Yrasuegui v.

PAL, 569 SCRA 467 (2008)

ISSUE:
Post under case digests, Political
2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Law at Wednesday,

February

08,
Is

Facts: Petitioner was a former international flight steward of PAL, herein

respondent. Petitioner was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to
the weight standards of the airline company. Petitioner claims that he was
illegally
dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was discriminated against when he was
dismissed.
Held: Petition denied. To make his claim more believable, petitioner
invokes the equal protection clause guaranty of the Constitution. However,
in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed
by the Constitution cannot be invoked. Put differently, the Bill of Rights is
not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. Indeed, the
US Supreme Court, in interpreting the 14th Amendment, which is the
source of our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that
the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions, no matter how egregious,
cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.

Rev.
Ely
Velez
Pamatong
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

Vs.

Commission

on

Elections

FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President.
Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance
candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered
political
party
with
a
national
constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court
claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to
opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those
who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by
political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since
he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he
possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the
president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has
numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the
capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in
other
countries,
and
he
has
a
platform
of
government.

there

constitutional

right

to

run

for

or

hold

public

office?

RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is
merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows
such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests
such
a
thrust
or
justifies
an
interpretation
of
the
sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the
Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The
provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,
and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the
"equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article
II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional
right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.
The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action
before
the
courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact
positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible
into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be
desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult
to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its
effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the
myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
"opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless
interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not
the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but
amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be
sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be
subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege
to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to
everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access
clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens
engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is
minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no
showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens
which
they
create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention

to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to
ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly.
Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations
in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates,
the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the
increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election.
The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is
onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions
or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral
process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably
ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be
bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral
process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance
candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both
legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this
Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence
is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further
evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao
Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the
Omnibus
Election
Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an

international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of
Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article
VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born
citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write;
(4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident
of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election.
At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and
was disqualified.

Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the

Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act).
- On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97
which Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it
hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines
(Fidel V. Ramos) of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization.
- The WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is
composed of the Agreement Proper and the associated legal instruments
included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which
are integral parts thereof.
- The Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO
Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services.
- Instant petition was filed: nullification of the Philippine ratification of the
WTO Agreement.

Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the

World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal
Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the
letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

May 2, 1997 (272 SCRA 18)

Petitioners: Taada
taxpayers, et. al.

and

Coseteng

as

members

of

the

Senate

and

Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by
Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.

Respondents: Angara and Romulo, et. al.

Facts:
- April 15, 1994: Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Sec. of the Department
of Trade and Industry, representing the Government of the Republic of the

Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that
help make them competitive.
Held:

The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case),
it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide.

What the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether
such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial
inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers
and the people.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government
Service Insurance System, et al., this Court held that Sec. 10, second par.,
Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which
is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable. However, as the constitutional provision itself
states, it is enforceable only in regard to the grants of rights, privileges
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony and not to
every aspect of trade and commerce.

It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to

meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be
interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances.

In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose
act is under review, is one of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus
entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body
independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular
and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive
arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will
resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted
definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in
the Senates processes, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to
impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senates exercise of its power of
concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of
the Constitution.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and

overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it
a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty
and power.

Heritage hotel vs national union of workers

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 30, 2005 and
Resolution dated June 4, 2007. The assailed Decision affirmed the
dismissal of a petition for cancellation of union registration filed by
petitioner, Grand Plaza Hotel Corporation, owner of Heritage Hotel Manila,
against respondent, National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant
and
Allied
Industries-Heritage
Hotel
Manila
Supervisors
Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC), a labor organization of the supervisory
employees of Heritage Hotel Manila.
The case stemmed from the following antecedents:
On October 11, 1995, respondent filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment-National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) a petition for certification
election.[2] The Med-Arbiter granted the petition on February 14, 1996
and ordered the holding of a certification election.[3] On appeal, the DOLE
Secretary, in a Resolution dated August 15, 1996, affirmed the MedArbiters order and remanded the case to the Med-Arbiter for the holding
of a preelection conference on February 26, 1997. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, but it was denied on September 23, 1996.
The preelection conference was not held as initially scheduled; it
was held a year later, or on February 20, 1998. Petitioner moved to archive
or to dismiss the petition due to alleged repeated non-appearance of
respondent. The latter agreed to suspend proceedings until further notice.
The preelection conference resumed on January 29, 2000.
Subsequently, petitioner discovered that respondent had failed to
submit to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) its annual financial report
for several years and the list of its members since it filed its registration
papers in 1995. Consequently, on May 19, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition
for Cancellation of Registration of respondent, on the ground of the nonsubmission of the said documents. Petitioner prayed that respondents
Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter be cancelled and its name be
deleted from the list of legitimate labor organizations. It further requested
the suspension of the certification election proceedings.[4]

