisdiction over plebiscite contests belonged to the Regional Trial
No. The participation of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices in Court (RTC), not COMELEC. According to him, while COMELEC
PET does not violate Article VIII, Section 12, since PET performs supervises the conduct of plebiscites, questions involving recounts
judicial functions, not administrative or quasi-judicial ones. and revisions of ballots were judicial in nature and must be brought
No. Petitioner lacked standing and was estopped from questioning before regular courts.
PET’s existence. The COMELEC initially ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the
petition, viewing the case as outside its quasi-judicial functions.
Petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, insisting that
REASONING under the 1987 Constitution, COMELEC’s power to “enforce all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of… plebiscites” included the
On PET’s Constitutionality
power to correct irregularities in the canvassing and to ascertain the
The Court clarified that PET is not an entity distinct from the SC, but true result, even by way of revision or recount.
rather the SC itself discharging its constitutional mandate under
Article VII, Section 4.
ISSUES
The 2005 PET Rules provisions (membership designation, separate
staff, seal, and appointing power) were upheld as necessary 1. Does COMELEC have jurisdiction to hear petitions seeking
implements to enable the SC to perform its special function. annulment of plebiscite results, including the recount or revision of
ballots?
The Doctrine of Necessary Implication applies: when the Constitution
vests the SC with authority to resolve presidential election contests, 2. Is jurisdiction over plebiscite contests vested instead in the
it is implied that the SC may adopt rules, designate staff, and secure Regional Trial Courts?
administrative facilities to effectively discharge that duty.
 natural-born Filipino and therefore not qualified to run for President
under the Constitution. Fornier alleged:
HELD
1. FPJ’s mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was American;
Yes. COMELEC has jurisdiction. Its constitutional mandate to “enforce
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of… plebiscites” 2. His father, Allan Poe, was Spanish, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
necessarily includes authority to annul tainted results, revise or Spanish subject;
recount ballots, and correct irregularities to ascertain the genuine
will of the people. 3. Even if Allan were Filipino, FPJ was illegitimate, born before his
parents married—thus inheriting the mother's non-Filipino
No. The RTCs have no jurisdiction over plebiscite contests. The power citizenship.
to review or annul plebiscite results lies exclusively with COMELEC
under its constitutional authority.
At the COMELEC hearing (Third Division on January 19, 2004), Fornier
presented these main exhibits:
REASONING
1. FPJ’s birth certificate;
On COMELEC’s Constitutional Authority
2. An affidavit by Paulita Poe y Gomez claiming Allan Poe was
Article IX-C, Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution grants COMELEC married to her prior to marrying Bessie;
the power to “enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, 3. Allan Poe’s birth certificate;
referendum, and recall.” 4. Certifications from the National Archives indicating no records of
The Court emphasized that this grant is broad. “Enforcement” is not Lorenzo Pou’s presence in the Philippines pre-1907;
limited to supervising the mechanics of voting but extends to 5. Evidence of record destruction during World War II in San Carlos,
remedying errors, irregularities, and fraud in the canvassing of Pangasinan.
results. Otherwise, COMELEC’s mandate to ensure honest, orderly,
and credible plebiscites would be meaningless.

On Revision and Recount FPJ, meanwhile, submitted evidence including:

Petitioners’ prayer for revision and recount of ballots falls within 1. A certificate of title and tax declarations in Lorenzo Pou’s name;
COMELEC’s power to enforce plebiscite laws. If COMELEC cannot
2. A marriage contract between Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley;
review ballots or canvassing irregularities, then it cannot genuinely
protect the people’s will in a plebiscite. 3. A City Civil Registrar certificate confirming destruction of birth
records in San Carlos from 1900–1946.
The Court rejected Cayetano’s contention that recounts are purely
judicial and belong to the RTC. The Constitution did not confer RTCs
with jurisdiction over plebiscites. Instead, COMELEC has exclusive
authority. On January 23, 2004, the COMELEC dismissed Fornier’s petition for
lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration filed on January 26, 2004,
On RTC’s Lack of Jurisdiction was denied on February 6, 2004.
Jurisdiction over electoral contests involving elective officials is On February 10, 2004, Fornier filed a petition with the Supreme
explicitly lodged either in COMELEC (for local officials) or electoral Court via Rule 65 (G.R. No. 161824). Other petitioners followed—
tribunals (for national officials). But plebiscites concern the Tecson and Desiderio (G.R. 161434), and Velez (G.R. 161634)—
ratification of a political question (e.g., creation of a city), not challenging both FPJ’s citizenship and COMELEC’s jurisdiction. These
contests over elective offices. petitions were consolidated and ultimately decided en banc.
Since the Constitution entrusts plebiscite enforcement to COMELEC,
no other body—including RTCs—may assume jurisdiction.
ISSUES

1. Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to rule on the

Doctrine Applied qualifications of a presidential candidate (e.g., FPJ), or does
jurisdiction lie initially with the COMELEC?
The Court applied the Doctrine of Necessary Implication: when
the Constitution grants COMELEC power to enforce plebiscite laws, it 2. Is Fernando Poe Jr. a natural-born Filipino citizen—and thus eligible
necessarily implies authority to take all actions indispensable to that to run for President?
function, including revision and recount.

HELD
RULING (Expanded)
No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to decide
On COMELEC’s Jurisdiction: The petition was granted. COMELEC, not on the eligibility of a candidate prior to election. That authority lies
the RTC, has jurisdiction to annul plebiscite results, conduct revision with the COMELEC, and the Court may review via certiorari only for
or recount, and address fraud or irregularities. grave abuse of discretion.
On RTC’s Role: RTCs cannot assume jurisdiction over plebiscite Yes. FPJ is a natural-born Filipino. His father, Allan Poe, was Filipino
contests, as no law or constitutional provision vests them with such by virtue of Lorenzo Pou’s residence in Pangasinan, granting
power. citizenship under the 1935 Constitution. FPJ's legitimacy—or lack
thereof—did not render him ineligible.
Thus, COMELEC’s refusal to take jurisdiction was erroneous.

REASONING
DISPOSITION
Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition. It declared that COMELEC
has jurisdiction over petitions questioning plebiscite results, The Court emphasized that COMELEC has exclusive, original
including recount or revision of ballots, and remanded the case to jurisdiction over the qualifications of candidates. The Supreme Court
COMELEC for proper proceedings. only intervenes via certiorari under Rule 65, where COMELEC may
have acted with grave abuse of discretion or without jurisdiction. The
petitions from Tecson, Desiderio, and Velez were dismissed for lack
Tecson, Desiderio, Velez, and Fornier v. Commission on of jurisdiction.
Elections (COMELEC) and Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ)
Citizenship
G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634, 161824, March 3, 2004
The heart of the controversy rested on whether FPJ was a natural-
FACTS born Filipino under the 1935 Constitution, which operates on jus
sanguinis—citizenship by blood, especially paternal. Key
In December 2003, Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ), whose real name is Ronald determinations:
Allan Kelly Poe, filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
presidency with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). In his COC, FPJ’s birth in Manila in 1939 was undisputed.
he declared that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen, born in Manila
Allan Poe’s citizenship was drawn by presumption: Lorenzo Pou,
on August 20, 1939.
Allan’s father, died in the Philippines, holding property and living in
Shortly thereafter, Victorino Fornier filed a petition (SPA No. 04-003) Pangasinan—thus presumed Filipino. This status passed to Allan and
before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ, arguing that he was not a in turn to FPJ.
Illegitimacy was not fatal: under the 1935 Constitution, natural-born REASONING
status could be conferred even on those born out of wedlock if the
father was Filipino. Election protests serve not just contestants’ personal interests but
address a broader public interest: resolving electoral uncertainties
There was no election fraud or willful misrepresentation. The and affirming the people's will
evidentiary submissions, including the death certificate of Lorenzo
and marriage documents, supported their claim. Therefore, An election contest becomes moot not merely on attaining the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse by dismissing the petition. contested office but if the protest is abandoned by the protestant
before final adjudication. In this case, Santiago’s filing of her COC,
successful run for Senate, assumption of office, and waiver of
remaining revisions—all combined to demonstrate an intention to
RULING (Expanded) withdraw from pursuing the presidency
Jurisdiction: The petitions by Tecson, Desiderio, and Velez were PET rules allow summary dismissal of election protests on technical
dismissed for want of jurisdiction—only COMELEC can rule initially on grounds. If such dismissals are permitted for procedural deficiencies,
credentials such as citizenship or eligibility. they underscore an even graver rationale to dismiss a protest when
Substantive Eligibility: On the merits, FPJ was affirmed as a it is already moot due to abandonment
natural-born Filipino. The evidence adequately supported his The Tribunal rejected Santiago’s argument that only the expiration of
eligibility, and the COMELEC’s dismissal of Fornier’s petition was the presidential term (not her assumption of another office) could
valid. render the protest moot. The legislative provision invoked
No grave abuse: The Court found no indication of arbitrary or (Dimaporo) expressly applied only to incumbents holding permanent
capricious exercise by the COMELEC. elective office—Santiago was not President at the time she ran for
Senate

DISPOSITION
RULING (Expanded)
G.R. 161434 (Tecson & Desiderio) – DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction. On Mootness and Abandonment: Santiago’s assumption of
Senatorial office, coupled with her waiver of further revision and
G.R. 161634 (Velez) – DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. absence of intent to continue presenting evidence, equated to
abandonment and rendered the protest moot.
G.R. 161824 (Fornier) – DISMISSED; COMELEC acted within
discretion, and FPJ’s natural-born status was upheld. On Procedural Authority: The Tribunal acted well within its
discretion to dismiss the protest on grounds stronger than technical
No costs were imposed.
deficiency—mootness by abandonment.

