purify

Potential Problem
Analysis (PPA) and
Failure Mode Effect
Analysis (FMEA)

protect

transport

Why?

Module Objectives

Introduce Potential Problem Analysis (PPA)

Introduce FMEA

Describe FMEA principles and techniques

Summarize the concepts, definitions, application
options and relationships with other tools

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 2

Problem Solving Process

Kepner-Tregoe Potential Problem Analysis

FMEA and K-T work from the same basic
model
POTENTIAL
PROBLEM

LIKELY

LIKELY

CAUSE

EFFECT
TRIGGER
CONTINGENT

PREVENTIVE

ACTIONS

- ADAPTIVE
-CORRECTIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 3

Initial Problem
POTENTIAL

WALK INTO DOOR

PROBLEM

LIKELY

CANT SEE

CAUSE

LIKELY

PAIN

EFFECT

BUMP HEAD

TRIGGER
CONTINGENT
PREVENTIVE

ACTIONS

- ADAPTIVE
-CORRECTIVE

GET GLASSES

WEAR HELMET
REMOVE DOORS

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 4

1st WHY
PROBLEM
BECOMES EFFECT
CAUSE BECOMES

POTENTIAL

NEW PROBLEM

LIKELY

CANT SEE

WALK INTO DOOR

PROBLEM

LIKELY

PAIN

CAUSE

EFFECT

BUMP HEAD

TRIGGER
CONTINGENT
PREVENTIVE

ACTIONS

- ADAPTIVE
-CORRECTIVE

GET GLASSES

CONFIDENTIAL

WEAR HELMET
REMOVE DOORS
BB PPA & FMEA
Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 5

1st WHY
POTENTIAL

CANT SEE

PROBLEM

NEAR
SIGHTED

LIKELY
CAUSE

LIKELY

PAIN

EFFECT

WALK INTO
DOOR AND
BUMP HEAD

TRIGGER
CONTINGENT
PREVENTIVE

ACTIONS

- ADAPTIVE
-CORRECTIVE

GET GLASSES

SURGERY

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 6

2nd WHY
POTENTIAL

CANT SEE

PROBLEM

NEAR
SIGHTED

LIKELY
CAUSE

LIKELY

PAIN

EFFECT

WALK INTO
DOOR AND
BUMP HEAD

TRIGGER
CONTINGENT
PREVENTIVE

ACTIONS

- ADAPTIVE
-CORRECTIVE

GET GLASSES

SURGERY

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 7

2nd WHY
POTENTIAL
PROBLEM

TOO MUCH
T.V.

LIKELY
CAUSE

NEAR
SIGHTED

LIKELY

PAIN

EFFECT

CANT SEE
WALK INTO
DOOR AND
BUMP HEAD

TRIGGER
CONTINGENT
PREVENTIVE

ACTIONS

- ADAPTIVE
-CORRECTIVE

SURGERY

CUT OUT
STAR TREK

HAVE WE FOUND ROOT CAUSE?

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 8

2nd WHY
POTENTIAL
PROBLEM

NEAR
SIGHTED

LIKELY

TOO MUCH
T.V.

CANT SEE
WALK INTO
DOOR AND
BUMP HEAD

LIKELY

PAIN

CAUSE

EFFECT

TRIGGER
CONTINGENT
PREVENTIVE

ACTIONS

- ADAPTIVE
-CORRECTIVE

SURGERY

CUT OUT
STAR TREK

OR GONE TOO FAR !

BB PPA & FMEA
Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 9

CONFIDENTIAL

Determining Level of Analysis

Whats Wrong with This Picture?
NUMBER OF PROCESS FAILURE CAUSES
OPERATOR ERROR
TOOLING
CONTAMINATION
SET-UP
HANDLING

Too general. May need

to further drill down.

DESIGN
GAGE
POW ER
0

10

15

20

25

CONFIDENTIAL

30

35

40

45

50

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 10

PPA Definition
Potential Process Analysis is a systematic process
for uncovering and dealing with potential problems
that are reasonably likely to occur and therefore
worthy of attention
PPA can be applied to a project plan or to a
transactional process to determine areas of potential
problem and risk.

