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were eunuchs. The Code punishes adultery with death (Hammurabi,
sees. 129, 130), whereas the Middle Assyrian Laws order castration
for this and other sex crimes (Meek, 1950: 181). The tables on
which these laws are recorded originated in the 12th century b.c,
but the laws themselves "may go back to the 15th century" (ibid.:
180). Assyrian references to what seem to be political eunuchs are
contained in inscriptions made under Adad-Nirari II (911-891 b.c.)
and Sargon (724-705 b.c.) (Luckenbill, AR, I: 116); but as far as
pictorial representations of beardless men are concerned, Maissner
(BA, I: 411) warns that these need not always indicate eunuchs.
 356 CLASSES IN HYDRAULIC SOCIETY feared, because it
was here that they came closest to the nerve centers of despotic
power. v. eunuchs: a few historical facts Thus institutionalized
eunuchism seems to have been altogether absent in ancient
America. Domestic eunuchism was known in many major areas of
Old World Oriental society. Political eunuchism was weakly developed
in Hindu India, where an enormously influential priesthood provided
the most important group of non-Kshatriya candidates for
government office. In China and the Near East it temporarily became
a formidable weapon of autocracy for supervising and controlling the
ranking officialdom. In China eunuchs emerged as political advisors
and heads of armies during the second half of the Chou period —
that is, at a time when the ranking officials still constituted a
hereditary (noble) bureaucracy.55 The founder of the empire, Ch'in
Shih Huang-ti, had at the close of his life as his most intimate
companion the eunuch, Chao Kao. After the emperor's death, Chao
Kao succeeded in destroying the great chancellor, Li Ssu, and many
other prominent functionaries. And so powerful was this eunuch that
after having brought about the suicide of the second emperor he,
and not a high-ranking official, chose the new emperor.56 The first
sovereigns of the long-lasting imperial dynasty, Han, soon began to
use eunuchs to maintain their autocratic rule. Under Empress
Dowager Lu* (188-180 b.c) the eunuch Chang Shih-ch'ing handled
the edicts and commands.57 Under Emperor Wen (180-157) two
eunuchs enjoyed considerable favor.58 Emperor Wu (141-87) left
political matters to his trusted eunuchs when he withdrew to his
harem,69 and two eunuchs, Hung Kung and Shih Hsien, played a
prominent role in the government of Emperor Yuan (48-33 b.c.).60
Under these rulers of Early Han individual eunuchs were prominent.
During the Later Han period (a.d. 25-220) eunuchs were merged in
a powerful group. Their influence increased notably in the second
half of the first century a.d. and, in the second century they held in
their hands "kingdoms and noble ranks and they had in their mouths
the decrees of Heaven." 61 As tools of the emperor or of his wives
or in-laws, they temporarily exerted an almost unlimited control over
the bureaucracy.62 Similar developments also characterized the
"typically" Chinese 63 dynasties, T'ang and Ming. The prominence of
political eunuchs in T'ang times coincided significantly with the
establishment of the examination system, and in Ming times with the
restrictions of the yin
 CHAPTER 8, I 357 prerogative. Under the Ming emperors "
eunuchs were in charge of special agencies for supervising the
metropolitan officials and commoners. The eunuch Liu Chin, the
most famous of the "Eight [eunuch] Tigers," systematically
persecuted his bureaucratic opponents, and he was equally merciless
in his dealings with members of the bureaucratic gentry.64 Although
Liu was eventually executed, eunuchs remained powerful until the
dynasty fell under the combined onslaught of Chinese rebels and
Manchu invaders. The Sung emperors relied less on political
eunuchism than did the Han, T'ang, and Ming rulers; but at the
beginning of the 12th century the eunuch Tung Kuan was raised to
the highest military rank and set over the empire's supreme defense
council. In Western Asia eunuchism flourished under the
Achaemenids. It receded under the Hellenistic monarchs, but it
acquired great strength as the Roman empire became increasingly
Orientalized. In strong contrast to earlier custom the emperors
Claudius, Nero, Vitellius, and Titus included eunuchs in their
entourage. Claudius was influenced by two, Posides and Halotus;
and Nero, who "married" the eunuch Spores, placed the eunuch
Pelago in charge of a terror squad.65 Under Elagabalus and Gordian
eunuchs became a permanent feature of the administration.66
Diocletian gave them a prominent place in his new court
hierarchy.67 Of the eighteen ranks of Byzantine officialdom eunuchs
could hold eight, among them the distinguished Patrikios; and
eunuch patricians were rated above ordinary patricians.68 Runciman
calls the employment of eunuchs "Byzantium's great weapon against
the feudal tendency for power to be concentrated in the hands of a
hereditary nobility, which provided so much trouble for the West."
