Case 4:25-cv-00419-MW-MJF Document 1 Filed 09/30/25 Page 1 of 37

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

)
BRITTNEY BROWN, )
) CASE NO.:
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
ROGER A. YOUNG in his official capacity )
as Executive Director of the Florida Fish )
and Wildlife Conservation Commission, and )
MELISSA TUCKER, )
in her individual capacity, )
)
Defendants. )
/

COMPLAINT

In the wake of the killing of Charlie Kirk on September 10, 2025, many

individuals and groups posted visceral reactions to social media that covered a wide

range of perspectives and beliefs. Most people on social media almost certainly

encountered speech they found despicable, no matter where they fall on the political

spectrum. That is the nature of a democracy where free speech is protected. And just

as political violence has no place in a just society, the unbridled trampling of

constitutional protections has no place either. One of the outcomes of the tragedy of

Mr. Kirk’s death has been a tremendously increased fervor for censorship. Indeed,
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government actors at all levels have called for Americans to lose their jobs and

livelihoods because they exercised their right to freely express political views that

are controversial — a right Mr. Kirk himself exercised and encouraged for others.

Yet the basic freedom to talk about the biggest public issues of the day, and to debate

and even condemn the political views of others, is fundamental to our democracy.

And it is that basic freedom that the State of Florida has denied Plaintiff Brittney

Brown.

1. Plaintiff brings this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants for their violation of her First

and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff also demands damages against the

Defendants for losses occasioned by their unconstitutional retaliation against her in

violation of the First Amendment.

JURISDICTION

2. This suit is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress....

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3. This Court has “federal question” jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1331 to hear cases arising under the Constitution of the United States; under 28

U.S.C. § 1343(3) to redress the deprivation under color of state law of any right,

privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution; and under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4)

to secure equitable or other relief for the protection of civil rights.

4. The Court has the authority to issue declaratory judgments and

permanent injunctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, and Rule 65 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

5. The Court may enter an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988.

6. This Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent

violations of the Plaintiff’s rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution

of the United States and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, specifically seeking redress

for the deprivation under color of state statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or

usage of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of

the United States. The rights sought to be protected in this cause of action arise and

are secured under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

7. This action seeks a judicial determination of issues, rights, and

liabilities embodied in an actual and present controversy between the parties

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involving the constitutionality of certain policies and practices of Defendants. There

are substantial bona fide doubts, disputes, and questions that must be resolved

concerning Defendants’ actions taken under color and authority of state law and

procedures, in violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the First and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

VENUE

8. Venue is proper in the Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee

Division, since Defendants are situated in Tallahassee, and a substantial part of the

actions complained of occurred within the district and geographical area assigned to

the Tallahassee Division. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); N.D. Fla. R. 3.1.

PARTIES

9. Plaintiff, BRITTNEY BROWN, (hereinafter “Brown” or “Plaintiff”),

is an individual, sui juris, residing in Bay County, Florida.

10. Plaintiff is a skilled biologist by virtue of both academic training and

extensive on-the-job experience. Plaintiff graduated cum laude with a Bachelor of

Science in Fisheries, Wildlife, & Conservation Biology and a minor in Biological

Sciences from North Carolina State University.

11. At all times material hereto, Brown was employed by the Florida Fish

and Wildlife Conservation Commission (“FWC”) as a “Fisheries & Wildlife

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Biological Scientist III, Critical Wildlife Area Biologist”. She works in FWC’s

Wildlife Diversity Conservation Section, which exists within the Division of Habitat

and Species Conservation. As a Biological Scientist III, Plaintiff was principally

assigned the task of studying and monitoring imperiled shorebirds and seabirds on

Tyndall Air Force Base Critical Wildlife Area and adjacent beaches. Plaintiff also

assisted with diamondback terrapins and sea turtle operations and rescues.

12. Plaintiff was the principal author for FWC’s weekly and annual reports

to Tyndall Air Force Base partners, including, most recently, the “Tyndall Critical

Wildlife Area 2024 Nesting Season Summary”.

13. Plaintiff assisted with in-field training pertaining to the FWC shorebird

program both for new FWC staff and for volunteers.

