THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 186420 : August 25, 2009]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. SAMUEL ANOD, Appellant.

RESOLUTION

Version of the Prosecution

Costan, was stabbed and hacked to death in his. His body was found by Miguel Platil.
The following day appellant and Lumbayan surrendered to Barangay Chairperson before
whom they admitted the killing of Costan. On May 18, 1997, appellant and Lumbayan
were brought to the police station.

Version of the Defense

Appellant averred that at around 7 p.m. of May 16, 1997, he and Lumbayan were
having a drinking spree in the store of one Dodoy Advincula in Borbonan where they
were joined by a certain Angges. An hour later, appellant asked his companions to go
home. On their way home and upon reaching a dark place, Lumbayan suddenly stabbed
Angges. He then invited appellant to sleep at the house of Lumbayan's aunt.
Subsequently, however, Lumbayan told appellant that they would spend the night at
Costan's house.

Upon reaching Costan's house, Lumbayan called for the victim. Costan opened the door
for them and immediately thereafter, Lumbayan poked a knife at Costan and ordered
appellant to tie the victim while the latter was lying down. He then ordered appellant to
stab Costan. Out of fear of being stabbed by Lumbayan who, at the time, was poking a
knife at appellant's breast, appellant stabbed Costan once at the back. They
surrendered to the Barangay Chairperson allegedly upon the prodding of appellant. On
the other hand, Lumbayan denied all the charges, claiming that he and appellant slept
early on the night of the incident at his aunt's house. The following day, they were
fetched and brought to the house of the Barangay Chairperson.

The RTC's Ruling

On July 3, 2001, the RTC found appellant and Lumbayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the widow of Costan in the amount of P50,000.00 as damages.

The CA's Ruling

In its Decision dated August 27, 2008, the CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC
with modification

Aggrieved, appellant appealed. In their respective Manifestations filed before this Court,
appellant, as represented by the Public Attorney's Office, and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) opted to adopt their respective Briefs filed before the CA as their
Supplemental Briefs.
Hence, this Appeal with the following assignment of errors:

I.

ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT APPELLANT'S CULPABILITY WAS PROVEN

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES OF IRRESISTIBLE FORCE AND
UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR.

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING TREACHERY AND EVIDENT

PREMEDITATION AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES. 8

Appellant argues that he blindly obeyed Lumbayan and stabbed Costan, an act that was
against his will and done under the compulsion of an irresistible force and
uncontrollable fear for his life. Moreover, appellant contends that the qualifying
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery were not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Except for the testimony of the Barangay Chairperson which did not
prove these qualifying circumstances, no other witness was presented to corroborate
the same.9

On the other hand, the OSG opines that the force supposedly exerted upon appellant
was not sufficient to exempt him from criminal liability. Apart from initially refusing
Lumbayan's order, as appellant alleged, he did not offer any protest or objection to the
said order. Appellant could have easily evaded Lumbayan, or he could have defended
himself in equal combat as he himself was armed with a knife. The OSG claims that,
while it may be conceded that evident premeditation was not adequately proven,
treachery was, however, duly established. Thus, the crime committed was murder. 10

Our Ruling

We dismiss the appeal.

Appellant failed to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in its
assailed Decision. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from
criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does
not act with freedom. However, we held that for such a defense to prosper, the duress,
force, fear, or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the
act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. In this case, as correctly held by the
CA, based on the evidence on record, appellant had the chance to escape Lumbayan's
threat or engage Lumbayan in combat, as appellant was also holding a knife at the
time. Thus, appellant's allegation of fear or duress is untenable. We have held that in
order for the circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the
compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for escape or self-defense
in equal combat.11 Therefore, under the circumstances, appellant's alleged fear, arising
from the threat of Lumbayan, would not suffice to exempt him from incurring criminal
liability.
Indubitably, the killing of the victim was attended by treachery. Treachery exists when
the offender commits a crime against persons, employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof which tend, directly and specifically, to ensure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from any defense or retaliatory act which the victim might
make. Here, appellant tied Costan while the latter was lying down before he and
Lumbayan stabbed the latter to death; thus, ensuring the execution of the crime
without risk to themselves. Obviously, Costan could not flee for his life or retaliate. This
aggravating circumstance qualifies the crime to murder. 12

We apply the cardinal rule that factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses, and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded
with great respect, if not conclusive effect, more so when affirmed by the CA. The
exception is when it is established that the trial court ignored, overlooked,
misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances that, if considered,
would change the outcome of the case. We have reviewed the records of the RTC and
the CA and we find no reason to deviate from the lower courts' findings and their
uniform conclusion that appellant is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder.13

As to damages, we held in People of the Philippines v. Judito Molina and John Doe, and
Joselito Tagudar,14 that when death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may
be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5)
temperate damages.

Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of
proof other than the commission of the crime. In this regard, however, we reduce the
award made by the CA, from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00.

It is worth stressing that, at the outset, the appellant, together with Lumbayan, was
sentenced by the RTC to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus, the CA's
reliance on our ruling in People v. dela Cruz 15 was misplaced. In dela Cruz, this Court
cited our ruling in People v. Tubongbanua, 16 wherein we held that the civil indemnity
imposed should be P75,000.00. However, the instant case does not share the same
factual milieu as dela Cruz and Tubongbanua. In the said cases, at the outset, the
accused were sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. However, in view of the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death
Penalty on June 24, 2006, the penalty meted to the accused was reduced to reclusion
perpetua. This jurisprudential trend was followed in the recent case of People of the
Philippines v. Generoso Rolida y Moreno, etc., 17 where this Court also increased the civil
indemnity from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Based on the foregoing disquisitions and the
current applicable jurisprudence, we hereby reduce the civil indemnity awarded herein
to P50,000.00.18 We affirm all the other awards made by the CA.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00195, finding appellant Samuel Anod guilty of the crime of murder
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the award of civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is reduced
to P50,000.00. In all other respects, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.