G9 Since eunuchism was already fully institutionalized in Byzantium
in the 4th century, it cannot have been instituted as a weapon to
combat a feudal tendency, which was certainly no issue in the
bureaucratic regime of Eastern Rome and which, even in the West,
only became an issue several centuries later. The suggestion that the
eunuchs "gave the Emperor a governing class he could trust" 70
comes closer to the heart of the matter. As elsewhere the political
eunuchs of Byzantium constituted an entirely trustworthy control
group within the absolutist bureaucracy. And they functioned so well
that Byzantium became a "eunuch's paradise." 7X Among the
eunuch generals, Narses, Solomon,72 and Nicephorus Uranus 73
were s. The rise of the eunuchs in Ming times began soon after the
founding of the dynasty (1368). Eunuchs were entrusted with the
defense of the northern border in 1403, and in 1406 the eunuch
Cheng Ho commanded the large imperial fleet that visited India,
Arabia, and East Africa.
 358 CLASSES IN HYDRAULIC SOCIETY outstanding, among
the eunuch admirals Eustathius Cymineanus 7* and Nicetas, who
commanded the Byzantine fleet in the battle for Sicily in g^.75 After
the military and political catastrophe of Manzikert, a eunuch,
Nicephorus the Logothete, "managed to reform the army." 76 "No
religious or secular office, however high — with the imperial dignity
as the only exception — was closed to them as a matter of
principle." 77 "A large proportion of the Patriarchs of Constantinople
were eunuchs." 78 At times eunuchs exerted unlimited power over
the sovereign. Constantius II (d. a.d. 361) was so completely
dominated by the eunuch Eusebius that the historian Ammianus
quipped: "To speak truly, Constantius had much influence with him."
' Political eunuchism flourished during and after the Abbassid
caliphate in the centers of Muslim power. From the 9th century on,
the caliphs placed eunuchs in important positions at the court and in
the army and navy. The Abbassid field-marshal Munis, the Samanid
general Fa'ig, and the admiral Thamil were eunuchs. How high, at
this time, eunuchs might rise in the military hierarchy is illustrated by
the fact that when the naval forces of Baghdad and Fatimid Egypt
fought each other in 919, both fleets were commanded by eunuch
admirals.7 79 Vi. THE DESPOT'S PERSONAL AGENCY NO INCIPIENT
PARTY Under the conditions of advancing industrialization and
intensive communications between the various segments of society
and the ruling center, an all-pervasive superorganization, such as the
Communist or Fascist state party,80 provides unique means for
maintaining total autocratic power. Oriental despotism needed no
such superorganization. The compartmentalized peasant or urban
communities, and also the individual officials who lacked modern
facilities for communication and potential conspiracy, could be
satisfactorily controlled by the postal and intelligence service, by the
ruler's "men," and by special segments of his officialdom, such as
the eunuchs. The intelligence service took care of the country's vital
administrative and military centers, the eunuchs in the main of the
court and, often also, of the capital. It is interesting to note that the
eunuchs never formed a very large group. In many hydraulic
societies a limited number of personal agents sufficed to assure the
ruler's autocratic position. t. Ammianus Marcellinus 18.4.3: "Eusebi .
. . apud quem - - si vere did debeat — multa Constantius potuit."
