The Special Forces Tactical Facility

Figure 1-8. Temporary phase latrines

Figure 1-9. Power transformers routing electricity to structures

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Chapter 1

PERMANENT PHASE
1-25. The third and final phase of a rural TACFAC is the permanent phase. This phase is initiated when the
SF unit expects to occupy the facility for an extended period of time. The permanent rural TACFAC is
better developed, organized, maintained, and prepared to handle security emergencies than the initial or
temporary TACFAC. The outer barrier may be a mud or brick wall, and security patrols are conducted at
random.
1-26. The permanent rural TACFAC should have a minimum of two covered and protected 200-kilowatt
diesel-electric generators (Figure 1-10). They should be of the same brand, type, and electrical capacity to
minimize spare parts and optimize efficiency. If necessary, parts can be interchanged. The generator
designated as primary is used for all daily electrical requirements. All other generators can provide
electrical backup during scheduled outages, routine maintenance, repairs, and emergencies.

Figure 1-10. Redundant permanent phase generators

1-27. The permanent TACFAC differs from initial and temporary facilities in that the facility occupies not
only one or two buildings, but an enclosed building complex. This complex offers greater security and
improved protection options. Permanent facilities incorporate PACE security planning for water, electricity,
medical treatment, communications, personnel security, and secure storage of ammunition and fuel. Critical
spare parts should be kept on hand.
1-28. The SFODA achieves control of the access road, administration sector, and surrounding area using
perimeter and barrier defenses in depth. An observation tower within the inner perimeter is a valuable
asset. Multiple rows and strands of barbed wire, tanglefoot, and claymore mines should be emplaced.
Stackable barrier systems (Figure 1-11, page 1-11) or fort-like barrier walls provide a great deal of security
for the facility. Outer barrier walls common in the Middle East and Central Asia (Figure 1-12, page 1-11)
are made from a local brown mud-type material and may be 4 to 5 meters high and 1 meter thick.

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 The Special Forces Tactical Facility

Figure 1-11. Filling stackable barrier systems

Figure 1-12. Tactical facility improved protection measure—solid, defensible mud wall

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Chapter 1

URBAN TACTICAL FACILITY

1-29. Urban TACFACs almost always are based on preexisting urban structures. There are unique
advantages and challenges in developing an urban TACFAC. For example, an SF unit occupying an urban
TACFAC may be able to take advantage of preexisting water, sewer, and electrical systems (if they are still
functional). However, the urban environment does offer some significant challenges to security because of
the proximity to surrounding buildings and the dense population concentration (which will likely include
hostile elements). Specific threats also increase in urban environments, such as the threat of snipers and
explosive devices (such as vehicleborne improvised explosive devices [VBIEDs]). Specific security
measures and equipment are covered in detail in Chapter 4.
1-30. Urban TACFACs, like their rural TACFAC counterparts, also may evolve through initial, temporary,
and permanent phases. Protection and security continue to remain paramount (as does the overall defensive
posture of the TACFAC) by maintaining the PACE planning process in an urban environment. The critical
nodes for urban TACFAC development are described in Figure 1-13.

Initial Temporary Permanent

Security and • 24/7 SFODA security • Perimeter fence • Brick and mortar wall
Protection • Triple-strand concertina • Rooftop security • Observation tower
• Fighting positions • SFODA with HN • HN augmented with SFODA
augmentation
Water • Bottled water • Local pumps • Indoor plumbing
• Water purification kits • ROWPU
Electricity • Batteries • 20 kW generator • 200 kW generator
• 5 kW generator • Local grid
Administration • Sand tables • Temporary classrooms • 25-meter range
and Host-Nation • HN meeting area • Rehearsal area
Training
Trash • Burn pit • Local disposal (operational • Sanitary and secure landfill
funds) (contracted)
• Incinerator
Medical • MOS 18D (M-5 medical bag) • SFODA dispensary • Clinic with U.S. and HN
• Medical bunker • HN treatment area medical augmentation

• HLZ
Sewage • Portable toilets • Septic tank • Local sewage treatment plant

Shelter • Existing structure • Improved structures • Hardened structures

(abandoned or leased) (masonry or concrete)

Figure 1-13. Urban Special Forces tactical facility critical nodes

INITIAL PHASE
1-31. The biggest difference between the initial rural TACFAC and the initial urban TACFAC is the
structure. In an urban TACFAC, the building likely already exists. Selection criteria include the following:
z Does the structure have a barrier around the perimeter, such as a fence or wall?
z Is the structure connected to the existing power grid and water and sewer systems?