On Public Policy: Dismissal served public interest by dispelling

Miriam Defensor-Santiago v. Fidel V. Ramos continued uncertainty over the 1992 election outcome and
promoting political stability in the nation’s post-recovery period
P.E.T. Case No. 001, En Banc, February 13, 1996

FACTS
DISPOSITION
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, as the protestant, filed an election protest
with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) challenging the Granted the motion to waive revision of remaining ballots.
proclaimed victory of Fidel V. Ramos in the 1992 presidential
Dismissed the election protest and the counter-protest on the ground
election. The PET ordered revision of ballots in three pilot areas
of abandonment.
(Metro Manila, Pampanga, and Zamboanga) to verify whether the
protest had merit. No costs.
On August 16, 1995, Santiago filed a motion to dispense with
revision in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas, arguing that
the revision process in those areas should be deemed complete. Atty. Evillo C. Pormento v. Joseph “Erap” Ejercito Estrada and
Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
The Tribunal deferred action on this motion and instead required
both parties to submit memoranda addressing whether the case had G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010 (Resolution)
become "moot" upon Santiago’s election to the Senate in May 1995 FACTS
and her assumption of office on June 30, 1995.
Atty. Evillo C. Pormento filed a petition seeking to disqualify former
In her memorandum, Santiago cited precedents such as Sibulo vda. President Joseph “Erap” Estrada from running as a candidate in the
de De Mesa v. Mencias, Lomugdang v. Javier, and De Castro v. 2010 presidential elections. Pormento cited the constitutional
Ginete, asserting that an election protest is imbued with public provision in Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution—“The
interest, not merely a private dispute. She contended that the President shall not be eligible for any re-election”—arguing that
protest should proceed unless the term of the contested office has Estrada’s bid for the presidency violated this ban.
expired, which had not yet occurred in her case, even though she
had become a Senator. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division denied the
petition, finding that Estrada’s political rights had been restored and
In response, Ramos (the protestee) invoked Dimaporo v. Mitra, thus he was eligible to run. Pormento’s motion for reconsideration
arguing that Santiago’s run and assumption of office as Senator was likewise denied by the COMELEC en banc.
constituted an abandonment of her protest, based on B.P. Blg. 881’s
Section 67. Nonetheless, he also noted that, for the sake of public Pormento then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a
interest, perhaps the protest should nevertheless be resolved on the petition for certiorari challenging COMELEC’s ruling. Notably,
merits to eliminate lingering uncertainty over the public’s true choice Pormento did not request a temporary restraining order (TRO) or
in 1992 and to establish precedents for future cases. preliminary injunction, meaning Estrada’s candidacy proceeded
unabated.

ISSUES
Estrada ultimately participated in the May 10, 2010 elections and
1. Has the election protest become moot due to Santiago’s election garnered the second highest number of votes, but did not win the
and assumption of office as Senator? presidency again.

2. Should technical abandonment be inferred from her actions, or ISSUES

should the case continue despite her new position?
1. Does the constitutional prohibition against “any re-election” apply
to former President Estrada’s candidacy in the 2010 elections?
HELD 2. Is there an actual justiciable controversy for the Supreme Court to
The Tribunal concluded that Santiago’s assumption of the Senate resolve, or has the matter become moot since Estrada was not re-
seat effectively abandoned her election protest, rendering it moot elected?
and academic.

The PET therefore granted her motion, dispensed with further HELD
revision of ballots, and dismissed both the protest and Ramos’s
counter-protest. The question of whether the constitutional clause prohibits Estrada’s
candidacy is now academic, as Estrada was not re-elected, thus no
controversy exists.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, reasoning there is no live No. COMELEC retains jurisdiction over disqualification petitions even
dispute or adverse interest calling for judicial resolution. if the candidate has been proclaimed or assumed office; the
proceedings must continue until final judgment.

REASONING
REASONING
For a court to intervene, there must be a real, live controversy with
legal interests at stake—not a hypothetical or speculative issue. On Term Limit Computation

Once elections concluded and Estrada failed to win, any discussion Article X, Section 8 and LG Code Section 43(b) both prohibit more
on the scope of “any re-election” became purely academic, serving than three consecutive terms but state that voluntary renunciation
no practical purpose. does not interrupt service.

The Court reaffirmed its principle that it may not rule on moot The Court clarified two essential requirements: (a) the official must
questions—those where no concrete relief can be granted or have been elected for three consecutive terms, and (b) must have
controversy resolved. fully served those terms.

Since Estrada did not secure a second term, there was no basis for In Lonzanida’s case, although proclaimed in 1995, he was ultimately
disqualification, and the issue falls outside the realm of justiciability. unseated by COMELEC. His assumption of office was based on a void
proclamation and therefore not counted as a valid term.
The absence of active stakes or harms made the case non-
justiciable, necessitating dismissal. Moreover, he did not complete the term; his removal before term-
end disrupted continuity and invalidated any claim that he served a
full term.
RULING (Expanded) Hence, the disqualification ruling based on the three-term rule was
On Candidacy Ban Interpretation: With Estrada’s non-election, unfounded.
determining the meaning of “any re-election” is unnecessary and On Jurisdiction of COMELEC
speculative.
Republic Act No. 6646, Section 6 mandates that COMELEC retains
On Justiciability: Because the matter could not yield any jurisdiction over disqualification proceedings despite proclamation,
meaningful relief or affect legal rights, it is moot. As such, the Court and even after the candidate is proclaimed or assumed office.
declined to engage in abstraction.
Previous jurisprudence (e.g., Sunga v. COMELEC) affirmed
Therefore, the petition was denied due course and dismissed. COMELEC's continuing authority to resolve protests until final
resolution, explicitly to prevent manipulation or delay tactics that
could undermine the electoral process.
DISPOSITION
Disqualification proceedings are meant to uphold election integrity;
The Supreme Court issued a Resolution: allowing jurisdiction to lapse post-proclamation would defeat these
safeguards.
The petition is DISMISSED.

Since no actual controversy existed at the time of adjudication, no

relief could be granted. RULING (Expanded)
No costs were imposed on the petitioner. On Term Limit: Lonzanida’s 1995–1998 service did not count as a
full term, as he was neither duly elected nor did he complete the
term. Thus, the three-term limit was not violated.
Romeo Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
On Jurisdiction: COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction when Lonzanida
Eufemio Muli
was proclaimed. The disqualification petition remained valid and
G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999 must proceed to final resolution.

FACTS

Romeo Lonzanida served as the Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, DISPOSITION

Zambales, having been duly elected for two consecutive terms from
The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition. It set aside the COMELEC
1989 to 1995. He ran again in the May 8, 1995 elections and was
resolutions disqualifying Lonzanida, reaffirmed COMELEC's
proclaimed winner, assuming office and performing mayoral duties.
continuing jurisdiction, and clarified the interpretation of term
However, his proclamation was challenged by Juan Alvez, who filed
service and proclamation in disqualification cases.
an election protest before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which
declared a failure of elections. Upon appeal to the COMELEC, the
disputed ballots were revised, and Alvez was ultimately declared the
duly elected mayor. A writ of execution followed, and Lonzanida
vacated the post before completing the term.

In anticipation of the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida filed his Joseph E. Estrada v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
certificate of candidacy again. His opponent, Eufemio Muli, lodged a
disqualification petition, arguing that Lonzanida had already served G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001 — En banc
three consecutive terms, exceeding the constitutional limit under
Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of the FACTS
Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160). The COMELEC First Division, Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the
and later the en banc, ruled that even though Lonzanida was Philippines and officially began his term on June 30, 1998, with Gloria
unseated, his assumption of office in 1995 still counted as a full Macapagal-Arroyo as Vice President.
term, thus disqualifying him from the 1998 race.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Luis “Chavit” Singson publicly
Lonzanida escalated the issue to the Supreme Court through a Rule accused Estrada of receiving millions of pesos in jueteng gambling
65 petition for certiorari, contesting both the substantive application payoffs, allegedly deposited in a secret bank account under the alias
of the three-term rule and the COMELEC’s jurisdiction after his “Jose Velarde.”
proclamation.
The allegations sparked a massive impeachment complaint filed in
the House of Representatives on November 13, 2000, which was
ISSUES subsequently transmitted to the Senate.

1. Does Lonzanida’s assumption of office from 1995 to 1998 count as The Senate convened as impeachment court, presided over by Chief
a full term, thereby triggering the three-term limit for local elective Justice Hilario Davide Jr.
officials? In mid-January 2001, the impeachment proceedings hit a pivotal
2. Does COMELEC retain jurisdiction over a disqualification petition moment. Clarissa Ocampo, Senior VP at Equitable-PCI Bank, testified
once the candidate has been proclaimed winner or assumed office? she personally witnessed Estrada signing documents using the alias
“Jose Velarde”—a supposed offense unmentioned in the original
complaint.

