/THE GRUMMAN CORPORATION, THE FIRST TWELVE YEJISvTHE RISE OF A.

NAVAL ^IRCRAFT MANUFACTURER, 1930-1941

by

JAKES ALLEN HEISER

B. S., Kansas

State University, 1984

A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

Manhattan, Kansas

1986

Approved by:

Major Profes^j/

"

AllEDb 7221.77

3-

Table of Contents

Introduction

Part

I.

"Grumman s Formative Tears,

1929-1933 .

Fart II.

'

"King of the Biplane Fighters,

Grumman Aircraft 1934-1938."

Part III.

"The Impact of the European

War and Tensions in the Pacific
on Grumman Aircraft, 1939-1941."

Conclusion

p.

p.

40

p.

71

p.

98

p.

100

Appendix 1.

"Investments and Stocks."

Appendix 2.

"Grumman 's Airplanes."

p. 101

Appendix 3.

"Business Data."

p. 110

Appendix 4.

"Aircraft Prices."

p.

111

Footnotes

p.

112

Bibliography

p. 120

Illustrations

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Table
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A. 1
A. 2
A. 3

1.1
1.2
1.3
l.U
1.5
2.1
2.2
2.3
2. It

2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
2.10
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.I1

3.5
3.6
3.7

1.1
1.2
1.3
l.h
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.U
2.5
3.1
3.2
3.3
3 .U

13
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m
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$0
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66
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Int roduc

ion

The Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation played a vital

role

in

supplying the United States' Navy with aircraft during the

Second World War.

The company supplied three of the most numerous

types purchased by the Navy from 1940-1945 and over one-half of all

carrier aircraft used by the American Navy during World War II.
Table 1.1
Top Four Naval Aircraft
Built During World War II
Vought F4U Corsair*
12,51*1
Grumman F6F Hellcat
12,275
Grumman TBF Avenger**
9.S37
4)Grumman F4F Wildcat***
7,893
In Number

1)

2)
3)

*7,829 built by Chance Vought, 4,017 by Goodyear,

and 735 by Brewster.
**7,522 (TBMs) built by Eastern Aircraft Division of
General Motors, the rest by Grumman.
***5,927 built by Eastern Aircraft Division of General
Motors, the rest by Grumman.
This corporation had been in business for just over a decade prior
to

the United States'

risen from

small

entry into the war, but in that time

"auto garage" plant to

700,000 square feet of work space, and

it

it

had

company housing nearly

had also become one of the

Navy's prime suppliers.

The 1930s were supposed to be a rough period for small com-

panies in the aircraft

industry.

The large holding companies'

control of the industry was being solidified by the Depression, yet

Grumman was able to show continued growth throughout the period.

How did this small corporation break into the industry during a
period of decline?
when

it

seemed as

How was
if

it

able to become

the market was

sewn up?

military supplier

How did the company

hold onto the position as

leading naval aircraft manufacturer and

continue to grow up to the Second world

iVar

and beyond?

ients to Grumman's prosperity were numerous,

that

s t

but

The ingred-

there were a few

ood out

The first component was it's management,

led by President Roy

This

Grumman and Vice-President and General Manager Leon Swirbul.

administration planned carefully and systematically in order to

obtain

production contract and establish the company as

aircraft manufacturer.

viable

Management made many important decisions

which guided the future of Grumman Aircraft, such as what type of

airframes

to

manufacture and what market to enter.

Management also

made some sound financial moves during the decade that aided the ex-

pansion of the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation.

Another feature responsible for Grumman's growth was it's excellent engineering staff which kept the company's airframes on the

leading edge of the developments in naval avaiation throughout the

decade. The young firm was engineer heavy, having a number of young,
yet experienced draftsmen who worked together

This allowed two or more minds

to

engineering staff was not dominated by

the drafting process,

teams.

Roy Grumman assisted

and he was responsible for two patented

features used on several of the company's airframes.

of

or

single individual, but

there were some exceptional men in this group.

in

in pairs

solve difficulties that arose. The

His philosophy

strength and simplicity in aircraft construction was instilled in

the entire staff.

Chief Engineer William Schwendler was another

catalyst to the effectiveness of the designs issued from the corporation. He was not only responsible for

great share of the blue-

prints drawn up, but his supervision of the entire department kept
it

moving forward.

The engineers' designs led to a number of

"firsts" in naval aviation, and helped the company break some

records in the number of planes contracted.

The engineers were

assisted by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA),

which in the 1930s was

government organization researching air-

craft design, primarily for military use.

of

it's airfoils and cowlings.

Grumman would use several

Grumman's engineers,

through their

own and the government's work, were able to utilize the development

resulting from the technological revolution taking place in the aircraft

industry during the 1920s and early 1930s.

Complimentary to the draftsmen was

in

the experimental construction crew.

was it's leader,

ize

the

Julie Holpit.

skilled group of craftsmen

Standing out in this group

He had an uncanny ability to visual-

two-dimens ional blueprints as they would be in 3-D, en-

abling him to spot design errors or problematic areas. The speed and

quality of the entire experimental

alliance with the acompl i shment

of

team's work was a fruitful

the engineers,

being greatly

responsible for the high percentage of Grumman prototypes leading to

production contracts.
Another key ingredient to the good fortune of Grumman Aircraft
was

it's association with the United States Navy.

written agreement, nor was there likely

the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics

to give

There was no

known verbal command,

in

the company preferential

treatment; however the Navy seemed to be quite congenial to helping

the Long Island manufacturer get

established.

One reason for this

was the Navy's desire for another aircraft supplier free from en-

tanglement in conflicting markets. The naval background of Grumman's

personnel was yet another link.

Another compliment to the firm's rise during the decade was the
growth of carrier avaiation.

The company emerged just after the in-

troduction of the Lexington and Saratoga

the first

real

fleet

carriers of the United States Navy (the Langley being considered an

experimental vessel).

By December 1941,

five more fleet carriers

were operational and many times this number were on order. With this

growth came the need for more aircraft built specifically for
carrier operations,

the predominant area

the corporation worked in.

Naval aircraft expenditures dipped downward with the Depression, but

grew at
at

moderate rate from 1934 to 1940. Grumman would also expand

steady gai

There were numerous other ingredients for Grumman'

first decade.

It's geographical position in the

successful

industrial northeast

was valuable for obtaining necessary materials such as aluminum and

for shipping the company's

finished goods

to

the United States

Navy's ports, or exporting them to Europe or South America.

The

location also allowed the firm an abundant source of metal workers

and machine operators laid off in the aircraft industry or other

industries because of the Depression.

ing the best personnel

This aided Grumman in obtain-

it's production lines.

for

creasing costs per pound of airframe also helped

The company's deit

gain contracts.

The lack of preparedness by the Allied Navies in Europe, at least in

the area of aviation,

also contributed to the firm gaining orders

after the war broke out in 1939.

Similarly the United States re-

armament program just prior to it's entrance to the war pushed it's
sales upward.

In comparison

to

the entire industry, Grumman's growth

was not phenomenal except during the first four years.

The rest of

the decade stayed relatively steady to the industry's pace.

It

was during the war that Grumman Aircraft climbed in the

ranks of the aeronautical

industry.

The number of aircraft built

from it's designs was much, much greater.

The reason for it's

success in this period came from it's accomplishments in the 1930s.

Examination in detail of the Grumman story will explain how this was
done

Grumman

Formative Years,

's

1929-1933

Though the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation was

established

in

December 1929,

four years passed before it's first

aircraft production contract was completed.

Nevertheless the cor-

poration's annual earnings increased during this period, so Grumman

defied the odds of
of

the

the early 1930s.

firm surviving in the aircraft industry

small

The company's first

four years coincides with

financial decline from the initial stages to the depth of the

Depression.

Small aircraft manufacturers with low capital

struggled to survive, and

large proportion failed.

was dominated by holding companies.

The United Aircraft & Transport

Corporation and the Cur t i ss-wr igh t Corporation,

ful

aircraft oligopolies, obtained

business, close to 80% of

945b

of

the United States'

reserves

The industry

715b

of

the

two most

power-

the Navy's aircraft

the Army's purchases,

and approximately

commercial sales from 1927 to 1933.

There was a widely held assumption by small manufacturers that the

Manufacturers' Aircraft Association,

world War

pool made up

primarily of big corporation controlled the industry and the

government's procurement decisions thereby sewing up the military

market so new contenders could not compete.
capital and was not part of

Grumman had limited

holding company or the Manufacturers

Aircraft Association, yet when most small companies were just trying to elude bankruptcy,
as a notable

it

was able to advance and establish itself

naval aircraft manufacturer.

What were

the reasons behind the young business'

achievements from 1930 to 1933?

It's

leaders'

financial

decision to produce

fighters and amphibians for the United States Navy was one component, as was the planning on how to earn working capital while

getting established in the naval market.

Complimentary

to

the com-

pany's decisions was the Navy's need for carrier aircraft and it's

desire for another supplier that could devote most of it's attention

the

of

The manufacturer's engineers would be very crucial

needs.

to naval
to

inital

success,

for

their designs would form the foundation

positive reputation for Grumman aircraft soon to be held by

many in the Bureau of Aeronautics down

to

The firm's

naval pilots.

utilization of the latest aeronautical technology provided Grumman

prototypes with respectable performance and figures that enabled the
firm to gain contracts.
The origins of Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation came
1928 when the New York investment

in

a part

of

the Cur

craft Company,

t i

ss-'.vr

firm llayden,

icht Corporation,

Stone and Company,

bought out Loening Air-

Long Island naval and commercial aircraft manu-

facturer. Loening was absorbed by Keystone Aircraft,

Cur

t i

ss-Wr ight

A group of Loening workers

subsidiary of

led by factory manager

LeRoy Grumman and Leon Swirbul however, did not want to join the

Keystone work force in Bristol,

Pennsylvania. They persuaded most of

what they viewed as the elite of Loening's workers to become part of

a

new company being formed by emphasizing the facts

that

the merger

called for relocation and the acceptance of demotions in position.

Grover and

A. P.

Loening,

the brothers who headed Loening Air-

craft, approved of the formation of

new corporation, but the

agreements in the Keystone merger limited them to being investors.

The capital

they provided was

vestments (See Appendix 1).

dividal

in

the

large percentage of the inital

Grover Loening was

in-

respected in-

industry, being an officer in aeronautical organi-

zations and a consultant

to

the government

on aviation affairs

during the 1930s. His association with industry's elite did not hurt

the corporation's chance of gaining contracts,

least once,

for he at

and likely on many more occasions referred potential buyers

GrujEunan

to

the new

The rest of the investors were part of

Aircraft.

management
The background of

leaders of Grumman'

the

the engineering experience of

knowledge of naval aircraft,

build and who to build

it

each individual.

management revealed
It

also showed their

influencing the decision of what

for.

Roy Grumman,

the

largest investor in the new firm, graduated from Cornell

the age of

twenty with

worked for

short

time

the New York Telephone Company.

United States entered World War

Navy and became

Machinists

Columbia University
but while
a

to

iv.ate,

in April

He was

then sent

In a

he kept quiet.

few weeks he realized that

His request

instruction.

to

become
to

study aircraft in-

mistake had been made

for flight

training,

to

but

Pensacola in July 1918 to complete his

Graduating on

September 1918 as

avaiator, Ensign Grumman stayed at Pensacola to serve as

squadron's flight instructor.

applied for the Naval Course

He

to

After learning elementary flying at Miami's Naval Air

Station, he was sent

in.I.T.

to

turned down because of his flat feet, but he was sent

and that he was actually in ground school

flight

then

When the

study engine operations on submarine chasers,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.l.T.)

spection.

1916 at
He

1917, Hoy enlisted in the

2nd Class.

there he applied for avaiation duty.

pilot was

in

degree in mechanical engineering.

for

to

president and second

naval
a

bombing

Once this tour was completed, Roy

in

studied under Edward

aeronautical engineering taught at

P.

Warner,

later head of

Upon completion of this course, Roy rose to Lieutenant,

the C.A.B.

junior grade

and was sent to the Naval Aircraft Factory in Philadelphia as a project engineer and test pilot.

He

served as the production super-

flights, on Navy-built Loening fighter while

visor, and flew the test

the NAF,

at
a

catching the eye of Grover Loening who soon offered him

On 30 September 1920 the twenty-five year old Lieutenant re-

job.

signed from the Navy to serve as General Manager and Test Pilot for

While working here from 1920 to 1929, his major

Loening Aircraft.

contribution came with the Loening amphibian which he helped design

and fly.

rtoy

was

largely responsible for the perfection of it's

landing gear, an area that would be important

to

the beginning of

his company. Grumman felt his background played an important part

his decision to run his own corporation.

war

experience as

Later he stated,

"sAy

in

World

Naval Aviator enabled me to gain knowledge and

experience with aircraft that in 1929,

Engineering Corporation...

'"

formed Grumman Aircraft

Roy Grumman had an abundance of

practical experience designing and flying naval aircraft when he became president of the new firm.
Leon "Jake" Swirbul,

the extroverted Vice-President and General

Manager of the new corporation, had been

civilian aircraft in-

spector for the United States Army Corps before joining Loening in
the mid-1920s.

Although he led an active social

keep him from maintaining

that

the assembly

life,

rigorous work schedule.

line ran smoothly,

versing with employees to learn

if

ficulties in their assigned tasks.

this did not

He saw to

it

roaming the shop floor and con-

they were encountering any dif-

His door was always open, and

workers were encouraged to come and discuss their likes and dislikes, and needs or desires.
feel comfortable

in his

His amiable personality made everyone

presence.

Swirbul's social abilities placed

him in charge of entertaining many of the visitors

(such as military

personnel and federal or foreign government dignitaries).

David Anderson stated that Swirbul's visibility was so high

Historian
it

seem-

ed as

not Grumman was

he,

if

the

real mover and shaker

Although Swirbul was important, Grumann had

pany.

in

10
the com-

greater in-

fluence on the company.

Chief Engineer William T.

Schwendler earned

degree

in

aero-

nautical engineering from New York University in 1924, and already

had practical experience having worked part-time for Chance Vought,

another naval aircraft manufacturer which became

U.A.

& T.

lie

subsidiary of

was hired by Loening as an engineer the same year. He

was a firm believer

in

stout construction of aircraft,

this philosophy on to the rest of

and passed

the design crew at Grumman.

His

doubling of strength in the vital areas of an aircraft became known

the "Schwendler

as

the numerous

factor."

He would be greatly responsible for

piston-engineered fighters which were produced on

Crumman's drafting boards, and the reputation they would gain for
their rugged airframes.

Hounding out the corporation's officers was Edmund Poor,

for-

merly an assistant treasurer at Loening who would head this division

at Grumman.

Poor's assistant was Clint Towl

gineering at Cornell

for

two years before

who had studied en-

learning the brokerage

business in New York. Each invested in the company.

not

invest,

Historian Charles Bright called this group

tion of

fliers from the twenties,

ly been

called inbred."

"closely knit associa-

the management

of Grumman has apt-

The majority of the administration had

real grasp of aeronautical

that studied the

ions.

Joseph Stamm did

but was made company secretary and purchasing agent.

engineering, giving the company

group

initial design critically and stated their opin-

This knowledge also allowed them to relate to the needs of the

engineers and production crews.

During the last months at Loening the new management made the

11

key decision to enter the naval market. This choice proved to be ad-

vantageous, but may have been questioned in 1320.

that year com-

In

mercial airframe production stood at approximately $33 million,

three times higher that military airframe building.

Commercial pro-

duction seemed to be the lucrative market for the future, while

those in the military market could expect
it's

limited funds.

million

in

fierce competition for

Sales to the military had dropped from $16

1923 to just over $10 million in 1929.

pression caused

The Great De-

drastic change in the industry's sales.

sales remained fairly constant

in

first years due

the

to

Military
the

five

year plans in motion, however by 1932 commercial purchases fell

only $2.5 million.
by management,

to

This downturn could not have been anticipated

so why did

the company choose

enter the military

to

market?
Financial considerations played

construct military aircraft.

not have

the capital

to

ihajor

Simply put,

part

ing the company had to pay all

In

the expenses of

capital

to

to

commercial manufacturexper i emen t a t ion

hoping to gain the money back in eventual sales.

it

the decision

absorb the losses of experimental work

necessary in the production of airframes.

were obtained,

in

the young corporation did

If

no contracts

could not make up the loss and still have the

continue the experimentation process on another design.

One or two designs moving through the research stages without gaining a contract could prove

financially devastating.

In

contrast the

military bought experimental models, and while this did not always
totally reimburse the manufacturer for all

substantial remuneration.
could accept the minimal

In

it's

it's costs,

it

provided

formative years, Grumman Aircraft

losses of the design phase in research air-

frames not acquired by the military, or the deficit

incurred in

12

building exper imen tal aircraft purchased by the military; but

could ill afford the total
The naval market

rfas

losses of experimentation.

also chosen because of the past exper-

the management and engineers.

ience of

it

These men had all v/orked

with the naval establishment while at Loening and knew

would be

it

much easier to obtain contracts from the Navy who knew them per-

sonally and also knew the quality of their work.

They also real-

ized the benefits brought by Roy Grumman's acquaintance with those

in

the high circles of naval

Grumman'

avaiation.

Edward

P.

viarner,

Hoy

aeronautical engineering instructor at M.l.T. was the

first Assistant Secretary of

the Navy for Aeronautics.

He held

this position when Grumman's management was making it's decision

(but during most of

dent of U.A.

the

1930s he held the position of Vice- Presi-

His successor,

& T.).

David Ingalls, was

naval pilot contemporary to Roy Grumman.

(j.g.)

in

the Fall

of

1918.

up to the Second World War,

from his days as

as General

pilot,

former

Both had been Lieutenants

The naval aviation community was small

therefore Roy Grumman knew personally

instructor, an engineer at the NAF, and

Manager of Loening, many of these men who rose into the

Bureau of Aeronautics, and was acquainted with others at least by

name and reputation.
to

His experience was a key factor

in

choosing

build for the Navy.

ivianagemen

knew that gaining a production contract would be

competitive with Boeing, Chance Vought, Douglas, Curtiss, and

others already firmly established as naval aircraft manufacturers,
so

they planned

systematic order to obtain

They first hoped to establish

designing
as

float

for

the Navy.

the repair of aircraft,

plane contract.

name and some working capital by

They also took on other work,

to gain

funding for their aircraft

such

13

projects.

The third step was

to

design an airplane for the Navy.

Then they hoped to gain a production contract.

The first step was tackled during the
t-oening when Roy Grumman and Bill

last months with

Schwendler designed

float,

utilizing Hoy's newly patented retractable undercarriage, better

suited to military performance.

The hull would be stronger yet

lighter, and the 'wheels would retract

the hull

far enough

flush with

to be

for more aerodynamic and hydrodynamic cleanliness.

landing mechanism moved in

rather than along

The

slightly deviated parallelogram

protracted arc swinging on

single hinge

that used on the Loening amphibian (See diagram A.l S A. 2).

like

Diagram A.l:

iinming

fr..n

in*

j,ut ( ni.