14. Plaintiff was employed by FWC for approximately seven years.

15. Plaintiff excelled at her job. She received performance-based raises

from her superiors every year since 2019. Her statewide team awarded her the “Got

Your Back Award” at the 2024 FWC Shorebird Program Meeting (“For always

supporting their colleagues”). This year, she has been advised by her peers that they

intend to nominate her for the Division of Habitat and Species Conservation’s

“Purveyor of Awesomeness Award”.

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16. Plaintiff’s work at FWC represented not just a livelihood, but a means

of pursuing her life’s passion while simultaneously providing socially and

scientifically valuable services.

17. Defendant, ROGER A. YOUNG (“Young”), is the Executive Director

of FWC. In that capacity, Young is responsible for carrying out all statutes and

regulations within the jurisdiction of the FWC. Young is also ultimately responsible

for all personnel decisions involving employees of the FWC, including the Plaintiff

herein. Young is sued only in his official capacity.

18. Defendant MELISSA TUCKER (“Tucker”) is a natural person, sui

juris, employed by the FWC as its Director of the Division of Habitat and Species

Conservation, which oversees the Wildlife Diversity Conservation Section. At all

times material to this action, Tucker acted in her capacity as Director of the Division

of Habitat and Species Conservation. Tucker was Plaintiff’s ultimate supervisor.

Tucker is sued in her individual capacity.

COLOR OF STATE LAW

19. Defendants are public officials and officials of a state agency and are

acting under color of state law and authority.

20. Defendants’ actions, taken under color of state law, violate Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights to engage in free speech.

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FACTS RELATIVE TO PLAINTIFF’S TERMINATION

21. Plaintiff has a private social media account on Instagram which is

accessible by friends and acquaintances who “follow” her but is not accessible to all

Internet users. The Instagram account has no connection with Plaintiff’s work for

the FWC; it is a purely private account.

22. Plaintiff follows a social media account on Instagram called

“@awhalefact”, 1 which is a parody/satirical account that pretends to speak on behalf

of a whale. The @awhalefact posts include a variety of messages, some which are

silly:

1
https://www.instagram.com/awhalefact/.

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and some of which comment on matters of public concern – often from a wry or

idiosyncratic viewpoint 2:

23. On or about Wednesday, September 10, 2025, @awhalefact posted the

following on Instagram:

“the whales are deeply saddened to learn of the shooting of charlie kirk, haha
just kidding, they care exactly as much as charlie kirk cared about children
being shot in their classrooms, which is to say, not at all”3

24. The @awhalefact post references the shooting of Mr. Kirk on

September 10, 2025, and his past controversial remarks on school shootings. Mr.

Kirk was a prominent conservative activist who was known for sharing his often

controversial viewpoints through podcasts and debates on college campuses. 4

2
https://www.instagram.com/awhalefact/; posts of 9/20/22 and 4/14/19,
respectively (last accessed 9/30/25).
3
It appears that this post was subsequently removed as it is not presently accessible.
4
See generally https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charlie_Kirk (last accessed 9/30/25).

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Among the views he shared was that “it’s worth to have a cost of, unfortunately,

some gun deaths every single year so that we can have the Second Amendment to

protect our other God-given rights” and that school shootings could best be

addressed by having more armed guards at schools. 5

25. On the same date, Plaintiff, who was on vacation and out of state,

reposted @awhalefact’s message to her “story” on her private Instagram account.

26. A repost is essentially copying and pasting a message from another

website or social media source onto one’s own site or page to share with one’s

followers. A story is a feature on Instagram that temporarily displays your post for

24 hours before it is automatically archived. If your account settings are set to

“private”, as Brown’s were, stories are visible only to the followers you have

accepted.

27. Plaintiff intended her repost to convey a particularized political

message which is apparent from the text itself. That political message incorporates

the following ideas:

5
Media Matters Staff, Charlie Kirk: “It’s worth to have a cost of, unfortunately,
some gun deaths every single year so that we can have the Second Amendment”,
Media Matters for America, Apr. 6, 2023, https://www.mediamatters.org/charlie-
kirk/charlie-kirk-its-worth-have-cost-unfortunately-some-gun-deaths-every-single-
year-so-we.

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A. Nature is indifferent to human affairs.

B. Mr. Kirk’s ideology included supporting gun rights even at the expense

of innocents, such as children in their classrooms.

28. Plaintiff’s political statement does not condone Mr. Kirk’s killing; nor

does it call for further violence.

