EPA CASES

1. ROMUALDEZ v. RTC

Facts:

Petitioner Philip Romualdez is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, the son of the former
Governor of Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, and nephew of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos. The petitioner, caused the construction of his residential house at Barangay
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte,. He soon thereafter also served as Barangay Captain of the place. In
the 1984 Batasan Election and 1986 "snap" Presidential Election, Romualdez acted as the
Campaign Manager of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) in Leyte where he voted. When
the eventful days from the 21st to the 24th of February, 1986, came or were about to come
to a close, petitioner together with his immediate family, left the Philippines and sought
"asylum" in the United States which the US government granted. While abroad, he took
special studies on the development of Leyte-Samar and international business finance. In
the early part of 1987, Romualdez attempted to come back to the Philippines to run for a
congressional seat in Leyte. On 23 March 1987, he finally decided to book a flight back to
the Philippines but the flight was somehow aborted. Romualdez received a letter from Mr.
Charles Cobb, District Director of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
informing him that he should depart from the U.S. at his expense on or before 23 August
1992. Upon receipt of the letter, Romualdez departed from the U.S. for the Philippines. He
returned to his residence at Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. During the registration of voters
conducted by the COMELEC for the Synchronized National and Local Election scheduled for
11 May 1992, petitioner registered himself anew as a voter. The chairman of the Board of
Election Inspectors, allowed him to be registered.Then, private respondent Donato
Advincula filed a petition with the Municipal Trial Court of Tolosa, Leyte, praying that
Romualdez be excluded from the list of voters in Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte,
under BP 881 and RA 7166. Advincula alleged that Romualdez was a resident of
Massachusetts, U.S.A.; that his profession and occupation was in the U.S.A.; that he had
just recently arrived in the Philippines; and that he did not have the required one-year
residence in the Philippines and the six-month residence in Tolosa to qualify him to register
as a voter in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Romualdez filed an answer, contending that
he has been a resident of Tolosa, Leyte, since the early 1980's, and that he has not
abandoned his said residence by his physical absence therefrom. The Municipal Court of
Tolosa, Leyte rendered a decision finding the respondent to be a resident of Brgy. Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte and qualified to register as a voter thereat. Respondent Court reverses the
decision of the lower court.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent court erred in finding the petitioner to have
voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

Held: In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms,
thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile",
which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return. That residence, in the case of the petitioner, was established during
the early 1980's to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residence thus acquired,
however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a
new domicile by choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
The political situation brought about by the "People's Power Revolution" must have truly
caused great apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern over the
safety and welfare of the members of their families. Their going into self-exile until
conditions favorable to them would have somehow stabilized is understandable. Certainly,
their sudden departure from the country cannot be described as "voluntary," or as
"abandonment of residence" at least in the context that these terms are used in applying
the concept of "domicile by choice."
The Court find not that much to convince them that the petitioner had, in fact, abandoned
his residence in the Philippines and established his domicile elsewhere. Petition granted.

2. insert na here pretty crissy

3. JOSE EMMANUEL L. CARLOS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE ACTING PRESIDING

JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN CALOOCAN CITY (BRANCH 125) and
ANTONIO M. SERAPIO, respondents.
facts:
parties were candidates for the position of mayor of the municipality of valenzuela, metro
manila during the 1998 elections. petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.
respondent filed with rtc an election protest challenging the results. the case was assigned
to the respondent judge. the revision of the ballot showed the following results:
(1) Per physical count of the ballots:
(a) protestant Serapio 76,246 votes.
(b) protestee Carlos 103,551 votes.
(2) Per revision, the court invalidated 9,697 votes of the protestant but validated 53 stray
votes in his favor.
The court invalidated 19,975 votes of the protestee and validated 33 stray votes in his
favor. The final tally showed:
(a) protestant Serapio 66,602 votes.
(b) protestee Carlos 83,609 votes, giving the latter a winning margin of 17,007 votes.
Nevertheless, in its decision, the trial court set aside the final tally of valid votes because of
its finding of "significant badges of fraud," namely:
1. The keys turned over by the City Treasurer to the court did not fit into the padlocks of
the ballot boxes that had to be forcibly opened;
2. Seven (7) ballot boxes did not contain any ballot and two (2) ballot boxes out of the
seven (7) ballot boxes did not contain any election returns;
3. Some schools where various precincts were located experienced brownouts during the
counting of votes causing delay in the counting although there was no undue commotion or
violence that occurred;
4. Some of the assigned watchers of protestant were not in their posts during the counting
of votes.
On the basis of the foregoing badges of fraud, the trial court declared that there was
enough pattern of fraud in the conduct of the election for mayor in Valenzuela. The court
held that the fraud was attributable to the protestee who had control over the election
paraphernalia and the basic services in the community such as the supply of electricity.
the trial court set aside the proclamation of protestee Jose Emmanuel Carlos by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers and declared protestant Antonio M.Serapio as the duly
elected mayor of Valenzuela City.

Hearing news that the protestant had won the election protest, the protestee secured a
copy of the decision from the trial court on May 4, 2000. On the other hand, notice of the
decision was received by the protestant on May 03, 2000.
On May 4, 2000, protestant filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending
appeal.7 On May 4, 2000, the trial court gave protestee five (5) days within which to
submit his comment or opposition to the motion. Meantime, on May 04, 2000, petitioner
filed a notice of appeal from the decision of the trial court to the Commission on Elections.

ISSUES
1. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review, by petition for certiorari as a
special civil action, the decision of the regional trial court in an election protest case
involving an elective municipal official considering that it has no appellate jurisdiction over
such
decision.
2. Whether the trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when
the court set aside the proclamation of petitioner and declared respondent Serapio as the
duly elected mayor of Valenzuela City despite its finding that petitioner garnered 83,609
valid votes while respondent obtained 66,602 valid votes, or a winning margin of 17,007
votes.

