Kho, Jr.

, [J]

G.R. No. 263590, June 27, 2023,

Decision,
Separate Opinion, Gesmundo, [CJ]
Separate Concurring Opinion, Singh, [J]
Separate Concurring Opinion, Dimaampao, [J]
Separate Concurring Opinion, Zalameda, [J]
Concurring Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
Separate Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
Separate Concurring Opinion, Leonen, [J]

Manila

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 263590. June 27, 2023 ]

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THROUGH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 263673]

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 ATTY. ALBERTO N. HIDALGO, ATTY. ALUINO O. ALA, ATTY. AGERICO
A. AVILA, ATTY. TED CASSEY B. CASTELLO, ATTY. JOYCE IVY C.
MACASA, AND ATTY. FRANCES MAY C. REALINO, PETITIONERS, VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, DULY REPRESENTED BY ITS SENATE PRESIDENT, JUAN
MIGUEL ZUBIRI, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DULY
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, FERDINAND MARTIN
ROMUALDEZ, AND THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DULY
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, GEORGE ERWIN M. GARCIA,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

KHO, JR., J.:

The importance of the people's choice must be the paramount

consideration in every election, for the Constitution has vested in
them the right to freely select, by secret-ballot in clean elections, the
men and women who shall make laws for them or govern in their
name and behalf. The people have a natural and a constitutional
right to participate directly in the form of government under which
they live. Such a right is among the most important and sacred of
the freedoms inherent in a democratic society and one which must be
most vigilantly guarded if a people desires to maintain through self-
government for themselves and their posterity a genuinely
functioning democracy in which the individual may, in accordance
with law, have a voice in the form of his government and in the
choice of the people who will run that government for him.

- Geronimo v. Ramos, 221 Phil. 130, 141 (1985)

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 [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc]

Before Us are consolidated Petitions assailing the constitutionality of

Republic Act No. (RA) 11935, entitled "An Act Postponing the December
2022 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, Amending for the
Purpose Republic Act No. 9164, As Amended, Appropriating Funds
therefor, and for Other Purposes."

The Petitions are as follows:

1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Extremely Urgent Prayer

for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (WPMI) and for the Conduct of a
Special Raffle of this Case1 filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo B.
Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal), docketed as G.R. No. 263590; and

2. Petition2 for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for

the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction filed by petitioners
Attys. Alberto N. Hidalgo, Aluino O. Ala, Agerico A. Avila, Ted Cassey
B. Castello, Joyce Ivy C. Macasa, and Frances May C. Realino (Atty.
Hidalgo, et al.), docketed as G.R. No. 263673.

THE FACTS

1. On October 10, 2022, President Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos, Jr.

approved RA 11935, the salient portions of which include:

a. The postponement of the barangay and sangguniang

kabataan elections (BSKE) scheduled on December 5, 2022 to a later
date, i.e., last Monday of October 2023; and

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 b. The authority given to incumbent barangay and sangguniang
kabataan (BSK) officials to remain in office until their successors have
been duly elected and qualified, unless sooner removed or suspended
for cause.

2. Pertinently, Sections 1 and 3 of RA 11935 read:

Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9164, as amended, is hereby

further amended to read as follows:

SECTION 1. Date of Election. — There shall be synchronized

barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections, which shall be held
on the last Monday of October 2023 and every three (3) years
thereafter.

xxxx

Section 3. Hold-Over. — Until their successors shall have been duly

elected and qualified, all incumbent barangay and sangguniang
kabataan officials shall remain in office, unless sooner removed or
suspended for cause: Provided, That barangay and sangguniang
kabataan officials who are ex officio members of the sangguniang
bayan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang panlalawigan, as
the case may be, shall continue to serve as such members in
the sanggunian concerned, until the next barangay
and sangguniang kabataan elections unless removed in accordance
with their existing rules or for cause.

G.R. No. 263590

On October 17, 2022, Atty. Macalintal filed the Petition subject of G.R.

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 No. 263590.3 In his Petition, Atty. Macalintal argues that RA 11935,
insofar as the barangay election is concerned, is unconstitutional,
considering that:

First, Congress has no power to postpone or cancel a scheduled

election because this power belongs to the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) after it has determined that serious causes, as provided
under Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
"Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines" (OEC),4 warrant such
postponement. Thus, by enacting a law postponing a scheduled
barangay election, Congress is in effect executing said provision of the
OEC and has overstepped its constitutional boundaries and assumed a
function that is reserved to the COMELEC.5

Second, the assailed law gives Congress the power to appoint

barangay officials whose term, as provided for by RA 11462,6 will
expire on December 31, 2022 in the guise of postponing the scheduled
December 5, 2022 barangay election and allowing the incumbent
barangay officials to continue serving until their successors are duly
elected and qualified. What Congress did is to make a "legislative
appointment" of these barangay officials, circumventing the legal
requirement that these barangay officials must be elected and not
appointed.7

Third, by arrogating unto itself the power to postpone the barangay

election, Congress effectively amended Section 5 of the OEC.8 This is
violative of the rule enshrined in the Constitution that every bill shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.9

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 Fourth, RA 11935 deprives the electorate of its right of suffrage by
extending the term of incumbent barangay officials whose term of
office is set to end on December 31, 2022.10

Fifth, while Congress has the power to fix the term of office of
barangay officials, it has no power to extend the same.11

Sixth, RA 11935 violates the State's guarantee of equal access to

opportunities for public service by postponing the barangay election
and depriving those who seek to be elected of an opportunity to serve
the public.12

Finally, RA 11935 violates the principle that barangay officials should

not have a term longer than that of their administrative superiors.
Under the assailed law, the term of the incumbent barangay officials
would exceed five years.13

In support of his application for TRO/WPMI, Atty. Macalintal alleges

that the COMELEC has already stopped its preparation for the
December 5, 2022 BSKE. He argues that the President is expected to
"undertake measures to enforce [the law] by recognizing said barangay
officials in holdover capacity and extending to them all emoluments and
financial benefits due a regular elected barangay official."14

Ultimately, the Petition in G.R. No. 263590 prays that RA 11935 be

declared unconstitutional; and that the COMELEC be directed to
proceed with the BSKE on December 5, 2022, or on a date reasonably
close to it.15

In a Resolution16 dated October 18, 2022, the Court, inter alia: (a)
required the respondents in G.R. No. 26359017 to file a comment on

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 the Petition and prayer for TRO/WPMI not later than 12:00 noon of
October 21, 2022; and (b) set oral arguments at 3:00 p.m. of even date.

In its Comment,18 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf

of the respondents in G.R. No. 263590, primarily argues that in order
to successfully invoke the Court's "expanded jurisdiction" under the
Constitution, Atty. Macalintal must show that the assailed action was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Here, the Petition contains no
allegation of grave abuse of discretion.19

Additionally, the OSG argues that the fact that no grave abuse of
discretion was alleged in the Petition should give the Court pause
before it exercises its power of judicial review, in view of the
fundamental principle of separation of powers, or the doctrine on
"political questions" or to the "enrolled bill rule"20 — more so in this
case, where the fundamental requisite of grave abuse of discretion is
missing.

Substantively, the OSG maintains that RA 11935 is valid and not

unconstitutional. The OSG contends that:

First, the Congress' power to legislate is plenary in nature, and

limitations thereto must be strictly construed to give due deference to
the constitutional grant of legislative power. As such, it has the
authority to pass laws relating to or affecting elections — including
the setting of the dates of the conduct and the postponement of the
BSKE — and to do so would not impinge on the COMELEC's powers
emanating either from the Constitution or the OEC.21

Second, there is no infringement on the electorate's right of suffrage,

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 considering that the postponement of the BSKE does not operate to
deprive them of such right. Rather, it merely adjusted the date by
which they shall exercise the same.22

Third, there is no denial of equal access to opportunities for public

service as RA 11935 does not provide for any restrictions or conditions
that would deprive any aspiring individual from joining the BSKE.23

Fourth, the hold-over provision in Section 3 of RA 11935 is not

tantamount to a legislative appointment. In fact, the legality of hold-
over provisions has already been upheld by various case law,
explaining that the same is necessary to preserve continuity in the
transaction of official businesses and to prevent a hiatus in
government office.24

Anent the prayer for TRO/WPMI, the OSG argues that Atty.
Macalintal has failed to prove his entitlement thereto.25

On October 21, 2022, the oral arguments for G.R. No.

263590 proceeded as scheduled, and thereafter, the parties were
instructed to submit their respective memoranda within 15 days from
the adjournment of the oral arguments.26 Both parties were able to
submit their respective Memoranda27 within such time.

G.R. No. 263673

Meanwhile, a day before the scheduled oral arguments for G.R. No.
263590, or on October 20, 2022, Atty. Hidalgo, et al. filed the Petition
subject of G.R. No. 263673. Procedurally, Atty. Hidalgo, et al. assert
that the requisites for the exercise by the Court of its judicial power of
review are met. Particularly:

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 First, the actual case or controversy consists of the fact that the
passage of RA 11935 into law, with its unconstitutional postponement
of the BSKE, is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Congress.

Second, as lawyers, taxpayers, and registered voters, petitioners have

legal standing to file the Petition as RA 11935 renders their right to
vote for barangay leaders practically inexistent.

Third, the signing by the President of RA 11935 into law made it

constitutionally ripe for adjudication.

Fourth, they raise the issue of unconstitutionality of RA 11935 at the

earliest opportunity, that is, when the President signed RA 11935 into
law.28

Finally, citing Arellano v. Gatdula,29 they argue that a special civil

action for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail actions of any
instrumentality or branch of the government on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.30

Substantively, Atty. Hidalgo, et al. posit that while the Constitution

vests upon the Congress the power to fix the term of office for
barangay officials, such power does not include the power to
postpone or suspend the BSKE as the same is constitutionally lodged
with the COMELEC. They likewise claim that a postponement of the
BSKE is tantamount to a term extension, which in turn, constitutes a
violation of the electorate's right to choose their own leaders, albeit
for a fixed period.31

As regards their prayer for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary

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 injunction, Atty. Hidalgo, et al. argue that the implementation of RA
11935 will cause grave and irreparable injury to them and to the
general public as they will be unduly prevented from casting their
votes in the BSKE which was scheduled on December 5, 2022.32 Thus,
Atty. Hidalgo, et al. pray that RA 11935 be declared null and void for
being patently unconstitutional, and that all persons acting on the
basis thereof be ordered to permanently cease and desist from
implementing the same.33

In a Resolution34 dated October 21, 2022, the Court directed: (a) the
respondents in G.R. No. 26367335 to comment on the Petition and
the prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction; and (b) the
consolidation of G.R. No. 263673 with G.R. No. 263590.

In its Comment,36 the OSG, on behalf of the respondents in G.R. No.

263673, reiterates that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
not available to Atty. Hidalgo, et al. The OSG adds that the petition
for mandamus is improper in this case because the remedy will lie only
to compel the performance of ministerial acts; the act in question, the
passage of RA 11935 in this case, is, however, not ministerial.

On the merits, the OSG maintains that RA 11935 is valid and not
unconstitutional. Essentially reiterating its arguments in its Comment
in G.R. No. 263590, the OSG asserts that due to the plenary nature of
the Congress' legislative power, it can pass laws relating to or
affecting elections. As such, it has the power to set or schedule, and
suspend or postpone the BSKE, and that such power is separate and
distinct from the constitutionally vested power to determine the term
of office of barangay officials.37

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 In addition to the foregoing, the OSG points out case law instructing
that the right to vote is not a natural right but a right created by law;
and as such, the State may regulate the same, subject only to the
requirement that any such regulations shall not impose literacy,
property, or any other substantive requirement on the exercise of
suffrage.38

Finally, the OSG contends in its Comment that while the

postponement of the BSKE under RA 11935 has somehow an indirect
or incidental effect on the electorate's right of suffrage, there is a
compelling state interest behind the same. In particular, the OSG,
citing the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Imee R. Marcos, points out
that the postponement of the BSKE is principally for the purpose of
allowing the Congress more time to review the present BSK systems,
among other practical considerations. Moreover, the ten-month
postponement of the BSKE (i.e., from December 5, 2022 to the last
Monday of October 2023) is the least restrictive means to protect
such compelling state interest as it is narrowly tailored to accomplish
the aforesaid purpose.39 As for the prayer for TRO and preliminary
injunction, the OSG similarly argues that Atty. Hidalgo, et al. failed to
show their entitlement thereto.40

THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT

The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether
RA 11935 — which, inter alia, postponed the BSKE scheduled on
December 5, 2022 to the last Monday of October 2023 — is
unconstitutional.

THE COURT'S RULING

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 I

At the core of the controversy is the apparent clash between two

fundamental interests in our democratic and republican society — one
is the people's exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed right of
suffrage, and the other is the Congress' exercise of its plenary
legislative power, which includes the power to regulate elections.

Petitioners claim an undue violation of their right of suffrage by the

Congress' act of postponing the BSKE. Respondents, on the other
hand, invoke the Congress' plenary power to legislate all matters for
the good and welfare of the people.

The Court's task therefore is to cast a legally sound and pragmatic

balance between these paramount interests.

Preliminarily, a discussion on the constitutional right of the people to

suffrage and the plenary power of the State to legislate through
Congress is in order.

II

A. Sovereignty and the Right of Suffrage

Sovereignty of the People

The sovereignty of the people is the core foundation of the

Constitution. It is for this reason that the First Principle in Article II,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution on the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies declares that " [t]he Philippines is a democratic and
republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government

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 authority emanates from them. "

Thus, by the very nature of our system of government as democratic

and republican, supreme power and authority resides in the body of
the people,41 and for whom such authority is exercised.

In the 1886 case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins (Yick Wo),42 the United States
(US) Supreme Court (SCOTUS) declared that "[s]overeignty itself is, of
course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; x x x
sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all
government exists and acts x x x."43 To quote US President James
Madison, ours is a "government which derives all its power directly or
indirectly from the great body of people; and is administered by persons
holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good
behavior."44 It is a government that derives "its powers from the
governed, always responsive to the will of the people and subject, at all
times, to their authority as sole repositories of state sovereignty."45

In our Constitution, there are many provisions that demonstrate the

foregoing essential constitutional postulate as it mandates the
Government "to serve and protect the people"46 and for public
officers to "at all times be accountable to the people."47 In fact, no less
than the Preamble explicitly recognizes that the Constitution came to
be as it is because it was "ordained and promulgated" by us, the
"sovereign people."48

Moreover, it is well to recall that the Constitutional Commission

likewise enunciated, as did the First Principle in the Declaration of
Principles of State Policies, that the Philippines is not only a
republican, but also a democratic state. As explained during their

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 deliberations, the addition of the word "democratic," while ostensibly
redundant, was precisely to emphasize people power and the people's
rights.49

On this score, it is likewise worth mentioning that the Articles of the

Constitution were specifically arranged in such manner because the
framers ultimately agreed to emphasize the primacy of the people
over and above the government. In the words of the late eminent
constitutionalist, Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.:

FR. BERNAS: I would like to say a few words in support of the

position of Commissioner Concepcion. I believe that it is true we
should arrange the articles in rational order. But there are perhaps
two ways of creating a rational order. One way would be on the
basis of chronological operationalization of the articles. If we base
it on chronological operationalization of the articles then we could
begin with the government, because it is only usually after the
government has acted that the Bill of Rights becomes operational
as a check on the government. So in that sense, it would be a
rational order.

But there is also another way of rationalizing the order; namely, on

the basis of the importance of the subjects of the article.

The two subjects are really people and government. We have

repeatedly said here that this Constitution will be people-
oriented. As far as we are concerned, people are more
important, and the Bill of Rights speaks of protection for the
people. So on the basis of that order, it should really go ahead
of government.50 (Emphasis supplied)

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 But while sovereignty resides in the people, it should not be forgotten
that our people ordained a republican government under which
representatives are freely chosen by the people and who, for the time
being, exercise some of the people's sovereignties and act on their
behalf. As Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz explained:

A republic is a representative government, a government run by and

for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern
themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation
and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public
functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on
their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are
replaced or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a
republican government is a responsible government whose officials
hold and discharge their position as a public trust and shall, according
to the Constitution, 'at all times be accountable to the people' they
are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is
almost needless to state, is the promotion of the common welfare
according to the will of the people themselves.51

The Right of Suffrage

As a democratic and republican state, our governmental framework

has for its cornerstone the electoral process through which
government by consent is secured.52

In Geronimo v. Ramos (Geronimo),53 the Court, through Associate

Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., declared that voting plays an important
instrumental value in preserving the viability of constitutional
democracy. Indeed, not only is the right to vote or the right of suffrage

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 an important political right; the very existence of the "right of
suffrage is a threshold for the preservation and enjoyment of all
other rights that it ought to be considered as one of the most sacred
parts of the [C]onstitution."54

As the SCOTUS recognized in Yick Wo, voting is a "fundamental

political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights."55 "[N]o right is
more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the
election of those who make the laws, under which, as good citizens, we
must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right
to vote is undermined."56

Unquestionably, thus, the right of suffrage is a treasured right in a

republican democratic society: the right to voice one's choice in the
election of those who make the laws and those who implement them
is indispensable in a free country that its absence will render illusory
other rights, even the most basic.57 As the Court, in Geronimo, held:

Such a right is among the most important and sacred of the freedoms
inherent in a democratic society and one which must be most
vigilantly guarded if a people desires to maintain through self-
government for themselves and their posterity a genuinely
functioning democracy in which the individual may, in accordance
with law, have a voice in the form of his government and in the choice
of the people who will run that government for him.58

Verily, by its very nature, the right of suffrage stands on a higher — if

not distinct — plane such that it is accorded its own Article under the
Constitution, separate from the other fundamental rights.

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 Because of the fundamental and indispensable role that the right of
suffrage plays in the preservation and enjoyment of all other rights, it
is protected in various international instruments.

Foremost of these instruments is the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights59 (UDHR) which, in Article 21 thereof, declares that "
[e]veryone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives." It also
stresses that "[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of the authority
of government" which "shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures."60

Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights (ICCPR), under Article 25 thereof, affirms the "right and the
opportunity [of every citizen], without any of the distinctions
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions" to "take
part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives."61 Article 25 likewise guarantees the right to "vote
and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors."62

To clarify the coverage and limitations of the rights guaranteed under

Article 25 of the ICCPR, the United Nations Committee on Human
Rights adopted General Comment No. 2563 on July 12, 1996, which
pertinently declares to wit:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every

citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote

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 and to be elected and the right to have access to public service.
Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the
Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures
as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective
opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects.

Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on the

consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the
Covenant. (Emphasis supplied)

Additionally, General Comment No. 25 emphasized that any

conditions or restrictions to be imposed in the exercise of the rights
protected by Article 25 should be based on "objective and reasonable
criteria," and the suspension or exclusion from the exercise thereof
should be founded "only on grounds which are established by law and
which are objective and reasonable."64

As a further measure for the free and meaningful exercise of the right,
General Comment No. 25 stressed, under its paragraph 9, that "
[g]enuine periodic elections in accordance with paragraph (b) are
essential to ensure the accountability of representatives for the exercise
of the legislative or executive powers vested in them,"65 and that such
genuine periodic elections "must be held at intervals which are not
unduly long and which ensure that the authority of government
continues to be based on the free expression of the will of
electors."66

Finally, under paragraph 19 thereof, it reiterated that "[i]n conformity

with paragraph (b), elections must be conducted fairly and freely on a
periodic basis within a framework of laws guaranteeing the effective

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 exercise of voting rights."67

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of Philippine law either by transformation or incorporation.

The transformation method "requires that an international law be

transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation."68 In the case of treaties, they become part
of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII,
Section 2169 of the Constitution, which requires Senate concurrence
thereof. From then, they have the force and effect of a statute
enacted by Congress.70

Meanwhile, the incorporation method applies when, by mere

constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the
force of domestic law.71 Article II, Section 272 of the Constitution
declares that generally accepted principles of international law are
adopted as part of the law of the land. "Generally accepted principles
of international law" refer to norms of general or customary
international law that are binding on all states.73 Examples of these
are renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the
principle of sovereign immunity, a person's right to life, liberty and
due process, and pacta sunt servanda, among others.74

In Pangilinan v. Cayetano,75 the Court, speaking through Associate

Justice (and eventual Senior Associate Justice) Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
(Justice Leonen), explained that the term "generally accepted
principles of international law" includes both "international custom"
and "general principles of law" — both of which constitute distinct
sources of international law under Article 3876 of the Statute of the

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 International Court of Justice. They form part of Philippine laws even
if they are not derived from treaty obligations of the Philippines.