.-..(

Diagram

A. 2:

GramnuiiTg
Tin-

retrartutjit hunl
-hock alworber trui

li.iN
in,'
hiiiice ..HV.-i. no thiit under eomprexHiun th eccentricity teml i-> kvsp strut
i,rkliii K
I r-tr-rtimr, <,Kbl fir.,
wh Vi .ui.ched to the np t .rr
(ml i tii -.ii.Hh uux.rlier member.
Xui'
Upp+r r.
turn. lawurd, -brewing" [.,,

from

th .heart) or
I

>:-

in Hi" point
iii.l
fold !i
...ueh
or Hi.- Jiftlnt loud Ih'Ihk i-.....,) by
Hie trnalan i. thi> -.I.... -Ic ...... . r.tnd.
'.

Tll A*Mll

oource
Kichard M. Mack, "Retractable
Landing Gears," Aviation,
February 1933, vol. 32, p. 36.
:

lilt*

iru,.-.

.,.

in.

Source
Grumman Utility," Aviat ion
December 1934, vol. 33,
p.

393.

The engineer's blueprints for the float also included

coque design which obtained it's strength throuan

s t

re

mono

sed-sk i

H
rather than

heavy framework.

..ionocoque

construction reduced the

weight of the design without reducing it's strength.

Aluminum

ring-shaped frames connected by lateral aluminum ribs, all covered by a heat or chemically hardened alloy outer covering was

basis of monocoque construction.

in naval

airframe building, and

It
it

the

just making it's entrance

was

played an important part in the

technological revolution that took place in the 1920s and 1930s in

the aircraft

industry. Grumman

'

use of

the company was up to date on

ed that

the monocoque design show-

the

latest

techniques used

aircraft construction while working on it's first project.

in

The

navy Department's Bureau of Aeronautics was skeptical about the

strength of Grumman's monocoque float design, but granted the firm

a

contract for two experimental floats for S33,700.

The float was

named the Model A (See Photo 1.1).

Swirbul

found

small

shop for Grumman Aircraft

in

(Long Island), New York which had previously been home

automotive showroom and garage (See Photo 1.2).

Daldwin
to an

"Clint" Towl was

placed in charge of cleaning and preparing than plant for opening.

Grumman and Schwendler were nearly finished with the

design when the business opened on
Photo 1.1:

MODEL
opment

"A"
of

FLOAT,

the

.'.iodel

January 1930.
Photo 1.2:

first

Grumman

develorgani-

Designed for the U. S.

Navy, because of the lack of
amphibians at that time, and used
on standard scout planes. Weight
zation.

of entire installation, including re-

tracting

mechanism, was 700

Source:

lbs.

Grumman Advertisement, Aero Digest

(1/1/40). p. 50.

vol.

36,

no.

15

The reasons Grumman built

It

required

to keep

float are easily distinguished.

low amount of capital,

yet

it

could bring in enough

the small manufacturer functioning while aircraft designs

were drafted.

was also

It

tion in naval circles,

easily build

good way to earn a favorable reputa-

the engineers believed they could

for

better float than the heavy wood-framed types in

use by the service

To fulfill

the second item on management's plan to gain a

major order, Grumman looked for repair work on Loening amphibians.

It

was hoped such work would keep the shop busy and pay the oper-

ating expenses of the manufacturer.

generating

Ttjis

was not

successful in

large volume of business.

Grumman quickly took it's third step in the management

to

become an established aircraft manufacturer.

1930,

'

plan

On 26 February

Roy and Jake met with Commander Webster, Chief of Designs

the Bureau of Aeronautics,

with the company's proposal for

in

high-

performance two-seat fighter using Roy's patented landing gear.

couple weeks later informal proposals and drawings were sent

to

Commander /vebster. These were informally approved by Webster on 29

March, and were followed by specific designs and data.
the beginning of

the XFF-1,

for experimental,

This was

for fighter,

for Grumman (G had already been taken by Great Lakes).

Informal

discussion would be undertaken on each successive design, but

there is

little record of

the contents of

such meetings.

The XFF-1, as the Navy designated Grumman'

all

it's successors went

can be briefly described.

first plane, and

Typically the Navy's Bureau of Aero-

nautics informed the industry that

competition for

through the procurement process, which

it

was going to hold

certain type of airplane.

design

Those manufacturers

16

interested drafted blueprints, submitting these along with the

projected performance of the design. From these the Bureau's Chief

of

Designs and his staff recommended to the Bureau's Chief which

designs to cnoose.

The number of designs picked to compete for

production varied, depending on the funding available,

much Congress had appropriated,

the quality of

i.e.,

the designs

how

sub-

mitted, and the degree of importance the type of airframe had in

the Navy.

The Navy usually picked at

least

two.

chosen built experimental models to take part in

tion.

The manufacturers
a

flying competi-

After numerous tests conducted under the Navy's control were

completed,

the

results were assessed by the Bureau of Aeronautics

whose Chief decided which plane should go into mass production.

The manufacturer and the Navy Department

then made

negotiated

contract on the number and the price of the airframes.

Secretary of the Navy had the power

decisions made,

for each needed his approval.

the procured aircraft

on a cash-on-de

The XFF-1 did not originate

enter

in

the comparison

to

1 i

The fiavy paid for

very (COD) basis.

this manner,

design or flying competition.

existing aircraft.

The

override any of the

to

for

it

did not

It's merits were based on

This was not

the only case

where the Navy would test only the manufacturer's product, nor was
it

collusive behavior.

It

was an indication however,

that Grumman

was considered a viable manufacturer, and was given the benefit of

the doubt on

it's ability to design promising airframes.

The decision to build carrier fighters and amphibians was

also important to the successful emergence of Grumman Aircraft.

Roy Grumman influenced these choices.

It

was no coincidence that

these were both the types he had worked on at

Factory and with Loening.

the Naval

Aircraft

There were other reasons why management

17

chose to construct carrier fighters.

They realized that carrier

aviation would be growing in the future with the successful operations of

the Lexington and Saratoga

pipeline.
tional

and with more carriers in the

Each carrier operated ninety plus aircraft, with addi-

squadrons training at various Naval Air Stations while the

carrier was at sea. With about

life for naval aircraft during

the

four to five year average service

1930s,

each carrier squadron

would change it's compliment of aircraft two or thre times during

the decade.

Thus a carrier utilizing two air groups during the

year would need aproximately 600 aircraft during a decade.

Grumman officials may also have realized that with carrier

aviation still

in

it's

edge in experience or
The

two companies

infancy,
a

no manufacturer would have a great

lock on certain types of carrier aircraft.

building carrier fighters at this time, Boeing

and Curtiss, were both adapting land planes to use aboard the

floating airstrips.
a

The new company likely felt

it

fighter better suited to naval needs by designing

in mind.

It's management may also have

or another
in

source that Boeing's

larger transport and bombers,

could fill.

with this

it

learned through E.P. Ivarner

long-term development plans were

leaving a vacancy that Grumman

Although these are specual t ions

possibility.

could provide

There is no denying that Grumman

each is
's

reasonable

entry coincides

with Boeing's withdrawal in building this type, but there

certainty of

is

no

connection.

After construction of the experimental Model

completed in the Spring of 1931,

floats were

they were tested by the Navy at

Anacostia. The catapult launch was the severest test of the float,
but

it

passed easily.

The Navy learned that despite

weight, which was less than any float

in

the Model A's

service, even those with-

18

out wheeled landing gear,

any other.

it

was as strong if not stronger than

The Navy received it's

first

lesson that Grumman en-

gineers understood the strain that naval aircraft had to withstand, and built accordingly.
at

unit price of $9,330. iu

The Havy ordered six of

the Model

The Navy Department was

impressed

with the landing gear implemented on the Model A.

It

As

asked Roy

when he visited .vashington, D.C. one week after the float contract
was signed if his undercarriage could be used on the Navy's current

fighter,

the

3oeing K4B-4.

He emphatically stated "No!",

noting the fuselage was much too slender for his gear. Roy did not
want

own

see his patent on any other fighter design but his

to

Loening amphibian repair and the contract for the floats was
not enough

to

keep the shop force busy and was not bringing in

enough working capital, so engineers drafted plans for aluminum

truck bodies

for Ted Lyon of Motor Haulage Trucking.

Twenty-five

truck bodies and a number of chassisless trailers were built

during the Fall of 1331 (After .Vorld War

was

fiberglass boats until

craf

II

when aeronautical work

short supply, Grumman diversified into aluminum canoes and

in

it

recovered it's market in military air-

Grumman added to it's engineering corps during the first

year, allowing a greater amount of design work to be undertaken.

Tom Rae and Charley Miles joined the work force in the last half
of

1930.

Rae was a former associate,

having been employed at

Loening while studying engineering at New York University.

January 1931 Charles Tilgner was hired.

with

In

He had a good background

Master's Degree in civil engineering from Princeton, and

experience with two aircraft manufacturers, one of which was

19

Loening.

These three all worked on the modification of

float,

the

allowing Roy and Bill Schwendler to work on the first plane.

Additional draftsmen allowed the engineering staff to work

in

teams on the projects undertaken. This decreased the mental errors

made,

Grumman and

for others could catch the mistakes early.

Schwendler dominated the staff during this period when engineering was so crucial
t

he

to

the establishment

of

the company as part of

ndus t ry

Grumman

'

engineers worked dilligently to create

fighter

design having high performance, ruggedness, maintainability, and

number of other contradictory factors.

and takeoff requirements were the first necessity to meet.

can carrier tactics mandated
The.Navy used

air

in

one

fourth of

time;

the deck

Ameri-

takeoff run of two hundred feet.

the deck-load strike

the shortest

Aircraft carrier landing

to get

the most

aircrafts in the

therefore the lead airplanes had only

to get

airborne.

..hen

landing, carrier air-

craft needed unobstructed visibility to snag an arresting wire

stretched over the aft end of the flight deck.

Carrier planes had

"beefed-up" landing gear and increased overall structural strength

compared to their land counterparts to absorb the punishment of

controlled stall landings and the jerk of the cable stopping the
craft. The carrier was operating independent of the battle fleet,
since it was vulnerable during an engagement. Operating alone,

the

vessel needed the greatest number of planes possible to protect

itself,

the battle

line,

and still attack the enemy.

The iJavy,

therefore desired small airframes that would take up the least

amount of space on the carrier deck and hangar.

The Mavy regarded

speed as extremely important, and was willing to sacrifice

as a

last

resort.

it

only

Faster planes could outfight ones more manuver-

20

able, being able to choose when to engage

flee.

A high rate of

three days after receiving

In

combat and when to

climb and maneuverability

formance characteristics desired.

the

in

fighter from the Navy on

formal

request for

guaranteed

pipeline in building this aircraft.

ten minutes.

It
a

indicating the
The firm
a

climb rate of 12,000 feet in

was to be powered by the new 575 h.p. Wright

variable-pitch propeller

adjusted from the cockpit).

British naval aircraft.

(a

prop whose bit could be

This was one of

variable-pitch propeller, and

the first uses of a

ten-year jump in front of the

Grumman increased the air flow around

this engine by using the new engine ring

(early cowlings) designed

by the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics

ternal

bid on

fighter with 190 m.p.h. capability at sea level,

landing speed below 66 m.p.h., and

Cyclone and

March 1931, Grumman submitted it's

new fighter bid quotation. This was unusually fast,

company had

other per-

./ere

(NACA).

structure of the wing was also NACA's design.

The

in-

had two

It

aluminum spars supporting the leading and trailing edges of the

wing,

these being connected by ribs which were braced in an elon-

gated "N" fashion.

The fabric covered wings were

plane (the leading edge of

of

the

top wing ahead of

the bottom wing with an unequal

bottom).

The fuselage was to be

ing the patented

sitating

landing gear,

the

staggered bileading edge

span (top wing lower than the

metal monocoque structure hous-

first

for naval

fighters, neces-

deep belly giving the impression the plane was preg-

nant. Another first was the "coupe top",

cockpit. The engineers' use of the latest

or canopy over

the

tandem

technology can easily be

seen in the XFF-1 design. 14

At

the

time of

the design,

there was disagreement

in

the

21

Navy's aeronautical establishment on the use of

This was by no means

two-seat fighters.

discussion for such an argument had

ne.v

occurred since the inception of the fighter.

Some naval officers

supported the two-seater, believing the performance lost by the

additional seat was made up through increased armament with the

rear gun and improved navigation. Others felt better speed, climb,

and maneuverability were most

necessary characteristic was

Despite the dispute,

important, and to compromise by una

mistake.

the Navy's Bureau of

Aeronautics under

Admiral William Moffet's leadership ordered the XFF-1 on

likely due to it's promised speed.

1931,

Julie Holpit, head of Grumman's experimental

the construction of a wooden mock-up.

and fitted together to insure

able
able,

the

April

Designs were sent to

shop, who supervised

Each part was made of wood

blueprints represented

work-

three dimensional airframe. When the design was proven tenthe experimental

framed model.

shop began building the actual aluminum-

The Bureau of Aeronautics asked the company to

design it's own rear-seat gun guidance system and submit

it

to

Commander Webster, for the Navy was experiencing difficulties in

finding a competent design.

Design teams were also working on the modification of the

Model A float which became known as the
the Navy ordered two experimental

cost of $12,960.16

..iodel

B.

During the Spring

"B" floats at an average unit

These were constructed quickly, and then

handed over to the Navy for evaulation. Following these tests,

Navy awarded Grumman

floats at

production contract for fifteen Model

unit price of $5,6255.

Vought 02U-3 Corsairs

ning smoothly.

'

the

These floats were used on the

(See Photo 1.3).

Management's plan was run-

22

Photo 1.3:

Photo 1.4:
plant at Valley Strean

GBUMMAN
'I2J

Source:

Aero Digest

vol.

35,

no.l,

January 1940, pp. 49, 50.

With the float and experimental plane contracts, more space

was needed at

the

factory.

On

November 1931 the corporation

moved into an old Naval Reserve Hangar at the Curtiss Airport in

Valley Stream, Long Island (See Photo 1.4). After settled in, production began on the

...odel

floats and the XFF-1 was completed

(See Photo 1.5).

Photo 1.5:

Source: Aviat ion

On 20 December
that

vol.

36,

the XFF-1 began

service aircraft must endure,

stration. At

this

no.

the

i.e.,

(April

1937).

first phase of

testing

the contractor's demon-

time test pilots could not be an employee of

the

manufacturer, so civilian pilot William McAvoy's services were obtained for this flight. After checking the ground handling charac-

23

teristics of the XFF-1 during taxiing,

soon made

took off, but he

,v;cAvoy

premature landing. An untightened oil cap had come off

and oil covered the windscreen. V.cAvoy soon returned to the air to

complete the flight test.

He appraised the

machine, being stable yet responding well

plane as a fine

controls.

to

reached 195 m.p.h. at sea level, and later naval

speed of 201 m.p.h.

Aviation historian Bill Gunston stated that

this speed was "faster

I

than any aircraft

the Navy or,

in

can discover, any Air Force at that time."

The XFF-1

's

i.lcAvoy

testing showed a

so

far as

speed certainly outclassed the United States

Navy's prime fighter. The Boeing F4B-4 attained

maximum speed of

only 195 m.p.h. at 15,000 feet, and 169 m.p.h. at sea level,

nificantly lower than Grumman's

fuel

new plane. 20

It's

sig-

120 gallon

tank provided a range of 800 miles, comparable to other

fighters.

The United States Navy would continue to procure fight-

ers with this range

not anticipate

Pacific.

the

throughout the decade,

This shows that

to

it

did

fleet defense would continue to be the

naval pursuit's main task, and that

carriers

revealing that

long-range fighter escorts needed in the vast

the Navy expected dueling

engage each other at smaller distances than actually

occurred in World aar II. Time to climb to 10,000 feet was approximately ten minutes,

somewhat below Grumman's guarantee and the

performance of current naval aircraft.

23,600 feet service

ceiling was recorded, also slightly below standards of the day.

Despite these limitations,
was better than most

the overall

performance of the XFF-1

single-seat fighters.

It's deficiencies

started Grumman considering a single-seat pursuit.

The Navy then began it's
(one year for the XFF-1).

testing, a phase that took some time

Aircraft were put through numerous tests

2L,

Anacostia. Pilots reports were written and critical inspections

at

were made,

listing any recommendations for changes or modifica-

tions, after each flight. The data from these reports was evaluated by the officials in the Navy Department before making the

decision whether to purchase production units. '*

Grumman

anxiously waited the verdict.

During the Spring of 1932,
on the modification of

the engineering department worked

the XFF-1

into

scout

(XSF-1) and an

amphibian design joining the fuselage of the Ff-1 with the Model
B

float

(XJF-1).

Grumman and Schwendler headed these tasks,

.foy

enjoyed drafting more than his presidential duties, helping to

give the impression that Swirbul did most of the wheeling and
deal ins
June the Model

By

practically the only production

floats,

order worked on during the year, had long been completed.

left

the

shop force without much work,

soon became busy,

for on

but

This

the experimental

team

June 1932 the Navy exercised their op-

tion for the scout version of

the FF-1.

The SF-1

v/as

to

have an

increased range over the FF-1, but would lose some of it's armament.

The SF-1 was Grumman

'

only experimental order in fiscal

year 1932.

Despite these contracts,

the

financial picture was not good

during the Summer of 1932. With no production orders, Grumman laid

off

it's workers

for two weeks. When they returned the engineering

staff worked on the single-seat

fighter started after the XFF-l's

deficiencies were revealed.

Work was also continued on the amphibian's blueprints.
Neady,

Jack

former engineer at Loening who had moved to Bristol

during the Keystone merger,

joined Gruudr.an.

His

specialty was

25

hydrodynamics, so he had been made chief draftsman of the XJF-1

project.
bian,

August 1932 the Navy ordered an experimental amphi-

In

needing an aircraft for target towing; aerial survey; aerial

photography;

rescue; and various other functions which could take-

off on land,

sea,

or a carrier's deck.

Gruir.man's

design looked

promi sing.

One can see the company's previous designs in the XJF-1.

Grumman engineers used similar features

tion of each successive design.

to

assist

The fuselage,

cockpit were similar to the XFF-1.

in

the produc-

engine ring, and

The wings were

stagger bi-

plane connected with "N" type struts, but this time of equal span.
The

fabric-covered wings internal construction consisted of dual

spars with "N" type braced ribs

(See Diagram A. 3).

and float were mated with external

structure.

Grumman increased the top heaviness of it's engineer-

ing corps when Richard Hutton joined the work force.

in

Loening's

Grumman'

siiop

after graduating from high school,

shop force at Baldwin while

joining

in

New York.

He moved

A. 3:

The .
wrh l,ru...
-n '

He had worked

taking night courses in

drafting and engineering at Pratt Institute

Diagram

The fuselage

skin making them look like one

p *" r

..r.lelur,.
,.-

cuM*

'.
;

<<""

"

Source:

nun*,!
,,f

rh,ia.i.

..hum Hvtrt ,,fi, lately

t'tlon*

-l..il'.. -te.-l .>uU.ir.|d| rlbl , r

1"cln. not ,....,

i,
.

t ,|hou..x tier.

",

'
,

,,,'n,,,^
,|.

"Grumman Utility," Aviat ion

Dec.

1934,

p.

302.

26

up in position when he completed this course.