The New Rational Manager, Charles Kepner, Benjamin Tregoe, Princeton Research Press, 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 11

Form
ACTIVITY:

PLAN ANALYSIS - POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

PLAN/ACTIONS
/TASKS

POTENTIAL
PROBLEMS

EFFECTS

LIKELY CAUSES SEV OCC

CONFIDENTIAL

PREVENTIVE
ACTIONS

CONTINGENT
ACTIONS

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 12

TRIGGERS FOR
CONTINGENT

Identifying Specific Potential Problems

WHAT
WHERE

Be specific
Problem may be too
broad and need a
narrower focus
Problem with delivery
What about delivery late, early, damaged,
wrong count, etc.

WHEN
EXTENT

Describe problems so
that they can be
addressed independently

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 13

Identifying Likely Causes

And Preventive Actions
Effect of a preventive action:
remove, partially or totally, the likely cause of a
potential problem
Effect of a contingent action:
reduce the impact of a problem that cannot be
prevented

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 14

Sphere of Influence
Consider:
Sphere of influence
SPHERE OF INFLUENCE

Span of Control

(Influence or persuasion only)

Some problems lie

within the teams /
process owners control,
some do not

SPAN OF CONTROL
(Full authority)

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 15

CONFIDENTIAL

PPA Steps
ACTIVITY:

PLAN ANALYSIS - POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

PLAN/ACTIONS
/TASKS

POTENTIAL
PROBLEMS

EFFECTS

LIKELY CAUSES

This is a chronological list of tasks or

project steps showing the risk
(vulnerable) areas.
A risk area is:
- anything never done before
- overlapping responsibility or authority
- tight deadlines
- activities carried out at long distance.
describes the WHAT, WHERE, WHEN
and EXTENT of individual items and
timing for each step in plan
CONFIDENTIAL

S
E
V

O
C
C

PREVENTIVE
ACTIONS

CONTINGENT
ACTIONS

TRIGGERS FOR
CONTINGENT
ACTION

This column most likely to go wrong

within the area of risk. Anticipates
possible deviations from intended
target.
Ask what should happen and then
what could happen or go wrong.
Be specific but avoid in-depth
explanation.

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 16

PPA Steps
ACTIVITY:

PLAN ANALYSIS - POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

PLAN/ACTIONS
/TASKS

POTENTIAL
PROBLEMS

EFFECTS

LIKELY CAUSES

S
E
V

O
C
C

PREVENTIVE
ACTIONS

CONTINGENT
ACTIONS

TRIGGERS FOR
CONTINGENT
ACTION

This is what the customer of end user

sees as symptoms. It is the
consequence of the failure on the next
process, operation, product, customer,
etc.

Identify factors which could create or

cause the anticipated problem.
Use imagination, experience, and
logic to help you determine likely
causes.

Answers "What does the customer

experience as a result of the problem?"

Additional tools such as cause-effect

diagram or affinity diagram may be
helpful in isolating causes.
Several causes may exist for each
potential problem.

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 17

CONFIDENTIAL

PPA Steps
ACTIVITY:

PLAN ANALYSIS - POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

PLAN/ACTIONS
/TASKS

POTENTIAL
PROBLEMS

EFFECTS

LIKELY CAUSES

S
E
V

O
C
C

PREVENTIVE
ACTIONS

CONTINGENT
ACTIONS

TRIGGERS FOR
CONTINGENT
ACTION

Assess threat in terms of severity and

likelihood, or occurrence.

Preventive actions work on the

CAUSES.

Use HIGH, MED or LOW.

Or number scale ie. 1 10.

Determine ways to keep likely causes

from creating potential problems.
List previous actions which are
feasible, and practical.
A preventive action can address one
or more causes.