In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,77 the Court, speaking through Associate Justice

Arturo D. Brion (Justice Brion), explained that international custom
pertains to "customary rules accepted as binding [and] result from the
combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in
question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it."78

For these reasons, while the UDHR is not a treaty and may not have
been originally intended to have legal binding force, it nonetheless has
been recognized as reflecting customary international law or has
gained binding character as customary law through the subsequent
adoption of treaties and international instruments that reflect its
various principles. Indeed, this Court has recognized the UDHR as part
of the generally accepted principles of international law, and
therefore, binding on the State.79 On the other hand, the Philippines
ratified the ICCPR on October 23, 1986.80 Thus, following Article VII,
Section 21 of the Constitution, the ICCPR likewise has the force and
effect of a statute enacted by Congress.

Accordingly, the recognition by the UDHR and the ICCPR of the

people's right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives and participate in genuine and
periodic elections, subject only to such conditions or restrictions
established by law based on objective and reasonable criteria are

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 deemed to be binding on the State and have the force of domestic
law.

On this score, it is well to note that while the Constitution is silent as

to the need to hold the elections periodically, the Constitutional
Commission's deliberations reflect this intention.81 Thus, there is an
unquestionable imperative that for our government to be truly
representative and democratic, elections must be held periodically
and at regular intervals.

Right to Vote and Freedom of Expression

An important aspect that cannot be detached from any discussion on

the exercise of the right of suffrage is the right to freedom of
expression. In its essence, the right to free expression involves the
freedom to disseminate ideas and beliefs, regardless of its subject and
tenor.82 It includes the entire range of communication, from vocal or
verbal expressions to expressive conduct or symbolic speech that
incorporates both speech and non-speech elements, including
inaction.83 Freedom of expression is considered as the foundation of
a free, open, and democratic society84 and plays an indispensable role
in assuring the fulfillment of our democratic and republican ideal of
government.

Thus, in Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC (Nicolas-Lewis),85 the Court,

through Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., expressly recognized that
the right to participate in the electoral process, which includes not
only the right to vote, but also the right to express one's preference
for a candidate is intrinsically linked to the right to freedom of
expression. Not only does the exercise of the freedom to express one's

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 view on political matters assure individual self-fulfillment to attain
the truth; it also secures participation by the people in social and
political decision-making, and in maintaining the balance between
stability and change. The Court said:

A fundamental part of this cherished freedom is the right to

participate in electoral processes, which includes not only the right to
vote, but also the right to express one's preference for a candidate or
the right to influence others to vote or otherwise not vote for a
particular candidate. This Court has always recognized that these
expressions are basic and fundamental rights in a democratic polity as
they are means to assure individual self-fulfillment, to attain the
truth, to secure participation by the people in social and political
decision-making, and to maintain the balance between stability and
change.

Rightfully so, since time immemorial, "[i]t has been our constant
holding that this preferred freedom [of expression] calls all the more
for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally
vital right of suffrage." In the recent case of 1-United Transport
Koalisyon (1-UTAK) v. COMELEC, the Court En Banc pronounced that
any governmental restriction on the right to convince others to vote
for or against a candidate — a protected expression— carries with it a
heavy presumption of invalidity.86

Indeed, participation in the electoral process through voting

constitutes "an act of pure expression" and "one of the most
consequential expressive acts in a persons' life, when a voice becomes an
action, and those actions dictate how we are governed."87 In other

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 words, the "right to vote is the right to have a 'voice' in the
elections,"88 As Associate Justice Antonio P. Barredo declared in his
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Gonzales v.
COMELEC,89 "suffrage itself would be next to useless if these liberties
cannot be [untrammeled] whether as to degree or time," viz.:

And in it is on this cornerstone that I hold it to be self-evident

that when the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly
and redress of grievances are being exercised in relation to
suffrage or as a means to enjoy the inalienable right of the
qualified citizen to vote, they are absolute and timeless. If our
democracy and republicanism are to be worthwhile, the conduct of
public affairs by our officials must be allowed to suffer incessant and
unabating scrutiny, favorable or unfavorable, everyday and at all
times. Every holder of power in our government must be ready to
undergo exposure any moment of the day or night, from January to
December every year, as it is only in this way that he can rightfully
gain the confidence of the people. I have no patience for those who
would regard public dissection of the establishment as an attribute to
be indulged by the people only at certain periods of time. I consider
the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly and redress
of grievances, when exercised in the name of suffrage, as the very
means by which the right itself to vote can only be properly
enjoyed. It stands to reason therefore, that suffrage itself would
be next to useless if these liberties cannot be [untrammeled]
whether as to degree or time.90 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Right to Vote as an Exercise of the Right to Liberty

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 Indispensably, as well, any consideration of the exercise of one's right
to vote entails a consideration of the exercise of the right to liberty —
of which one cannot be deprived without due process and equal
protection of the law. Liberty is defined as the right to exercise the
rights enumerated in the Constitution or under natural law.91 It
means " freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable restraint upon an
individual. Freedom from restraint refers to more than just physical
restraint, but also the freedom to act according to one's own will."92

Liberty is generally recognized in two aspects: civil and political

liberty.

Civil liberty refers to "the absence of arbitrary restraint and the

assurance of a body of rights, such as those found in bills of rights, in
statutes, and in judicial decisions."93

In Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,94 the Court, through Associate

Justice George A. Malcolm, explained further:

Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may
be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful
enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to liberty guaranteed
by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free
from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be
dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of
the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the
faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only
to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. As
enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, liberty includes the

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 right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to
live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; to pursue any avocation, and for that purpose, to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his
carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief
[elements] of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to
choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of
locomotion.

In general, it may be said that liberty means the opportunity to do

those things which are ordinarily done by free
[persons].95 (Underscoring supplied)

Political liberty, on the other hand, "consists of the right of individuals

to participate in government by voting and by holding public
office."96 In simpler terms, it refers to the right and opportunity to
choose those who will lead the governed with their consent.97

Based on these definitions, the exercise of the right to vote is not an

empty, meaningless, rote ceremony. It is the most fundamental
form of political expression and enjoyment of one's faculties. It
signifies the electorate's assent to the myriad ways by which the
government may limit or restrict their freedoms through law. Thus, at
its core, it is the act of the people freely and consciously
consenting to surrender a portion of their sacred rights and
liberties to those who will temporarily exercise the powers that
inviolably belong to them.

Perceived in these lights, therefore, the exercise of the rights to vote

and to liberty is necessarily reciprocal and complementary. The

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 people's exercise of their right to vote is an exercise of the freedom to
act according to their will, choose their representatives, and consent
to surrender a portion of their sovereignty to their chosen
representatives who, for the time being, have the authority to act for
the common good and protection of the people's rights. At the same
time, however, the exercise of the right to vote is the means by which
the people can theoretically safeguard and guarantee to themselves
the continued exercise of their fundamental rights and freedoms.98

B. Plenary Power of the State to Legislate

Under our representative and democratic system of government, the

totality of the sovereign power is voluntarily and expressly
surrendered by the body politic to their chosen representatives,
except to the extent expressly reserved to them by the Constitution.
As a measure of checks and balances, the sovereign power is then
divided and distributed into the three branches of government: the
power to enact laws is lodged with the legislative; the power to
execute the laws is lodged in the executive; and the power to interpret
the law lies with the judiciary.99

The power of Congress to enact laws has been described as "broad,

general and comprehensive." Indeed, case law provides that "[t]he
legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil
government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition,
is necessarily possessed by Congress x x x. Except as limited by the
Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all
subjects and extends to all matters of general concern or common
interest."100

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 Concomitantly, it is settled that the legislature is vested by the
Constitution with the power to "make, ordain, and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the [C]onstitution, as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same."101 Broad and plenary, the power of the
Congress to legislate embraces the three inherent powers of the
State: police power, eminent domain, and power of taxation. Of these
three, police power has been described as "the most pervasive, the
least limitable, and the most demanding of the three fundamental
powers of the State"102 that it "virtually extends to all public needs."103

In simpler terms, the legislature has the broad and extensive power
to regulate all matters which in its discretion are for the common
good of the people — including the maintenance of peace and order
and protection of life and liberty — which the Constitution deems
indispensable for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessing of
democracy.104

The Power to Legislate in Relation to Elections vis-à-vis the Power of the

COMELEC to Administer the Electoral Process

Among the matters that fall within the legislature's broad and
extensive discretion pertain to all aspects affecting the elections
and the exercise of the right of suffrage insofar as the framers had
not specifically spelled out the parameters thereof in the
Constitution.

Indeed, the Constitution is replete with such provisions that it can be

logically inferred that the power of the Congress to

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 legislate embraces, as well, the exercise of fundamental rights, such
as suffrage. Foremost of these provisions is found under Article V on
"Suffrage," Section 1 of which grants Congress with the authority to
provide, by law, grounds to disqualify citizens from exercising the
right of suffrage. Section 2, on the other hand, mandates the Congress
to provide for "a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballot," "absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad," as well as a
"procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the
assistance of other persons."105

Under Article VI of the Constitution, the Congress is tasked to provide,

by law, for the election at large by the qualified voters of the
Philippines, of Senators, and change the commencement of the term
of office thereof.106 Article VI likewise authorizes the Congress to fix
the number of members of the House of Representatives, provide for
a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations, as well as change the commencement of the
term of office of such members.107 Further, Article VI authorizes
Congress to provide for a different date for the regular election of
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, as well as for
the holding of special elections in case of vacancy in either house of
Congress.108 Finally, Article VI mandates Congress to provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, including the exceptions,
whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or
reject any act or law or part thereof.109

Article VII of the Constitution governing the Executive Department,

on the other hand, authorizes Congress to provide for a different date
for the regular election of, and for the determination of the

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 authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass for
President and Vice-President.110 It also provides for "the manner in
which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or
a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent
disability, or inability of the officials" specifically enumerated in the
Constitution to act as such, as well as those "who shall serve as
President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the
Acting President."111

Under, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Congress is authorized to

provide for the manner of appointment of poll watchers by political
parties, organizations, or coalitions registered in the party-list
system.112 While Article X of the Constitution tasks Congress with the
duty to enact a local government code that shall provide for, among
others, the qualifications and election of local officials, including the
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, as well as the term
of office of barangay officials.113

In contrast with the Congress' broad and plenary powers with respect
to aspects affecting the elections and the exercise of the right of
suffrage, the COMELEC is specifically charged by the Constitution with
the administration, enforcement, and regulation of all laws and
regulations relative not only to the conduct of elections, but also to
the conduct of plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.114 The
power includes, among others, adjudicating all contests relating to
"the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts

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 of limited jurisdiction," deciding "all questions affecting elections," as
well as registering "political parties, organizations, or coalitions."115 It
also includes the limited authority to fix the election period in special
cases, and to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all
franchises or permits for the operation of public utilities during the
election period.116

To the Court's mind, the foregoing comparison demonstrates, in clear

terms, the expanse in scope and character of the power of
Congress, vis-a-vis those of the COMELEC with respect to matters
affecting the elections and the exercise of the right of suffrage. While
the latter is specifically created as the independent constitutional
body charged with the administration and enforcement of
elections and election laws — and whose very existence perforce is
intricately and inseparably related to elections, the broad and
plenary power of the Congress with respect to election matters is
not automatically limited thereby.

On plainer perspective, matters that solely and distinctly pertain to

election administration can be said to fall primarily within the power
of the COMELEC. On the other hand, matters that intersect and
transcend numerous constitutional interests and rights — beyond the
strict confines of election matters and the right of suffrage — must
generally be viewed as falling primarily within the broad and plenary
power of the Congress.

The Power of Congress vis-à-vis the Power of the COMELEC to Postpone

Elections

Given the broad and plenary power of the Congress that

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 encompasses, as well, matters affecting the elections and the exercise
of the right of suffrage, it logically follows that its power extends to
the postponement of elections, including at the barangay level.

As earlier intimated, the power and duty to determine the term of

office of barangay officials is expressly vested in the Congress under
Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution, viz.:

SECTION 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except

barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected. (Emphasis supplied)

Further, Article X, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates the

Congress to enact a local government code which shall, among
others, provide for the election of local officials, thus:

SECTION 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code

which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum,
allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other
matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

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 On the other hand, the Constitution specified that
the administration of the electoral process is lodged with the
COMELEC. For this purpose, the COMELEC has been vested with
executive, quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative powers. Article IX-C,
Section 2 of the Constitution reads:

ARTICLE IX
Constitutional Commissions

xxxx

C. The Commission on Elections

xxxx

SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the

following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to

the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall.

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating

to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections

contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be

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 final, executory, and not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions
affecting elections, including determination of the number and
location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law

enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government,
including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive
purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,

organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government
shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their

agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or
candidates related to elections constitute interference in national
affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the
cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition
to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

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 (6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize

election spending, including limitation of places where
propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize
all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance
candidacies.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or

employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of or disobedience to
its directive, order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive

report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, or recall. (Emphasis, italics, and underscoring
supplied)

Together, these powers were granted to the COMELEC with the

intention to give it all the necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve its primary mandate to ensure the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.117 In turn, these
constitutional powers of the COMELEC are refined and implemented
by legislation through, among others, the powers expressly provided
under the OEC, which the Congress enacted.

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 Specifically, the OEC authorizes the COMELEC, motu proprio or upon a
verified petition, to postpone elections for such causes that would
effectively render impossible the holding of a free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections in any political subdivision, thus:

SECTION 5. Postponement of election. — When for any serious

cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous
causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and
honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified
petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing,
whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be
heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which should
be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended
or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days
after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect. (Sec. 6, 1978 EC)

xxxx

SECTION 45. Postponement or failure of election. — When for any

serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of
election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other
analogous causes of such nature that the holding of a free,
orderly and honest election should become impossible in any
barangay, the Commission, upon a verified petition of an
interested party and after due notice and hearing at which the
interested parties are given equal opportunity to be heard, shall
postpone the election therein for such time as it may deem

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 necessary.

If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other

analogous causes, the election in any barangay has not been held
on the date herein fixed or has been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting therein and such failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission, on the basis of a verified petition of an interested
party, and after due notice and hearing, at which the interested
parties are given equal opportunity to be heard shall call for the
holding or continuation of the election within thirty days after it
shall have verified and found that the cause or causes for which
the election has been postponed or suspended have ceased to exist
or upon petition of at least thirty percent of the registered voters
in the barangay concerned.

When the conditions in these areas warrant, upon verification by

the Commission, or upon petition of at least thirty percent of the
registered voters in the barangay concerned, it shall order the
holding of the barangay election which was postponed or
suspended. (Emphasis, italics, and underscoring supplied)

As discussed, "[a]ny power, deemed to be legislative by usage and

tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress" and unless limited
by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, "legislative power
embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general concern or
common interest."118 Thus, while the power to postpone elections
has not been expressly granted to the legislature, neither has it been
expressly nor impliedly withheld therefrom.

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 Consequently, the power to postpone barangay election must be
deemed to be inherently included, generally, in the Congress' broad
and plenary power to legislate and specifically, in the Congress'
constitutionally granted power to determine the term of office of
barangay officials. For these reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to
the claim of petitioners that the powers granted to the COMELEC
under Sections 2 (1), (2), and (3), Article IX-C of the Constitution
vest in it the sole authority to postpone elections and that the
power vested in the legislature under Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution is limited to setting the term of office of barangay
officials.

On this point, it must be underscored that while the COMELEC is an

independent constitutional body vested with such powers and
functions to ensure the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections, it still is an administrative agency119 vested with
powers that are intentionally and inherently administrative, quasi-
judicial, and quasi-legislative. It bears emphasizing that under our
system of government, the power to enact laws is lodged with the
legislature, the power to execute the laws with the executive, and the
power to interpret laws with the judiciary. Thus, when legislative or
judicial power is exercised by a body or agency other than the
legislature or judiciary, that power is essentially partial, having some
but not all of the features of legislative or judicial power.

Case law defines quasi-legislative power as "the power to make rules

and regulations that results in delegated, legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability
and separability of powers."120 Quasi-judicial power, on the other

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 hand, refers to "the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering
the same law."121 Meanwhile, administrative power pertains to
"administration, especially management, as by managing or
conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or
conduct of persons or things."122

In Francisco v. COMELEC,123 the Court, through Associate Justice

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., clarified that the powers vested in the
COMELEC under Article IX-C, Section 2 (1) and (3) of the Constitution
are administrative in nature, while the power vested in it under Article
IX-C, Section 2 (2) of the Constitution is quasi-judicial. Moreover, with
respect to the latter, the Court explicated that the "COMELEC's
adjudicative function over election contests is quasi-judicial in character
since [it] is a governmental body, other than a court, that is vested with
jurisdiction to decide the specific class of controversies it is charged with
resolving."124

In Javier v. COMELEC,125 decided under the 1973 Constitution, the

Court, through Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz, defined "contests" as
"any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made
before or after the proclamation of the winner, whether or not the
contestant is claiming the office in dispute." Therefore, postponement
of barangay election does not constitute "contests" over which the
COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial powers under Article IX-C,
Section 2 (2) of the Constitution.

As regards the power of the COMELEC to "decide questions affecting

elections found in Section 2 (3), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the

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 Court, speaking through Justice Leonen in The Diocese of Bacolod v.
COMELEC,126 explained that the phrase "affecting elections" does not
imply that the COMELEC is empowered to decide any and all
questions affecting elections. Indeed, a reading of Article IX-C, Section
2 (3) shows that the matters falling within the COMELEC's power to
decide involves the logistical details in the facilitation of the
electoral process, i.e., the "determination of the number and location
of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and
registration of voters."127 Thus, to interpret otherwise will not only
unduly interfere with the ordered system of our government where
the powers are divided among the three great branches; but
moreover, it can render ineffective the system of checks and balances.

A further point that bears mentioning is that under the 1935128 and
1973129 Constitutions, the power of the COMELEC to decide questions
was explicitly limited to "administrative questions effecting elections."
While the term "administrative" was deleted from its current
iteration, the constitutional intent to retain the administrative
character of the COMELEC's power to decide questions affecting
elections is all too evident such that the propriety of postponing the
barangay election, including the reasons therefor, cannot justifiably be
argued to fall under the COMELEC's administrative power to decide
under Article IX-C, Section 2 (3) of the Constitution.

Finally, it is well to highlight that the OEC is a creation of Congress

through its exercise of legislative power. As such, the COMELEC's
power to postpone elections under Sections 5 and 45 of the OEC must
be deemed to be delegated and subordinate in character. In fact, it is
all too apparent that its power to postpone elections under Sections 5

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 and 45 of the OEC is expressly limited in terms of (i) geographical
scope and (ii) the gravity and the unforeseeable nature of the
causes.

As Sections 5 and 45 of the OEC explicitly state, the COMELEC may

postpone the elections only for "serious causes such as violence,
terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records,
force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature" that
would render impossible the holding of a free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections. Case law settles that the term
"analogous causes" under Section 5, as reiterated in Section 45, of the
OEC, shall be "restricted to those unforeseen or unexpected events
that prevent the holding of the scheduled elections."130 Outside of
these enumerated causes, the COMELEC is without any basis to
postpone an election.

Sections 5 and 45 of the OEC further limit the power of the COMELEC
to postpone an election to "political subdivisions" only. "Political
subdivisions," as defined under Article X, Section 1 of the Constitution,
refer to "the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays." Accordingly, the Court cannot accept the argument of
petitioners that the COMELEC is empowered to postpone an
election on a nationwide basis, especially when the legislature
explicitly limited the exercise thereof by the COMELEC to political
subdivisions, as defined in the Constitution.

Verily, these express limitations reveal the legislative intention to

grant the COMELEC only with the limited power to postpone, and
retaining for itself the broad and general power to postpone
elections under any other circumstances, serious or otherwise,

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 and regardless of the geographical scope beyond the boundaries
of any political subdivision.