HELD The prosecution sought to open a sealed second envelope believed

to contain stronger evidence, possibly Php 3.3 billion. Chief Justice
No. Lonzanida’s 1995–1998 stint cannot be considered a full term Davide allowed it, but the Senate vote (11 opposed, 10 in favor)
because he was not duly elected and did not fully serve the term— blocked its release. Following this, private prosecutors withdrew,
thus, he did not exceed the three-term limit.
sparking mass protests—a movement that ultimately became known The case was initiated by the Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.
as EDSA II. (PHILCONSA), a non-profit civic group dedicated to upholding
constitutional principles. PHILCONSA filed a petition for prohibition
Amid the escalating crisis, Estrada offered his support for evidence with a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Auditor General and
disclosure and suggested holding snap elections, but negotiations various disbursing officers of both Houses of Congress. The target: to
failed. On January 20, 2001: restrain them from approving or processing any voucher or check for
At 12 noon, Gloria Arroyo took her oath as President, administered payment of retirement gratuities and commutable vacation and sick
by Chief Justice Davide, in the absence of a formal resignation letter leave benefits to former Senators, Members of the House of
from Estrada. Representatives, and certain elective congressional officers—
pursuant to Republic Act No. 3836 (RA 3836).
Estrada left Malacañang for a private residence. He sent farewell
letters, and his daughter announced his resignation by conduct, not
formal text. PHILCONSA assailed RA 3836 on multiple grounds:
Subsequently, the Supreme Court consolidated related petitions, Title Deficiency – The retirement and leave benefits for lawmakers
including G.R. No. 146738, to rule on the legality of Estrada’s were not reflected in the law’s title, violating the constitutional
departure and Arroyo’s assumption. requirement that every legislative bill must express its subject in the
title.

ISSUES Circumventing the Salary Increase Ban – RA 3836 sought to

bypass the constitutional prohibition against increasing
1. Did Estrada effectively resign from the presidency by conduct— congressional compensation during a term (Article VI, Section 14).
through actions and circumstances—even without a written
resignation? Class Legislation – It unfairly allowed members of Congress to
retire after 12 years with generous lump-sum benefits, contrasting
2. Was Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s assumption and exercise of the sharply with other public servants who received more modest,
presidency constitutional and valid? regulated retirement benefits.

Unfair Leave Benefit – The provision allowing retirement benefits

from commutable leave at the “highest rate received” represented
HELD
another unconstitutional compensation enhancement.
The Supreme Court held Estrada had in effect resigned prematurely
“Forbidden Compensation” – PHILCONSA claimed such benefits
through his withdrawal of support, abandonment of the office, and
constituted “other emoluments or allowances” prohibited from
conduct that rendered him incapable of governance.
immediate effect under the Constitution.
Arroyo’s assumption of the presidency was deemed valid,
constitutional under the circumstances, and done in the interest of
preserving the nation's political stability. In defense, the Solicitor General contended:

The retirement and leave benefits under RA 3836 were not

“forbidden compensation.”
REASONING
The gratuity was merely a mode of computing pension, not an
Estrada’s De Facto Resignation
unauthorized salary increase.
Though no resignation was formally tendered, Estrada’s departure
RA 3836 did not amount to class legislation, nor did it violate the title
from the Palace, relinquishment of control, and apparent inability to
rule.
govern amounted to resignation by conduct.

The Court applied a "totality of circumstances" test: cumulative acts

—massive protests, military withdrawal, and his own exit— ISSUES
constituted an effective relinquishment of the office.
Locus Standi: Does PHILCONSA have legal standing to challenge RA
Arroyo’s Succession 3836?
Given Estrada’s de facto resignation and loss of capacity to govern, Violation of Salary Increase Ban: Does RA 3836 violate Article VI,
the succession protocol under the Constitution was triggered. Section 14 of the Constitution, which forbids increases in
congressional compensation during an existing term?
Arroyo’s oath-taking, in the absence of a formal resignation, was
legitimate to ensure continuity of governance and uphold the rule of Equal Protection: Does the law violate the equal protection clause
law. by granting superior benefits to lawmakers?
Separation of Powers & Political Stability Title Rule: Does RA 3836 breach the constitutional requirement that
its title must include its substantive content?

The Court acknowledged that the political crisis demanded an

immediate and lawful resolution to prevent destabilization. HELD
The judiciary’s role was strictly confined to legal validation, not Yes. PHILCONSA has standing to institute the suit.
political decision-making.
Yes. RA 3836’s retirement and leave benefits are “emoluments” and
violate the prohibition on post-election compensation increase.
RULING (Expanded) Yes. The law discriminated against other public officials, violating
equal protection.
On Resignation by Conduct: Estrada’s actions and the context
rendered his departure tantamount to resignation. No. The title was not sufficiently germane to the law’s substantive
provisions; it did not fully express the legislation’s scope.
On Arroyo’s Exercise of Office: Her accession was constitutionally
sound and binding. As a result, RA 3836 was declared unconstitutional in these respects.
On Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court properly assumed jurisdiction
to resolve the constitutional uncertainty.
REASONING

1. Standing
DISPOSITION
PHILCONSA, as a civic organization and substantial taxpayer group,
The petitions challenging the legality of Arroyo’s presidency were possessed a sufficient legal interest to petition the courts. Their role
denied. in preventing illegal public fund disbursement affirmed their
standing.
The Court affirmed that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is the legitimate
President, as Estrada had effectively resigned. 2. Salary Increase Ban (Article VI, Section 14)

The Constitution prohibits any increase in congressional

compensation, including “other emoluments or allowances,” from
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. (PHILCONSA) vs.
taking effect until after the end of the full term of all approving
Pedro M. Gimenez, Auditor General
members. RA 3836 granted immediate benefits—retirement gratuity
G.R. No. L-23326 (December 18, 1965) and conversion of leave—thereby breaching this restriction. The
Court defined “emolument” to include compensation or benefits
FACTS attached to office—even post-service benefits qualify.
3. Equal Protection Sec. 13 on Cabinet officials—these provisions must be harmonized,
with the stricter rule governing.
The Court found the benefits enjoyed by lawmakers through RA 3836
to be discriminatory: while lawmakers received generous lump-sum Yes. Ex-officio roles that entail additional duties without extra
gratuity and favored leave conversion, other officials were limited to compensation, and are demanded by the official’s primary functions,
smaller pensions and stricter terms. This disparity violated the are allowed under the Constitution.
constitutional equal protection guarantee.

4. Title Rule (Article VI, Section 21)

REASONING
A bill must contain no more than one subject, clearly stated in its
title. RA 3836’s title failed to explicitly include provisions on Constitutional Purpose & Context: The framers of the 1987
retirement gratuities and leave commutation. This title mismatch Constitution intended to end the Marcos-era practice of officials
undermined legislative transparency and violated constitutional holding multiple positions for self-enrichment. Art. VII, Sec. 13 was
mandates. crafted as a strict and absolute prohibition, applying especially to the
President’s inner circle. While a general rule exists for appointive
officials under Art. IX-B, Sec. 7(2), a specific exception for Cabinet
officials was clearly intended to exclude them from such allowances
RULING (Expanded) and must be interpreted accordingly
Locus Standi: PHILCONSA is entitled to judicial relief as a Harmonization Rule: The Constitution’s provisions must be read
constitutional advocate and taxpayer group. harmoniously. Art. IX-B, Sec. 7(2) sets a general standard, while Art.
Substance: RA 3836 is unconstitutional: VII, Sec. 13 imposes a higher standard of restraint for Cabinet
members. Judicial construction favors making all constitutional
Section providing immediate legislative benefits constitutes a provisions operative, not nullifying more specific restrictions
compensation increase in violation of Article VI, Section 14.
Ex-Officio Exception: Duties inherently integral to one’s primary
It also violates equal protection with uneven benefits favoring office—such as the Secretary of Justice serving automatically on the
lawmakers. Judicial and Bar Council—are permitted. However, these must not
involve additional compensation, as that would amount to prohibited
The title is non-germane, breaching due process and legislative
emoluments
integrity.

RULING (Expanded)
DISPOSITION
EO 284 Violates Art. VII, Sec. 13: The Executive Order improperly
The Court granted the petition, declared the retirement gratuity and
allows Cabinet members, deputy secretaries, and assistant
commutable leave benefits under RA 3836 unconstitutional, and
secretaries to hold multiple remunerated positions beyond their main
enjoined further disbursement of these benefits. The offending
office, contravening the absolute prohibition established by the
provisions were struck down.
Constitution.

General Exceptions Do Not Override Specific Prohibition:

Civil Liberties Union (CLU) vs. Executive Secretary Article IX-B, Sec. 7(2) may allow broader allowances, but these do
not apply to the stricter limitation placed on the President’s closest
G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991 (En banc) administrative officials. The Constitution’s specific provision must
FACTS prevail.