 CHAPTER 8, I 359 Vii. THE TRIBAL NOBLES OF CONQUEST
DYNASTIES In many Oriental societies, but not in all. To mention
only one exception: even in the hydraulic societies of the Old World
that knew institutionalized eunuchism, political eunuchs were of no
great importance in conquest societies. We have already commented
on the peculiar role played in Oriental conquest societies by the
nobles and commoners of the conquering nationality. Alien
commoners were ideal instruments of coercion, and alien nobles,
ranking above the native bureaucracy, formed a social elite whose
prominence and security depended on their loyalty to the ruler and
their ability to control the native officials. Alien nobles regularly
commanded the cadre armies and usually headed strategic civil
offices. They were political agents who, as faithfully as any eunuch,
upheld the interests of the conquering dynasty — which indeed was
substantially identical with their own. Why did the Umayyad caliphs
have little use for political eunuchs? Religion has been invoked to
explain this interesting phenomenon.81 But the Abbassid
development shows that theological difficulties could be easily
overcome, if the ruler wanted it so. More probably, the Umayyads, as
a conquest dynasty, found it quite satisfactory to base their
autocratic power essentially on their Arab nationals, nobles and
commoners. The Ch'i-tan masters of the Liao empire established
their domination over northeastern China without engendering an
excessive antagonism between pastoral victors and sedentary
subjects. Nevertheless, they prudently reserved for themselves the
key positions of power, and the emperor personally handled both
strategic communications and the supreme command.82 The only
high-ranking Chinese who was thoroughly trusted (because of his
great achievements in the war against the Sung empire) did not shift
the center of authority to the Chinese sector of the government.
Instead, he was given a Ch'i-tan clan name, a symbol of his inclusion
in the "barbarian" nobility of the conquerors. When the last Liao
emperor, in desperation and already deprived of a great part of his
realm, offered the command of the remnants of his eastern forces to
a Chinese, the man of his choice declined, noting bitterly and
correctly that "under the old system Chinese did not participate in
the important military and state policies . . ." 8S Indeed under the
old system the major military and civil decisions were made by the
alien ruler and his "barbarian" nobles. No wonder then that "eunuchs
. . . were marginal men in Liao society. ... no real political influence
was ever concentrated in the
 360 CLASSES IN HYDRAULIC SOCIETY hands of any Liao
eunuch mentioned in the historical records." 84 In the Manchu
dynasty, too, the Manchu nobles made eunuchs superfluous. The
T'ai-p'ing Rebellion (1850-1863) weakened, but did not destroy, the
hegemony of the tribal aristocrats, and the shortlived attempt of
1898 to modernize the government, which under a heretic Manchu
emperor was undertaken by Chinese reformers, was crushed by the
Empress Dowager. In her first restoration edicts she significantly
appointed a number of Manchus to positions of power.85 Thus even
the Manchus who had accepted more of Chinese culture than any of
the three preceding conquest dynasties relied not so much on
eunuchs as on "barbarian" nobles. These nobles came as close to
constituting a "quasiparty" as any dominant segment in the ruling
class of hydraulic society anywhere." viii. SLAVES In nonconquest
societies eunuchs are a formidable weapon of autocratic policy.
However, slaves (and ex-slaves) may serve similarly, since they too
are socially rootless. And they may fulfill their purpose even more
effectively, since their more normal physique makes them seem
more suitable to represent the despot's authority everywhere. Some
early Roman emperors employed freed slaves (libertini) in important
political positions; 88 but later emperors preferred eunuchs, who,
unlike the slaves, were traditionally associated with the power of
Oriental despotism. The use of slaves as the ruler's serving men was
more frequent in the Islamic Near East, where quickly changing
conditions of war and political alignments strongly encouraged
experiments with hired soldiers. In contrast to the Umayyads, who
maintained their conquest regime essentially by means of tribal
supporters, the Abbassids relied increasingly on mercenaries.
Eventually, and particularly for the caliph's bodyguard, they bought
Turkish slaves. The Samanid and Seljuk rulers of Persia followed the
Abbassid example.87 In the Mamluk empire an alien elite of ex-slave
warriors perpetuated itself by systematically filling vacancies with
slaves purchased abroad. When entering upon their official careers,
these slaves were solemnly enfranchised; but they remained a
socially self-contained stratum.88 In u. Political eunuchs emerged
temporarily under Emperor Shih-tsu (d. 1661) (Hummel, ECCP, I:
256 ff,). But the trend was stopped abruptly and never showed
strength again except under the last Empress Dowager (cf. Hummel,
ECCP, I: 296; II: 724; cf. also I: 298). Even this extraordinary
woman despot, however, sought to enhance her power not by
intensifying eunuchism, but by restoring Manchu control over the
Chinese officialdom.