On this note, it bears mentioning that, when asked by Chief Justice

Alexander G. Gesmundo (Chief Justice Gesmundo) during the oral
arguments on this case, COMELEC Chairperson George Erwin M.
Garcia (Chairperson Garcia) appeared to share the Court's
understanding of the dynamics between the powers of the Congress
and the COMELEC with respect to the postponement of elections, viz.:

CHIEF JUSTICE GESMUNDO:

Thank you.

The petitioner harps on Section 5 of the [OEC] saying that the

power to postpone [an] election is exclusively lodged with the
COMELEC. Did you hear his arguments?

CHAIRPERSON GARCIA:

Yes, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE GESMUNDO:

Do you agree with that?

CHAIRPERSON GARCIA:

I strongly disagree, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE GESMUNDO:

Why do you disagree?

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 CHAIRPERSON GARCIA:

Because the provision of Section 5 Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 is a

delegated authority coming from Congress. Being a delegated
authority, it can be taken, [modified] or even [reviewed] by
Congress. Meaning to say that when Congress deemed it necessary
to give us the power to postpone the election, the Congress
limited such exercise of power to the causes as mentioned therein.
Meaning, there is an urgency for the Commission to act on these
matters. And that's why the limitation as given in Section 5
pertains to the causes mentioned therein and likewise pertaining
to the subdivisions as mentioned likewise in the last part of
the Batas Pambansa Bilang 881. And so therefore, Your Honor,
when Congress said COMELEC can postpone the election based on
these causes, Congress can likewise postpone the election based
on any other causes other than those mentioned.

CHIEF JUSTICE GESMUNDO:

Okay. I had an opportunity to work with the COMELEC and tell me

if this is the situation contemplated in Section 5. Congress sets the
date of the election whatever, local or national. So, on that date,
COMELEC should conduct the election, right?

CHAIRPERSON GARCIA:

Right, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE GESMUNDO:

You cannot deviate from that?

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 CHAIRPERSON GARCIA:

That's right. Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE GESMUNDO:

But, on the day of the election the circumstances enumerated in

Section 5 of the [OEC] happens, right?

CHAIRPERSON GARCIA:

That's right, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE GESMUNDO:

Terrorism, what have you... That is the time you have given the
power to postpone the election, is that not correct?

CHAIRPERSON GARCIA:

That's right, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE GESMUNDO:

To address that contingency that will prevent the conduct of a fair

and honest election, COMELEC can unilaterally postpone the
election, correct?

CHAIRPERSON GARCIA:

Yes, Your Honor, motu proprio, yes.

CHIEF JUSTICE GESMUNDO:

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 And this is different from the postponement, postponement under
the law. Is that not correct?

CHAIRPERSON GARCIA:

That's right, Your Honor, under Article X, Section 8 of the

Constitution.

CHIEF JUSTICE GESMUNDO:

So that Section 5 of the [OEC] simply tells you that when these
happens, you are authorized to postpone?

CHAIRPERSON GARCIA:

Yes, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE GESMUNDO:

It does not cover the postponement which simply means that

Congress resets the date?

CHAIRPERSON GARCIA:

Yes, Your Honor, only on the causes as mentioned.131 (Emphasis

and underscoring supplied)

C. The State's Plenary Power to Legislate is Subject to Limitations

Despite the broad, plenary, and ostensibly illimitable power of the

State, however, the same is not without limitations. Case law is clear
that the power of the State to legislate is subject to express and
implied constitutional limitations.

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 It has been held that "the primacy of the Constitution as the supreme
law of the land dictates that where the Constitution has itself made a
determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or
mandated should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by
amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional process. A
necessary corollary [to this principle] is that none of the three branches
of government can deviate from the constitutional mandate except only
as the Constitution itself may allow. If at all, Congress may only pass
legislation filing in details to fully operationalize the constitutional
command or to implement it by legislation if it is non-self-executing;
this Court, on the other hand, may only interpret the mandate if an
interpretation is appropriate and called for."132

The express constitutional limitations can be generally found in the

Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article II) and in the Bill of
Rights (Article III). Other constitutional provisions, such as the
initiative and referendum clauses of Article VI, Sections 1 and 32 and
the local autonomy provisions of Article X, provide their own express
limitations.133 Meanwhile the implied limitations on Congress" power
are said to be found "in the evident purpose which was in view and the
circumstances and historical events which led to the enactment of the
particular provision as a part of organic law."134

Due Process Clause as the Principal Yardstick in Determining the Validity

of Any Government Regulation

The primordial and vital role the right of suffrage plays in our
democracy ineluctably necessitates some form of State regulation to
ensure the free, fair, credible, and honest exercise of this right and the
safeguarding of the will of the people. "To preserve the purity of

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 elections, comprehensive and sometimes complex election codes are
enacted, each provision of which — whether it governs the registration
and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or
the voting process itself — inevitably affects the individual's right to
vote."135

Nonetheless, the Court has consistently made it clear that any

interpretation of the law or the rules that would have the effect of
hindering, in any way, not only the free and intelligent casting of the
votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the
results is frowned upon. As the right to vote in a free and unimpaired
manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, "any
alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully
and meticulously scrutinized."136

One of the principal yardsticks against which the power of the State
to regulate the right of suffrage is measured is the due process
clause found under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution,
which guarantees the right of the people against deprivation of "life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." It includes two related
but distinct restrictions on government, namely: "procedural due
process" — or the method or manner by which the law is enforced;
and "substantive due process" — which requires that the law itself,
not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair,
reasonable, and just,137 and free from any arbitrariness and
unreasonableness.138

With respect to substantive due process, it requires the concurrence

of two requisites, namely:

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 1. the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State, referred to as
the lawful subject; and

2. the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of

the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly arbitrary or
oppressive upon individuals, referred to as the lawful method.139

In the determination of whether the two requisites of substantial due

process exist, case law has developed three levels of
scrutiny depending on the rights affected, including the level of
constitutional protection accorded thereby and the degree of the
law's interference with said rights, and the gravity of the
governmental objective sought through the law.140 These are
the strict scrutiny, the intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis
tests.

Notably pervading these levels of scrutiny are the basic requirements

of legitimate government interest or purpose and reasonable
necessity of the means employed to attain the government interest.
These requisites correspond to the lawful subject and lawful means
requisites of the substantive aspect of the due process clause and
therefore form the core of any valid legislative enactment. Regardless
of the level of scrutiny employed, the absence of either or both of
these requisites renders a statute unconstitutional for violation of
the due process clause.

III

A. Power of the Court to Review the Constitutionality of RA 11935

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 Power of the Court to Review the Constitutionality of RA 11935; the
Requisites and its Exceptions

Judicial power, which the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court and
all other courts established by law,141 has been described as the
"totality of powers a court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and
hears and decides a case."142 Under Article VIII, Section 1, of the
Constitution, it includes "the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."143

The definition of judicial power under the Constitution embodies two

basic conceptions — (i) the traditional mode, which has been
expressed in our organic laws since the time of the American
occupation,144 and (ii) the expanded mode, which arose from the
use and abuse of the political question doctrine during the martial law
era under former President Ferdinand E. Marcos.145

Under traditional judicial power, the judiciary involves itself

with controversies brought about by rights, whether public or
private, which are demandable and enforceable against another.146

On the other hand, expanded judicial power does not address the
rights that a private party may demand of another party, whether
public or private. It solely addresses the relationships of parties to any
branch or instrumentality of the government, and the rights that a
party may have against the latter in its exercise of discretion to the
petitioning party's prejudice. It is a direct but limited remedy against

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 the government on the sole ground that a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of government is alleged to have been
committed. Thus, the scope of this judicial power is very narrow, but
its focus also gives it strength as it is a unique remedy specifically
fashioned to actualize an active means of redress against an all-
powerful government.147

There are two distinct situations where the exercise of both modes of
judicial power may be sought. Each situation carries requirements
distinct to the nature of each situation, which should be recognized in
the specific remedy to be used under each situation.

The first is the constitutional situation where the constitutionality of

acts is questioned. In the constitutional situation, the exercise of
either the expanded or traditional mode of judicial power involves the
exercise of the power of judicial review, or the power of the courts
to test the validity of executive and legislative acts, including those of
constitutional bodies and administrative agencies, for their
conformity with the Constitution and through which the judiciary
enforces and upholds the supremacy of the
Constitution.148 The second is the non-constitutional
situation where no constitutional questions or violations are raised,
but which may include challenges against acts amounting to grave
abuse of discretion.149

Under the traditional mode, plaintiffs question the constitutionality

of a governmental action through the cases they file before the lower
courts or when the defendants interpose the defense of
unconstitutionality of the law under which they are being sued.150 A
petition for certiorari (or prohibition) based solely under Rule 65 of the

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 Rules of Court (in contrast to a certiorari petition filed to invoke the
Court's expanded judicial power) may be raised against quasi-judicial
actions (and ministerial in the case of a petition for prohibition) since
acts or exercise of functions that violate, and therefore go beyond the
contemplation of, the Constitution are necessarily committed with
grave abuse of discretion.151

In contrast, Court rulings on the exercise of the expanded mode have

allowed the filing of petitions for certiorari and prohibition — using
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as the procedural vehicle152 — to
question, for grave abuse of discretion, actions, or the exercise of a
function on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government that violate the Constitution. The governmental action
may be questioned regardless of whether it is quasi-judicial,
legislative, quasi-legislative, or administrative in nature.153

In the exercise of either modes of judicial power (i.e., traditional or

expanded modes) and regardless of the situation covered (i.e.,
constitutional or non-constitutional situation), a fundamental and
indispensable requisite is the presence of a case or
controversy.154 Whether a case or controversy actually exists, on the
other hand, depends on the party's allegations, following our basic
procedural requisites, as influenced by the elements of standing and
ripeness — including the related concepts of prematurity and the
moot and academic principle.155

i. Case or Controversy

Case or controversy is a fundamental and indispensable requirement

before judicial power may be exercised in view of the express

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 constitutional command to only settle actual controversies and
determine grave abuse of discretion.

This requirement proceeds too from the fundamental constitutional

principle of having separate, but balanced, powers of the three
branches of the government,156 which therefore precludes courts
from resolving hypothetical questions157 that will effectively render
them an advisory body to the political branches of the government
(i.e., the executive and legislative), or any other instrumentality, or
agency of the government. This preclusion from rendering advisory
opinions is particularly relevant to the Court which rulings form part
of the legal system. In other words, the requirement pertains to
conflicts susceptible of judicial resolution.158

Under the traditional mode, a case or controversy exists "when the

case presents conflicting or opposite legal rights that may be resolved by
the court in a judicial proceeding."159

In contrast thereto, the case or controversy requirement is simplified

by the Court in constitutional cases handled under the expanded
mode by merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of the governmental act.160 The grave
abuse of discretion the Constitution contemplates must amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is
being questioned or such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
that is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.161 Case law
provides that a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion

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 exists when the assailed act is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution.162

ii. Standing

Corollary to the element of case or controversy, the element

of standing must likewise be present.

Broadly speaking, standing means "a right of appearance in a court of

justice on a given question."163 Specifically, it requires the party to
have "in its favor, the demandable and enforceable right or interest
giving rise to a justiciable controversy after the right is violated by the
offending party."164 This element proceeds from the definition of
judicial power that requires "actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable" or "grave abuse of
discretion."165 It is translated in civil actions into "real party in
interest," "offended party" in criminal actions, and "interested party"
in special proceedings.166

Under the traditional mode, the standing requirement is satisfied

when a party alleges "a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that [they have] sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result"167 or "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions."168 It is based on the possession
of rights that are demandable and enforceable or which have been
violated, giving rise to damage or injury and to actual disputes or
controversies between or among the contending parties.169 Thus,
under the traditional mode, standing requires the party to allege and

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 sufficiently show an actual and direct injury or violation of rights,
or imminent or credible threat170 thereof.

There are, of course, recognized exceptions to the requirement of

actual or threatened injury to satisfy the standing element under the
traditional mode. Among these exceptions to standing is in the area
of constitutional cases involving issues of "transcendental
importance." In these cases, the Court justified the necessity for
relaxation of procedural niceties in view of the perceived "imminence
and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights"171 which
therefore warrants invocation of relief from the Court. Despite this
characterization, it can be observed that the "transcendental
importance" exception has not been clearly defined in case law, such
that it has been used to relax not only the standing requirement, but
also the case or controversy requirement, including the hierarchy of
courts principle that led to petitions being filed before the Court at
the first instance.

For example, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,172 a petition

for mandamus was filed by petitioner Francisco I. Chavez directly
before the Court, asserting the citizen's constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern which the Public Estates
Authority allegedly violated by failing to disclose the sale of the
reclaimed lands along Manila Bay to Amari Coastal Bay and
Development Corporation. Notwithstanding the apparent lack of
"actual or threatened injury" to petitioner himself, the Court,
speaking through Associate Justice (and eventual Senior Associate
Justice) Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio), accepted the case declaring
that the enforcement of constitutional rights to information and the

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 equitable diffusion of natural resources are "matters of
transcendental public importance" which clothe therein petitioner
with "locus standi."

Case law has also recognized actual or threatened injury exceptions in

constitutional cases through the allegation of "citizen," "taxpayer,"
"voter," and "legislator" standing, subject to satisfaction of certain
requisites.173 These requisites include: (i) for taxpayers, there must be
a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure
is unconstitutional; (ii) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the election law in question; (iii) for
concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are
of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (iv) for
legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained
of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.174

A related but distinct concept which case law has considered as an

exception to the actual or threatened injury requirement is third-
party standing.175 Generally, a person may assert only his/her rights
or interest in the litigation, and not challenge the constitutionality of
a statute or governmental act based on its alleged infringement of the
protected right of other or others. However, under the third-party
standing, a person is permitted to bring actions on behalf of another
or third parties not before the court.176 To be permitted, a party
asserting third-party standing must satisfy the following
requisites: (i) the litigant must have suffered an "injury-in-fact," thus
giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of
the issue in dispute; (ii) the litigant must have a close relation to the
third party; and (iii) there must exist some hindrance to the third

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 party's ability to protect his or her own interests.177

Based on these requisites, it is clear that the litigants or petitioners

invoking third-party standing must show actual or threatened injury
to themselves before they can raise any alleged violation to the rights
of others who are not before the court. In other words, the third-party
standing does not really dispense with the requirement of an actual or
threatened injury on the part of the litigants or petitioning parties
who must still sufficiently allege the same before they may properly
invoke the exercise of judicial power. Thus, conceptually, third-party
standing does not accurately constitute as an exception to the
standing requirement.

In contrast with the traditional mode, the Court has relaxed the
standing requirement in constitutional cases under the expanded
mode by simply requiring a prima facie showing that the questioned
governmental act violated the Constitution. Under our democratic
and republican system of government, it is the sovereign Filipino
nation who approved the Constitution and endowed it with authority.
As such, any act that violates the Constitution effectively disputably
shows an injury to the sovereign Filipino nation, who, collectively or
individually, may therefore question the same before the courts.178

iii. Ripeness

A third corollary element that is pertinent to both constitutional and

non-constitutional situations, regardless of whether the case reaches
the Court through the traditional mode or expanded mode,
is ripeness. In cases involving administrative acts, ripeness is affected
by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which

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 requires the exhaustion of remedies within an agency's administrative
process before external remedies can be applied.179 Separately from
ripeness, but intrinsically connected thereto, is the related concept of
the moot and academic principle.180 Both these concepts relate to
the timing of the presentation of a controversy before the Court:
ripeness — as affected by the exhaustion of remedies principle in
administrative cases — relates to its prematurity, while mootness
relates to a belated or unnecessary judgment on the issues.181

The importance of timing in the exercise of judicial power highlights

and reinforces the need for an actual case or controversy or an act
that may violate a party's right. Without any completed action or a
concrete threat of injury to the petitioning party, which the petitioner
must sufficiently allege, the act is not yet ripe for adjudication. Thus,
the question of ripeness asks whether: (i) an act had already been
accomplished or performed by either branch of the government;
and (ii) there is an immediate and actual or threatened injury to the
petitioner as a result thereof182 or the act was attended with grave
abuse of discretion.

Conversely, an issue that was once ripe for resolution but which
resolution, since then, has been rendered unnecessary because of
some supervening event, needs no resolution from the Court, as it
presents no actual case or controversy. In either situation, the case is
vulnerable to dismissal as the issue presented is merely a hypothetical
problem which, as discussed above, the Court is without power to
resolve.183

iv. Lis Mota

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 A fourth requisite, essential only in constitutional situation (whether
under the traditional or expanded modes), is the element of lis
mota, which prevents the courts from passing upon the
constitutionality of a governmental act unless the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case
itself.184 This means that "the Court will not pass upon a question of
unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be
disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute
or the general law."185 It proceeds from the rule that "every law has in
its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or
argumentative."186

Political Question Doctrine

The foregoing requisites for the Court's exercise of its judicial review
power, particularly the requirement of "an actual case or controversy,"
carry the assurance that "courts will not intrude into areas committed
to the other branches of government," pursuant to the principle of
separation of powers.

The requirement of an actual case or controversy, in essence, involves

the legality of a particular measure or an allocation of constitutional
boundaries. Thus, questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or with regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislature or executive branch of Government, are beyond the pale of
judicial review power. These are political questions, the resolution of
which is dependent on the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular

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 measure and therefore do not present an actual case or controversy.

As originally formulated in the US case of Baker v. Carr,187 "the

[political question] doctrine applies when there is found among
others, 'a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department,' 'a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it' or 'the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.'"188

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court, speaking through

Associate Justice (and eventual Senior Associate Justice) Estela M.
Perlas-Bernabe (Justice Perlas-Bernabe) in Belgica v. Ochoa,
Jr. (Belgica),189 explicated that the constraining reach of the doctrine
on the power of the Court has been greatly reduced under the 1987
Constitution by expanding the Court's power of judicial review to not
only settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether there
has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on any branch or instrumentality of the government. The
Court said:

Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not
present political but legal questions which are within its province
to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature
or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular

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 measure." The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel
System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the
political branches of government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act
upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along
constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of
government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is
an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present
Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to
exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to
proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law. [It] includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v.
Desierto, the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987
Constitution and its effect on the political question doctrine was
explained as follows:

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach

of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power
of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

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 excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has
focused on the "thou shalt not’s" of the Constitution directed
against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision,
however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine
what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did
not just grant the Court power of doing nothing.190 x x x
(Emphasis supplied)

Belgica clarified that "'when the judiciary mediates to allocate

constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature for the executive], but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution.' To a great extent, the
Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal
branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court
must faithfully perform its duty. x x x After all, it is in the best interest of
the people that each great branch of government, within its own sphere,
contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution
to the problems of society."191

Jurisdiction

Inextricably linked to the exercise of judicial power is jurisdiction. It is

defined as the authority to hear and determine cases or the right to
act in cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question
belong.192 In order for a court or an adjudicative body to have
authority to dispose of a case on its merits and thus, exercise judicial

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 power, it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter. As case law
settles, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law.193

The Supreme Court is the only court established by the Constitution

whose powers and jurisdiction are likewise explicitly provided by it. By
express constitutional mandate, such jurisdiction cannot be removed
or withdrawn by Congress. All other lower courts are established by
laws passed by the legislature;194 their jurisdiction is defined,
prescribed, and circumscribed by the laws that respectively created
them.195 However, by constitutional fiat,196 the other lower courts
established by law likewise become repositories of judicial power —
that includes both the traditional and expanded modes — which they
may fully exercise within the confines of their statutorily defined
jurisdictions. Without such jurisdiction, any exercise by a court of
judicial power is null and void. Thus, judicial power is the extent and
totality of the powers courts exercise when they assume jurisdiction
and rule on a case. Jurisdiction, on the other hand, is the prerequisite
authority which permits courts to exercise judicial power in a specific
case.