HELD:
respondent's position: He submitted that Comelec and not the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the present petition for certiorari assailing the decision dated April 24,
2000 of the regional trial court. Assuming that this Court and Comelec have concurrent
jurisdiction and applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the Comelec has jurisdiction
since petitioner has perfected his appeal therewith before the filing of the instant petition.

I. The Supreme Court is vested with original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus against the decision of the regional trial court in the election
protest case before it, regardless of whether it has appellate jurisdiction over such decision.
Article VIII, Section 5 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "Sec. 5. The Supreme
Court
shall
have
the
following
powers:
"(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas
corpus."
xxx
xxx
xxx

Rule 65, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides that:
"SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasijudicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of nonforum shopping as provided in the third paragraph
of section 3, Rule 46."
By Constitutional fiat, the Commission on Election (Comelec) has appellate jurisdiction over
election protest cases involving elective municipal officials decided by courts of general
jurisdiction, as provided for in Article IX (C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution:
"Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
"(1) x x x.
"(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction."
In like manner, the Comelec has original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus involving election cases in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
ast paragraph of Section 50 of B. P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:
The Commission is vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.
remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section
1, Article IXC of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the
COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."
Consequently, both the Supreme Court and Comelec have concurrent jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general
jurisdiction (regional trial courts) in election cases involving elective municipal officials. The
Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdictionover the case. Ergo,
this Court has jurisdiction over the present petition of certiorari as a special civil action
expressly conferred on it and provided for in the Constitution.
Relative to the appeal that petitioner filed with the COMELEC, the same would not bar the
present action as an exception to the rule because under the circumstances, appeal would
not be a speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The exception is
sparingly allowed in situations where the abuse of discretion is not only grave and

whimsical but also palpable and patent, and the invalidity of the assailed act is shown on
its face.
II. Certiorari lies. The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Its decision is void.
The next question that arises is whether certiorari lies because the trial court committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in deciding the way it
did Election Protest Case No. 14V98, declaring respondent Serapio as the duly "elected"
mayor
of
Valenzuela,
Metro
Manila.
In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or selection of candidates to public office
by popular vote" through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of which are
determined through the will of the electorate.
"An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power
of the people. "Specifically, the term 'election', in the context of the Constitution, may refer
to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of votes." The winner is the candidate who has
obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election. "Sound policy dictates
that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest number of votes cast
in the election for that office.
For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election." In case of protest, a revision or recount of
the ballots cast for the candidates decides the election protest case. The candidate
receiving the highest number or plurality of votes shall be proclaimed the winner. Even if
the candidate receiving the majority votes is ineligible or disqualified, the candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes or the second placer, cannot be declared
elected.
"The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated
loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the
person who has obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving the
next
highest
number
of
votes to be declared elected." In other words, "a defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office."
"Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers should
not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will
of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. Laws governing election contests
must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. In an election case, the court
has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means within its command who is the real

candidate elected by the electorate. The Supreme Court frowns upon any interpretation of
the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the
free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of
the results."
Consequently, the final tally clearly showed petitioner Carlos as the overwhelming winner
in the May 11, 1998 elections.
However, the trial court set aside the final tally of votes because of what the trial court
perceived to be "significant badges of fraud" attributable to the protestee.29 These are:
First: The failure of the keys turned over by the City Treasurer to the trial court to fit the
padlocks on the ballot boxes that compelled the court to forcibly open the padlocks. The
trial court concluded that the real keys were lost or the padlocks substituted pointing to
possible tampering of the contents of the ballot boxes.
Procedurally, the keys to the ballot boxes were turned over by the Board of Election
Inspectors from the precinct level to the Municipal Board of Canvassers and finally to the
municipal treasurer for safekeeping. The threelevel turnover of the keys will not prevent
the possibility of these keys being mixed up. This is an ordinary occurrence during
elections. The mere inability of the keys to fit into the padlocks attached to the ballot boxes
does not affect the integrity of the ballots. At any rate, the trial court easily forced open the
padlocks and found valid votes cast therein;
Second: Seven (7) ballot boxes were found empty. Thus, the trial court concluded that
there were "missing ballots" and "missing election returns." This is pure speculation
without factual basis. "The sea of suspicion has no shore,
and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass."30 On the other hand,
the Summary of Votes as revised does not show any unaccounted precinct or whether
there was any precinct without any ballot or election returns. It is a standard procedure of
the Commission on Elections (Comelec) to provide extra empty ballot boxes for the use of
the Board of Election Inspectors or the Board of Canvassers, in case of necessity.
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The empty ballot boxes found could be the empty reserve ballot boxes that were not used
by the Board of Election Inspectors or the Board of Canvassers since there was neither
proof nor even a claim of missing ballots or missing election returns.
Third: Some schoolhouses experienced brownout during the counting of votes. There was
nothing extraordinary that would invite serious doubts or suspicion that fraud was
committed during the brownout that occurred. Indeed, one witness stated that it was the
first time that he observed brownout in Dalandanan Elementary School and another stated
that the brownout was localized in Coloong Elementary School. Since counting of votes
lasted until midnight, the brownouts had caused only slight delay in the canvassing of
votes because the election officials availed themselves of candles, flashlights and
emergency lights. There were no reports of cheating or tampering of the election returns.
In fact, witnesses testified that the counting of votes proceeded smoothly and no
commotion or violence occurred. So, the brownouts had no effect on the integrity of the
canvass.
Fourth: The absence of watchers for candidate Serapio from their posts during the counting
of votes. This cannot be taken against candidate Carlos since it is the candidate's own lookout to protect his interest during the counting of votes and canvassing of election returns.
As long as notices were duly served to the parties, the counting and canvassing of votes
may validly proceed in the absence of watchers. Otherwise, candidates may easily delay