 CHAPTER 8, I 36l Ottoman Turkey tribute boys and persons
of slave or slavelike origin were trained to be cadre warriors and top-
ranking administrators. These Turkish "slave" functionaries were
offered many incentives: substantial earnings, honors, opportunities
for advancement, and, at times, also a chance to marry. They were
no chattel slaves but highly privileged half-slaves, if they were not
completely enfranchised. But even as ex-slaves, they remained
closely attached to the ruler.v More favorably situated in many ways
than the great majority of the free population, they considered it an
honor to be his personal property. But the distinctions they enjoyed
did not remove the basic deficiency of their position — their essential
rootlessness. True, they might at the height of their career invite
certain of their relatives to share their glory and wealth, but this was
more the exception than the rule. In any case — and this was to the
benefit of the ruler — the fortunate relatives were almost always
persons of humble status; and thus they formed no link to an
ambitious and self-perpetuating (noble) bureaucratic gentry. Their
rootlessness was further aggravated when the ruler selected his
slave functionaries from among the children of nonbelievers,
particularly from among the children of Christians. Of course, they
were given a thorough Muslim education, but their special training
widened the gap between them and the upper-class believers, from
whom they were already separated by accidents of origin. The social
effects of the system of slave officials appeared with classical clarity
in Turkey. During the heyday of Ottoman power the administrative
and military functionaries did not establish a hereditary
officialdom,89 and they prevented the hereditary leaders of the
militia cavalry, who were supported by office land [khasses, ziamets,
and timars),90 from attaining more than secondary and subordinate
positions of power. In this set-up political eunuchs were not
altogether absent,10 but they only bulwarked an autocratic edifice
that was essentially a "government by a slave class." 91 The
functionaries of this government were so thoroughly disciplined and,
even in the civilian sphere, so well integrated that Machiavelli saw no
chance of upsetting the Turkic. The Turkish word "hul" like the Arab
word "mamluk" means "slave." w. In the Mamluk empire eunuchs
were in charge of the training of the Mamluks (Ayalon, 1951: 14 ff.).
The Turkish sultans made the chief White Eunuch the head of the
Palace School, where the military and administrative leaders of the
state were educated (Miller, 1941: 64, 88). Another high-ranking
White Eunuch guarded the treasures in the sultan's private treasury
(Miller, 1941: 38). The chief White Eunuch, in addition to being in
charge of the Palace School and Harem and acting as the grand
master of ceremonies, was also the sultan's confidential agent
(Miller, 1941: 88).
 362 CLASSES IN HYDRAULIC SOCIETY ish regime through
cooperation with dissenters (today we would say a fifth column) as
could be done in feudal France. For "in kingdoms governed like that
of France . . . it is easy to enter them by winning over some baron of
the kingdom, there being always malcontents, and those desiring
innovations. These can, for the reasons stated, open the way to you
and facilitate victory." 92 Not so with the Turks. "Because, being all
slaves and dependent, it will be more difficult to corrupt them, and
even if they were corrupted, little effect could be hoped for, as they
would not be able to carry the people with them for the reasons
mentioned. Therefore, whoever assaults the Turk must be prepared
to meet his united forces, and must rely more on his own strength
than on the disorders of others." 93 Contemplating the struggle
between the supreme ruler and his serving men, we are not so
much surprised that the Turkish office holders advanced eventually
to hereditary or semihereditary tenure,94 but that, over a
considerable period, the sultan was able to successfully block these
trends by maintaining a socially rootless class of "slave-officials." * 7.
