The Legal and Normative Framework of International Migration
The Legal and Normative Framework of International Migration
of international migration
by
Susan Martin
Institute for the Study of International Migration
Georgetown University
martinsf@georgetown.edu
September 2005
The analysis provided in this paper is that of the author, and does not
represent the views of the Global Commission on International Migration.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Nevertheless, the gaps in international law and norms remain, particularly related to
migration for family and economic reasons.
States possess broad authority to regulate the movement of foreign nationals across their
borders. Although these authorities are not absolute, States exercise their sovereign
powers to determine who will be admitted and for what period. In support of these
powers, States enact law and regulations to govern issuance passports, admissions,
exclusion and removal of aliens, and border security. States vary in the types of laws and
regulations adopted, with some being more restrictive than others are, but all States adopt
rules that govern entry into and exit from their territories.
1
in Persons, Especially Women and Children and the Protocol against the Smuggling of
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, both of which supplement the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime.
Most of these conventions and protocols have been ratified by a wide range of States, but
the Migrant Rights Convention has been ratified by only 27 States. No major destination
country of international migrants is among its State parties although such States as
Mexico, which is source, transit and destination country, have become parties to the
Convention. The obstacles are both practical and political. On the practical side, the
MWC is extensive and complex, raising technical questions as well as financial
obligations on State parties. More fundamentally, the Convention raises basic questions
about State sovereignty, particularly regarding the capacity of States to deter irregular
migration.
Advocacy at the national and local levels appears to be the most likely inducement to
State ratification. To the extent that there is a vocal and well-organised constituency in
support of migrant rights, States are more likely to overcome their concerns about the
Convention. States may also re-think ratification if the provisions in the Convention
relating to inter-state cooperation in combating irregular migration can be operationalised
into concrete actions. States may be more willing to extend rights to migrants if they
believe they are able to effectively control who and how many persons migrate.
Policies and programs at the national level can be effective ways to protect the rights of
migrants. The better-informed workers are prior to migrating, the better able they are to
assert their rights. Access to language training courses in destination countries will also
help migrant workers to learn of and assert their rights when employers or family
members violate them. Monitoring recruitment agencies and employers is essential to the
protection of migrant workers. When abuses occur, legal representation for migrant
workers can help them fight against discrimination, sexual harassment, lost wages and
other violations of their labour rights. Programmes that provide shelter and social
services to migrant workers who have experienced abuse are essential to protecting their
rights. Migrant workers who decide to return home after escaping abusive conditions
may also need assistance in repatriation and reintegration. Consular protection can play
an important role in ensuring that migrant workers do not face abusive situations.
Consular officers can monitor the security of migrant workers in potentially vulnerable
positions, using their diplomatic positions to engage the host country in interceding in
favour of the migrant worker.
A weak but growing body of international law and effective practices focus on
international cooperation in managing international migration. There are a number of
models through which international cooperation has been advanced. In the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), States voluntarily commit to rules for the
admission of certain categories of migrants. Since the commitments are made as part of a
treaty, the State foregoes the right to change the rules unilaterally. Using the GATS
example as a model, an international body, such as the World Trade Organization, would
monitor implementation and hear complaints that States are violating their commitments.
2
The Trafficking and Smuggling Protocols are more explicit in setting out specific areas in
which State Parties agree to cooperate with each other. The protocols emphasize
information exchange, training, public information and other joint efforts to prevent
smuggling and trafficking. Implicit in this model is the recognition that unilateral actions
on the parts of States will be ineffective in addressing transnational problems that affect
all countries.
Moving from the current arrangements to a more robust international regime may be
premature, however. While there has been progress in setting out common
understandings, there continue to be fundamental disagreements among States as to
causes and consequences of international migration and the extent to which it is in the
interests of States to liberalize or restrict flows of migrants. This situation contrasts
sharply with the general consensus that governs movements of goods, capital and
services—that it is in the ultimate interest of all States to lessen barriers to the movements
of these factors.
3
• Prevention and prosecution of human smuggling and human trafficking
operations; and
• Return, readmission and reintegration of persons who do not have, or no
longer have, authorization to remain in a destination country.
4
INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on binding international law as well as non-legally binding best
practices and principles. Certain international instruments affecting management of
migration have been widely ratified (for example, 145 States have ratified the 1951
Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees). Others have
entered into force with relatively few parties (for example, only 27 States, all principally
source countries of migration, have ratified the UN Convention on the Protection of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families). See appendix I for complete listing of
relevant instruments with their State parties.
1
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, “International Legal Norms and Migration: A Report,” in T. A. Aleinikoff and
V. Chetail, Eds. , Migration and International Legal Norms, The Hague, The Netherlands: Asser Press,
2003, p. 2. See also Louis B. Sohn and Thomas Buergenthal, The Movement of Persons Across Borders,
Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, No. 23, Washington, DC: The American Society of International
Law, 1992 for discussion norms established in international law.
2
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137, entered into force
22 April 1954 and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS
267, entered into force 4 october 1967. Also, see Guy Goodwin-Gill and Kathleen Newland, “Forced
Migration and International Law,” in Aleinikoff, Migration and International Legal Norms, pp. 123-136.
3
Protocol on Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted 15
November 2000, GA Res. 55/25 (Trafficking Protocol), and Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants
by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime, adopted 15 November 2000, GA Res. 55/25 (Smuggling Protocol). See also Vitit Muntarbhorn,
“Combating Migrant Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women: The Normative
Framework Re-Appraised,” in Aleinikoff, Migration and International Legal Norms, pp. 151-166.
4
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, adopted 24 April 1963, 596 UNTS 261, entered into force 19
March 1967
5
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 December 1948, GA Res. 217A (III) and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, entered
into force 23 March 1976. See Gregor Noll, “Return of persons to States of Origin and Third States,” in
Aleinikoff, Migration and International Legal Norms, pp. 61-74.
6
See Kate Jastram, “Family Unity,” in Aleinikoff, Migration and International Legal Norms, pp. 185-201.
7
See Kay Hailbronner, “Nationality,” in Aleinikoff, Migration and International Legal Norms, pp. 80-82.
8
See Walter Kälin, “Human Rights and the Integration of Migrants,” in Aleinikoff, Migration and
International Legal Norms, pp. 271-288.
5
Aleinikoff notes that too often the debate about international migration tries to pit State
authority and interest in regulating migration against the fundamental human rights of
migrants that States cannot abridge. This framework is too rigid and simple, however,
missing the “possibility for cooperative efforts at managing migration in the interest of
both states and migrants”9. In fact, existing international law provides useful
contributions to a normative and legal framework regarding:
Nevertheless, the gaps in international law and norms, particularly related to migration
for family and economic reasons, make State cooperation in managing international flows
of people all the more difficult. This paper reviews the legal framework in these three
areas and identifies gaps that the Global Commission on International Migration may
wish to address.
States possess broad authority to regulate the movement of foreign nationals across their
borders10. Although these authorities are not absolute, as discussed in the next section,
States generally are able to exercise their sovereign powers to determine who will be
admitted and for what period. In support of these powers, States may enact “internal law
and regulations on such matters as passports, admissions, exclusion and expulsion of
aliens and frontier control”11. States vary in the types of laws and regulations adopted,
with some being more restrictive than others are, but all States adopt rules that govern
entry into and exit from their territories.
National security
Even when States recognize the rights of certain foreign nationals to remain in their
territory, concerns about national security often trump any exercise of migrant rights.
Security exceptions may take explicit form, for example, in the form of limitation
clauses, or ‘clawbacks’ and derogation clauses. Clawbacks appear immediately after a
phrase guaranteeing a right, typically allowing exception to the right as long as the
restrictions are “provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order,
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the
9
Aleinikoff, Migration and International Legal Norms, p. 1.
10
See David Martin, “The Authority and Responsibility of States,” in Aleinikoff, Migration and
International Legal Norms, pp. 31-45.
11
Sohn and Buergenthal, Movement of Persons, p. 3.
6
other rights recognized” in the applicable treaty12. Derogations permit States to abrogate
otherwise protected rights in exceptional circumstances. Derogations generally are
temporary, required by the exigencies of the situation and must be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner13. As a measure of the importance of national security exceptions,
states’ needs for security-related information about aliens applying for admission
generally trumps migrant rights, such as the right to privacy, that may otherwise be
protected14.
