1

The Imagined State:

History, Ethnicity and Statehood in Macedonia













Exam no. 7360147
MA International Relations
Supervisor: Dr. Luke March
Word count: 9759

2


Abstract

The Balkans have been increasingly attracted the attention of the international
community since the early 1990s. This paper critically assesses the case of Macedonian
nationalism and state-building. Using theory from nationalism, ethnicity and conflict studies, it
finds that Macedonia avoided the trend of inter-ethnic violence in the Balkans because of the
principles proposed by the historographic myth of IMRO and the Ilinden uprising, the
effectiveness of Macedonian leadership after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and intervention from
the international community. In conclusion it proposes that the Macedonian model can be
applied to the study of ethnically charged regions and in conflict prevention.













3


Acknowledgements
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Luke March, for his invaluable
guidance, and his kind patience. Thank you to professor Vasil for his insight and council. My
sincerest thanks to all my tutors and lecturers for all they did and tried to teach me. I thank my
friends, close and far for all their love and care. Thanks for bearing with me. I am deeply
indebted to my parents, for giving me everything. Finally, thank you to my home, for providing
inspiration.

4


Introduction

The Balkans is and always has been a place of diversity. However the nation-states that
inhabit it make consistent claims of ethnic homogeneity and a linear undisturbed continuity of
presence in their respective territories. In the pursuit of justification for their territorial claims
they have often adopted groups, whose national consciousness is still negotiable, as their own on
the grounds of their will to participate in the home nation and its historic continuity (Akrivoulis,
2004: 1). These ideological schematizations have been one of the main culprits of the conflicts
that followed the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. The Balkans have become synonymous with
violence, hatred and disarray therefore most academic research done on the Balkans deals with
these issues. Because of the many contradicting historical narratives, the lack of hard evidence
and the general difficulty to arrive at a solid conclusion, the academic analysis of the Balkans has
been quite limited and generalized, therefore as students of politics we rarely get the opportunity
to understand the deeper issues that underline the horrible events that have taken place or the
interplay between different groups that influence the processes of identification (Todorova, 2009:
3-4). I have chosen to examine the case of the emergence of the modern Macedonian state and
nation because it is a unique rare instance of East-originated nationalism that has defied all of the
characteristics usually associated with Balkans nationalisms such as ethnic chauvinism,
supremacy, conflict and genocide. By examining the development of Macedonian national
consciousness and the process of state-building after the dissolution of Yugoslavia we can gain
valuable insight into ways of preventing conflict in ethnically charged areas.
Everything about Macedonia is controversial. Its name, nation, language and culture have
been contested by almost every nation in the Balkans (Bennet, 1997: 218). Because of its size, its
economic and military capabilities and the trend of annexation in the Balkans one question begs

5


to be asked: Why did Macedonia manage maintain state stability after the dissolution of
Yugoslavia? Why did it avoid the pitfall of ethnic conflict? Why has it made so many allowances
towards its minorities? The literature on Macedonia is diverse and often ridden with
inconsistencies, but there are a few factors that seem to repeat throughout each narrative on
which I will build my argument. I will argue that the reason why Macedonia is the only Balkan
state which has avoided civil war and ethnic conflict and still maintains a stable multi-cultural
society is because of the historic legacy of inclusive nationalism, the political leadership of post-
Yugoslav Macedonia and the intervention of the international community at crucial times.
The paper will address the argument by critically analyzing two historical case studies
within a theoretical framework of nationalism and ethnicity. The cases represent two course
defining moments in Macedonian history when we can see the emergence of Macedonian
consciousness against the breakdown of the previous regime. The first study will look at
Macedonian nation-building in the early 20
th
century and the emergence of the Internal
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) before the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.
The second case study will look at the condition of the Macedonian national sentiment after the
dissolution of Yugoslavia and the process of state-building. Here I will pay particular attention to
the inter-ethnic relations at this time, the emergence of a new political elite and the return of the
IMRO ideas.
This sense of continuity between the emergence of Macedonian nationalism in the 19
th

century and the establishment of the Macedonian state in 1991 has played a crucial role in the
justification of the Macedonian claim to their territory and independence, and the relations
between ethnic Macedonians and other groups living in the Macedonian state, especially the
Albanian minority.

6


Chapter 1: Literature Review

In order to achieve an understanding of why Macedonia has managed to retain its
stability after the dissolution of Yugoslavia we need define terms such as nation, nationalism,
multiculturalism and ethnicity.

What is a nation?

There is no agreement about the subjective and objective factors in the definition of a
nation. Objective factors include things such as a common language, history, religion and culture
but many scholars claim that there are too many exceptions to consider this a rule, therefore have
attempted to define the nation through subjective criteria. Max Weber claims that the nation is a
prestige community with a culture mission to preserve its own particularity. He claims that
although nations are too varied for us to pinpoint the exact decisive factors they are affiliated to
ethnic communities through a myth of common descent: a myth of an ancestry which binds all
members of the nation forming a community of sentiment. What distinguishes nations from
ethnic communities is their political ambition to become a state (Weber, Nationalism 1999: 123).
Furthering Webers argument, Walker Connor claims that the nation is indeed a community of
decent but unlike an ethnic group; the nation is self-defined rather then other-defined therefore
the groups origin is not always in accord with the facts (Connor, Nationalism 1999: 72).
Benedict Andersons definition is that the nation is an imagined political community- imagined
as both inherently limited and sovereign (Anderson 1991: 10). The nation is imagined
because within any nation, one member will never know all or most of the other members, and
thus the connection and sense of community is, according to Anderson, imagined. The nation is

7


limited because none ever considers itself to be conterminous with mankind in that it always
viewed as a sub-set within the human race, thus necessary exclusive, and it is sovereign
because there is no monarch that is able to claim authority of it (Anderson 1991: 10). All of these
definitions cite a sense of community and belonging as the principal deciding factor in the
definition of nation. The nations prerogative to become a state is what distinguishes it from any
other form of belonging.
In terms of the origins of nations, there are two major schools of thought: the modernist
approach and the ethno-symbolic approach. While the modernist approach holds that it is
nationalism, which conditions for creation can only be found in modernity, creates nations, the
ethno-symbolist approach says the opposite: that it is already established groups, defined as
ethnie, that go on to evolve their own sense of nationalism. The leading representative of
modernism, Ernest Gellner claims that the notion that the nation is a natural, god-given way of
classifying men as an inherent, though delayed, political destiny is a myth. In fact, nationalism
manipulates or invents pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, obliterating the pre-
exiting cultures in the process. Nation-building requires a process of collective remembering and
forgetting where a single straightforward history has to be written from the many complex and
contradictory regional and ethnic histories previously told (Gellner 1983: 6). The teaching of this
national history is essential to the creation and sustainability of the nation so education,
specifically literacy, is crucial to the creation of the nation. (Gellner, 1994: 36) On the other
hand, as an ethno centralist, Anthony Smith believes that nations as we know today came to
existence long before the nation came to be understood in political terms. He argues that myths,
legends, and memory of events, all part of a collective memory associated with a groups land
territory as well as a retelling of a shared history, create a sense of consciousness of the group as
distinct, nations begin to form (Smith 1999: 120). Nations cannot exist without a real ethnic,