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 18

PPA Steps
ACTIVITY:

PLAN ANALYSIS - POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

PLAN/ACTIONS
/TASKS

POTENTIAL
PROBLEMS

EFFECTS

LIKELY CAUSES

Contingent actions reduce likely

EFFECTS. They are to minimize the
impact of a potential problem should it
occur.

S
E
V

O
C
C

PREVENTIVE
ACTIONS

CONTINGENT
ACTIONS

TRIGGERS FOR
CONTINGENT
ACTION

Establishes a feedback that indicates

that a potential problem has occurred.
Its purpose is to activate a contingent
action.
Triggers should be automatic if
possible and include:
- how the problem will be spotted
- how the contingent action will be set
in motion.

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 19

When to Use PPA

PPA is a simplified version of FMEA suitable for
business processes
Use PPA whenever experience and gut feeling say
that something could go wrong in the future.
PPA enables a person to make full use of his or her
experience.
Merely being able to remember a thousand horror
stories is of no use unless that body of information
can be used to prevent more
Kepner-Tregoe

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 20

Actions
A well-developed FMEA or PPA will be of
limited value without positive and effective
corrective actions.

The design or process must be

improved based on the results of
the FMEA or PPA study.

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 21

CONFIDENTIAL

Example AGB project: PPA Inventory Accuracy

ACTIVITY:
ACTIVITY: Inventory
Inventory Accuracy
Accuracy

PLAN ANALYSIS - POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

PLANS/ACTIONS/TASKS POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
PLANS/ACTIONS/TASKS POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
Adjustments made after
Period End Adjustments
doing a period end
physical count
Adjustments
made after
Period End Adjustments
doing a period end
physical count

Correct Inventory

Correct Inventory

Planned adjustments

Planned adjustments

Adjustments made after a Can not complete an

problem occurs. (Material work order.
issue initiatesmade
a count)
Adjustments
after a Can not complete an
problem occurs. (Material work order.
issue initiates a count)
Reusable packaging is
intended adjustment, but
is
treated packaging
as unwanted.
Reusable
is

intended adjustment, but

is treated as unwanted.
Correct Transactions

Incorrect Transactions

Inaccurate Count

Inaccurate Count

EFFECTS
EFFECTS
Many variables increase
the chance of an
inaccurate
count.
Many
variables
increase
the chance of an
inaccurate count.

Skew the magnitude of

the adjustment problem

Skew the magnitude of

the adjustment problem

Adjustments are made in

SAP to correct inventory
that was not initially
Adjustments
are made in
entered
correctly
SAP
to correct
inventory
that was not initially
entered correctly
Inventory is not accurate
because of a poor count

Inventory is skewed and

requirements are not
accurate is skewed and
Inventory
requirements are not
accurate

Inventory is not accurate

because of a poor count

Inaccurate adjustments

Inaccurate adjustments

LIKELY CAUSES
LIKELY CAUSES
Current practice
does not allow for a
clean break
in Work
Current
practice
in process
& for a
does
not allow
available
inventory
clean
break
in Work
in process &
available inventory

Actual use of
inventory and no
transaction
Actual
use of
completedand
to relieve
inventory
no
inventory
transaction

SEV
SEV

OCC
OCC

$267,753

32%

$267,753

32%

$176,834

21%

$176,834

21%

completed to relieve
The current business
inventory
$158,438
practice doesn't
separate
thebusiness
wanted
The
current
from unwanted.
$158,438
practice
doesn't
separate the wanted
from unwanted.
Inventory should have
been entered using a $141,315
different (correct)
should have
Inventory
transaction.
been
entered using a $141,315
different (correct)
transaction.
The variables of open
work orders increase
the chance
of of
a open
The
variables
counting error
work orders increase
the chance of a
counting error

19%

19%

17%

17%

$70,144

8%

$70,144

8%

CONFIDENTIAL

PREVENTIVE ACTIONS
PREVENTIVE ACTIONS
Put the 1st operation on
the work order as pick
components
and
Put
the 1st operation
on
backflush.
Discrete
the
work order
as pick
issue components
components
and
backflush. Discrete
issue components

CONTINGENT ACTIONS
CONTINGENT ACTIONS
Perform cycle counts
daily.
Perform cycle counts
daily.