29. Mr. Kirk was a public figure widely known for his controversial

political views, and his death is a matter of public concern. At the time Plaintiff

reposted this message, Mr. Kirk’s killing was the topic of discussion across the

nation. The President and much of his cabinet attended Mr. Kirk’s memorial along

with some 90,000 of his followers. 6 Mr. Kirk’s legacy remains a point of contention

among both politicians and citizens in Florida and everywhere else in the country.

30. Plaintiff’s political post is fully protected by the First Amendment to

the United States Constitution, made effective against the States through the

incorporation doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment.

31. Political speech on matters of public interest and concern lies at the core

of the First Amendment.

6
See https://www.foxnews.com/politics/charlie-kirk-honored-90k-one-largest-
memorials-private-citizen (last accessed 9/30/25).

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32. Plaintiff’s post does not fall within any of the narrow categories of

speech which are excluded from the protection of the First Amendment: 7

A. Plaintiff’s post did not pose any risk of imminent incitement to lawless

action and did not include any “fighting words”; it was a political statement

disseminated by way of the Internet; was not directed at any particular person or

group; did not employ any epithets or racial slurs; was sent under calm

circumstances; and did not call for the commission of any violent act.

B. Plaintiff’s post was not a true threat; the post did not threaten anyone

but merely stated a political opinion about a political figure.

C. Plaintiff’s post was not obscene in whole or in part; the post does not

depict or describe any sexual act that might appeal to the prurient interest.

D. Plaintiff’s post was not defamatory in whole or in part; the post

represented a pure political opinion which cannot be proven true or false and which

contained obvious elements of rhetorical hyperbole.

E. Plaintiff’s post was not associated with any criminal conspiracy and

was not integral to criminal conduct; no crime was suggested, contemplated, or

associated with this political post.

7
See generally United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010); Counterman
v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 73–74 (2023).

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F. Plaintiff’s post was not involved in any fraud and did not propose any

fraudulent transaction; the post was a noncommercial political statement.

G. Plaintiff’s post did not invade any registered copyright, trademark or

patent or otherwise infringe anyone’s intellectual property rights.

H. Plaintiff’s post was not treasonous or a call for insurrection, nor did it

betray any state secrets or threaten the nation’s security.

33. Plaintiff’s repost was not connected with her employment in any

respect. Plaintiff alleges the following particulars:

A. The repost was not shared during work hours and did not involve any

State property, money, or resources. Instead, the repost was shared from Brown’s

personal phone while she was on vacation out of state.

B. Plaintiff’s post was not made in connection with her employment and

was not part of her job responsibilities.

C. Plaintiff was employed as a wildlife biologist and not as a public

information officer. In addition, the death of Mr. Kirk has nothing to do with the

function or purposes of the FWC.

D. While the post mentioned whales, Plaintiff’s job duties do not involve

whales; indeed, whales are outside of FWC jurisdiction except for the rare instances

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when a whale gets stuck on shore or a carcass washes ashore. Even still, Plaintiff

would have no job duties related to whales.

E. The FWC did not request or direct Plaintiff to make this repost.

F. Plaintiff did not identify herself as an employee of the FWC on her

Instagram account. The FWC is not mentioned anywhere in the text of the repost,

Plaintiff does not appear in any recognizable uniform, and there would be no reason

for the general public to link or associate Plaintiff’s post with the FWC.

G. Plaintiff was not purporting to speak for or on behalf of the FWC; the

text and circumstances show that Plaintiff was making a purely personal political

statement unconnected with her employer.

34. On Sunday, September 14, 2025, at approximately 9:48 A.M. Central

Time an individual or group known as “Libs of TikTok” shared a screenshot of

Brown’s post aside a screenshot of her LinkedIn profile on x.com. The screenshot

was accompanied by text suggesting that Plaintiff should be fired from her position

at the FWC8:

8
https://x.com/libsoftiktok/status/1967254164876272097 (last accessed 9/30/25).

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35. The general public would never have known that Plaintiff was a public

employee of any agency but for the doxing 9 engaged in by the “Libs of Tik Tok”

account on social-media platform X.

36. Libs of TikTok is a username for various social-media accounts

operated by Chaya Raichik, who uses the accounts to repost content created

by politically liberal people on various social-media platforms, often with mocking

or derogatory commentary.