8


cultural basis for their establishment. Nations are politicized forms of what Smith identifies as
ethnie, a named population sharing a collective proper name, a presumed common ancestry,
shared historical memories, one or more differencing elements of common culture, an
association with a specific homeland and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the
population. The goal of nationalist groups is to turn the ethnie into a more abstract and
politicized entity, the nation (Smith 1991:xii).

What is nationalism?
From the modernist point of view, nationalism was born in the age of the Enlightenment
along with all other philosophical systems that that were designed to respond to the clashing
views on society, science, nature and man. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars and the
struggles and propagandas that accompanied them transformed the western monarchies into
nation-states (Breuilly, 2001: 38) The ideology that justified this transformation and justified the
loyalty that the nation-state demanded is nationalism. It is an artificially fostered collective
feeling that demands the primary loyalty of each individual, irrespective of other affiliations to
both the nation state and the ideology of the same. Nationalism is neither natural nor acquired, it
is a dogma injected by education and propaganda into each member of each generation thereby
creating nations where they dont exist (Gellner 1994: 58). On the other hand, ethno-centrists
argue that the strength of nationalism lays in the pre-existing cultural forms the modernist claim
to be irrelevant and fashions them into new identities and new communities all the while
maintaining the sense of continuity with the past. The historical myths on which nationalism is
based perform a whole range of functions such as constructing, defining and providing political
mobilization for nations (Smith 1999: 36). This is because there is a constant dialectic between
the material and symbolic conditions of life. This dialectic establishes an encompassing cultural

9


order through which events and facts are constituted and people turn experiences into discourse
(Brown 2004: 233). More recent discourses on nationalism claim that nationalism has divided
between two types. One is civic nationalism which is usually associated with the West and is
based primarily on an existing state territory and the other is ethnic nationalism, which is usually
associated with the East and is based primary on ethnicity and is not necessarily coincident with
existing state borders. Civic nationalism is seen as the product of the revolutions of the
Enlightenment (France and America) and the embarrassment of its modernizing aspects, while
ethnic nationalism is a reaction to the revolutionary wave, a cultural defensive mechanism
against perceived threat (Poulton, 1995: 7). In ethnic nationalism factors such as language,
history, culture and religion become crucial in the defining of the ethnic group. A further
development in this debate is that nationalism spread from its point of origin in Western Europe
and expanded eastward undergoing significant changes (Sugar & Banac, 1969: 9).

Eastern vs. Western nationalism

According to Hans Kohn, while nationalism in Western Europe corresponded to the social,
economic and political changes, it spread to Central and Eastern Europe before these changes
could take place. As a result, nationalism was shaped by a deferent set of institutional and social
conditions which in the West belonged to the past creating a set of nationalist ideologies which
were based on irrational and pre-enlightened concepts that tended towards exclusiveness. He
further suggests that Western nationalism is based in reality in a centralized nation-state, while
Eastern nationalism is based on myths and dreams in protest or conflict with the existing state
pattern which in the 19
th
century was the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires. Eastern European
nationalism needed a justification, a specific mission for a given group that did often include all

10


members of the nationality (Kohn, 1969: 457). Kohns imagination of Eastern nationalism goes
in line with what Anthony Smith has defined as the myth of ethnic election which definitive for
ethnic survival and self-renewal. It represents a collective religious-like belief that ones group is
chosen for a mission by the deity. The salvation of the ethnie is conditioned upon the fulfillment
of this mission which in itself imposes a set of moral obligations to follow former ways and
beliefs. This by itself guarantees the longevity and renewal of the group. According to him,
ethnies such as the Jewish community, that lacked such myths, were more easily absorbed or
diminished by other more dominant groups (Smith 1991: 36-7).

Balkan nationalism

We already established the importance of history to nationalists. The demonstration of past
control over a territory gives the modern state a claim on that territory. In his book on
Macedonian nationalism and identity, Hugh Poulton claims that in the Balkans this has lead to
different nations claiming the same historical ancestors, events and myths. The issue is further
complicated, he says, by popular migration whereby a particular people have inhabited different
areas in different times, and the political changes where different states associated with different
modern nations have at different times controlled the same piece of land. He claims that, unlike
in the West where nationalism has managed to transcend regional loyalties, in the Balkans these
regional identities are still preserved and many of them have retained a sense of former glorious
history when they had control over a particular area which, with the national awakenings of
the 19
th
century, they claimed once again. These claims were often made at the expense of their
neighbours who also made similar historic claims to the same territory (Poulton 1994: 6-10).
F.A.K. Yasamee has made similar observation on the nature of Balkans nationalism. He claims

11


that Balkan nations, especially Macedonia, are particularly vulnerable to cultural assimilation.
This fact has played a large part in the processes of nation building in the 19
th
and 20
th
century
since most of the Balkan population at this time was illiterate and spoke in unofficial dialects
rather than languages. The process of this assimilation, at least at the time before the national
awakenings, was a vehicle for social and financial prosperity through the acceptance of the
language and culture of the dominant group (Yasamee 1995: 123). Furthermore, Yasamee
identifies three general aspects of modern Balkan nations. First is the small nation syndrome
where the participants of the nation do not regard their institutions, habits and ways of life as
being for export, in contrast to the cultures of Western Europe. They have, throughout history,
mostly played the part of importers and have always relied on external patrons and partners
(Yasamee 1995: 124). Second, the Balkan nations do not follow the standard for nationalist
accounts. Since the 19
th
century there has been a progressive dissolution of larger identities
(Ortodox and Muslim religion) into smaller national units (Greek, Bulgarian, Romanian,
Macedonian, Bosnian, Albanian etc). The modern Balkans are an amalgam of allegiances and
the emergence of national identities should be understood as a process of reconstruction and
reinterpretation leaving space for further change. The final observation concerns history and the
way it is perceived. In the Balkans, history, as a subject of study, is highly politicized. It not only
fosters a collective sense of origin, accomplishment and continuity, but it also legitimizes the
present and arouses expectations for the future (Yasamee 1995: 124-5). Ulf Brunnbauer also
recognizes the importance of historiography in Balkan nationalism. He claims that during
Yugoslavia and after historians faced the task of providing historical legitimacy for the state. The
historic myths fostered by this endeavour provide the members of the nation the emotional need
to be part of a nation and a glorious past. Due to the importance of these myths, history in the
Balkans is a prime responsibility for the state (Brunnbauer 2005: 264-265).