Historian David

Anderson called Hutton "th brilliant young designer of so many of

Grumman's aircraft..." 22

His major contribution came with the

Hellcat nearly a decade later, however his and Neady's hiring before gaining
to

production contract shows the company's dedication

team design concept.

the

The XSf-1

flew for the first

manufacturer's flight showed

wright Cyclone.

700 n.p.

better than the XFF-1.

livery of

the plane

to

It's

time on 20 August

1932.

The

top speed of 207 m.p.h. with it's

range was 1,100 miles,

The Navy took over the

300 miles

tests with the de-

Anacostia.

While keeping abreast of the Navy's testing of the XSF-1,

the

experimental shop worked on the amphibian and the engineering department completed it's draft of the single-seat fighter. On
vember the bureau of Aeronautics asked for

fignter was smaller than the XFF-1, yet

housed

it

No-

The biplane

XF2F-1.

more powerful

engine (Pratt

performance.

Better aerodynamic efficiency was gained through the

Whitney 625 h.p. XR-1535-44) giving

it

use of MACA's new cowling which surrounded the engine.

first use of

the

two-row radial engine in

increased

This was

fighter, allowing

smaller fuselage design. This was also the first single-seat naval
fighter with an enclosed cockpit.
G r uiiiiiia n

The XF2F-1

incorporated

patented undercarriage, which created another fat-belli-

metal-skin, monocoque fuselage.

ed,
in

'

A fabric-covered NACA airfoil

staggered, unequal span structure extended outward from the

airframe

'

body.

Grumman moved into it's third factory in it's third year of

existence in November 1932.
again on Long Long Island.

The plant was

located in Farmi ngdal e

Originally built for

trucking firm,

27

Photo 1.6:
it

had just previously been

home to American Airplane

and Engine Company.

the plant was a

to

Adjacent
larger

grass airfield.

Good news came quickly

Source
after the move to Farmingdale.
In

the middle of

the Navy Department

plane was 319,000.

for

2 1

Aero Pi Jes

Jan.

51.

twenty-seven FF-ls.

The average price per

This was the beginning of management's last

step to establish a permanent foothold as

er,

1940, p.

December the first production order arrived from

naval aircraft suppli-

for once a production contract was completed,

the Mavy's confidence

in

it

was believed

the new firm would be confirmed.

The contract caused the shop force to expand rapidly from the

previous forty-two workers. Experienced and skilled craftsmen were

obtained since most aircraft corporations were decreasing their

work force due to the financial pinch caused by the Depression.

These men were hired to perform the numerous tasks required to

construct an airframe.

Benchhands prefabricated various parts,

their work being apportioned by

cut,

dispatcher.

Sheet metal workers

formed, and hardened metal by heat or chemical

operated drill presses, grinders,

solution.

lathes, milling machines,

,\ien

saws,

punch presses, and routing machines, while others were assigned as

welders, riveters, bucker uppers, coverers (those working with

fabric), armorers, electricians, etc.
ferent sections such as wings,

Assemblers constructed dif-

fuselage,

fin and rudder,

and sta-

bilizers; and then joined them into one airframe.

Early in 1933 the Bureau of Aeronautics ordered twenty-seven

2S

machine gun mountings to be placed into the FF-1.

The engineers

made the gun and chair swivel together with manpower guiding the
system.

Each gun mount was priced at

of design had come

$150." Grumman's simplicity

through when other turret designs failed.

The

engineers again proved their ability.

While the assembly line began producing the FF-1, Holpit's

experimental team completed the amphibious XJF-1 "Duck".

ducted it's .manufacturing test flight on
Hovgard.

The 700 h.p.

It's overall

as acceptable,

the Navy took charge of

to

Anacos t ia

In

the Spring of

..lay

21

con-

flight characteristics were viewed

testing after delivery

1933 FF-ls began rolling off

the assembly

with deliveries to Fighter Squadron VF-5V of the U.S.S.

beginning on

It

piloted by Paul

Pratt & Whitney provided enough power to

reach 165 m.p.h.

so

L,

line,

Lexington

June. Approximately five were delivered each month

until the order was completed in November.

The performance of

production aircraft had been increased with the use of

Wright Cyclone and

the

755 h.p.

larger propeller. Speed rose to 220 m.p.h. at

7,000 feet, and 10,000 feet could now be reached in seven minutes.
A

ten-gallon increase in fuel capacity extended it's range to S60

miles.

Naval aviation historian Theodore Roscoe thought highly

of

this plane,

in

the

'Ft

Fi

stating;

first half of
'

(as

the

"Perhaps the best carrier plane produced

1930s was the stubby little Grumman

the FF-1 was affectionately called by the pilots)."*'

Although the fighter performed it's tasks admirably

two-seat pursuit used in the interwar period.

through the application of the FF-1

that

'

it

was the

The Navy realized,

successors from Grumman,

single-seat fighters could establish air superiority, desired

in naval

theory on fleet air defense, better than the two-seater.

29

While the FF-1 production was in full swing,

supervised the construction of the latest fighter,

Julie iiolpit
the XF2F-1.

It

recorded it's first flight on IS October 1933 with Jimmy Collins

at

the controls.

and

He

noted that

it

was fast, maneuverabl e

little touchy during takeoffs and landings.

test and the subsequent naval

220 m.p.h., yet

it

rugged,

This initial

tests showed the maximum speed to be

still had a slow landing speed of 66 m.p.h.

It

registered an initial rate of climb of 3000 feet per minute, dropping off to 2,200 feet after losing it's forward momentum.

XF2F-1 ascended to
of

ceiling of 29,000 feet,

climb, maneuverability, and small

speed,

ed perfect

.v'ith

size,

The

it's combination
the XF2F-1

seem-

for carrier duty during this period.

Although production of the FF-1 ended in November,

the

assembly line was not idle for the Navy ordered thirty-four SF-ls
on

It

December.

The corporation originally priced the contract at

just under $800,000,

however

this sum considerably.

$19,000 to $16,000.
the Navy Department

$62,000.

2y

mounts were also ordered. 30

capital,

it

Navy "Fair i'rice Audit" reduced

The cost of each plane was

lowered from

The total price now equalled iob'7,260,

saving

Thirty-four $150 flexible gun

Now that Grumman was gaining working

was not going to be given as free a hand to set

slightly "inflated" prices.

Although

it

appears that the Navy De-

partment gave the company slightly preferential treatment during

it's

first years, allowing it

to

make

profit on experimental

orders when other manufacturers could not,

the
to

this was only to allow

firm to function until an economy of scale could allow profits

be made,

i.e.

until production had grown large enough to make

financial gain possible.

manufacturer to make

The Navy could not afford to allow any

high profit on a contract, for accusations

30
of

profiteering and scandal had led to

Congressional hearing

(Delaney Hearings) which was currently investigating the practices

of

the aircraft

industry.

Sad press would not help the growth of

naval aviation.

During the first few years of Grumman's existence there was

active opposition to the Manufacturers Aircraft Association,

cross-licensing agreement formed in July 1917 under pressure from

the government which desired mass production utilizing all

latest aeronautical developments.

the best arrangement

to meet

the concentration of

the

panies of the patent pool

The government

the needs of

the

saw the pool as

.Vorld War

I.

It

aided in

industry by allowing the selected comto

use all

the

latest developments,

thus

giving them better chances to gain orders than those outside the
Those uninvolved called for it's dissolution after the war,

pool.
but

it

continued to function.

the virtue of

The Hoover administration expressed

laissez-faire capitalism, however

it

did not oppose

voluntary cooperation among businesses and the government.

The

companies connected with the "Air Trust", primarily the subsidiaries of United Aircraft & Transport and the Cur t ss-Wright

Corporation, had grown substantially, and the government supported

big business. Such growth was viewed as economically beneficial
the country.

If

the companies of

to

the Air Trust could provide

better airplanes, then this would reduce foreign imports.

These

companies also utilized lobbyists to aid in obtaining contracts.

The Depression,

combined with accusations of profiteering and

claims that United States military aircraft were

inferior to

foreign airplanes, caused the government to listen more closely to

the opposition of

the Manufacturers Aircraft Association.

1933 to 1935 three Congressional

From

investigations looked at the

31

practices of the aircraft industry.

naval standpoint was

The most

important from the

the House of Representative's Naval

Affairs

subcommittee on Aeronautics hearings concerning naval aircraft

manufacturers.

Congressman John Delaney of New York presided,

hence the investigation has been called the Delaney Hearings.

Senate's inquiry of the munitions industry included

amining the aircraft industry.

North Dakota Senator Gerald

chaired the comittee which

to

Delaney Hearings.

ca.ne

The

section ex?.

Nye

conclusions similar to the

The third hearing concerning aeronautical

practices was held by the House Committee on Patents, which in-

vestigated the .Manufacturers Aircraft Association.

Among the most vocal of the independent aircraft enterpreneurs to oppose the Air Trust was James Martin, president of the

Martin Aircraft Factory (not

to

be confused with Glenn .Martin,

whose company was part of the MAA).

impossible for an

^independent]

into operation...

for

the MAAJ

arranged for their benefit..." J

royalty.

He

the pool

"made

managed that it's adoption

it

is

Martin claimed eight to twenty-

two patents on all modern aircraft,

of

He believed

invent er ... to get his device

yet he never received any form

maintained his aircraft designs were greatly

superior to others, yet he was unable to gain contracts because of

the Air Trust.

Navy, but

held

He designed a

Jerome Hunsaker,

for the

commanding position in the Navy service and had prevented

tests in our

\U

/NACA'

claimed to be able to build

(without

laboratories of my design."

sj

received the contract with

mi les

fighter capable of 212 m.p.h.

Curtiss Company "air-trust agent"

plane 60 m.p.h.

a
a

bomber with

it's bomb load),

Curtiss

slower. 32 Martin also

range of nine thousand

compared to the one thousand mile

range of contemporary United States Army Air Corps bombers.

Such

32

preposterous figure illuminates one reason why Martin could not

obtain orders.

Martin blamed the Air Trust, claiming General

Pratt, Chief of

the procurement

ton,

section of the Air Corps in Day-

Ohio told him, "You cannot get

contract.

The Air Corps'

policy is to keep all the business in the Curtlss-Wright Company,

and their associates,
terests, and
any cont rac

it
s

the Manufacturers Aircraft Association in-

would be futile and a waste of time to try to get

"33

.Martin regarded the National Advisory Committee

for Aero-

nautics as a "tool of the Air Trust," with men such as Dr. Ames of
John Hopkins
in both

(chairman of NACA), E.P. Warner, and others involved

organizations.

lie

Knabenshue, an expert on

called NACA

"bribe committee." Roy

igh t er-t han-ai

aircraft, agreed with

Martin believing NACA was an instrument utilized by the large aircraft manufacturers to get ahold of new concepts and innovations

made by independent inventors.

He believed NACA's cowling was a

copy of his invention devised to be used in front of blimps for

reducing wind resistance.

Former Brigadier General Billy Mitchell of the United States
Army Air Corps also considered the Air Trust as
lieved

it

menace.

He be-

lessened the competitive atmosphere of the industry, re-

sulting ultimately in the degrading of America's military capabilities.

He

felt aircraft would play a major role

in

future war;

however with the practices of the MAA the United States was not

getting the best possible aircraft.

LeRoy Grumman's testimony during the Delaney Hearings presented an alternative view toward the relationship of the Manu-

facturers Aircraft Association and the inability of non-members to

gain contracts or patents.

Prior to the congressional

inquiry, Roy

33

stated he did not even know the Air Trust existed, which seems incredible. Taken on face value, his ignorance stemmed from the high

degree of engineering work he undertook and the lack of publicity

of

Grumman noted that even though his company was not

the S1AA.

part of

large holding company,

from the government.

as

the

It

it

retractable landing gear. 35

son for his company's success

Navy and NACA.

was able to obtain business

also had no problem gaining patents,

in

sucn

Roy did not attribute any rea-

receiving good treatment from the

Again his acquaintance with E.P. Warner aided the

company's relations with both governmental divisions, since ..arner

was involved in both areas.

The small size of

the naval

air ser-

vice community assured the Bureau of Aeronautics was conscious of

the ability of Grumman's personnel,

president

and was no stranger to it's

The growth of carrier aviation was also responsible for the

Navy's conduct,
area was needed.
1933,

for a manufacturer that worked primarily in this

The carrier Ranger was nearing completion in

and would be commissioned the following year.

Summer OF 1533 The National

During the

Industrial Recovery Act authorized the

construction of two more carriers which became the Yorktown and

Enterprise

CV Nos.

and 6).

Another reason for Grumman's success with the Navy was it's

willingness to work within the Navy's guidelines.

took the

It

Navy's stance om many of the issues of

the procurement

did not make waves when it disagreed.

One of the concerns raised,

process and

primarily by those who could not break into the military market,
was competitive bidding.

Billy Mitchelll opposed negotiated con-

tracts in military aircraft procurement, which were the rule

rather than the exception.

he believed aeronautical

equipment

34

should be bought after three competitions

price

rather

two. .Mitchell
of

than the current

in

design,

flying, and

system which used only the first

also suggested the government consider building more

it's own aircraft

manufacturers.

since it could do so cheaper than private

To prove his point,

he

pointed out the Naval Air-

craft Factory in Philadelphia had constructed airframes for 15-20%

less

than builders

in

the private sector.

Rear Admiral Ernest

J.

King, Chief of

the Bureau of Aeronautics

William

after his death in the crash of the rigid airship

..:offet

Akron in 1933) disputed this view,

ment more to build aircraft at
the XT2N-1

as an example.

(replacement for Admiral

believing

the Naval

it

cost

the

This single-engine experimental trainer

cost $71,030 (comparable to Grumman's combat aircraft),

price did not

govern-

Aircraft Factory, giving

but

this

include price depreciation, maintenance, engineering

and office salaries which the private sector prorated into it's
cost. 36

Unlike General Mitchell, Koy opposed competitive bidding for

production contracts on
Navy's position,

design already accepted.

believing

it

lie

adopted the

wasted too much time and further de-

layed the drawn out procurement process.

The lengthening of pro-

curement would provide airframes that were more obsolescent upon

delivery.
less

Grumman believed

time, and would provide

construction.

negotiated contract could be made in

the military service with superior

feelings were exemplified in his reply to Con-

His

gressman W.D. McFarlane of Texas who asked

could do as good

with our airplane....!

is

if

another manufacturer

Roy stated,

"Not

think the person who develops the airplane

best qualified to build it."

believing that

if

job building a Grumman design.

He expanded on

this

thought,

design was manufactured by another company,

35

they might try to cut costs and cheapen the quality of the plane.

They might also find problems in the design, yet still build them
into the aircraft

since they were not

responsible for the original

blueprint. Grumman believed pride was a strong motivator for manufacturers, and should not be taken away by allowing another firm

build it's airframes.

to

could have been harmful

signs but had yet

Grumman also realized that such

to

to gain

Aircraft Manufacturers were interested

tracts, of which there were two types,

that

type was cost plus a percentage of profit,

tractor's costs were paid along with

costs.

policy

his company wnich had a number of de-

many production contracts.

in

cost-plus con-

insured profits.
in

One

which the con-

percentage of the total

The government was especially leery of

this

type,

was to the advantage of the manufacturer to drive up costs

way in order to make a greater profit.

for

it

in any

These efforts to drive up

costs would likely take the form of delays, which would create

more obselete aircraft reaching the services. The second type was
a

cost-plus-fee contract.

The government paid the costs plus

pre-de t ermined bonus negotiated between

service.

t lie

manufacturer and the

Although Grumman supported the idea of cost-plus con-

tracts, he was not strongly opposed to fixed-fee ordering.

The

Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics favored fixed-fee contracts and was

opposed to any change.

.for

It

could not afford an increase in costs

appropriations were declining.

ing by it's suppliers,

With accusations of profiteer-

the Navy could

ill

afford more negative

publicity for it's aircraft procuring process. To initiate the use

of

cost-plus contracts would be throwing fuel on

trollable fire.
issued throughout

nearly uncon-

Negotiated fixed price contracts continued to be

the

1930s. 33

36

The growth Grumman Aircraft experienced in it's first four

years was remarkable.

to

Personnel expanded from twenty-three in 1930

two hundred and seven in 1933.39

steady annual progress, with

Financial ly, Grumman made

good leap upward in 1933 when

completed the FF-1 production order.

$109,000 in 1930 to $684,100 in 1933.

Annual gross income rose

from $109,000 in 1930 to $6S3,000 in 1933. i0

During the same four

year period naval aircraft expenditures were cut

craft

it

Annual sales grew from

in half

and air-

industry production fell from $48,530,715 in 1931 to

$33,347,122 in 1933.
financial picture;
Table 1.2

Grumman

Sales

(See Table 1.2 and Table

1.3 for

total

see also Appendix 3).

'

Annual
Gross
Income

Finances
Annual
Met

Profits

Aircraft
Industry
Production

Grumman
% of

1930

$109,000

$109,000

5,476

1931

$256,971

$146,000

4,456

$48,539,715

0.334

1932

$250,333

$276,000

44,371

$34,861,158

0. Sri

1933

$862,000

$647,000

$133,676

$33,357,122

2.6%

Table 1.3

Grumman's Sales to Navy Expenditures

Sales

%
U.S.

Naval
Aircraft

Navy

Expenditures

Grumman

1930

$109,000

31%

$14,245,000

1931

$256,971

80%

$12,199,000

1.0%

1932

$250,333

89%

8,715,000

2.3%

1933

$862,600

100%

7,203,000

0.2SS

12.0%

'

in-

dustry product i on

37

Sources used to compile Table 1.2 and 1.3:

Delanev Hearings pp. 466, 632-633.
Threulsen, The Grunman Story
E. E. Feudenthal, "The Aviation Business in the 1930s,"
p. &$.
"Naval Aircraft Expenditures 1920-1939," Concession
p. 105.
Record pp. 727-723.
,

'

The company's ability to expand while funding for naval air-

craft dropped and industrial production decreases made it's

initial

success more spectular.

The two tables reveal Grumman

liance on the United States Navy.

'8

financial growth and it's re-

Only 5153,492 of the firm's

sales were in the commercial market,

on which a 4% profit was

Compared to the $17 million made in commercial sales by the

made.

nine .major naval aircraft manufacturers between 1927 and 1933, or

just

Boeing's $7 million, Grumman's figure was miniscule.^

This in-

come came from truck production and Loenins repair, not from

actual airframe production.

Table 1.4

United States Navy

Production Contracts
Experimental Contracts
Sales
Cost
+/Sales
+/Cos
Grumman Aircraft
Engineering Corp. S234.43S
S210,lo4 +11^ S217.757
$154 763 +40',;
t

Source:

Delaney Hearings

Navy Table, p. 502.

Every aircraft sold by Grumman during the first four years

went

to

the Navy.

The corporation's sales were 1.2% of

aircraft expenditures.

A 11% profit was made

the Navy's

on it's production

contracts, and profits made in the experimental

area totalled 40%.
This was another

indication that the Navy was willing to subsi-

dize Grumman while it attempted to get established,

for naval

air-

38

craft manufacturer were averaging a 34% loss

tracts.

Reflecting the fact that

erations,

2,8% of

perimental,
in

t.'o

this area.