9
Doxing involves making someone’s private or identifying information public,
usually with malicious intent.

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37. On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that Libs of TikTok is

closely followed by senior officials in the DeSantis administration and in Florida’s

Legislature.

38. On that same September 14, 2025, Sunday evening, at 5:34 P.M.

Central Time — mere hours after the Libs of TikTok tweet — an official with the

FWC posted the following statement: “We’ve been made aware of an FWC

employee’s recent social media post and we do not condone nor tolerate this type of

hateful sentiment. We’re actively working towards a swift and immediate resolution

regarding this individual’s employment.” This statement was posted officially

through the FWC X account10:

10
https://x.com/MyFWC/status/1967356249022009566 (last accessed 9/30/25).
Screenshots to this and other social media posts include herein were taken in the
Eastern time zone, so timestamps reflect eastern, rather than central, time.

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39. The FWC press release was made after hours on a weekend. On

information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that the FWC seldom, if ever, issues a press

release outside of normal 9–5 hours during the work week.

40. At approximately 8:55 A.M. Central Time on September 15, 2025 —

less than 24 hours after the publication of the Libs of TikTok post, Plaintiff received

a call from her direct supervisor asking her to come into the office. Plaintiff was told

to choose between resignation and termination.

41. Plaintiff responded that she wished to consult with an attorney.

42. At approximately 9:35 A.M. Central Time on September 15, 2025, the

Regional Director of the FWC came onto Plaintiff’s property accompanied by a law

enforcement officer. The Regional Director delivered a termination letter advising

Plaintiff that she had been fired from her employment. A copy of the termination

letter is attached as Exhibit “1” to this Complaint.

43. On information and belief, Defendant Young made the decision to

terminate Plaintiff after consultations with senior officials in the DeSantis

administration.

44. The formal termination of Plaintiff’s employment was carried out by

Defendant Tucker, who executed the termination letter.

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45. At 9:45 A.M. Central Time, Libs of TikTok posted a statement on X

confirming that FWC had terminated Plaintiff’s employment 11:

46. At 10:55 A.M. Central Time, FWC released another press release on X

announcing that Plaintiff had been fired 12:

11
https://x.com/libsoftiktok/status/1967600668275003748 (last accessed 9/30/25).
12
https://x.com/MyFWC/status/1967618398873084198 (last accessed 9/30/25).

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47. That post stated:

“This weekend, we were made aware of a deeply troubling

incident involving an FWC employee who shared a social media
post that made light of the assassination of Mr. Kirk. The
comments and actions of this individual are not in line with the
FWC, our values, or our mission. We have a zero-tolerance
policy towards the promotion of violence and hate, and we will
not stand for such behavior. Upon learning of the social media
post, FWC leadership took swift action, terminating the
individual. We expect all our employees to conduct themselves
with the utmost professionalism and always keep the public’s
trust in mind.”

48. The X post confirms that FWC terminated Plaintiff because her

political commentary “made light of the assassination of Charlie Kirk” which was

“not in line with the FWC[’s] values”. The FWC post confirms that this official

agency action was taken by “FWC leadership”.

49. Defendants object to the content of Plaintiff’s speech and the particular

viewpoint expressed in her political statement.

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50. Defendants specifically object to the viewpoint expressed by Plaintiff:

indifference to Mr. Kirk’s killing. That viewpoint-based discrimination is

demonstrated by the following:

A. Defendants have not terminated anyone for publicly mourning Mr.

Kirk’s death.

B. In its public statement, the FWC claimed that Plaintiff’s post is “not in

line” with the agency’s “values”.

51. Defendants’ actions here were based on their opposition to the content

and viewpoint of Plaintiff’s speech and not based on any good faith belief that

Plaintiff’s post would disrupt the ability of the FWC to function, upset its ability to

deliver state services, or lead to dissension in the office. Plaintiff alleges the

following particulars:

A. No disruption occurred on the workdays following the time Plaintiff

reposted on Instagram.

B. Defendant Young apparently made his decision to terminate Plaintiff

within hours of the Libs of TikTok post on a Sunday before the next workday

commenced. As FWC publicly announced, “Upon learning of the social media post,

FWC leadership took swift action.” There was literally no opportunity for disruption

to occur.