12



What is multiculturalism?

The word culture has been defined in countless ways, but one starting point would be
Kymlickas definition in which culture is synonymous with a nation or a people. It is an
intergenerational community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory
or homeland, sharing a distinct language and history (Kymlicka, 1996: 11). He further refines
the concept by narrowing down different types of culture, and specifically defining what he calls
societal culture which provides members with meaningful ways of lifeincluding societal,
educational, religious, recreational, and economic life (Kymlicka, 1996: 13). It is important to
point out the ambiguity surrounding the difference between a nation and a culture. Although it
would be difficult to draw a complete line between the two, it would seem that a considered
homeland would be necessary for a nation, as well as a sense of majority of members present. On
the other hand, a culture can consist of two or more people from a given nation replicating some
objective traits of that culture. The culture not only exists within the nation, but exists outside of
it among emigrants and their descendants. Multiculturalism therefore is an idea which
acknowledges and promotes the existence of many cultures within a given nation, viewing the
incorporation of languages, ethnicities, religions, political views and other cultural indicators as a
new, unique national culture (Kymlicka, 1996: 11). Mann provides an idealistic, and
unattainable, conception of multiculturalism, that is a completely equal treatment and respect
for outgroups with no violence resulting in a kind of ethnic blindness (Mann, 2005). The issue
with this approach to multiculturalism is that it does not count on the existence of one dominant
culture that might end up prevailing over the others resulting in conflict, or the fact that there are
hardly any nation-states in the world who would agree to be completely a-cultural in the literal

13


sense of the word.

Issues with minorities

For many of the worlds peoples, the state as the expression of nationality does not exist. The
state today makes a claim to its citizens trumping in the process other forms of belonging based
on past and present identities. However, individuals who are part of a particular state do not
simply abandon other forms and sources of group distinctiveness or the emotional connection to
non-civic identities. The fact that these citizens are part of a common polity does not relinquish
their membership in alternative moral communities (Wilmer, 2002: 11). Frankie Wilmer goes
further by claiming that one can still arouse powerful emotions by evoking solidarity on the basis
of group identity that is derived from both symbolic and substantive differences that remain
pervasive in modern societies and states. According to him, ethnicity still remains one of the
most potent symbolic categories of political difference (Wilmer 2002: 11). In his discourse on
ethnic groups and moral communities he claims that it is through the existence of a dominant
ethnic group that minorities are created. What we call ethnic conflict is a manifestation of ethnic
minorities resisting the states that structures power according to the ability of ethnic groups to
assert their control over it. (Wilmer 2002: 12). Danforth furthers this opinion by stating that
nations hold in themselves the potential for their destruction. Through the creation of the nation-
state and the process of homogenization some people, whose culture does not conform to the
new national one, will inevitably be left at the margins. These people will eventually constitute
the national minorities which pose the threat to the legitimacy of nation-states. When nationalism
equates loyalty to the nation to membership in a state transforms minorities into enemies
(Danforth 1995: 21).

14


Chapter 2: The Macedonian Question and Liberation Movement 1870-1903

The territory of Macedonia has had many different rulers and inhabitants, making it confusing to
pinpoint the origin of Macedonian national identity. Some date it back to the Ancient kingdom of
Alexander and Philip the Great. (Poulton, 1995: 14-15) Others see it in the emergence of a single
Slav language in the mid 19
th
century when two teachers, Cyril and Methodius layed the ground
for a mass spread Slavic literacy (Poulton, 1995: 18:19). However, Danforth rightfully points out
that national identity often emerges in times of conflict from the realization of the categories of
others. People know who they are not before they know who they are (Danforth, 1995: 56); a
realization that did not appear among the Slav population of Macedonia until the 19
th
century
with the emergence of the IMRO and their most ambitious endevour - the Ilinden uprising. This
is the first expression of modern Maceonian ethnic nationalism by a group of intellectuals in the
Balkan capitals, marking the begining of the process of imagining the Macedonian national
community (Poulton, 1995: 57). Going in line with the modernist school of nationalism, this
example illustrates that nations emerge in specific socio-political conditions, such as education,
urbanization and the emergence of an excluded intelligentsia (Sugar & Banac, 1969: 7-8). In this
chapter I will provide an overview of the events leading to the establishment of the IMRO
(Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) and the Ilinden uprising, for an awareness of
these events is crucial to this study. The IMRO and Ilinden are a focal point of the creation of the
Macedonian national myth and the justification for the Macedonian nation-state (Brunnbauer,
2005: 282-3).
To begin the analysis of the birth of the Macedonian national sentiment we must identify three
linked elements: What was the exact extent of the Macedonian territory?; Which state had
rightful claim to it?; and what was the exact nationality of its inhabitants? Through these

15


questions we can analytically separate the geographical, political and ethnographic dimensions of
the adjective Macedonian. In the late 19
th
century a somewhat general consensus had been
reached in European circles to the extent of geographic Macedonia. At the time when the
Ottoman Empire controlled most of Eastern Europe, this territory included much of northern
Greece, all of Albania, Kosovo and the modern Republic of Macedonia, parts of southern Serbia
and parts of southwest Bulgaria (Perry, 1988:2)
1
. Ottoman authorities had divided this territory
into three areas called vilayets (Uskub-Skopje, Monastir- Bitola and Salonika- Thessaloniki), but
did not use the term Macedonia; it was assigned later on to this territory by Europeans (Brown,
2003: 37). Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, all of which had just acquired their autonomy from
Turkey, all advertised their claims on Ottoman Macedonia and the national-ecclesial disputes
that had lasted for the past ten centuries between the three Balkan powers acquired an
increasingly nationalist character. In addition to this, Macedonia became the focus of interest of
the Great Powers of Europe who feared or hoped for the ultimate demise of the Ottoman Empire
and many of them were exploring means of expanding their influence in the Balkans. (Barker,
1950: 14-15) In 1870 Russia had chosen Bulgaria as the best channel to accomplish this and
pushed Turkey to accept the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1872. Within the same
year the Exarchate acquired the ecclesial districts of Skopje and Orchrid as its eparchies in
accord with the Turkish decree of 1870 which stated that each district in which two-thirds of the
population wished to join the Exarchate could do so after an appropriate investigation, prompting
the Greek Patriarchate to declare the Exarchate as schismatic. (Barker, 1950: 15). The Bulgarians
seized the favorable situation to send Bulgarian priests and teachers, usually enthusiastic
nationalists, throughout the Slav population of Macedonia setting up churches and affiliated
schools and begin their assimilation campaign which was same method was practiced later on by