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 The Special Forces Tactical Facility

1-32. Ideally, the initial structure will have most of the upgrades required to transition from an initial to a
permanent TACFAC. If not, as a minimum, initial requirements include the following:
z 5-kilowatt generator.
z Indoor toilet, outhouse, or burn barrel.
z Perimeter protection (fence or brick wall). If no perimeter protection exists, continuous security
patrols and observation are required.

TEMPORARY PHASE
1-33. If a perimeter wall or fence does not exist, it is installed during this phase of development. Also, the
unit constructs a safe room. These additions create extra protection and explosive standoff distance. Other
temporary urban upgrades include 2 or more 20-kilowatt generators, portable toilets, and extra rooftop
security.

PERMANENT PHASE
1-34. In the permanent urban TACFAC phase, power-generation requirements may increase, thereby
requiring a pair of 200-kilowatt generators of the same make, model, and capacity. Indoor plumbing and
sewerage services are made available. Outside security is enhanced with the addition of a rooftop guard
tower; permanent, industrial grade security cameras; motion-activated lights; sensors, including electro-
optical devices; and increased active and passive security and surveillance measures.

SUMMARY
1-35. As the TACFAC progresses through the three phases of development in both rural and urban
environments, the previous phase remains a part of the PACE plan for TACFAC operations. For example,
small, portable, 5-kilowatt electric generators that were used as a primary source of power in the initial
phase revert to contingency or emergency use in the temporary phase.
1-36. There are no clearly defined checklists or timelines for TACFAC development. New building
construction may begin at any time during any phase, and upgrades, repairs, and maintenance should be
constant. Defensive improvements and facility infrastructure improvements must be planned and developed
according to METT-TC.

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 Chapter 2
Tactical Facility Planning and Design

Commanders of SFODAs, SFODBs in AOBs, or SFODCs in SOTFs may be tasked

with planning, designing, constructing, and operating from TACFACs. Each SOTF
commander normally organizes his base into an OPCEN, signals center (SIGCEN),
and support center (SPTCEN). Isolation is a technique, not a building; as a result, all
SFOD TACFACs must be able to combine secure planning with self-isolation
capabilities within their OPCEN.

SECTION I—PLANNING
2-1. Armed with the basic requirements and phases of identifying and/or constructing a TACFAC, an SF
unit conducts the standard military decision-making process (MDMP). The MDMP steps found in FM 5-0,
Army Planning and Orders Production, and Graphic Training Aid (GTA) 31-01-003, Detachment Mission
Planning Guide, help to determine the course of action (COA) required for each specific TACFAC to
become operational.
2-2. The statement of requirement (SOR), area study (Appendix A), site survey (Appendix B), area
assessment (Appendix C), and special operations debrief and retrieval system (SODARS) are five of many
resource documents used during the predeployment planning process. Depending upon the mission, these
documents may carry a security classification of CONFIDENTIAL or higher.

STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENTS
2-3. The intent of the SOR is to identify the requesting unit’s logistic and materiel needs—particularly
those that exceed their organic capabilities—early in the MDMP. This early identification becomes
particularly relevant when an SF unit is tasked to develop an original TACFAC.
2-4. Once developed, consolidated, and prioritized, the SF unit routes the SOR through the chain of
command. This ensures that mission supply (Classes I through X), facility maintenance, transportation,
personnel, medical, signal, operational, and security needs are addressed and any shortcomings are
identified as the SF unit continues to plan.

AREA STUDY
2-5. The area study provides initial information to the SFOD about the specific country where they will
perform operations. It is a valuable planning resource, along with the site survey, area assessment, and the
SODARS. (Appendix A provides the format for an area study.)

SITE SURVEY
2-6. The site survey team operates in a similar fashion to a reconnaissance patrol. Teams typically deploy
in small units of two to six Soldiers and gather information. Soldiers on the survey team are from the unit
that will occupy the selected site. The team conducts site surveys of potential TACFAC locations and
documents the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) and other vital information. After
the site survey is complete, the results of the CCIRs are shared, distributed, and coordinated with all
pertinent units.