TRIGGERS FOR
CONTINGENT
EASINESS
TOACTION
High Dollar adjustments
TACKLE
as it relates to frequency
& consumption
Difficult

Perform cycle counts to

assure accurate material
flow.
Perform
cycle counts to
assure accurate material
flow.

High Dollar adjustments

as it relates to frequency

Single out the wanted

adjustment before a
differentout
tracking
/
Single
the wanted
reporting system
adjustment
beforeisa in
place tracking /
different
reporting system is in
Complete transactions in place
a timely manner.
(Returns from
completed
Complete
transactions
in
work
orders)
a timely
manner.

High Dollar adjustments

as it relates to frequency

Started to separately
account wanted from
unwanted.
Started
to separately
account wanted from
unwanted.

(Returns from completed

work orders)
Put the 1st operation on
the work order as pick
components
and
Put
the 1st operation
on
backflush. Discrete
the work order as pick
issue components
components and
backflush. Discrete
issue components

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 22

Moderate

Easy

High Dollar adjustments

as it relates to frequency

Moderate

High Dollar adjustments

as it relates to frequency

Difficult

Example AGB project: Potting Leaks

ANALYZE PHASE CONCLUSIONS
Measurement Grid - AGB Project, Potting Leaks
Measur
e No.

Measurement Issue

Interdependence
Between
Measurements

Plan
Test for strength and leaking.
Sandy will build 10 when the
newgrommet comes in appox.
8/12/05 if needed.

Strength of 5 minute epoxy on Grommet.

Clearance height requirement within

flowcover.

Ability to solder wires with varied

conductor lengths.

Move cable depth during soldering?

Heat shrink a benefit?

Height of potting required. Min, Max.

Nominal and Variability by operator.

Board height reduced with elimination Helen measure existing potting

of RTV?
height on 50 covers/ Complete.

5
6

Affects
g of eliminating RT
gV.
cover. Min, Max., Nominal and
Variability by operator.

Leak potential with the smaller

grommet.

Height of the cable jacket within the

cover to remain above the potting. Min,
Max. Nominal and Variability by
operator.

9
10

11

5, 7

Additional Comments

Epoxy needed? Use one-part epoxy or

sealant? Out gassing an issue.

Results

Epoxy not needed with newgrommet.

Helen will measure wire

clearance

3, 4, 5,

No change

Ran 20 test units, wires didn't

interfer with the sensors on the
flowmeter.

Leak potential

Opportunity for a fixture to firmly

establish the length?

Helen/Sandy

Water test with cold and hot water?

Mike- Complete 7/19/05

No leak around cable.

Test with existing cable jacket length.

Helen/Sandy

We did a GR & R on the jacket

length of the cable to determine the
it is the same. Determined that it is
consistant and had the cable extend 1
in. out of the cover on the test units.

Extend the cable allowing less

protrusion of the flowmeter cover
cable?

Is current cable length usable

with the flowmeter cable being
shorter.

Measured units in inventory, the

cable length in the cover is
consistantly 6 5/16 in. long. Using
the test units on a IFC, we were able
to plug in the cables with out any
issues.

Look at a 1 part epoxy for around the

cable

If needed

Mike - Locktite Rep.

Not needed with the newgrommet.

Potting Process

Lock down board with stop-lock prior

to potting top of board.

Sandy, Try different ways of

potting to help standardize the
process.

Connecting IFC cover cable length

requirements and options.

6, 4, 3, 2

CONFIDENTIAL

Determined to be 1 in.