1
Refer to Image 1

16


both the Greeks and the Serbs (Barker 1950: 14-15). After the Russo-Turkish war, the dispute
over Macedonia was escalated by the signing of the San Stefano Treaty which awarded nearly all
of Slav Macedonia, and strips of Greece and Albania to Bulgaria. However, before the year was
over, the Great Powers pressured Russia to renegotiate this arrangement with the Treaty of
Berlin and return of the Macedonian territory back to Turkey. (Barker, 1950: 16) Just as
important, the Treaty of Berlin provided guarantees for religious liberties in Macedonia and
elsewhere meaning that all of the Balkan powers had an open opportunity to assimilate the
diverse population of Macedonia through religion and education.
At the twilight of the 19th century, the Macedonian territory was one of the most ethnically
diverse areas in the Ottoman Empire. In a space of 67.000 square kilometers lived people who
declared themselves as Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks, Slavs, Turks, Vlachs, and Jews, sometimes at
the same time (Barker 1950: 16). The 19
th
century Ottoman Empire was led according to
religious (Muslim) precepts, according to which the empires population was not divided by
language, ethnicity or nationality but by religion, through the millet system. Traditionally,
religion has always been one of the main factors in differentiating between different groups in
the Balkans (Danforth, 1995: 9). Frederic Abbott, a British scholar who visited Macedonia in the
early 1900s notes this fact in his travel journals notices that in the Macedonian territory
nationality had little to do with sentiment, blood or language and a lot to do with religion,
education and politics associated with it. As a result of the various assimilation campaigns by
Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia at different times it was common to encounter several different
nationalities within the same immediate family. The peoples who populated the Macedonia
territory had national affiliations, but no national sentiments. As he puts it, they were peoples
with no national soul (Abbott, 1903:8).
It is clear that although the geographical dimension of Macedonia is comprehensible, the

17


political and ethnographical ones are difficult to pinpoint. Since we cannot determine the exact
nationality of the population of Macedonia, we cannot determine who had a rightful claim to the
territory, and vice versa. When the eventual demise of the Ottoman Empire was inevitable, the
national loyalties of the Macedonian population rested with the swift and the rich (Abbott 1906:
75). This means that nationality was a suitable tool for social and financial ascendance so
Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria all focused their attention towards winning the hearts and minds of
the people (Gerolymatos, 2002). The people of Macedonia were often content to accept the
culture and practices of the dominant group while at the same time privately holding on to their
own local identity (Poulton, 1995: 9) This identity was often rooted in religion rather than
ethnicity. By the 1870s the Bulgarians were the dominant national party in Macedonia. The
reasons for the Bulgarian dominance in Macedonia at this time are numerous, but the most
influential factors are most likely the linguistic proximity between the Macedonian Slav
language and the Bulgarian one and the similarities in church practices. One can logically
assume that the Macedonian Slav population would affiliate with the group they least had to
assimilate to and who would provide them with the easiest life; in this case it was the Bulgarians.
(Yasamee, 1995: 126) This prompted Bulgaria, and many outside observers, to believe that after
the demise of the Ottoman Empire, Macedonia would be included in a Bulgarian successor-state
(Yasamee, 1995: 127).
This was prevented by what F.A.K. Yasamee calls a series of catastrophic events which
diverted the course of Macedonian history (Yasamee 1995: 126) The first event was the
establishment of the independent Bulgarian state in 1878 as a consequence of the Russo-Ottoman
war. However, this did not extend to the Macedonian territory which remained under Ottoman
rule. The political separation significantly diminished the Bulgarian influence in Macedonia,
prompting Serbia and Greece to intensify their own assimilatory nationalist propaganda. These

18


efforts were, nonetheless, ill fated because the Bulgarian ecclesiastical and educational activities
had taken their toll in Macedonia, influencing the emergence of a new generation of Bulgarian
educated intelligentsia among the Slavs in Macedonia. It was members of this new generation
that prompted the second catastrophe to face the Slavs of Macedonia, which was the
establishment of the IMRO and their subsequent campaign to overthrow Ottoman rule in
Macedonia (Yasamee 1995: 127).
This event goes in line with what modernist thinkers in nationalism theory, especially Ernest
Gellner, claim to be a crucial prerequisite for the establishment of nationalism (Gellner, 1994:
31). The full citizens produced by nation-size educational system that Gellner talks about were
created in the Bulgarian schools of higher education. However, due to the unique ethnic
constitution of the Macedonian population, Bulgaria inadvertently fostered the founders of a
foreign nation. (Yasamee, 1995: 127) In 1893 in Salonika, the Central Macedonian
Revolutionary Committee was established whose goal was to set up an internal organization, the
IMRO, and prepare Macedonia for a general uprising. At this point the academic opinions
become divided. Some authors, such as Elisabeth Barker and Loring Danforth claim that the
IMRO was a genuinely Macedonian organization which was divided into two wings, one which
tended towards the closest collaboration with the Supreme Committee, which was backed by the
Bulgarian government and wanted Macedonian autonomy for the sole purpose of it being
annexed to Bulgaria. The other wing trended towards genuine autonomy or independence in
Macedonia, and the unification of all the Macedonian people regardless of their ethnic
background (Barker 1950: 16, Danforth, 1995). On the other hand, other more contemporary
authors such as F.A.K Yasamee and Ulf Brunnbauer claim that that it is misleading to believe
that the IMRO viewed the Slavs of Macedonia as an independent nation just because they asked
for Macedonian autonomy. In fact, according to him, the IMRO never questioned the Bulgarian