Gru.T.rr.an

it's naval contracts

in

was

experimental conjust

beginning op-

(in monetary value)

were ex-

other company came close to having so much at stake

Consolidated was second

average was 4.9%.

in

line at 15%. and the

There was past evidence that

willing to assist fledgling companies,

for

the military was

Pratt & Whitney, an

engine manufacturer, also made high profits in the first few years

after

it

began operation in 1926.

Grumman needed profits on it's

experimental contracts during these early years to survive, yet

the Navy may not

have expected the manufacturer to make the per-

centage

It

or

it

did.

must be noted that there were no major delays

problems in the building and flight

first

four experimental aircraft.

testing of

the

floats or

The Navy may have included

little extra in case setbacks had been encountered,

but

the en-

gineering and construction efforts proved up to the tasks at hand.

When

lloy

Grumman was asked about the positive profits on experi-

mental contracts, he replied, "1 think our company is

more efficient on experimental work due to our small

little

size."^

while that may have been part of the explanation, preferential

treatment by the Navy also played a part.

One may wonder why the Navy was willing partially to sub-

sidize Grumman Aircraft? Evidence points towards the Navy's desire

to

be

supplied by manufacturers who gave them first priority.

two biggest

producers of naval airplanes at this time were the

Glenn Martin and Chance Vought Corporation, with S9,S95,605 and

$6, 469,134

in naval

sales between 1927 and 1933,

respectively.

Neither of these two conducted any business with the Army Air
Corps during this period, and only Chance Vought made any com-

The

33

mercial sales (25%).

was likely no coincidence that Grumman

It

picked as it's major product

type

that would not have

compete

to

initially with aircraft from these companies. The void left by the
merger of Loening with Keystone, and the increasing need for
carrier aircraft also added to the Navy's desire for
er

needed by carriers,

i.e.

manufactur-

fighters and amphibians.

Grumman Aircraft was by no means

the end of

similar types that Loening had built and the types

that built

it's four years,

but

it

in

commanding position at

had made some good strides.

pansion had come despite the odds that were faced.

surmounted by planning, sound decision making,

Ex-

These had been

the use of

the most

modern engineering concepts without forgetting maritime requirements, and

product complimentary to the needs of

the Navy.

Grumman now looked to the future, with Rear Admiral Ernest

J.

King, Chief of

>iar

the 3ureau of Aeronautics

specifically including

it

on a

list of

(CNO during world

three naval airframe

manuf ac turers that he expected to be working with the Navy in

coming years. AS

11)

King of

the Biplane Fighters,

Part

Grumman Aircraft 1934-3b'

II

Now that Grumman Aircraft had established itself as a capable

naval aircraft manufacturer,
It's desires came true,

qaudrupled, with

hoped to witness corporate growth.

it

for from 1934

1336 it's gross

to

steady rise each year.

income

The reasons for it's

financial prosperity during these five years were sin.ilar to that

seen in the first

four years.

The engineer's work from the forma-

tive period continued to pay dividends,

as did some of

their

drafting between 1934 to 193S; however there were some disappointments in the engineering department as well.

central concern,

so new designs

came out at

Production became
a

slower pace than in

the period before or

following Grumman's reign as the naval bi-

plane fighter King.

The price per pound of Grumman aircraft de-

creased during this period. The growth of carrier aviation and the
Navy's slowness to adopt monoplanes also continued to assist

company's rise.

the

Orders placed for Grumman aircraft by purchasers

other than the Navy also improved the company's financial standi

no

At

the beginning of

1934 construction continued on the

thirty-four SF-ls and the design of the XF3F. The management stayed well

informed on the progress of the Navy's testing of the

XJF-1 and the XF2F-1

future.

hoping to obtain production orders in the

Besides the time spent at the Navy Department and the

testing area at Anacostia,

Soy had to spend some extra time in

Washington during February 1934.

He

testified at the hearine be-

41

fore the House of Representatives'

subcommittee on aeronautics,

which were investigating the practice of aircraft manufacturers,

otherwise known as the Delaney Hearings (See Part
while Hoy was involved with the inquiry,

twenty-seven JF-1 "Ducks",

craft.

I).

the Navy ordered

first order for these utility air-

the

Powered by a 700 h.p. Pratt S Whitney,

it

had

capacity of

four with two in the tandem cockpit and accomodations for tjo more
in

the hull,

and an "unusually extensive coiiiplemen

photographic equipment.'''

radio and

of

latter was complementary to the

The

roles of air search and rescue,

reconnaissance, gunnery spotting,

and patrolling to be performed by the amphibian.

The JF-l's

average price was $21,000.*

The design work from it's first
off.

V/hile

the XF2F-1 was

four years continued to pay

being put together tests at Anacostia,

Grumman extrolled the virtues of the aircraft to persuade the Navy

Department into awarding his company another production order.

ile

noted the small size, performance, and handling capabilities were

ideal

for carrier operations.

The retractable undercarriage, which

included the tailwheel assembly and arresting hook, was

improved

over earlier models.

On 17 March 1934 the diligence paid off,

order came for fifty-four F2F-ls,

for a production

largest single order for

the

aircraft by the Navy up to this time. Evidently the Navy was aware
of

the virtues of Grumman's airplane.

just under $1 million for airframes,

formation.

The total contract came to

parts, and drawing and in-

Grumman now had three assembly lines

dale factory throughout most of 1934.

the forefront

of

at

the Farming-

Production efforts moved to

Grumman's activities.

Legislation in 1934 had an impact on naval aircraft

42

suppliers.

The aircraft

1S33 due

the

to

and the end of

industry had reached it's low point in

slow commercial
the military's

looked into the problem,

sales caused by the Depression

five year plans.

The Baker Board

resulting in new five year aircraft pro-

curement plans for the services beginning in 1335.

tion came in the form of
.arch

1934.

It

the Vinson-Tramme

legisla-

i.,ore

Act which passed

1 1

in

increased the authorization for aircraft to be pur-

chased by the Navy, more than doubling the previous one thousand
plane navy.

This expansion was to be completed by 1940. These

planes *ere necessary to fill

the decks of

limited contractors to 10% profit of

to

also

It

it's airframes and engines.

The politics behind the Vinson-Tramme

One purpose was

carriers

the aircraft

authorized by the Act, and those already being built.

Act were

threefold.

warn the Japanese the United States did not

approve of it's terrorism in ...anchuria or it's announcement

longer adherred to the 5:5:3 tonnage requirements of
ton and London Naval Treaties

quired by treaty).

Another reason for the legislation was

the economic situation of

the

shipbuilding industry.

to

the United States by providing jobs

A

no

it

the Washing-

(one year advance notification re-

third purpose was

fiteering, or the fear of profiteering,

to

aid
in

eliminate pro-

recently discussed in the

Nye and Delaney inquiries.

On 30

.viarch

1934 Grumman began deliveries of the SF-1

United States Navy.

to

the

Scouting Squadron VS-3B of the Lexington re-

ceived the aircraft, putting the FF-ls and SF-ls aboard the same
carrier.

Grumman airplanes now formed more than half of the

vessel's air group.

Aviation historian Bill Gunston stated, "The

serviceability and toughness of these aircraft earned the company

a

reputation

it

has

jealously guarded.

"->

At

the

end of

fiscal

43

year 1934 (year ending 30 June 1934), Secretary of

the

Claude

.'Javy

Swanson stated that the "past year had witnessed placing in service carrier planes of marked increase in performance." 31
in

part describing the introduction of

front

the FF-1 and SF-1

He was

active

to

line service.

While both of these aircraft performed admirably,

last of a breed.
the Wavy until

very last

The FF-1 was the last

two-seat

each was the

fighter used by

night-fighters showed up in World war II, and the

to have

an aft machine gun (the large twin-engined F-61

Widow night-fighter may be an exception since

lilack

turret,

however

it

it

had

top

was usually locked in the forward position to

complement it's other guns). The single-seat fighters from Grumman

that succeeded it proved

to

the Navy that

gaining command of the air over tne fleet.

scout-fighters;

they were superior in

The SF-1 was the

last

of

the

of

attack and the need for increased range in scouts was needed to

for as

the carrier

turned more to the role

offset the dramatic increase in range of shore-basea patrol

planes,

scouting duties were performed by bombers.

Douglas'

Dauntless' dive bombers were performing this role when the war
broke out in the Facific in 1941.
In

October 1934 the Navy accepted the design proposals of the

XF3F-1 which had recently been submitted to Commander Royce,

the

new chief of Designs in the Bureau of Aeronautics for a price of

75,840 (nearly S20.000 cheaper than XF2F-1).

Grumman'

XF3F-1

fighter prototype was it's third pursuit, and fourth consecutive

design purchased by the Navy.

over the F2F to improve

cestor.

ing product during the

It's dimensions had been increased

it's maneuverability compared to

(See Appendix 2).

it's an-

The F3F was the company's biggest sell-

1930s.

It

was also the last biplane used by

44

the Navy.

The JF-1 production line was augmented by an order from the Coast

Guard for fifteen utility amphibians in July 1934.

ment was added along with the 700 h.p.
the Coast Guard's Ducks were designated

one of
a

Seversky's (who flew

of

lie

v/as

Stone establisned

F.

broke \iajor Alexander de

Seversky amphibian)

Stone's new mark

176.76 m.p.h.

therefore

On 21 December 1934

JF-2.

these JF-2s piloted by Commander E.

new world record for amphibians.

Special equip-

Cyclone;

'..'right

October 1933 record

191. C m.p.h.

The beginning of 1935 saw the start of deliveries of

F2F-ls to the

i-iavy.

feet and 205 m.p.h.

of

sea level.

at

It

had an initial

3,000 ft./min., and could reach 10,000 feet

At

range of 750 miles,

but at one-quarter throttle

210 m.p.h.

rate of climb

four minutes and

in

forty-two seconds.

out 900 miles.

the

Production models reached 231 m.p.h. at 7,500

cruising speed,

the F2F had a

it

could squeeze

The cockpit enclosure was enlarged and modified on

the production order

for more pilot comfort.

been re-designed to provide

around the two-row Pratt

&

The NACA cowling had

increased aerodynamic efficiency

Whitney engine.

Matt and Robertson,

historians of naval fighters, stated that the F2F was "easily

serviced," and it's rugged construction allowed "violent

maneuvers" without causing "strain on the aircraft.

The Navy was

concerned with the F2F's tendency to spin and it's directional

instability, good qualities for quick maneuvering, but poor for
landing and long flights over water where vertigo was
F2Fs were delivered to the U.S.S.

missioned U.S.S. Ranker

Ranger

'

problem.

Lexington and the newly coms

F2F squadrons

later were

used by the carriers Wasp and Yorlctown until replaced by F3Fs in

1939.

VF-7 aboard the Lexington would operate F2Fs until June

giving these aircraft

1940,

one naif years,

front

line service

life of

which was above average for the 1930s. ^*

From the perspecitve of today's aerospace industry

years would he an extremely short life.
has served for over

compromises

five and

twenty years as

1/2

McDonnell's F-i Phantom

gh t er-bomber

yet

it

still

large percentage of modern air forces and can com-

pete with newer aircraft.

Grumman's own F-14 Tomcat has been

carrier fighter for more than a decade, yet

it

elite interceptor on into the iy90s.

1950s service

In

the

will be the Navy's

lives of

airframes were much shorter, with naval fighters averaging four

years

The reasons for the changing life-spans of

in

the

jet

age have been the

the

1930s

to

tnat

increasing investment in design and

testing aircraft and the change in the emphasis on performance.

The cost of designing and testing combat aircraft
be

today can only

undertaken by large corporations with huge reserves of capital

for

the

length of the design phase has increased,

portantly

tiie

but more

im-

amount of technical equipment such as radars, com-

puters, and complex missile systems has caused the rise in costs.

Such systems have been the major technological advancement in the

two decades, whereas

last

in

the

1930s technical development pro-

vided improved strength and better performance. Airframe construction was changing from wood frames and canvas coverings

um frames and skins.

to

alumin-

The Boeing F4E initially had wooden wings,

whereas Grumman always used aluminum construction.

iioy

Grumman

noted in 193d that 90% of the weight of his aircraft was aluminum.

Speed and climb spiraled upward at

improved metallurgy,
the

tremendous rate with

better understanding of aerodynamics, and

increasing horsepower of engines.

46

Gruinman received more orders

amphibians on 12 February 1935.

from the N'avy for the utility

Eleven JF-ls plus parts were pur-

chased for an average of 520, S44. 30

The amphibian's price had not

been increased.
By

the XF3F-1 was

.V.arch

ready for initial

testing.

The plane

improved the compact cockpit, directional unsteadiness and the

proneness to enter an unwanted spin that it's predecessor (the

F2F) suffered.
of

it's own.

It

was soon discovered that

Tragedy struck on 22

;.iarch

the XF3F-1

had troubles

when Jimmy Collins was

killed in the crash of the experimental plane while conducting the

terminal velocity dive test

altitude,
out of
of

(diving straight down from

high

reaching the highest speed possible, and then pulling

the dive).

the N'avy",

airframes.

As

shown in .varner Lirothers'

this test *as one of

the

1930 movie "ivings

severest of experimental

The XF3F-1 was supposed to encounter nine

(the force of gravity)

it's pullout,

in

"C-s"

however the recorder re-

covered from the wreck showed the stress was actually fourteen
Gs.
a

The plane had encountered the problem of high compression,

menace just beginning to be understood by leading aerodynamic

theore t icians
The 3ureau of Aeronautics purchased a second experimental

model with reinforced fittings and engine mount.

It

successfully

completed tests at Farmingdale, and was delivered to Anacostia in

May.

A second setback was suffered

in

the XF3F-l's

trials when

naval pilot Lee Gelbach was forced to bail out after losing control

of

the prototype

Bill Schwendler

in a

tunnel at Langley Field.

solved by adding

spin.

took a model of

small

After the crash Chief Engineer

the design to NACA's new spin

After numerous tests,

the problem was

fin below the fin and rudder.

NACA's spin

tunnel saved Grumman from losing a contract

for the Dureau of

Aeronautics were still interested in procuring production F3Fs.

Julie liolpit's crew refitted the Celbach wreck in less

month,

than one

turning it over to the Navy on 20 June so testing could

cont inue '

.

late

In

,.iay

or early June

GruiruT.an

entered

flight competi-

tion with Chance Vought after these two were awarded contracts for

their experimental scout-bombers.

Grumman'

plane was an improved

version of the SF-1, with better aerodynamics and

iiolpit

bigger engine,

and his fellow workers began working on the new bomber,

designated XSBF-1, and would have

eight months.

For the first

it

ready for flight tests in

time Grumman had moved away from the

fighter or amphibian area, but the end result was not encouraging.

Grumman received more orders from the Navy in June.

On the

2yth the Bureau of Aeronautics ordered twenty-nine JF-2 amphibians.

a

These amphibians were basically the JF-1 except they housed

more powerful 330 h.p.

Pratt Whitney,

thus causing a slight

change in designation. These Ducks averaged $23,337, only

increase due to the modifications made.
that

the Navy was pleased with

it's continual purchases.

In

It

the capabilities of
the

last

modest

was simple to see

two years

it

the Ducks by

had procured

sixty-seven utilities from Grumman (not including the fifteen ordered by the Coast Guard).
on hand prior

to

This was 62.75; more than the Navy had

the Vi nson-Tramme

Act. 01

At

the end of

fiscal

year 1935 the Navy's arsenal consisted of nine hundred and

seventy-four service aircraft with four hundred and seventy-two on

order.

Grumman placed one hundred and eighty-two airframes on

these lists,

equalling 12.6% of all naval aircraft on hand or on

48

order.

Grumman's J2F-1 Utility

Jane's All The v.orlc's Aircraft
193c,

Source:

p.

August 1935 started out on a bleak note when

270c.

hail

storm

obliterated the glass skylights of the Farmingdale factory, but

the despairing problems

August

soon gave way to encouraging news.

the Navy ordered fifty-four F3F-ls.

The F3F-1 won

competition against an airframe from Curtiss Aeroplane

Liuffalo,

Mew York.

On 24
a

flight

Motor of

Curtiss' bid was the lowest at $1,067,344, but

Grumman's SI, 082, 965 bid gained the order with Secretary of the
Navy Claude Svanson using his power to award contracts to the lowest

respons

bl

bidder.

Curtiss dealt with the Air Corps more

than the Navy, having obtained nearly twice

from the Army from 1927 to 1933.

land planes,

so did not

Navy realized that

purchases.

put naval

the amount

in

sales

It's planes were adaptations of

need first.

In

case of war,

the Army's orders would be placed ahead of

the

it's

Another consideration was the Navy's experience with

the 13F2C fighters

recently built by Curtiss for carrier duty.

These fighters only lasted

few months before having to be

taken

49

out of service after suffering numerous accidents caused by faulty

retractable landing gear.

facturer.

This made Grumman a more reliable manu-

It's prototype also proved to have a better maximum

speed and other performance characteristics.

During 1935 the design team led by Chief Engineer Schwendler

had been working on yet another new biplane fighter,

the XF4F-1.

Cn 15 November Rear Admiral King, Chief of the Bureau of Aero-

nautics, approved the recommendation for

a

carrier fighter.

design competition for

The contest pitted designs

Seversky and Grumman against each other.

Sill, 300 for their biplane,

saw

it

for

the manufacturer's

but

it

from Brewster de

Grumman was

to

receive

was scrapped after the company

could not compete with Brewster's monoplane.

January 1936 saw the experimental scout-bomber (XSBF-1) ready

flight

taken to Anacostia for naval

lost

in a

After passing these,

test.

testing.

time Grumman Aircraft was unable

gain

to

competition with the Vindicator,

Vought of East Hartsford, Connecticut.

lower than Chance Vought's,

it

was

The XSliF-1 marked the first

production order.
a

It

product of Chance

Grumman"

bid was actually

being priced at $1,473,722 while

Vought's contract read 51,346,308.

The Navy opted for the ex-

pensive contract for a variety of reasons. Vought had more experience building scouts and bombers
a

than Grumman, which was viewed as

supplier of fighters and utilities, giving Vought an upper hand.

This company was one of the Navy's prime aircraft suppliers so

was obligated to keep them busy if
look elsewhere for business.

around to keep

it

it

did not want the firm to

The Navy liked to spread it's sales

number of suppliers in business, and Grumman had

plenty of orders in 1935 to keep them busy.

The Vought design may

have had better performance for which the Navy was willing to pay

50

extra, although Grumman

i t

es

believed their product at least equal-

led their competitions.

Photo 2.2
The XSBF-1
Source: "A Decade of
Grumman Progress,"
Aero Diges t
Jan. 1940
:

Photo 2.3
Source:
Jane's All
:

the orld's Aircraft

193d,

p.

Grumman's production forces were instrumental

270c.

in

placing new

aircraft with the naval air fleet and as yet every contract had
been completed in less than one year. Grumman delivered it's first

production JF-2 to the Mavy in April and by the end of Fiscal Year
1936 eleven were operated under naval control.

Forty-nine F3F-ls

were placed in the Navy's control by 30 June, with the order of

fifty-four completed in August.

The Navy used the fighters

aboard the carriers Hanger and Saratoga

While the shop force labored on these airframes,

the en-

gineers worked on a couple new designs in the corporation's two

areas of specialization, amphibians and fighters.
was the G-21 Goose.