the counting of votes or canvassing of returns by simply not sending their watchers. There
was no incomplete canvass of returns, contrary to what the trial court declared. The
evidence showed complete canvass in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.31
"We cannot allow an election protest on such flimsy averments to prosper, otherwise, the
whole election process will
deteriorate into an endless stream of crabs pulling at each other, racing to disembank from
the water."32
Assuming for the nonce that the trial court was correct in holding that the final tally of valid
votes as per revision report may be set aside because of the "significant badges of fraud",
the same would be tantamount to a ruling that there were no valid votes cast at all for the
candidates, and, thus, no winner could be declared in the election protest case. In short,
there was failure of election.
In such case, the proper remedy is an action before the Commission on Elections en banc
to declare a failure of election or to annul the election.33 However, the case below was an
election protest case involving an elective
municipal position which, under Section 251 of the Election Code, falls within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the appropriate regional trial court.34
Nonetheless, the annulment of an election on the ground of fraud, irregularities and
violations of election laws may be raised as an incident to an election contest. Such
grounds for annulment of an election may be invoked in an election protest case. However,
an election must not be nullified and the voters disenfranchised whenever it is possible to
determine a winner on the basis of valid votes cast, and discard the illegally cast ballots. In
this case, the petitioner admittedly received 17,007 valid votes more than the protestee,
and therefore the nullification of the election would not lie. The power to nullify an election
must be exercised with the greatest care with a view not to
disenfranchise the voters, and only under circumstances that clearly call for such drastic
remedial measure.35
As heretofore stated, in this jurisdiction, elections are won on the basis of a majority or
plurality of votes cast and
received by the candidates. "The right to hold an elective office is rooted on electoral
mandate, not perceived entitlement to the office."36
More importantly, the trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of election.37
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that:
"Sec. 6. Failure of Election.If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or
after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or
in the custody of canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of
such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended
or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty (30) days
after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or
failure to elect." (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, RA 7166 provides that:
"Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections". The postponement,
declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections

5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en
banc by a majority vote of its members. The causes for
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the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on
the day of the election." (Emphasis supplied)
It is the Commission (Comelec) sitting en banc that is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to
declare a failure of election.38
"In a petition to annul an election under Section 6, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, two
conditions must be averred in order to support a sufficient cause of action. These are: (1)
the illegality must affect more than 50% of the votes cast and (2) the good votes can be
distinguished from the bad ones. It is only when these two conditions are established that
the annulment of the election can be justified because the remaining votes do not
constitute a valid
constituency."39
We have held that: "To declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must occur: first, no
voting has taken place in
the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there were voting, the election
nevertheless resulted in a
failure to elect; and, second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election."40
Neither of these conditions was present in the case at bar.
More recently, we clarified that, "Under the pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus
Election Code, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of elections may be
declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed
on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the
election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of
the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes."41
Thus, the trial court in its decision actually pronounced a failure of election by disregarding
and setting aside the results of the election. Nonetheless, as hereinabove stated, the trial
court erred to the extent of ousting itself of jurisdiction because the grounds for failure of
election were not significant and even nonexistent. More importantly, the commission of
fraud can not be attributed to the protestee. There was no evidence on record that
protestee had a hand in any of the irregularities that protestant averred. It is wrong for the
trial court to state that the protestee had control over the "election paraphernalia" or over
electric services. The Commission on Elections has control over
election paraphernalia, through its officials and deputies.42 The Comelec can deputize with
the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.43 On the other hand, electric utility services in Metro Manila, including
Valenzuela are under the control of its franchise holder, particularly the Manila Electric
Company, a public service company, certainly not owned or controlled by the protestee. In
fact, during election period, Comelec has control over such utilities as electric and even
telephone

service.44 What is important, however, is that the voters of Valenzuela were able to cast
their votes freely and fairly. And in the election protest case, the trial court was able to
recount and determine the valid votes cast.
Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to declare a failure of election, the extent of
that power is limited to the annulment of the election and the calling of special elections.45
The result is a failure of election for that particular office. In such case, the court can not
declare a winner.46 A permanent vacancy is thus created. In such eventuality, the duly
elected vicemayor shall succeed as provided by law.47
We find that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision proclaiming respondent Serapio the duly
elected mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on the basis of its perception of the voice of the
people of Valenzuela, even without a majority or plurality votes cast in his favor. In fact,
without a single vote in his favor as the trial court discarded all the votes. Thus, the
decision is not supported by the highest number of valid votes cast in his favor. This
violated the right to due process of law of petitioner who was not heard on the issue of
failure of election, an issue that was not raised by the protestant. "A
decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity
of being heard."48 The trial court can not decide the election protest case outside the
issues raised. If it does, as in this case, the trial court is ousted of its jurisdiction. Court
GRANTS the petition

4. Santiago vs Comelec.
The heart of this controversy brought to us is the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system
of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars,
before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. It is, for both under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the
Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members and (2) by a constitutional convention.
Facts:
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a
Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples
Initiative
wherein
Delfin
asked
the
COMELEC
for
an
order
:
a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country,
b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation,
and
c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing
signing
stations
- citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution (right of the people to exercise the power
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution.)

Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of
the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco,
the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.Senator Roco filed a motion
to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizableby the COMELEC.
The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpinfiled this civil
action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and theDelfin
petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision
onpeoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be
passed byCongress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to
amendments to theConstitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits
constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme
Court granted the Motions for Intervention
ISSUES:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative
on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately
covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations
Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on
National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the
conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in
the draft Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, would constitute a revision of, or
an amendment to, the Constitution.
Held:
1- .R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND.
The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so
with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws
sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No.
6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Also, while the law provides
subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no
subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the
law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended
to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the
primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and
local laws. While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and

referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
II- Comelec resolution no. 2300, in sofa as it prescribes rules and regulatios on the conduct
of initiative on amendments to the constitution, is void. It logically follows that the
COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELECs
power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and
regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3
of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized
and which satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard tests. It has been an
established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata
non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter
cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to
peoples initiative
III- The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the
Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ., it would involve a change from
a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure;
and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions,
such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal
access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision
cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution, is limited to amendments. The prohibition against reelection of the President
and the limits provided for all other national and local elective officials are based on the
philosophy of governance, to open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos
qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and
economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for
participation in policy and decision-making for the common good; hence, to remove the
term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.

5. ISIDRO MILLARE vs. HON. LEOPOLDO B. GIRONELLA, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Abra, HON. ADRIANO BERNARDINO, Acting Municipal Circuit Judge of Tayum, Abra, and
ALFREDO ELVEA
Facts:
Petitioner Isidro Millare ran for the position of Barangay Captain of Barangay Budac, Tayum
Abra, against private respondent Alfredo Elvea during the barangay election held on May
17,
1982.
Elvea filed in the Municipal Circuit Court of Tayum, Abra, a petition for the exclusion and
disqualification of Millare, docketed as Barangay Election Case No. 48. The said petition
sought to strike out Millare's name from the voters' list, and to disqualify him as a
candidate for the position of barangay captain of barangay Budac on the ground that he
was not an actual resident of the said barangay for at least six months prior to the
elections,
as
required
by
Section
7
of
Batas
Pambansa
Blg.
222.
At the hearing of the said petition, Millare failed to appear and, after receiving the evidence

of Elvea the respondent Municipal Circuit Judge of Tayum, Judge Adriano Bernardino,
issued an order striking out Millare's name from the voters' list and declaring him
disqualified
to
run
as
barangay
captain
of
barangay
Budac.
Millare filed a motion for a reconsideration of the said order. The motion was set for
hearing, and in an order, Judge Bernardino denied the, same, with the modification that
Millare's name was allowed to remain in the voters' list. Millare received a copy of the order
denying his motion for reconsideration at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 16, 1982,
which
was
a
Sunday,
the
eve
of
election
day.
Despite the declaration as to his disqualification, Millare ran just the same in the election. It
appears undisputed that he garnered more votes than Elvea His votes, however, were not
considered by the barangay board of tellers, they having been declared as stray. The
barangay board of canvassers proclaimed Elvea as the duly elected Barangay Captain of
barangay
Budac.
Millare did not appeal the orders in Election Case No. 48 which declared him disqualified to
run
as
barangay
captain
of
barangay
Budac.
Millare filed with the respondent Municipal Circuit Court Election Protest No. 49 against
Elvea praying for the annulment of the proclamation of Elvea and for a declaration that
he (Millare) was the duly elected Barangay Captain of barangay Budac.
In his order, Judge Bernardino dismissed the election protest for lack of merit. He reasoned
out that the election protest may not be availed of as a means of appealing the decision in
Election Case No. 48 which declared Millare as disqualified as a candidate and which had
already become final and executory, there having been no appeal taken from the same.
Millare appealed the order of dismissal of Election Protest No. 49 to the Court of First
Instance of Tayum. The then court of first instance, through public respondent Judge
Leopoldo B. Gironella, rendered a decision affirming the decision of the Municipal Circuit
Court
in
Election
Protest
No.
49.
Millare filed the instant petition which he entitled as a "Petition for Review on certiorari on
Questions of Law." He prays principally that the aforementioned decision and orders of the
respondents Judge Gironella and Judge Bernardino be nullified, and that Election Protest No.
49 be remanded to the Municipal Circuit Court of Tayum for trial on the merits.
Issue: WON respondent judge erred in dismissing Election Protest No. 49.
Held:
From a strict legal standpoint, the view that the order disqualifying Millare had become
final and executory due to his failure to appeal the same may be said to be technically
correct. The law governing barangay elections is contained in Batas Pambansa Blg. 222,
otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982. Section 21 of the said law provides
that "the provisions of the 1978 Election Code and the Revised Barangay Chapter no,
inconsistent herewith shall be applicable in a suppletory character to the election of barrio
officials. " Section 8 of the Revised Barangay Chapter, Republic Act No. 3590, as amended
and as adopted by Presidential Decree No. 557, provides in its last paragraph as follows:
All disputes over barangay elections shad be brought before the municipal court of the
municipality concerned; and in the determination and decision thereof, the court shall
follow as closely as possible the procedure prescribed for inferior courts in Rule 4 (now Rule
5), Rules of Court. The decision of the municipal court shag be appealable pursuant to the
Rules of Court to the Court of First Instance whose decision shall be final on questions of
fact.
The pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court which have been made applicable to "all