Two consolidated petitions were filed by the Civil Liberties Union Permissible Ex-Officio Assignments: Roles that are incidental
(CLU), the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, and others, and uncompensated—and required by law to be performed by the
challenging the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284, issued officeholder—are constitutionally valid and do not breach the
by President Corazon Aquino on July 25, 1987. This EO allowed prohibition.
members of the Cabinet, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and
other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold up to
two additional positions in government or GOCCs, and receive Remedy: Cabinet members holding unauthorized additional
compensation therefor—even while serving in their primary roles. positions must relinquish them. Those who have already received
compensation in good faith may keep it as de facto officers.
Petitioners argued that EO 284 violated Article VII, Section 13 of the
1987 Constitution, which provides:

“The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and DISPOSITION

their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in
The Supreme Court declared Executive Order No. 284
this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
unconstitutional and void. Cabinet members, undersecretaries, and
tenure…” They contended that the EO effectively created exceptions
assistant secretaries occupying unauthorized additional positions
not found in the Constitution.
were ordered to relinquish them. However, compensation already
received for services rendered in good faith as de facto officers was
allowed to be retained.
Respondents defended EO 284 by invoking Article IX-B, Section 7(2)
—which generally allows appointive officials to hold additional
positions if permitted by law or necessary to their primary functions
Dennis A. B. Funa v. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,
—as justifying Cabinet members’ ability to assume multiple
et al. G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010 — En banc
positions.
FACTS

On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed

ISSUES
Maria Elena H. Bautista as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of
1. Does EO 284 violate Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution by the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). This
permitting Cabinet members and their deputies to hold additional appointment was formalized in Special Order No. 2006-171 dated
compensated positions beyond those expressly allowed by the October 23, 2006.
Constitution?
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of the Maritime
2. Can Article IX-B, Section 7(2)’s broader exception for appointive Industry Authority (MARINA) Administrator, Bautista was designated
officials be read into the stricter constitutional prohibition for as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of MARINA, in concurrent capacity with her
Cabinets, deputies, and assistants? role as DOTC Undersecretary.

3. Are ex-officio positions—duties inherently incidental to one’s main On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa, acting as a taxpayer,
office—permitted under the Constitution, even with additional roles concerned citizen, and lawyer, filed a Rule 65 petition (certiorari,
that carry no extra compensation? prohibition, mandamus), with a prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He challenged the
constitutionality of Bautista’s concurrent positions, asserting that this
HELD violated Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution, which does
not allow the President, Vice-President, Cabinet members, their
Yes. EO 284 is unconstitutional because it permits additional public deputies or assistants to hold any other office or employment during
positions with compensation for Cabinet members and their their tenure.
deputies, contrary to Art. VII, Sec. 13.
During the pendency of the petition, on January 5, 2009, Bautista
No. Article IX-B, Section 7(2)'s general provision for appointive was formally appointed as Administrator of MARINA, replacing
officials does not override the stricter limitation imposed by Art. VII, Vicente T. Suazo Jr., and assumed office on February 2, 2009.
The respondents—Executive Secretary Ermita, DOTC Secretary
Mendoza, and Undersecretary Bautista—argued that:
Dennis A. B. Funa v. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita
The constitutional prohibition did not bar ex-officio or temporary (on behalf of the President); Secretary Leandro R. Mendoza;
designations connected to primary duties; Undersecretary Maria Elena H. Bautista

The OIC designation was merely provisional and did not violate the G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010 — En banc
Constitution;
FACTS
The issue might now be moot, given Bautista’s later formal
appointment and relinquishment of her DOTC post. On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed
Maria Elena H. Bautista as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) via
Special Order No. 2006-171.
ISSUES
Later, on September 1, 2008, with the resignation of the MARINA
1. Does the petitioner have legal standing (locus standi) to challenge (Maritime Industry Authority) Administrator, Bautista was designated
Bautista’s concurrent designation as DOTC Undersecretary and as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of MARINA, while still concurrently serving
MARINA OIC? as DOTC Undersecretary.
2. Is the issue now moot because Bautista was later formally On October 21, 2008, Dennis A.B. Funa, in his capacity as a
appointed as MARINA Administrator and relinquished her DOTC role? taxpayer, concerned citizen, and lawyer, filed a Rule 65 petition
3. Does Bautista’s designation as MARINA OIC, concurrent with her (certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus) with prayer for
DOTC post, violate Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution? TRO/preliminary injunction, challenging the constitutionality of
Bautista’s dual roles. He argued this violated Article VII, Section 13 of
the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits the President, Vice President,
Cabinet members, and their deputies from holding any other office or
HELD
employment during their tenure—unless otherwise provided in the
Yes, the petitioner has legal standing as a concerned citizen Constitution.
challenging a grave violation of constitutional prohibition.
During the court proceedings, on January 5, 2009, Bautista was
No, although circumstances changed, the petition falls under the formally appointed as MARINA Administrator, and she assumed the
“capable of repetition yet evading review” doctrine, warranting position on February 2, 2009. This change did not deter the
resolution on merit. petitioner from pursuing the action, invoking the doctrine of “capable
of repetition, yet evading review.”
Yes, the designation was unconstitutional and void; Bautista’s
concurrent roles violated the clear prohibition in Article VII, Section
13.
ISSUES

1. Does Funa have standing (locus standi) to challenge the dual

REASONING occupancy of Bautista’s offices?

1. Locus Standi 2. Is the petition now moot, given Bautista’s appointment as MARINA
Administrator and relinquishment of her DOTC post?
The Court affirmed that when a citizen challenges a blatant violation
of the constitution—particularly involving public official conduct—it is 3. Does Bautista’s holding of concurrent roles as DOTC
sufficient to confer legal standing. Funa’s qualifications as a Undersecretary and MARINA OIC/Administrator violate Article VII,
taxpayer, lawyer, and concerned citizen met this threshold Section 13?

2. Mootness vs. Justiciability

While Bautista’s formal appointment and subsequent departure from HELD

her DOTC post could render the petition moot, the Court applied the
Yes, Funa has standing as a concerned citizen litigating a clear
capable of repetition yet evading review doctrine. The constitutional
constitutional violation.
question is recurrent and carries significant public interest; thus, it
should be adjudicated despite changed facts No, the case is not moot and is justiciable under the doctrine of
capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review.
3. Violation of Article VII, Section 13
Yes, Bautista’s concurrent appointments are unconstitutional and
Strict Prohibition: Article VII, Section 13 unequivocally forbids Cabinet
void, as they violate Article VII, Section 13 and do not fall under any
members and their deputies/assistants from holding any other office
valid exception.
or employment during their term, with only limited, expressly stated
exceptions. The prohibition is intentional and categorical

Ex-Officio Exception Narrow: The only permissible concurrent REASONING

roles are ex-officio functions essential to one’s primary office.
Bautista’s MARINA OIC role was neither an ex-officio function under 1. Locus Standi
the DOTC charter nor incidental to her duties as Maritime Transport The Supreme Court affirmed that a citizen has standing to challenge
Undersecretary government acts that involve clear constitutional breaches (e.g.,
Designation vs. Appointment: Temporary designation is still a appointment of officials to multiple positions prohibited by the
form of holding office. Whether appointed or designated, the official Constitution), especially where public interest is at stake. Funa’s
performs the functions of the office, and the Constitution prohibits status as a taxpayer and lawyer was sufficient to litigate.
such a scenario. Bautista’s OIC role was substantive and exceeded 2. Mootness & Justiciability
the constitutional exception
Though Bautista had been formally appointed and left her role as
DOTC Undersecretary, the constitutional issue remains recurrent in
RULING (Expanded) nature. The Court applied the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-
review exception, recognizing that without adjudication, such
Locus Standi: Valid, petitioner meets requirements. violations may recur unchecked.
Justiciability: Petition is not moot; it addresses a recurring 3. Constitutional Prohibition (Art. VII, Section 13)
constitutional issue.
The Constitution expressly forbids Cabinet members and their
Constitutional Violation: Bautista’s concurrent roles go beyond deputies or assistants from holding any other office or employment
what is permitted under Article VII, Section 13; the ex-officio during their term, except as provided. The Court held this prohibition
exception does not apply here. is strict and unequivocal—designed to prevent excessive
concentration of executive power.
Thus, the Court granted the petition and declared Bautista’s
concurrent designation as MARINA OIC unconstitutional and void. Bautista failed to prove her designation as MARINA OIC was in an ex-
officio capacity, a narrowly-tailored exception recognized in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary. The MARINA Administrator
DISPOSITION role is substantive and administrative in nature, not incidental to her
primary DOTC functions.
Petition GRANTED.
4. Appointment vs. Designation
The designation of Maria Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge,
MARINA, while concurrently serving as DOTC Undersecretary for The Court ruled that whether the position is obtained via
Maritime Transport, is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and VOID. appointment or mere designation, the prohibition still applies,

No costs assessed.
because the critical factor is the exercise of office and its functions— Yes, executive privilege applies to ongoing diplomatic negotiations;
not the labels or formality of appointment. the negotiation drafts and exchanged offers are privileged.
Petitioners failed to present sufficient, overriding public interest to
overcome the privilege.
RULING (Expanded)