In developing rules to regulate movements across borders, States have full authority to
apply different laws and regulations, depending on the reason for entry and exit and the
nationality of the persons moving across the border15. In effect, the rules fall into four
categories: citizens leaving the State of their nationality, aliens leaving a foreign State,
citizens returning to the State of their nationality, and aliens seeking admission to the
territory of a foreign State. Often, States treat foreign nationals who are permanent
residents of the country in a manner that falls between the treatment of citizens and other
aliens.
State authority is more constrained in regulating the movement of its own nationals
across its borders than it is in regulating the movement of non-nationals. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), as well as the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), specifies that nationals have the right to leave and re-enter
their countries. Significantly, they do not have the right to enter into another country,
limiting the actual ability of persons to exercise the rights. Moreover, even in this
respect, States have authority under the ICCPR to place reasonable limitations on exit if
related to national security, public order, public health or morals or the proper
administration of justice16. The ICCPR provides, however, that States may not arbitrarily
deny nationals the right to re-enter. The Human Rights Committee held that “there are
few, if any circumstances in which deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country
could be reasonable”17.
States may impose different rules and expectations on foreign nationals based on the
purpose of their entry, with different rules, for example, for persons who are working,
studying, conducting business or touring the country. States may establish special rules
based on treaty relations or traditional or cultural ties that effectively give preference or
greater access to admissions of nationals of certain other States. States are limited,
12
David Fisher, Susan Martin, and Andrew Schoenholtz, “Migration and Security in International Law,” in
Aleinikoff, Migration and International Legal Norms, pp 97-99
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid, p. 99.
15
Sohn and Buergenthal, Movement of Persons, p. 13.
16
Sohn and Buergenthal, Movement of Persons, pp. 6-7; See also Fisher et al. , “Migration and Security in
International Law,” pp. 111-112 (right to exit) and 104-105 (right to enter).
17
Fisher et al. , “Migration and Security in International Law , p. 105.
7
however, in applying entry and exit rules in a manner that discriminates on such grounds
as race, sex, language or religion18.
Generally, States have broad authority to exclude foreign nationals from entering their
territory and expel or deport persons already in their countries19. Grounds for exclusion
and deportation may be similar: public health, criminal convictions or activities, earlier
violations of immigration law, economic reasons, for example, in addition to the national
security grounds discussed previously. Procedures may differ substantially, however, and
States generally provide more rights to persons already in the countries to contest the
deportation or expulsion. This stance is consistent with international law. Article 13 of
the ICCPR provides that aliens lawfully present in a State are entitled to procedural
protections prior to being expelled, including review by a competent authority and the
opportunity to submit reasons against the expulsion. These procedural rights may be
denied, however, if national security so requires20. Clearly, those unlawfully present
would not be entitled to the same level of procedural protection, although many States
recognize that individuals gain equities and rights the longer they are present on their
territory. Moreover, States need to establish a procedure to determine if the alien falls
into a category protected against return (e. g. , persons fearing persecution or torture).
States have broad authority, if not obligation, to represent the interest of their nationals
who visit or reside in other States. Under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
States may establish consular posts in other countries. Consular functions include:
• Protecting the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, both individuals
and bodies corporate, within the limits permitted by international law;
• Helping and assisting nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, of the
sending State;
• Issuing passports and travel documents to nationals of the sending State, and visas
or appropriate documents to persons wishing to travel to the sending State; and
• Representing or arranging appropriate representation for nationals of the sending
State before the tribunals and other authorities of the receiving State …where,
because of absence or any other reason, such nationals are unable at the proper
time to assume the defense of their rights and interests21.
18
Ibid. , p. 17.
19
Martin, “The Authority and Responsibility of States,” p. 34. The authority to expel or deport its own
citizens is far more limited.
20
Fisher et al. , “Migration and Security in International Law,” p. 117.
21
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Article 5.
8
RIGHTS OF PERSONS MOVING ACROSS BORDERS
Non-nationals enjoy all of the unalienable rights applicable in international law22. The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) defines such basic rights of
all persons as: the right to life, liberty and security; the right not to be held in slavery or
servitude; the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment; the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or
exile; the right to marry and to found a family. Article 2 specifies that such rights are
provided without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
22
This section discusses five of the seven core human rights instruments. The Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and the Convention
Against Torture are discussed more fully below.
23
Article II.
24
Article II.
9
experience racial discrimination. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
includes several articles useful in protecting migrant children (for example, Article 11
proscribes trafficking of children under 18 years old; Article 19 requires States to protect
children from violence, abuse, neglect, exploitation and sexual abuse).
Each of these instruments has a mechanism through which State parties report on their
progress in observing the convention standards. The Treaty Monitoring Bodies (TMB) to
which State parties report are the Human Rights Committee (which monitors
implementation of the ICCPR), the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights,
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Committee on the Rights of the Child.
A recent study published by the International Catholic Migration Commission and
December 18 vzw found that about half of the conclusions of these bodies reference
migrant-related issues25. In some cases, the TMBs express concern over violations,
particularly discriminatory treatment of non-nationals, racism and xenophobia, absence of
labour protections, and human trafficking and other exploitation, particularly of women
and children26. The TBMs also report positive steps taken by State parties, including
legislation to protect the rights of non-nationals, to regulate the actions of labour
recruiters and employers of foreign workers, to regularise the status of those in irregular
status, and to protect persons who have been trafficked27. The report notes, however, that
50 percent of State reports do not include references to protection of migrant rights and
identifies a number of issues covered in the Migrant Rights Convention but not in the
other human rights instruments. The conclusions on migrant rights are often vague and
provide too little guidance on steps that should be taken better to protect the rights of
migrants28.
Beyond these universal rights, the rights of persons moving across borders vary
depending on the purposes of their movement and the circumstances they will face upon
return to their home countries. The following sections discuss the rights of three
categories of persons: migrant workers, including both legal and irregular migrants;
refugees and displaced persons; and trafficked and smuggled persons. The section further
discusses the right to family unity as it affects migrants. Also included in this section is a
discussion of the rights of individuals to a nationality and the related issue of
statelessness.
25
Isabelle Slinckx, The UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies and Migrant Workers: a Samizdat, International
Catholic Migration Commission and December 18 vzw, November 2004.
26
Ibid. , pp. 14-16.
27
Ibid. , pp. 12-14.
28
Ibid. , p. 21.
10
Migrant workers
ILO conventions
Other relevant ILO conventions are the Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory
Labour (No. 29), the Convention Concerning Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105), the
Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100), and the Discrimination (Employment and
Occupation) Convention (No. 100).
The Convention defines the rights of migrant workers under two main headings: “The
human rights of migrants workers and members of their families” (Part III), which
reaffirms the human rights of all migrants regardless of their legal status, and “Other
29
State parties are Azerbaijan, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde,
Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Kyrgyzstan, Lybian Arab Jamahiriya,
Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, Senegal, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Tajikstan, Timor Leste, Turkey,
Uganda, and Uruguay.
30
Some of the State parties do receive migrants and serve as a transit point for migration but they are
primarily source countries. Mexico, for example, receives migrants from Central America, but it remains
primarily a source country of millions of migrants residing in the United States.
11
rights of migrant workers” (Part IV) which sets out additional rights applicant only to
migrant workers in a regular situation. Documented migrants are defined as those
“authorized to enter, to stay and engage in a remunerated activity in the State of
employment pursuant to the law of that State and to international agreements to which
that State is a party” (Article 5).
A number of provisions focus on the right of all migrants, including those in irregular
situations. Article 10 prohibits torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. Article 11 prohibits slavery or servitude and forced or compulsory labour.
Article 12 provides for freedom of thought, religion and conscience, Article 13 provides
for the right of expression, Article 14 prohibits arbitrary or unlawful interference with
privacy or attacks on honour and reputation and Article 15 prohibits arbitrary denial of
property. Article 16 entitles migrants “to effective protection by the State against
violence, physical injury, threats, and intimidation, whether by public officials or by
private individuals, groups or institutions”. Articles 17 to 21 pertain to the rights of
migrants who have been detained by State authorities for immigration and criminal
offences. Article 22 prohibits collective expulsion and sets out the rights of migrants in
expulsion proceedings. Article 23 provides the right of all migrants to seek the protection
and assistance of the consular or diplomatic officials of their countries of origin.