On June 1, 2000, petitioner reiterated its request by filing a

Motion to Dismiss or Suspend the [Certification Election] Proceedings,
[5] arguing that the dismissal or suspension of the proceedings is
warranted, considering that the legitimacy of respondent is seriously
being challenged in the petition for cancellation of registration. Petitioner
maintained that the resolution of the issue of whether respondent is a
legitimate labor organization is crucial to the issue of whether it may
exercise rights of a legitimate labor organization, which include the right
to be certified as the bargaining agent of the covered employees.
Nevertheless, the certification election pushed through on June 23,
2000. Respondent emerged as the winner.[6]
On June 28, 2000, petitioner filed a Protest with Motion to Defer
Certification of Election Results and Winner,[7] stating that the
certification election held on June 23, 2000 was an exercise in futility
because, once respondents registration is cancelled, it would no longer be
entitled to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the
supervisory employees. Petitioner also claimed that some of respondents
members were not qualified to join the union because they were either
confidential employees or managerial employees. It then prayed that the
certification of the election results and winner be deferred until the
petition for cancellation shall have been resolved, and that respondents
members who held confidential or managerial positions be excluded from
the supervisors bargaining unit.
Meanwhile, respondent filed its Answer[8] to the petition for the
cancellation of its registration. It averred that the petition was filed
primarily to delay the conduct of the certification election, the
respondents certification as the exclusive bargaining representative of
the supervisory employees, and the commencement of bargaining
negotiations. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petition for the
following reasons: (a) petitioner is estopped from questioning
respondents status as a legitimate labor organization as it had already
recognized respondent as such during the preelection conferences; (b)
petitioner is not the party-in-interest, as the union members are the ones
who would be disadvantaged by the non-submission of financial reports;
(c) it has already complied with the reportorial requirements, having
submitted its financial statements for 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999, its
updated list of officers, and its list of members for the years 1995, 1996,
1997, 1998, and 1999; (d) the petition is already moot and academic,
considering that the certification election had already been held, and the
members had manifested their will to be represented by respondent.
Citing National Union of Bank Employees v. Minister of Labor, et al.
[9] and Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic v. Hon. Laguesma,
[10] the Med-Arbiter held that the pendency of a petition for cancellation
of registration is not a bar to the holding of a certification election. Thus,
in an Order[11] dated January 26, 2001, the Med-Arbiter dismissed

petitioners protest, and certified respondent as the sole and exclusive

bargaining agent of all supervisory employees.
Petitioner subsequently appealed the said Order to the DOLE
Secretary.[12] The appeal was later dismissed by DOLE Secretary Patricia
A. Sto. Tomas (DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas) in the Resolution of August 21,
2002.[13] Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the motion was also
denied.[14]
In the meantime, Regional Director Alex E. Maraan (Regional
Director Maraan) of DOLE-NCR finally resolved the petition for cancellation
of registration. While finding that respondent had indeed failed to file
financial reports and the list of its members for several years, he,
nonetheless, denied the petition, ratiocinating that freedom of association
and the employees right to self-organization are more substantive
considerations. He took into account the fact that respondent won the
certification election and that it had already been certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent of the supervisory employees. In view of the foregoing,
Regional Director Maraanwhile emphasizing that the non-compliance
with the law is not viewed with favorconsidered the belated submission
of the annual financial reports and the list of members as sufficient
compliance thereof and considered them as having been submitted on
time. The dispositive portion of the decision[15] dated December 29, 2001
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition to delist the

National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied IndustriesHeritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter from the roll of legitimate labor
organizations is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision to the BLR.[17] BLR
Director Hans Leo Cacdac inhibited himself from the case because he had
been a former counsel of respondent.
In view of Director Cacdacs inhibition, DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas
took cognizance of the appeal. In a resolution[18] dated February 21,
2003, she dismissed the appeal, holding that the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of association and right of workers to selforganization outweighed respondents noncompliance with the statutory
requirements
to
maintain
its
status
as
a
legitimate
labor
organization.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[19] but the motion was
likewise denied in a resolution[20] dated May 30, 2003. DOLE Secretary
Sto. Tomas admitted that it was the BLR which had jurisdiction over the
appeal, but she pointed out that the BLR Director had voluntarily inhibited

himself from the case because he used to appear as counsel for

respondent. In order to maintain the integrity of the decision and of the
BLR, she therefore accepted the motion to inhibit and took cognizance of
the appeal.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, raising the issue
of whether the DOLE Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance of the appeal and affirming the dismissal of its petition
for cancellation of respondents registration.
In a Decision dated May 30, 2005, the CA denied the petition. The CA
opined that the DOLE Secretary may legally assume jurisdiction over an
appeal from the decision of the Regional Director in the event that the
Director of the BLR inhibits himself from the case. According to the CA, in
the absence of the BLR Director, there is no person more competent to
resolve the appeal than the DOLE Secretary. The CA brushed aside the
allegation of bias and partiality on the part of the DOLE Secretary,
considering that such allegation was not supported by any evidence.
The CA also found that the DOLE Secretary did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when she affirmed the dismissal of the petition
for cancellation of respondents registration as a labor organization.
Echoing the DOLE Secretary, the CA held that the requirements of
registration of labor organizations are an exercise of the overriding police
power of the State, designed for the protection of workers against
potential abuse by the union that recruits them. These requirements, the
CA opined, should not be exploited to work against the workers
constitutionally protected right to self-organization.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, invoking this
Courts ruling in Abbott Labs. Phils., Inc. v. Abbott Labs. Employees Union,
[21] which categorically declared that the DOLE Secretary has no authority
to review the decision of the Regional Director in a petition for
cancellation of union registration, and Section 4,[22] Rule VIII, Book V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
In its Resolution[23] dated June 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioners
motion, stating that the BLR Directors inhibition from the case was a
peculiarity not present in the Abbott case, and that such inhibition
justified the assumption of jurisdiction by the DOLE Secretary.