19


nationalism of the Macedonian Slavs. Their apparent preference for autonomy was in fact only a
political tactic implemented in order not to alienate the numerous non-Bulgar population of
Macedonia (Yasamee 1995: 127, Brunnbauer, 2005: 280). Whichever the case was, it is mostly a
matter of speculation since there is no sure way to verify what the true goals of the organization
since the convictions within it were just as diverse as its membership. What we do know for
certain is that almost all of the founding members were born in the territory of Macedonia, were
of Slav ethnic origin and belonged to Bulgarian Exarchate. They were all students in the
Bulgarian schools of higher education in Salonika or Sofia, and before their revolutionary
activities they worked as teachers, lawyers or publishers for the Bulgarian state. From the 1890s
onwards the IMRO embarked on their revolutionary campaign culminating in 1903 with the
unsuccessful Ilinden uprising in the mountain town of Krusevo.
2
The uprising represents a
pivotal moment in the history of Macedonian national identity in the 20
th
century. On August 2
nd
,
1903 the IMRO drove out the Turkish garrison from Krusevo and set up a provisional
government in which the towns people and village representatives were to participate. They also
distributed a written proclamation of their peaceful state-building intentions, a document that
came to be known as the Krusevo Manifesto (Brown 2003: 3). The Krusevo republic was short-
lived however, and only two weeks after its establishment the Ottoman forces took the town
under siege. After defeating a few determined rebels on the nearby hill of Meckin Kamen, the
Ottoman forces retaliated on the town people. After an extended bombardment, the Turkish
troops repeatedly sacked the town resulting in a lot of house burning, rape, arrest and
imprisonment (Brown 2003: 6). The consequences of the Ilinden uprising for the Slav population
in Macedonia were grave, prompting many of them to flee to Bulgaria, or denounce their
Bulgarian nationality and declare themselves as Greeks or Serbs. As for the IMRO, most of its

2
Refer to Image 2

20


high ranking officials were either killed or driven into exile and in the face of failure rapidly lost
its organizational coherence and broke into mutually hostile factions (Yasamee 1995: 127).
Today, the Bulgarian state still refuses to accept the existence of the Macedonian nation.
According to them Macedonians are Bulgarians of a different linguistic background. Goce
Delcev and Dame Gruev, the IMROs most prominent members are Bulgarian revolutionaries
who fought for Bulgarian ideals (Brunnbauer, 2005: 283). The Macedonian state on the other
hand has established the IMRO, its heroes and the Ilinden uprising as the cradle of the
Macedonian nation and the subsequent historic narrative is written to demonstrate a sense of
continuity from that time, place and events. The importance of the establishment of the IMRO
and its activities for Macedonian nationalism lies in the way they were and still are imagined by
Macedonian nationalists as a symbol of unity, struggle, liberty, political vision and self-sacrifice.
The founders of the IMRO are scarified as heroes and visionaries, the fathers of the nation
(Rossos, 2008: 99-100). But the memory of the IMRO and Ilinden is selective. In modern
Macedonia, Gruev and Delchev are given much more prominence than the other IMRO
founders. The establishment of the Krusevo Republic is portrayed as the pinnacle of the
revolutionary fight in Macedonia (Brunnbauer, 2005: 284) But as Keith Brown puts it:
[..] A Burkean conversation over events in Krusevo in 1903 has been going on for a century,
with some additional features. In the weaving together of "nationalist," "socialist," and
"localist" versions of the past exiles, residents, historians, ideologues, and creative artists have
all played their part. They have not, though, entered the debate as equals[] (Brown 2003: 7).




21


Chapter 3: Identity, Independence, Crisis and Compromise: 1989-today

The period between the Ilinden uprising and Macedonian independence was both
turbulent and violent for the people living in Macedonia. After the decline of the IMRO in 1907
the Greek, Serbs and Bulgarians all came down on the Macedonian territory, all wanting to get
the biggest share. In fact, both the Balkan Wars in the 1910s took place because of Serbias
Bulgarias and Greeces territorial appetites for Macedonia (Gerolymatos 2002: 192-194)
3
. Any
kind of notion of an independent Macedonia was lost until the end of WWII, the establishment of
the Socialist Republic of Macedonia and the Yugoslav federation. Macedonians appreciated their
membership in Yugoslavia and were quite concerned with the prospect of the federation
breaking up. In Yugoslavia, Macedonia was shielded from the territorial appetites of Bulgaria,
Albania and Greece, while Serbia acted as a patronizing, but protective force. It found great
comfort in the balance between external security and limited internal autonomy. In fact, most of
the Macedonian population, both Albanian, who had become a prominent presence in the
Balkans and ethnic Macedonian believed that the federal framework will keep the frictions
between the ethnic communities at bay. Nonetheless, by 1990 it was obvious that Yugoslavia
could not be preserved leaving the Macedonian political leadership with the heavy task of
building an independent state. Macedonia was the only state to achieve its independence
peacefully and to avoid any major conflict between its ethnic groups in the subsequent years of
state building. This was achieved through a combination of the mythical legacy of Ilinden and
the birth of the Macedonian nation, the careful internal and external policies of Macedonias
political leadership and intervention from the international community.

3
Refer to Image 3

22


In his article on historographic myths in the Republic of Macedonia, Ulf Brunnbauer claims that
Macedonian historians have constructed a national myth to give meaning to the history of the
Macedonian nation and to assert their claim on the homeland. This goes in line with Anthony
Smiths argument that the national myth helps the construction, definition and political
mobilization of nations. The national myth helps answer questions of the origin of the nation, its
members, enemies and destiny (Smith, 1992: 56-60). Even in Yugoslav times, since the myth of
Ilinden fit well with the Yugoslav idea of Brotherhood and Unity, it held a significant place in
the national consciousness of the Macedonian people. The Socialist Republic of Macedonia was
founded on the anniversary of Ilinden in 1944 at the ASNOM assembly creating a symbolic
chain of nationalist affirmation and socialist revolution (Brunnbauer, 2005: 283-284)
4
. Even after
the fall of socialism the connection between these events, without the socialist aspect, continued
to be of importance to the national mythology. The establishment of an independent Macedonian
state in 1991 is portrayed as the full realization of the Ilinden legacy, a sort of third Ilinden
(Brunnbauer, 2005: 284, Rossos, 2008: 99). The newly gained Macedonian independence
brought with itself numerous issues such as the name dispute with Greece, the friction with the
growing Albanian minority and the concern for national identity. These historic myths provided
reassurance for the Macedonian people of their past, their present and their future and an
impression that an independent Macedonian state was a pre-ordained path that they, as a nation,
were bound to follow. In fact this is what Smith identified as the myth of ethnic election and the
salvation of the nation through following certain moral guidelines which delegated the practice
of former beliefs and customs an through them, ensuring the long term survival of the ethnic
group (Smith, 1991: 36-7). The VMRO-DPMNE which was, and still is, the leading right-wing
party in Macedonia harvested the myth of Ilinden in the early years when Macedonian