A number of other articles focus on the social and economic status of migrants. Article
25 entitles all migrant workers to “enjoy treatment not less favourable than that which
applies to nationals of the State of employment in respect of remuneration” and other
conditions of work. Article 26 pertains to the right to join trade unions. Article 27,
regarding social security, recognises that States may limit benefits to migrant workers but
encourages States “to examine the possibility of reimbursing interested persons the
amount of contributions made by them with respect to that benefit on the basis of the
treatment granted to nationals who are in similar circumstances”. Article 28 sets out the
right of migrants and their families to health care “that is urgently required for the
preservation of their life or the avoidance of irreparable harm to their health”, specifying
that emergency medical care should not be refused to those in irregular status. Article 29
discusses the rights of the children of migrants to a name, birth registration, a nationality.
Article 30 provides a right to basic education, which cannot be denied because of the
child’s or his or her parents’ irregular status. Article 31 protects the cultural identity of
migrants and members of their family.
Part IV of the MRC includes provisions related to the treatment and rights of documented
migrant workers. As examples, Article 43 provides equal treatment of documented
migrants with nationals with respect to access to education, vocational training, housing,
and health services. [Article 45 confers the same rights for members of families].
Article 50 provides that in case of death or dissolution of marriage, State shall favourably
consider granting authorization to stay to the families of documented migrants. Part V of
the Convention spells out rights of specific categories of migrant workers, including
frontier workers, seasonal workers, and self-employed workers.
12
Although the rights provided by the Convention apply to both men and women migrants
and Article 45 specifically addresses the equality of the rights, the Convention fails to
address expressly many needs that are particular to women. Many migrant women work
in non-regulated sectors of the economy, including domestic work, which leaves them
vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Guaranteeing equal treatment with nationals will
not help migrant workers in such situations because the regulatory structure is weak for
both populations31.
In addition to spelling out the rights of migrant workers, the MRC also requires
cooperation by States Parties in managing movements of persons. Part VI addresses the
development of sound, equitable, humane and lawful conditions for migration. Article 64
says States Parties shall as appropriate consult and cooperate to promote sound, equitable
and humane conditions, stating that “due regard shall be paid not only to labour needs
and resources, but also to the social, economic, cultural and other needs of migrant
workers and members of their families involved, as well as to the consequences of such
migration for the communities concerned”. Article 67 provides that States Parties shall
cooperate in the “adoption of measures regarding the orderly return of migrant workers
and members of their families when they decide to return or their authorization of
residence or employment expires or when they are in the State of employment in an
irregular situation”. Article 68 requires States Parties to collaborate with a view to
preventing and eliminating illegal or clandestine movements and employment of migrant
workers in an irregular situation. Article 69 requires States Parties to take appropriate
measures to ensure that, when migrant workers and members of their families are within
their territory in an irregular situation, that such a situation does not persist.
31
See S. Hune, “Migrant Women in the Context of the International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families,” International Migration Review, 25/4,
1991 and R. Cholewinski, Migrant Workers in International Human Rights Law: Their Protection in
Countries of Employment, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
.
13
submit written information on matters that fall within the convention’s scope for the
Committee’s consideration.
Article 76 sets forth a process for a State Party to complain about another State Party’s
failure to fulfil its obligations. Only States that are parties to the Convention and that
have declared that they recognize the competence of the Committee may make
complaints to the Committee. Article 77 provides that individuals of State Parties may
bring complaints against State Parties only under certain circumstances. They are not
involved in some other international settlement mechanism; they have exhausted
domestic remedies; the State Party against which the complaint has been made has
recognized the competence of the Committee to hear individual complaints; and 10 state
parties declare that they recognize the competence of the Committee to receive and
consider communications from or on behalf of individuals.
Only 27 countries have ratified the Migrant Workers Convention, with no major
receiving country among them. Why are States reluctant to ratify the Convention? The
obstacles are both practical and political. On the practical side, the MWC is extensive
and complex, raising technical questions as well as financial obligations on State
parties32. For example, Article 65 of the Convention requires States Parties “to maintain
appropriate services to deal with questions concerning international migration of workers
and members of their families. Their functions shall include, inter alia:
Further, although almost all States have some emigration and immigration, States with
relatively low levels of migration may see no particular reasons to ratify the Convention.
On the political level, the Convention raises basic questions about State sovereignty,
particularly regarding the capacity of States to deter irregular migration. Even though the
Convention requires States Parties to cooperate in curbing irregular migration and
32
Cholewinski, pp. 199-200.
14
returning those without authorization to remain in a destination State, many receiving
countries are concerned that the rights granted to irregular migrants will hinder their
ability to control such movements. Some States are concerned that specifying the rights
of irregular migrants will serve as a magnet, drawing them to their territory. A Dutch
government paper on the Convention explains the reluctance of the Netherlands to ratify:
“The granting of certain social and economic rights on the part of the state is considered
to be more of an encouragement for illegal residence and employment than a deterrent”33.
As one expert notes:
Even with regard to documented migrants, “the Convention’s central concept of non-
discrimination interferes with explorations of other forms of temporary immigration in
which this principle would not be fully abided by”35. In effect, States often see a trade-
off between the number of migrants admitted and the generosity of rights bestowed upon
them. Providing rights equivalent to nationals, particularly when such rights entail
financial obligations on the part of receiving States, may severely limit the number of
migrants to be admitted. Otherwise, States fear, there will be a public backlash against
migrants who are perceived as being costly to taxpayers. Even when there is little factual
basis to such charges, and migrants can be seen to be contributing to the economy,
publics may perceive migrants to be competitors for limited jobs and resources.
Some States see no need to ratify the Convention, arguing that other human rights
instruments already provide protection of the most fundamental rights outlined in the
Migrant Rights Convention. Or, they argue, national laws provide adequate protection.
Other States, however, see the MRC as promoting rights not specified elsewhere and not
necessarily in their national interest. The Dutch paper discussed above holds that the
MRC “contains a number of new provisions that were not previously included in broadly
ratified treaties36. In particular, the Dutch paper argues, the Convention grants a right to
33
“The UN International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families of 1991,” prepared for the Global Commission on International Migration, January 2005, p. 3.
34
Linda S. Bosniak, State Sovereignty, Human Rights and the New U. N. Migrant Workers Convention,
86 American Society for International Law, Proc. 623 (1992)
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid.
15
family reunification not only to legally resident migrants but also to illegally resident
ones37.
Advocacy at the national and local levels appears to be the most likely inducement to
State ratification. To the extent that there is a vocal and well-organised constituency in
support of migrant rights, States are more likely to overcome their concerns about the
Convention. States may also re-think ratification if the provisions in the Convention
relating to inter-state cooperation in combating irregular migration can be operationalised
into concrete actions. States may be more willing to extend rights to migrants if they
believe they are able to effectively control who and how many persons migrate.
In the meantime, advocacy to incorporate migrant rights into regional conventions and
agreements and, particularly, national legislation and policies may be a more effective
way to protect these rights, as discussed below. In this respect, the work of the Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Migrant Workers has been useful in identifying problems
and best practices in overcoming them.
37
Ibid.
38
International Migrant Rights Watch Committee, Achieving Dignity: Campaigners’ Handbook for the
Migrant Rights Convention, 19 August 1998 (http://www. migrantsrights. org/LAYHNDBK. INDEX. htm)
16
(a) To request and receive information from all relevant sources, including
migrants themselves, on violations of the human rights of migrants and their
families;
(b) To formulate appropriate recommendations to prevent and remedy violations
of the human rights of migrants, wherever they may occur;
(c) To promote the effective application of relevant international norms and
standards on the issue;
(d) To recommend actions and measures applicable at the national, regional and
international levels to eliminate violations of the human rights of migrants;
(e) To take into account a gender perspective when requesting and analysing
information, as well as to give special attention to the occurrence of multiple
discrimination and violence against migrant women.
