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Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo
G.R. No. 180906
07 October 2008
PONENTE: Puno, C.J.
PARTIES:
PETITIONERS: SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENTS: RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
Supreme Court: Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order
Supreme Court: Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to treat their Existing Petition as Amparo Petition
Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals summarily heard the Petition
of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a judgment which is the subject of the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
FACTS:
On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo (hereafter referred to as Raymond) and
Reynaldo Manalo (hereafter referred to as Reynaldo) were abducted by military men belonging to the
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they were members and
supporters of the New Peoples Army (NPA). After eighteen (18) months of detention and torture, the
brothers escaped on 13 August 2007.
On 23 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to stop the military officers and agents from depriving
them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. In a Resolution dated 24 August 2007, the Supreme
Court ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, and
further enjoined them from causing the arrest of Raymond and Reynaldo. Forthwith, they filed a
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting
Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs.
While the aforementioned case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October
2007. Raymond and Reynaldo subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their
existing peti tion as amparo petition.
On 25 October 2007, the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23 August 2007 Petition as a petition
under the Amparo Rule. The Supreme Court likewise granted the Writ of Amparo and remanded the
petition to the Court of Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and decide the petition.
On 26 December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The Court of
Appeals ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the
Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the custody of Raymond
and Reynaldo, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and
produce all medical reports and records of Raymond and Reynaldo while under military custody.
Aggrieved, the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP filed an appeal with the
Supreme Court.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is sufficient for amparo petitions.
Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the right to security of a person may be
invoked.
ANSWER:
It depends on the credibility and candidness of the victims in their statements.
No.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1.
ON EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON AMPARO PETITIONS
Effect of the nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the quantum of evidence required With
the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during
detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the
victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in
their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as
physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where
they were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to
surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.
2.
ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO PETITION
Permutations of the Right to Security A closer look at the right to security of person would yield
various permutations of the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is freedom from
fear. In its whereas clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a
world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want
has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people. Some scholars postulate that
freedom from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international
human right. It is the right to security of person as the word security itself means freedom from
fear. Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
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Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be
searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may
constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of
physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries
constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a
person.
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Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. In
the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty
under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from
threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to
security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect
for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of
person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when
they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances
(or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
Freedom from fear as a right In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is
the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of
mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range
from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one
person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past
experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to
security is actually the freedom from threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation
Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security
mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
Deprivation of liberty is not necessary before the right to security may be invoked While the right to
security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has
ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words,
there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26
December 2007.