Hierarchy of Courts Principle

Another fundamental and distinctively correlated concept affecting

the exercise of judicial power — that applies regardless of the mode
and the situation under which the power is exercised — is
the principle of hierarchy of courts. The principle recognizes the
jurisdiction and the various levels of courts in the country as they are
established under the Constitution and by law, and their relationship
with one another.197 It recognizes, too, the practical need to restrain

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 parties from directly resorting to the Court when relief may be
obtained before the lower courts in order to prevent "inordinate
demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, as well as to
prevent the congestion of the Court's dockets."198

Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court is designated as the

highest court with irreducible powers,199 whose rulings serve as
precedent that other courts must follow because they form part of
the law of the land. All other courts are established and given their
defined jurisdictions by law. As a rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier
of facts and generally rules only on questions of law;200 in contrast
to the Court of Appeals and other intermediate courts which rule on
both questions of law and of fact. At the lowest level of courts are the
municipal and the regional trial courts which also handle questions of
fact and law at the first instance according to the jurisdiction granted
to them by law.201

Pursuant to the foregoing structure and by its very essence, the

hierarchy principle commands that cases must first be brought
before the lowest court with jurisdiction, and not before the higher
courts. These cases may ultimately reach the Supreme Court through
the medium of an appeal or certiorari.202 Considering that jurisdiction
and the leveling of the courts are defined by law, the hierarchy should
leave very little opening for flexibility (and potential legal questions),
except for the fact that laws have conferred concurrent jurisdictions
for certain cases or remedies to courts at different and defined levels.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition fall under the concurrent
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts and the higher courts, including

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 the Supreme Court.203 Nonetheless, it should be borne in mind that
under the Constitution, the Court's power to revise, reverse, or modify
final judgments on certiorari is subject to what "the law or the Rules of
Court may provide."204 Thus, despite the fact that the power to
promulgate rules is constitutionally lodged in the Court, it is equally
constitutionally precluded from arbitrarily assuming jurisdiction
over certiorari (including prohibition) petitions at the first instance in
violation of the constitutional command.

Certainly, there are recognized exceptions to the general rule found in

jurisprudence, particularly in constitutional situations invoking the
Court's expanded judicial power. In these recognized exceptions, the
Court allows direct filing of the cases before it based on its authority
to relax the application of its own rules.205 Among the recognized
exceptions developed by case law include: (a) genuine issues of
constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate
time;206 (b) transcendental importance;207 (c) cases of first
impression;208 (d) constitutional issues which are better decided by
the Supreme Court;209 (e) time element or exigency in certain
situations;210 (f) a review an act of a constitutional organ;211 (g)
situations wherein there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law;212 and (h) questions that are
dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained
of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as
clearly an inappropriate remedy.213

B. Petitioners have Satisfied the Requisites for the Exercise by the

Court of its Judicial Review Power under Both Traditional and

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 Expanded Modes

Applying the foregoing parameters, the Court finds the exercise of its
judicial review power proper in the case.

Firstly, the present consolidated Petitions have sufficiently

established a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence, i.e., the
inherent power and duty of the legislature to enact laws regulating
the elections in order to ensure the credible, honest, and peaceful
conduct thereof vis-à-vis the fundamental right of the people to
participate in the elections. Moreover, the consolidated Petitions have
sufficiently presented prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion
when the assailed act is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution.

Secondly, petitioners, as voters, taxpayers, and citizens, have

sufficiently alleged a personal and substantial interest in the case and
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the Court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Indeed, the postponement of the December
2022 BSKE constitutes an actual and direct violation of petitioners'
right to participate in the BSKE, or at the very least, poses an
imminent or credible threat of violation of their right of suffrage.
Moreover, petitioners' arguments sufficiently presented a prima
facie grave violation of the Constitution by the assailed governmental
act.

Thirdly, the constitutional challenge against RA 11935 was raised at

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 the earliest opportunity, i.e., seven days (or on October 17, 2022) after
its enactment on October 10, 2022, and the continued efficacy of the
law constitutes an immediate and actual or threatened injury to
petitioners as a result thereof. As the subsequent discussions will
show, the unconstitutionality of RA 11935 is rooted in its violation of
the fundamental right of the people to vote. While the date of the
December 2022 BSKE has already lapsed, the evident transgression
on the people's right of suffrage continues until the BSKE is finally
held. What is more, as likewise will be discussed in detail below, the
enactment of RA 11935 was blatantly attended with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a patent failure to act in contemplation of
the law.

On this score, the Court stresses that despite the lapse of the
originally scheduled date of the BSKE, i.e., December 5, 2022, the case
has not been rendered moot as to preclude the exercise by this
Court of its judicial review power. To reiterate and emphasize, the
law's transgression on the people's right of suffrage is continuing and
did not cease upon the passing of the December 5, 2022 BSKE
schedule. Thus, despite the intervening expiration of the previous
election date, the case undoubtedly presents an actual case or
controversy that justifies the continued exercise by this Court of its
judicial review power.

Even on the assumption of mootness, case law expresses that "the

moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case."214 The Court
will decide cases, otherwise moot, first, there is a grave violation of
the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation

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 and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.215

All these exceptional situations that would justify the Court in

deciding a case otherwise rendered moot are blatantly evident in the
present consolidated Petitions.

First, as will be explained later on, a grave violation of the

Constitution attended the enactment of RA 11935.1aшphi1

Second, the case calls for the resolution of a novel and unprecedented
issue that affects the people's right of suffrage at the grassroots level.

Third, the constitutional issue raised under the circumstances

surrounding this case is capable of repetition yet evading review; and
thus, demands formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public.

Fourth, the resolution of the question involving the constitutionality

of RA 11935 is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the present
consolidated petitions.

Lastly, the consolidated Petitions assail the constitutionality of an act

of a co-equal branch of government — the legislature. It involves a
determination of the proper allocation and delineation between the
Congress, on the one hand, and the COMELEC, on the other hand, of
the power to postpone the BSKE. These matters undoubtedly require
scrutiny of the "contours of the system along constitutional
lines"216 which precisely call for the exercise of judicial power by the

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 Court.

C. Constitutionality of RA 11935

RA 11935 Does Not Unconstitutionally Encroach on the Power of the

COMELEC to Administer the Elections

Applying the foregoing principles, the Court finds that RA 11935 does
not unconstitutionally encroach on the power and functions of the
COMELEC to administer the elections.

To recall, the Congress has the plenary power to regulate all

matters which, in its discretion, are for the common good of the
people and which the Constitution deems indispensable for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Consequently, while the COMELEC is specifically created as the

independent constitutional body charged with the administration and
enforcement of elections and election laws – and whose very
existence perforce is intricately and inseparably related to elections,
the broad and plenary power of the Congress with respect to election
matters is not automatically limited thereby. Indeed, "[a]ny power,
deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress" and unless limited by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, "legislative power embraces all subjects and
extends to all matters of general concern or common
interest."217 Thus, while the power to postpone elections has not
been expressly granted to the legislature, neither has it been expressly
nor impliedly withheld therefrom.

With this delineation, matters that solely and distinctly pertain to

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 election administration fall primarily within the power of the
COMELEC, while those that intersect and transcend numerous
constitutional interests and rights must generally be viewed as falling
primarily within the broad and plenary power of Congress.
Concomitantly, therefore, the power to postpone barangay election
must be deemed to be inherently included, generally, in the Congress'
broad and plenary power to legislate and specifically, in the Congress'
constitutionally granted power to determine the term of office of
barangay officials.

For these reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the claim of

petitioners that by enacting RA 11935, Congress has
unconstitutionally encroached on the power of the COMELEC to
postpone elections. Accordingly, the challenge against the validity of
RA 11935 on this ground must necessarily fail.

Nonetheless, RA 11935 Unconstitutionally Violates the Freedom of

Suffrage for Failing to Satisfy the Due Process Requisites.

The foregoing notwithstanding, a judicious examination of the law

and the records convinces the Court that RA 11935 unconstitutionally
violates the freedom of suffrage for failing to satisfy the requisites of
the substantive aspect of the due process clause of the Constitution.

Firstly, the legislative measure is not supported by a legitimate

government interest or objective. It also unconstitutionally exceeds
the bounds of the power of Congress to legislate.

Principally, the law, as worded, does not provide any supporting

reasons or justifications for the postponement of the elections. It is

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 for this reason that the parties offer varying justifications for the
postponement of the December 2022 BSKE that, while rationally
plausible, raise serious doubts on the law's fairness and
reasonableness.

In defending the law, the OSG points out that the postponement of
the BSKE under RA 11935 is principally for the purpose of allowing
Congress more time to review the present BSK systems, including the
term of barangay officials, among other practical
considerations.218 Relatedly, the OSG made similar remarks during
the oral arguments in G.R. No. 263590:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RICARDO R. ROSARIO:

Yes, good afternoon, Sir. One of the reasons cited for the
postponement is election fatigue. Now, what is your basis for
saying that the electorate is suffering from election fatigue? And is
election fatigue a sufficient reason to postpone election, Sir?

SOLICITOR GENERAL MENARDO I. GUEVARRA:

Your Honor, my only reference material with respect to the

purpose of the postponement of the barangay elections consists of
the official records and journal of both Chambers of Congress. And
as far as the journal of the House of Representatives would show,
apparently issues pertaining to the budget, as well as proposed
increases in the allowances for poll workers were among those
that needed to be discussed. With respect to the records of the
Senate, it would appear that the principal reason given by
Congress, by the Senate in their desire also to postpone the

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 barangay elections was to have enough or some more time to
discuss electoral reforms that would also affect the forthcoming
barangay elections. And we are made to understand that because
of their current engagement about the General Appropriations
Act, they are very busy with the GAA, they would need more time
to consider possible electoral reforms that would also affect the
barangay elections. So, as far as the records would concern... are
concerned, Your Honors, this would appear to be the reasons. x x
x219

Yet, COMELEC Chairperson Garcia disclosed during the oral

arguments that, when he appeared before the House of
Representatives, the reasons primarily given point to the realignment
of the funds earmarked for the December 2022 BSKE towards funding
other government projects, programs, or activities.220

For his part, Atty. Macalintal asserts that the enactment of RA 11935,
and even the earlier BSKE postponement laws for that matter, have
no valid reasons, and — because of the law's silence — even insinuates
that "the reason for postponing the barangay election is but to fulfill a
'promise' by some candidates to get the support of incumbent
barangay leaders to whom they make the promise to extend their
(barangay leaders') term after the elections."221 To Atty. Macalintal,
this underlying reason constitutes the election offense of "vote-
buying" under Section 261 (a) (1) of the OEC.

Meanwhile, Atty. Hidalgo, et al. did not explicitly offer any reason
behind the postponement under RA 11935. Nonetheless, it may be
implied from their Petition that the same had no valid reason/s
and/or justification/s when they argued that "[b]y enacting [RA]

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 11935, the Congress, based on their own whims and caprices,
effectively decides when the Filipino people can vote and be voted
upon in the [BSKE], thereby manipulating at will the constitutionally
guaranteed right of the Filipino people to suffrage."222

In line with the requirement that there must be a legitimate

government interest or purpose for the legislative act as a requisite
for substantive due process, an explicit statement thereof would have
helped dispel any doubt as to the legislature's intent and the law's
purpose. Consequently, in view of the conflicting accounts and
explanations given by the parties in this case, the Court is compelled
to consider the history and records of RA 11935 to determine whether
the law's objective is free from arbitrariness and unfairness.

Corollary thereto, the Court notes that House Bill No. (HB) 4673
(which, together with its Senate counterpart, became RA 11935) is
equally silent as to its reasons which, in view of its legislative history,
appears to have been purposely formulated so to portray a sense of
legislative consensus. Interestingly, varying reasons were given in the
Explanatory Notes of the various HBs223 (43 in total) filed before the
Congress which sought for the postponement of the December 2022
BSKE. These include: realignment of the COMELEC's budget allocation
for the December 2022 BSKE towards the government's COVID-19
response programs and to stimulate the country's economic
recovery;224 continuity of government service at the barangay
level;225 thwarting further divisiveness among the Filipino
people;226 providing a respite for the electorate, considering the
recently concluded May 2022 national and local elections;227 allowing
the newly-elected national and local officials to benefit from the

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 experience of the officials at the barangay level in implementing
COVID-19 programs and policies;228 preventing the further spread of
COVID-19;229 and aligning the BSKE schedule with the schedule
originally provided under the Local Government Code.230

Despite these varied reasons, however, it is clear from a reading of the

Committee Report231 for HB 4673 and the various Explanatory Notes
that the Congress essentially intended to realign the COMELEC's PHP
8.4 billion budget allocation for the December 2022 BSKE towards the
government's COVID-19 response programs and to stimulate the
country's economic recovery.

The same observations can be gleaned from the Explanatory Notes of

the bills filed before the Senate that equally sought to postpone the
December 2022 BSKE, namely: Senate Bill No. (SB) 288, filed by
Senator (Sen.) Francis G. Escudero; SB 453 filed by Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito
Estrada; and SB 684, filed by Sen. Win Gatchalian, thus:

SB 288 Explanatory Note

This proposed measure seeks to bolster the stability and

consistency of public service at the barangay level by postponing
the [BSKE] from the fifth day of December 2022 to the second
Monday of May 2024.

This senate bill provides several distinct advantages. First, the

postponement of the barangay and [sangguniang kabataan (SK)]
elections affords continuity in government operations at the
barangay level, particularly in providing basic social services and
implementing national and local programs and projects. Second,

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 the proposed measure gives ready access to the institutional
memories of grassroots leaders, which could be used in
formulating plans, programs and other interventions to adapt to
the new normal and to return to the pre-pandemic growth
trajectory of the Philippines. Third, the postponement of the
barangay and SK elections allows both the national
government agencies and local government units to focus on
interventions needed to recover from the pandemic and
address the ongoing concerns over oil prices, inflation and
poverty. Finally, the bill enables the government to realign a
portion of the [PHP) 8.44 billion appropriations for the
barangay and SK elections towards interventions aimed at
sustaining the current momentum in addressing the
coronavirus pandemic and achieving our collective
socioeconomic objectives. (Emphasis supplied)

----------------------------

SB 453 Explanatory Note

The recently concluded national election, albeit successful, had

caused much divisiveness among the Filipino electorate. The
political atmosphere is very polarized that plunging Filipino voters
to another situation of political toxicity in a close interval would
not be beneficial to our national well-being.

Furthermore, our country is still in the midst of pandemic brought

about by COVID-19. Our country has not yet fully recovered from
the havoc brought about by the pandemic. The budget in the
amount of eight billion for the conduct of the said election can

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 be used to fund economic programs and health services to ease
the effects of pandemic to all Filipinos, particularly to those
who were greatly affected. (Emphasis supplied)

----------------------------

SB 684 Explanatory Note

Given this continuing and current fiscal situation, the incoming

administration must be provided with enough leeway to start
things in a better light. Comelec Commissioner George Garcia
related in a May 24, 2022 briefing that by June 2022, COMELEC will
start preparing for the barangay election. He also said that
registration of voters will start in July 2022, and that COMELEC will
moreover start looking for equipment that will be used, especially
in ballot printing, as the [BSKE] are conducted manually. He
further said that they have not received the budget for the
December 2022 barangay and SK polls.

As there is a need to conserve our already constrained financial

resources, the postponement of the December 5, 2022
Barangay and SK elections for just a year, or to December 4,
2023, is a prudent exercise to keep afloat amidst our country's
dire budgetary limitations. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, while Committee Report No. 4232 dated September 12, 2022 on
SB 1306 (the Senate counterpart of HB 4673) is manifestly silent, it is
evident that one of the primary, if not animating, reasons for the
postponement was to realign the COMELEC's budget allocation
for the 2022 BSKE towards the government's other projects and

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 programs. This is an unconstitutional consideration that therefore
taints the law with arbitrariness and unreasonableness.

Notably, Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution explicitly

proscribes any transfer of appropriations except only in the situations
and under the conditions specifically provided therein, viz.:

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;

however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized
to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In Sanchez v. Commission on Audit (Sanchez),233 the Court, speaking

through Justice Dante O. Tinga, emphasized that the prohibition
against the transfer of appropriation is explicit in the Constitution.
While the Constitution affords certain flexibility in the use of public
funds and resources, the leeway granted is limited and subject to such
categorical restrictions and only by the persons specifically provided
therein. The Court said:

Construing this provision, the Court ruled in the pre-eminent case

of Demetria v. Alba:

The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to

another was explicit and categorical under the 1973
Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different
branches of the government and those of the constitutional

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 commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds
and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law
authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of
augmenting an item from savings in another item in the
appropriation concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited.
The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred
were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of
augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if
there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body.

xxxx

Clearly, there are two essential requisites in order that a transfer of

appropriation with the corresponding funds may legally be
effected. First, there must be savings in the programmed
appropriation of the transferring agency. Second, there must be
an existing item, project or activity with an appropriation in
the receiving agency to which the savings will be transferred.

Actual savings is a sine qua non to a valid transfer of funds from

one government agency to another. The word 'actual' denotes that
something is real or substantial, or exists presently in fact as
opposed to something which is merely theoretical, possible,
potential or hypothetical.

xxxx

The thesis that savings may and should be presumed from the
mere transfer of funds is plainly anathema to the doctrine laid

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 down in Demetria v. Alba as it makes the prohibition against
transfer of appropriations the general rule rather than the
stringent exception the constitutional framers clearly intended it
to be. It makes a mockery of Demetria v. Alba as it would have the
Court allow the mere expectancy of savings to be
transferred.234 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, under Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution, the transfer
of appropriations or realignment is prohibited. However, the
Constitution authorizes the transfer only if made by the President,
with respect to the Executive branch, the Senate President for the
Senate, the Speaker for the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice
for the Judiciary, and the Heads of the constitutional bodies, and only
with respect to their respective entities.

Consequently, the savings from one branch or constitutional

body cannot be transferred to another branch or
body.235 Moreover, as the Court stressed in Sanchez, a valid
realignment requires: (1) the existence of savings in the programmed
appropriation of the transferring agency; and (2) the existence of an
item, project, or activity with an appropriation in the receiving agency
to which the savings will be transferred.236

Pursuant to the strict constitutional limitations, the postponement of

the December 2022 BSKE in order to realign the COMELEC's budget
allocation for the same under the 2022 General Appropriations Act to
the executive's COVID-19 and economic recovery programs
constitutes as an impermissible transfer of appropriations. As
explicitly provided under Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution,
this COMELEC allocation can only be constitutionally transferred by

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 the COMELEC's chairperson, and only with respect to the COMELEC's
"item, project, or activity with an appropriation." It cannot be
transferred to another branch or constitutional body. Verily, this
intended transfer by the legislature — no matter how well-intentioned
it might have been — constitutes an arbitrary and unconstitutional
consideration that renders RA 11935 unconstitutional.

Secondly, the means employed are unreasonably unnecessary for the

attainment of the government interest or purpose sought to be
accomplished and are unduly arbitrary or oppressive to the
electorate's exercise of their right of suffrage.

To reiterate, the transfer or realignment of the COMELEC's budget

allocation for the December 2022 BSKE to the Executive for its use in
its programs or projects cannot validly be accomplished without
violating the explicit constitutional prohibition against the
transfer of appropriations. Accordingly, the postponement of the
December 2022 BSKE to augment the Executive's funds for its
programs and projects is not only an unlawful means to attain the
legislative object of augmenting the government's budget for
economic and social programs, it also arbitrarily overreaches the
exercise of the right of suffrage.

All told, in failing to satisfy the substantive due process requisites of

the Constitution, RA 11935 is unconstitutional as it unreasonably and
arbitrarily infringed on the people's right of suffrage.

Grave Abuse of Discretion Attended the Enactment of RA 11935

Finally, the enactment of RA 11935 by the Congress was attended

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 with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

As had been thoroughly discussed in this Decision, while the Congress

is granted by the Constitution with the plenary power to "make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same," this power is not without limitations. Plenary as
it is, however, the power of the Congress to legislate is subject to
express and implied constitutional limitations.

As case law settles, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land
and the powers of the three great branches of the government are
only derived therefrom, except to the extent as the Constitution itself
may allow. Indeed, "the primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law
of the land dictates that where the Constitution has itself made a
determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or
mandated should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by
amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional process." "
[N]one of the three branches of government can deviate from the
constitutional mandate except only as the Constitution itself may
allow."237

In determining the existence of grave abuse of discretion, the Court

looks at whether the exercise of discretion by the official or body
amounts to such a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that
is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary

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 and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.238 Grave
abuse of discretion also exists when the assailed act is manifestly
shown to have infringed the Constitution.