It

was

the

The amphibian

largest aircraft built by Grumman

51

during the 1930s, and the company's first commercial product.

entered the commercial market now that

a3e.1-.ent

:/,an-

the company had

capital to pay for it's design and indicators showed expansion in

the area.

The G-21 was the corporation's

using NACA's 23012 airfoil design.

.vhitney Jasp Juniors were placed

wing.

A top speed of

first monoplane to fly,

pair of 400 h.p.

in nacelles

Pratt

S.

leading into the high

200 m.p.h. and a range of 300 miles was ex-

pected from the commercial amphibian.

passengers plus the crew.

It

was designed for eight

The Goose was a flying-boat,

since

it's

floating capability came from it's own semi-monocoque hull and not
an attached float.

The patented Grumman undercarriage retracted

from the hull, providing the Goose with it's amphibious capability.

Ralston Stalb, chief engineer for the G-21 project, had just

recently joined Grumman, but he was no stranger to the company's

management.

He had been a chief

engineer at Loening before it's

merger with Keystone, and therefore associated with Roy and his
cohorts.

Stalb was

naval architect by training,

i'nis

influence

can be seen in the stout construction of the Goose, and it also

paralleled the corporation's philosophy on construction (See

Photos 2.4,2.5, 2.6 on following page). Roy likely had some input
as well,

despite the fact that his presidential duties were keep-

ing him from spending much time as an engineer.

His knowledge of

amphibians and desire to make the first commercial venture

successful one would have overridden some of his unimportant

tasks, or allowing Jake to handle more of

the administrative

dut ies

The decision to start

the project

came after a group of

wealthy New York businessmen led by William Lloyd-Smith having

been referred to Grumman by Grover Loening, discussed with the

52

Photo 2.4:

The

Source:

Grumman

G-21 Commercial Amphibian (two 450 h.p. PratI

Jane's All

the world's Aircraft

&

Whitney "Wasp-Junior" engines).

1938,

271c.

p.

Photo 2.5:
Center Section of the G-21's Wine
The

Navy

parent

ass* aasrasis*:

"Grumman's

1937)

p.

An.phi bian

Aviat ion

"

travel

in

the city so

vol.

'

36,

no.

(July

represented and each

quicker mode of transportation

they could avoid the delays caused by the

congestion of New York traffic.

rfere

apcenter

is

37.

company's management the need for

to

tntlutnC*the husky

fmMSaj!^fE!g^3sggj&

\gmf HWVtM BP. US MTT

Source:

in

re

Representatives of air commuters

looking for new aircraft. The group

hoped Grumman could produce an airplane ideal

for

business flights.

Aircraft had to pro-

vide all

For the first

the funding for

time

Grutr..~an

snort or

the development of an aircraft,

long

but

they

53

vere almost assured of gaining at

least a few orders

f^

f. ?

^argj2flThe heavy

j&'J&T^* ~ bottom

from the groups of entre-

frames andy

'..o^r

furr..jn rigidity lor the

qirder

fl?%yjCgSBSZ*

preneurs.

uiinocesaary.

ft

'

Another engineering
team, under the guidance of
Bill Schwendler, worked on
the previously mentioned

biplane in competition with

designs from Brewster and
de Seversky.

The project

was scrapped since

the F3F

was already meeting the ex-

Photo 2.o
Source
"Grumman s Amphibian,"
Avia t ion
v. 3b, July 1937,
:

pected performance of the

'

new design and the engineers

p.

realized that

37.

biplane

design could not operate with Brewster's monoplane (XF2A-1),

to be outdone,

Grumman engineers also began working on

plane. This decision was

ing fringe

in naval

important

to

Not

mono-

Grumman staying on the lead-

aircraft development. Chief of Bureau of Aero-

nautics King approved Grumman's new monoplane design (XF4F-2) on

25 July.

The XFiF-2 and XF2A-l's engineers both promised

speed of at

Hall

least 300 m.p.h.

for

Two more engineers were hired by Grumman at

this

joined in a dual role,

being a designer and

had worked for Fairchild and Stinson,

speedy but

up

to

the

jet age.

"

test

top

flew all

time.

Bob

test pilot.

He

and was the designer of the

lethal handling Gee Bee racing plane.

exhiliration of flight,

their respective designs.

Hall,

loving the

the history-making aircraft

George Titterton also joined Grumman. He

54

had worked for the Bureau of Aeronautics as

civilian engineer.

Titterton had been the Navy's representative at the manufacturing

flight of

the XFF-1

years before.

His understanding of

the Navy's

bureaucracy would be another asset. These two further supplemented

the use of

team design.

July 1936 contained another piece in Grumman'

development.
in

rather than

naval

On 25 July the Navy purchased the XF3F-2,

the F3F series.

a

Pratt

It

&

fighter

variant

was powered by a 1000 h.p. Wright Cyclone

Whitney like the original version.

The

Bureau of Aeronautics paid $26,300 for data, designs, and the mod-

ifications of the last production F3F-1

an experimental
earl ier contract
In

It

was not uncommon for

variant to be made from the last airframe of an

.

the summer of

national orders.

1935 the firm broice new ground with inter-

export came from the Argentine Govern-

It's first

ment which ordered eight Ducks. The Company's other planes were on
the

export market,

carrier fighters.

but

there was not an international demand for

Only a few navies operated aircraft carriers,

and those that did produced their own naval aircraft.

tion continued until World

.>ar

11;

This situa-

however an international deal

was made on one of it's fighters early in October 1936 between

Grumman and the Canadian Car

Foundry Company, Ltd. of Montreal.

These businesses announced that an agreement had been reached

giving the Canadian company the rights to build the FF-1

Canadian Air Force planned to use

teen were built

for

it

The

this purpose, and they were named Goblin

One Canadian built FF-1 was delivered to Nicaragua,

showed up in Japan.

as an advanced trainer.

FifI.

and another

Fifty more were delivered to Turkey, which

passed them to France where they were purchased by the Spanish

55

Republican Air Force to take part

began in 1936.

Unfortunately

or how they faired

bat,

in

the Spanish Civil

do not know whether

war which

they saw com-

engaged in combat.

if

Grumman also worked on an aerobatic plane for Gulf Oil ComNewcomer George Titterton headed the project. The plane had

pany.

been ordered after Al Williams,

ing

team and currently stunt

former member of the Navy's rac-

flyer and chairman of the aviation

department of Gulf Oil, flew the F3F-2 while looking for

placement for his Curtiss F6C.
the plane,

hawk II.

he asked for a modified version

It

was completed on

Roosevelt Field, Long Island.

the

F3F with the wings of

Wright Cyclone.

be

called the Gulfto

The Culfhawk mated the fuselage of

and was powered by

the F2F,

luuO h.p.

was modified for enhancement of aerobatic capa-

It

it

large tail,

and by install-

tanks which had several outlets plus extra pumps

which allowed

it

to

290 m.p.h.

at

12,000 feet and

of

to

December 1936 and delivered

bility by such methods as giving

ing oil and gas

re-

Intrigued by the responsiveness of

fly inverted for one-half hour.

a

It

had a speed

3,500 ft./min. climb rate.

vivid color scheme was used to increase it's visibility.

plane was coated in

radiating white stripes on the upper and lower wing surfaces.

the next
in

twelve years

the Gulfhawk

the United States and Europe.

image.

In

1948

it

tion and now hangs

II

Foundry sponsored

tvvo-seat

fighter.

For

thrilled air show audiences

This use aided Grumman

'

public

became the property of the Smithsonian Instituin

the National Air & Space

Museum."

After their recent agreement to build FF-ls,

a

The air-

glossy orange with blue trim with outward

flight

On 13 December Howard

Roosevelt Field, Long Island,

the Canadian Car

from New York to Montreal using the

F.

Klein took-off from

landing one hour and forty minutes

5fa

later at Montreal's St.

Hubert Field.

This was seventeen minutes

faster than Frank Hawk's 1931 record flight time between the two
cities. Two days later on his return flight Klein improved his own
time by ten minutes,

thus on the

an airspeed of 220 m.p.h. 7'^?

of

the

firm,
the

At

two

trips combined,

he averaged

Such records also improved tne image

bringing public recognition.

time

this FF-1 was making a record,

the FF-ls and

SF-ls were being withdrawn from the carrier fleet and being

assigned to the
the

h'aval

Reserve. This provides

life of aircraft

the

in

These aircraft

1930s.

service two or three years, yet

to

perfect example of

tremendous rate of performance growth and the short service

the

reserves.

iiad

only been in

they were already being downgraded

Aircraft were being produced that were 30 m.p.h.

faster, while others on the drawing boards were nearly 100 m.p.h.

quicker.

Such fast

improvement during the aeronautical revolution

caused the FF-1 and SF-1 to have had

phase that was nearly as

long as

The XF3F-2 endured it's

ing sent on for naval

it's

initial

testing.

design and experimental

front

line service.

testing in January 1937,

be-

Variants of an already proven de-

sign did not have to go through the same testing procedure as new

models.

This airplane endured three months of observation of

mating of the 850 h.p. Wright Cyclone driving

controllable-pitch propeller and the Grumman airframe.

was pleased with the results,

fighters on 23 March.

It

316,536.73

was the largest order for airplanes the

the second

the

time

the company

The average price per plane was

The production F3F _ 2s could attain

200 m.p.h., yet

The Navy

ordering eighty-one of these naval

Navy had ever handed out at one time,

received this distinction.

the

Hamilton Standard

a raaximutn

speed of

landing speed still hovered around 66 m.p.h.

57

The new F3Fs could reach an altitude of 32,000 feet,

vice ceiling for pursuits.

when cruising at 125 rn.p.h.

had a range of 975 miles.

ginal production version,

over it's predecessor,

record ser-

the F3F-2

With only an ill increase over the oriyet a substantial

the Navy got

rise

performance

in

good bargain.

F3F-2s were

used aboard the Enterprise, which would be commissioned in 1938,

and in Marine squadrons. The entry of the new carriers and tne

in-

crease in Marine Corps aviation were the stimulants causing the

large order.

F3Fs served aboard the Fnterpri se until

to

and

ay 1941,

with the Marines until after the war broke out between the United
States and Japan.

Following the recpetion of the large contract, Grumman prepared to occupy it's fourth home in it's eight year existence.

decision to build

plant was made after finding out

Farmingdale complex presently being rented was

to

be

that

The

the

sold to de

Seversky (later Republic). Construction of the new quarter million

dollar factory began the previous autumn on

one hundred and

twenty acre parcel of land located in Bethpage, Long Island.

land was purchased at S300 per acre.

serves and short-term loans.

struction progressed steadily.

The

Funding came from Grumman re-

Under Clint Towl

'

supervision con-

3y the end of March 1936 the com-

pany began moving into the nearly completed structure, which had
twice the floor space of
was

corr.pl e

At

the previous

the new plant

By

April

the move

the shop force got quickly to work on their

back-log of orders from the Navy.

airfran.es,

site.

ed.

it

of Aeronautics

Despite the continual work on

could not keep up with new orders.

In

May the Bureau

ordered an additional fifteen Ducks for 5571,923,

which after the deduction of $114,385 for parts,

the amphibians

55

cost $30,000.

"

An additional

August for the same price.

fifteen amphibians were ordered in

The reason for the increase

over Ducks sold in previous years was these were

in

price

new variant,

which had some design modifications.

The G-21 Goose neared the point when

financial drain when

it

it

would stop being a

made it's first flight on the last day of

May with Bud Gillies and Hob Hall at the controls. The flight

progressed without

hitch,

so

two already in the production process.

On July 16 the first G-21

was delivered to Lloyd-Smith, who paid 360,000.

the Goose continued to pour

in

test

ten ordered units were added to the

Single orders for

during the rest of 1937, and

according to Aero Digest the owner's list of the G-21 became "a
veritable

'Blue Book'

of

important persons in America.'

America's richest were not the only elite

to

for in 1937 financier Ben Smith ordered

G-21 for his friend Lord

receive the amphibian

Beaverbrook, Great Britain's Minister of Aircraft Production.

1940 Beaverbrook ordered another G-21.

In

Grumman 's underwriter in the company's move

The corporation began to feel
tance with the country's short

In

the process Smith became

to

the need for

public stock.'"
financial assis-

lapse back into depression,

the

need to relieve the shortage of capital caused by the recent venture

into the commercial market,

and the desire to expand to meet

the Navy's needs with the carriers

.vasp

and Hornet under construc-

tion to curb the growth of unfilled orders.

public with it's stock.

It

decided to go

Ben Smith aided the company in register-

ing 140,000 shares of common stock with

the Securities & Exchange

Commission, of which 95,000 were for public consumption, 5000 for

Grumman employees, and the final 40,000 reserved for exercise of

warrants. 79J

In

October of the following year the business would

59
be

listed on the New York Curb Exchange board. With the assistance

of

the public,

to

America's involvement in world war II.

In

Grumman would continue to expand in the years prior

1937 Grumman attempted to

improve it's relationship with

the Navy by hiring Oscar Olsen as a

liason between the Navy De-

partment in Washington, D.C. and the corporation's headquarters in

!3ethpage.

Since Grumman did not have an office in Washington D.C.

like many aeronautical manufacturers, Olsen flew there once a

Tuesday became "Grumman Day" at the Navy Department, with

week.

Olsen meeting those with problems or questions concerning the corporation's airframes.

These affairs rfould be transmitted to Uetn-

page either immediately or in the following day, depending upon

the severity of

problem.

the

The Company hoped to "earn the re-

spect and confidence of Navy people" by employing

On

liason.

60

September 1337 the XF4F-2 became airborne for the first

time under the guidance of bob Hall.

Despite changing to a mono-

plane design after brewster completed it's airframe's blueprints,

Orumman's "wildcat" flew four months before Brewster's "Buffalo.

The configuration of

the XF4F-2 was different

warbid that was produced later,

planes.
of

the

It

had

"

than the well-known

it's outline favoring the bi-

three spar NACA airfoil

located on the centerline

fuselage, where the biplanes had two spars; however these

wings, and the tail surfaces, had rounded tips like the biplanes.
The "razor back" aft of

the cockpit

curved down into the rear

fuselage rather than curving back up into the fin and rudder as

would in later models.

rear fuselage,
and rudder.

but

in

The horizontal
later models

A spinner was

it

tail

it

plane fitted into tne

would be raised onto the fin

placed on the nose of the propeller (it

can barely be seen in Photo 2.7).

The airframe was armed with four

DO

Photo 2.1

The XF4F-2

Source
Aviat ion

.50 calibre machine guns,

wing.

The yoO h.p.

powered
but

it

to

two located in the nose and two

single-state supercharged Pratt

&

the

in

Whitney

speed of 290 m.p.h., which was less than promised

slightly faster than Brewster's exper imental plane. The XF4F-2

had an increased rate of climb compared to the company's biplanes,

but

it

for

the

recorded
first

time

lower ceiling.
in

After Brewster's monoplane flew

January 1938,

the

struggle between the three

fighters from de Seversky, Brewster, and Grumman in

petition officially began,

tract

the winner to receive

flight com-

production con-

While the XF4F-2 competed with two rivals at

ing grounds

(See Part

design new airframes.

2),

the Navy's

test-

Grumman workers continued to build and

One such plane was the Gulfhawk 111,

second purchase by Al Williams of Gulf Oil Company.

two-seat biplane was completed and delivered on

the

This special

May 1938.

Grumman Aircraft also Duilt one for it's own use, such as quick
flights to Washington, D.C.
over by the Army Air Corps

both of these planes would be taken

to

be

used as trainers after the war

came to America.

Grumman was indirectly influenced by Congress, which passed

the Naval

Expansion Act of 193S on

17

May.

It

provided for an in-

crease in aircraft carrier tonnage to 175,000 tons, and to keep

61

pace

it

authorized

3000-plane navy.

tne Navy Claude Swanson,

According to Secretary of

"Demands of the fleet consistently re-

quire broader and more inclusive roles for aircraft

al

organization.

in

the

tactic-

importance of meeting these demands has re-

The

sulted in assigning greater precedence to aircraft deve lopment

Aviation was paining status in the Navy.

In

June Grumman received it's

the United States Army.

obtained the XOA-9,

first production contract

military version of the G-21 Goose. The Navy

also bought an experimental model,

XJHF-1, during the same period.
for $74,000 just

which was designated the

The naval version was purchased

slightly higher than the commercial fee. td

air corps granted the corporation

contract

that

2U;s

916. 6i

(5262,563) would be subtracted for spares,

0A-9s averaged $43,474,

reasonable price when compared

566,000 of the commercial G-21.

The

The

June for twenty-

in

six amphibians and spare parts at a price of SI 41

ing

from

During fiscal year 1936 the Army Air Corps

Assum-

the Army's
to

tne

low cost demonstrated the ad-

vantages of bulk purchases.

During the flight competition at Anacostia between the three
fighter prototypes, Grumman'
share of problems.

It

crankshaft bearing burnt out.

lage caught

forced
the

On another occasion the rear fuse-

The worst came when

crash landing.

tests.

speed,

fire.

XF4F-3 encountered more than it's

first experienced engine trouble when

second engine failure

de Severksky's NF-1 also crashed during

Despite Grumman's prototype recording the highest

Brewster's entry won by default owing to the trouble ex-

perienced by it's competitors.

On 11 June 1936 the Navy purchased

fifty-four F2A-ls at an average price of 520,302

(a

figure that

would prove to be to Grumman's advantage in the following year).^

62

with Boeing's F4B-4 being retired from the fleet

in

1938, Grumman

fighters constituted the only air superiority weapon on the

carriers and with the Marine Corps until

the

Buffalo began to

reach squadron service after the war began in 1939.

Grumman Air-

craft had been the only manufacturer to receive orders for naval

fighters for approximately five years prior to Brewster's order,

quite a feat for such

In

the

young,

first half of

small company.

1938 the engineering team had been work-

ing on a fighter design to be

included in the Bureau of Aero-

nautic's competition to be held in June.

initiated the Vought F4U Corsair,

will be referred to later in the text.

Grumman's few failures,

the XF5F-1

showed

the XF5F-1

This pursuit contest

reputable aircraft which

the

It

radically new outline,

twin-engine design for

carrier fighter.

was the fuselage which grew out of

also produced one of

"Skyrocket."
it

The blueprints of

being the first

Another unique feature

the main spar of

the wing

(See

ehoto 2.8). The tail unit sported twin fins and rudders mounted at
the edges of

the horizontal

planes and the XF4F-2,

surfaces.

stabilizers.

the Skyrocket

The large wingspan of

Unlike the Grumman bi-

had square wings and control

forty-two feet was cut

in

half by

upward folding wings. On 30 June the Navy ordered the experimental

plane for

total of $248,000; with expenses broken down in the

following categories:

Design Data and Drawings

wind Tunnel Test ;..odel (full size)
Tests and Miscellaneous Data
Airplane (2 engine) less engine and props
Final Corrected Information and Drawings

3 71,000
5 10,000
S 45,000
S112.000
j,

10 ,000

S24b' ,000

The Navy ordered two other aircraft

from this design competition;

63

Photo

The Grumman XF5F-1 Skyrocket

2.;

---Ha

Source:

~^i.

Aviat ion

vol.

39,

no.