In this petition, petitioner argues that:

I.
The Court of Appeals seriously erred in ruling that the Labor Secretary
properly assumed jurisdiction over Petitioners appeal of the Regional
Directors Decision in the Cancellation Petition x x x.

A.
Jurisdiction is conferred only by law. The Labor Secretary had no
jurisdiction to review the decision of the Regional Director in a petition for
cancellation. Such jurisdiction is conferred by law to the BLR.
B.
The unilateral inhibition by the BLR Director cannot justify the
Labor Secretarys exercise of jurisdiction over the Appeal.
C.
The Labor Secretarys assumption of jurisdiction over the
Appeal without notice violated Petitioners right to due process.
II.
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the dismissal of the
Cancellation Petition despite the mandatory and unequivocal provisions of
the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.[24]
The petition has no merit.
Jurisdiction to review the decision of the Regional Director lies with
the BLR. This is clearly provided in the Implementing Rules of the Labor
Code and enunciated by the Court in Abbott. But as pointed out by the CA,
the present case involves a peculiar circumstance that was not present or
covered by the ruling in Abbott. In this case, the BLR Director inhibited
himself from the case because he was a former counsel of respondent.
Who, then, shall resolve the case in his place?
In Abbott, the appeal from the Regional Directors decision was directly
filed with the Office of the DOLE Secretary, and we ruled that the latter has
no appellate jurisdiction. In the instant case, the appeal was filed by
petitioner with the BLR, which, undisputedly, acquired jurisdiction over the
case. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the court, it remains with it until the
full termination of the case.[25]
Thus, jurisdiction remained with the BLR despite the BLR Directors
inhibition. When the DOLE Secretary resolved the appeal, she merely
stepped into the shoes of the BLR Director and performed a function that
the latter could not himself perform. She did so pursuant to her power of
supervision and control over the BLR.[26]
Expounding on the extent of the power of control, the Court,
in Araneta, et al. v. Hon. M. Gatmaitan, et al.,[27] pronounced that, if a
certain power or authority is vested by law upon the Department
Secretary, then such power or authority may be exercised directly by the
President, who exercises supervision and control over the departments.
This principle was incorporated in the Administrative Code of 1987, which
defines supervision and control as including the authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate.[28] Applying the foregoing to the present case, it is clear
that the DOLE Secretary, as the person exercising the power of supervision

and control over the BLR, has the authority to directly exercise the quasijudicial function entrusted by law to the BLR Director.

Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor Code read:

ART. 238. CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION; APPEAL

It is true that the power of control and supervision does not give the
Department Secretary unbridled authority to take over the functions of his
or her subordinate. Such authority is subject to certain guidelines which
are stated in Book IV, Chapter 8, Section 39(1)(a) of the Administrative
Code of 1987.[29] However, in the present case, the DOLE Secretarys act
of taking over the function of the BLR Director was warranted and
necessitated by the latters inhibition from the case and the objective to
maintain the integrity of the decision, as well as the Bureau
itself.[30]
Petitioner insists that the BLR Directors subordinates should have
resolved the appeal, citing the provision under the Administrative Code of
1987 which states, in case of the absence or disability of the head of a
bureau or office, his duties shall be performed by the assistant
head.[31] The provision clearly does not apply considering that the BLR
Director was neither absent nor suffering from any disability; he remained
as head of the BLR. Thus, to dispel any suspicion of bias, the DOLE
Secretary opted to resolve the appeal herself.
Petitioner was not denied the right to due process when it was not
notified in advance of the BLR Directors inhibition and the DOLE
Secretarys assumption of the case. Well-settled is the rule that the
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.[32] Petitioner had the opportunity to question the BLR Directors
inhibition and the DOLE Secretarys taking cognizance of the case when it
filed a motion for reconsideration of the latters decision. It would be well
to state that a critical component of due process is a hearing before an
impartial and disinterested tribunal, for all the elements of due process,
like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision
would come from a partial and biased judge.[33] It was precisely to
ensure a fair trial that moved the BLR Director to inhibit himself from the
case and the DOLE Secretary to take over his function.
Petitioner also insists that respondents registration as a legitimate
labor union should be cancelled. Petitioner posits that once it is
determined that a ground enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code is
present, cancellation of registration should follow; it becomes the
ministerial duty of the Regional Director to cancel the registration of the
labor organization, hence, the use of the word shall. Petitioner points
out that the Regional Director has admitted in its decision that respondent
failed to submit the required documents for a number of years; therefore,
cancellation of its registration should have followed as a matter of course.
We are not persuaded.