Standing: Recognized and upheld. REASONING

Justiciability: Constitutional issue reaches review even post-fact On Standing
due to its recurring implications.
The Constitution’s guarantee of the right to information on matters
Merits: Bautista’s concurrent appointment to OIC/Administrator of of public concern is a public right, not a private or individual one. As
MARINA, while serving as DOTC Undersecretary, is unconstitutional members of the public—including NGOs and legislators—petitioners
under Art. VII, Sec. 13. No valid exception applies. need not show personal injury or direct interest. Their general civic
Therefore, the Court granted the petition, declaring the OIC standing suffices.
designation null and void. On Mootness

Because the JPEPA text has been publicly released (September

DISPOSITION 2006), the portion of the petition demanding the entire text is moot.
However, the negotiation offers are still undisclosed and directly at
The petition is GRANTED. The designation of Maria Elena H. Bautista issue—so that part of the petition remains justiciable.
as MARINA Officer-in-Charge, while concurrently serving as DOTC
Undersecretary, is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and VOID. There On Executive Privilege
are no costs imposed. The Court reaffirmed that diplomatic and executive communications,
particularly internal negotiation documents in progress, are
presumptively privileged. Early disclosure may chill candid
Akbayan Citizens Action Party, Pambansang Katipunan ng diplomacy, hamper frank talks, and damage national interests.
mga Samahan sa Kanayunan (PKSK), Alliance of Progressive
Labor, and several citizens and congresspersons v. Once executive privilege is invoked, petitioners must show a
Undersecretary Thomas G. Aquino et al. sufficient overriding public need—beyond general public interest—to
justify disclosure. Petitioners did not make such a showing. Simply
G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 — En banc labeling the information as “of public concern” is not enough to
override the privilege.

Respondents raised privilege in their official comment, which the

FACTS
Court found acceptable. They were not required to assert it during
The petitioners—comprising NGOs like Akbayan, rural community House hearings, where requests were non-compulsory and not
groups, labor organizations, concerned taxpayers, and members of subpoenas.
the House of Representatives—filed a petition for mandamus and
Although petitioner-members of the House attempted to involve the
prohibition. They sought full disclosure of the Japan–Philippines
legislature’s inquiry powers, the Court clarified that only the Senate
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the offers exchanged
has constitutional power to concur in treaties; the House has no
during its negotiation, along with all attachments and annexes.
binding role over treaty approval or negotiation—negating claims of
The JPEPA, a bilateral free trade agreement initiated between the legislative functional necessity to overrule privilege.
Philippines and Japan, encompassed wide-ranging topics: trade in
goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trade,
intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of RULING (Expanded)
persons, cooperation, dispute settlement, and more. It was the first
of its kind for the Philippines and carried far-reaching economic and On Standing: Affirmed—petitioners properly initiated the action
policy implications. under the right to information.

In January 2005, a House Resolution triggered an inquiry by the On Mootness: Demand for the final JPEPA is moot; negotiation
House Special Committee on Globalization, which formally requested offers remain validly sought but justiciable.
respondents—Undersecretary Thomas G. Aquino, Executive On Executive Privilege: The privilege is upheld. Diplomatic
Secretary Eduardo Ermita, Sec. Alberto Romulo of DFA, and others— negotiations are confidential. Without a clear, overriding need,
for draft texts and negotiation documents. disclosure of negotiation offers is denied.
In response, Aquino and Ermita declined to disclose the drafts, The petition is DISMISSED.
saying they would only release them “once negotiations are
completed and after a thorough legal review.” They cited that the
negotiations were ongoing and that the draft was not yet final.
DISPOSITION
Amid efforts to subpoena the documents, the House held back,
reportedly at the behest of the Speaker, pending executive The petition is DISMISSED as follows:
clearance. The request for the full text of JPEPA is now moot; thus, denied.
With JPEPA signed later in September 2006, and its final text The request for negotiation offers is denied based on executive
eventually made public, the petition was filed on December 9, 2005, privilege and lack of showing of sufficient need.
prior to final disclosure, to compel the release of negotiation
materials. No costs were imposed.

ISSUES Romulo L. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of

Public Officers and Investigations, et al.
1. Do petitioners have standing to demand disclosure of diplomatic
negotiation documents—namely, JPEPA texts and offers—under the G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 (En banc)
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern?
FACTS
2. Is the petition moot, given that the full text of the JPEPA is now
The National Broadband Network (NBN) project, a government
publicly available?
initiative worth approximately US$329 million, raised public concern
3. Does executive privilege legitimately protect negotiation due to alleged irregular deals with Chinese telecommunications firm
documents—especially draft versions and offers—from disclosure? If ZTE.
so, did respondents properly invoke this privilege?
As Director General of the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA), Romulo L. Neri was summoned to testify before
three Senate Committees investigating the project: Accountability of
HELD Public Officers and Investigations, Trade and Commerce, and
Yes, the petitioners—including NGOs, concerned citizens, and National Defense and Security.
congresspersons—have standing to assert the public’s right to During an 11-hour hearing, Neri testified that Benjamin Abalos, then
information in matters of significant public and economic COMELEC Chairman, allegedly offered him Php 200 million to favor
consequence. the NBN project. Neri further disclosed he informed then-President
Partially moot: The demand for the final JPEPA text is moot, as it is Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who allegedly instructed him to reject the
now accessible; however, requests for the Philippine and Japanese bribe.
negotiation offers remain live and justiciable. Subsequently, the Senate questioned Neri on whether the President:
followed up on the NBN project;

directed him to prioritize it; Francisco I. Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (PEA) and
Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation
directed him to approve it.
G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002 — En banc
Neri refused to answer these three questions, invoking executive
privilege, citing their nature as confidential communications with the FACTS
President. On November 15, Executive Secretary Ermita formally
invoked executive privilege to avoid Neri’s continued participation. In 1973, the government contracted with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim
The Senate issued a Show Cause Letter, and upon Neri’s non- portions of Manila Bay's foreshore and offshore and construct
compliance, cited him in contempt, ordering his arrest and detention. portions of the Manila–Cavite Coastal Road. In return, CDCP would
receive half of the reclaimed land.
Neri filed a petition for certiorari, seeking annulment of both the
contempt order and the arrest directive, arguing the Senate had In 1977, President Marcos created the Public Estates Authority (PEA)
committed grave abuse of discretion by ignoring presidential via PD No. 1084, empowering it to reclaim, manage, lease, and sell
communications privilege. public domain lands. A companion decree, PD No. 1085, transferred
reclaimed lands to PEA.

ISSUES
In 1988, President Aquino issued a Special Patent (No. 3517)
1. Are the three questions the Senate asked—about whether the transferring reclaimed parcels—the so-called Freedom Islands—to
President followed up, prioritized, or directed approval of the NBN PEA. The Register of Deeds subsequently issued Torrens titles to
project—protected by executive privilege? PEA.
2. Did the Senate Committees commit a grave abuse of discretion in In 1995, without public bidding, PEA entered into a Joint Venture
issuing the contempt order and/or directing Neri’s detention? Agreement (JVA) with Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation.
The agreement allowed Amari to develop the Freedom Islands and
reclaim additional submerged areas. Later renegotiated, the
HELD Amended JVA granted Amari title to 367.5 hectares, including both
reclaimed and still-to-be reclaimed land, in exchange for bearing
Yes. The communications sought were protected by executive
reclamation costs. Titles were to be issued in Amari's name.
(presidential) communications privilege, which the Court deemed
validly invoked. In 1998, as reports emerged of ongoing renegotiations between PEA
and Amari, lawyer-taxpayer Francisco Chavez filed a petition for
Yes. The Senate Committees erred gravely in citing Neri for
mandamus, seeking PEA to disclose negotiation details and enjoin
contempt, which they did despite valid assertion of privilege.
implementation of the JVA. PEA claimed transparency would
The Supreme Court granted Neri’s petition, nullifying both the compromise negotiations; Chavez asserted the constitutional right to
contempt and arrest orders. information.

REASONING ISSUES

Executive Privilege Criteria: 1. Are the lands subject to the Amended JVA—both reclaimed and
submerged areas—still part of the public domain, and thus not
Quintessential and non-delegable presidential power: The alienable to private corporations?
subject—decisions and involvement regarding the NBN project—falls
squarely within the President’s domain of foreign dealings and high- 2. Does the transfer of ownership and title of such lands to Amari
level policymaking. violate Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution?