"Regular" Officials, Control Groups, and the People Slave officials
were among the most effective tools that the ruler of a hydraulic
state could muster. Political eunuchs or a nobility of tribal conquerors
might supervise, weaken, and restrict the "regular" officialdom, but
slave officials could replace it. Despite obvious differences, the three
groups resembled each other in one significant way. Each of them
constituted a control group, which from the autocrat's standpoint
was manifestly more effective than the commoners who might be
included in the ranks of the officialdom. The priests, who in ancient
America, India, and elsewhere were placed in important government
positions, most probably fulfilled a similar function. x. The autocratic
master of the new class society in the USSR exerts supreme control
over the ranking apparatchiki by a variety of methods, among them
the periodic purging of established groups of functionaries (the "old
guard," the "old cadres") and the introduction of technically and
politically suitable commoners. From the standpoint of the supreme
autocrat, the functionaries' reliability may be expected to be greater,
the less they are rooted in any prestige group that preserves
elements of social cohesion. The Great Purge of the thirties
liquidated the bulk of the Old Bolsheviks, and subsequent purges
many other persons of prominence in the party, government, and
army. Vyshinsky, who was a Menshevik until the early days of the
regime, was ideally fitted to prosecute the Old Bolsheviks. No bonds
of comradeship tempered his assault; and his heterodox past made
him particularly vulnerable — and particularly ready to please the
supreme Party leadership.
 CHAPTER 8, J 363 The regular officials were remote from,
and above, the people. But the members of the control groups, who
were particularly close to the despot, were also particularly removed
from the people. A wellintentioned regular official or a member of
the bureaucratic gentry might develop quasipatriarchal relations to
the local population. This was much less likely to be the case with
priest officials, slave officials, alien nobles, or eunuchs. J. SOCIAL
PROMOTION The political careers of eunuchs, slaves, ex-slaves, and
commoners in hydraulic society have a further significance. They
demonstrate that social (vertical) mobility means one thing in open
and balanced societies, and another in societies which exist under
the shadow of total power. Obviously there is more than a single
pattern of social mobility. And any discussion of the phenomenon will
be satisfactory only to the degree that the facts are placed in their
specific institutional setting. 1. Reservoirs and Mainsprings of Social
Promotion In open and property-based societies a commoner may
rise above his original station, either through political or economic
achievement. Members of the upper class may try to prevent his
ascent, but they cannot forbid it. They may discriminate against the
power parvenu or the nouveau riche personally, but usually the
newcomer's children or grandchildren achieve social acceptance.
This was the general pattern in the democratic city states of ancient
Greece. And it is increasingly typical for such modern industrial
countries as England, Scandinavia, Australia, and the United States.
This pattern of democratic and spontaneous social mobility differs
fundamentally from the patterns of social mobility that characterize
hydraulic society. In hydraulic society the lowly ones who entered
the ruling class rarely came from the ranks of free and prominent
commoners. In China the number of persons who could obtain a
higher examination degree was carefully restricted; and even this
Chinese pattern was by no means typical for the majority of all
Oriental civilizations. In general, a vigorous commoner was not likely
to become a member of the ruling class. The eunuchs, freedmen,
and slaves who rose to political prominence originally ranked below
the free commoners. And this was true also for the slave girls, who
in the ruler's harem could become the mothers of future rulers.
Members of these groups rose to positions of distinction, not be 
 364 CLASSES IN HYDRAULIC SOCIETY cause they
overcame barriers o£ established wealth and power through their
own efforts, but because their ruler was sufficiently strong to select
whom he pleased and to place the person of his choice where he
pleased. What vertical mobility there was in hydraulic society
resulted from manipulation from above. To be sure, there are active
elements in passive behavior, just as there are passive elements in
active behavior.0 But this does not negate the validity of the
conclusion that under Oriental despotism social mobility was
essentially a passive process. It may be said, of course, that in
certain complex and semicomplex Oriental societies some
commoners have risen from poor and humble origins to wealth and
distinction within their class, improving their status in a way that is
typical for property-based open societies. True enough. However, in
many hydraulic societies such patterns are almost entirely lacking,
and where they do occur they do not involve ascent into the ruling
class. 2. Criteria for Social Promotion (Aptitudes "plus" . . . ) Total
power promotes prudently and discriminatingly. And it promotes
those who may be expected to satisfy the needs of the apparatus
state. In such a process the candidate must possess aptitudes
"plus." . . . What is this "plus"? Some who are selected for promotion
may be unusually talented; and this certainly is desirable. But all
must excel in the key virtue of totalitarianism: total and ingenious
servility. This qualification may be expressed in either an
ideologically or a ceremonially subtle way (as was the case in
Confucian China and Hindu India) or pragmatically and directly (as
was the case in many other hydraulic civilizations). But the
substance was everywhere the same; and the supreme manipulators
of total power would have considered themselves fools if they had
not insisted on a qualification that, from their standpoint, was vital.