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Chapter 2

2-7. As the SFOD develops a facility construction plan, the commander may also conduct an HN
capability assessment. In particular, the commander gets answers to the following questions:
z Are the HN soldiers able to assist the SF unit during the facility construction process?
z Are personnel identified to provide and deliver heavy equipment to the chosen location?
z Are construction materials available in country, and who receives compensation?
z Are large-capacity diesel-electric generators and spare parts available for local purchase?
z Are HN heavy equipment operators available for hire and how are they to be paid?
2-8. The site survey team deploys with sufficient portable electronic data-collection and data-storage
devices (for example, computers, cameras, hard drives, and discs). When the SFOD mission is identified as
particularly exceptional, individuals with area-specific qualifications (subject-matter experts [SMEs]) may
deploy with the site survey team. Because building a new SF TACFAC in an austere environment is a
unique endeavor, survey teams should include at least one Special Forces engineer sergeant (MOS 18C) as
an SME.
2-9. Although most thorough survey missions are lengthy because they require answers to detailed
questions, some survey missions may require only limited TACFAC development criteria and basic site
selection. On these survey missions, SFODs preview potential sites, make appropriate choices, and return
to base.
2-10. A comprehensive site survey requires the SFOD—particularly the 18C—to perform a complete
review of all potential HN permanent structures and any available bare-ground locations that may require
improvement. If a bare-ground site is selected, the initial site survey must include a tentative construction
plan and a tentative bill of material. This plan includes any heavy construction vehicles, equipment, and
personnel needed to build the TACFAC and addresses facility design, logistic accessibility, topographic
layout, elevation, drainage, soil excavation, electric, plumbing, defense, and security considerations. The
plan provides a tentative construction timeline that allows for the overall TACFAC construction stages to
mesh together seamlessly.
2-11. A primary site survey consideration is the provision of seamless protection and security procedures
for the SF TACFAC throughout each phase of construction. The SFOD determines who will provide this
protection and how many personnel will be needed.
2-12. For a thorough survey, the SF unit incorporates an extensive and comprehensive resource review.
This review may include verbal, written, and electronic media examples of lessons learned, unit after-
action reviews (AARs), and SORs used by other SF units. If possible, Soldiers may speak with other
SFODs and senior SF unit leaders regarding previous TACFAC missions. Most unit AARs and reports
from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) are UNCLASSIFIED. (Appendix B contains a site
survey format.)

AREA ASSESSMENT
2-13. The initial area assessment begins very early in the MDMP—immediately after mission receipt. The
principal area assessment effort is ongoing and continues to be updated after the SF unit arrives in country.
This assessment forms the foundation for a large part of the SFOD’s subsequent activities in their AO.
(Appendix C provides an area assessment format.)

SPECIAL OPERATIONS DEBRIEF AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM

2-14. The SODARS is designed to collect debrief reports from SO personnel to be used as electronic
reference material by the greater SO community. SF units use SODARS to retrieve detailed information
about any SF TACFAC that may have been used by previous SF units. SODARS reports are classified
documents housed on the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) SECRET Internet
Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

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 Tactical Facility Planning and Design

SECTION II—DESIGN
2-15. The preferred design option for an SF TACFAC in a hostile environment is hardened, independent,
and capable of supporting and protecting the SFOD and HN soldiers in the worst-case scenario—the
TACFAC coming under siege. The facility is built around an inner perimeter OPCEN or tactical operations
center (TOC). Buildings and support infrastructure house the SFOD and possibly other government
agencies (OGAs), and HN soldiers with or without their dependents.

Vietnam Tactical Facility Design

Square, triangular, pentagon and freeform TACFAC exterior designs were constructed
by the early SF units in Vietnam. By 1968, there was a standard TACFAC interior
design in use for buildings, firing positions, and mortar pits.

In 1962, Camp Nam Dong was at first built in a freeform shape which, after being
overrun, proved to be an ineffective design. In 1964, it was rebuilt into the classic
triangular shape.