Here, as the Court has extensively discussed, the Constitution

expressly protects the right of suffrage of all citizens of the Philippines
who are not otherwise disqualified by law; and guarantees the right of
every person against the deprivation of their life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, and of their freedom of expression.
Additionally, Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution explicitly
proscribes any transfer of appropriations except only in the situations
and under the conditions specifically provided therein.

For these reasons, the postponement of the 2022 BSKE by RA 11935 to

augment the Executive's funds for its programs and projects violates
the Constitution because (i) it unconstitutionally transgresses the
constitutional prohibition against any transfer of appropriations,
and (ii) it unconstitutionally and arbitrarily overreaches the exercise of
the rights of suffrage, liberty, and expression.

As such, the Court is convinced that the Congress, in enacting RA

11935, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In acting as it did, the Congress exercised its
constitutionally granted authority and judgment in a patently gross
manner as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law.

Verily, the Court will not stand idle. However, in ruling as it does in
this case and for avoidance of any misunderstanding, the Court is not

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 at all asserting its power over Congress. Far from it. Rather, the Court
is simply performing its sacred duty of upholding the supremacy
of the Constitution.

IV

Effect of The Declaration of Unconstitutionality of RA 11935

At this juncture, the Court recognizes that the declaration of

unconstitutionality of RA 11935 raises two critical questions that must
be addressed in view of the legal and practical repercussions and
consequences that this resulting conclusion entails:

First, what law will now govern the BSKE? In relation thereto, will RA
11462 be deemed revived?

Second, assuming that RA 11462 will be deemed revived, when will the
next BSKE be held, considering that the date previously set by it, i.e.,
December 2022, had already lapsed?

Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality of RA 11935: Rule; Exception.

As a rule, a legislative or executive act that violates the Constitution is

null and void. It produces no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no
protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation,
inoperative as if it has not been passed.239 As such, it cannot justify
an official act taken under it.240 It is therefore stricken from the
statute books and considered never to have existed at all. Not only
the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of
unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter invoke
it, nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It

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 is, in other words, a total nullity.241

The rule proceeds from the settled doctrine that the Constitution is
supreme and provides the measure for the validity of legislative or
executive acts.242 It is likewise supported by Article 7 of the Civil
Code, which provides:

ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation
or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or
practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the

Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
(Emphasis supplied)

Concomitantly, a law that has been declared unconstitutional is

deemed not to exist and results in the revival of the laws that it has
repealed. Stated otherwise, an unconstitutional law returns us to
the status quo ante and this return is beyond the power of the
Court to stay.243

By way of exception, the Court has recognized the legal and practical
reality that a judicial declaration of invalidity may not necessarily
obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act occurring
prior to such declaration.244 Moreover, there may be situations that
"may aptly be described as fait accompli," in that they "may no longer
be open for further inquiry, let alone to be unsettled by a subsequent
declaration of nullity of a governing statute."245

In these situations, the Court has declared that the "actual existence
of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality],

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 is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations,
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and
official."246

The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the possibility that not all
the effects and consequences of a void act prior to judicial declaration
of invalidity may be obliterated or completely ignored. As a matter of
equity and fair play, and in recognition of the undeniable reality that
the act existed for the time being, there is an imperative necessity to
leave the effects undisturbed despite the unconstitutionality of the
law.

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power

Corporation,247 the Court, speaking through Justice Carpio, citing de
Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank,248 penned by Justice Enrique M.
Fernando, extensively discussed the operative fact doctrine as follows:

The doctrine of operative fact is an exception to the general

rule, such that a judicial declaration of invalidity may not
necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void
act prior to such declaration. In Serrano de Agbayani v. Philippine
National Bank, the application of the doctrine of operative fact
was discussed as follows:

The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an

unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a
municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot

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 be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any
official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law
once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and
purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new Civil Code puts it:
'When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the
Constitution.' It is understandable why it should be so, the
Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or
executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of

simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does
not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such
challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force
and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is
entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted
under it and may have changed their positions. What could be
more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had
to what has been done while such legislative or executive act
was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is
now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to
reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have
elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may

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 lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of
its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The

actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of
the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, with respect to particular
relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct,
private and official.'249

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The Court, through Justice Perlas-Bernabe, reiterated the foregoing

exposition in Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon
Heritage Realty Corporation,250 and further underscored the
"realistic" consequences that the operative fact doctrine recognizes.
The Court also highlighted the equity and "fair play" underpinnings of
any discussion involving the operative fact doctrine, but added the
caution that the effects must be carefully examined as the doctrine
applies only to extraordinary circumstances, viz.:

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power

Corporation, citing Serrano de Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank,
the Court had the opportunity to extensively discuss the operative
fact doctrine, explaining the "realistic" consequences whenever an
act of Congress is declared as unconstitutional by the proper court.

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 Furthermore, the operative fact doctrine has been discussed within
the context of fair play such that "[i]t would be to deprive the law
of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition
of what had transpired prior to [its] adjudication [by the Court as
unconstitutional]," x x x

xxxx

The operative fact doctrine recognizes the existence and validity of

a legal provision prior to its being declared as unconstitutional and
hence, legitimizes otherwise invalid acts done pursuant thereto
because of considerations of practicality and fairness. In this
regard, certain acts done pursuant to a legal provision which was
just recently declared as unconstitutional by the Court cannot be
anymore undone because not only would it be highly impractical
to do so, but more so, unfair to those who have relied on the said
legal provision prior to the time it was struck down.

However, in the fairly recent case of Mandanas v. Ochoa, Jr.,

citing Araullo v. Aquino III, the Court stated that the doctrine of
operative fact "applies only to cases where extraordinary
circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary
circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will
permit its application." The doctrine of operative fact "nullifies
the effects of an unconstitutional law or an executive act by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination
of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences that cannot always be ignored. It applies when a
declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue
burden on those who have relied on the invalid law." To

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 reiterate the Court's pronouncement, "[i]t would be to deprive
the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication."

Therefore, in applying the doctrine of operative fact, courts

ought to examine with particularity the effects of the already
accomplished acts arising from the unconstitutional statute,
and determine, on the basis of equity and fair play, if such
effects should be allowed to stand. It should not operate to give
any unwarranted advantage to parties, but merely seeks to protect
those who, in good faith, relied on the invalid law.251 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Simply put, the operative fact doctrine operates on reasons of

practicality and fairness. It recognizes the reality that prior to the
Court's exercise of its power of judicial review that led to the
declaration of nullity, the combined acts of the legislative and
executive branches carried the presumption of constitutionality and
regularity that everyone was obliged to observe and follow. And, in
pursuance thereof, certain actions, private and official, may have been
done which would be unjust and impractical to reverse. Thus, to
simply declare RA 11935 as unconstitutional and therefore void from
the beginning, without more, cannot be reasonably and fairly justified.

Nonetheless, in applying the doctrine, the Court is equally bound by

justice and equity; and therefore, must act with prudence and
restraint to prevent giving any unwarranted advantage to parties or
unfairly impact the rights of those who relied on the law in good faith.
Thus, the Court must carefully examine the particular relations,
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official,

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 as well as rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly,
and of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and
of its previous application.252

The Operative Fact Doctrine Applies in this Case

Proceeding from the foregoing premises, the Court is of the view

that the actual existence of RA 11935, prior to the judicial
declaration of its unconstitutionality, is an operative fact which
has consequences and effects that cannot be ignored and reversed
as a matter of equity and practicality.

For one, the declaration of unconstitutionality of RA 11935 results in

the revival of RA 11462. The proviso of Section 1 thereof states that the
BSKE "shall be postponed to December 5, 2022" with the subsequent
synchronized BSKE to be "held on the first Monday of December 2025
and every three (3) years thereafter." Since December 5, 2022 has
already lapsed, it is evident that the BSKE previously scheduled under
RA 11462 can no longer proceed as such. Following Section 1 of RA
11462, therefore, it is apparent that the BSKE will have to be
conducted "on the first Monday of December 2025" or close to seven
years from the date of the last BSKE — which was held in May 2018.

Significantly, however, RA 11462, as well as RA 11935, explicitly states

that the synchronized BSKE shall be held "every three 3 years" which
therefore reflects the legislative intent to hold the BSKE at a regular
and periodic interval, i.e., every three years, consistent with the
mandates of the Constitution. In fact, a survey of the laws that had
amended RA 9164 — the law that first provided for a synchronized

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 BSKE — would readily reveal a similar legislative mandate that the
BSKE "shall be held every three 3 years thereafter," viz.:

SCHEDULED TERM OF OFFICE

ELECTIONS - HELD LEGAL BASIS PROVIDED UNDER
OR POSTPONED THE LAW
July 2002 - RA 9164 Provided for a term
Synchronized BSKE of office of 3 years;
held subsequent BSKE
shall be held on
the last Monday of
October every 3
years
2005 - RA 9340, amending RA "Subsequent
Synchronized BSKE 9164 synchronized
postponed [BSKE] shall be
held on the last
Monday of
October 2007 and
every three (3)
years thereafter"
October 2007 -
Synchronized BSKE
held
October 2010 -
Synchronized BSKE
held
October 2013 – Postponed sangguniang "Subsequent
barangay election kabataan election per synchronized
held, sangguniang RA 10632 [BSKE] shall be
kabataan election held on the last
postponed Monday of
October 2007 and
every three (3)

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 years thereafter;"
2014 – Postponed sangguniang "Subsequent
sangguniang kabataan per RA 10656 synchronized
kabataan election [BSKE] shall be
postponed held on the last
Monday of
October 2007 and
every three (3)
years thereafter''

October 2016 – RA 10923 "Subsequent

synchronized BSKE synchronized
postponed to (BSKE] shall be
October 2017 held on the second
Monday of May
2022 and every
three (3) years
thereafter"
October 2017 - RA 10952 "Subsequent
synchronized BSKE synchronized
postponed to May [BSKE] shall be
2018 held on the second
Monday of May
2022 and every
three (3) years
thereafter"
May 2018 -
Synchronized BSKE
held
2020 Elections RA 11462 "Subsequent
Synchronized BSKE synchronized
postponed to [BSKE] shall be
December 5, 2022 held on the first
Monday of
December 2025

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 and every three (3)
years thereafter"
December 2022 - RA 11935 "and every three
Synchronized BSKE years thereafter."
postponed to
October 2023

Moreover, it can be observed that none of these laws had amended

the term of office originally provided under RA 9164 which, under
Section 2 thereof, states that the "term of office of all barangay and
sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be
three (3) years." Verily, there can equally be gleaned a legislative
intention to set a period of only three years within which the elected
BSK officials shall serve and discharge the functions of their office.
Thus, while it is already established in case law that the word "term"
is not synonymous with "tenure" — the difference of which shall be
further addressed in the subsequent portions of this Decision — it is
reasonably arguable that allowing the sitting BSK officials to serve as
such for a period far longer than their term of office provided under
the governing law when they were elected, would effectively defeat
the legislative intention: that the BSK officials shall have a term —
and therefore serve as such — of only three years and that the BSKE
shall be held every three years.

Another, December 5, 2022 had already lapsed without the BSKE

scheduled under RA 11462 having been held. Moreover, the COMELEC
had taken steps towards the preparation for the BSKE based on the
schedule provided under RA 11935, i.e., in October 2023. Certainly, it
cannot be denied that the consequences of the postponement of the
December 2022 BSKE pursuant to RA 11935 extend beyond the mere

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 change in the date of the said elections. In the interim, the BSKE
officials elected in May 2018 pursuant to RA 11462 continued to
discharge the duties and responsibilities of the office in a hold-over
capacity pursuant to the provisions of RA 11935. In turn, the people
have relied on the actions undertaken by them in the discharge of
their functions as such officials, and have dealt with the latter in good
faith, believing in their authority to act.

Based on these circumstances, it is evident that a refusal to recognize

the consequences and effects of the existence of RA 11935 prior to its
nullity — and absolutely demand a return to the status quo as if the
law had never existed — will lead to an unnecessary and unwarranted
application of the provisions of RA 11462 beyond the legislative intent.

To restate the obvious, RA 11462 explicitly set the schedule of the

BSKE on December 5, 2022 — which date had already lapsed.
Therefore, to strictly adhere to the provisions of RA 11462 will lead to
an incongruent situation where the next BSKE will have to be held in
December 2025 or close to seven years from the date of the last BSKE
(held in May 2018) — a period unnecessarily longer than "every three
[3]-year period" intended by the legislature.

More importantly, such refusal will result in an unwarranted

infringement on the right of suffrage. To the Court's mind, a strict
adherence to the rule will deprive the electorate of their right to
choose a new representative for an unreasonably longer period
beyond the term which they agreed under RA 11462 that the
representative will serve. So also, the electorate's freedom to choose
their representative and to consent to temporarily surrender a portion
of their sovereignty is effectively forcibly wrested in favor of

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 individuals who may no longer truly represent their interests.
Together, these constitute extraordinary circumstances that justify
the application of the operative fact doctrine.

For these reasons, while the Court hereby declares RA 11935

unconstitutional, it recognizes the legal practicality of proceeding
with the holding of the BSKE on the last Monday of October 2023, as
provided under RA 11935. Additionally, the sitting BSK officials shall
continue to hold office until their successors shall have been elected
and qualified. But, their term of office shall be deemed to have ended
on December 31, 2022, consistent with the provisions of RA 11462.
Further, the succeeding synchronized BSKE shall be held pursuant to
the provisions of RA 11462, that is, "on the first Monday of December
2025 and every three years (3) thereafter." Finally, the Congress is not
precluded by these pronouncements from further amending the
provisions of RA 9164, but the same shall be subject to the proper
observance of the guidelines provided in the succeeding discussions.

The Continuation in the Office of the Current BSK Officials in a Hold-over

Capacity Does Not Amount to a Legislative Appointment

In relation to the foregoing discussions, the Court finds it imperative

to dispel any perceived notion that allowing the sitting barangay
officials to continue serving in a "hold-over" capacity constitutes as an
unconstitutional "legislative appointment."

Inarguably, the "hold-over" principle is not a novel concept and is

primarily dictated by the necessity and interests of continuity in
government service.

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 In Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines Employees' Union (CAAP-
EU) v. Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines,253 the Court, speaking
through Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., recognized that "the
principle of [hold-over] is specifically intended to prevent public
convenience from suffering because of a vacancy and to avoid a hiatus
in the performance of government functions."254 As the Court
reasoned, "the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, and courts
generally indulge in the strong presumption against a legislative
intent to create, by statute, a condition which may result in an
executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time,
wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its
functions."255 Thus, in the absence of "an express or implied
constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is
entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and
has qualified."256 Indeed, "[t]he legislative intent of not allowing
[hold-over] must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the
legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that
the law-making body favors the same."257

Significantly, the Court in Kida v. COMELEC,258 through Justice Brion,

recognized the permissibility of hold-over for officials whose term of
office are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, as in the case
of barangay officials. Nonetheless, it must be emphasized that
that the rule of hold-over can only apply as an available option
where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary
exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.

Verily, therefore, a statute that provides for hold-over capacity of

incumbent officials shall be given respect and full recognition by the

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 Court in the absence of an express or implied constitutional or
statutory provision to the contrary, or a clear and palpable grave
abuse of legislative discretion.

In the same vein, the Court disagrees with the position advanced by
Atty. Macalintal that the "hold-over" principle amounts to an
extension of the term in public office of the incumbent barangay
officials.

As the Court, through Justice Brion, explained in Valle Verde Country

Club, Inc. v. Africa (Valle Verde),259 the word "term" refers to "the
time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of
right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another."260 It is fixed by statute and it does not change
simply because the office may have become vacant, nor because the
incumbent holds over in office beyond the end of the term due to the
fact that a successor has not been elected and has failed to
qualify.261 Indeed, it is settled that "a [hold-over] is not technically
an extension of the term of the officer but a recognition of the
incumbent as a de facto officer, which is made imperative by the
necessity for a continuous performance of public
functions."262 Thus, the term of office is not affected by the hold-
over.

The official's "term," however, should be contrasted with

"tenure" which refers to the period during which the
incumbent actually holds office. Unlike the "term," the tenure may
be shorter (or, in case of hold-over, longer) than the term for reasons
within or beyond the power of the incumbent.263 In plainer terms, a
hold-over essentially extends the tenure, or the actual holding of

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 office, of the officer, not the term which should be deemed to have
concluded at the appointed date.

For these reasons, the Court cannot reasonably subscribe to the view
that a hold-over provision in a law or rule postponing the barangay
election will unjustifiably extend the previously determined term of
office of an incumbent barangay official. As already declared by the
Court in Valle Verde, while the tenure can be affected (and extended)
by the holdover, the term of office is not affected as it is fixed by
the statute.

Further, it should not be missed that no express or implied intent to

the contrary exists either in the Constitution or in the laws with
respect to the holding of barangay and SK positions in a hold-over
capacity. Rather, what is extant at this point is a clear legislative
intent to authorize incumbent barangay and SK officials to discharge
the functions of the office in a hold-over capacity unless sooner
removed or suspended for cause, evidently to preserve the continuity
in the transaction of official business. Since the power to prescribe the
term of office of barangay officials is expressly lodged in Congress by
the Constitution, its decision to prescribe the new term of office of
barangay officials, the commencement thereof, as well as the manner
of ensuring the continuity of service in the meantime, such as through
hold-over of incumbents, are policy decisions that the Court will not
lightly interfere with.

In this regard, it is well to underscore that the Court had in fact

already upheld the validity of a hold-over provision involving BSK
officials in at least three cases. In Adap v. COMELEC,264 the Court,
through Associate Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez, citing Sambarani v.

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 COMELEC,265 penned by Justice Carpio, held:

Lastly, petitioners' contention that it was grave abuse of

discretion for the COMELEC En Banc to order herein private
respondents to continue as Punong Barangays in a hold-over
capacity until the holding of special elections, is likewise
devoid of merit. In Sambarani v. Comelec, the Court already
explained, thus:

x x x Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9164 ("RA 9164") provides:

Sec. 5. Hold Over. – All incumbent barangay officials

and sangguniang kabataan officials shall remain in office unless
sooner removed or suspended for cause until their successors shall
have been elected and qualified. The provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code relative to failure of elections and special elections
are hereby reiterated in this Act.

RA 9164 is now the law that fixes the date of barangay and SK
elections, prescribes the term of office of barangay and SK officials,
and provides for the qualifications of candidates and voters for the
SK elections.

As the law now stands, the language of Section 5 of RA 9164 is

clear. It is the duty of this Court to apply the plain meaning of
the language of Section 5. Since there was a failure of elections
in the 15 July 2002 regular elections and in the 13 August 2002
special elections, petitioners can legally remain in office as
barangay [chairpersons] of their respective barangays in a
holdover capacity. They shall continue to discharge their powers

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 and duties as punong barangay, and enjoy the rights and privileges
pertaining to the office. True, Section 43(c) of the Local
Government Code limits the term of elective barangay officials to
three years. However, Section 5 of RA 9164 explicitly provides
that incumbent barangay officials may continue in office in a
hold over capacity until their successors are elected and
qualified.

Section 5 of RA 9164 reiterates Section 4 of RA 6679 which

provides that "[A]ll incumbent barangay officials x x x shall remain
in office unless sooner removed or suspended for cause x x x until
their successors shall have been elected and qualified." Section 8 of
the same RA 6679 also slates that incumbent elective barangay
officials running for the same office "shall continue to hold office
until their successors shall have been elected and qualified."

The application of the hold-over principle preserves continuity

in the transaction of official business and prevents a hiatus in
government pending the assumption of a successor into
office. As held in Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, cases of extreme
necessity justify the application of the hold-over principle.

Clearly therefrom, the COMELEC En Banc did not commit grave

abuse of discretion in ordering those who have been elected
and proclaimed in the barangay elections prior to the 2002
elections to continue as Punong Barangays in a hold-over
capacity until the holding of special barangay
elections.266 (Emphasis supplied)

The Court also upheld the validity of a hold-over provision involving

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 barangay and SK officials in the earlier case of Montesclaros v.
COMELEC,267 also penned by Justice Carpio.