Operational proximity: Neri, as NEDA head, is a close advisor and 3. Is the Amended JVA therefore null and void ab initio?
directly involved in policy coordination, satisfying the second
criterion.
HELD
Overriding public need: Petitioners failed to demonstrate a
compelling need overpowering privilege. The Senate sought Yes, both the reclaimed lands (Freedom Islands) and submerged
oversight on internal executive deliberations—legislative inquiry areas remain lands of the public domain; they may only be sold or
cannot pry into presidential internal decision-making absent greater leased under strict constitutional conditions.
justification.
Yes, transferring ownership of such lands to Amari—a private
Contempt Order's Grave Abuse: corporation—is unconstitutional under applicable provisions of the
Constitution.
By constitutional design, the people’s right to public information is
subject to exceptions such as executive privilege (Art. III, Sec. 7). Yes, as a result, the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio.
The Senate’s contempt citation disregarded the legitimate invocation
of privilege.
REASONING
Issuing a contempt order in face of valid executive privilege
constitutes grave abuse of legislative power. Regalian Doctrine

Justiciability: Rooted in historical jurisprudence, the Regalian doctrine recognizes

state ownership over all lands of the public domain, which include
The Court reaffirmed that compulsive power of legislative branch foreshore and submerged areas—even if reclaimed. Only lands
cannot override constitutional limits; judicial review is necessary to lawfully classified as “alienable agricultural” may be disposed of.
prevent overreach.
Constitutional Provisions – Art. XII

Section 2, Article XII designates all natural resources as state-owned;

RULING (Expanded) only agricultural public land may be made alienable.
The three questions posed to Neri about the President’s role in the Section 3, Article XII forbids private corporations from holding such
NBN project were privileged communications and not subject to alienable lands—except by lease not exceeding 25 years.
compulsory testimony.
Invalidity of the Amended JVA
The contempt and arrest orders issued by the Senate Committees for
Neri’s refusal were null and void as they violated constitutional The JVA transferred ownership of reclaimed and submerged area to a
protections and exceeded legislative authority. private corporation—directly contravening the constitutional
restrictions.

Submerged lands, not yet reclaimed, are inalienable natural

DISPOSITION resources and cannot be transferred at all.
Petition GRANTED. The JVA thus violated both Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII.
The Senate’s Show Cause and contempt orders, including its Nullity under Civil Code
directive for arrest and detention, are DECLARED NULL AND VOID for
grave abuse of discretion. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, a contract whose object is
illegal or contrary to law is inexistent and void from the beginning.
Neri was relieved from any such penalties and the matter was closed
with respect to contempt charges.
RULING privilege without context or articulation of specific grounds. This
blanket provision frustrated the Senate’s power of inquiry and
The Supreme Court granted the petition. It declared the Amended subverted its oversight role.
JVA null and void ab initio.
4. Validity of Limited Restriction on Question Hour
PEA and Amari were permanently enjoined from executing or
implementing the agreement. Section 1(a) of EO 464, which governs executive attendance during
question hour, was upheld as constitutional—it merely reiterated the
requirement in Article VI, Section 22, where executive attendance is
DISPOSITION discretionary. The Court construed this portion narrowly and
consistent with constitutional norms.
The petition was GRANTED. The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
between PEA and Amari is null and void ab initio. Both parties are 5. Provisions Invalidated for Overbreadth
permanently enjoined from enforcing or implementing it. Sections 2(b) and 3 of EO 464, which broadly prohibited executive
officials from appearing before Congress without presidential
clearance—regardless of context—were declared unconstitutional.
Senate of the Philippines v. Executive Secretary Ermita These sections improperly curtailed legislative authority and the
public's right to information by enabling evasion of inquiries without
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006 — En banc
legitimate privilege claims.
FACTS

In late September 2005, the Senate issued invitations to key officials

DISPOSITION
of the Executive Department—including Cabinet members and
military officers—to appear before the Senate on September 29. The The petition is PARTLY GRANTED:
purpose was to provide testimony and insight on a range of pressing
national issues: the North Rail project (a contentious infrastructure Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared null and void.
contract with China), allegations of wiretapping allegedly targeting Section 1(a) remains valid as it concerns only question-hour
the President, and the Fertilizer Scam, among other matters raised attendance, aligning with Article VI, Section 22.
during various privilege speeches.
This ruling reaffirmed the constitutional architecture of checks and
A few days later, on September 27–28, Executive Secretary Eduardo balances and safeguarded legislative oversight by ensuring
Ermita, acting as the President’s alter-ego, wrote to Senate President executive accountability in areas affecting public interest.
Franklin Drilon requesting that the hearings be postponed. This, the
letter explained, was to afford the invited officials sufficient time to
prepare meaningful responses to the Senate's complex inquiries. The
Senate declined the request. Mario Jose E. Sereno v. Committee on Trade and Related
Matters (CTRM) of the National Economic and Development
On September 28, 2005, Executive Order No. 464 was issued, Authority (NEDA)
effective immediately. This order mandated that all executive
officials—Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, G.R. No. 175210, February 1, 2016 — En banc
high-ranking military officers, and other senior officials—must secure FACTS
presidential consent before appearing before either House of
Congress, whether in question hour or legislative inquiries. That The Committee on Trade and Related Matters (CTRM)—a high-level
same day, Executive Secretary Ermita informed the Senate that advisory committee within NEDA composed of the NEDA Director-
executive and military resource persons would not attend without General, Executive Secretary, Cabinet secretaries (Trade, Finance,
the President’s approval. Notably, two military officials, Col. Balutan Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Environment and Natural Resources,
and Brig. Gen. Gudani, defied the order and testified; they were Budget and Management, Transportation and Communications,
subsequently subjected to disciplinary proceedings. Labor and Employment, Agrarian Reform), the Governor of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and the Chair of the Tariff Commission,
Disillusioned by these constraints, the Senate, represented by its among others—met on May 23, 2005 to deliberate on tariff reduction
leadership—including Senate President Drilon and prominent schedules under Executive Order No. 161 (AFTA-CEPT scheme).
Senators—filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
The petition sought to nullify EO 464 in its entirety, asserting that it During that meeting, the CTRM resolved to recommend to the
unconstitutionally infringed their constitutional power “to conduct President the lifting of the suspension on tariff reductions for
inquiries in aid of legislation” (Article VI, Section 21), violated the petrochemical resins and selected plastic products, proposing to
separation of powers, and unjustly hindered legislative oversight. reduce Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) rates from 7% or
10% to 5%, starting July 2005. The decision included a stipulation to
revert to original tariff levels once a domestic naphtha cracker plant
ISSUES became operational.

1. Did EO 464 unconstitutionally encroach on Congress’s power of On June 9, 2005, Wilfredo A. Paras, Chairman of the Association of
inquiry and violate the principle of separation of powers? Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP), formally
requested access to the minutes of the CTRM meeting. He cited the
2. Is the blanket requirement of presidential consent for executive potential adverse impact of the decision on the domestic
officials to testify valid, or does it unduly restrict legislative oversight petrochemical industry.
and the public’s right to know?
In response, Brenda R. Mendoza, Director of NEDA's Trade, Industry
& Utilities Staff, issued letters on June 20 and August 31, 2005,
denying the request. She stated that, although the law generally
RULING (Expanded) mandates disclosure of official documents, closed-door Cabinet
1. Power of Inquiry as Constitutional Imperative meetings—such as the CTRM—are exempt under Section 3(c) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Code of Conduct and
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Congress’s power of inquiry in Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713).
aid of legislation (Art. VI, Sec. 21) is a constitutional prerogative—an These exemptions include sensitive categories such as diplomatic
extension of its legislative function. To legislate wisely, lawmakers correspondence, privileged deliberations, and closed-door executive
must have access to information, and the Constitution empowers sessions.
them to compel executive officials to testify.
APMP, through Executive Director Mario Jose E. Sereno, filed a
2. Distinction from Question Hour petition for mandamus in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to compel
disclosure of the minutes and related data used in formulating
The Court distinguished between two separate powers:
Executive Order No. 486 (the executive order lifting the suspension).
Question Hour (Art. VI, Sec. 22): Allows discretionary attendance by The RTC dismissed the petition on October 16, 2006, ruling that the
department heads upon request. information fell under the legal exceptions to open disclosure.

Inquiry in Aid of Legislation (Art. VI, Sec. 21): Permits subpoenaed Sereno elevated the case to the Supreme Court, where the core
attendance via compulsory process when needed for legislative issue became whether the CTRM minutes—despite dealing with
deliberation. publicly impactful policy recommendations—were legally exempt
from mandamus ordering due to their confidential, deliberative
The Court held that the protective provisions of EO 464 cannot nature.
override the mandatory nature of Section 21 appearances.

3. Executive Privilege as a Limited Exception

ISSUES
While executive privilege is recognized as a constitutional concept—
primarily to safeguard sensitive communications—it must be 1. Does Sereno have the right to compel CTRM to disclose the
explicitly asserted and reasonably justified, not merely implied. EO minutes of a meeting involving policy recommendations through a
464, however, established a blanket requirement that invoked writ of mandamus?
2. Are such meeting minutes—and the meetings themselves— The Supreme Court granted the writs, acknowledging Rodriguez’s
exempt from the constitutional right to information as “closed-door allegations of abduction and torture. The case proceeded to the
Cabinet meetings”? Court of Appeals (CA). The CA held several military officials liable but
declared former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo immune from
HELD suit, citing presidential immunity. Certain respondents were
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the RTC’s dismissal: CTRM meetings dismissed due to lack of evidence.
and their minutes are exempt from the constitutional right to access Rodriguez then petitioned the Supreme Court via annulment with
information, as closed-door Cabinet meetings dealing with sensitive certiorari, challenging the immunity determination and invoking the
policy and foreign affairs. doctrine of command responsibility—asserting former President
Arroyo, being the Commander-in-Chief, could be held accountable for
military actions.
RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the RTC’s dismissal, providing a two-

pronged analysis: ISSUES

Mandamus Inadequate to Override Privilege 1. Does the presidential immunity extend beyond the President’s
tenure or term, immunizing a former President from amparo
For a writ of mandamus compelling disclosure to issue, two proceedings?
conditions must be satisfied:
2. Can the doctrine of command responsibility apply in amparo and
The sought information must concern a matter of public interest or habeas data cases to determine accountability?
concern;
3. Did Rodriguez provide sufficient evidence to hold former President
It must not be legally exempt from disclosure. Arroyo and other respondents responsible or accountable?
Here, despite the petitioner satisfying the first condition—given the
decision's potential economic impact—the second was unmet
because the records were covered under the law’s privileged HELD
exceptions. This dual-test approach upheld the mandamus denial.) No. A former President does not enjoy immunity from suit once out of
Closed-Door Deliberations as Protected office. Presidential immunity ceases upon the end of actual
incumbency (tenure), not the term.
The Court stressed the importance of maintaining confidentiality in
high-stakes policymaking, especially where sensitive economic and Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be applied in
trade strategies are concerned. amparo proceedings to identify those accountable for enforced
disappearances or extrajudicial violations—even absent criminal
It emphasized that the exemption is determined not by the liability.
composition of a committee but by the nature of the information—
i.e., that it reflects the executive’s deliberative process, exempt from No. Rodriguez failed to show sufficient evidence to hold Arroyo or
immediate public view. Closed-door sessions allow frank internal several other respondents responsible or accountable for his
discussions free from external pressure. abduction.