11

(November 1940),

the previously mentioned Vought XF4U-1 Corsair and

Lioth

were conventional
In

the

in outline,

first six months of

G-21 had been received.

p.

the

19.

Bell XFL-1.

unlike the Skyrocket.

193S

few orders for commercial

Since the corporation was quite busy and

did not have practical experience in marketing commercial aircraft,

this

task was placed in the hands of Gillies Aviation Cor-

poration of Hicksville, New York;

Jack Gillies,

It

was owned and operated by

brother of Grumman test pilot Bud Gillies. This com-

pany obtained eight orders for the $66,000 Goose. b7

In

last

July the Navy took control of

the XF3F-3

which was the

production F3F-2 transformed into an experimental plane.

conversion cost S12.750.

S8

The

Without putting the XF3F-3 through the

extensive testing procedure, since the airframe had already proved

itself and only minor modifications had been made to incorporate a

larger engine,

the Bureau of Aeronautics ordered

twenty-seven of

the

single-seat biplane fighters at a unit price of 525 937

B^

Compared

to

earlier F3Fs,

this

figure was quite high.

Part of

the

reason for the increase was the result of tne low number ordered,
but

the previous month's

for

the 3uffalo had a greater effect.

loss

to

Brewster and the price charged

The high price was un-

warranted, and the only real drastic deviation from the cost per
pound of Grumman aircraft
The conservatism of

purchase biplanes after

This type of

(which will be shown later in the text).

the Navy shown

it

through as

was willing to

thinking aided the 3ethpage manufacturer. The follow-

ing year these F3Fs went aboard the Yorktown

c

it

was conceded monoplanes were superior.

which had been

omm issioned in 1937.

September Grumman gained another contract from the United

In

States

iJavy

for

it's utility series.

still at a unit price of 530,100.

Twenty J2F-3s were ordered,

Continued procurement

of

this

series showed the :Javy was pleased witn it's performance.

During the same period an export order for four G-21A

amphibians had been received from the Peruvian Air Force.

These

planes were completed the following Spring. Lt. Commander ilumberto

Cal-Lino of Peru's Air Flotilla took control of the delivery to

his country in April

1939.

The export contract

totalled approxi-

mately 5200,000.
After the fifty-four Brewster Buffaloes were ordered in June
1938, Grumman went

right

ing XF4F-3 brought about

2.10).

was

To support

increased by

airfoil
as well.

the

to

work to modify the XF4F-2. The result-

the well-known Grumman shape.

rising weight of the design,

larger span and squared tips,

"plank-like" appearance.

(See Photo

the wing area

thus giving the

The fin and rudder was squared

This squaring improved capability of mass production,

the

65

Photo 2.9:

Source:
p.

first

"Decade of Grumman Projrss," Aero Digest

sign the company expected increased orders

The tail-plane was raised onto the rudder,

gently down to join the fuselage spine.

wasp (XR-1S30-75) engine, with
er,

vol.

36,

no.

powered the airframe.

It

in

the

future.

latter curving

the

The Pratt & iVhitney Twin

two-stage,

two-speed supercharg-

was expected to improve

performance at higher altitudes.

the

wildcat's

The Navy ordered the XF4F-3 in

Photo 2.10:
An artist's rendi

ion

of the F4F-3, showing

the plank- like wing.
Also note the spinner
on the prop, which
was not part of the

production models.
Source: An Adver
tisement in Aero
Digest
vol
36
.

no

1,

52.

p.

51

F4F-3, the
" B1 MODEL
Grumman product.

"--.

The performance of this

hghter is comparable to
that
any service type airplane
<he world. Conceded
the
most potent weapon in
the
of
,n

Navys fighting squadthe

F4F-3. like? all
fighters, is intended
or operation
from either
)nd or earner deck.

U. S.
rons,

Orumman
l:

66

October.

It

was not

the Havy Uept.,

FY

listed specifically in Aircraft Purchased by

1939

being one of the numerous orders record-

"confidential."

ed as

Towards the end of 1938 the Bethpage plant sold two sets of

dozen Ducks to the Argentine Navy and the United States Coast
Guard.

Considering the price paid for the J2Fs sold, each of

these contracts brought

in

approximately $434,300.

corporation was branching out with exports

In

193o the

Peru and Argentina,

to

military sales to the Air Corps and the Coast Guard, and commercial

sales.

Grumman became less dependent on the United States

Navy this year.

Although the corporation had not received any orders relating

to

the rising world tensions over

look for military exports

the possibility of war,

looked promising.

long with the infusion of public capital,

expand.

It

bought 100 acres of

caused the company to

land adjacent

headquarters at the end of 1938 for $28, 500. 92

for

the out-

This expectation, a-

to

tneir current

This allowed space

future plant addition which would soon be added.

Table 2.1

Billings

Income
from
Sales

SI, 808, 400

SI, 368, 000

51,640,000

$1,114,000
$1,719,000

% In-

come
from

1934
1935
1936
1937
1938

US1-

SI, 915, 000

88%
87%
84%

$3,574,533*
$4,904,941

Source:
Threulsen, The Grumman Story p. 89.
*:.'.y
own figure, which do not always correspond to Threulsen's.
,

67

Table 2.2:

U.S. Naval
Aircraft
A

Grumman

Exp, :ndi ture

Aircraft
Industry
Product ion

Grumman

1934
1935.

1936
1937
1933

$12
S20
$26
$20

,273
,691
,561
,963

,000
,000
,000
,000
$27, ,265, ,000

10. OS

4.7%
5.4%
7.4%

S 43,891,925
3 42,506,204
78.148.S93
$115,076,950
$150,000,000

3. IS

2.6%
2.2%

3.2%

Source: Freudenthal, The Aviation Business in the 1930s,"

The History of the American Aircraft Industry
Ca.nbr idre
ass:
The mIT Press, 1968)
p. 105.
"Naval Aircraft Expenditures 1920-1939," The Congressional Record vol. 85, Part 2, 76th Con;-res s 2cd
Session, pp. 727-28.
(the percentages are ay figures)
,

Table 2.3:

Y
E

Units
Ordered

%
U.S.

Navy

1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938

Uni
Del

from

ver ed

to

USN

30
34
97

1005

100;.

97

100*

29
64
72
78 +

124
112

855!

100%
100%
88%
90%
90%+

905;

665!

Source:
"Industry & Finance," Aviat ion
(Oct. 1937), pp. 6364. Plus additional sources statin;; ^hen orders were complete, etc.
means unknown).
,

Table 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 list Grumman

'

finances, orders, and

deliveries, and the company's progression compared to naval aircraft expenditures and the industry's production.

Grumman Air-

craft's income quadrupled from 1934 to 1935, as did it's orders

from 1933 to 1937.

Despite these increases,

the corporation

68

initially declined in it's percentage of industrial production and

it's shares of
the fall

in

share naval aircraft expenditures.

it's percentage of

the aircraft

The reason for

industry's production

were the greater Air Corps expenditures and the improvement

commercial market.

in

tne

between 1934 and 1938 the Army spent $129

million on aircraft compared to 373 million in naval spending. 33

Commercial production,

though consistently below that

military services, was climbing during this period.

for

for

this climb was

the

Boeing and Douglas.

the

reached and

It

surpassed the levels attained before the Depression.

The reasons

introduction of the modern airliners from

Grumman

'

sales were almost

totally to the

Navy and Coast Guard from 1934 to 1936,

thus explaining why tne

company's finances grew, yet reduced

comparison with the rest

of

the

industry.

As

in

the company entered other markets

in

1937

through 1933 the firm's share of production began to increase,

management's decision to enter these markets proved to be beneficial.

The expansion of carrier aviation was

Grumman's growth.
1934 to 1938,

big stimulus to

With the addition of three new carriers from

the need for carrier aircraft more

than doubled.

Grumman Aircraft supplied nearly all the fighters for the fleet
during this period.

This explains why the corporation's per-

centage of naval aircraft expenditures rose through most of the

period.
of

The drop from 1934 to 1935 was

available funds, not

facturer.

the result of

the doubling

decrease in purchases from the manu-

Grumman had to compete for portions of the funding with

manufacturers building larger, more expensive aircraft.

ample,
of

in

For ex-

1937 the Bureau of Aeronautics announced the purchases

nineteen amphibians,

fifteen from Grumman and the remaining

69

four to Sikorsky.

Grumman's fifteen

ing 1 e-engi ned utilities

to-

talled i;>54,300, while the four Sikorsky twin-engined amphibians

cost $327, c39.

It's growth in monetary income from the Navy

showed the company was supplying an increasing percentage of tne

number of Uavy aircraft.

The engineering success discussed in the text can be shown in

looking at the fleet service lives of

the various

board the carriers during the 1930s.

The average service life was

four years, yet Grumman'

three fighters averaged five years a-

board carriers. Only one of the fighters

2

saw combat

To deduce

in

,,orld

fighters used a-

'..ar

11

(the F2A)

listed on Table

and none saw combat

from a carrier.

the aircraft's combat ability,

one can only compare per-

formance figures and service lives, and Grumman held high marks in
both categories.

Grumman's success in the mid-1950s was partly due to the low'

cost of

it's airframes.

55 range

in cost

It's

fighters consistently stayed in the

per pound, with the lone exception (See Table

2.5). Other manufacturer's costs varied more.

These airframes were

also just modified land planes, whereas Grumman aircraft were

built

for

the naval

environment. The Long Island firm's other air-

craft sold to the military had lower costs

frames in the commercial market).

at

(not

including the air-

The SF-1 and JF-1 were priced

S5.15 and $3.64 per pound, respectively.

Production efficiency

combined with the good designs and the growing need for carrier
fighters made Grumman successful in the mid 1930s.

70

Fleet Service Li

the

in

330s

Years of
Fleet
Service

Plane

Cur t i S3
Cur t ss
Cur t i s s
Curt i ss

F6C
F8C
BFC
BF2C

3
2

1/2

Boeing F3B
Boeing F4B

Grumman
Grumman
Grumman
Grumman
Brewster

FF-1
F2F
F3F
F4F

1/2

F2A

Average

Table

Carrier-Fighter Prices
Ai rplane

Boeing F4B-2
Boeing F4E-3
Boeing F4B-4

Curtiss BFC-2
Curtiss BF2C-1

Grumman
Grumman
Grumman
Grumman
Grumman
Grumman

Average price
per Airplane
S
S
S

of

2,000 lbs.
2,301 lbs.
2,354 lbs.
3,037 lbs.
3,163 lbs.
3 ,221

19,000
14,515
16,525
16,536
25,037
26,472

25,302

F3F-2
F3F-3
F4F-3

S
b
S

the

limpty Weight
of Airplane

14,731
15,613

FF-1
F2F
F3F-1

Brewster F2A-1

18,565
17,414
10,900

i/;

2
2

,625
,870

3, ,250
3. ,250
5, ,238

lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.

4,420 lbs.

1930s

Price per
Pound
$

5
$

9.28
7.59
4.65

4.65
5.00

5.90
5.64
5.75
5.09
7.70
5.05

6.40

S
5
S
$
S

HI

'art

The
in

Impact of the iiuropean ,,ar and Tensions

Pacific on Grumman Aircraft, 1939-1941

tne

The period from January 1939

to December

period for Grumman Aircraft in many ways.

1941 was

ago of

the biplane was over.

critical

Grumman had established

itself as an eminent naval biplane fighter manufacturer,

but

the

Brewster had the jump in monoplane

fighters after the Buffalo beat the wildcat,

so

the Bethpage man-

ufacturer would have to make up some .qround to re-establish it's

previous position.
the planes

tested.

to

The three year period was also important

see combat

world war

in

II

for the success of

ability.

role at

tensions in Europe until after the war began.

With the outbreak of war,

the United States

sponsible for
the entire

for assistance

time,

...ost

in

the European

of
in

their own

the belligerents

this area.

turned to

Their need was re-

suroe in orders and income at Grumman, as well as

industry.

Tensions increased

Japan became more aggressive.

not

this

firm's airframes depended upon their

the

Grumman's finances or orders were not affected by the

countries expected to build all of their aircraft

factories.

for

were beinj designed and

The engineering corps played a crucial

been in effect

The naval

in

the Pacific as well

since 1936, yet no Significant naval expansion

had yet been undertaken.

It

was not until approximately one and

half years prior to Pearl Harbor that Grumman felt

dications that the

as

limitation treaties had

.\avy was

orders came in the final

the

first

in-

expanding, and most of the rise in

twelve months before the surprise attack.

These three years allowed Grumman to expand it's facilities and

72

design the warbids,

thus placing it

in

position to be counted

on to supply so many aircraft during the Second ,.orld

The year 1939 began with Julie Ho 1 pi

crew working on the XF4F-3,

four months.

in

showing their metal by completing

After a successful

first

attained

the .Vildcat

334 ra.p.h., an initial

a

in

the nose and

the airfoil

two

it

six months

maximum speed

of

Grumman and Navy officials de-

cided to reposition all four guns in the wing,

in

the

In

rate of climb of 2,800 feet per minute, and

service ceiling of 3,500 feet.

two

it

flight on 12 February,

was turned over to the Navy for evaluation.

spent at Anacostia,

,Var.

and his experimental

in

the wing.

for the guns,

rather than placing

The monoplane had ample room

and this placement did not require

synchronized gear to shoot through the propeller.

The loss to

Brewster proved to be advantageous, for the new design was far

superior to the XF4F-2.

Grumman's commercial Goose was proving to be

fine military

vehicle, gaining two contracts in the Spring of 1939.

The Navy

wanted twenty JKFs, and the Coast Guard asked for ten. The average
price per plane was $41,675 on these contracts, considerably less
than the commercial price and two thousand less

Corps'

than the Air

order despite the lower number contracted.

The Bethpage

corporation treated it's best customer well.

During the first four months of 1939 aircraft deliveries
brought in 31,755,474 in income, 24% more than the same period in
1938.

Part of

these deliveries were the final F3F-3s,

contract was completed in

.\.ay

squadron aboard the York town

which had been commissioned in 1937.

Grunraan fighters now composed all

the United States Navy,

for the

These aircraft filled the fighter

the carrier

showing the dominance

fighter squadrons of
it

had in rrainino

73

orders for naval pursuits in the rald-1930s.

Management's decision to obtain financial assistance by going

public' with

it's stock in 1937-38 was beginning

to

be

noticable

when the company occupied the new addition to it's plant.

Con-

struction began at the start of 1939, and added tnree thousand

square feet of floor space.

This did not include the new paint

spraying room that was completed within a few weeks.

The Bethpage

factory now contained 48,000 square feet of work space for it's
700 workers,
l-'3ir

roughly equal to the area taken up by forty-eight

placed wing tip to wing tip. Jb

allowed the firm

to

buy the machine

The financial assistance also

tools

to

be

used

in

the new

work area.
Phot o 3.1:

Grumman

's

Plant Mo.

our present modern plant

1939.
at Bethpage. Long Island, N.

Source:
Advertisement in
Aero Digest
vol. 36, no.
,

1,

p.

51,

The engineering improvement of

August 1939.

the Wildcat

paid dividends

in

Brewster's Buffalo entered squadron service in June

74

with a top speed of 323 m.p.h., a 2,500 feet per minute initial

climb rate, and

roughly equal

to

34,000 foot celling, all of which were below or

the XF4F-3 then testing at Anacostia. y

did not hesitate very

for

Ions,

fifty-four Wildcats.

before granting

'

The

contract on

,'Javy

August

These fighters averaged $426,472 per

plane, nearly 32,000 less than

single buffalo.''

51.35 less per pound for the wildcat,

better airplane.

yet

it

The Navy paid

was receiving

Grumman was again competing with lirevster to see

which company would emerge as the main supplier of naval fighters.

With Hitler's attack on i'oland on
and France declared war on Germany.

September 193S, britain

The navies of both countries

needed aircraft and looked to the United States

own industrial output.

to

based fighter to be used on the Dearn and two

ers which had just been laid down.

|of

policy was to concentrate aircraft purchases

Jacquin, chairman of

carrier-

class carri-

in

the United States,

Colonel

the French Purchasing Commission

ordered 100 G-36AS (wildcats) from Bethpage.

These fighters were

powered by the Wright Cyclone since the French were already

to be

experiencing delays in the delivery of the Pratt

the

re

After war broke out, French

and Grumman Aircraft was included in it's orders.

(Jacques)

augment their

Among the needs of France was

two-stage,

two-speed supercharger.

short supply because of

&

Whitney with

The Twin Wasps were in

the numerous orders,

and the time con-

suming mechanical setbacks it's supercharger encountered.

Grumman

had to modify the nose of

but

within

for

the .'.right Cyclone,

week one took to the air with the new engine.

France and britain,

of

the G-36

the American aircraft

realizing they would need the assistance

industry, paid inflated prices for the

aircraft provided by United States factories.

The reasons for the

75

exxagerated payment were twofold.

It

was

these airframes was completed posthaste.

manufacturers capital to expand.

following June,

this order

insure production of

to

was also to give these

It

With the fall of France the

(which has been reduced to 51) was

transferred to Britain.
while Hitler and Stalin conquered Poland and enjoyed their

spoils,

the engineering staff

several new designs.

a

the Bethpage plant worked on

at

The Bureau of Aeronautics announced in 1939

design competition for

torpedo-bomber for the carrier fleet.

The Navy wanted a 300 m.p.h.

airplane with

scouting, range

(without ordinance) of 3000 miles, an internal weapons bay,

sealing fuel tanks, and plate armour.

charge of Grumman'

bob

rial

project, which became the TBF Avenger.

The engineers also worked on a second plane

the

self-

was placed in

commercial market.

It

was

taking the name G-ii Widgeon.

to

be placed on

smaller version of the G-21,

The G-44's plans snowed accomoda-

tions for four to five passengers, giving businessmen a smaller

and cheaper transport.

Draftsmen labored to modify the XF5F for the United States

Army Air Corps, which designated
the blueprints

the XP-50.

it

Unlike in the XF5F,

showed a fuselage stretched forward ahead of the

wing and a hydraul ical ly operated tricycle landing gear extending

from the tip of it's nose.

The

two supercharged ..right Cyclones

rotated in the opposite direction to avoid the problems of

The Air Corps was

interested enough to order

torque.

prototype on 25

November, despite a high investment.

In

the

latter part of 1939 the Bureau of Aeronautics asked

for a Wildcat with folding wings.

carrier planes in the hangar decks,

The Royal Navy stored all

so

it's

every square foot saved was

7o

important;

thus

it

was also deeply interested.

Grumman wished

to

avoid folding the wings straight up since this weakened the wing
structure.

Designers also had to contend with the various hangar

deck heights in aircraft carriers.

with paper clips and drafting

erasers, Roy Grumman developed the idea behind his patented "sto-

wing."

r..echancial ly

"the mainplane pivoted about

they folded back to lie against

was similar

to a

the

bird tucking it's wings back along it's body. The

sto-wing reduced the wingspan of

four inches,

62% reduction.

inclined single-hinge system

of

the mainspar as

fuselage sides."-'" This system

the company's approach

to

Wildcat from 3o feet to \L feet

One aviation historian called the

"brilliant and simple idea,

design." 100

wing and discussing the system with the Navy,

Wildcat, which was designated XF4F-4,

in

tvpical

After designing the stoit

was ordered on a

March 1940. Grumaian'

in-

genuity again brought results that would eventually reap rewards.