Considering the discussions and the circumstances of this case, the

Court finds no reason to depart from these rulings.

Guidelines for the Bench, the Bar, and the Public

On this score, the Court finds it relevant to highlight the apparent

trend in the actions of the legislature in postponing the BSKE –
separately or concurrently – for varying reasons not explicitly stated in
the law. Certainly, these matters are well-founded and established by
public records which the Court can take judicial notice of.

Accordingly, while this is the first instance wherein the

constitutionality of a law postponing the BSKE has been
challenged, the Court finds it imperative to set forth guidelines and
principles respecting the exercise by the Congress of its power to
postpone elections. The guidelines will likewise serve as a standard
for future situations wherein the Court is called upon to intervene
against the exercise of the Congress' power to postpone that
purportedly violates the right of suffrage.

To recapitulate and emphasize, the right to vote is among the most

important and sacred freedoms inherent in a democratic society and
one which must be most vigilantly guarded if a people desires to
maintain, through self-government, for themselves and their
posterity, a genuinely functioning democracy in which the individual
may, in accordance with law, have a voice in the form of their

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 government and in the choice of the people who will run that
government for them.268

Given the indispensable role that the right to vote plays in preserving
and guaranteeing the viability of constitutional democracy, the
exercise of this right indubitably creates a sacred contract between
the chosen representatives and the people. Under this contract, the
people consent to surrender a portion of their sovereignty, for a
limited period previously fixed and determined in the statute
prevailing at the time of the election, to the chosen representative in
exchange for the latter's promise to serve the people and fulfill the
duties and responsibilities of the office.269 It is a mutual agreement, a
concession of rights and responsibilities for the time being voluntarily
entered into by the people and their representatives under the
circumstances prevailing at the time of the election.

Nonetheless, it must be recognized that the right of suffrage does not

exist in a vacuum. A free, clean, honest, orderly, peaceful, and credible
election is an equally primordial consideration that must be zealously
guarded both by the State and the electorate if the guarantee of
protection of fundamental rights which the right of suffrage provides
is to be fulfilled. For these reasons, state measures aimed at
preventing fraud in an election is a necessary and indispensable reason
to guarantee a truly democratic and republican system of
government.

Viewed in this light, the postponement of an election may necessarily

amount to a restriction on the right of suffrage as it can effectively
operate to restrict the right of the people to choose a new
representative within a preordained period. The postponement may

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 result in the extension of the exercise by the previously chosen
representative of the rights, duties, privileges, and responsibilities of
the office by virtue of a "hold-over" capacity, but which is shorn of the
express consent of the people. In such situation, the postponement —
and the concomitant extension — may ostensibly casts doubt on the
legitimacy of the representative's continued claim to office. Thus, the
postponement could foster a government that is not "democratic and
republican" as mandated by the Constitution.

Given these considerations, the postponement must be supported

by sufficient government interest. Examples of sufficient
government interest include the need to guarantee the conduct of
free, honest, orderly, and safe elections, the safeguarding of the
electorate's right of suffrage, or of the people's other fundamental
rights. Other similar justifications include being necessitated by public
emergency, but only if and to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation.270

In this regard, it is well to note that reasons, such as election fatigue,

purported resulting divisiveness among the people, shortness of the
existing term, or other superficial or farcical reasons, alone, may not
serve as sufficient governmental interest to justify the postponement
of an election. To be sufficient, the reason for the postponement
must primarily be justified by the need to safeguard the right of
suffrage or other fundamental rights, required by a public
emergency situation, or other similar important justifications.

Additionally, the State must show that the postponement of the

barangay election is based on genuine reasons grounded only on
objective and reasonable criteria.271 While not comprehensively

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 illustrative, the fact that a localized postponement is not viable and
will not serve the State's interest is a prime example. Necessarily, any
reason advanced for the postponement of the elections that will
tend, directly or indirectly, to violate the Constitution cannot
satisfy the genuine reason criteria.

The Court recognizes that in cases involving the determination of the

constitutionality of an act of the legislature, the Court generally
exercises restraint in the exercise of its judicial power and accord due
respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branches based on the principle
of separation of powers. Policy decision is wholly within the discretion
of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers
and the Court cannot, as a rule, pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice, or expediency of legislation done within the co-equal
branches' sphere of competence and authority. It is only where their
actions are attended with unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion that the Court can step in to nullify their actions as
authorized by Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.272

It is therefore in this sense that the Court may investigate the

constitutionality of any reasons that the Congress may put forward in
postponing elections, not necessarily with respect to the wisdom
thereof, but to make sure that it has acted in consonance with its
authorities and rights as mandated by the Constitution.273 As the
Court articulated in the 1910 case of U.S. v. Toribio,274 penned by
Justice Adam Clarke Carson, the legislative determination as to "what
is a proper exercise of its [powers] is not final or conclusive, but is
subject to the supervision of the courts." If after said review, the Court
finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more

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 authority of proscribing the actions under review.275

In addition to genuine reasons, the State must also demonstrate

that despite the postponement, the electorate is still guaranteed
an effective opportunity to enjoy their right276 to vote without
unreasonable restrictions.277 An important factor that may be
considered in determining the effectiveness of the opportunity to vote
and reasonableness of the restriction is the length of the
postponement and periodicity of the elections, despite the
postponement.

Periodic is defined as "happening regularly over a period of

time"278 or something that is "occurring, appearing, or recurring at
regular intervals."279 Elections that occur at periodic intervals
signifies regularity of the frequency and schedule thereof such that
the people can justifiably expect its next occurrence. To overcome
constitutional challenge, therefore, the state measure
must guarantee the holding of elections at regular periodic
intervals280 that are not unduly long, and which will ensure that
the authority of the government continues to be based on the free
expression of the will of the electors.281

Finally, any law or rule that purports to defer or postpone the

exercise of the right of suffrage must be deemed as the exception;
it must be resorted to only in exceptional circumstances and upon
compliance with the foregoing parameters.

Summary of the Guidelines

To summarize, the following criteria shall serve as guidelines in the

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 determination of the validity of any future laws or rules postponing
elections:

1. The right of suffrage requires the holding of honest, genuine,

regular, and periodic elections. Thus, postponement of the
elections is the exception.

2. The postponement of the elections must be justified by

reasons sufficiently important, substantial, or compelling under
the circumstances:

a. The postponement must be intended to guarantee the conduct

of free, honest, orderly, and safe elections;

b. The postponement must be intended to safeguard the

electorate's right of suffrage;

c. The postponement must be intended to safeguard other

fundamental rights of the electorate; or

d. Such other important, substantial, or compelling reasons that

necessitate the postponement of the elections, i.e., necessitated
by public emergency, but only if and to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation.

i. Reasons such as election fatigue, purported resulting

divisiveness, shortness of existing term, and/or other superficial
or farcical reasons, alone, may not serve as important,
substantial, or compelling reasons to justify the postponement
of the elections. To be sufficiently important, the reason for the
postponement must primarily be justified by the need to

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 safeguard the right of suffrage or other fundamental rights or
required by a public emergency situation.

3. The electorate must still be guaranteed an effective

opportunity to enjoy their right of suffrage without unreasonable
restrictions notwithstanding the postponement of the elections.

4. The postponement of the elections is reasonably appropriate

for the purpose of advancing sufficiently important, substantial,
or compelling governmental reasons.

a. The postponement of the elections must be based on genuine

reasons and only on objective and reasonable criteria.

b. The postponement must still guarantee that the elections will

be held at regular periodic intervals that are not unduly long.

i. The intervals must still ensure that the authority of the

government continues to be based on the free expression of the
will of the electorate.

ii. Holding the postponed elections at a date so far remote from

the original elections date may serve as badge of the
unreasonableness of the interval that may render questionable
the genuineness of the reasons for the postponement.

c. The postponement of the elections is reasonably narrowly

tailored only to the extent necessary to advance the government
interest.

5. The postponement must not violate the Constitution or

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 existing laws.

VI

Summary

In sum, the Court hereby declares RA

11935 unconstitutional for (i) violating the right to due process of law,
and accordingly, infringing the constitutional right of the Filipino
people to suffrage, and (ii) having been enacted in patent grave abuse
of discretion.

Nonetheless, the Court recognizes the existence of the law as an

operative fact which had consequences and effects that cannot be
justifiably reversed, much less ignored. Thus, these pronouncements
shall have the following effects:

1. The declaration of unconstitutionality of RA 11935 shall

retroact to the date of its enactment, subject to the proper
recognition of the consequences and effects of the law's
existence prior to this ruling;

2. The BSKE set on the last Monday of October 2023 pursuant to

RA 11935 shall proceed as scheduled;

3. The sitting BSK officials shall continue to hold office until their
successor shall have been elected and qualified;

4. But the term of office of the sitting BSK officials shall be

deemed to have ended on December 31, 2022, consistent with the
provisions of RA 11462;

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 5. The succeeding synchronized BSKE shall be held pursuant to
the provisions of RA 11462, that is, "on the first Monday of
December 2025 and every three years (3) thereafter"; and

6. The Congress, however, is not precluded from further

amending RA 9164, as amended, subject to the proper
observance of the guidelines herein provided.

Finally, for the guidance of the bench, the bar, and the public, any
government action that seeks to postpone any elections must observe
the guidelines stated herein.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant consolidated Petitions are GRANTED.

Republic Act No. 11935 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

Hernando, Inting, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, and Marquez,

JJ., concur.

Gesmundo, C.J. (Chairperson), on official leave but left a vote. See

separate concurring opinion.

Leonen, Acting C.J., I concur. See separate opinion.

Caguioa, J., see separate opinion.

Lazaro-Javier, J., see concurrence.

Zalameda, Dimaampao, and Singh, JJ., see separate concurring

opinion.

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 Footnotes

* On official leave but left a vote.

1 Rollo (G.R. No. 263590), pp. 3-29

2 Rollo (G.R. No. 263673), pp. 3-30.

3 Rollo (G.R. No. 263590), p. 3.

4 (December 3, 1985).

5 Rollo (G.R. No. 263590), pp. 11-16.

6 ENTITLED "AN ACT POSTPONING THE MAY 2020 BARANGAY

AND SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9164, AS AMENDED BY
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9340, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10632, REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 10656, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10923, AND REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 10952, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on December
3, 2019.

7 Rollo (G.R. No. 263590), pp. 5 and 16-17.

8 Id. at 16.

9 Id., citing the CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (1).

10 See rollo (G.R. No. 263590), pp. 17-19.

11 Id. at 23-24.

12 Id. at 24-25.

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 13 Id. at 25.

14 Id. at 26.

15 Id. at 27-28.

16 Id. at 35-36.

17 Referring to the Commission on Elections and the Office of the

President, through Executive Secretary Lucas P. Bersamin.

18 Rollo (G.R. No. 263590), pp. 59-109.

19 Id. at 63-64.

20 See OSG's Memorandum, id. at 248, citing Joaquin Bernas, S.J.,

THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEWER, 327 (2011).

21 See id. at 67-90.

22 Id. at 90-94.

23 Id. at 94-99.

24 Id. at 99-103.

25 Id. at 103-105.

26 See Resolution dated October 21, 2022; id. at 120-126.

27 See Memorandum for Petitioner filed on November 3, 2022 (id.

at 127-158) and Memorandum for Respondents filed on

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 November 7, 2022 (id. at 234-307). See also Manifestation filed on
November 8, 2022 (id. at 225-231).

28 Rollo (G.R. No. 263673), pp. 12-13.

29 864 Phil. 879 (2019) [Per J. J.C. Reyes, Jr., Second Division].

30 Rollo (G.R. No. 263673), pp. 13-14.

31 Id. at 14-20.

32 Id. at 21-23.

33 Id. at 26.

34 Id. at 34-35.

35 Referring to Executive Secretary Lucas P. Bersamin, the Senate

of the Philippines, duly represented by its Senate President, Juan
Miguel Zubiri, the House of Representatives, duly represented by
its Speaker of the House, Ferdinand Martin Romualdez, and the
Commission on Elections, duly represented by its Chairman,
George Erwin M. Garcia.

36 Rollo (G.R. No. 263673), pp. 71-131.

37 Id. at 84-111.

38 Id. at 111-113.

39 Id. at 115-120.

40 Id. at 120-125.

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 41 Joaquin Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, 2003 Ed., p. 56.
citing Chisholm v. Georgia, Dall. 429, 457 (US 1793).

42 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

43 Id.; italics supplied.

44 Joaquin Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, 2003 Ed., p. 57.
citing 1 Aruego, THE FRAMING OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION 132 (1936); italics supplied.

45 RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 12 (June 18, 1986);

italics supplied.

46 CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec 4; italics supplied.

47 CONSTITUTION, Art. XI, Sec. 1; italics supplied.

48 See Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario's Dissenting

Opinion in Lambino v. COMELEC, 536 Phil. 1 (2006) [Per J.
Carpio, En Banc]; italic supplied.

49 See RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 86 (September

18, 1986), particularly the following exchanges:

MR. OPLE: I see that Section 1 is largely a repetition of the

original text of the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, except for
a few changes The Committee added the word "democratic"
to "republican," and, therefore, the first sentence states: "The
Philippines is a republican and democratic state." In the

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 second sentence, the same phrase from the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions appears:

Sovereignty resides in the people and all government

authority emanates from them and continues only with their
consent.

May I know from the committee the reason for adding the
word "democratic" to "republican"? The constitutional
framers of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were content with
"republican." Was this done merely for the sake of emphasis?

MR. NOLLEDO: Madam President, that question has been

asked several times, out being the proponent of this
amendment, I would like the Commissioner to know that
"democratic" was added because of the need to emphasize
people's power and the many provisions in the Constitution
that we have approved related to recall, people's
organizations, initiative and the like, which recognize the
participation of the people in policy-making in certain
circumstances. Also, this was added to assert our respect for
people's rights as against authoritarianism or one-man rule. I
know that even without putting "democratic" there,
democracy is reflected in the characteristics of republicanism;
namely, among others, the existence of the Bill of Rights, the
accountability of public officers, the periodic elections and
others.

MR. OPLE: I thank the Commissioner. That is a very clear

answer and I think it does meet a need. I felt I should ask the

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 question, however, because the meaning of democracy has
been evolving since 1935. In the old days, it was taken for
granted that democracy stood for liberal democracy. I think
democracy has since expanded in its scope to include also
concepts of national democracy which is what the National
Democratic Front stands for — social democracy which is just
a synonym for democratic socialism and liberal democracy
which is the brand more immediately recognizable to many
Filipinos.

Does the word "democracy" in this context accommodate all

the nuances of democracy in our time?

MR. NOLLEDO: According to Commissioner Rosario Braid,

"democracy" here is understood as participatory democracy.

MR. OPLE: Yes, of course, we can agree most wholeheartedly

on that construction of the word.

50 RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 104 (October 10,

1986).

51 See Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno's Concurring Opinion

in Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 327 Phil. 521 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, En
Banc].

52 See RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 41 (July 28,

1986), wherein the late Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. noted
during the constitutional commission deliberations, "the
sovereignty of the people is principally expressed in the elections
process."

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 53 221 Phil. 130 (1985) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].

54 See Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno's Dissenting Opinion

in Tolentino v. COMELEC, 465 Phil. 385 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, En
Banc]; emphasis and italics supplied.

55 118 U.S. 356 (1886); italics and underscoring supplied.

56 See Wesherry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).

57 See also Armand Derfner and J. Gerald Herbert, "Voting Is

Speech," 34 Yale L. & POL'Y REV. 471 (2016) p. 486, ft. 100 (last
visited January 15, 2023), citing the following list of US voting
rights cases since Baker v. Carr where voting is characterized as
providing citizens with a "voice" in their democracy: Clingman v.
Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 599 (2005); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
932, 937 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 675 (1993); U.S.
Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 460
(1992); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992); Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,
398 n.25 (1991); Bd. of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, 489
U.S. 688, 693 (1989); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 166 (1986)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 649 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Ball v.
James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 (1981); Democratic Party of U.S. v.
Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 127, 134 (1981); City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176 n.12 (1980); City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 78 (1980); Holt Civic Club v. City of
Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 76 (1978); United Jewish Organizations of
Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 177 n.5 (1977); City of

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 Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 387 (1975); Am. Party of
Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 799 (1974); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S.
709, 721 (1974); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58 (1973); Rosario v.
Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 764 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315,
321, 323 (1973); Jenness v. Forston, 403 U.S. 431, 442
(1971); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 141 (1971); Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 134 (1970); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419,
422 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627
(1969); Hadnott v. Amos, 393 U.S. 904, 906 (1968); Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968); Avery v. Midland County, Tex., 390
U.S. 474, 480 (1968); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89
(1965); Fortson v. Toombs, 379 U.S. 621, 626 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Roman v. Sincock, 377
U.S. 695 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 655
(1964); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 576; Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 10, 17; Gray
v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 386 (1963).

58 Geronimo v. Ramos, supra.

59 Proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris

on December 10, 1948 (General Assembly Resolution 217 A).

60 See UDHR, Article 21 (1) and (3); emphasis and italics supplied.

61 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on

December 16, 1996 and entered into force on March 23, 1976.
Signed by the Philippines on December 19, 1966, ratified on
October 23, 1986, and took effect on January 1, 1987; italics
supplied.

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 62 Id.; emphasis and italics supplied.

63 Adopted by the Committee on Human Rights at its

1510th meeting (fifty-seventh session) on July 12, 1996.

64 Italics supplied.

65 Emphasis and italics supplied.

66 Emphasis and italics supplied.

67 Emphasis and italics supplied.

68 See Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 621 Phil. 536, 600 (2009) [Per J.
Brion, En Banc], citing Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, 561 Phil. 386, 397-398
(2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].

69 Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid

and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.

70 See Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. No. 238875, March 16, 2021

[Per J. Leonen, En Banc], citing Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, supra.

71 See Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, supra; and Pangilinan v. Cayetano, id.

72 Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of

national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and

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 amity with all nations. (Emphasis supplied)

73 See Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, supra.

74 See Pangilinan v. Cayetano, supra, citing Pharmaceutical and

Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,supra at 399-
400.

75 See Pangilinan v. Cayetano, id., citing Rubrico v. Arroyo, 627

Phil. 37, 80-81 (2010) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].

76 Article 38

1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with

international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall
apply:

a. international conventions, whether general or particular,

establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states;

b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice

accepted as law;

c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and

the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.

2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to

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 decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.

Adopted June 26, 1945 and entered into force on October 24,
1945. Philippines ratified on October 11, 1945.

77 Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, supra.

78 Id. See also Pangilinan v. Cayetano, supra, citing Associate

Justice Antonio T. Carpio's Dissenting Opinion in Bayan Muna v.
Romulo, 656 Phil. 246, 325-326 (2011) [Per J. Velasco, En Banc].

79 See Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, 782 Phil. 292, 808 (2016)

[Per J. Perez, En Banc].

80 See (last visited June 23, 2023) and (last visited June 23, 2023).

81 See RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 84 (September

16, 1986); and RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 86
(September 18, 1986).

82 See Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio's Separate Concurring

Opinion in Chavez v. Gonzales, 569 Phil. 155, 236 (2008) [Per C.J.
Puno, En Banc]. See also In Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940), citing The Continental Congress (Journal of the
Continental Congress, 1904 ed., vol. I, pp. 104 and 108) in its
letter sent to the Inhabitants of Quebec (October 26, 1774), it was
held: "'The last right we shall mention regards the freedom of the
press. The importance of this consists, besides the advancement
of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of
liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its
ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its

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 consequential promotion of union among them whereby
oppressive officers are ashamed or intimidated into more
[honorable] and just modes of conducting affairs.' x x x Freedom
of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation,
must embrace all issues about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

83 See The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, 751 Phil. 301, 356

(2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

84 See Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio's Separate Concurring

Opinion in Chavez v. Gonzales, supra at 235.

85 859 Phil. 560 (2019) [Per J. J.C. Reyes. Jr., En Banc].

86 Id. at 587; citations omitted.

87 See (last visited January 15, 2023).

88 Arrnand Derfner and J. Gerald Hebert, Voting Is Speech, 34

YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 471 (2016).

89 See Associate Justice Antonio P. Barredo's Concurring and

Dissenting Opinion in Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471 (1969)
[Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

90 Id.

91 (last visited January 15, 2023).