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 23

FMEA
Describe FMEA principles and techniques
Summarize the concepts, definitions,
application options and relationships with
other tools
Perform a FMEA

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 24

Background
Developed in the early 60s by NASA
to fail-proof Apollo missions.
Adopted in early 70s by US Navy .
By late 80s, automotive industry had
implemented FMEA and began
requiring suppliers do the same.
Liability costs were the main driving
force.
Used sporadically throughout
industry during 1980s.
CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 25

Definition of FMEA
FMEA is a systematic evaluation procedure
whose purpose is to:
1. Identify and prevent potential problems in a
new system
2. Prioritize action to attack causes in our root
cause analysis
3. Document the project teams thinking process

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 26

Benefit of FMEA

After root cause analysis, you will have

numerous causes that need to be
investigated
Which one do you pick first?
Why do you pick that one?

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 27

CONFIDENTIAL

Process FMEA Form

Process Name:
Prepared by:
FMEA Date
(Orig)

Responsible:

In what ways does the Key What is the impact on the

Input go wrong?
Key Output Variables
(Customer Requirements) or
internal requirements?

S
E
V

Potential Causes

What causes the Key Input to

go wrong?

O
C
C

Current Controls

What are the existing controls

and procedures (inspection and
test) that prevent either the cause
or the Failure Mode? Should
include an SOP number.

D
E
T

R
P
N

How well can you detect cause or FM?

Potential Failure Effects

How often does cause or FM occur?

What is the
process step/
Input under
investigation?

Potential Failure Mode

How Severe is the effect to the

customer?

Process Step /
Input

Actions
Recommended

CONFIDENTIAL

Resp.

What are the actions

Who Is
for reducing the
Responsible
occurrence of the
for the
Cause, or improving recommende
detection? Should
d action?
have actions only on
high RPN's or easy
fixes.

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 28

Elements of FMEA
Failure Mode

Any way in which a process could fail to meet some measurable

expectation.

Effect

Assuming a failure does occur, describe the effects. List separately

each main effect on both a downstream operation and the end user.

Severity

Using a scale provided, rate the seriousness of the effect. 10

represents worst case, 1 represents least severe.

Causes

This is the list of causes and/or potential causes of the failure mode.

Occurrence

This is a ranking, on a scale provided, of the likelihood of the failure

occurring. 10 represents near certainty. In the case of a Six Sigma
project, occurrence is generally derived from defect data.

Current Controls All means of detecting the failure before product reaches the end user
are listed under current controls.

Effectiveness

The effectiveness of each current control method is rated on a

provided scale from 1 to 10. A 10 implies the control will not detect the
presence of a failure; a 1 suggests detection is nearly certain.

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 29

Definitions
Failure Mode
Cause
Effect

E-mails can
not be sent

Notes Server
Crashes

IF

CAUSE

HOW DO
I KNOW?

FAILURE MODE

THEN

IT help desk
calls go up
EFFECT

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 30

A Failure Mode is . . .

 Failure to perform a defined function

 Something occurring that you don't
expect, or want

 Wrong application

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 31

Risk Priority Number

SEVERITY of the effect

As it applies to the effects on the local system, next

level, and end user.
Scale of 1 (least severe) to 10 (most severe)
OCCURRENCE frequency of the cause

Likelihood that a specific cause will occur and result in a

specific failure mode
Scale of 1 (least often) to 10 (most often)
DETECTION system for spotting the failure

Ability of the current / proposed control mechanism to

detect and identify the failure mode
Scale of 10 (no detection) to 1 (good detection)

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 32

Generation of a Risk Priority Number

RPN = O x S x D
Occurrence x
Severity x
Detection

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 33

CONFIDENTIAL

Risk Priority Number

With this number we can now prioritize the causes to tackle
first
Adjustment causes - 12 pay periods

80000

100

70000

Count

50000

60

40000
40

30000

Percent

80

60000

20000
20
10000
0

0
c ip
Dis

C ount
Percent
C um %

line

55680
72.1
72.1

ig
ss

en
nm

17168
22.2
94.3

CONFIDENTIAL

lic
Po

3917
5.1
99.4

e
O th

502
0.6
100.0

rs

Adjustment
Causes

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 34

Process
1. Assemble team
2. Complete Failure Mode column and Cause column by using
primary causes on the root cause analysis
3. For each failure mode list the effect
4. List control systems for each failure mode in place today to
detect the failure mode
5. Score Severity column through team consensus (1-10)
6. Score Occurrence column by reaching a team consensus (110)
7. Score Detection column through team consensus (10-1)
8. Calculate your RPN
9. Draw your Pareto Chart and identify 80% to carry over to
analyze