The Special Rapporteur has issued reports each year since 2000. Based on information
she receives about actual and potential human rights abuses of migrants, she sends urgent
appeals to governments. The information generally comes from nongovernmental
organizations or directly from migrants. The Special Rapporteur has referenced sending
appeals to the Governments of the Argentine Republic, Bahrain, Canada, Indonesia,
Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Tongo, Turkey, the United Arab
Emirates and the United States, drawing their urgent attention to information received on
alleged violations of the human rights of migrants”39. These urgent appeals generally
involved reports of executions, detention, deportation, and violence against migrants. In
some cases, the appeals were made jointly with the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions.
Regional conventions offer rights to migrant workers. The European Convention on the
Legal Status of Migrant Workers focuses primarily on migrants in legal work situations.
A minority of States in Europe have ratified it. The European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) and the European Social Charter (ESC) are broader instruments. The
39
Report of the Special Rapporteur, Ms. Gabriela Rodríguez Pizarro, submitted pursuant to Commission
on Human Rights resolution 2000/48, E/CN. 4/2001/83 and Report of the Special Rapporteur, Ms.
Gabriela Rodríguez Pizarro, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/52,
E/CN. 4/2002/94
17
ECHR, focusing on political and civil rights, affords the same absolute (that is,
nonderogable) rights to foreign nationals as to European nationals, including the right to
life and to be free from torture. The ESC covers social, economic and cultural rights.
For example, it provides equal access to social housing for foreigners; accessible,
effective health care facilities for the entire population; prohibition of forced labour; the
right to social security, social welfare and social services; a limited right to family
reunion; procedural safeguards in the event of expulsion; and the right of women and
men to equal treatment and equal opportunities in employment. The ESC guarantees to
all nationals and foreigners legally resident and/or working that all the rights set out in the
Charter apply regardless of race, sex, age, colour, language, religion, opinions, national
origin, social background, state of health or association with a national minority.
For most migrant workers, national laws and procedures remain the principal support or
barrier to the exercise of rights. These laws vary significantly, however, in the extent to
which they protect the rights of migrant workers. A range of activities will help migrant
workers better protect their rights. These include ‘know your rights’ training programs
for workers who migrate. The better-informed workers are prior to migrating, the better
able they are to assert their rights. This is particularly the case for contract labourers who
may have little idea of the wages or working conditions to which they are entitled.
Similarly, workers migrating to join family members need to know and understand their
rights, both in relationship to their spouses or children (particularly regarding domestic
violence) and in relationship to their immigration status. Access to language training
courses in destination countries will also help migrant workers to learn of and assert their
rights when employers or family members violate them. Often, highly restrictive and
detrimental contracts signed by migrant workers are in a language they do not
understand40.
40
Migrant Workers: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Migrant Workers, U. N. ESCOR, 60 Sess. ,
Agenda Item 14(a), 40, U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/2004/76.
18
Singapore provides a telephone number which migrant domestic workers can call free of
charge to obtain information on their rights and on the procedure for changing
employers41. In Costa Rica, the Ministry of Employment carries out inspections and can
receive complaints from female migrant domestic workers. The National Institute of
Women has set up training programmes for female migrant domestic workers working in
the country42. Training for government officials, employers and others as to the rights of
migrant workers and their obligations under international and national law will also help
curb abuses.
When abuses occur, legal representation for migrant workers can help them fight against
discrimination, sexual harassment, lost wages and other violations of their labour rights.
Consular protection can extend to covering the costs of such representation. The
Philippines embassies, for example, will pay legal costs if a case alleging abuse goes to
court. Destination countries also provide legal aid. Destination countries also pay costs
of representation. In Bahrain, for example, if a contract dispute involving a domestic
worker cannot be resolved and goes to court, the court will appoint a lawyer for the
migrant worker43. At times, public interest or class action lawsuits may help ensure that
an entire class of workers migrants obtain their rights. Nongovernmental organisations
and trade unions play important roles in providing legal support in such cases.
Associations of migrant workers can be useful rallying points for identifying problems
and seeking legal redress.
Finally, programmes that provide shelter and social services to migrant workers who have
experienced abuse are essential to protecting their rights. Migrant workers who decide to
return home after escaping abusive conditions may also need assistance in repatriation
and reintegration. Nongovernmental organizations, religious institutions and trade unions
provide such assistance in a number of countries.
Consular protection can play an important role in ensuring that migrant workers do not
face abusive situations. Consular officers can monitor the security of migrant workers in
potentially vulnerable positions, using their diplomatic positions to engage the host
country in interceding in favor of the migrant worker. Too often, however, there are too
few consular offices and officials to be able to carry out these activities.
Refugees
International legal standards for the protection of forced migrants are in refugee, human
rights and humanitarian law. The most developed of these frameworks applies to
refugees as defined by the 1951 UN Convention —that is, persons who have a well-
founded fear of persecution—and persons who would be tortured if they were returned to
their home countries. There is a growing international consensus, however, about the
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
19
rights of persons who have been displaced by conflict and other situations that are likely
to pose serious harm if return takes place.
The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees emerged in the early days of
the Cold War particularly to resolve the situation of some hundreds of thousands of
refugees who still remained displaced by World War II and fascist/Nazi persecution44. At
its core, this treaty substitutes the protection of the international community (in the form
of a host government) for that of an unable or unwilling sovereign. The treaty limits this
stand-in protection to those who were unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the
protection of their home countries because of a “well-founded fear of persecution based
on their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social
group”. The Convention had time limits (refugees displaced by 1951) and geographic
restrictions (Europe) that were lifted in the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees.
The Convention drafters recognized that among refugee populations would be found
individuals whose actions made them undeserving of international protection. The so-
called “exclusion” clauses of the Convention set forth two major kinds of such
individuals—human rights violators and serious criminals. Thus, those who have
committed a crime against peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a serious
non-political crime are excluded from international protection. That is, they are not to be
granted refugee status and its attendant benefits.
Separately, there are two exceptions to a state’s non-refoulement obligation under Article
33. States may return to a country of persecution an individual regarded “as a danger to
44
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The State of the World’s Refugees 2000:
Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 17.
45
According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, “There is no universally accepted definition of
“persecution,” and various attempts to formulate such a definition have met with little success. From
Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, it may be inferred that a threat to life or freedom on account of race,
religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group is always persecution.
Other serious violations of human rights--for the same reasons--would also constitute persecution. “ See
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, (Geneva: UNHCR, January 1992), para. 51.
20
the security of the country” of refuge, as well as someone who “having been convicted by
a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of
that country”46.
The Convention also sets out the rights of refugees who have been admitted into the
territory of another country. Certain fundamental human rights such as freedom of
religion (Article 4) and access to courts (Article 16) are guaranteed to be at least those
accorded to the citizens of the state hosting the refugee. Thus if legal assistance is
provided to citizens, the same must be accorded to refugees (Article 16(2)). Elementary
education is also accorded to refugees as it is to citizens (Article 22(1)). Refugees
lawfully residing in a host country are guaranteed public relief in this way as well (Article
23). In addition, the Convention cannot be applied in a discriminatory way regarding
race, religion, and country of origin (Article 3).
Many important rights accorded recognized refugees, however, do not need to match
those of citizens. Rights as fundamental as the right of association (Article 15) and
freedom of movement (Article 26) are accorded to refugees to the same degree that they
are accorded to nationals of other countries. Rights regarding employment (Article 17),
property (Article 13), public education beyond elementary school (Article 22(2)), and
housing (Article 21) are also accorded to refugees in a manner no less favourable than
those accorded to citizens of other countries. However, with regard to wage-earning
employment, refugees are accorded national treatment after three years of residence in the
host country (Article 17(2)(a)). Certain legal matters are left completely to the host state.
States are encouraged to facilitate the naturalization of refugees, thought they are not
required to match any naturalization rights provided to other non-citizens (Article 34).
Conflict-induced displacement
The 1951 Refugee Convention’s focus on persecution as the cause of forced migration
limits its applicability47. The causes of flight of most refugees are war and civil strife48.