92 See Legal Information Institute, (last visited January 15, 2023);

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 italics supplied.

93 (last visited January 15, 2023); italics supplied.

94 39 Phil. 660 (1919).

95 Citing Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1866); Wilkinson v.

Leland, 2 Pet. 627 (1829); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 274
(1900); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1896); State v.
Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530 (1902). See 6 R. C. L., 258, 261.

96 (last visited January 15, 2023); italics supplied.

97 Per Associate Justice Angelina D. Sandoval-Gutierrez's

Concurring Opinion in Tecson v. COMELEC, 468 Phil. 421 (2004)
[Per. J. Vitug, En Banc].

98 See Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno's Dissenting Opinion

in Tolentino v. COMELEC, supra note 54. See also James A.
Gardner, "Liberty, Community and the Constitutional Structure
of Political Influence: A Consideration of the Right to Vote,"
Pennsylvania Law Review (1997), Vol. 145: 893, p. 903, citing Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 370 (1836); accord Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).

99 See Santiago v. Guingona, 359 Phil. 276 (1998) [Per J.

Panganiban, En Banc], citing Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 151-A
Phil. 35 (1973) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc]. See also Angara v. The
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En
Banc]; Pangilinan v. Cayetano, supra note 70.

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 100 Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, 675 Phil. 316, 361 (2011) [Per J.
Brion, En Banc]; italics supplied.

101 See Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The Department of

Social Welfare and Development, 809 Phil. 315, 338 (2017) [Per J.
Reyes, En Banc]; italics supplied.

102 Id. at 340; italics supplied. See also Venus Commercial Co., Inc.
v. Department of Health, G.R. No. 240764, November 18, 2021 [Per
J. Lazaro-Javier, First Division], citing Gerochi v. Department of
Energy, 554 Phil. 563, 579-580 (2007) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc].

103 Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The Department of

Social Welfare and Development, id.; italics supplied.

104 See Section 5, Article II of the CONSTITUTION, which states

that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by ail the people of the
blessings of democracy."

105 Italics supplied.

106 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Secs. 2 and 4.

107 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Secs. 5 and 7.

108 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Secs. 8 and 9.

109 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 32.

110 CONSTITUTION, Art. VII, Sec. 4.

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 111 CONSTITUTION, Art. VII, Secs. 7 and 8, italics supplied.

112 CONSTITUTION, Art. IX-C, Sec. 8.

113 CONSTITUTION, Art. X, Secs. 3 and 8, emphasis supplied.

114 CONSTITUTION, Art. IX-C, Sec. 2 (1).

115 CONSTITUTION, Art. IX-C, Secs. 2 (2), (3), and (5); italics
supplied.

116 CONSTITUTION, Art. IX-C, Secs. 4 and 9.

117 See Maruhom v. COMELEC, 387 Phil. 491 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, En Banc].

118 Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, supra note 100, at 361;

emphasis supplied.

119 See Francisco v. COMELEC, 831 Phil. 106, 121 (2018) [Per J.
Velasco Jr., En Banc].

120 The Chairman and Executive Director Palawan Council for

Sustainable Development v. Lim, 793 Phil. 690, 698 (2016) [Per J.
Bersamin, First Division]; italics supplied.

121 Id.; italics supplied.

122 See Limkaichong v. COMELEC, 601 Phil. 751, 777 (2009) [Per J.
Peralta, En Banc]; italics supplied.

123 Francisco v. COMELEC, supra.

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 124 Id. at 121; italics supplied.

125 228 Phil. 193 (1986) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].

126 The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, supra note 83, at 326-327.

127 Italics supplied.

128 1935 CONSTITUTION, as amended, Art. X Sec. 2.

129 1973 CONSTITUTION, as amended, Art. XII-C, Sec. 2 (3).

130 Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, supra note 100, at 371;

emphasis supplied.

131 TSN, October 21, 2022, pp. 145-147.

132 Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, supra note 100, at 365-366;

emphasis and italics supplied; citations omitted.

133 Id. at 361.

134 Id.; italics supplied.

135 See Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno's Dissenting Opinion

in Tolentino v. COMELEC, supra note 54; italics supplied.

136 Id., citing Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). See also
the U.S. cases of Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626
(1969); and Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670
(1966) where the SCOTUS held that any abridgment of the right
to vote must survive strict scrutiny (cited by James A. Gardner in
"Liberty, Community and the Constitutional Structure of Political

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 Influence: A Consideration of the Right to Vote," University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 145: 893, p. 894.

137 See Maynilad Water Services, Inc. v. The Secretary of the

Environment and Natural Resources, 858 Phil. 765, 849 (2019) [Per
J. Hernando, En Banc]; citations omitted.

138 See Legaspi v. City of Cebu, 723 Phil. 90, 106-107 (2013) [Per J.
Bersamin, En Banc].

139 See Venus Commercial Co., Inc. v. The Department of

Health, supra note 102; Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr. 568
Phil. 658, 702 (2008) [Per J. Corona, First Division].

140 See Venus Commercial Co., Inc. v. The Department of

Health, id.; and Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr., id. See also City
of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc],
where the Court held:

Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether

the government has an adequate reason for taking away a
person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due
process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the
government's action. Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us
that whether there is such a justification depends very much on
the level of scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area
where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due
process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict
scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then

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 the government will meet substantive due process only if it can
prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling
government purpose. (Emphasis supplied)

141 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 1 (1).

142 See Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals, 772 Phil. 672, 731-732
(2015) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

143 Italics supplied.

144 Note that while judicial power was not expressly defined in
Philippine organic laws prior to the 1987 Constitution, it has been
defined in jurisprudence as the "authority to settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable
and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of
wrongs for violation of such rights." (See for example Lopez v.
Roxas, 124 Phil. 168 1966 [Per C.J. Concepcion]).

The Philippine Organic Act of 1902, entitled "AN ACT

TEMPORARILY TO PROVIDE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE AFFAIRS OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," simply provides that:
"the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of the
Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as
heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall
hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands,
subject to the power of said Government to change the
practice and method of procedure."

The Jones law of 1916, entitled "AN ACT TO DECLARE THE

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 PURPOSE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AS TO THE
FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, AND TO PROVIDE A MORE
AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT FOR THOSE ISLANDS," on the
other hand, similarly states: "the Supreme Court and the
Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess
and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such
additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law."

Meanwhile, the 1935 and 1973 CONSTITUTIONS similarly

provides that the "Judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be
established by law."

Considering that our organic laws were largely patterned

after the US Constitution, its Article III, See. 2 clause may
likewise be considered, thus: "The Judicial Power shall extend
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;
to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;
— to Controversies between two or more States; between a
State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of
different States,—between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects." Adkins v. Children's Hosp. (261 U.S. 525 [1923])

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 defined judicial power as "that power vested in courts to
enable them to administer justice according to law," which
includes "the duty to declare and enforce the rule of the
supreme law and reject that of an inferior act of legislation
which, transcending the Constitution, is of no effect and
binding on no one." See also Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. 137
(1803); In re Pacific Railway Commission. 32 Fed. 241 (1887).

145 See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v.

GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., 802 Phil. 116, 137-
138 (2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc]; and GSIS Family Bank Employees
Union v. Villanueva, 846 Phil. 30, 47 (2019) [Per J. Leonen, Third
Division].

146 Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion's Separate Opinion

in Araullo v. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457, 682-683 (2014) [Per J.
Bersamin, En Banc].

147 See id.

148 See Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64, 73 (2009) [Per J.
Brion, En Banc]. See also Association of Medical Clinics for
Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers
Association, Inc., supra; and Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion's
Separate Opinion in Araullo v. Aquino III, supra.

149 See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v.

GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., id. at 152.

150 See for example the case of Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate

Court, 232 Phil. 615 (1987) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc], involving an

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 appeal from the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court,
affirming the trial court's ruling which sustained the confiscation
of petitioner Restitute Ynot's carabaos pursuant to E.O. No. 626-
A (prohibiting the transportation of carabaos from one province
to another). The Court declared:

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a
becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they
are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest
tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law
or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of
lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the
resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by
these lower courts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

See also Casanovas v. Hord, 8 Phil. 125 (1907) [Per J. Willard],

involving an appeal from the lower court's ruling in an action
brought by the plaintiff to recover the amount paid by him under
protest as taxes on certain mining claims owned by him. The
Court agreed with the plaintiff that Section 134 of Act No. 1189
(the Internal Revenue Act), on which the tax assessment against
him was based, impairs the obligation of contracts under Section
5 of the Organic Act of 1902. The Court also held it void for
violating Section 60 of the Organic Act which provides that all
perfected concessions prior to April 11, 1899 shall be cancelled
only by reason of illegality in the procedure by which they were

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 obtained or for failure to comply with the prescribed conditions
for their retention tinder the laws by which they were granted.

151 See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v.

GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., supra at 145.

152 Id. at 138-139. See also Araullo v. Aquino III, supra; and Private
Hospitals Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Medialdea, 842 Phil.
747, 776-777 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, En Banc].

153 See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v.

GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc.. id. at 145.

154 See SPARK v. Quezon City, 815 Phil. 1067, 1090-1091 (2017) [Per
J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]; Association of Medical Clinics for
Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers
Association, Inc., id. at 140-141; and Private Hospitals Association
of the Philippines, Inc. v. Medialdea, supra at 782-784.

155 See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v.

GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., id. With regard to
the case or controversy requirement's relation to ripeness, see
also Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of
the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, 841 Phil. 724 (2018) [Per J.
Caguioa, En Banc]; and Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. 732 Phil. 1
(2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

See also Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General, 861 Phil. 388, 437 (2019)
[Per J. Leonen, En Banc], citing Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 Phil. 416
(2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc] in Ocampo v. Enriquez, 798
Phil. 227, 288 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc] declaring that "the

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 expansion of this Court's judicial power is by no means an
abandonment of the need to satisfy the basic requisites of
justiciability."

156 Under the separation of powers principle that underlies the

Constitution, each of the three fundamental powers of the
government have been distributed to its main branches, thus: to
the legislative branch, through the Congress, belongs the power
to make laws; to the executive branch, through the President, the
power to enforce the laws; and to the judiciary, through the
Court, the power to interpret the laws. Under this structure, each
of these branches has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (See Belgica v.
Ochoa, Jr., id. at 534).

The principle of checks and balances complements the

separation of powers doctrine whereby one department, acting
within its own sphere and pursuant to its mandate, controls,
modifies, or influences the action of another, as a deterrent
measure and check against the arbitrary or self-interest
assertions of another or others, to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments, and for the maintenance
and enforcement of the boundaries of authority and control
between them. (See Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460
Phil. 830 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc]; Belgica v. Ochoa,
Jr., id. at 548; and Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924) [Per J.
Malcolm].

157 See Garcia v. Executive Secretary, supra note 148; and Falcis III
v. Civil Registrar General, supra.

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 158 See Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra at 519.

Note: The bar on advisory opinions can be traced to the 1793

"Correspondence of the Justices" involving the queries sent by
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, of then newly-formed
U.S. government led by President George Washington, to U.S.
Supreme Court Chief Justice Jay and his fellow Justices. The
questions concerned America's obligations to the warring
British and French powers under its treaties and international
law. Jefferson's letter requested "in the first place, their
opinion, whether the public may, with propriety, be availed of
their advice on these questions? The Jay Court refused to
answer, reasoning that that it would be improper for them to
answer legal questions "extrajudicially" in light of "[t]he Lines
of Separation" between the branches and "their being in
certain Respects checks on each other." (See Advisory
Opinions and the Influence of the Supreme Court over
American Policymaking, Harvard Law Review, 2011).

See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1992), citing Chief Justice Jay's response to Jefferson's Letter
in the "Letter of August 8, 1793, 3 Johnston, Correspondence
and Public Papers of John Jay (1891), 489 (last visited June 26,
2023), viz.:

We exceedingly regret every event that may cause

embarrassment to your administration, but we derive
consolation from the reflection that your judgment will
discern what is right, and that your usual prudence, decision,
and firmness will surmount every obstacle to the preservation

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 of the rights, peace, and dignity of the United States.

See further (last visited January 23, 2023.

159 GSIS Family Bank Employees Union v. Villanueva, supra note

145, at 47; emphasis supplied. See also Association of Medical
Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical
Centers Association, Inc., supra note 145; Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., id.;
and Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of
the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, supra note 155.

160 See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v.

GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., id.; GSIS Family
Bank Employees Union v. Villanueva, supra note 145.

161 See Garcia v. Executive Secretary, supra note 148.

162 See Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban,
First Division]; Province of North Cotabato v. Gov’t. of the Republic
of the Phils. Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, 589 Phil. 387 (2008)
[Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc]; Private Hospitals Association of
the Philippines, Inc. v. Medialdea, supra note 152; Spouses Imbong v
Ochoa, Jr., supra note 155; and Council of Teachers and Staff of
Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of
Education, supra note 155.

163 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705 (2006) [Per J.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc]; and Araullo v. Aquino III, supra note
146, at 535.

164 Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC

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 Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., supra note 145, at 151;
italics supplied.

165 Id.

166 Note that our Rules of Civil Procedure require a party to be a

"real party in interest" to lodge an action, and for parties to have
"a legal interest" in order to intervene. Section 2, Rule 3 thereof
provides:

Section 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the

party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest.

Section 1, Rule 19 thereof, on the other hand, provides:

Section 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal

interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as
to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof
may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.

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 As regards criminal actions, jurisprudence has recognized the
People of the Philippines as "the offended party" (see, for
example, People of the Philippines v. Santiago, 255 Phil. 851
[1989] [Per J. Gancayco, First Division).

As to special proceedings, the Rules require the parties to

have an interest in the proceeding initiated to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact.

167 See David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra, citing People v. Vera, 65

Phil. 56 (1937) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc]; as well as Custodio v.
President of the Senate, 42 Off. Gaz., 1243 (1945), Manila Race
Horse Trainers' Association v. De la Fuente, G.R. No. 2947, January
11, 1959 [Per J. Tuason, En Banc], Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc], and Anti-
Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012 (1947) [Per J.
Feria, En Banc]. See also Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The
Executive Secretary, 558 Phil. 338 (2007) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En
Banc]; emphasis and italics supplied.

168 Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 155, at 527; emphasis and
italics supplied. See also White Light Corporation v. City of Manila,
596 Phil. 444 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].

169 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2. See also Associate

Justice Arturo D. Brion's Separate Opinion in Araullo v. Aquino
III, supra note 146.

170 See Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-

Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452, 481 (2010) [Per J. Carpio

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 Morales, En Banc], which recognized "credible threat of
prosecution" as sufficient standing allegation. See also List v.
Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. 1 (2010), Babitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289 (1979);
and Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U S. 118 (2007).

171 Ang Nars Party-List v. The Executive Secretary, 864 Phil. 607,
637 (2019) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc], citing The Diocese of Bacolod v.
COMELEC, supra note 83, at 330-332. See also Estrada v. Desierto,
406 Phil. 1 (2001) [Per J. Puno, En Banc]; Maza v. Turla, 805 Phil.
736 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]; and Saguisag v.
Executive Secretary, 777 Phil. 280 (2016) [Per J. Sereno, En Banc];
italics supplied.

172 433 Phil. 506 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

[l73 See David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 163. In the US,

"citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public suits (or so-called
citizen and taxpayer suits) have also been recognized. See for
example Beauchamp v. Silk, 275 Ky. Ct. App. 1938; Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968). It has also recognized standing in
"environmental suits" in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973);
and Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S.
497 (2007).

174 See David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, id. See also Council of Teachers

and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary
of Education, supra note 155.

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 175 For example, see White Light Corporation v. City of
Manila, supra note 168; and The Provincial Bus Operators
Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and
Employment, 836 Phil. 205 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

176 See for example the following US cases: U.S. Department of

Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.
106 (1976); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisentadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 Phil. 52 (1976); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976): Caplin v. Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.
259 (1953).

177 See White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, supra note 168,
citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), as well as Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); and The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the
Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, supra.

178 See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v.

GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., supra note 145, at
152.

179 Id. at 145.

180 Id. at 146.

181 Id.

182 See Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa's Separate

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 Concurring Opinion in Private Hospitals Association of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Medialdea, supra note 152, at 804, citations
omitted.

183 See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v.

GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., supra note 145, at
146-147.

184 See Francisco v. House of Representatives, supra note 156.

185 See Garcia v. Executive Secretary, supra note 148, at 82.

186 Id.; citations omitted.

187 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

188 Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 155, at 525.

189 Id.

190 Id. at 526-527; citations omitted.

191 Id. at 527; italics supplied; citations omitted.

192 See Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. v. Pineda, 837, Phil.

419, 423 (2018) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]. See
also Mitsubishi Motors Philippines v. Bureau of Customs, 760 Phil.
954, 960 (2015) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division]; Carpio
Morales v. Court of Appeals, supra note 142, at 730; The Diocese of
Bacolod v. COMELEC, supra note 83, at 325; and Zamora v. Court
of Appeals, 262 Phil. 298 (1990) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].

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 193 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 1.

194 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 2, par. 1.

195 See Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129, as amended, (otherwise

known as "THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980,
approved on August 14, 1981) which established the Court of
Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, and Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; RA 1125
(entitled "AN ACT CREATING THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS,"
approved on June 16, 1954) which established the Court of Tax
Appeals; and Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1486 (entitled
"CREATING A SPECIAL COURT TO BE KNOWN AS
'SANDIGANBAYAN' AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on
June 11, 1987) which established the Sandiganbayan.

196 See Sec. 1, par. 1, Art. VIII of the CONSTITUTION, which states
that "judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law." (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

197 See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v.

GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., supra note 145.

198 See Aala v. Uy, 803 Phil. 36, 54 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

199 Under Sec. 2, Art. VIII of the CONSTITUTION: "The Congress

shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Secton 5
hereof." (Emphasis supplied)

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 200 See Article VIII, Sec. 5 (2) of the CONSTITUTION, viz.:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following

powers:

xxxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal

or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any

treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,

assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in

issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion

perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is

involved. (Emphasis supplied)

201 See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v.

GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., supra note 145.

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 202 See Sec. 5 (2), Art. VIII, of the CONSTITUTION, viz.:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following

powers:

xxxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal

or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any

treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,

assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in

issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion

perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is

involved. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

See also Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v.

GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., id.

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 203 See Sec. 5(1), Art. VIII of the CONSTITUTION which grants to
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction "over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus." Section 9 (1), Chapter I and Section 21 (1), Chapter II of BP
129 similarly grants the Court of Appeals and the RTC,
respectively, original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, and quo warranto. See also Association of
Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical
Centers Association, Inc., id.; and Carpio Morales v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 142.

204 See Sec. 5 (2), Art. VIII of the CONSTITUTION, viz.:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal

or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any

treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,

assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in

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 issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion

perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is

involved. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

205 See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v.

GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., supra note 145.

206 See The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, supra note 83, at 331,
citing Aquino III v. COMELEC, 631 Phil. 595 (2010) [Per J. Perez, En
Banc]; Magallona v. Ermita, 671 Phil. 243 (2011) [Per J. Carpio, En
Banc]. See also Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 557 Phil. 29
(2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc]; and Cabarles v. Maceda, 545
Phil. 210 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division], providing
the exception of "compelling reasons or if warranted by the
nature of the issues raised."

207 See The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, id. at 332,

citing Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through
Alternative Legal Services, Inc. v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation, 696 Phil. 486 (2012) [Per J. Villarama,
Jr., En Banc]; Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc., 450 Phil. 744, 805 (2003) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].

208 See The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, id. at 332-333,

citing Soriano v. Laguardia, 605 Phil. 43, 99 (2009) [Per J. Velasco,
Jr., En Banc]. See also Mallion v. Alcantara, 536 Phil. 1049, 1053
(2006) [Per J. Azcuna, Second Division].

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 290 See The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, id. 333, citing Drilon
v. Lim, 305 Phil. 146 (1994) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].

210 See The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, id. at 333-334.

211 See id. at 334, citing Albano v. Arranz 114 Phil. 318 (1962) [Per J.
J.B.L. Reyes].

212 See The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, id. at 334.

213 See The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, id. at 334-335,

citing Chong v. Dela Cruz, 610 Phil. 725 (2009) [Per J. Nachura,
Third Division]; Chavez v. Romulo, 475 Phil. 486 (2004) [Per J.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc]; COMELEC v. Quijano-Padilla, 438
Phil. 72 (2002) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc]; and Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, 413 Phil. 281 (2001) Per J. Sandoval-
Gutierrez, En Banc].