disputes over barangay elections" require that the decision of a municipal court be
appealed to the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) "within fifteen days
after notification of the judgment complained of." It is a fact that Millare did not take an
appeal from the orders issued by Judge Bernardino in Election Case No. 48.
However, Millare could not have appealed the order disqualifying him as a candidate before
the election. The order denying his motion for reconsideration or the order dated May 13,
1982 in Election Case No. 48 was received by Millare only at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon
of May 16, 1982, a Sunday, or only a few hours before the opening of the polling places.
As to whether Millare should have appealed the said order of disqualification after election
day, more particularly when his votes, which were more than those of his opponents, were
not credited to him, they having been considered stray due to the aforementioned
disqualification, was not plain nor certain enough as the proper course of action to take.
The barangay board of tellers had considered the order of his disqualification as already
final and executory, for which reason they considered his votes stray. If the order of
disqualification was still appealable, as contended by the respondents, such action on the
part of the barangay board of tellers was legally unjustified and erroneous. The quandary in
the mind of Millare as to what course of action to take after Elvea was proclaimed the
winner despite his having received less votes than Millare was not helped any by the state
of the law and of the applicable decisions on the matter. As aforesaid, there is no express
legal provision or pertinent jurisprudence which indicates whether, under such a situation,
Millare should have appealed the order of his disqualification, or file an election protest.
Existing provisions seemingly indicate that the appropriate step to take is to file an election
contest. The second paragraph of Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222 provides as
follows:
A sworn petition contesting the election of any barangay official shall be filed with the city
or municipal or metropolitan trial court, as the case may be, within ten days from the date
of the proclamation of the winners. The trial court shall decide the election protest within
fifteen days after the filing thereof. The decision of the municipal or city or metropolitan
trial court may be appealed within ten days from receipt of a copy thereof to the Regional
Trial Court (CFI) which shall decide within thirty days from submission, and whose decision
shall
be
final.
The choice between appealing the order of disqualification in Election Case No. 48 and
filing election contest after the election had been held was thus not easy to make. Or,
having made such decision, may one be certain as to the correctness of the same. The
propriety of Millare's filing a separate election contest in lieu of appealing the order of
disqualification in Election Case No. 48 could have been induced also by the need to raise
issues in the election contest other than the sole question of the alleged non-residence of
Millare in Barangay Budac; such as, the denial of due process consisting in the lack of
opportunity to present evidence in his behalf, the propriety of declaring the votes cast in
his favor as stray, and the refusal of Judge Bernardino to allow the reopening of the ballot
boxes for a recanvassing of the votes. At any rate, if appeal is indeed the proper remedy,
the filing of Election Protest No. 49, or well within the period of appeal, may be considered
as in the same nature of that remedy. Whatever procedural mis-step may have been
committed in this regard may not override the paramount consideration of upholding the
sovereign will of the people expressed through the democratic process of suffrage. Millare
may not be faulted for sleeping on his rights. He had insisted on his qualification for the
position he ran for, and took determined and seasonable steps to assert the same.
The court accordingly find merit in the petitioner's complaint against the actuations of the
public respondents. The issue of the petitioner's non-residence in Barangay Budac upon

which his disqualification was predicated in the decisions and orders complained of had
never been ventilated at all, it having been buried and lost sight of in a maze of
technicalities. Millare was never afforded the chance to prove that he was an actual
resident of Barangay Budac (where, according to him, he has been residing for the last
twenty years in a big house of strong materials) for at least six months prior to the
elections, and as such qualified to run for the position of Barangay Captain thereof. The
least that he is entitled to is to be given that chance, if only to give satisfaction to those
who
voted
for
him.
Petition granted.

6. Rulloda vs COMELEC
FACTS: In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L.
Placido were the contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto,
Pangasinan. On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed away. His widow,
petitioner Petronila Betty Rulloda, wrote a letter to the Commission on Elections on June
25, 2002 seeking permission to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in
lieu of her late husband. Petitioners request was supported by the Appeal-Petition
containing several signatures of people purporting to be members of the electorate of
Barangay
Sto.
Tomas.
Said
request
was
granted
to
petitioner.
Based on the votes tallied, petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent received only
290 votes. Despite such, the Board of Canvassers still proclaimed respondent as the
winning candidate.
After the elections, petitioner learned that COMELEC passed Resolution No. 5217 which
denied due course to the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner and to direct the election
officer to delete the name of petitioner (from the ballot). COMELEC cited Section 9 of
Resolution No. 4801 which prohibits the substitution of candidates for barangay and
sangguniang kabataan officials.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari seeking to annul said section and Resolution
No. 5217.
Respondent Placido claims that there can be no substitution since the barangay elections
are non-partisan and that petitioner did not file a certificate of candidacy leaving him as
the only candidate. COMELEC likewise answered that the Resolution was issued as an
incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of the barangay elections.
Therefore, the same may not be the subject of review in a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON petitioner may validly substitute her deceased husband in said barangay
elections
RULING: In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of candidates to
public office by popular vote through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials which
are determined through the will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the
popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. The winner is the
candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election. Sound

policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all republican forms of
government the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election.
Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay election is non-partisan, there
can be no substitution because there is no political party from which to designate the
substitute. Such an interpretation, aside from being non sequitur, ignores the purpose of
election laws which is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. It is a
solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It is well-settled
that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit to the
popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Contrary to respondents claim, the absence of a specific provision governing substitution
of candidates in barangay elections can not be inferred as a prohibition against said
substitution. Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into the law where the same is
not written. Indeed, there is more reason to allow the substitution of candidates where no
political parties are involved than when political considerations or party affiliations reign, a
fact that must have been subsumed by law.
Private respondent likewise contends that the votes in petitioners favor can not be
counted because she did not file any certificate of candidacy. In other words, he was the
only candidate for Barangay Chairman. His claim is refuted by the Memorandum of the
COMELEC Law Department as well as the assailed Resolution No. 5217, wherein it
indubitably appears that petitioners letter-request to be allowed to run as Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband was treated as a certificate of
candidacy.
To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the contested election.
Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the
way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections.