In recognition of the actual forced movements occurring regularly in Africa, the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa in 1969. While acknowledging the UN Refugee
Convention as the basic and universal instrument regarding the protection of refugees, the
OAU Convention broadened the definition and set out other important protection
provisions. In addition to protecting one who flees persecution, this regional treaty
protects an individual who “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination
or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of
46
UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 33(2), July 28, 1951.
47
See Louise W. Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time: The Work of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, 1951-1972 (Metuchen, N. J. : Scarecrow Press, 1975).
48
James Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991), 10.
21
origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek
refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality”49.
In a similar vein, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees expanded the definition of
protected refugees in the Latin American region. Like the OAU definition, it supports the
1951 Convention and adds protection to those who have fled their country “because their
lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign
aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances
that have seriously disturbed public order”. More recently, the forty-five-member state
Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization adopted the OAU refugee definition in its
revision of the Bangkok Principles on the Status and Treatment of Refugees50. As with
the Latin American expansion of the refugee definition, the Bangkok Principles are
declaratory in nature.
The United States and European nations have developed more limited policies on
protecting civil war refugees and others covered by the OAU Convention and the
Cartagena Declaration. In 1990, the United States adopted legislation granting
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to persons fleeing armed conflict and natural disasters.
While this type of protection is established by statute, Congress gave the Attorney
General significant discretion in determining which nationals qualify for TPS, and these
officials have exercised their discretion by selecting only some of the many countries
experiencing conflict for this status. Most importantly, even when the Attorney General
provides TPS to certain nationals, this status is limited to those who have already reached
the U. S. at the time of the Attorney General’s proclamation. On limited occasions,
however, an Attorney General has moved the qualifying date forward to allow those
nationals who arrived after the initial qualifying date to become eligible for TPS. Except
for a belated use as the civil wars in Central America were winding down in the early
1990s, the numbers provided this type of temporary protection have been relatively small.
Those protected under TPS are allowed to work and attend public school but are
generally not eligible for public assistance51. TPS status does not provide for family
reunification. It is awarded on a group basis. The United States does not offer any
complementary humanitarian status in individual determinations, though experts have
proposed such policies52.
49
1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, UNTS No. 14
691.
50
Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization Resolution 40/3, June 24, 2001, New Delhi.
51
Susan Martin, Andrew I. Schoenholtz and Deborah Waller Meyers, “Temporary Protection: Towards a
New Regional and Domestic Framework,” 12 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 543, 1998.
52
Martin, Schoenholtz and Waller Meyers, “Temporary Protection,” 569-570.
22
persons (Directive)53. The protection is granted in situations of mass influx if the
Council, upon recommendation by the Commission and taking into account reception
capacities of the Member States, so decides by a qualified majority. Temporary
protection may last up to a maximum of three years and obliges Member States to grant
beneficiaries a residence permit, employment authorization, access to suitable
accommodation, social welfare and medical assistance, access to education for those
under the age of 18, and nuclear family reunification54. The Directive requires States to
allow beneficiaries to lodge an asylum application, but allows States to suspend the
examination of such applications until after the end of temporary protection55. According
to a leading expert, the Directive is, in principle, compatible with the requirements of
international refugee law, although much will depend on the quality of the asylum
procedure when temporary protection ends and most beneficiaries can return home in
safety and with dignity56.
Torture victims
State parties to the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) commit themselves not to return a person
“where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subject to torture (Art. 3)”. A similar provision is included in the European Convention
53
Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in
the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and measures promoting a balance of efforts between
Member states in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, O. J. 2001 L 212/12.
54
Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15.
55
Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001, Article 17.
56
Walter Kalin, Temporary Protection in the EC: Refugee Law, Human Rights and the Temptations of
Pragmatism, 44 German Yearbook of International Law 202, 220 (2001).
57
UNHCR, Population Data Unit, Asylum applications and refugee status determination in selected
European countries, 2000-2002, Table 2 (20 February 2004).
58
Id.
59
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and
status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need
international protection and the content of the protection granted.
23
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which has been interrupted to prohibit the
return to a State where there is a “real risk” that the person will be subject to inhuman or
degrading treatment and punishment60. Unlike the Refugee Convention’s refoulement
provision, CAT contains no exceptions on the basis of national security.
While the norms and international legal frameworks are well accepted, serious problems
of implementation continue. These legal frameworks must be seen in the context of
growing confusion about the nexus between asylum and other forms of migration. No
international treaty provides for a right to asylum—only a right to seek asylum61.
Determining who is a refugee, as compared to an economic migrant, can be an extremely
difficult task, particularly when individuals migrate for a complex variety of reasons. For
example, an individual may leave his or her home because of persecution or life-
endangering conflict, but he or she may choose a destination because of family
connections or employment opportunities or, even, the decision may be made for the
individual by a smuggler.
States have adopted various policies to deter asylum seekers from reaching their territory
or to shift the burden for making refugee status determinations to other States. Policies
that fall short of actual refoulement nevertheless deter bonafide refugees from seeking
protection62. These include visa restrictions imposed on nationals of certain States,
sanctions against carriers that transport persons without proper documentation, safe third
country and safe country of origin provisions through which States return asylum seekers
without hearing their applications, transfer of asylum seekers interdicted on the high seas
to processing centres in other countries, expedited processing provisions that turn away
certain applicants (those judged to have no credible claim or a manifestly unfounded
claim) without benefit of a full asylum hearing, and mandatory detention of asylum
seekers.
States and forced migrants will benefit when asylum systems provide for meaningful
access, are operated fairly and efficiently, and minimize abuse. National and regional
approaches based on the OAU Convention definition of a refugee are the best ways to
ensure legal protection for the vast majority of today’s refugees who flee conflict and
other forms of serious harm. Finally, to help ensure the effective protection of refugees
in their region of origin, the international community should find ways to get important
60
Aleinikoff, Migration and International Legal Norms, p. 13.
61
Attempts to secure a right to asylum in the 1960’s and 1970’s were rejected by the United Nations
Conference on Territorial Asylum in 1977. Given the lack of consensus on this issue, the Conference
simply recommended that the General Assembly consider its reconvening at a suitable time. The
Conference has never been reconvened. 61 Sovereign states have consistently chosen to retain their
discretion over asylum.
62
The policies sometimes include actual refoulement. The US Supreme Court in Haitian Refugee Center
versus Sales determined that the government could return Haitians directly to Haiti, without access to a
refugee determination, if the Haitians were interdicted on the high seas.
24
refugee receiving states to become parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967
Protocol.
The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air,
both of which supplement the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime, went into force in December 2003 and January 2004, respectively.
Within a few years of their adoption, the trafficking and smuggling protocols have
garnished considerable support, with more than 100 signatories and 67 and 59 parties,
respectively.
The Smuggling Protocol requires States to adopt measures to criminalize smuggling and
to prevent smuggling (Article 7, 8, 11, 15), requires States to preserve and protect the
rights of migrants who have been smuggled (Article 16) and requires States to facilitate
the return of migrants (Article 18). These instruments require international cooperation
in combating smuggling and trafficking, an issue that will be further discussed below.
The adoption of separate protocols on trafficking and smuggling reflects the need to
clearly distinguish these two activities. Whilst undocumented migrants willingly accept
to pay and take risks to be transported across borders in search of better life prospects,
trafficked persons are victims of criminal groups. Yet, the sometimes overlapping nature
of trafficking in humans, labour migration into exploitative situations, and debt bondage
to pay off smuggling fees calls for a careful use of these terms. Persons might volunteer
to migrate but then find themselves subject to violence, coercion and exploitation after
leaving their home communities. Trafficking is defined by such exploitation, coercion
and abuse, not the original motivation for migration. For example, migrants may agree to
pay smugglers to bring them across borders. If they are unable to pay all of the costs, the
smugglers may “sell” the migrants to businesses that cover the fees in exchange for
indentured labour. This debt bondage can amount to virtual slavery, particularly for
63
The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.
25
women and children forced into sexually exploitive occupations. Such a person has been
trafficked, even if she initially consented to the smuggling arrangement.
Trafficking and smuggling must be addressed at three levels. First is the supply of
trafficked and smuggled persons. Second is the demand side—those who ultimately use
or benefit from the services provided by trafficked or smuggled persons. Third are the
traffickers and smugglers themselves as well as the corrupt officials who enable them to
operate with impunity.