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C. Defendants’ decision to terminate Plaintiff came at a time when none,

or practically none, of Plaintiff’s colleagues were even aware of the post.

D. Because the post was made to Plaintiff’s private Instagram account

where she has a circumscribed group of followers and was set to disappear after 24

hours, it was extremely unlikely that more than a handful of her co-workers would

ever have become aware of the post, but for Defendants’ and Libs of TikTok’s

amplification of the issue.

E. On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that none of her co-workers

complained about her post.

F. Plaintiff continues to receive support and cordiality from her

colleagues.

G. Plaintiff has no supervisory responsibilities in her job position; she is a

low-level employee.

H. Plaintiff is a scientist, not a public information officer, and her primary

job duties do not include regular interaction with the public on behalf of the FWC.

Her natural constituency is birds; not human beings.

I. FWC has no formal policies governing the private social media

activities of its employees. While FWC does have policies governing the Internet

and media posts, those policies do not address personal posts by FWC employees on

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their own accounts. Instead, FWC’s social media policies deal exclusively with the

use of FWC’s “Information Technology Resources” 13 and posts on the agency’s own

social media accounts. 14

52. Instead of supporting Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, and those of

other dissenting individuals, Defendants rushed to capitulate to the Libs of TikTok

heckler’s veto and make a political example of Brown.

53. Defendants’ decision to terminate Plaintiff was based on objections to

Plaintiff’s speech. Plaintiff alleges the following particulars:

A. Plaintiff was told of no other rationale for her termination or given an

opportunity to discuss alternatives to termination.

B. Plaintiff’s political statement was brought to the attention of

Defendants (and senior officials in the DeSantis administration) by way of a public

13
See “FWC Internal Management Policies and Procedures (IMPP)”,
https://impp.myfwc.com/3.7-Information-Technology-Resource-Usage-Policy.pdf
(last accessed 9/30/25). Plaintiff did not make use of any public resources or
facilities when making her private political post.
14
See “Social Media Comment Policy – Revised in 2023,”
https://myfwc.com/news/social/ (last accessed 9/30/25). The Social Media
Comment Policy does not state that termination is a remedy for posts on FWC sites.
Instead, the policy only states that improper posts are subject to FWC’s “right to
report, hide or delete submissions”. Id. In any event, no social media policy for a
public agency can limit the protections afforded by the First Amendment.

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media campaign by a partisan individual wielding a particularly loud heckler’s veto.

C. The timing of Plaintiff’s termination leaves no doubt that it was

motivated purely in response to her political statement.

D. Defendants nowhere claim that Plaintiff’s political statement disrupted

or had any potential to disrupt the FWC’s ability to deliver services or effectively

administer its programs.

E. Even ignoring all of the foregoing facts, Defendants readily admit —

and effectively brag — in their public statements that the firing was based

exclusively on Plaintiff’s speech.

54. On information and belief, Defendants intended this termination to chill

the future speech of all FWC employees by making a public example of Plaintiff.

55. There is a direct causal connection between Plaintiff’s political speech

and Defendants’ decision to terminate her employment; the timing and substance of

the FWC press statements leave no doubt.

ALLEGATIONS IN SUPPORT OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

56. Plaintiff’s free speech has been chilled now, and in the future, as she

has been deprived of her very livelihood as a consequence of her speech.

57. Unless the actions, policies, and practices of Defendants are enjoined

by this Court, Plaintiff will suffer the continuing loss of her constitutional rights.

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58. Plaintiff has suffered irreparable injury and continues to suffer

irreparable injury as a result of the Defendants’ actions, policies, and practices.

59. Plaintiff will continue to suffer the violation of her First Amendment

rights unless and until she is restored to her employment and position at FWC.

60. Plaintiff does not have a plain, adequate, or complete remedy to protect

her constitutional rights and to redress the wrongs and illegal acts complained of,

other than immediate and continuing injunctive relief.

61. Plaintiff does not have an adequate remedy at law. Deprivation of rights

guaranteed under the Constitution is an irreparable injury for purposes of injunctive

relief. In cases involving the loss of First Amendment rights, such as in this case,

monetary damages are inadequate.

62. The public interest would be served by the granting of injunctive relief.

In fact, the public interest is disserved by actions, such as those of Defendants, which

interfere with the public’s rights guaranteed under the First Amendment.