The war

in

Europe caused

short change in the main bene-

factors of Grumman's production. The first production model of the

F4F-3 made it's first flight in February 1940.

facturer had planned to provide the

F4Fs as possible when

showing

it

U.

S.

The Dethpage manu-

Navy with as many of

had the best carrier fighter available.

it

the

received the initial Wildcat contract,

But with

the

war in Europe, France's 1939 G-36 production order took precedence,

wildcats which soon began rolling off the production line

were sent

to

the Europeans.

In

1940, Great Britain received the

majority of planes coming from Grumman's assembly line. The XF5F-1

twin-engined fighter was completed in March, making it's first
flight on

April with Bud Gillies controlling, the joystick.

The

experimental plane was then handed over to the Navy for more testing.

Several delays were experienced at Anacostia,

for

the radical

77

design and it's engines experienced numerous "teething" problems.

functional,

..hen

and 380 rn.p.h.

it

at

recorded

4000 feet per minute,

thing

it

met

had an initial

It

the XF5F-1

tne air due

in

speed of 358 m.p.h. at sea level,

to

it's

the Skyrocket had some

the pilot had an obstructed

the wing.

flaws

landing view,

The size of

in
a

Despite it's

it's design.

For one,

fatal vice for any

the cockpit

the plane and

line were also considered detriments.

While

reported to outfly any-

speed and climb.

carrier aircraft, with the placement of

ing edge of

rate of climb of

thus gaining the name "Skyrocket."

under the Navy's control

performance,

16,500 feet.

the

at

it's

train-

radical out-

The problems encountered

during testing brought in more negative views.

The anticipated

high price was yet another factor keeping the Skyrocket

from

making progress, but Grumman had other projects

it's

place

to

take

The XTBF-1 moved forward on

the go ahead to build

The blueprints held all

speed,

April when the corporation got

two experimental

three-seat

torpedo-bombers.

the Navy's desired characteristics of

range, and an internal weapons bay.

The Avenger was the

first plane used by the Navy to hold it's torpedo inside

bay.

The drafts also included the sto-wing,

span to IS'
turret was

bomber.

4"

(a

to be

66% decrease).
used,

bomb
2"

reducing it's 54'

An electrically-driven dorsal

another first for an American single-engine

An outward-retracting undercarriage was utilized, making

the Avenger

the

first Grumman production model not

patented landing gear.

The outline of

larged Wildcat, with it's barrel

the XTBF-1

to use Roy's

resembled an en-

fuselage and square wings and

tail.

The first export G-36A lifted off at Bethpage on 11

ray,

just

7b'

I'hoto 3.2:

Two views of the Grumman

Avenger, which served in
The U.S. Navy and the
Royal Navy during World
..ar

the

Eric brown,
Navy p. 125.

the order was

iv

ingj

few reached France,

transferred to Great Britain after the fall

France on 22 June.

Royal Navy,

the

fighter the

the Martlet

as

:..artlet

Upon reaching

:,.kl.

fastest airplane.

it's

Eric brown of the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm,

the number of deck

but

of

Britain received it's first G-35A on 27 June.

The Admiralty renamed

"1

3.3:

after Germany's invasion of the west.

the

ho

II.

Source:
of

'.'

who set

Captain
record for

landings while flying various aircraft,

will always maintain

the Martlet

had the best

acteristics of any naval aircraft that

flew...

stated;

landing charIt

offered good

forward vision, excellent slow flying characteristics,

robust

undercarriage fully capable of absorbing the most punishing vertical

velocities and an intelligently positioned arrestor hook that

could convert

shaky approach into

safe arrival."

was "designed specifically for the naval evironment,

gree tnat

it

than on

runway..."

The Martlet
to

such

de-

was easier to takeoff and land on an aircraft carrier

that aided the pilot

brown was also impressed with other aspects

in air combat,

such as the all around view

79

(with even two windows on the floor of

the cockpit

limited

for

downward visibility). Seeing the other guy first has always been
vital need for air combatants.

roll"

of

nery.

The

(tartlet

maneuvering, and provided

in

Brown believed the initial

3300 feet per minute,

the performance of

little

round to touch it."

the most

ight er

sensational aspects of

(j J here was nothing a-

Brown concluded the Martlet was "one of

finest shipboard aeroplanes ever created."

the Martlet

of

results of

was

the

"good rate

rate of climb, which he stated as

"was one of

this

also had

stable platform for gun-

the

Brown's assessment

summation of two factors. First, he saw the

the engineers'

design for naval envi ronmen t

He also

was affected by the poor performance of British naval aircraft,

thus making

the Martlet

By October

delivered to Britain.
month,

seem even better than

They entered squadron service the same

:<oyal

Navy with

hardpressed for fighters

the Battle of

shore,

but

to

Gru.i.man

fine aircraft when Britain was

defend their homeland.

The heightn of

Britain had just passed, and planes and pilots were

short supply.

the

was.

replacing the Sea Gladiators of &04 Squadron. 102

provided the

in

it

1940 the eighty-one Martlets were completed and

The first batch of .Martlets would operate from

later deliveries would be utilized aboard the

British carriers.
The United States Navy gained

was important

to

the

legislation in June 1940 which

surge of naval aircraft orders which took

place during the last year before America's involvement in the

war

The

11% Expansion Act of

June

increased aircraft carrier

tonnage to 79,500 tons and authorized an increment

craft

from 3,000 to 4,500.

In naval

air-

The following day the Aviation Ex-

pansion Act enlarged the number to 10,000.

Yet another bill,

oO
the 70% Expans ion Act

was passed on 19 July,

increasing the

number of planes authorized to 15,00u. Congress also appropriated

two billion dollars

for aviation purposes

for

fiscal year 1941

June 1940 through 30 June 1941), which was nearly half of

total defense bill.
for the Navy.

to be

Of

the

(JO

the

19,000 planes to be built, 4,000 were

The Bureau of Aeronautics received $125

million in cash and 3375 million in contract authority to purchase

the aeronautical

equipment for the Navy.

The appropriation bill

also provided the funds for twenty Essex class carriers.

effects of this

The

legislation would soon be felt by Grumman.

While Grumman's military market

looked promising,

it

1(Jj

also

took a step forward in the commercial market with the first

of

the C-44 widgeon on 2b

ed the successful

ment

in all

June.

flight

But Gillies ana Roy Grumman pilot-

flight of the amphibian (showing iioy's involve-

aspects of manufacturing, and his desire to shuck his

administrative duties at times). Construction of production models

single buyers began right away.

for

Discussions would soon begin

between the Navy and Grumman over the former's use of

August 1940 was

big month for

the G-44.

the growth of Grumman's

business and an indication the U.S. Navy was preparing for war.
On

August

Ducks.

the United States Navy placed an order for

ten utility

Two days later the Navy awarded the "Iron Works"

gest contract

to

it's

big-

date. Two hundred forty-three F4F-3 wildcats jere

purchased for $7,260,280, dropping it's average price to

$23,361.

decision

This looks to be the point at which the Navy made the

to

replace the Buffalo with Wildcats.

Only eleven of the

initial order for fifty-four Buffaloes had been given to the Navy,
the remaining had been sent

to Finland.

An

improved version of the

F2A had been ordered but only one hundred and eight were produced.

was ajain on top of

GrumjT.an
In

six months Gruir.man

'

increase.

three months of

the

July,

-'

August, and September the com-

pany shipped $3,779,619 worth of airframes,

F4Fs

(Martlets).

been

It

year's production.

Pratt
to

Whitney engine.

New sales made in the same period

This figure came from the U.S.

British order for 100 Martlet

including sixty-four

had not been many years when this would have

totalled $14,c07,000.
chases and

fighter list.

backlog grew to 58", while Brewster's

showed little significant

In

the United States Navy's

&ik

Navy pur-

lis with a standard

These contracts pushed Grumman's backlog

320 million. 106

The great volume of orders

datory.

in

1940 made plant expansion man-

September 1940 the company purchased

In

farm adjacent

to

it's

factory.

fifty-three acre

The new acreage was

to

be

the

lo-

cation for a new "blackout" factory designed and constructed dv

the Austin Company.
a

140

The nearly 500,000 square feet

center aisle for final assmebly with

foot

iiOU

structure held
foot alleys on

both sides to build smaller units such as the wing and tail,

rlourescent tubes and v.azda high-intensity lamps lighted the workshops.

network of overhead conveyor belts was utilized to keep

the workers

teria,

supplied with materials.

twelve hundred seat cafe-

locker room, a communication system, air-conditioning,

and two thousand space parking lot were also part of the project.
The 52,100,000 factory was to be completed in 120 working days.

Funding for the plant came from several sources. Grumman was aided
by

the

inflated prices

and Italy.
tax code,

it

charged the Allies at war with Germany

The United States Government's new corporation income

which allowed aircraft manufacturers to depreciate new

construction in five years, helped lower the overall cost.

The

82

company

,-nainly

made use of the Emergency Plain Facilities program,

where the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (KFC)

manufacturer it's building costs

in

five year period,

took ownership of

title or

it

sola the factory to the

completed, and
craft

the KFC either

played

it

loaned the

five year plan.

firm.

Plant Mo.

the

was soon

key role in the output of Grumman air-

the upcoming war. 107

throughout

On Christmas Day 1940, Grumman Aircraft received

in

After the

the plant's

feat by two of

it's airplanes which brought

"present"

the company

some publicity and proved it's product could perform the task
was designed for.

it

On that day two Grumman -made Martlets of

Britain's 304 Squadron, piloted by Lt. L.V. Carver and SubLt.

A.

Parke destroyed

it

German Junker (Ju 6b)

twin-engine bomber as

attempted to attack the British Flet at Scapa Flow.

one of

the better performing medium bombers of

the Luftwaffe,

which made the accomplishments even more spectacular.

tinction of the victory was that

it

was

The Ju 66 was

The dis-

the first air-to-air

"kill" by an American-made airplane during ..orld War

11.

Grumman

workers proudly boast of their plane's tour de force. 100

December 1940 was another distinctive month for the contracts

awarded the Bethpage Corporation.
made it's first flight,

Eight months before the XTBF-1

the Avenger edged out Vought's design

gaining a production order.

in

The United States Navy procured 28b

torpedo bombers for S30 million, by far the largest order ever re-

ceived by Grumman up to that time.

$84,688.
of

The

144 J2F-5 Ducks.

ties,

The unit price of

largest order was followed by

the TBFs was

S6 million purchase

The big orders for torpedo bombers and utili-

coupled with the large order for fighters four months earli-

er showed

the Mavy was

finally anticipating the likelihood of war,

63

and were preparing for it.

With these orders, Grum.T.an's backlog

rocketed to $60 million at the beginning of 1941.

To combat

this

rise the corporation began to use the two ten-hour shifts to get

production moving at
Early in 1941

swifter pace.

10

-*

the United States Navy asked for ninety-five

F4F-3As (wildcats using the Wright Cyclone with a single-stage

supercharger) as an insurance measure in case the newer Pratt

Whitney failed. The latter was experiencing difficulties with it's

t/o-stage
in

blower.

By the end of

the year sixty-five F4F-3AS *ere

operation with the Navy and Marine Corps.

In

planes.

1941, Greece was anxiously trying to obtain modern fighter

It

had been attempting to purchase these aircraft

United States since the fall of France in June 1940.

liellenic Air Force was

from the

The Royal

totally dependent on foreign manufacturers.

Greece tried to go through proper and improper channels

Curtiss P-40s, but numerous obstacles were met.

to

For one,

buy
U.S.

Secretary of State Cordell Hull was initially unwilling to hear

the request.

Secondly, Britain continually remained opposed,

lieving it's imports from the U.S. would be impaired by

be-

Greek

purchase. Another obstacle was President Roosevelt's unwillingness

to consent

to aid

while campaigning for his third term.

October Italy declared war on Greece, creating

for the fighters,

but

the release of planes

On 28

greater demand

still met snags.

Morgenthau Jr., Secretary of Treasury for the United States,

Henry
sug-

gested Britain receive the P-iOs, and in return send another

fighter to the Hellenic peninsula.

The British agreed to send the

Boultan-Paul Defiant, but Greece was not willing to accept the

Defiant

in

lieu of

the Curtiss t.arhawk/Tomahwak

had promised to supply the aircraft,

so

The United States

the government continued

Si

pressing for

visible solution.

In

January 1941 Frank Knox,

Secretary of the Navy, recommended that Greece purchase thirty of

the F3Fs currently being replaced by more modern

the i<asp

but

solete Grumman biplanes.

that

to accept

and only

planes intended for the Navy to go to Greece.

The Navy was still

for the Neturality Acts required Admir-

Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),

items as non-essential

national security.

to

to

The passage of

the

latter on

livery of planes possible; however for

iioosevelt hampered the
it

11

approve the

The Navy stated the

sale would interfere with the passage of Lend-Lease,

Britain since

Knox was i-

presidential order forced him to rele.iate the

able to stop the shipment,

was halted.

ob-

On 11 February Morgenthau informed Knox

thirty Grumman Wtlcats were to be sold instead.

rate,

al

fighters aboard

the Hellenic government was unwilling

..larch

short

so

the order

made the de-

time President

sale by planning to send the planes

was now aiding Greece.

lie

to

felt British pilots

would be better prepared to use the modern fighters. Roosevelt re-

versed his decision just prior to the German invasion on

1541.

April

The shipment of F4Fs was on it's way the following week,

but

was held up at Gibraltar as Hitler's two-prong attack rolled down

the Hellenic peninsula.

Britain took control of the thirty F4Fs,

and ordered ten more like them,

let

Ills.

the

At

Wildcats,

wing so

all of which were designated Mart-

110

it

it

time the Navy was concerned about

the

loss of

it's

also anxiously waited for the development of the sto-

could be utilized on carrier aircraft.

Grumman, making

sure the folding wing would stand up to the stress of flight and

landings,
for

the

took it's

first

time.

time.

On 14 April

the XF4F-4

left

the ground

The prototype had a hydraulic wing folding

mechanism, but in production models

for the carrier deck crew.

it

was folded manually

task

The sto-wing and other modifications

soon incorporated into the Wildcat,

such as

the

inclusion of self-

sealing fuel tanks; plate armour and bullet-proof glass for pilot

protection; and the increase to six .50 calibre machine guns (added after

the British recommendation),

increased to nearly 8000 lbs.

and the weight of the F4F

Thus a slightly slower and more

sluggish Wildcat was created, but also one less destructable and
one

taking up less carrier deck or hangar space.

The first operational use of

Fleet came in

*iay

1941.

Lt.

the

wildcat with the Pacific

Commander Clarence

Fighting Six (VF-6) aboard the

.vade

McClusky's

Enterprise was the first

squadron to obtain the Wildcat. The air unit exchanged it's F3F-2s
A Group of

FiF-i wildcats:

tit
':

Photo 3.4

Source: O'Leary,
38 (USN).

p.

United States Nava

Fighters
of World War
5

II

00

for eighteen F4F-3As.

vert

the wildcat

to

Other carrier fighter squadrons would con-

throughout the year.

Although the twin-engined Skyrocket was discarded by the Mavy

after 211 test flights,
terest

the Air Corps.

to

it's sister,
But

the XP-50,

was still of in-

this changed after

it's supercharger

blew up and caught fire on it's maiden voyage on 14 May.

brought

it

down to land, but

the hydraulic

out,

Bob Hall

lines had been severed

and the back-up system failed to lower the nose gear.

bailed

Hall

letting the XP-50 crash in the depths of Long Island Sound.

Becuase of this failure, along with the Air Corps'

Lockheed's P-3S Lightning and

Grumman,

interest in

new twin-engine project by

the XP-50 was cancelled.

Although it's first twin-engined fighter had been terminated

by both services, Grumman had another

to

take

it's place.

design used a tricycle undercarriage for improved taxiing;

pit

The C-51
a

cock-

placed well ahead of the wing for excellent visibility for-

ward; a

1/2

ing mechanism;

foot,

square-tipped wing utillizing an upward fold-

and a long slender fuselage with

sharp-edged

spine flowing into the tail giving the "Tigercat" it's "sleek"
looks.

With two 1,800 h.p. Wright engines, Grumman anticipated

maximum speed of 430 m.p.h.

On 19 May 1941,

XP-50 crashed,

the Air Corps ordered

called XP-65.

The Navy also showed interest, ordering two on 30

June, which were designated XF7F-1

just days after the

two prototypes which were

While moving through the ex-

perimental stage with this design, Grumman came to the conclusion

that

the

requirements desired by the two services were unique e-

nough that both could not be filled.

This attitude likely came

from pressures by the services to deal exclusively with them.

There was at this time an unwritten guideline forming in the air-

07

craft

industry to deal primarily with a single service.

Grum.-r.an

stuck to naval aircraft construction.

Photo 3.5:

The F7F Tigercat

Source:
O'Leary, p. 140. This is a -3N version housing radar in
it's nose.
It was used as a night-fighter.

Another important fighter design was on the drawing boards in

the first half of

1941.

This pursuit had

background of designs

dating back to 193b when the company studied the idea of using
larger engine in the wildcat.

The outline had been formed in

January and was given it's "final definition" in Specification SD236 and Report No.

2421 on 24 February 1941.

1

officially started.
In

The F5F Hellcat was

June the Navy asked Grumman for an improved wildcat

in

case of delays in the Vought F4U Corsair, which came out of the

previously mentioned 1933 design competition.

Grumman instead

showed them the blueprints for the new design, and the Navy ordered two on the

last day of

Wright Cyclone,

but with

the month.

The Hellcat

first used the

the delays encountered by tne Corsair and

Republic's P-47 Thunderbolt,

it

switched to the Pratt & Whitney

Double Wasp engine with it's two-stage,

two-speed supercharger,

often considered the best radial piston engine ever used.

It

gave

the

first production Hellcats

were flying
i*orth

year and

speed of 375 m.p.h.

These FSFs

half after the experimental order.

American's P 51 Mustang could claim

and this was only by one month.

Only

faster development,

Because of the rising weights be-

ing encountered in combat aircraft, Grumman designers put an

...

*v-,"x
-- _/
i

Photo 3.6
Grumman
F6F-5 liellcat
:

'

Source for Both

Photos
John
fay lor, Combat
Aircraft of the
:

iior Id

503

Photo 3.7
FGF-3 Hellcat
the
variant joining
:

the fleet in
19A2-A3.

r
- ~>*

jx

*v

:->.:-

.-

Grumman

i'f.F-3 Ik-Ik. ,i

immense wing on the liellcat.

It

was

the

largest airfoil

to

be

used

on a single-engined fighter during the war with a span of nearly

forty-three feet and

wing area of 334 square feet. Two-thirds of

the wingspan was eliminated during storage with

of

the sto-wing.

the

installation

The big powerplant and the large wing gave the

XF6F an initial climb rate of nearly 3,000 feet per minute and

production versions 3,650 feet per minute.

Speed and climb had

been seen as being extremely important in combat

America's involvement.

in

Europe before

General Manager Swirbul visited England

during the Battle of Britain and became informed of what was needed.

He

later went

to

the Pacific after

Japan at tacked the United

'

89

States, and naval pilots'

supported the earlier information.