4
Refer to Image 4

23


independence was questionable by stating that it would adhere to fulfil the ideal of unifying the
Macedonian people in an independent state. This proved to be a very successful campaign for
VMRO since they attracted massive support from the ethnic Macedonian and rallied the people
to support succession (Rossos, 2008: 262-3). The myth of Ilinden also aided to defuse the
friction between the Albanian minority and Macedonian majority. Both sides were deeply
distrustful of each other; the Albanians claiming that the Macedonians wanted to establish
dominance over them and the Macedonians believing the Albanians to be disloyal to Macedonia
and secretly wanting to destabilize it. However, what partly prevented the frictions to escalate
into full-blown civil war and rallied the citizen support behind minority rights laws was the
collective belief from the Macedonian side that Macedonia should be an inclusive state and as a
victim of crude domination and should not inflict that misfortune to anyone else (Rossos, 2008:
278).
The Macedonian political elites had an ideology through which they could rally popular support.
However, there were many political and economic problems that threatened Macedonian
stability. As one of the least developed federal republics it was poor, ethnically divided,
militarily weak and surrounded by aggressive neighbors (Bennet, 1995: 218). Macedonia was
hardly ready for independence. After the Macedonian Communist Union opened the door of
pluralism in 1990, the situation was further deteriorated by the fact that a deep ideological wedge
was already forming between the dominant political parties, the SKM which was the Communist
party, the SRS- the pro-Yugoslav party led by Ante Markovic the last Yugoslav prime minister,
the VMRO-DPMNE and PDP-NDP which was the Albanian coalition (Poulton, 1995: 172-7).
The first parliamentary election was scheduled for November 1990, and the tension of the
competition further divided the parties. It had a particular influence on the Albanian-Macedonian
relations since it was obvious that the Albanian minority would vote for the PDP-NDP while the

24


ethnic Macedonians were divided. Some favoured an arrangement that would allow Macedonia
to remain in the federation while others demanded immediate independence. The results of the
election were as such: most Albanians as predicted voted for their own, and the former socialists
and the federalists, SKM and SRS, usually came in first in predominantly Macedonian districts
while the VMRO-DPMNE came second or third. The results of the election reflected the belief
of most people that, even though an independent state was an attractive prospect, in reality peace
in Macedonia would only is maintained if Macedonia would continue to be part of Yugoslavia or
at least maintain strong ties with it (Panev, 2005: 602). SRS and SKM emerged as the dominant
force with combined 56 seats out of 120, but without a majority to form a government. At the
end all political forces had to forge a minimal mutual understanding in the interest of state
stability and citizen security. One of the most significant events at this time was the election of
Kiro Gligorov as the first president of Macedonia. Gligorov was already 74 when he became
president and had no political ambitions of his own in contrast to most of the political elite in
Macedonia at the time that were young, zealous and very ambitious. Known for his career as an
economic reformer in Belgrade, Gligorov had spent most of his years in the Yugoslav capital
following Macedonian affairs, but never intervening. Having an incomparable understanding of
Macedonian, Balkan and international affairs he was the best choice to take over the difficult
task of state building (Rossos, 2008: 264). In terms of state independence, Gligorov along with
Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia was persistent to preserve, in some form, the old state for he feared
that a total break-up of Yugoslavia would be fatal to Macedonian consciousness which was still a
relatively new development. He was also suspicious of the intentions of the large Albanian
minority and Macedonias predatory neighbours (Poulton, 1995: 175-6). However, the
proclamation of independence by Slovenia and Croatia and the resulting military conflicts killed
any hope of maintaining a federal framework and Macedonia was pushed to independence. After

25


the issuing of the Sovereignty Declaration and the referendum of independence in 1991 it was
upon the parliament to establish a new constitution. The Albanian minority refused to accept the
state independence since they feared they would be treated as second-class citizens without the
protection of Yugoslavia. The VMRO proposed the dominance of the Macedonian culture and
language while the SRS and the SKM (now known together as SDSM) favoured a non-
nationalistic constitution (Panev, 2005: 603). Since no compromise could be made between the
socialist and Albanian parties, the two Macedonian parties had to reach an understanding in
order for the parliament to adopt a constitution. The result was a constitution that kept the
minorities at the same political standing as ethnic Macedonians, but also asserted the dominance
of Macedonian language and culture. This outcome was unacceptable to the Albanian parties and
they refused to take part in the voting of the constitution initiating a process of political erosion
that would manifest in the short insurgent crisis in 2001 (Panev, 2005: 603). Perhaps one of the
most significant contributions of Gligorovs term as a president was the fact that he enjoyed
good relations with both the ex-federalist and the Albanian parliamentary group who in recent
time had started to develop a closer working relationship. His shaping of a political
parliamentary majority assured a more stable government and additional power to the president
through the parliament (Glenny, 1996: 137). The second parliamentary election went in favour of
the former socialists, whose victory VMRO-DPMNE attempted to thwart. However, the results
of the election were left to stand, and due to VMROs refusal to participate in the government,
the parliament was formed without an opposition. The outcome of the elections placed a great
amount of political power in the hands of a small elite resulting in a significant rise in corruption
(Panev, 2005: 605). Immediately before the third parliamentary election the VMRO-DPMNE
made a radical change in its political position and entered into a coalition with a group of
reformed socialists who hadnt been politically active during the years of early independence.