63. A permanent injunction will preserve Plaintiff’s civil rights and will

minimize the need to award extensive compensatory damages.

DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES

64. Because of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth

Amendment rights have been violated and Plaintiff is faced with similar and repeated

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violations of her rights in the future.

65. Plaintiff has suffered economic losses, including the lost income from

employment she would have received but for her illegal and unconstitutional

termination.

66. Plaintiff has retained Benjamin, Aaronson, Edinger & Patanzo, P.A.

and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Inc. as her attorneys

to represent her in this action. Defendants are obligated to pay Plaintiff’s attorney’s

fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

COUNT I
First Amendment Violation - Retaliation
(Against Young)

67. Plaintiff realleges the facts set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 66 and

incorporate those facts into this Count by reference.

68. This is an action for declaratory relief and injunctive relief brought by

the Plaintiff against Young under this Court’s general jurisdiction and pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

69. Plaintiff is uncertain as to her rights and remedies following the

termination of her employment in apparent violation of the First Amendment to the

United States Constitution.

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70. In posting the political comment concerning the death of Mr. Kirk,

Plaintiff spoke as a private citizen.

71. Plaintiff’s comments concerning the death of Mr. Kirk addressed

matters of public concern.

72. Defendant Young took adverse action against Plaintiff — specifically

her discharge from employment and the associated wages and benefits.

73. Defendant Young had the actual authority to bring disciplinary charges

against Plaintiff, including her discharge from employment.

74. The termination notice ordered by Young and signed and executed by

Tucker gave effect to and implemented the disciplinary action against Plaintiff.

75. Defendant Young’s actions directly deprived Plaintiff of her First

Amendment rights.

76. Defendant Young’s adverse action was in direct response to Plaintiff’s

protected political speech.

77. Plaintiff’s political post was the motivating factor in Defendant

Young’s decision to take retaliatory action against Plaintiff. Defendant Young

immediately terminated Plaintiff because of her private political comments on a

matter of public importance.

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78. Defendant Young’s response to Plaintiff’s expression was sufficient to

deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in expressive activity.

79. Defendant Young’s actions have chilled Plaintiff’s speech.

80. Defendant Young’s actions were based on his objections to the content

of Plaintiff’s speech and the particular viewpoint expressed, all in direct retaliation

for Plaintiff’s speech.

81. Defendant Young’s decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment was

motivated by FWC’s opposition to Plaintiff’s viewpoint, which the FWC labeled as

contrary to its “values”.

82. Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of her claims.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the following relief:

A. That this Court take jurisdiction over the parties and this cause;

B. That this Court enter a judgment declaring that Defendant Young’s

decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment violated the First Amendment because

it was content-based;

C. That this Court enter a judgment declaring that Defendant Young’s

decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment violated the First Amendment because

it was viewpoint-based;

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D. That this Court enter a preliminary and permanent injunction

reinstating Plaintiff’s employment and restoring Plaintiff to her associated position

and responsibilities;

E. That this Court enter a preliminary and permanent injunction forever

enjoining Defendant and the various agents and employees of FWC from

disciplining Plaintiff in the future for posting the specific political statement at the

center of this lawsuit in the exercise of her First Amendment rights;

F. That this Court enter a judgment for benefits and credit for job seniority

for any time after the FWC ceased to pay Plaintiff;

G. That this Court enter a judgment for front pay in the event reinstatement

is not granted;

H. That this Court enter a judgment for pre-judgment and post-judgment

interest at the highest lawful rate;

I. That this Court award Plaintiff nominal damages;

J. That this Court award Plaintiff her recoverable costs and reasonable

attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and

K. That this Court award Plaintiff all other relief in law and in equity to

which she may be entitled.

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COUNT II
First Amendment Violation - Content and Viewpoint Discrimination
(Against Young)

83. Plaintiff realleges the facts set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 66 and

incorporates those facts into this Count by reference.

84. This is an action for declaratory relief and injunctive relief brought by

the Plaintiff against Young under this Court’s general jurisdiction and pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

85. Plaintiff is uncertain as to her rights and remedies following the

termination of her employment in apparent violation of the First Amendment to the

United States Constitution.

86. In posting the political comment concerning the death of Mr. Kirk,

Plaintiff spoke as a private citizen.