The Trafficking Protocol focuses most concretely on the third element, particularly the
prosecution of traffickers. Yet, the Protocol recognizes that there is need to balance
crime prevention/prosecution with protection of the rights of the trafficked persons. The
Protocol states a purpose of “protecting and assisting victims of trafficking, “with full
respect for their human rights” (Art 2). State parties are to take steps to protect the
physical safety, privacy and identity of victims, assist them in legal proceedings, and
consider measures to provide for the physical, psychological and social recovery of
survivors (Art 6). It also urges States to consider adopting laws or regulations that permit
victims to remain in the territory for a temporary or permanent basis (Art 7).
The Protocol recognizes that prosecution and protection of victims are mutually
supportive goals. The testimony of trafficking survivors is generally invaluable to the
prosecution of cases against traffickers. Trafficking is a difficult crime to investigate and
highly dependent on the willingness of victims to cooperate with law enforcement. Such
cooperation can be highly dangerous for the trafficked persons, however. They will be
too afraid to testify unless there are effective ways to prevent retaliation against them or
their families at home.
The United Nations recommends that law enforcement officials work in partnership with
non-governmental organizations to help ensure greater protection of the victims of
traffickers. Law enforcement should also implement measures to “ensure that ‘rescue’
operations do not further harm the rights and dignity of trafficked persons. Such
operations should only take place once appropriate and adequate procedures for
responding to the needs of trafficked persons released in this way have been put in
place”64.
64
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights
and Human Trafficking, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the
Economic and Social Council, E/2002/68/Add. 1
26
labour inspectorates, trade unions, ethnic associations and other parts of civil society
must be involved in the identification of women and children who have been trafficked.
Laws in some countries provide for temporary or permanent legal status to trafficking
victims. Often the legislation requires cooperation with law enforcement agencies in the
capture or prosecution of the traffickers. In some cases, family members still in the
country of origin will be admitted to the country of destination if the traffickers are likely
to retaliate against them. The United States Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act, enacted in 2000, in addition to increasing criminal penalties for
traffickers, provides immigration benefits to victims of severe trafficking who cooperate
in the prosecution of traffickers, including a special visa and access to benefits granted to
refugees. A number of European countries have similar provisions that grant residency
status to victims who cooperate with law enforcement. Such countries as Germany and
the Netherlands have official ‘reflection periods’ during which victims are given time to
decide whether to cooperate in the prosecution of their traffickers. In 2004, the European
Union adopted a Council Directive on short-term residence permits to those victims who
cooperate with the authorities.
Nationality
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that “everyone has the right to a
nationality”. In general, citizenship is confirmed by birth (jus solis), by descent (jus
sanguinis) and/or by naturalization. Many countries permit a combination of these
mechanisms to grant citizenship, but some countries rely primarily on birth or on descent,
and some make naturalization very difficult to obtain for most foreign nationals.
Although most persons are citizens of a single country, international migration creates
exceptions to the rule. In one direction, migration produces opportunities for multiple
nationalities. For example, an immigrant might naturalize, becoming a citizen of her new
country, but she will not necessarily lose the citizenship of her country of birth. If her
country of origin provides for citizenship by descent, and her country of residence
provides citizenship by birth on its territory, her children might be dual nationals. If the
child’s father is a citizen of a third country that offers citizenship by descent, the children
might have citizenship in three countries. The reverse can happen as well. If the country
of the migrant’s birth only provides citizenship to those born on its territory, and the
country in which she gives birth provides citizenship only by descent, her children might
be stateless unless she is able to naturalize. The Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness mandates that State parties grant nationality to persons born in their
territories who would otherwise be stateless, but only 26 States have become parties to
this instrument65.
65
Aleinikoff, Migration and International Legal Norms, p. 21.
27
Naturalization policies differ significantly by country. A study of the naturalization laws
of 25 countries66 found the required period of residence for immigrants prior to
naturalization varied from as little as three years to as many as ten years. In some States,
the required period of residence is reduced for spouses of citizens. Ten countries required
that naturalization applicants show they were of good character; and seven required
renunciation of prior citizenship. A majority of countries required that naturalizing
citizens demonstrate knowledge of their new country’s language, with a smaller number
also requiring knowledge of the history of the new country. Sufficient income
requirements were found in ten countries.
The issue of multiple nationalities has come to the fore as increasing numbers of persons
hold the citizenship of more than one country. Increased mobility creates the potential
for dual nationality as cross-national marriages occurs and children are born with the
nationality of both parents. Increased migration has also created greater likelihood of
dual nationality when persons who naturalize obtain new citizenship, often without
relinquishing their old nationality. Further, State practice has shifted from a general
reluctance to permit dual nationality to recognition of its inevitability and, even, benefits.
As a growing and relatively new issue for many States, “sorting out rights and duties for
dual nationals would be an appropriate area for interstate deliberation and cooperation”67.
Family unity
The right to family unity remains a controversial issue. The right is enshrined in
international law; Article 16(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states
clearly that: “the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by the society and the state”. Splitting families apart deprives each
member of the fundamental right to respect of his or her family life. Whether the
principle of family unity requires a State to admit the non-national family members of
someone residing legally on its territory is the point of contention. Many States do, in
fact, permit the entry of spouses and minor children to join a lawfully resident immigrant,
66
Patrick Weil, Access to citizenship: A comparison of twenty-five nationality laws, in T. A. Aleinikoff
and D. Klusmeyer, eds. , Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices, Washington, D. C. :
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001.
67
Aleinikoff and Chetail, International Legal Norms and Migration, p.
28
but many also place serious restrictions of the ability of families to enter. Contract labour
arrangements, in particular, often preclude admission of family members. Admission
rules often restrict family reunification for asylum seekers and those granted temporary
protection. Often, only after obtaining asylum can applicants apply for family
reunification.
States also adopt rules to guard against marriage fraud. The European Union defines a
“marriage of convenience” as a:
Where there is well-founded reason to believe the marriage fits this definition, Member
States may be required to interview the spouses separately to validate the application for
admission. To combat the potential for fraud in marriage cases, the United States offers
conditional status to the immigrating spouse in recent marriages and reviews the case
after two years to make sure that the marriage is valid before granting permanent status.
Arranged and forced marriages also are receiving scrutiny in a number of countries. Of
particular concern are marriages between or with minors. The European Union
determined “In order to ensure better integration and to prevent forced marriages Member
States may require the sponsor and his/her spouse to be of a minimum age, and at
maximum 21 years, before the spouse is able to join him/her” (EU Council Directive
2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, Art. 4).
Denmark requires that both spouses be at least 24 years of age before the non-Danish
29
spouse can apply for admission; the spouse in Denmark must have been residing in the
country for at least eight years and demonstrate that the couple has a stronger attachment
to Denmark than to non-Danish spouse’s country of origin. Such policies hold the
potential for harming those in bonafide marriages while trying to address concerns about
forced marriages.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
A weak but growing component of international law defines areas in which States agree
to cooperate in the management of international migration68. This section discusses three
quite different examples of international cooperation: state to state cooperation in the
prevention of human smuggling and human trafficking; responsibility-sharing in
protecting and assisting forced migrants, and State commitments under Mode 4 of the
General Agreement on Trade with regard to admission of persons providing trade in
services.
State Parties to the Protocols on Human Trafficking and Human Smuggling make
explicit commitments to cooperate with other States in combating smuggling and
trafficking. Cooperation in the exchange of information is emphasized in both Protocols.
For example, Article 10 of the Trafficking Protocol specifies that:
68
The institutional venues for promoting inter-State cooperation in managing migration are discussed in a
companion paper by Kathleen Newland at the Migration Policy Institute. The past decade has seen the
growth of regional consultative mechanisms in which States convene to discuss international migration
within and to their regions. More recently, the Berne Initiative, a State sponsored process, has sought to
develop consensus on best practices internationally in managing international migration.
30
Article 13 provides that “at the request of another State Party, a State Party shall, in
accordance with its domestic law, verify within a reasonable time the legitimacy and
validity of travel or identity documents issued or purported to have been issued in its
name and suspected of being used for trafficking in persons”.