The certificate of registration of any legitimate labor organization,

whether national or local, shall be canceled by the Bureau if it has reason
to believe, after due hearing, that the said labor organization no longer
meets one or more of the requirements herein prescribed.[34]

ART.
239. GROUNDS
REGISTRATION.

FOR

CANCELLATION

OF

UNION

The following shall constitute grounds for cancellation of union

registration:
x xx x
d) Failure to submit the annual financial report to
the Bureau within thirty (30) days after the closing of every fiscal year and
misrepresentation, false entries or fraud in the preparation of the financial
report itself;
xxxx
(i) Failure to submit list of individual members to the Bureau
once a year or whenever required by the Bureau.[35]
These provisions give the Regional Director ample discretion in
dealing with a petition for cancellation of a unions registration,
particularly, determining whether the union still meets the requirements
prescribed by law. It is sufficient to give the Regional Director license to
treat the late filing of required documents as sufficient compliance with
the requirements of the law. After all, the law requires the labor
organization to submit the annual financial report and list of members in
order to verify if it is still viable and financially sustainable as an
organization so as to protect the employer and employees from fraudulent
or fly-by-night unions. With the submission of the required documents by
respondent, the purpose of the law has been achieved, though belatedly.
We cannot ascribe abuse of discretion to the Regional Director and
the DOLE Secretary in denying the petition for cancellation of respondents
registration. The union members and, in fact, all the employees belonging
to the appropriate bargaining unit should not be deprived of a bargaining
agent, merely because of the negligence of the union officers who were
responsible for the submission of the documents to the BLR.
Labor authorities should, indeed, act with circumspection in
treating petitions for cancellation of union registration, lest they be
accused of interfering with union activities. In resolving the petition,
consideration must be taken of the fundamental rights guaranteed by
Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution, i.e., the rights of all workers to

self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful

concerted activities. Labor authorities should bear in mind that
registration confers upon a union the status of legitimacy and the
concomitant right and privileges granted by law to a legitimate labor
organization, particularly the right to participate in or ask for certification
election in a bargaining unit.[36] Thus, the cancellation of a certificate of
registration is the equivalent of snuffing out the life of a labor
organization. For without such registration, it loses - as a rule - its rights
under the Labor Code.[37]
It is worth mentioning that the Labor Codes provisions on
cancellation of union registration and on reportorial requirements have
been recently amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9481, An Act
Strengthening the Workers Constitutional Right to Self-Organization,
Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended,
Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, which lapsed into
law on May 25, 2007 and became effective on June 14, 2007. The
amendment sought to strengthen the workers right to self-organization
and enhance the Philippines compliance with its international obligations
as embodied in the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No.
87,[38] pertaining to the non-dissolution of workers organizations by
administrative authority.[39] Thus, R.A. No. 9481 amended Article 239 to
read:

ART. 239. Grounds for Cancellation of Union Registration.The

following may constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration:

(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with

the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments
thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of members who took part
in the ratification;

(b) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with

the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and the list of
voters;

(c) Voluntary dissolution by the members.

R.A. No. 9481 also inserted in the Labor Code Article 242-A, which
provides:

ART. 242-A. Reportorial Requirements.The following are documents

required to be submitted to the Bureau by the legitimate labor
organization concerned:

(a) Its constitution and by-laws, or amendments thereto, the

minutes of ratification, and the list of members who took part in the
ratification of the constitution and by-laws within thirty (30) days from
adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments
thereto;

(b) Its list of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and list of
voters within thirty (30) days from election;

(c) Its annual financial report within thirty (30) days after the close of
every fiscal year; and

(d) Its list of members at least once a year or whenever required by

the Bureau.

Failure to comply with the above requirements shall not be a

ground for cancellation of union registration but shall subject the erring
officers or members to suspension, expulsion from membership, or any
appropriate penalty.

ILO Convention No. 87, which we have ratified in 1953, provides that
workers and employers organizations shall not be liable to be dissolved
or suspended by administrative authority. The ILO has expressed the
opinion that the cancellation of union registration by the registrar of labor
unions, which in our case is the BLR, is tantamount to dissolution of the
organization by administrative authority when such measure would give
rise to the loss of legal personality of the union or loss of advantages
necessary for it to carry out its activities, which is true in our jurisdiction.
Although the ILO has allowed such measure to be taken, provided that
judicial safeguards are in place, i.e., the right to appeal to a judicial body,
it has nonetheless reminded its members that dissolution of a union, and

cancellation of registration for that matter, involve serious consequences

for occupational representation. It has, therefore, deemed it preferable if
such actions were to be taken only as a last resort and after exhausting
other possibilities with less serious effects on the organization.[40]

The aforesaid amendments and the ILOs opinion on this matter

serve to fortify our ruling in this case. We therefore quote with approval
the DOLE Secretarys rationale for denying the petition, thus:
It is undisputed that appellee failed to submit its annual financial reports
and list of individual members in accordance with Article 239 of the Labor
Code. However, the existence of this ground should not necessarily lead to
the cancellation of union registration. Article 239 recognizes the
regulatory authority of the State to exact compliance with reporting
requirements. Yet there is more at stake in this case than merely
monitoring union activities and requiring periodic documentation thereof.

members be not easily visited with capital punishments against the

association itself.