87. Plaintiff’s comments concerning the death of Mr. Kirk addressed

matters of public concern.

88. Plaintiff’s interest in speaking as a private citizen on matters of public

concern necessarily outweighs Defendants’ interests in advancing content- or

viewpoint-discrimination.

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89. Plaintiff’s interest in speaking as a private citizen on matters of public

concern outweighs Defendants’ interest in content and viewpoint discrimination or

imposing a heckler’s veto.

90. Defendant Young terminated Plaintiff’s employment because of

Defendant’s opposition to the content of Plaintiff’s political statement, or because

of public reactions to Plaintiff’s message, or both.

91. Defendant Young never asserted that Plaintiff’s political speech would

upset the orderly operations of the FWC, nor were such disruptions reasonably

foreseeable given the limited publication of Plaintiff’s private speech, the lack of

knowledge by her co-workers, Plaintiff’s position and job responsibilities, and the

content of Plaintiff’s speech.

92. Plaintiff’s speech did not, in fact, disrupt FWC’s operations.

93. Public reaction to speech is never a content-neutral basis for regulation.

See Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992). A heckler’s

veto is a viewpoint-based limitation on expression and is impermissible under the

First Amendment.

94. The First Amendment prohibits government officials from

discriminating against speech “based on the ideas or opinions it conveys.” Iancu v.

Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors

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of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–30 (1995) (action taken against a speaker because

of “its message” is viewpoint discrimination). Viewpoint discrimination is an

“egregious form of content discrimination” and is “presumptively unconstitutional.”

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30.

95. Defendant Young’s decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment is the

product of viewpoint discrimination and is in retaliation for Plaintiff’s speech.

96. Defendant Young’s decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment was

motivated by FWC’s opposition to Plaintiff’s viewpoint, which the FWC labeled as

contrary to its “values”.

97. Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of her claims.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the following relief:

A. That this Court take jurisdiction over the parties and this cause;

B. That this Court enter a judgment declaring that Defendant Young’s

decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment violated the First Amendment because

it was content-based;

C. That this Court enter a judgment declaring that Defendant Young’s

decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment violated the First Amendment because

it was viewpoint-based;

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D. That this Court enter a preliminary and permanent injunction

reinstating Plaintiff’s employment and restoring Plaintiff to her associated position

and responsibilities;

E. That this Court enter a preliminary and permanent injunction forever

enjoining Defendant and the various agents and employees of FWC from

disciplining in the future Plaintiff for posting the specific political statement at the

center of this lawsuit in the exercise of her First Amendment rights;

F. That this Court enter a judgment benefits and credit for job seniority

for any time after the FWC ceased to pay Plaintiff;

G. That this Court enter a judgment for front pay in the event reinstatement

is not granted;

H. That this Court enter a judgment for pre-judgment and post-judgment

interest at the highest lawful rate;

I. That this Court award Plaintiff nominal damages;

J. That this Court award Plaintiff her recoverable costs and reasonable

attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and

K. That this Court award Plaintiff all other relief in law and in equity to

which she may be entitled.

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COUNT III
First Amendment Violation - Content and Viewpoint Discrimination
(Against Tucker)

98. Plaintiff reallege the facts set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 55 and 64

through 66, and incorporate those facts into this Count by reference.

99. This is an action for declaratory relief and injunctive relief brought by

the Plaintiff against Defendant Tucker under this Court’s general jurisdiction and

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

100. Plaintiff is uncertain as to her rights and remedies following the

termination of her employment in apparent violation of the First Amendment to the

United States Constitution.

101. In posting the political comment concerning the death of Mr. Kirk,

Plaintiff spoke as a private citizen.

102. Plaintiff’s comments concerning the death of Mr. Kirk addressed

matters of public concern.

103. Plaintiff’s interest in speaking as a private citizen on matters of public

concern necessarily outweighs the Defendants’ interests in advancing content- or

viewpoint-discrimination.

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104. Plaintiff’s interest in speaking as a private citizen on matters of public

concern outweighs the Defendants’ interest in content and viewpoint discrimination

or imposing a heckler’s veto.

105. Defendant Young terminated Plaintiff’s employment because of

Defendants’ opposition to the content of Plaintiff’s political statement, or because

of public reactions to Plaintiff’s message, or both.