26


They also made a public declaration not to impose Macedonian culture and ethnicity as the
dominant one in the state which allowed them to attract supporters from the lines of citizens who
saw them to be too radical before (Panev, 2005: 605).
One has to recognize that no matter how skilled the political leaders of a state are, if that state is
weak in terms of economic and military power, in order to defend its existence from forces that
would benefit from its demise, it requires some powerful allies. Because of the states delicate
geographic and ethnographic position, the stability of Macedonia was and still is of greater
international interest. The international community, especially the EU and US, have directly or
indirectly helped maintain the stability of the Macedonian state. Their most significant
involvements are twofold: the worldwide recognition of an independent Macedonian state and its
subsequent acceptance in international organizations, the mediation of the Ohrid Framework
Agreement in 2001 after the Albanian insurgent crisis.
In the early 1990s the European Commission established the Badinter Commission to evaluate
the cases made for autonomy by different entities in the federal republic which ruled out that
Slovenia and Macedonia fulfilled all the criteria for immediate recognition (Brown, 2000: 122).
Despite the Commissions recommendation Macedonia failed to receive recognition of its
independence. The international recognition of Macedonia was severely hindered by Greece
since it believed that the Macedonian name, flag and constitution made indirect claims to Greek
territory and heritage. Namely, the Greek government claimed, and still claims to this day, that
the 16-point star/sun symbol
5
that was the emblem of the first Macedonian flag was in fact an
ancient Greek symbol dating from the time of Alexander the Great who, according to Greek
national history was a Hellenic king. Furthermore, the clause of the newly drafted Macedonian
constitution where the Macedonian state promises to care for the status and rights of

5
Refer to image 5

27


Macedonians living out of the Macedonian borders was interpreted by Greece to indicate the
Slavophone population living in the northern part of Greece which is also called Macedonia
(Brown, 2000: 123). Greece identified Macedonia as a security threat and blocked Macedonias
recognition in the EU through it membership and in the US through its powerful lobby. The US
and EU refused to recognize Macedonias independence until the dispute was settled which in
turn influenced other states to hold back their recognition (Glenny, 1996). In the summer of
1992, the second year of independence, Macedonia was recognized by only six states. Curiously
enough, Bulgaria was the first country to recognize Macedonias independence under the
condition that Macedonia would give up any territorial claims to Bulgarian territory. It refused
however to recognize the existence of a Macedonian nation and language (Rossos, 2008: 267-8).
Greece on the other hand was encouraged by the hesitance of the international community and
took a more aggressive approach. In 1993 it established a total embargo on the Macedonian-
Greek border which, combined with the economic sanctions Serbia was facing in the north, put a
severe strain on the weak Macedonian economy. The UN estimate was that Macedonia lost
approximately US $58 million for every month of the embargo which only added to the ethnic
tensions in the state (Glenny, 1996: 143). This prompted the international community, namely
the US, EU and NATO to realize that Macedonia was on the brink of collapse and was in
immediate need of security guarantees through international recognition (Rossos 2008: 271). In
the next few years, from 1993 to 1996 Macedonia was recognized by the EU, accepted into the
Council of Europe, OSCE and NATOs Program for Peace. The dispute with Greece was
temporarily resolved with the Interim Accord in New York in September 1995 where Macedonia
agreed to change its flag and amend its constitution and in exchange Greece agreed to lift the
trade embargo and not block Macedonias acceptance in any international organizations.
Macedonia and Greece agreed upon a temporary solution to use the name Former Yugoslav

28


Republic of Macedonia for diplomatic purposes (UN Interim Accord, 1995).
The Kosovo crisis in 1999 came to be another test for the Macedonian state. During the crisis
Macedonia hosted almost 300.000 refugees, and the Macedonian government paid most of
financial costs for hosting them resulting in a drastic increase of Macedonias public debt. The
international community pledged its full diplomatic and political support to handle the refugee
situation, but this promise was never materialized (Panev, 2005: 608). However, due to NATOs
involvement with Serbia, Macedonia became the point of interest of world politics and many
world leaders paid a visit. The war in Kosovo helped increase the international awareness of
Macedonia, establishing it world wide as a distinct entity (Panev, 2005: 608). But, the defeat of
Milosevic in Kosovo brought what is perhaps the greatest challenge the Macedonian state has
faced in regards to its internal stability and security. In 2001, a group of extreme Albanian
nationalists used Albanian grievances as a pretext to launch a series of armed insurrection against
the Macedonian government. In order to comprehend the ethnic crisis of 2001 one must
understand the nature of the Albanian-Macedonian relations after the states independence. Since
the independence, the Albanian minority claim that they constitute between 35-48% of the total
population, while government census says that the figure is no higher than 21%. The Kosovo
crisis significantly swelled Albanian numbers which were already increasing due to high birth
rates. The friction between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority is of a political
nature. The Albanian minority feels that they have been given a subordinate political position
and the only way to rectify this is by drafting a constitution that does not refer to any ethnic
group, but to the citizens of Macedonia as a whole (Poulton, 1995: 184). On the other hand, for
the Macedonian majority, the existence of their nation is directly tied to the fate of the state
which has led them to be very possessive of it. Albanians do not have the same attachment to the
state since most of them identify with Albania, Kosovo or the idea of a Great Albania, a state

29


that would unite all of the Albanian populated territories together. Because of their different
attitudes towards the state the relations between the two groups have been rather tense with the
Albanians viewing the Macedonians as domineering, and the Macedonians thinking of the
Albanians as disloyal (Rossos, 2008: 278). In February 2001, a group of insurgents carried out a
series of armed provocations against the military and police near the Kosovo border. The rebels
seized part of the nearby territory, and by the end of the first half of 2001 the insurgency spread
throughout the north-western part of Macedonia. As the tension and animosity grew all across
the country the fear of a full scale civil war was well on its way to become reality. The
international community could hardly watch idly by, so in the summer of 2001 NATO deployed
3500 troops to disarm the insurgents while the US and EU pressured the Albanian and
Macedonian political parties into a negotiation resulting in the Ohrid Framework Agreement
(Matveeva, 2003: 12). The agreement, which was co-signed by DPA (the new Albanian party),
SDSM (the former socialists), PDP (the original Albanian party) and VMRO (the nationalists)
resulted in a power-sharing agreement which dictated an immediate cease fire and created new
norms and institutions in Macedonian society giving minorities certain rights and benefits such
as non-discrimination, equal representation, more power to local governments, favourable
parliamentary procedures, education in native language and state funding for non-Macedonian
speaking universities, and positive discrimination for university admission (Framework
Agreement, 2001). Both the EU and the US put intense pressure on Macedonian officials to
accept the agreements who were very uncomfortable with the loss of Macedonian identity in the
state. Furthermore, there was still a great deal of mistrust between the Albanian and Macedonian
community, but they both agreed to uphold their obligations in the good faith that the other side
will as well (Matveeva, 2003: 15-7). In recent years attainment of EU memebership in has
become Macedonias number one policy priority ever since the Commission granted it candiate

30


status in 2005. Working under EU suggestions, both the Macedonian and Albanian leaders have
made great concessions to build a state suitable for EU membership which often means putting
personal differences aside (EurActiv, 2010). Due to the great desire of the Macedonian state to
join the EU as soon as possible combined with the volume and intrusivness of the rules attached
to its membership have granted the EU an unprecedented amount of influence over the
restructuring of domestic institurions and public policies (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004:
661). In the case of Macedonia, it has prompted the solution on the border dispute with Kosovo
and the reconition of its independence, even though both Serbia and Russia were opposed to the
move. This made Macedonia the first ex-Yugoslav state to complete its border demarcation
(EurActiv, 2009). The solution to the ethnic frictions in Macedonia was never a military one, but
political. Through the prospect of an EU membership, the Macedonian government found a new
practical cause through which they can justify almost any policy move.