At any rate, we note that on 19 May 2000, appellee had submitted

its financial statement for the years 1996-1999. With this submission,
appellee has substantially complied with its duty to submit its financial
report for the said period. To rule differently would be to preclude the
union, after having failed to meet its periodic obligations promptly, from
taking appropriate measures to correct its omissions. For the record, we
do not view with favor appellees late submission. Punctuality on the part
of the union and its officers could have prevented this petition.[41]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision

dated May 30, 2005 and Resolution dated June 4, 2007 are AFFIRMED.
People vs. Siton

The more substantive considerations involve the constitutionally

guaranteed freedom of association and right of workers to selforganization. Also involved is the public policy to promote free trade
unionism and collective bargaining as instruments of industrial peace and
democracy. An overly stringent interpretation of the statute governing
cancellation of union registration without regard to surrounding
circumstances cannot be allowed. Otherwise, it would lead to an
unconstitutional application of the statute and emasculation of public
policy objectives. Worse, it can render nugatory the protection to labor
and social justice clauses that pervades the Constitution and the Labor
Code.

1987
CONSTITUTION, 1987
CONSTITUTION
CASES, CASE
DIGESTS, CASES, CONSTITUTION
CASES, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
CASES November 16th, 2012 | No Comments
inShare
September 18, 2009 (600 SCRA 476)

Petitioners: People of the Philippines

Respondents: Evangeline Siton Y Sacil and Krystel Saragano Y Mefania

Moreover, submission of the required documents is the duty of the

officers of the union. It would be unreasonable for this Office to order the
cancellation of the union and penalize the entire union membership on the
basis of the negligence of its officers. In National Union of Bank Employees
vs. Minister of Labor, L-53406, 14 December 1981, 110 SCRA 296, the
Supreme Court ruled:

As aptly ruled by respondent Bureau of Labor Relations Director

Noriel: The rights of workers to self-organization finds general and
specific constitutional guarantees. x x x Such constitutional guarantees
should not be lightly taken much less nullified. A healthy respect for the
freedom of association demands that acts imputable to officers or

Facts:
- Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged
with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code in two
separate Informations dated November 18, 2003.
- Article 202, Paragraph 2 of RPC states that: Vagrants and prostitutes;
penalty. The following are vagrants: 2. Any person found loitering
about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering
about the country or the streets without visible means of support;
- Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents
filed separate Motions to Quash on the ground that Article 202 (2) is
unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.

- In an Order dated April 28, 2004, the municipal trial court denied the
motions and directed respondents anew to file their respective counteraffidavits. The municipal trial court also declared that the law on vagrancy
was enacted pursuant to the States police power and justified by the Latin
maxim salus populi est suprem(a) lex, which calls for the subordination
of individual benefit to the interest of the greater number.
- Respondents assailed the constitutionality of Anti-Vagrancy Law claimed
that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under the
Constitution because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed,
thus permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
- The Regional Trial Court declared Article 202 (2) as unconstitutional and
granted the petition of the respondents.

Issue:

U.S.
Supreme
Court
in
Jacksonville
declared
the
ordinance
unconstitutional, because such activities or habits as nightwalking,
wandering or strolling around without any lawful purpose or object,
habitual loafing, habitual spending of time at places where alcoholic
beverages are sold or served, and living upon the earnings of wives or
minor children, which are otherwise common and normal, were declared
illegal. But these are specific acts or activities not found in Article 202 (2).

The Supreme Court said As applied to the instant case, it appears that the
police authorities have been conducting previous surveillance operations
on respondents prior to their arrest. On the surface, this satisfies the
probable cause requirement under our Constitution. For this reason, we
are not moved by respondents trepidation that Article 202 (2) could have
been a source of police abuse in their case.

- Whether or not Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional or not.

Held:
The legislature must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts
it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of
conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid. This requirement has
come to be known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law.
In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a
vagrant as any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings
or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets
without visible means of support.

In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a
vagrant as any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings
or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets
without visible means of support. This provision was based on the second
clause of Section 1 of Act No. 519 which defined vagrant as every
person found loitering about saloons or dramshops or gambling houses, or
tramping or straying through the country without visible means of
support.
The second clause was essentially retained with the
modification that the places under which the offense might be committed
is now expressed in general terms public or semi-public places.

This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202 (2)
belongs. These laws were crafted to maintain minimum standards of
decency, morality and civility in human society.

Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it
discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public
order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or
unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as
to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the
community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to
act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.

Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered

constitutionally offensive. It is a public order crime which punishes
persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time which
orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant
and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as would engender a
justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the
community.

Every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be

resolved in favor of its constitutionality.

- Petitioners
respondents.
As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore be
viewed in a constitutional light.