3. Social Promotion on a Slave Plantation Social mobility in hydraulic
society is not identical with social mobility on a slave-operated
plantation. Nevertheless, some features of the latter are not without
interest for the former. A plantation owner may raise the most lowly
slaves to be his foremen or personal servants, a. Cf. Wittfogel, 1932:
474 ff. This study has tried to define the potential influence of an
object upon the operations to which it is exposed.
 CHAPTER 8, K 365 but an awareness of this possibility does
not favor an independent spirit among their fellows. On the contrary.
The fact that promotion is offered essentially to those who are
unquestionably submissive tends to stimulate among the
opportunistic majority of all slaves attitudes of spectacular servility.
K. THE TOTAL RULING CLASS— A MONOPOLY BUREAUCRACY 1. The
Ruling Class of Hydraulic Society and the Upper Classes in Other
Stratified Societies From still another angle, the peculiarity of social
mobility in hydraulic society indicates the peculiarity of its ruling
class. For all practical purposes this ruling class is a closed class.
Only by the will of its recognized representatives can members of
lower classes be incorporated into it. In this respect it is like the
feudal nobility and unlike the upper classes of a modern property-
based industrial society. The peculiarity of the hydraulic variant of a
closed ruling class derives mainly from the manner in which it is
organized. The active core of the ruling class of hydraulic society is a
rigidly cohesive body; in this respect it differs not only from the
modern bourgeoisie but also from the feudal nobility. Even where
entrepreneurial monopolies coordinate prominent elements of the
haute bourgeoisie, we do not find the business class as a whole
hierarchically and formally organized, as were the vassals of feudal
countries. The organizational unity of the feudal lords reached its
peak in their combined (national) military actions; but both the
scope of these actions and the disciplinary controls exercised by the
supreme leader were very restricted. For the most part the lords
were independently concerned with their own military, economic,
and social affairs. The serving men of hydraulic despotism were
organized as a per manently operating and highly centralized
"apparatus." In contrast to the bourgeois upper class, which has no
recognized head, and in contrast also to the feudal lords, whose
recognized head was the first among equals in a conspicuously
decentralized order, the men of the hydraulic apparatus state held
their ruler to be the supreme leader, who always and unconditionally
determined their position and tasks. Prior to the rise of the modern
industrial apparatus state, the men of a hydraulic government were
the only major example of a ruling class, whose operational core
permanently functioned as an organized, centralized, and
semimilitary entity.
 g66 classes in hydraulic society 2. Authoritarian Bodies Do
Not Necessarily Exert Total Power Even a formidable authoritarian
body cannot prevail totally as long as significant countervailing
forces exert a restraining or controlling influence on it. Both in
Periclean Athens and in a modern industrial democracy the army is
an authoritarian organization; its commanders expect, and have the
means to enforce, unquestioning obedience. But in each case it is
subordinated to the decisions of an over-all and democratically
established political body. Manifestly no society is without its
authoritarian segments, but in a democratic society such segments
can be supervised and controlled. Awareness of this fact is essential
for a proper evaluation of the effects (and the limitations) of
authoritarian patterns in Big Business, Big Labor, and Big
Government that appear in modern property-based civilizations. The
absolutist governments of late and postfeudal Europe had to cope
with such forces as an organized nobility, the Church, the guilds, and
the rising capitalist middle classes. These governments were
authoritarian enough, and they strove hard to exert exclusive (total)
power. But on the whole they were unable to do so, because they
were unable to attain a monopoly of societal leadership. 3. Monopoly
versus Competition in Societal Leadership Societal leadership may be
exerted by several groups or classes that in various ways offset one
another. Or it may be exerted monopolistically by a single group or
class. Manifestly, a group that exerts monopolistic leadership
behaves differently from a group that, despite its superior strength,
is unable to crush its rivals. In postfeudal Europe and Japan state
power and active (entrepreneurial) property gave rise to several
upper classes; and no class succeeded in establishing exclusive
(total) prominence. More recently the owners of land and capital are
being confronted with a new type of rival: the owners of a special
kind of property, labor. Today labor openly contests the political and
social leadership of the old upper classes. In hydraulic society
development took a different course. There the rise of propertied
classes — artisans, merchants, and landowners — did not involve
the rise of competing upper classes. In semicomplex and complex