Camp Gia Vuc was pentagon-shaped and one of the most menacing in Vietnam. It
had more than 20 individual fighting positions, 2 machine gun bunkers per wall, 1
machine gun at each corner bunker, 18 mortar pits, 6 105-mm howitzers, and 2
155-mm howitzers, for a total of 15 direct-fire and 26 indirect-fire guns.

2-16. Each SF TACFAC is similar in function but unique in its design because it is dependent upon
METT-TC, terrain analysis (OAKOC), and the material available in the AO. There are seven sectors or
areas common to many permanent SF TACFACs. SF TACFACs in urban environments may be unable to
accommodate all seven sectors. Also, many mature rural TACFACs incorporate shooting ranges; detention
facilities; DFACs; gymnasiums; showers; laundry facilities; motor pools; morale, welfare, and recreation
(MWR) facilities; HN administration and meeting rooms; HLZs; and airfields within the seven sectors.
Beginning in the center of the TACFAC and moving outward, the seven sectors or areas that should be
common to all SF TACFACs are best displayed in the example of permanent rural TACFACs depicted in
Figures 2-1 and 2-2, page 2-4. The sectors or areas illustrated in Figures 2-1 and 2-2 are as follows:
z Inner perimeter (item A).
z Inner barrier (item B).
z Outer perimeter (item C).
z Outer barrier (item D).
z Administration area (item E).
z Access road (item F).
z Surrounding area (item G).

INNER PERIMETER
2-17. The inner perimeter is the heart of the SF TACFAC. Operational, administrative, and logistic
operations are controlled from various hardened and protected buildings within this sector. At the very
least, the SF unit should build one primary observation tower within the inner perimeter. Additional towers
may be constructed as the TACFAC develops. The inner perimeter is vital to the defense of the TACFAC;
it should be surrounded entirely and protected by an inner protective berm or wall.

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Chapter 2

Figure 2-1. Rural Special Forces tactical facility overview (example 1)

Figure 2-2. Rural Special Forces tactical facility overview (example 2)

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 Tactical Facility Planning and Design

INNER PROTECTIVE BERM OR WALL

2-18. An inner protective berm or wall (Figure 2-3) is built from the ground up, and its construction should
be one of the first priorities of the occupying SF unit. The protective inner berm may be constructed using
available native materials, such as mud, sand, or lumber. The berm incorporates elevated bunkers and
fighting positions for crew-served and individual weapons. All positions are shielded from the rear by a
low-splinter wall, creating, in effect, an aboveground trench. By elevating the inner-berm fighting positions
(Figure 2-4), Soldiers firing from the center of the TACFAC have clear fields of fire over the heads of
friendly forces in the lower elevation of the outermost sectors. This elevation layering permits the
TACFAC to maximize all defensive firepower.

Figure 2-3. Inner protective berm

Figure 2-4. Elevated inner berm positions

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Chapter 2

PREDETONATION MATERIALS AND FRAGMENT SHIELDING LAYERS

2-19. The close proximity of a TACFAC to hostile urban or rural areas denies it the ability to control an
adequate standoff area beyond the TACFAC perimeter. The concentration of operational and support
billeting areas are a concern due to their high casualty potential and inherent lack of effective protective
measures. Soldier’s quarters generally are soft targets and usually consist of tents, trailers, and field-
expedient structures. The soft nature of these quarters and the density of personnel render them vulnerable
to fragmenting munitions such as rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM).
2-20. The use of retrofit cyclone fencing and corrugated roofing designed as predetonation material and
fragment-shielding layers (stand-off protection) in shelter areas and outer and inner perimeter defense can
significantly enhance TACFAC survivability. Cyclone fencing can be used along the outer wall of a
TACFAC in order to predetonate rockets prior to them entering the perimeter and detonating on a building
or bunker or in close proximity to personnel. However, due to the number of structures involved and the
square footage requirements, predetonation materials and fragment-shielding layers must be prioritized,
cost-effective, and easy to construct at the TACFAC. Figure 2-5 is a three-photo sequence that illustrates
the preemptive use of fencing material to predetonate a rocket.