Statutory Support in R.A. No. 6713

Section 3(c) of R.A. 6713’s IRR expressly excludes such high-level, REASONING
policy-oriented deliberations from mandatory public disclosure, On Presidential Immunity:
consistent with constitutional blessings to the right to information
being subject to reasonable limitations. The judiciary will not The Court clarified that immunity from suit is confined to the period
subordinate these legislated exceptions in absence of specific of actual incumbency. Once a President leaves office, the immunity
justification. no longer applies. It emphasized the framers’ intent to limit this
privilege to the time in office, not the entire term—allowing judicial
Balance of Public Interest vs Confidential Governance scrutiny afterward.
The Court acknowledged a need for balance: while citizens have a On Command Responsibility:
right to be informed—especially when policy decisions affect
economic stakeholders—unfiltered exposure of internal deliberations Drawing from Rubrico v. Arroyo, the Court explained that although
may undermine the very quality and integrity of government amparo proceedings do not adjudicate criminal guilt, the command
decision-making. The exemptive shield therefore must be afforded to responsibility doctrine serves a remedial purpose: to pinpoint officials
preserve deliberative candor. with accountability over subordinates’ actions so that effective
protection orders can be issued. It does not determine criminal or
administrative liability.
DISPOSITION On Evidence of Accountability:
Petition DENIED. Rodriguez failed to provide specific evidence linking Arroyo or other
The Regional Trial Court’s dismissal of the mandamus petition is respondents to knowledge or failure to act regarding his abduction.
AFFIRMED. The mere existence of generalized findings from the Melo and Alston
reports wasn’t sufficient; no direct evidence was presented to legally
The minutes and associated documents from the CTRM meeting shall impute responsibility or accountability.
remain undisclosed, as they are properly shielded under statutory
confidentiality provisions.

No costs awarded. RULING (Expanded)

The Court denied immunity to former President Arroyo, permitting

judicial proceedings under amparo despite her departure from office.
Noriel H. Rodriguez v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.
Command responsibility may be invoked to establish accountability
G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011 — En banc thresholds in protective proceedings—limited to identification and
remediation, not punitive liability.
FACTS
Rodriguez’s petitions lacked concrete evidence that any of the
Noriel H. Rodriguez, a member of the peasant group Alyansa Dagiti
named respondents—especially those dismissed by CA—were
Mannalon Iti Cagayan, aligned with the militant organization KMP,
knowingly responsible or had a duty to prevent or remedy his rights
alleged serious human rights violations under Oplan Bantay Laya, an
deprivation.
anti-insurgency program branding KMP members as state enemies.

On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez was abducted in Cagayan by men

in civilian clothes. He was forcibly placed in a vehicle with armed DISPOSITION
individuals, taken to a military camp affiliated with the 17th Infantry
Battalion, and subjected to repeated torture to extract false The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the CA decision with modifications:
confessions of NPA membership. He was coerced into signing Former President Arroyo, along with some other respondents
documents falsely stating that he surrendered voluntarily. After days (Tolentino, Santos, Calog, Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan, and Callagan),
of mistreatment, he was allowed to return home. Shortly after, he were dismissed for lack of merit.
and his family were monitored by unidentified men.
The Court thus dismissed the petition as to these individuals, while
On December 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed petitions for the writs of preserving the amparo claims against those found potentially
Amparo and Habeas Data, seeking protection, inspection, and responsible in the CA decision.
production orders under these new remedies designed to safeguard
human rights and personal data.
Case Digest: Rubrico v. Macapagal–Arroyo While denying relief against certain respondents, the Court
mandated that the incumbent AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Director-
G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010 — En banc General, or their successors, pursue the aggravated disappearance,
FACTS threats, and harassment with "extraordinary diligence", per the
Amparo Rule.
Lourdes D. Rubrico, chair of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon iti Cagayan,
affiliated with militant peasant groups, was abducted on April 3, Specific action steps included:
2007 by armed men wearing civilian clothes and identified as Identifying and locating respondents like Maj. Darwin Sy (“Reyes”),
personnel from the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and an individual named
part of the Philippine Air Force stationed at Fernando Air Base, Lipa “Jonathan.”
City, Batangas.
Providing cartographic sketches for identification.
During her forced detention, Rubrico was transported to the military
facility, beaten, interrogated, and coerced into signing a declaration Submitting findings within six months and a progress report within
that she had willingly surrendered to authorities. She was only 30 days thereof.
released after enduring days of violent mistreatment.

The trauma extended beyond her; Rubrico's daughters, Jean Rubrico

Apruebo and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel, were subsequently DISPOSITION
harassed by individuals including Senior Inspector Arsenio Gomez, The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED:
and subjected to surveillance and intimidation, which heightened
fears for their safety. President Arroyo and certain other officials are dismissed as
respondents, per the correct application of immunity doctrine and
On October 25, 2007, Rubrico, represented by family members, filed failure of factual basis.
petitions for the writs of Amparo and Habeas Data, aiming to obtain
court protection against further threats, force the release of any The case continues against other respondents, with affirmed
government-held personal data on them, and compel the Office of investigative responsibilities imposed on current AFP and PNP
the Ombudsman to immediately file kidnapping charges— leadership for procedural action.
highlighting the aggravating circumstance of gender. She also
demanded restitution for damages and the production of pertinent
documents. Esmero v. Duterte
The Supreme Court granted the writs, forwarding the case to the G.R. No. 256288, June 15, 2021
Court of Appeals (CA) for summary hearing. In response, the CA
issued a partial judgment: FACTS

It dropped President Arroyo as a respondent. Atty. Romeo M. Esmero, motivated by the rising tensions in the West
Philippine Sea and the continuous incursions of Chinese forces into
It dismissed claims against several military officers and the Philippine territory, filed a Petition for Mandamus directly before the
Ombudsman based on failure to allege essential facts. Supreme Court. He named President Rodrigo Roa Duterte as the sole
respondent.
Rubrico filed a petition for review via certiorari to the Supreme Court,
asking it to reconsider the applicability of presidential immunity and Esmero’s petition alleged that the President had a constitutional and
the command responsibility doctrine within amparo proceedings. legal duty to protect the nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,
and that his failure to assert the Philippines’ arbitral victory before
international tribunals constituted unlawful neglect of duty.
ISSUES
Key points of Esmero’s petition included:
1. Whether the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit applies to
Duty to Protect Sovereignty – The President must actively defend
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in a petition for the writ of
the Philippines’ sovereign rights and territorial integrity, particularly
amparo and habeas data.
in the West Philippine Sea, as guaranteed under the 1987
2. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility may be invoked Constitution.
in amparo proceedings.
Impact on Coastal Communities – By neglecting to defend
3. Whether the petition sufficiently alleged factual bases to hold national territory, the government endangers the livelihood of
other government officials, including the Ombudsman, liable in coastal Filipinos who depend on fishing rights in the country’s
amparo and habeas data proceedings. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

4. Whether the writs of amparo and habeas data extend to compel UN Arbitral Tribunal Ruling – The Philippines had already secured
affirmative obligations on the part of present AFP and PNP officials to a favorable ruling from the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
investigate, locate, and disclose the identities of the abductors and under UNCLOS, affirming sovereign rights over maritime areas. The
harassers. President’s alleged refusal to assert this victory was an abdication of
duty.

Foreign Policy Actions Sought – Esmero urged the Court to

RULING compel the President to:
Presidential Immunity Does Not Extend Beyond Incumbency Invoke the UN Uniting for Peace Resolution;
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine of presidential immunity, Initiate action before the International Court of Justice (ICJ);
emphasizing that it exists only during the actual period of holding
office (“incumbency”), not throughout the entire term. Demand reparations from China for the seizure of the Kalayaan
Island Group.
Since Arroyo had already left office, she could no longer avail herself
of immunity in protective proceedings. Immunity Exception Argument – Esmero argued that presidential
immunity should not apply in cases of inaction to defend
Command Responsibility Is Inappropriate in Amparo sovereignty, since such neglect affects the entire Filipino nation and
Proceedings cannot be shielded by executive indemnity.
The Court clarified that the doctrine of command responsibility, Thus, Esmero prayed that the Supreme Court issue a writ of
rooted in criminal liability in international law, is not suitable for mandamus directing the President to perform specific foreign policy
amparo proceedings. Amparo remedies are civil and protective, not measures against China.
punitive.