hydraulic societies the ranking officials accepted as inevitable, and in
some measure as desirable, the presence of men of wealth who
were detached from government. But even when these men were
 CHAPTER 8, K 367 numerous enough to constitute a class,
they did not compete with the bureaucratic upper class for social
and political leadership. They did not compete because they had no
opportunity to engage in a substantial political struggle. Neither at
the start nor later did these holders of independent small or large
property succeed in coordinating their forces into a national and
politically effective rival organization. In all probability the men of
the apparatus were not clearly aware of the threat that a rival
organization might pose. Most hydraulic societies originated prior to,
and far away from, the balanced agrarian societies that crystallized
in ancient Greece and Rome and in Medieval Europe and Japan. And
in most simple hydraulic societies the independent propertied groups
were too feeble to make their political will felt either in general
political assemblies or in estatelike corporations. Democratic tribal
traditions — where they existed — were apparently abandoned
either when, or before, they became a serious threat to the masters
of the agromanagerial regime. This may have happened in proto-
Sumerian society, but even in this case the evidence is weak. As a
rule the representatives of the young despotic states seem to have
kept the owners of private mobile or immobile property politically
atomized, sometimes by resorting to violence, but more often
without exerting any untoward physical or political effort. In late
medieval and postmedieval times the Orientally despotic states of
the Near East and Russia co-existed with European states that were
characterized by multiple political organizations. But except for post-
Muscovite Russia and 19th-century Turkey, there is little to show that
the Western pattern was consciously imitated in these nearby
Eastern lands. The Christian crusaders weakened the absolutist
power of Late Byzantium, but its men of property were unable to
create independent and effective feudal or burgher corporations. In
Turkey and Russia multiple political organizations appeared only
when the industrial revolution and the impact of Western power
created an altogether new national and international situation. 4.
Monopoly of Societal Leadership Appears in Oriental Despotism as
Monopoly of Bureaucratic Organization ("Monopoly Bureaucracy")
The freedom to compete involves the freedom to organize; and it
involves the freedom, when conditions permit, to use bureaucratic
devices for developing and perpetuating organizational bonds. The
corporate barons and burghers of the feudal world utilized bureau 
 g68 CLASSES IN HYDRAULIC SOCIETY cratic means only to
a modest degree. But the history of the medieval Church shows that
during that era a powerful nongovernmental body could erect, if it
wanted to, impressive bureaucratic structures. In the modern
countries of central and western Europe, in America, Australia and
Japan, many smaller and larger bureaucracies exist outside and
independent of government. Aristocratic landlords, where they still
survive, may employ bureaucratic devices to protect their interests.
Merchants, industrialists, and bankers run large enterprises with
bureaucratically organized staffs; and when they combine to achieve
comprehensive political goals, they create or support
bureaucratically organized lobbies or parties. Farmers, too, are
resorting more and more to bureaucratically coordinated action. And
trade unions and labor parties are gaining economic and political
prominence, because they effectively use bureaucratic methods to
realize the organizational potential inherent in the concentration of
workers in large plants. Of all these developments, the expansion of
large business enterprises into monopolistic giants has been
particularly commented upon by certain analysts, who viewed it as
so outstanding a feature of our time that they decided to speak of
an entire period of "monopoly capitalism." The concept "monopoly
capitalism" is as provocative as it is misleading, but its very
deficiencies aid us in putting into proper relief the peculiarities of the
Oriental monopoly bureaucracy. The modern giant enterprises are
indeed formidable, both in dimension and influence; and they
certainly have crushed or absorbed many mediumsized and small
rivals. But only rarely have they been able to prevent the operations
of other giants in different branches of economy. And never have
they been able to prevent the rise of big societal rivals, such as Big
Government and Big Labor. "Monopoly capitalism" is therefore a
misnomer for an institutional conformation in which multiple societal
forces, however monopolistically inclined, counterbalance each other
so as to preclude the exclusive leadership of any one of them. No
such checks weaken the monopolistic claims of a total apparatus
state. The masters of hydraulic society permit no conspicuous and
bureaucratically organized rivals. They exert exclusive leadership by
ruthlessly and continually operating as a genuine monopoly
bureaucracy.