31


Conclusion
Traditions and accepted opinions die hard no matter their origin. They can only be disproven
with great difficulty. A matter of conviction, or belief and these are really feelings and have no
direct connection to the truth (Gregorevic, 1918). Nowhere is this more true than with issues of
collective beleif. Issues of nation, culture and ethnicity are deeply engraved in peoples
consiousness. The viability or rightfulness of these issues is immaterial in regard to how easy
would it be to remove them.
Most Balkan states are still dominated by nationalist, xenophobic and intolerant policies. The
issue at hand is that in order to achive stablity in the Balkans one must look beyond the
institutional level and provide conditions for a possible re-imagination of the Balkans by the
Balkans themselves (Akrivoulis, 2004: 3). By looking at the example of Macedonia we can see
that there is a place for liberalism and peaceful ethnic co-existance in the Balkans, if approached
with the right attitude. The legacy of the IMRO and the ideals of Ilinden of an inlcusive
Macedonian state have gone a long way to defuse the tensions that tend to arise between the
different cultural groups in Macedonia. Its political leaderhip after the dissolution of Yugoslavia
can serve as an example for prudent and careful decision making. Finally, the joined intervention
from both the US and the EU has served to push the extra mile. All of these factors are crucial
contributors to the stability of Macedonia. Most importantly, perhaps because of the history of
always being under foreign rule, the Macedonian citizens, of all groups, and their leaders
understood the importance of compromise and the danger of reigidity.
True, the success formula that worked in Macedonia will not necessarily work in the other
Balkan states, but it is clear, even today, that the situation in the Balkans will never be
completely defused until a process of compromise and allowance does not take palce.


32




33



Image 1: Balkans before 1912


Image 2: An artful depiction of the Ilinden uprising, very popular in the early years of independence

34



Image 3: Balkans after First Balkan War



Image 4: Yugoslav Federation

Image 5: The Virgina symbol

35



Bibliography

Abbott, F.G., 1903. A tale of Tour in Macedonia.with illustrations. London.

Akrivoulis, D.E., 2004. A New Ethos for the Balkans: collective memories, the weight of
suffering and forgivness. In Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association. Lincoln,
2004. University of Lincoln.

Anderson, B., 1983. Cultural Roots. In Imagined Communities. 2nd ed. London: Verso. pp.9-32.
EU/US/Macedonia 2001. Ohrid Framework Agreement. Ohrid, R. Macedonia.

Barker, E., 1950. Macedonia: Its place in Balkan power politics. London and New York: The
Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Bennet, C., 1997. Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: causes, course, consequences. New York: New
York University Press.

Breuilly, J., 2001. The State and Nationalism. In M. Guibernau & J. Hutchinson, eds.
Understanding Nationalism. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing. pp.32-53.

Brown, K.S., 2000. In the Realm of the Doubleheaded Eagle: parapolitics in Macedonia 1994-9.
In J.K. Cowan, ed. Macedonia: The politics of identity and difference. Sterling: Pluto Press.
pp.122-40.

Brown, K., 2003. The Past in Question?: Modern Macedonia an the uncertainties of a nation.

Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Brown, K., 2004. Villans and the Symbolic Pollution in the Narratives of Nations: the case of


36


Boris Sarafov. In M. Todorova, ed. Balkan Identities: nation and memory. London: Hurst and
Company. pp.233-53.

Brunnbauer, U., 2005. Historographic myths in the Republic of Macedonia. In P. Kolsto, ed.
Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe. London: Hurst and Company. pp.262-98.

Danforth, L.M., 1995. The Macedonian Conflict. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

EurActiv, 2009. EurActiv. [Online] Available at: HYPERLINK
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-hails-macedonia-kosovo-solving-border-
quarrel/article-186514 [Accessed 24 December 2010].

EurActiv, 2010. EurActiv. [Online]
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-macedonia-relations-linksdossier-329923
[Accessed 20 December 2010].

Gellner, E., 1983. Nations and Nationalism (New Perspectives on the Past). New York: Cornell
University Press.

Gellner, E., 1994. Nationalism and Modernization. In J. Hutchinson & A.D. Smith, eds.
Nationalism. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.55-63.

Gerolymatos, A., 2002. The Balkan Wars. New York: Basic Books.

Glenny, M., 1996. The Macedonian Question. In A. Danchev & T. Halverson, eds. International
Perspectives on the Yugolsav Conflict. London : McMillian Press. pp.134-48.

Gregorevic, T.R., 1918. Macedonia. New York: Macmilian Group.

Kohn, H., 1961. The idea of Nationalism. New York: Macmilian Publishing.


37


Kymlicka, W., 1996. Multicultural Citizenship - A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.

Mann, M., 2005. The Argument. In The Dark Side of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. pp.1-34.

Matveeva, A., 2003. Macedonia: guns, policing and ethnic devision. London, Bonn: Bonn
International Center for Conversion Safeworld.

United Nations, 1995. Interim Accord: Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
No. 3219. New York, 1995. United Nations- Treaty Series.

Panev, A., 2005. Macedonia. In R. Frucht, ed. Eastern Europe: an introduction to the people,
land and culture. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc. pp.583-621.

Poulton, H., 1995. Who are the Macedonians? London: C. Hurst and Co.

Rossos, A., 2008. Macedonia and the Macedonians. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.

Schimmelfennig, F. & Sedelmeier, U., 2004. Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to
the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public Policy,
11:4(August), pp.661-79.

Smith, A.D., 1991. National Identity. London: Penguin Books.

Smith, A.D., 1992. Myths and Memories of the Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sugar, P. & Banac, I., 1969. Nationalism in Eastern Europe. Seattle and London: University of
Washington Press.

Todorova, M., 2009. Imagining the Balkans. New York: Oxford University Press.


38


Wilmer, F., 2002. The construction of man, the state, and war: identity, conflict and violence in
Foreign Yugoslavia. London and New York: Routlege.

Yasamee, F.A.K., 1995. Nationality in the Balkans: the case of the Macedonians. In G.G.
Ozdogan & K. Saybasili, eds. Balkans: a mirror of the new international world order. Istanbul :
Marmara University.