The decision of the RTC declaring Article 202 (2) as unconstitutional is

reversed and set aside.

filed

complaint

to

the

Disciplinary

Board

against

- As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB were involved in the
mauling incidents, a joint DLSU-CSB Discipline Board was formed to
investigate the incidents.
- On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution
finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty
of automatic expulsion, pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.

Under Due Process in General SO ORDERED.

- Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration before the

Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Operations of DLSU. The
motions were all denied in a Letter-Resolution.

Petitioners: De La Salle University, Inc., et. al.

- On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila,
against petitioners a petition for certiorari and injunction with prayer for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

Respondents: Court of Appeals, CHED, et. al.

Facts:
- Mr. James Yap, while eating alone at Manangs Restaurant, overheard the
conversation of the two men from Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity bad-mouthing
at Domino Lux (his fraternity).
- When he came home, he informed his brod about what happened and the
latter came back to Manangs to confront the two men from Tau Gamma
Phi.
- After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of
the fraternity through the intercession of the Student Council.
- Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to the tambayan
of the Domino Lux Fraternity in the campus to look for Mr. Yap (based on
their descriptions.)
- March 29, 1995: Mr. Yap was attacked and mauled by respondents
Bungubung, Valdes, Reverente and Lee. Mr. Pascual, brod of Mr. Yap,
informed Domino Lux about what happened but the latter decided not to
do anything. Mr. Pascual, together with Mr. Cano and Perez, was mauled
again by the respondents.
- The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims,
namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and
Michael Perez, are members of the Domino Lux Fraternity, while the
alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul
Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of
Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity, a rival fraternity.

- The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO24

directing DLSU, its subordinates, agents, representatives and/or other
persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist from
implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated
June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment of
Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.
- Other respondents filed for petitions for intervention. The petitioners,
except James Yap, filed a petition to dismiss the petitions-in-intervention.
- Respondent-Judge granted the petitions for intervention and denied the
petition to dismiss by the petitioners (in this case).
- Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused
enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he attempted to enroll on September
22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on September 25,
1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite
petitioners (respondents there) in contempt of court.
- On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the enforcement of respondent Judges order and writ of
preliminary injuction.
- On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners prayer for preliminary
injunction.
- On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96,
summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private
respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private
respondents were to be excluded.

- DLSU still prevent Mr. Aguilar from enrolling and attending his classes
which prompted the latters lawyer to send several demand letters.
- The Court of Appeals said in its decision that the resolution of CHED is
immediately executory in character.
-On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his manifestation
stating that he has long completed his course at petitioner DLSU. He
finished and passed all his enrolled subjects but despite having completed
all the academic requirements for his course, DLSU has not issued a
certificate of completion/graduation in his favor.

Issues:
1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review
decisions of institutions of higher learning that impose disciplinary action
on their students found violating disciplinary rules.

2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private

respondents.

2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?

2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?
2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence?

3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is

proportionate to their misdeed.

Ruling:

Petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle of having two different
directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge CHED ordering the
exclusion of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.,
and the Judge ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and
complete their degree courses until their graduation.

According to the SC, This is the reason why we opt to decide the whole
case on the merits, brushing aside technicalities, in order to settle the
substantial issues involved. This Court has the power to take cognizance of
the petition at bar due to compelling reasons, and the nature and
importance of the issues raised warrant the immediate exercise of our
jurisdiction.

1. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the power of supervision and review
over disciplinary cases decided by institutions of higher learning.

2a. Private respondents were accorded due process of law.

The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution

embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded
in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental
to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history. The constitutional
behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law is solemn and inflexible.

In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating

school discipline, [t]here are withal minimum standards which must be
met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these
are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if
desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they
shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as

applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side
or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.

Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against

them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales.
They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them as
they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also informed

of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings
before the Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to
adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board
considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties
before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.

2b. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses

academic freedom which includes determination of who to admit for study.

Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of

higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for
some restraint.

Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom,
which includes its free choice of students for admission to its school.

The alibi of Aguilar was supported by a certification signed by an authority.

Therefore, alibi assumes commensurate strength. This is but consistent
with the presumption of innocence in favor of accused.
3. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is
disproportionate to their misdeed.

It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students
as subsumed in their academic freedom and that the establishment of
rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining
to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth
and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival. This
power, however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion to impose
a penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If
the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and the
sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes.
That would give rise to a due process question.

The petition is partially granted. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated

July 30, 1996 and dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 36, Order dated January 7, 1997 are ANNULLED AND SET
ASIDE, while CHED Resolution 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED.

2c. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr.
was proven by substantial evidence.

Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who
can positively identify the accused. Alibi is an inherently weak defense and
courts must receive it with caution because one can easily fabricate an
alibi.

Final:
Petitioner
DLSU
is
ordered
to
issue
a
certificate
of
completion/graduation in favor of private respondent Aguilar. On the other
hand, it may exclude or drop the names of private respondents
Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their transfer
credentials immediately issued.