214 See Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 155, at 522.

215 Id.

216 Id. at 526.

217 Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, supra note 100.

218 See rollo (G.R. No. 263590), pp. 60-66; rollo (G.R. No.
263673), pp. 113-120.

219 TSN, October 21, 2022, p. 77.

220 TSN, October 21, 2022, pp. 108-111.

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 221 See rollo (G.R. No. 263590), p. 149.

222 See rollo (G.R. No. 263673), p. 15.

223 The various reasons/justifications proffered in the bills tiled

before the House of Representatives for the postponement of
the December 2022 BSKE are summarized below:

HB 41 - Minimize the spread of the virus and

Explanatory prevent another surge;
Note (by Rep.
Paul Ruiz Daza)
- Allow newly elected national and local
officials to improve upon the programs
and projects that were already
implemented since the outbreak of the
pandemic;
- Allow the projected expense thereof to
be utilized instead for other more
pressing and critical programs, activities,
and projects of the national government;
and
- Relieve the COMELEC from the burden of
having to conduct two elections in one
year with only a six-month gap between
them.
HB 121 - Instead of spending on another electoral
Explanatory exercise, the government can direct its
Note (by Rep. resources to COVID-19 related programs
Juliet Marie De and help rebuild our economy;
Leon Ferrer)
- Continuity in the implementation of
programs; and

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 - COMELEC will have more time for the
BSKE if it will be postponed to 2023, in
view of the recent conduct of the
national and local elections.

HB 133 - The national and local elections have just

Explanatory been concluded, and to conduct BSKE for
Note (by Rep. the same year will lead to present
Rachel division of electorates; and
Marguerite
"Cutie" Del
Mar)
- There will be additional expenditures for
the conduct of the elections, it would be
beneficial for the country to defer the
BSKE to allow it to concentrate on other
economic programs.
HB 333 - The estimated cost for conducting the
Explanatory BSKE can be better utilized and should be
Note (by Rep. redirected to various economic stimulus
Michael L. programs that can help alleviate the
Romero) hardships of our countrymen resulting
from the continuing effects of the
COVID-19 pandemic and the war
between Russia and Ukraine.
HB 398 - To give extension for incumbent
Explanatory barangay officials to finish programs that
Note (by Rep. they have started and ensure stability in
Gustavo S. barangay affairs.
Tambunting)
HB 432 - Continuity in the implementation of
Explanatory barangay-level programs.
Note (by Rep.
Johnny
Pimentel)

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 HB 480 - Conserve the resources and simply
Explanatory allocate the billions of pesos towards the
Note (by Rep. pandemic response program of the
Gloria national government; and
Macapagal-
Arroyo)
- Provide continuity in service since the
national and local officials had just been
elected.
HB 504 - Address the interruption in the term of
Explanatory incumbent BSK officials to allow them to
Note (by Reps. efficiently deliver all ongoing programs,
Edvic G. Yap, services, and projects in the community;
Eric G. Yap, and
Paolo Z.
Duterte, and
Jeffrey Soriano
- Allow a relief from the heavy social,
economic, and political toll that the
elections, particularly the presidential
elections, entail.
HB 515 - [no reason/justification for
Explanatory postponement]
Note (by Rep.
Ramon Jolo E.
Revilla III)
HB 937 - Rationalize the national expenditures to
Explanatory accommodate the most pressing
Note (by Rep. challenges facing the Filipino people and
Richard I. serve as economic aid for small and
Gomez) medium-sized enterprises;
- Allow the barangay officials to continue
and strengthen their efforts in fighting
the COVID-19 virus; and

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 - Provide the people with the need respite
from the exhaustion, animosity, and
division that ensued with the recently
concluded elections.
HB 949 - Give the present officials a full five-year
Explanatory term and return the month of election in
Note (by Rep. May; and
PM Vargas)

- Reasonable to prioritize the budget

allocated for the December 2022 local
elections to more programs on health,
livelihood, education, and other social
services.
HB 1035 - Postponing the BSKE will free up more
Explanatory than PHP 8 Billion which can be used for
Note (by Rep. pandemic response or as a financial aid
Francisco Jose to our countrymen; and
F. Matugas III)
- Give more time to barangay officials to
effectively implement their programs
and plans for their constituents.
HB 1110 - Re-allocate the supposed budget for the
Explanatory elections to support and fund the
Note (by Rep. government's efforts towards economic
Marvin C. Rillo) recovery and termination of or actions
against COVID-19; and
- Provide a measure of continuity in the
national government's efforts to combat
the ill-effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.
HB 1138 - Continuity in government response to
Explanatory the COVID-19 pandemic; and
Note (by Rep.
Faustino

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 "Inno" A. Dy V)
- Use the funds initially allotted for BSKE
to much-needed social programs for the
people.
HB 1254 - Allow incumbent officials to continue to
Explanatory perform their functions and to achieve
Note (by Rep. their goals set in their respective
Emmarie programs and long-term plan for their
"Lolypop" respective barangays; and
Ouano-Dizon)
- To allow for effective use of all available
resources for the transition to the new
Administration.

HB 1367 - The government can use the allocation

Explanatory for the 2022 BSKE instead for post-
Note (by Rep. pandemic measures to keep its people
Cheeno Miguel safe, and help the economy bounce back;
D. Almario)
- Newly elected officials will benefit from
the experience of BSK officials in fighting
the pandemic; and
- "To heal the wounds" brought by the
recently concluded elections.
HB 1696 - The budget for the BSKE may be utilized
Explanatory and located to resources and services
Note (by Rep. necessary for the response and recovery
Edwin L. of the nation from the COVID-19
Olivarez) pandemic; and
- Ensure continuity and effectiveness in
the implementation of local and national
plans and programs at barangay levels.
HB 1840 - Give the COMELEC and other involved

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 Explanatory agencies additional time to prepare ad
Note (by Rep. ensure credible and effective barangay
Ron P. Salo) elections, and for registration of voters,
particularly for first time voters; and
- Provide a political respite to the people
after a highly divisive election.
HB 1932 - Postponement of the BSKE will result in
Explanatory government savings of PHP 8 Billion
Note (by Rep. which can be diverted to economic
Mark O. Go) stimulus and recovery packages that are
much needed now as the country
endeavors to move forward.
HB 1961 - Need to ensure continuity of programs
Explanatory and projects in the barangay level; and
Note (by Rep.
Alfredo D.
Marañon III)
- Postponement bolstered by budgetary
constraints.
HB 2057 - Focus the national and local officials'
Explanatory attention to strengthening and building
Note (by Rep. strategies, programs, and projects to
Francisco contain and address the global
Paolo P. Ortega pandemic;
V)
- The familiarity of the barangay officials
will facilitate delivery of services; and
- COMELEC will be given ample time to
prepare for the next BSKE since we have
just concluded the national and local
elections
HB 2071 - The budgetary allocation for the BSKE
Explanatory may be utilized for a much-needed

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 Note (by Rep. government endeavor.
Jaime Eduardo
Marc D.
Cojuangco)
HB 2185 - Savings to be generated amounting to
Explanatory PHP 8.4 Billion from the postponement
Note (by Rep. of the BSKE would significantly
Ralph G. contribute in funding the priority
Recto) programs of the DA to ensure food
security and sufficiency for the Filipinos.
HB 2235 - Afford continuity in government
Explanatory operations at the grass-roots level and
Note (by Rep. have ready access to the skills and
Christopherson expertise of incumbent barangay officials
"Coco" M. Yap) in implementing national programs and
projects, pandemic response, and health
protocols, among others; and

- The allocation for the BSKE could be

tapped by the government for other
programs aimed at hastening economic
recovery and extending more financial
support to those marginalized by the
pandemic.
HB 2240 - Will create opportunities for incumbent
Explanatory BSK officials to continue their programs
Note (by Rep. and projects already commenced, and
Dean Asistio) further introduce improvement and
remedial interventions to ongoing
reforms.
HB 2476 - Incumbent barangay officials are better
Explanatory equipped to continue the
Note (by Rep. implementation of national programs
Florencio and projects during an ongoing
Gabriel "Bem" pandemic; and

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 G. Noel)
- Allow the national government to
allocate a portion budget allocation for
the BSKE to other matters of greater
national concern.
HB 2494 - Create enough time and opportunity for
Explanatory incumbent BSK officials to provide
Note (by Rep. assistance and support to the newly
Ma. Theresa V. elected national and local officials in
Collantes) designing and implementing measures
that will ensure the effective delivery of
government programs directly to the
people.
HB 2576 - Postponement of the BSKE will ensure
Explanatory continuity in government operations at
Note (by Rep. the barangay level for the time being.
Florida P.
Robes)
HB 2932 - The funds that will be saved form the
Explanatory postponement of the BSKE might as well
Note (by Rep. be reallocated to paying our country's
Joseph "Jojo" L. debt or in securing vaccines for the
Lara) general population.
HB 2984 - The budget for the BSKE would make the
Explanatory most significant impact on providing
Note (by Rep. relief to our countrymen; and
Aurelio "Dong"
D. Gonzales,
Jr.)
- Continuity of service leads to effective
implementation of programs, policies,
and projects.
HB 2985 - To ensure continuity in government
Explanatory response; and

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 Note (by Rep.
Salvador A.
Pleyto, Sr.)
- Funds allocated for the BSKE can be
channeled to the administration's
priority program to help cushion the
negative effect on the economy of the
COVID-19 pandemic and the war
between Russia and Ukraine.
HB 2986 - Ensure the thorough implementation of
Explanatory all programs and projects as well as
Note (by Rep. efficient delivery of services at the
Nelson L. barangay level despite the changes in the
Dayanghirang) national and local leadership;
- Ease the burden of the COMELEC in
conducting two elections in the same
year; and
- Postponement of the BSKE will be of
huge help to the government given the
limited financial resources.
HB 3310 - The cost of conducting the BSKE can be
Explanatory redirected to finance other equally
Note (by Rep. important government initiatives to
Josefina B. arrest the financial impact of the
Tallado) pandemic and substantial rise in the
price of fuel and basic commodities.
- Alleviate the burden of the COMELEC in
conducting another nationwide election
in a span of only seven months while the
pandemic is still prevalent; and
- Allow the incumbent BSK officials to
continue the current COVID-19 response
and provide much needed guide to new
local chiefs in ensuring the effective and

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 efficient governance at the barangay
level.
HB 3324 - Consistency in the performance of the
Explanatory performance of the roles and functions
Note (by Rep. relative to the fight against the COVID-19
Jefferson F. virus;
Khonghun)
- Redirect budget allocation into
addressing the needs of the citizens,
particularly of the health sector; and
- Continuity in the implementation of the
policies, plans, and projects of incumbent
barangay officials.
HB 3384 - To generate savings and reallocate the
Explanatory same for economic stimulus and COVID-
Note (by Rep. 19 response programs for the benefit of
Mujiv S. the entire nation.
Mataman)
HB 3426 - The budget earmarked for the 2022 BSKE
Explanatory may be utilized by the new
Note (by Rep. administration to jumpstart our
Sittie Aminah economic recovery.
Q. Dimaporo)

HB 3427 - The budget earmarked for the 2022 BSKE

Explanatory may be utilized by the new
Note (by Rep. administration to jumpstart our
Mohamad economic recovery.
Khalid Q.
Dimaporo)
HB 3603 - Give the COMELEC and the electorate
Explanatory ample time to prepare;
Note (by Reps.
Ralph Wndel P.

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 Tulfo and
Jocelyn P. Tulfo)
- Realign the BSKE with the LGC which
originally set these elections on the
second Monday of May and every three
years thereafter; and
- "The national and local elections of May
9, 2022 pushed through, as scheduled,
despite the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus a
pandemic alone is not sufficient reason
or basis for rescheduling any elections."
HB 3673 - Use the budget allocated for the 2022
Explanatory BSKE for the new administration's plans
Note (by Rep. and programs, especially for the
Rolando M. continued pandemic response.
Valeriano)
HB 3717 - Allow the government to tap on the
Explanatory expertise and training of the incumbent
Note (by Rep. barangay leaders which could be valuable
Anthony R.T. in formulating plans, programs and other
Golez, Jr.) interventions to adapt to the new normal
and to spearhead recovery to pre-
pandemic levels;
- Enable the government to realign a
portion of the apportions for the BSKE
towards interventions aimed to address
economy, peace and order, education,
food security, and disaster resilience.

HB 4030 - The amount allocated for the 2022 BSKE

Explanatory can be used for the programs that will
Note (by Rep. help the Philippines in its efforts to
Aniela Bianca recover from the COVID-19 pandemic.
D. Tolentino)

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 HB 4199 - Holding another election in the same
Explanatory year will further divide the populace.
Note (by Rep.
Rufus B.
Rodriguez)

224 In 33 out of the 43 HBs filed: HBs 41, 121, 133, 333, 480, 937,
949, 1035, 1110, 1138, 1254, 1367, 1696, 1932, 1961, 2057, 2071, 2185,
2235, 2476, 2932, 2984, 2985, 2986, 3310, 3324, 3384, 3426, 3427,
3603, 3673, 3717, and 4030.

225 In 20 out of the 43 HBs filed: HBs 121, 398, 432, 480, 504, 937,
1035, 1110, 1138, 1254, 1696, 1961, 2057, 2235, 2240, 2476, 2576,
2984, 2985, 2986, and 3324.

226 In 4 out of the 43 HBs filed: HBs 133, 1367, 1840, and 4199.

227 In 9 out of the 43 HBs filed: HBs 41, 121, 504, 1367, 1840, 2057,
2986, 3310, and 3603.

228 In 8 out of the 43 HBs filed: HBs 41, 1367, 2057, 2476, 2494,
2986, 3310, and 3717.

229 In HB 41.

230 In HB 949.

231 Committee Report No. 33, September 12, 2022 for HB 4673
(submitted by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
and the Committee on Appropriations) (In substitution of HBs 41,
121, 133, 333, 398, 432, 480, 504, 515, 937, 949, 995, 1035, 1110,
1138, 1254, 1367, 1696, 1840, 1932, 1961, 2057, 2071, 2185, 2235,

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 2240, 2476, 2494, 2576, 2932, 2984, 2985, 2986, 3310, 3324, 3384,
3426, 3427, 3603, 3673, 3717, 4030, 4199). It pertinently states: "
[t]o postpone the December 5, 2022 synchronized [BSKE] to the
first Monday of December 2023 in order to allow the [COMELEC]
and local government units to better prepare for it and for the
Government to apply corrective adjustments to the honoraria of
poll workers." (Italics supplied)

232 Submitted by the Committees on Electoral Reforms and

People's Participation; Local Government; and Finance, in
substitution of SBs 288, 453, 684.

233 575 Phil. 428 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], citing Demetria v.
Alba, 232 Phil. 222 (1987) [Per J. Fernan, En Banc].

234 Id. at 452-454; emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations

omitted.

235 See Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio's Separate Opinion

in Araullo v. Aquino III, supra note 146.

236 See also Nazareth v. Villar, 702 Phil. 319 (2013) [Per J.
Bersamin, En Banc].

237 Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, supra note 100, at 365-366;

italics supplied.

238 See Garcia v. Executive Secretary, supra note 148.

239 See League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, 663 Phil.

496 (2010) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc], Film Development Council

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 of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation, 865 Phil.
384 (2019) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. Note that the
statement was first formulated in Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425 (1886). See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

240 See League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, id.;

and Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage
Realty Corporation, id.

241 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 298 Phil. 291 (1993) [Per J. Vitug,
Third Division], quoting the treatise made by J. Cruz.

242 See Associate Justice Enrique M. Fernando's Concurring

Opinion in Fernandez v. Cuerva, 129 Phil. 332 (1967) [Per J.
Zaldivar]. The Rule also proceeds from the principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity (see Chicot County Drainage Dist. V. Baxter
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 [1940]).

243 See Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 346 Phil.

321 (1997) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].

244 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra.

245 Id.

246 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power

Corporation, 719 Phil. 137, 158 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc],
citing de Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, 148 Phil. 443 (1971)
[Per J. Fernando]. See also Chicot County Drainage Dist. V. Baxter
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940); and Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S.
282 (1977); italics supplied.

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 Note: It would appear that the operative fact doctrine proceeds
from the theory that a statute which is declared unconstitutional
is inoperative only from the lime of the decision and not from the
time of its purported enactment (see Field, Oliver P. [1926] "Effect
of an Unconstitutional Statute," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 1: Issue
No. 1, Article 1).

247 Id.

248 Id.

249 i>Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power

Corporation, at 157-158.

250 865 Phil. 384 (2019) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

251 Id. at 393-395; citations omitted.

252 See Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308
U.S. 371(1940).

253 746 Phil. 503 (2014) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., En Banc].

254 Id. at 543, citation omitted.

255 Id.

256 Id.

257 Id.

258 Supra note 100.

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 259 614 Phil. 390 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

260 Id. at 397.

261 Id.

262 See Kida v. COMELEC, supra note 100, at 435; emphasis

supplied.

263 Id. at 373.

264 545 Phil. 297 (2007) [Per. J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].

265 481 Phil. 661 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

266 Adap v. COMELEC, supra; other citations omitted.

267 433 Phil. 620 (2002) [Per. J. Carpio, En Banc].

268 See Geronimo v. Ramos, supra note 53.

269 See Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno's dissent in Tolentino v.

COMELEC, supra note 54, where he traced the evolution of
democracy, noting that during the 17th century, the theory
of popular sovereignty revived an interest in democracy and that
"the refinements of the grant of power by the people to the
government led to the social contract theory: that is, the social
contract is the act of people exercising their sovereignty and
creating a government to which they consent."

Among the theorists that greatly influenced the current

understanding of democracy are: Thomas Hobbes, John Locke,

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 Charles Montesquieu, and Jean-Jacques Rosseau. In his
treatise Leviathan, Hobbes described a "state of nature"
where all individuals were naturally equal and were free to do
what they needed to do to survive. There were no laws or
anyone to enforce them. Consequently, everyone suffered
from "continued fear and danger of violent death; and the life
of man [was] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." And
the only solution was for the people to create some supreme
power to impose peace on everyone.

Borrowing from the English contract law. Hobbes asserted

that the people agreed among themselves to "lay down their
natural rights of equality and freedom and give absolute
power to a sovereign" which "might be a person or group x x x
who would make and enforce the laws to secure a peaceful
society, making life, liberty, and property possible. Hobbes
called this agreement the 'social contract" which is agreed
only among the people.

Locke, on the other hand, while generally agreeing with

Hobbes on the need for a social contract to assure peace,
believed that the contract was not just an agreement among
the people, but between them and the sovereign. He likewise
argued that "natural rights such as life, liberty, and property
existed in the state of nature and could never be taken away
or even voluntarily given up by individuals" as these were
"inalienable." These natural rights limited the power of the
king and if violated, "the social contract was broken, and the
people had the right to revolt and establish a new

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 government."

For his part, Montesquieu theorized that the "main purpose

of government is to maintain law and order, political liberty,
and the property of the individual."

Meanwhile, Rousseau proposed that people should enter into

a social contract where they "would give up all their rights,
not to a king, but to 'the whole community," or all the people
which he called the sovereign. "The people then exercised
their 'general will' to make laws for the 'public good."' (See
Constitutional Rights Foundation (last visited January 15,
2023).

270 See Article 25 of the ICCPR.

271 See Article 21 of the UDHR; Article 25 of the ICCPR; and

General Comment No. 25 of the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights adopted on July 12, 1996.

272 See Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 155.

273 Id. at 120-121.

274 15 Phil. 85 (1910) [Per J. Carson], citing the Opinion of J. Brown

in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).

275 See Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 155, at 121.

276 See Par. 9 of the General Comment No. 25 of the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights adopted
on July 12, 1996.

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 277 See Article 25 of the ICCPR.

278 See (last visited January 15, 2023).

279 See (last visited January 15, 2023).

280 See Article 21 of the UDHR; Article 25 of the ICCPR; and

General Comment No. 25 of the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights adopted on July 12, 1996.

281 See Par. 9 of the General Comment No. 25 of the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights adopted on July 12, 1996.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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