(a) Embarkation and destination points, as well as routes, carriers and means of
transportation, known to be or suspected of being used by an organized criminal
group engaged in conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol;
(b) The identity and methods of organizations or organized criminal groups
known to be or suspected of being engaged in conduct set forth in article 6 of this
Protocol;
(c) The authenticity and proper form of travel documents issued by a State Party
and the theft or related misuse of blank travel or identity documents;
(d) Means and methods of concealment and transportation of persons, the
unlawful alteration, reproduction or acquisition or other misuse of travel or
identity documents used in conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol and ways
of detecting them;
(e) Legislative experiences and practices and measures to prevent and combat the
conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol; and
(f) Scientific and technological information useful to law enforcement, so as to
enhance each other’s ability to prevent, detect and investigate the conduct set
forth in article 669 of this Protocol and to prosecute those involved.
In Article 14, Parties to the Smuggling Protocol also commit “cooperate with each other
and with competent international organizations, non-governmental organizations, other
relevant organizations and other elements of civil society”. Training should cover such
areas as: improving the security and quality of travel documents; recognizing and
detecting fraudulent travel or identity documents; gathering criminal intelligence, relating
in particular to the identification of organized criminal groups, the methods used to
transport smuggled migrants, the misuse of travel or identity documents and the means of
concealment used in the smuggling of migrants; improving procedures for detecting
smuggled persons at conventional and non-conventional points of entry and exit; and the
humane treatment of migrants and the protection of their rights as set forth in the
Protocol.
The Protocols break new ground in identifying areas of cooperation that go well beyond
law enforcement to prevention and protection of the victims of these forms of organized
crime. Article 15 of the Smuggling Protocol commits States to “cooperate in the field of
public information for the purpose of preventing potential migrants from falling victim to
organized criminal groups”. It also specifies “Each State Party shall promote or
strengthen, as appropriate, development programmes and cooperation at the national,
69
Article 6 specifies smuggling activities that should be considered as criminal offenses.
31
regional and international levels, taking into account the socio-economic realities of
migration and paying special attention to economically and socially depressed areas, in
order to combat the root socio-economic causes of the smuggling of migrants, such as
poverty and underdevelopment”. Similarly, Article 9 of the Trafficking Protocol states
“States Parties shall take or strengthen measures, including through bilateral or
multilateral cooperation, to alleviate the factors that make persons, especially women and
children, vulnerable to trafficking, such as poverty, underdevelopment and lack of equal
opportunity”.
The Convention explicitly mandates that States Parties cooperate with the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, including providing information on the conditions of
refugees, the implementation of the Convention, and laws, regulations and decrees related
to refugees. Cooperation on “international solidarity, burden sharing and duties of
States” has been spelled out in Conclusions of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR.
Conclusion 22, for example, states that “action with a view to burden-sharing should be
directed towards facilitating voluntary repatriation, promoting local settlement in the
receiving country, providing resettlement opportunities in third countries, as appropriate”.
Among the modes of responsibility sharing listed in the conclusion are “financial and
technical assistance” and joint efforts to address the causes of large-scale influxes of
asylum seekers. Conclusion 52 “stressed that the principle of international solidarity has
a fundamental role to play in encouraging a humanitarian approach to the grant of asylum
and in the effective implementation of international protection in general”.
For the most part, cooperation takes the form of financial support from wealthier
countries for the protection, care and maintenance of refugees in poorer countries which
house the majority of refugees. Resettlement, in which refugees are moved from
countries of first asylum to third countries where they are able to reside permanently, is
another form of international cooperation that affects only a small minority of refugees.
Regional accords also seek to promote international cooperation. The OAU Refugee
Convention contains similar language to the 1951 Convention but in addition to
committing to cooperation with UNHCR, States Parties also commit to cooperate with
the Organization for African Unity. The European Union Directive on Temporary
Protection includes provisions calling for member State solidarity. “The Member States
may call on the European Refugee Fund to finance the measures provided for in the
Directive (financial solidarity). In a declaration acknowledging a massive influx,
32
attached to the Council decision, each Member State indicates either its capacity to
receive displaced persons, in numerical terms or in general. At any time after the Council
decision has been adopted, the Member States may indicate any additional capacity by
informing the Council and the Commission. Throughout the period of temporary
protection, the Member States will cooperate with each other with a view to transferring
the persons concerned, where appropriate, to another Member State. Such transfers will
take place on a voluntary basis”.
The national commitments under Mode 4 of GATS vary considerably. Over one hundred
countries made commitments. Most commitments pertain to highly skilled persons,
including intra-company transfers, executives, managers and specialists71. States also
made commitments to admit persons engaged in sales negotiations and other business
visitors72. The period of admission may vary from several years for intracompany
transfers to 90 days for business travelers.
In some cases, particularly in the few instances in which States commit to admission of
lesser-skilled personnel, they provide for economic needs tests that require a showing that
qualified domestic workers are not available. Other restrictions include requirements that
the person be pre-employed by the company requesting his or her admission; limits on
the freedom of the worker to move within the country or into another position;
requirements that the workers be paid the prevailing wages for that occupation; and
provisions to suspend the commitments in the event of a labor-management dispute73.
Although GATS has not yet proved to be a robust framework for international
cooperation, and is limited to only one class of migrants—those providing services—it
could potentially be an important model for gaining agreement among States on
international migration. Perhaps the most important role that agreements such as GATS
70
This section focuses on the principal multilateral trade agreement, but similar points could be make about
such regional agreements as the North American Free Trade Agreement.
71
Steve Charnovitz, “Trade Law Norms on International Migration,” in Aleinikoff and Chetail, Migration
and International Legal Norms, p. 248.
72
Ibid.
73
Ibid.
33
can play is providing transparency on the rules used by States in determining who can be
admitted for what period. Such negotiations can also help define admission categories
and harmonize standards for admission. For example, at present, States often use
different definitions in determining what constitutes an ‘executive’ or ‘manager’ or
person with ‘specialized knowledge. ’ Moreover, each country establishes its own tests of
its labor market, which are generally not well understood by other States, businesses or
persons seeking admission.
A cautionary note, however, about the use of trade agreements to define immigration
commitments. The movement of persons, particularly when they migrate for extended
periods, creates far different and greater impacts on source and destination countries than
do, for example, the movement of goods. Migrants have rights and they and their
families have need for healthcare, education, and other services. Those whom they leave
behind also have rights and may be highly dependent on them for financial assistance
through remittances. As such, movement of persons affects not only the migrants but
also the communities in which they reside and from which they come. Trade agreements
are not necessarily the best way to negotiate commitments that take into account the full
range of issues arising from movement of persons.
74
The Goal of the Berne Initiative, April 2003 (http://www. iom.
int//DOCUMENTS/OFFICIALTXT/EN/Goal_E. pdf)
34
for a Planned, Balanced, and Comprehensive Approach to Management of Migration”.
Twenty common understandings are listed:
35
15. Enhanced efforts are needed at all levels to combat human trafficking,
organised migrant smuggling and other forms of international criminality
affecting migrants and to provide support to victims of trafficking.
16. The family is the basic unit of society and as such deserves special attention.
In the context of migration, family separation has to be avoided. Facilitation of
family reunion can contribute to maximising the positive effects of social and
cultural integration of migrants in the host community.
17. Integration of migrants is essential to foster social and political stability, to
maximise the contributions migrants can make, and to reduce instances of racism
and xenophobia.
18. The dissemination of accurate, objective and detailed information on
migration policies and procedures enables migrants to make informed decisions.
It is necessary for informed public opinion and support for migration and
migrants.
19. The systematic collection, analysis and exchange of timely, accurate and
comparable data on all aspects of migration, while respecting the right to privacy,
are important for migration management at national, regional and international
levels.
20. Research on all aspects of migration is needed to better understand the causes
and consequences of international migration.
The strength of the Berne Initiative is its consultative process that has brought source,
transit and destination countries together to build consensus on the common
understandings and effective practices. The Common Understandings briefly restate or
give adherence to international law, but they go well beyond conventions to achieve
consensus on a framework for international cooperation. This framework recognises the
benefits of legal avenues of migration and the integration of immigrants, but also
emphasises the need to reduce irregular migration and curb such abuses as smuggling and
trafficking as well as racism and xenophobia.