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 35

Levels of FMEA
It is important to realize that an FMEA can be applied to
causes further down the root cause tree to further refine
the KPIV list for analyze
This is very applicable in large projects and is a way of
tasking out smaller projects to Green Belts

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 36

Example FMEA
AGB project: Isolator Burn-In Time Reduction

missing isolator

fails leak test

sensor unstable, drifty

fails leak test

Tight connection (Strip

fails leak test
fitting)
Cross threading the fitting fails leak test

Loose connection

Damaged inlet hose

Low/No air pressure
Low/No air pressure mid
burnin cycle

Fails calibration
damage to fitting
Cosmetic damage to fitting
fails leak test

D
E
T

Current Controls

What are the existing controls

and procedures (inspection
and test) that prevent either
the cause or the Failure
Mode? Should include an
SOP number.

R
P
N

How well can you detect

cause or FM?

operator does not install

1
isolator
operator does not install o-ring 1

fails to calibrate

Load Units Into Oven Dropped units

Dropped units
Dropped units
Connect Air Inlet To Loose connection
Pressure Fitting
Tight connection (Strip
fitting)
Cross threading the fitting

Apply Air Pressure

8
8

retaining ring improperly

torqued

Connect units to
pressure fittings

What causes the Key Input to

go wrong?

Contaminates customer
processes
fails to calibrate

missing o-ring

O
C
C

Potential Causes

How often does cause or

FM occur?

What is the process In what ways does the Key What is the impact on the
Input go wrong?
Key Output Variables
step/ Input under
(Customer Requirements) or
investigation?
internal requirements?

Assemble isolator
into flow body

S
E
V

Potential Failure Effects

How Severe is the effect

to the customer?

Process Step / Input Potential Failure Mode

Isolator Burn-in process

10

80

Isolator Burn-in process

operator does not torque

retaining ring
operator does not torque
retaining ring
operator does not torque
retaining ring
Operator does not properly
secure fittings

Isolator Burn-in process

Isolator Burn-in process

80

Isolator Burn-in process

Characterize test
Isolator Burn-in process

16

Operator over tightens fittings

Isolator Burn-in process

16

Operator does not properly

secure fittings
Operator drops unit
Operator drops unit
Operator drops unit
Operator does not properly
secure fittings
Operator over tightens fittings

Isolator Burn-in process

16

1
1
1
1

Isolator Burn-in process

Isolator Burn-in process
Isolator Burn-in process
Isolator Burn-in process

1
1
5
1

8
8
40
8

Isolator Burn-in process

16

Isolator Burn-in process

16

4
1
1

Opeator training
Isolator Burn-in process
Equip maintenance

1
1
10

32
8
80

8
8
8
8

fails leak test

fails leak test

fails leak test

Leaks may not be found
Unit may fail leak check

8
8
8

Operator does not properly

secure fittings
Over use
Tank pressure is low
Leak in system

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 37

Example FMEA / PPA for High Impact

Causes

High
priority
failures

d
Expectet
bigges
gain

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 38

FMEA Exercise
Conduct an FMEA for setting
up and firing the catapult.
Perform an FMEA on the
catapult in groups of 5 or
less.
45 minutes followed by a 5
minute presentation by
selected groups during
which the instructor asks
questions and discusses
some of the subtleties of
FMEA.

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 39

Recap

Introduce Potential Problem Analysis (PPA)

Introduce FMEA

Describe FMEA principles and techniques

Summarize the concepts, definitions, application
options and relationships with other tools

CONFIDENTIAL

BB PPA & FMEA

Gary Jing
02/16/06 Slide 40