106. Defendant Young instructed Defendant Tucker to give effect to this

decision to terminate the Plaintiff. In particular, Young instructed Tucker to prepare

and execute a termination letter.

107. Defendant Tucker is the ultimate supervisor of Plaintiff’s division and

the official who executed the decision to terminate Plaintiff.

108. Tucker has actual knowledge that Plaintiff was being terminated solely

because of objections to the content of her political post.

109. Tucker has actual knowledge that Plaintiff was being terminated solely

because of objections to the particular viewpoint expressed in her political post.

110. Tucker shared Young’s objections to the content of Plaintiff’s speech

and the viewpoint expressed in Plaintiff’s post.

111. The First Amendment prohibits government officials from

discriminating against speech “based on the ideas or opinions it conveys.” Iancu v.

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Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors

of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–30 (1995) (action taken against a speaker because

of “its message” is viewpoint discrimination). Viewpoint discrimination is an

“egregious form of content discrimination” and is “presumptively unconstitutional.”

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30.

112. The law is clearly established that — where a public employee is

engaging in private public speech on a matter of public concern, and where no

disruption in government operations is shown — the government cannot terminate

or retaliate against the employee based on the content or viewpoint of their speech.

See, e.g., Travers v. Jones, 323 F.3d 1294, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2003) (“The law is

clearly established that an employer may not demote or discharge a public employee

for engaging in protected speech.”) (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383

(1987).

113. Even if the viewpoint-based discrimination at issue in this case does not

categorically preclude any claim for qualified immunity, the Pickering15 balancing

would lead to the inevitable conclusion that Plaintiff’s discharge was unlawful.

15
Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Illinois, 391 U.S.
563 (1968).

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114. Defendant Tucker intentionally violated Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth

Amendment rights for discriminatory and retaliatory purposes.

115. Tucker had actual knowledge or should have known that Young’s

instruction to terminate the Plaintiff in retaliation for her political speech was

unlawful and in violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.

116. The termination notice ordered by Young and signed and executed by

Tucker gave effect to and implemented the disciplinary action against Plaintiff.

117. Defendant’s decision to prepare, sign and execute the termination letter

discharging Plaintiff from her employment is the product of viewpoint

discrimination and is in retaliation for Plaintiff’s speech.

118. Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of her claims.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the following relief:

A. That this Court take jurisdiction over the parties and this cause;

B. That this Court enter a judgment declaring that Defendant Tucker’s

actions in preparing, signing, and executing the termination letter discharging

Plaintiff from her employment violated the First Amendment because it was content-

based;

C. That this Court enter a judgment declaring that Defendant Tucker’s

actions in preparing, signing, and executing the termination letter discharging

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Plaintiff from her employment violated the First Amendment because it was

viewpoint-based;

D. That this Court enter a judgment for back pay in amounts to be

determined at trial, along with benefits and credit for job seniority for any time after

the FWC ceased to pay Plaintiff;

E. That this Court enter a judgment for front pay, in the event

reinstatement is not granted;

F. That this Court enter a judgement for pre-judgment and post-judgment

interest at the highest lawful rate;

G. That this Court award Plaintiff nominal damages;

H. That this Court award compensatory damages in an amount to be

determined at trial;

I. That this Court award punitive damages against Tucker to deter the

Defendant from violating Plaintiff’s rights and other similarly situated employees in

the future;

J. That this Court award Plaintiff her recoverable costs and reasonable

attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and

K. That this Court award Plaintiff all other relief in law and in equity to

which she may be entitled.

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JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable as a matter of right.

/s/ Gary S. Edinger

Caroline A. McNamara (FBN 1038312) GARY S. EDINGER, Esquire
Michelle Morton (FBN 81975) BENJAMIN, AARONSON, EDINGER
Samantha J. Past (FBN 1054519) & PATANZO, P.A.
Daniel B. Tilley (FBN 102882) Florida Bar No. 0606812
ACLU FOUNDATION OF FLA. 305 N.E. 1st Street
4343 West Flagler Street, Suite 400 Gainesville, Florida 32601
Miami, FL 33134 Tel.: (352) 338-4440
Tel.: (786) 363-2714 Fax.: (352) 337-0696
cmcnamara@aclufl.org GSEdinger12@gmail.com
mmorton@aclufl.org
spast@aclufl.org
dtilley@aclufl.org

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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