Under Due Process in General

The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline
cases, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of
evidence but only substantial evidence. According to Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations, it means such reasonable evidence as a reasonable
mind
might
accept
as
adequate
to
support
a
conclusion.
Respondents were unable to show convincingly that they were not at the
scene of the crime on March 29, 1995 and that it was impossible for them
to have been there. Moreover, their alibi cannot prevail over their positive
identification by the victims.

Southern vs Antiterrorism
In the recent case of SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK,
INC., on behalf of the South-South Network (SSN) for Non-State Armed
Group Engagement, and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., vs. ANTITERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et. al., G.R. No. 178552,
Oct. 5, 2010, which involved the issue of constitutionality of the HUMAN
SECURITY ACT (anti-terrorism law), the Supreme Court dismissed the
petitions questioning the constitutionality of the said law on the basis of
the following doctrinal pronouncements, which are extensively quoted
below,
for
research
purposes,
to
wit:

1. Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not

exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of
Court
is
clear:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of

particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their
respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack
or
excess
of
jurisdiction.

2. In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by

four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.[10]

3. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome

of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination
of
difficult
constitutional
questions.[11]

4. Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and

substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.

5. A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct

and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any
governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and
not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that
it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is
lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties
by
reason
of
the
statute
or
act
complained
of.

6. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it

must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2)
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)

7. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material

requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may
be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be
said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and
facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one
not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known
within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy
cannot
reasonably
be
questionable.

8. Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial matters

coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary
experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted
by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be
found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far
and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as
being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial
notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or nonexistence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.[16]
(emphasis
and
underscoring
supplied.)

9. While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist

organization, the United States of America[17] (US) and the European
Union[18] (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as
foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of the joint statement
of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales
that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of
the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations.[19] Such statement
notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to
declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed
organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three
years now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have
conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less
an
actual,
prosecution
or
proscription
under
RA
9372.

10. The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not,
however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing.[27]
The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the
assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and duties.
Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a single arrest
or
detention
effected
under
RA
9372.

11. Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as

taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an
exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress,[28] whereas citizen
standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.[29]

12. RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any
appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of the
individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest
in
the
implementation
of
the
law.

13. It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the

assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a
direct
and
personal
interest
is
key.

14. By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an

actual
case
or
controversy.

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such
lower
courts
as
may
be
established
by
law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of
any
branch
or
instrumentality
of
the
Government.[30]

15. The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies

to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions
and
to
sterile
conclusions
unrelated
to
actualities.

16. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy

that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.[32]

17. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy

scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy
must be justiciabledefinite and concrete, touching on the legal relations
of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings
must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one
hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand; that is, it must concern a
real and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an
actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

18. The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence
of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest suffices to provide a
basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified
by the requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court
to
intelligently
adjudicate
the
issues.[38]

19. Petitioners
supposedly being
credible threat of
lured to render

obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and

tagged as communist fronts in no way approximate a
prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being
an advisory opinion, which is not its function.[43]

20. Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas
for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Then again, declaratory actions characterized by double contingency,
where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the
anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie
beyond
judicial
review
for
lack
of
ripeness.[44]

21. The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not

avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and
merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the
exercise of any power granted by law may be abused.[45] Allegations of
abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.

22. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases,

wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted

23. Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad
the definition of the crime of terrorism[46] under RA 9372 in that terms
like widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace
and coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand are
nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure
the
prohibited
acts.

24. The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application
only to free-speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity
of penal statutes.[50] It added that, at any rate, the challenged provision,
under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.[51]

25. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one

which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected
speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech
and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value
to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify
allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be
regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm

to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is

outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory
effects
of
overly
broad
statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented
from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

26. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special

application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth'
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." Claims of
facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and, again, that
"overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial
challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the
vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its
face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the
vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."

27. In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness

are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that
"one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to
attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might
be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in
the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this
Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

28. Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them
down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not
before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It
constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the
Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual
settings
and
in
sterile
abstract
contexts.

29. To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth

do
not
operate
on
the
same
plane.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks

comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle.[57] The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile,
decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected
freedoms.[58]

30. As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth

doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits
and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is
protected.[59]

32. The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial

challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus
successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either
vagueness
or
overbreadth
grounds.

33. The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by

the aim to avert the chilling effect on protected speech, the exercise of
which should not at all times be abridged.[62] As reflected earlier, this
rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an in
terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent
and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the
exercise
of
constitutionally
protected
rights.[63]

34. The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech,
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially
challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a
facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal
statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No
prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a
facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would
effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing
and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately
exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous
and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third
parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the
allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will
impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be
nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to
prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal
statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as
applied
to
him.[65]
(Emphasis
and
underscoring
supplied)

31. A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied

challenge.
35. It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth
doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given
rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant
facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the
entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its
actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction
that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from
constitutionally
protected
speech
or
activities.[60]

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial

type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably
almost always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise

stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially

overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the
litigants.