Figure 2-5. Rocket predetonation sequence

2-21. Chain-link fencing or durable wire mesh is installed in front of the firing ports of each building or
bunker at an appropriate distance (it must be measured and tested) to disrupt, predetonate, and defeat
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and thrown explosive satchels or grenades. Fence sections are placed at
an angle to prevent oblique shots from penetrating. If only a limited supply of fencing and sturdy wire
mesh is available, the SFOD must prioritize by buildings and bunkers. Priority RPG fencing should be
placed on the outer perimeter bunkers first, followed by inner perimeter bunkers, and then buildings (when
available).

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 Tactical Facility Planning and Design

2-22. Various combinations of materials and techniques are being used that provide increased protection
against blast and fragmentation effects. By adding effective blast-resistant walls, predetonation cyclone
fencing, and fragment-shielding corrugated roofing over existing TACFAC structures, the potential for
casualties is greatly diminished.

FIGHTING BUNKER MATERIALS AND DESIGN

2-23. If suitable local building materials are unavailable to build fighting bunkers and buildings, materials
may be obtained through the USG or civilian contractors. Commonly used materials include stackable
barrier system containers, containers express (CONEXs), concrete, Cinva-Ram blocks, 55-gallon drums,
and sandbags. Large fighting bunkers may have sleeping areas; however, space is limited in even the most
sizeable of bunkers. Sleeping bunks may be double or even triple stacked. Bunker floors are built to include
drainage channels and grenade sumps. Whenever possible, all buildings and bunkers should utilize a dual roof
or an improved protective system to mitigate the destructive effect of rocket and mortar rounds.
2-24. The main heavy weapon used in fighting bunkers is determined by METT-TC analysis. The main
heavy weapons usually are medium machine guns, heavy machine guns, or automatic grenade launchers.
Within each fighting position, the SF unit should keep or have immediate access to a supply of—
z Main-gun ammunition.
z Fragmentation grenades.
z Smoke grenades.
z White phosphorous (WP) grenades.
z Food and water.
z First-aid supplies.
z Communications equipment and laser rangefinder or compass (with extra batteries for electronic
components).
z Night vision goggles (NVGs) and thermal imaging equipment (with extra batteries).
z Range card (Figure 2-6, page 2-8).

SPECIAL FORCES TEAM HOUSES

2-25. SF team houses can function as logistics centers, administration centers, isolation facilities
(ISOFACs), and sleeping quarters for the SF unit. SF units must keep at least one (and preferably two)
U.S. Soldiers awake during any 24-hour period. When eating, resting, or sleeping, SF personnel avoid
bunching up. Wherever possible, Soldiers disperse and sleep in different buildings. Soldiers must know
where to go during an enemy attack and the quickest route to their assigned positions. TACFAC visitors
must also be briefed on appropriate emergency procedures. SF team houses, like fighting positions, are
built above or below ground level. Aboveground structures should, at a minimum, be lined with sandbags
stacked 2 rows wide and 10 rows high. A dual roof is constructed using two sets of corrugated metal sheets
and sandbags. This creates a sandwich-like layer of metal sheeting and sandbags. The second roof provides
weather protection, helping to keep sandbags dry and preventing them from soaking up excess water
weight. Additionally, the extra material helps deflect and absorb kinetic-energy blasts. Bunkers close to the
team house (Figure 2-7, page 2-9) provide additional protection during indirect-fire attacks.

OPERATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS BUNKERS

2-26. The OPCEN and communications-electronics (CE) bunkers are the focal point structures of the inner
perimeter. These bunkers typically are positioned belowground, have dual roofs (like the team houses) or
extensive overhead protection, and two secure access points.
2-27. The CE bunker contains rooms for the SF unit and its HN counterparts. Entrance to the OPCEN
bunker, however, should be limited to U.S. and vetted HN personnel only. Both OPCEN and CE bunkers
are equipped with—
z Separate contingency generators to provide power for communications equipment.

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Chapter 2

z Spare batteries for the lighting systems. The lighting is connected to the contingency generator
only if it is large enough to sustain both the communications equipment and lighting systems.
Batteries or solar power can be used as an emergency power source.
z Small-arms with additional ammunition.
z Fragmentation, smoke, and WP grenades.
z Food, water, and first-aid supplies.

Figure 2-6. DA Form 5517-R (Standard Range Card)

2-8 FM 3-05.230 8 February 2009