7.
LEON
G.
MAQUERA, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN BORRA, CESAR MIRAFLOR, and GREGORIO SANTAYANA, in their respective
capacities as Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections, and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondents.
Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal
offices" to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or emoluments of the
position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the national,
provincial, city or municipal government concerned if the candidate, except when declared
winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes cast for the office to which he has filed his
certificate of candidacy, there being not more than four (4) candidates for the same office;"

That said Republic Act No. 4421 has, accordingly, the effect of imposing property
qualifications in order that a person could run for a public office and that the people
could validly vote for him;
ISSUE:
Petitioners question the constitutionality of Republic Act 4421 on the ground that the
same is undemocratic and contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
HELD:
said property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican
system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same,
for said political system is premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily
that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the
individual concerned, whereas social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and
poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the
chance to be elected to public office; and
That the bond required in Republic Act No. 4421 and the confiscation of said bond are not
predicated upon the necessity of defraying certain expenses or of compensating services
given in connection with elections, and is, therefore, arbitrary and oppressive.
The Court declares that said Republic Act No. 4421 is unconstitutional and hence null and
void, and, hence, to enjoin respondents herein, as well as their representatives and agents,
from enforcing and/or implementing said constitutional enactment.
BENGZONs CONCURRENT DECISION
if it puts a real barrier that would stop many suitable men and women from presenting
themselves as prospective candidates, it becomes unjustifiable, for it would defeat its very
objective of securing the right of honest candidates to run for public office.
Freedom of the voters to exercise the elective franchise at a general election implies the
right to freely choose from all qualified candidates for public office. The imposition of
unwarranted restrictions and hindrances precluding qualified candidates from running is,
therefore, violative of the constitutional guaranty of freedom in the exercise of elective
franchise. It seriously interferes with the right of the electorate to choose freely from
among those eligible to office whomever they may desire. ***
8)
MATSURA
V.
COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Michael O. Mastura and private respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen were
congressional candidates for the first district of Maguindanao during the 8 May 1995
elections. In the canvassing of votes, Dilangalen objected to the inclusion of the Certificate
of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog on the ground that the same was allegedly
tampered. Acting on the objection, the COMELEC Second Division ordered the production
and examination of the election returns of the Municipality of Matanog
Upon examination and comparison of the copies of the election returns of the MTC Judge
and the COMELEC, the COMELEC Second Division found that, indeed, the Certificate of

Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog had been tampered with. Consequently, the
COMELEC Second Division issued the herein assailed Order of 29 February 1996 annulling
the Certificate of Canvass of Matanog. The following day, Mastura filed an Urgent Motion to
Examine and Verify the Canvassed MBC Copies of the Election Returns and the COMELEC
Copy of the Certificate of Canvass and Accompanying Statement of Votes. The COMELEC
Second Division merely noted the motion in view of the 29 February 1996 Order.
Mastura filed an Urgent Motion to Defer Implementation of the 29 February 1996 Order.
Mastura argued that the 29 February 1996 Order was issued precipitately and prematurely
considering that some other documents, particularly the Certificate of Canvass of Matanog
which he considered necessary for the resolution of the issue, was yet to be produced and
examined.
The
COMELEC
Second
Division
denied
the
motion:
It appearing that when the Commission opened the election returns for Matanog,
Maguindanao, particularly the Judge copy and the Comelec copy and made comparison
thereof to ascertain the actual votes of candidates Didagen P. Dilangalen and Michael O.
Mastura per precinct which consists of fifty-seven (57) precincts, in compliance with the
Supreme Court resolution, the results thereof, fully convinced the Commission of the
manifest irregularity committed in the Statement of Votes by precincts. Thus, it annuls the
canvass made by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Matanog, Maguindanao.
As a result, private respondent Dilangalen was proclaimed the duly elected member of the
House of Representatives, First District of Maguindanao. Mastura now comes to us imputing
to public respondent COMELEC Second Division grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack
of
jurisdiction
in
issuing
its
Orders
Issue:
WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the 1996 Orders.
Held:
No. We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC. It is settled
jurisprudence that COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether
there exists a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from the disputed
voting centers. Corollarily, once the election returns were found to be falsified or tampered
with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the Board of Canvassers to
reconvene and proclaim the winners on the basis of the genuine returns or, if it should
refuse, replace the members of the board or proclaim the winners itself
That the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog was tampered with is a
factual finding of the COMELEC. Absent any showing of abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, this Court should refrain from reviewing the same, and must accord it
instead the respect it deserves. The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will
not be disturbed by courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no
substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when
it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the
COMELEC - created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself - on a level
higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain
the true results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is
not
strictly
bound
by
the
rules
of
evidence
It is within the legitimate concerns of Comelec to annul a canvass or proclamation based
on incomplete returns, or on incorrect or tampered returns; annul a canvass or
proclamation made in an unauthorized meeting of the board of canvassers either because
it lacked a quorum or because the board did not meet at all. Neither Constitution nor
statute has granted Comelec or board of canvassers the power, in the canvass of election
returns, to look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity.
9. Maruhom v CA