36. In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the

Court, in at least two cases,[67] observed that the US Supreme Court has
not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the
First Amendment,[68] and that claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words.[69] In Virginia v. Hicks,[70] it was held that
rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or
regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related
conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression.[71]

40. Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must
first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of
the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including
the coercion of the government to accede to an unlawful demand. Given
the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot
recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.

42. As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual

charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited
vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of terrorism is thus legally
impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither
contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on
hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of
a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
G.R. No. 170338

37. American jurisprudence[74] instructs that vagueness challenges that

do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the
specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial
validity.

38. In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the

due process clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of
criminal statutes. In at least three cases,[76] the Court brought the
doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of
municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable
under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under
Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these
three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases,
were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the
present
case.

39. From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section
3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender
commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the
commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3)
the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in
to
an
unlawful
demand.

Petitioner: Virgilio O. Garcillano

Respondents: House of Representatives Committees

G.R. No. 179275

Petitioners: Ranada and Agcaoili
Respondents: The Senate of the Republic of the Philippines Represented
by Sen. Pres. Villar

Petitioner in Intervention: Maj. Rex Sagge

Respondents-Intervenors: Pimentel, Aquino, et. al.

Facts:

- Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly

between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced.
- The tapes, notoriously referred to as the Hello Garci tapes, allegedly
contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential
elections.
- The tapes became the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.
- The tapes were presented in the committee hearings. Alarmed by these
developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano filed with this Court a
Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R.
No. 170338.
- He prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from
using these tape recordings of the illegally obtained wiretapped
conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose.
- Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on
the Garci tapes abruptly stopped.
- On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a
privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution
absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the
contents of the Hello Garci tapes. However, she recommended a
legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP
(ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government entities in the
alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.
- On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo
Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a
Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as G.R.
No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled
legislative inquiry.

Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be

inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
- The Senate continued its public hearing because the court did not issue a
writ of injunction.
- It may be noted that while both petitions involve the Hello Garci
recordings, they have different objectivesthe first is poised at preventing
the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the
committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct
of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
- The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the
second, G.R. No. 179275.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the cased filed.

2. Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower

the senate to further proceed with their investigation?

Ruling:

1. In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate

the petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the Hello
Garci tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the
respondent committees as one of the voices in the recordings.

- The respondents argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry
violates R.A. No. 4200 (Wiretapping / Privacy of Communication) and
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution
(Section 3 The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing
by alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of
the IBP.

Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the

execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional
right to due process, they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.

2. As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The
Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that

[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The requisite of publication of the
rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.

even provide that the rules shall take effect seven (7) days after
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation, precluding any
other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is
mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules
of Procedure put a persons liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules
of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could

not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the
legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.

The Supreme Court held: Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the
Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from
conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the Hello Garci
tapes.
Under Due Process in General

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on
oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation
only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th
Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced
on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these
rules when they first opened their session.

The phrase duly published rules of procedure requires the Senate of

every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid
of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or
after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for onehalf of the Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also
changes by the end of each term.

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or

in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the
Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure

G.R.
No.
170338
December
23,
2008
VIRGILIO
O.
GARCILLANO,
petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION,
PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND
ELECTORAL
REFORMS,
respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R.
No.
179275
December
23,
2008
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE
SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
MAJ.
LINDSAY
REX
SAGGE,
petitioner-in-intervention
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G.
BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL,
and
ANTONIO
F.
TRILLANES,
respondents-intervenors
Facts: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises.
During the 2007 election the conversation of President Arroyo and the
herein petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional director, regarding

the desire of the president to have a favourable outcome in terms of his

senatoriables. Such conversation was recorded and was played during the
house of representative investigation. Because of such turn of events, a
petition was filed before the court praying that such playing of the illegally
seized communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping
law. Also such petition for injunction prays that the Senate committee be
prevented from further conducting such investigation for the basic reason
that there was no proper publication of the senate rules, empowering
them to make such investigation of the unlawfully seized documents.
Issue: Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to
empower the senate to further proceed with their investigation?
Held:

No,

the

Supreme

Court

mentioned

the

following:

The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the

questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in
clear
derogation
of
the
constitutional
requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the
rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process.Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code,
which provides that "laws shall take effect after 15 days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper
of
general
circulation
in
the
Philippines."
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone
for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules
cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous

language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law

instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules
of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these
rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate
to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition
followed
by
the
Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.
8792,otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support
their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more
incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for
evidentiary purposes.In other words, the law merely recognizes the
admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents.It does not make the internet a
medium
for
publishing
laws,
rules
and
regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could
not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the
legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in
accordance
with
its
duly
published
rules
of
procedure."
Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation
cannot proceed for the reason that the rules that they will observe was not
properly published as provided by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such
inquiry if allowed without observance of the required publication will put a
persons life, liberty and property at stake without due process of law.
Also, the further assertion of the senate that they already published such
rules through their web page, in observance of the RA 8792 or the
Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed by the court as matter of
evidence and still does not conforme with what the constitution
propounded.
In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing
the senate to conduct such inquiry in aid of legislation.