Without a domestic statute, applying command responsibility would

blur the line between protection and criminal adjudication. ISSUE
Consequently, it has minimal relevance to amparo actions.
1. Whether a sitting President may be compelled by mandamus to
Lack of Sufficient Allegations for Specific Respondents assert the Philippines’ rights in the West Philippine Sea by taking
specific foreign policy actions (e.g., invoking the UN Uniting for Peace
The petition raised general allegations against various officials (e.g., Resolution, filing a case before the ICJ, demanding reparations from
General Hermogenes Esperon, AFP Chief of Staff; PNP Chief Avelino China).
Razon; and the Ombudsman) but failed to supply specific facts
demonstrating their involvement or knowledge in the human rights 2. Whether the doctrine of presidential immunity during incumbency
violation. bars the petition for mandamus filed directly against the President.

The Court affirmed their dismissal, citing insufficient basis to link

them to accountability or command responsibility.
RULING (Highly Detailed)
Directive for Additional Investigation and Reporting
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition outright for utter lack of President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed six new Sandiganbayan
merit, resolving the issues as follows: Associate Justices from the combined list of 37 nominees submitted
by the JBC, without adhering to the clustering arrangement. The
Presidential Immunity During Incumbency petitioners challenged these appointments, asserting that the
The Court reaffirmed the doctrine that a sitting President is immune President's disregard of the clustering practice rendered the
from suit during his incumbency, regardless of the nature of the legal appointments invalid.
action. The JBC filed motions for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the
This principle, rooted in separation of powers, ensures the ponente, arguing that the clustering practice was within its discretion
President’s unhampered performance of executive duties. and did not violate the Constitution. The Court, in its November 29,
2016 decision, declared the clustering of nominees by the JBC
Citing De Lima v. Duterte, the Court emphasized that the immunity unconstitutional but upheld the validity of the appointments made by
doctrine applies both to criminal and civil actions, including special President Aquino.
writs such as mandamus.

Since Esmero named President Duterte as the sole respondent, the

petition could not prosper and had to be dismissed. ISSUES

Mandamus Cannot Compel Discretionary Acts 1. Whether the clustering of nominees by the JBC for the six new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice positions is unconstitutional.
Even assuming arguendo that the petition had named the Executive
Secretary as a representative of the President, mandamus would still 2. Whether the appointments made by President Aquino from the
not apply. combined list of nominees, disregarding the clustering, are valid.

Under Rule 65, mandamus compels the performance of ministerial 3. Whether the motions for reconsideration and for the inhibition of
duties—those clearly imposed by law without room for discretion. the ponente filed by the JBC should be granted.

Esmero failed to show that the President had a clear, ministerial, and
legally imposed duty to take the specific measures he demanded RULING
(e.g., bringing China to the ICJ, invoking the UN Uniting for Peace
Resolution). Clustering of Nominees is Unconstitutional

Foreign policy and defense measures are inherently discretionary The Supreme Court held that the JBC's practice of clustering
executive functions, requiring judgment and flexibility. Courts cannot nominees for specific vacancies is unconstitutional. The Court
substitute their will for that of the President. reasoned that such clustering unduly restricts the President's
discretion to appoint from a broader pool of qualified nominees. The
Scope of the President’s Foreign Affairs Power Constitution mandates that the President appoint from at least three
The Court reiterated that the President is the sole organ of the nation nominees per vacancy, but it does not require the nominees to be
in foreign relations, recognized as the chief architect of foreign grouped into separate shortlists. The Court emphasized that the
policy. President's power to appoint is a broad constitutional prerogative
that should not be limited by procedural practices not grounded in
This power, though not limitless, is exercised with wide latitude and the Constitution.
subject only to:
Appointments Made by President Aquino are Valid
Constitutional mandates;
Despite declaring the clustering practice unconstitutional, the Court
Domestic laws; and upheld the validity of the appointments made by President Aquino.
The Court noted that the JBC submitted a total of 37 qualified
International obligations.
nominees, exceeding the constitutional requirement of at least three
There is no legal provision obligating the President to invoke UN nominees per vacancy. The President exercised his discretion to
mechanisms, pursue reparations, or bring disputes before the ICJ. appoint from this combined list, which was within his constitutional
authority. The Court concluded that the defect in the clustering
The Philippines had already pursued peaceful dispute resolution process did not invalidate the appointments already made.
through arbitration under UNCLOS. The choice not to pursue further
international legal remedies is a matter of executive discretion, not Motions for Reconsideration and Inhibition Denied
judicial compulsion.
The Court denied the motions for reconsideration and for the
inhibition of the ponente filed by the JBC. The Court found no merit in
the JBC's arguments and noted that the ponente had not participated
DISPOSITION in the JBC's executive sessions or decisions related to the clustering
The Petition was DISMISSED. practice. Therefore, there was no basis for claims of bias or conflict
of interest.
The Court upheld the doctrine of presidential immunity during
incumbency.

The Court further ruled that mandamus cannot compel the President DISPOSITION
to exercise discretionary foreign policy powers in a manner dictated The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for quo warranto,
by private citizens. certiorari, and prohibition for lack of merit. The Court declared the
No costs were awarded. clustering of nominees by the JBC unconstitutional but upheld the
validity of the appointments made by President Aquino. The Court
The ruling reaffirmed the separation of powers, the breadth of also denied the motions for reconsideration and for the inhibition of
executive authority in foreign affairs, and the limits of judicial the ponente filed by the JBC.
intervention in matters of sovereignty and national security.

Aguinaldo v. Aquino III

Powers of the President (1987 Philippine Constitution)
G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017 — En Banc
1. Appointing Power
FACTS
Article VII, Sec. 16
In 2015, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) clustered the nominees for
six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice positions into separate Power:
shortlists, each corresponding to a specific vacancy. This practice Appoints heads of executive departments (Cabinet)
was intended to streamline the nomination process for the newly
created positions. However, the JBC's clustering approach was Ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls
challenged by several petitioners, including Hon. Philip A. Aguinaldo,
Officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Hon. Reynaldo A. Alhambra, Hon. Danilo S. Cruz, Hon. Benjamin T.
Pozon, Hon. Salvador V. Timbang, Jr., and the Integrated Bar of the Judges of lower courts
Philippines (IBP), who filed a petition for quo warranto, certiorari, and
prohibition against the President and other government officials. Other officials whose appointments are vested in the President by
law
The petitioners argued that the JBC's clustering of nominees was
unconstitutional, as it restricted the President's discretion in Limitations / Exceptions:
appointing justices by limiting the pool of nominees to specific Certain appointments require confirmation by the Commission on
shortlists for each vacancy. They contended that this practice Appointments (CA).
violated the constitutional requirement that the President appoint
from at least three nominees per vacancy, as mandated by Article Cannot appoint members of independent constitutional bodies (e.g.,
VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution. Constitutional Commissions, Ombudsman), except as provided by
law.
Recess appointments expire at the end of the next session of the CA. Reporting does not confer legislative authority.

2. Control Power (Administrative Power)

Article VII, Sec. 17

Power:

Supervises and ensures that laws are faithfully executed.

Can require written reports from heads of executive departments.

Can remove or reassign subordinate officials.

Limitations / Exceptions:

Cannot remove constitutional officers (e.g., COA, CSC, COMELEC,

Ombudsman) whose tenure is protected by law.

3. Military Power

Article VII, Sec. 18

Power:

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Can call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress invasion,

rebellion, or lawless violence.

May declare martial law for 60 days in case of invasion or rebellion.

Limitations / Exceptions:

Must report to Congress within 48 hours.

Congress can revoke the proclamation by a majority vote.

Supreme Court can review the factual basis of martial law.

4. Borrowing Power

Article VII, Sec. 20

Power:

May contract loans or incur debt on behalf of the Republic.

Limitations / Exceptions:

Borrowing must comply with the General Appropriations Act.

Loans exceeding certain limits require Congressional approval.

5. Diplomatic Power

Article VII, Sec. 21

Power:

Negotiates and signs treaties and international agreements.

Appoints ambassadors and receives foreign diplomats.

Limitations / Exceptions:

Treaties and international agreements must be ratified by 2/3 of the

Senate.

Recognition of foreign states is subject to international law and

existing treaties.

6. Budgetary Power

Article VII, Sec. 22

Power:

Submits the annual national budget to Congress.

Limitations / Exceptions:

Congress may modify, approve, or reject parts of the budget.

Budget must conform to laws on expenditures, fiscal policy, and debt

ceilings.

7. Informing Power

Article VII, Sec. 23

Power:

Reports to Congress on the State of the Nation at least once a year.

Recommends measures he/she considers necessary and expedient.

Limitations / Exceptions:

Recommendations are advisory; Congress may accept, reject, or

modify them.