Maruhom and Dimaporo were both candidates for Mayor in the Municipality of Marogong,
Lanao del Sur. During the counting of votes, serious irregularities, anomalies and electoral
frauds were committed at the instance of petitioner or his followers in that votes actually
casted forthe private respondent were not counted and credited in his favor thru the
concerted acts, conspiracy and manipulation of the Board of Election Inspectors, military,
Election Officer and the Machine Operator who happens to be a nephew of the petitioner.
Many official ballots were refused or rejected by the machine. As a result of the foregoing
irregularities,anomalies and electoral frauds, the petitioner was illegally proclaimed as
winner because he appeared to have obtained 2,020 votes while the private respondent
garnered 2,000 votes with a slight margin of only 20 votes. Private respondent, knowing
that he was cheated and the true winner for Mayor, filed before this Honorable Commission
a petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom as the duly elected
Mayor of Marogong, Lanao delSur. Subsequently, a Revision Committee was created and its
membership were duly appointed in open court which committee was directed by the
COMELEC to finish the revision of ballots. After the Revision Committee was directed by the
respondent to commence the revision of ballots, the petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom thru
counsel orally moved for the dismissal of the protest on the grounds that (1) The ballot
boxes containing the ballots in the protested and counter-protested precincts have been
violated; (2) Automated counting of ballots does not contemplate a manual recount of the
ballots.
Issue: WON the COMELEC may order manual recount of ballots even not mentioned in R.A.
8436
Held: Yes. Although admittedly there is a lacuna leges in R.A.No. 8436 which prescribes the
adoption of an automated election system. However, while conceding as much, this Court
ruled
in
Tupay Loong v COMELEC, 42 that the Commission is nevertheless not precluded from
conducting a manual count when the automated counting system fails,reasoning thus:. . .
In enacting R.A. No. 8436,Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in
counting is not machine related for human foresight is not all-seeing.
We hold,however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating
above the problem .Section 2(1) of Article IX (C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the
broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations elative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative,referendum and recall."Undoubtedly, the text and intent of
this provision is to give the COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,peaceful and credible
elections.Congruent to this intent, this Courthas not been niggardly in defining
theparameters of powers of COMELEC in the conduct of our elections . . . In the case at bar,
the COMELEC order for a manual count was not only reasonable. It was the only way to
count the decisive local votes . . .The bottom line is that by means of the manual count, the
will
of
thevoters
of
Sulu
was
honestlydetermined.
We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A.
8436.R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work
. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC . .
. . . Our elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running for public
offices, candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post. Too often, COMELEC has to make

snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert thewill of our
voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed,may even
be debatable. We cannot,however engage in a swivel chair criticism of these actions often
taken under very difficult circumstances.
Verily, the legal compass from which the COMELEC should take its bearings in acting upon
election controversies is the principle that "clean elections control the appropriateness of
the remedy." Be that as it may, the fact is the averments in petitioner's counter-protest and
private respondent's protest already justified the determination of the issues through
ajudicial revision and recounting of the ballots pursuant to Section 255 of the Omnibus
Election
Code
which
provides
that
Sec.
255.
Judicial
counting
of
votes
in
election
contest
.

Where allegations in a protest or counter-protest so warrant or whenever in the opinion of

the
court
the
interests
of
justice
so
require
, it shall immediately order the book of voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballots and
other documents used in the election be brought before it and that the ballots be examined
and votes recounted.

10. irah baby

11. MASANGCAY V. COMELEC
FACTS:
Benjamin Masangcay, then provincial treasurer of Aklan designated to take charge of the
receipt and custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their
distribution, among the different municipalities of the province, was charged before the
Comelec with contempt for having opened 3 boxes containing official and sample ballots
for the municipalities of the province of Aklan. This is in violation of the instructions of said
Commission inasmuch as he opened said boxes not in the presence of the division
superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized
representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens Party, as
required in its resolution, which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election
Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
The Commission rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty
as charged and sentencing each of them to suffer 3 months imprisonment and pay a fine of
P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of 2 months in case of insolvency, to be served in the
provincial jail of Aklan.
Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the
constitutionality of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which grants the Comelec as
well as its members the power to punish acts of contempt against said body under the
same procedure and with the same penalties provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
Masangcay contends that the portion of said section which grants the Commission and its
members the power to punish for contempt is unconstitutional for it infringes the principle

underlying the separation of powers that exists among the three departments of the
government.
ISSUE: WON the Commission on Election has the valid power to impose disciplinary penalty
(in this case, the power to punish acts of contempt) against Masangcay.
HELD: The Comelec lacks power to impose the disciplinary penalty meted out to
Masangcay. When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the
power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature. The
power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders
and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice. The exercise of
this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts. Its
exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power
to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance
of its administrative function has been held invalid.
The resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the charge
for contempt was filed against Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an administrative
or ministerial function for they merely concern the procedure to be followed in the
distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the different municipalities.
The Commission, thus, has exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so
its decision is null and void.
Constitutionality of Section 5 of Revised Election Code not passed upon due to conclusion
arrived at, the Court deemed it unnecessary to pass on the question of constitutionality
with regard to the portion of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which confers upon the
Comelec the power to punish for contempt for acts provided for in Rule 64 of our Rules of
Court.

Alvarez vs. COMELEC

Facts:
On May 12, 1997, petitioner was proclaimed duly elected Punong Barangay of Doa Aurora,
Quezon City. He received 590 votes while his opponent, private respondent AbadSarmiento, obtained 585 votes. Private respondent filed an election protest claiming
irregularities, i.e. misreading and misappreciation of ballots by the Board of Election
Inspectors. After petitioner answered and the issues were joined, the Metropolitan Trial
Court ordered the reopening and recounting of the ballots in ten contested precincts. It
subsequently rendered its decision that private respondent won the election. She garnered
596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes after the recount.
On appeal, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that private respondent won over
petitioner. Private respondent, meanwhile, filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal
which petitioner opposed. The COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration

and affirmed the decision of the Second Division. It granted the Motion for Execution
pending appeal.
Petitioner brought before the Court this petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
Petitioner avers that the Commission violated its mandate on preferential disposition of
election contests as mandated by Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution as well as
Section 257, Omnibus Election Code that the COMELEC shall decide all election cases
brought before it within ninety days from the date of submission.
Petitioner also contends that the COMELEC misinterpreted Section 2 (2), second paragraph,
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. He insists that factual findings of the COMELEC in
election cases involving municipal and barangay officials may still be appealed. He cites
jurisprudence stating that such decisions, final orders or rulings do not preclude a recourse
to this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari, when grave abuse of discretion
has marred such factual determination, and when there is arbitrariness in the factual
findings.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
No.
But we agree that election cases must be resolved justly, expeditiously and inexpensively.
We are also not unaware of the requirement of Section 257 of the Omnibus Election Code
that election cases brought before the Commission shall be decided within ninety days
from the date of submission for decision. The records show that petitioner contested the
results of ten (10) election precincts involving scrutiny of affirmation, reversal, validity,
invalidity, legibility, misspelling, authenticity, and other irregularities in these ballots. The
COMELEC has numerous cases before it where attention to minutiae is critical. Considering
further the tribunals manpower and logistic limitations, it is sensible to treat the
procedural requirements on deadlines realistically. Overly strict adherence to deadlines
might induce the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of
material time. In our view this is not what the framers of the Code had intended since a
very strict construction might allow procedural flaws to subvert the will of the electorate
and would amount to disenfranchisement of voters in numerous cases.
However, petitioner misreads the provision in Section 258 of the Omnibus Election Code. It
will be noted that the preferential disposition applies to cases before the courts and not
those before the COMELEC, as a faithful reading of the section will readily show.
Further, we note that petitioner raises the alleged delay of the COMELEC for the first time.
As private respondent pointed out, petitioner did not raise the issue before the COMELEC
when the case was pending before it. In fact, private respondent points out that it was she
who filed a Motion for Early Resolution of the case when it was before the COMELEC. The
active participation of a party coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the
court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of

that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said
party from later impugning the court or the bodys jurisdiction. In the matter of the assailed
resolution, therefore, we find no grave abuse of discretion on this score by the COMELEC.
With regard to the Constitutional provision that decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
Commission on Election contests involving municipal and barangay officials shall be final,
executory and not appealable, we agree with petitioner that election cases pertaining to
barangay elections may be appealed by way of a special civil action for certiorari. But this
recourse is available only when the COMELECs factual determinations are marred by grave
abuse of discretion. We find no such abuse in the instant case. From the pleadings and the
records, we observed that the lower court and the COMELEC meticulously pored over the
ballots reviewed. Because of its fact-finding facilities and its knowledge derived from actual
experience, the COMELEC is in a peculiarly advantageous position to evaluate, appreciate
and decide on factual questions before it. Here, we find no basis for the allegation that
abuse of discretion or arbitrariness marred the factual findings of the COMELEC.
Hence, Petition is dismissed.

13. GUERRERO VS. COMELEC

Facts:
In the Second Division of the COMELEC, Ruiz sought to perpetually disqualify respondent
Farias as a candidate for the position of Congressman. Ruiz alleged that Farias had been
campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite his failure
to file a Certificate of Candidacy for said office. Ruiz averred that Farias failure to file said
Certificate violated Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Ruiz asked the COMELEC to
declare Farias as a "nuisance candidate" pursuant to Section 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code and to disqualify him from running in the May 11, 1998 elections, as well as in all
future
polls.
Farias filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC, substituting candidate
Chevylle
V.
Farias
who
withdrew
on
April
3,
1998.
The Second Division of the COMELEC dismissed Ruiz petition stating that there is none in
the records to consider respondent an official candidate to speak of without the filing of
said certificate. Hence, there is no certificate of candidacy to be cancelled, consequently,
no
candidate
to
be
disqualified.
On May 11, 1998, the elections pushed through as scheduled and Farias was duly
proclaimed
winner.
Ruiz then filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Farias could not validly
substitute for Chevylle V. Farias, since the latter was not the official candidate of the Lakas
ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino (LAMMP), but was an independent candidate. Another
person cannot substitute for an independent candidate. Thus, Farias certificate of
candidacy claiming to be the official candidate of LAMMP was fatally defective, according to
Ruiz.
On June 3, 1998, Farias took his oath of office as a member of the House of
Representatives.
Petitioner herein filed his "Petition-In-Intervention" in COMELEC averring that he was the
official candidate of the Liberal Party (LP) in said elections for Congressman, and stood to

be adversely affected. Guerrero contended that Farias, having failed to file his Certificate
of Candidacy on or before the last day therefor, being midnight of March 27, 1998, Farias
illegally resorted to the remedy of substitution provided for under Section 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code and thus, Farias disqualification was in order. Guerrero then asked
that the position of Representative of the first district of Ilocos Norte be declared vacant
and special elections called for, but disallowing the candidacy of Farias.
But COMELEC En Banc dismissed Ruizs motion for reconsideration and Guerreros petitionin-intervention
for
lack
of
jurisdiction.
However, petitioner Guerrero argues that the refusal of the COMELEC to rule on the validity
or invalidity of the certificate of candidacy of Farias amounted to grave abuse of
discretion on its part. He claims that COMELEC failed in its Constitutional duty to uphold
and enforce all laws relative to elections.
ISSUE:
Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of
the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Farias is already within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives?
Ruling:
No.
In the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when
it held that its jurisdiction over the case had ceased with the assumption of office of
respondent Farias as Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte. While the
COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its
refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by
Farias is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (HRET). Under Article VI, Section 17 of
the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to
the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus,
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction
begins. Thus, the COMELECs decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is
justifiable,
in
deference
to
the
HRETs
own
jurisdiction
and
functions.
In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who
has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is
best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity
of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to
the
peoples
mandate.
Petitioner contends that the jurisdiction of the HRET as defined under Article VI, Section 17
of the Constitution is limited only to the qualifications prescribed under Article VI, Section 6
of the Constitution. This contention lacks cogency and is far from persuasive. Article VI,
Section 17 of the Constitution cannot be circumscribed lexically. The word "qualifications"
cannot be read as qualified by the term "constitutional." Ubi lex non distinguit noc nos
distinguire debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the
application of a law where none is indicated. For firstly, the drafters of the fundamental
law, in making no qualification in the use of a general word or expression, must have
intended no distinction at all. Secondly, the courts could only distinguish where there are

facts or circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In

such a case, the courts would merely give effect to the lawgivers intent.
The petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.