 CHAPTER 9 V he rise and fall of the theory of the Asiatic
mode of production Such is hydraulic society, as it emerges from our
inquiry. This society persisted over millennia — indeed until it
suffered the impact of the rising industrial and commercial West.
Then chain reactions were set in motion that gave the old order a
new shape and a new direction. Does our analysis of traditional
hydraulic society enable us to understand these recent
developments? At this point the reader who has followed us so far
may want to ask some questions. The concept of hydraulic society,
he may say, seems to have been eminently productive for the study
of the past. But is it also useful for evaluating the present and the
future? Isn't the "feudal" interpretation of Oriental conditions equally
appropriate? Certainly it indicates the vigorous condemnation of an
evil heritage — and already it is widely employed in the East and in
the West. This may well be so. However, in our context vigor and
currency can scarcely be decisive criteria. The history of social and
racial demagoguery shows that false slogans pervert man's thoughts
and deeds — the more disastrously, the more often and the more
insistently they are uttered. By equating the Orient and feudal
Europe, we lose sight of basic differences. And by ignoring the
existence of major non- Western societies, we run the danger of
abandoning the freedom of historical choice, because we are
paralyzed by the fiction of a unilinear and irresistible development.
No such danger resulted from the efforts of the 19th-century
unilinealists whose errors are easily recognized. Essentially it is a
product of contemporary Marxism-Leninism, which combines
ideological and political means to liquidate both the theory of
Oriental society and the concept of a multilinear development.
Unidentified, this Marxist-Leninist force may block the analysis of
hydraulic society in transition — not by open argument, but by
creating an enervating atmosphere of ambivalence and distrust.
Prop369
 SJ70 THE ASIATIC MODE OF PRODUCTION erly identified,
it will give a new impetus to the study of the facts — and the
potentialities — of a multiform and changing world. A. OLD AND
NEW CONSTRUCTS OF A UNILINEAR DEVELOPMENT DISREGARD
HYDRAULIC SOCIETY 1. 19TH-CENTURY UNILINEALISTS The
unilinealists of the 19th century disregarded hydraulic society, not
because they shunned the reality of bureaucratic despotism but
because they were inspired by the stupendous consequences of the
industrial revolution. Overgeneralizing the experience of a rapidly
changing Western world, they naively postulated a simple, unilinear,
and progressive course of societal growth. Man seemed to move
irresistibly toward freedom (Hegel), toward universal harmony
(Fourier), toward a just and rational society (Comte), toward general
happiness (Spencer). Archaeologists began to distinguish a scale of
"ages" based on the use of stone, bronze, and iron; and ethnologists
arranged selected features of primitive life in consecutive "stages."
By defining the "Paleolithic" and "Neolithic" as forerunners of the
"Metal Age," Lubbock completed in 1865 what Thomson had
initiated in 1836. And in 1877 Morgan formulated his much cited
typological sequence: Old Stone Age (savagery), New Stone Age
(barbarism), and Iron Age (civilization). 2. Negative Criticisms The
19th-century evolutionists should certainly be praised for their efforts
to find structure and orderly change in the turbulent currents of
history. But their performance can hardly be deemed satisfactory, for
they were able to depict the higher civilizations as progressing
unilineally only by disregarding the fate of over one-half of the
people of the globe. Nor did the criticism that was subsequently
leveled against them close the gap, for it, too, failed to take into
account the stagnation of the hydraulic world. A wealth of new
anthropological and archaeological data enabled scholars such as
Boas to demonstrate that the 19th-century theoreticians "erred in
assuming a single unilinear evolution." l But the new insights were
accompanied by a stubborn reluctance to draw upon the facts of
Western and Oriental institutional history for a new multilinear
pattern of development. Said Boas: "Laws of development, except in
most generalized form, cannot be established and a detailed course
of growth cannot be predicted. All we can do is to watch and judge
day by day what we are doing by what we have learned and