The weakness of the Berne Initiative is its emphasis on State participation in the
consultations. Although nongovernmental organisations and academic experts
participated in the international and regional meetings, the process has been dominated—
purposefully—by States. Since the State participants usually have a vested interest in the
issues (coming from Ministries with specific responsibilities for migration), convincing
the broader political spectrum as well as public opinion as to the wisdom of the common
understandings and effective practices may be difficult.
By contrast, the Hague process has been a nongovernmental effort launched by the
Society for International Development’s Netherlands chapter in 2000. Bringing together
36
about 500 persons from government, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental
organizations and academia. The Declaration presents twenty-one principles for
managing migration. It begins recognising that the primary responsibility for migration
and refugee policy rests with States, but it asserts that States cannot act alone and succeed
in managing migration. The Declaration emphasises that “coherent orderly migration
programmes are key instruments in a new approach to migration” because they clarify
rights and obligations of migrants, strengthen public confidence, and reduce the
constraints and costs of unauthorised migration. Placing great focus on refugees and
displaced persons, the Declaration calls for conflict prevention measures, respect for
human rights and international humanitarian law, adherence to the UN Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,
and “new, inclusive, bottom-up approaches to post-conflict situations. “ The Declaration
also promotes integration and social inclusion of migrants, emphasising that “refugees
and migrants have skills, knowledge, experience and strong aspirations for a better life”.
Accordingly, the Declaration includes a specific reference to the corporate sector, calling
on business leaders to “actively ensure the inclusion into the labour force of refugees and
migrants in host countries and thereby reinforce the integration process”. The
Declaration’s 20th Principle recognises that “powerful instruments of human rights,
international humanitarian law and refugee law already exist to protect refugee, and to a
lesser extent migrants. The priority for the future is to ensure their effective
implementation”. The Declaration ends with a call for re-examination of the institutional
arrangements for population movements at the global and regional levels.
INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
To date, much of the consensus building has taken place through ad hoc, informal
mechanisms such as the Berne Initiative, at the international level, and the various
consultative mechanisms established at the regional level. These mechanisms provide
useful forums for discussion but they do not seek to enforce norms of behaviour on their
members. They may identify gaps in international law and even set out normative
frameworks (or common understandings, as in the Berne Initiative), but members may
choose to ignore the norms.
Moving from the current arrangements to a more robust international regime may be
premature, however. While there has been progress in setting out common
understandings, there continue to be fundamental disagreements among States as to
causes and consequences of international migration and the extent to which it is in the
interests of States to liberalize or restrict flows of migrants. This situation contrasts
37
sharply with the general consensus that governs movements of goods, capital and
services—that it is in the ultimate interest of all States to lessen barriers to the movements
of these factors.
Should one international organization seek to cover all of the issues raised by
international migration? The international legal framework would argue for keeping the
institutional arrangements for refugees distinct from those for voluntary migrants. The
Refugee Convention covers individuals who cannot or will not accept the protection of
their own countries because of a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of one of
five protected grounds. By contrast, labour or family migrants can presumably call upon
their own country’s protection, either via consular protection or by return to their home
territory. The role of the international community is far more limited in the case of
voluntary migrants than it is in the case of refugees because of these distinctions. Yet, it
is also true that the line between migration and asylum is often blurred and States have
difficulties determining who qualifies for international protection.
One possible option arising from the differences in international law would be to continue
to assign responsibility for protection and assistance to refugees to the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees while identifying and assigning to a separate organization or
set of organizations (for example, the International Organization for Migration (IOM),
International Labour Organisation (ILO) and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
(UNHCHR) responsibility for helping States manage migration and protect the rights of
migrants75. IOM already provides technical assistance to States in the management of
immigration and development of policies and programs, while ILO and UNHCHR
already have mechanisms in place to address violations of the rights of migrants. A
coordination mechanism could then be established to address issues that arise at the nexus
between refugee and migration issues.
75
In other writings, this author has recommended that a single international organization—dubbed the UN
High Commissioner for Forced Migrants—take responsibility for both refugees and internally displaced
persons who share similar characteristics with refugees—that is, a need for international protection because
their own countries are unwilling or unable to protect them.
38
CONCLUSION
During the past decade, there has been significant progress in establishing an
international legal and normative framework for managing the movement of people
across borders and for protecting the rights of international migrants. Just in the past two
years, three international agreements affecting international migration went into force: the
Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families and the
Protocols on Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking. Although ratification of the
migrant rights convention has been disappointing, the document provides a useful
compilation of norms, most of which exist in more broadly ratified international law.
The smuggling and trafficking protocols broke new ground in setting out standards by
which States can be held accountable in terms of their actions in preventing smuggling
and trafficking, prosecuting smugglers and traffickers, protecting those who have been
smuggled and trafficked, and cooperating with other States to accomplish the goals of
these agreements.
Progress has also been made at the regional level in setting out agreements among States
to manage international movements of persons. The European Union has issued
directives in such areas as temporary protection, rights of third country nationals, visa
policy, family reunification and asylum. The various Regional Conferences on Migration
(RCM) have established plans of action for cooperation in managing migration within
their regions. The RCM for the Americas, for example, adopted a plan of action in three
areas: migration policies and management, human rights, and the linkages between
migration and development. The Berne Initiative in turn brought the regional
perspectives together into a framework based on effective practices and common
understandings.
This is not to downplay the gaps that remain in the international and regional legal and
normative frameworks. As discussed in this paper, international law is particularly weak
in setting out norms for regulating the movement of persons for family unity purposes.
There are also major gaps in addressing the movement of persons who are at the nexus of
the asylum and migration systems, particularly those leaving countries in conflict and
seeking entry to countries with greater economic opportunities. The international
frameworks to prevent irregular migration are new and untested (in the case of smuggling
and trafficking) and lacking altogether with regard to other unlawful movements for
economic reasons. At the same times, State systems for implementing existing laws are
weak and fail to convince policymakers or the public in the ability of governments to
manage migration pressures or patterns. Too often, migration appears to be out of the
control of State authorities.
39
• Legal channels for migration of persons seeking work opportunities in other
countries;
• Protection of the rights of migrants and their families, including persons who
have been smuggled or trafficked;
• Protection of refugees and durable solutions to refugee problems;
• Prevention and prosecution of human smuggling and human trafficking
operations; and
• Return, readmission and reintegration of persons who do not have, or no
longer have, authorization to remain in a destination country.
The Trafficking and Smuggling Protocols is more explicit in setting out specific areas in
which State Parties agree to cooperate with each other. The protocols emphasize
information exchange, training, public information and other joint efforts to prevent
smuggling and trafficking. Implicit in this model is the recognition that unilateral actions
on the parts of States will be ineffective in addressing transnational problems that affect
all countries. The 1951 UN Refugee Convention and regional agreements on forced
migration promote international cooperation as a way to share responsibility for assisting,
protecting and finding solutions for persons who cannot rely on their own governments.
Again, implicit in this approach is the need for international cooperation to address a
phenomenon that is beyond the capacity of any one country. The forms of international
cooperation include the sharing of financial resources and the potential movement of
refugees and others in need of protection from one country to another. A key role is
assigned to the United Nations, particularly the UNHCR, not only in protecting the rights
of the refugees but also promoting cooperation among States.
76
For example, in the Uruguay Round of GATS, the United States committed to admit no fewer than
65,000 professionals and speciality workers per year.
40
No one legal or normative model appears perfect in eliciting the type of cooperation
needed to manage international migration more effectively. It is likely that a combination
will be needed. Existing international law, in combination with best practices in national
and regional law and policies, provide an excellent starting point for the development of a
well-regulated international system. At present, however, the legal framework is spread
across so many different instruments that it confuses rather than illuminates the situation.
Compiling the rules and best practices into a single set of guidance for States would
increase understanding of the legal and normative framework and improve its
implementation. Ultimately, however, States will need to develop more effective
mechanisms to promote consultation and cooperation in managing a phenomenon that is
here to stay.
41