The

knowledge gained in these trips was incorporated into the Hellcat's structure
In

June workers continued to build wildcats and Martlets as

orders came in for more to be made.

let

lis

to

be

(the first

There were still ninety Mart-

contructed, all of which would use the sto-win"

ten on the contract did not have

additional 150 Martlet Mk IVs (equivalent

the

to

folding wing).

United States Navy followed

summer.

Five of

the

f i

latter were delivered by the end of the year.

the Davy's preparation

In

in

struggle at sea had

for a

'

new sales, but

much greater

this area.

the

first six months of

1941, Grumman

'

unfilled orders

had risen to $70 million despite working two shifts.

this period equalled over 39 million,

period was $747,218.

the entire

Income during

287% increase over the

amount earned by 30 June the previous year.

was

The

another 436 F4F-4s during the

The war in Europe was having an effect on Grumman

impact

An

F4F-4 except for the

use of a Wright eigine) were placed on order by the British.

Net profit

in

this

Every business category was skyrocketing, as

industry's production and financial statistics.

Grumman's share of the orders placed in the aircraft industry

still hovered around 1.0%.

The next five months were a busy period for Grumman.

sixty-nine Widgeons were sold,

In

thirty-three to individuals.

Coast Guard obtained twenty-five.

1941

The

The remaining eleven G-44s were

originally ordered by the government of Portugal, but were com-

mandeered by the United States Army after the Japanese surprise

attack.

more were sold to the Navy, and also to the British

(called Goslings), during the war.

11

-'

90

On

August 1941 the Avenger made it's first flight. Although

the XTBF-1 nearly ,net

the requirements promised,

the Avengers

pro-

duced in quantity did not have the speed or ceiling originally

specified. The rising weights of pilot protection,

more caused the reduction in performance.

It

fuel

tanKs,

and

was nicknamed "Tur-

key" by naval pilots who viewed it's ability to fly when it's

"wings were clipped," for without power the TBF lost altitude
fast.

Despite the shortcomings the Avenger performed their tasks

admirably, especially when escorted by Grumman or Vought fighters.

With the initial

flight and the previous production order for

TBFs,

three major warbirds built by the corporation had

two of

the

flown and were in mass production by the time the United States

entered the Second World har.

mental order.

Thus Grumman,

The
like

third had received an experithe

industry as a whole, fought

the war with pre-war designs.

Table 3.1 shows the financial development of Grumman during

the

four years prior to the United States entry into

The company was growing at

until

the war broke out

tion's financial

in Europe.

assuring
Net

1941,

r t

II.

,iar

ies

This event caused the corpora-

statistics to skyrocket.

In

come doubled over the previous year's total.

first half of

'..orlc

rate similar to the mid- t hi

1940 it's total

By

end of

the

in-

the

gross income already exceeded the 1940 total,

second consecutive doubling of annual gross profits.

profits grew,

too,

ders made the greatest

but not at

leap,

such a high rate.

growing from three and

Unfilled ora

half million

dollars at the end of 1933 to seventy million dollars by 30 June

1941. Compared to the aircraft
ed at a similar rate.

analogous

to

the

industry, Grumman

The affect

results of all

'

backlog advanc-

the war had on the company was

the manufacturers,

i.e.,

it

was

91

obtaining the same amount of orders as the rest of the industry.

The war in Europe had a major

contracts the company received.

impact on the amount of exports

Table 3.2 shows that

these rose

from 4% of the planes procured in 1938 to 41% in the year the war
began.

the

In

second half of 1940,

the United States Navy began to

prepare itself for war after Japan took advantage of France's

Table 3.1

Grumman'

Grumman
Backlog

(end of)

's

Finance's 1938-40

Grumman
Backlog

Grumman
Gross

vs.

Income

Grumman'

's

Net

Profits

Industry

1938
1939
1940

3,500,000
5 6,000,000
$63,500,000

1.0%
1.6%

34,904,946 S 617,074
54,482,350 $ 892,063
$8,811,294 $1,415,916

$70,000,000

1.0%

$9,001,013 $747,218

1941
1st 6

months

Sources
vol.

39

"Aviation Finance: Current Earnings Report," Aviation,

(May 1940), p.

84.
1

(
,

Table 3.2
y
E

vol>
vol
.

4
4

iiay

(Cct.

1941),
1941),

in.
131.

p.

planes
ordered

USN

Military

US Army
Air
Corps

112
194,
1
651
790

66%
38%
S5%
86%

ft

Export

1S3S
1939
1940
1941*

4%
41%
15%
5%

23%
1%

0.2%

number may be too low, for Threulsen stated 759 wildcats (p. 122)
ordered in 1940. Even by adding the 95 F4F-3As which Swanborough
and Bowers state as ordered in 1941 (p. 206)
which makes our
1941 Wildcat orders roughly the same
the most
get is 592.

*Does not include orders after 12/7/41.

(The graph may exclude some comn.erc a
~~
unaware o f
i

sales

the author

is
'

92

helplessness after German conquest by invading and occupying

French Indochina.

The United States demanded,

splendor of President Franklin D. Roosevelt,

Japan relinquish it's "protectorship",

materials as iron and oil until

it

did so.

Under this backdrop of events,

war.

last

the

that

It's refusal made war

the Navy geared

sixteen months before the war began,

Grumman four very large contracts for F4Fs

J2F-5s.

July 19A1

imposing embargoes on such

inevitable.
In

through the oracle

in

(2

it

for

awarded

orders), TBFs and

The Navy's preparation for war caused it's return as

Grumman Aircraft's main market.

The successf ulness of

the company during

the

last

three

years before Pearl Harbor can be illustrated by the achievement of

planes designed and produced during this period.

Each of

poration's planes, except the J2F series, was designed,

in

the early stage of

production between 1939 and 1941.

the cor-

tested,

or

These

planes showed their "metal" in the war.

The amphibians or the J2F series,
the Goose and rtidgeon,

interwar period.

and the naval versions of

performed many unglorious tasks during the

Aviators learned the procedures to aerial search

and rescue, air patrol, and personnel and supply transport.

J2F also aided many to

target sleeve.

the
to

fulfill

the

jobs

The

learn the art of aerial gunnery by pulling

After the war began these airplanes continued

that do not get

the notoriety they deserve.

Though these roles were often monotonous and certainly unglamorous,

they were still

important to the total war effort.

Of Grumman's combat aircraft

cat

of '.vorld War

II,

only the wild-

had been produced in quantity by the time Japan attacked the

United States.

.Vhen

the war began

number one fighter for the Navy.

the F4F was entrenched as

Although Harvard's Graduate

the

93

School of business showed that 471 F2A Buffaloes had been accepted to only 430 Grumman wildcats,

realistic portrayal of

U.

S.

wildcats to 90 Buffaloes.

Richard Threulsen save

Navy fighter strength,

In

more

listing 250

terms of front-line carrier ser-

vice the F4F was certainly top dog. Of

162 fighters aboard the

the

seven fleet carriers available in December 1941, all but 18 were

wildcats. 117
The F4F could not equal

Zero (Zeke),

in a

it's prime adversary,

dogfighting dual; however

Japanese

the

could more than

it

hold it's own against an equal or superior number of enemy fighters when operating as a group and utilizing tactics
it's ruggedness and firepower.

As one marine

highly contested airspace over Gaudacanal stated,

outmaneuver, outclimb, outspeed us.

is

not an even fight,

but with mutual

worth four or five Zeros."

In

support two Grummans are

"A Zero can't

take

fire from a Grumman and a Grumman can some times

the war against

fire from

Japan,

Zero."

In

year

the ratio

nearly 7:1.

in

the air by a

two seconds'

take as high as

first six months of

the

the F4F rolled up a kill

(meaning for every three planes shot down by

cat was destroyed

"The Zero could

One Zero against one Grumman

speaking of the wildcat's rugged-

ness, another pilot exaggerated,

fifteen minutes'

founded upon
involved in the

pilot

ratio of 3:1

Wildcat, one wild-

Japanese pilot).

At

the end of a

increased to 5:1, and by the end of the war

it

was

The F4F Wildcat performed it's Job well.

The Wildcats domestic competitor in the manufacturing arena,

the 3uffalo,
it

did not fare nearly as well.

performed di sas t r ious ly

was discounted (for

it

In

Even if it's poor

it's limited combat

U.

S.

battle record

did serve Finland adequately in the

94

country's struggle with the Soviet Union),

with the Navy because
ment.

it

the F2A was a failure

could not survive the carrier environ-

As historian John Lundstrom noted,

"The Brewster airplane

simply lacked the strength for prolonged service at sea." 120

Buffaloes experienced

high number of carrier deck crashes,

largely due to an inadequate undercarriage.

These mishaps caused

naval pilots to lose confidence

Brewster's reputation

in

the F2A.

sank farther into the depths when the Corsairs it built during the
war suffered wing stress, with several

losing their airfoils

during aerobatics. The scandalous activities of the company forced

it

out of business.

Grumman
war.

'

Avenger also achieved great distinction during the

Deliveries of the torpedo-bomber began in January 1942. After

the TEFs were "devastated" on 4

June at

the

were the first six Avengers to see combat),

Battle of .Midway (as

the TBF became

the

only torpedo-bomber used by the American Navy through the rest of

the war.

until

continued to serve various functions with the Navy

It

1954.

The Grumman airplane that presented the best performance

during the Pacific war was the F6F Hellcat, which was only being
built as a prototype when the American battleship fleet was made

obsolete on
flight

December 1941. After recording it's first production

in November

Fall of 1943.

For

the vast Pacific.

1942,

it

the next

made it's combat debut early in the

two years

it

dominated the skies over

Hellcats virtually won the Battle of the Phili-

pine Sea single-handedly by destroying

large majority of Japan's

carrier aircraft and pilots while defending the task force off the
:.iarianas.

In

two years of aerial

combat, F6Fs destroyed 5,155

enemy aircraft, nearly 75% of all Navy and Marine Corps "kills"

made in the entire war.

Only 270 Hellcats were lost to enemy a-

viators, giving the F6F an impressive kill ratio of 19:1.

The

vaunted Corsair, often considered the best pi ton-engined naval

fighter ever produced, had

10.5:1 kill

cats escorted attack aircraft

two of

the bombers were

lost

to

it

to

the air

It

the Hell-

hen

only fortv-

was also a mechanic's dream,

be ready for operations 90

highest mark in the fleet.

,'

tar pets,

enmeny combatants, making the

fighter an appreciated chaperone.

allowing

ratio

the assigned

to

122

to 95ii of

the

time,

the

when the F6F began to be replaced in

superiority role by the Corsair, which had proved it's

ability to operate off carriers while serving with Britain's Koyal

>iavy,

it

stayed aboard the fleet carriers as an attack aircraft,

even though

it

was not specifically designed for such a role.

The

Hellcat and the wildcat provided cheap but effective carrier

fighters
The F7F Tigercat and the F8F Bearcat
the beginning of

the war)

(a

project started after

were joining the fleet and marine units

when the atomic blasts ended the conflict.

combat,

though the F7F did serve as

.Marines

for several months.

Neither saw any major

night-fighter for the

Both would see action in Korea

few

years later, but by this time they were over-shadowed by the jets.
The perf ormance of these planes was superior, to the warbirds,

and

had the war continued in the Pacific they would have upheld the

reputation built by their predecessors.

Table 3.3 provides

list of all

used by the Navy during the war.

It

the carrier-fighters

iod utilized for design and experimental

warbirds, which was

planes.

to be

shows the relative short per-

work on the company's

contributing factor to the success of these

The quick design phase coupled with the squared features

96
Table 3.3

Air
Design
plane ,Vork
Started

Prototype
ordered

First
Flight

Produc-

5th Air-

tion
order

plane
delivery

Years
up to
5th

Years
Frontline
Service

del

F2A
mid 1935 6/23/3S
F4U
2/ /38 6/11/33
F4F-3 raid 193o 10/--/36
Fbf
/41
5/
6/30/42

1/--/38
5/29/40
2/12/39
12/02/43

6/11/33
4/02/41
3/03/39
-

6/--/39
Late 42
3/--/39

4
4

2*

4/

/44

1/2

3/4

12 +

This figure is somewhat misleading for it does not include the

work on the XF4F-1 biplane nor the -2 monoplane which lost in a
flight competition to the F2A, but this variant had been altered
enough to use the starting date listed.

Source:
Problems Accelerating Aircraft Produc t i on ...
Harvard
Business School, p. 16: plus a.y own personal compilation of
facts attained throughout the sources listed in the bibliography
,

of

the corporation's airframes which were easily manufactured,

helped Grumman mass porduce the aircraft used during the war.
This integration also allowed the most economical means

to

make aircraft be utilized. Grumman was very proud of the fact that
it

had the

lower-priced carriers available to the fleet, as Table

3.4 shows. The cost per pound of aircraft produced by the Sethpage

Table 3.4

Prices For ,Vorld

,;ar

II

Carrier-Fighters

Airplane

Price per Empty ,-,eight

Airplane of aircraft

Brewster F2A
Grumman F4F
Grumman F6F
Vought F4U

323,302
326,472
335,000*
$50,000**

4,420
5,238
9,025
8,932

lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.

Price/lb.
aircraft

of

$6.40
$5.05
$3.33
S3. 57

stated in Anderson's Hel lcat

p. 23.
The 27 Sept. 1943
article in Li f
entitled "Navy's Newest Fighter," has a
lower figure of $24,000.
** Anderson states Hellcat costs 2/3rds of Corsair.
*

As

manufacturer was decreasing in the war period.

The price of

Grumman's aircraft compared to it's competitors was favorable. The

comparison between the F2A and the F4F in Table 3.4 was

good

97

illustration in that
ly the

it

co.-nes

from two production orders in rough-

same period for the exact same number of airframes

(54).

Likewise the F6F and F4U prices were those at the end of tne war
when both had been built in nearly equal amount.

Good designs,

and efficient production leading to comparatively low prices, were

the key components

to

the

success of the period from 1939 to 1941.

Cone 1 us i on

The Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation's orders and

finances followed

parabolic pattern through it's first twelve

years in operation,

(See Diagram C.l and C.2)

similar to the pro-

duction in the periods of peacetime equilibrium and rearmamental

instability according to the wave theory presented by Robin

Hicham in Air Power:

A Concise

which reached it's low point

in

History

Unlike the industry,

peacetime production in 1933,

Grumman was growing rather than declining before this point.

.Management's planning to stay in business while the engineers pro-

duced their initial designs, and it's decision to produce fighters

and amphibians

for

the Navy were vital

this

to

initial success.

The Navy's purchase of experimental and production models of each

of

the

first

five designs produced by Grumman was also

reason for it's rise.

major

The reasons for these initial orders were

combination of the quality of engineering and the needs

of

the

Navy with it's expanding carrier force.

From 1934 to 193S Grumman grew at roughly the same pace as

naval aircraft expenditures.

It's progression in this period was

closely associated with the rise of carrier aviation.

Grumman

supplied the majority of fighters and single-engine amphibians for

the Navy.

The firm also associated it's growth by constructing

aircraft for export and commercial markets.

most

Production was the

important element of this period, and the firm's consistent

fair pricing, with perhaps one exception,

and the performance of

Diagram C.l
20
19

G
r

IS

17

16
I
B

15

14
IB

12

n
11

a
i

10

1
I

8
n
3

i
5

4
1
1

2
1

1930 1931 193Z 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941

YEAR

Diagram C.2;
800 r

A
i

r
P
i
a
5

d
e

780760740720700680660640620600580560540520500430460440-

420

400380360340320300-

d
f

r
ttt

Q
r

m
m
a
n

28C
260240220200180160140120.
100806040.
20.

32

33

34

35

36

37

YEAR.

38

39

40

41

Table C.31

Aircraft Production, 1940-45

Production

Company

41.188
.30.903

Douglas

30,696

Curtiss-Wright

26. LSI

Lockheed

18.926

Boeing

18..381

Grumman

17.428

Republic

15.60.3

Bell

13,575

Eastern Aircraft

D ivision.

General Motors

1.3,449

Martin

8.810

Chance-Vought
Ford
Goodyear

6,791

7.890
3,940
Production by
Airframe Weight
ithousands of lbs!

Company
Douglas

306.573

Convair

291.073

Percent ofS-Year
Gram! Total

15.3
14.6

Boeing

226,447

11.3

North American

210.913

10.5

Lockheed

180,118

9.0

Curtiss-Wright

136.091

Martin

126.970

6.3

Ford

6.9

123. 076

6.2

Republic

75.893

3.9

Grumman

73.767

3.7

Bell

.53.037

Eastern

'"

47.869

2.7
2.4

Chance -Vo ught

Goodyear

28.952

1.4

13.668

0.7

other plants

101,136

5.1

1,995,613

100.0

All

hij

Sumlier of Units

North American
Convair

Grand

total

11

plants

SOURCE: \V. F. Craven and J. L. Cult. "Men and Plimw." as cited in Jnlin Bell
Roe
Climb In Greatness: The American Aircraft Industry, 1920-imO
(Cambridge Mass MIT

Press.

1968), p.

168.

* Eastern aircraft Division of General motors built

airframes from Grumman' s designs, thus the number
of planes built from the company's blueprints
was
even higher.

99
the aircraft produced allowed

The war years of

it

to

expand.

1939 to 1941 were a jreat

growth of the corporation.

stimulus to the

Orders leaped upward in 1939 and sky-

rocketed in 1940, and gross income followed suit, although

lagged behind the orders by one year.

engineering work on the warbirds was

of

this period,

for

it

major factor in the success

allowes the new designs to play

role in the upcoming war.

the beginning of

building of

major

The cheap costs compared to it's com-

petitors was an added bonus to the Navy.

in

it

The quick, yet skillful

The expansion that came

1939 with the aid of public finance, and the

new plant in 1940 funded by European orders and the

Reconstruction Finance Corporation were important in supplying

aircraft early in the war. The expansion from 1939 to 1941 in men,

machines, and work space placed the company in

able to obtain the orders during World War 11.

position

to

be

100

Appendix 1;

Table A-lj

Investments and Stock

ORIGINAL IMESTKiL'T

Investor
Shares

A. p. Loening

Grover Loening
Leroy Grumman
Leon Swirbul
E. U. Poor
F. G. Towl

Preferred
100
200

100

_50_

^ub-tptal

450

Money for Shares

100
200
675
325
ICO

_50_
1-450

Preferred
510,000
20,000

*2,500

Total Money

512,500
$25,000
516,375 + 575
$ 3,125
512,500
* 6.250

5.000

5,000
16,375
3,125
2,500
1,250

545.000

536.250

531.250

53,125
500
1,000
1.000

5 3,125
$
500
5 1,000
5 1.000

10,000

J75

3 March 1930

Investment
Bill Schwendler
. W. Poor
2d Vfeick
Julie Kolpit

125
20
40

Total

1-675

545.000

541.375

586.375 + 575

Source; Richard Threulsen, The Grumman Story ,

pp. 32, U.
Adds the three incorporation shares purchased
by Grumman.
e U Se
XiStS
W7 > 2 5> f wiiioh available funds equalled ,n^
?
* 53,825 (In Guggenheim Medalists initial capital stated
as 567 000)
when giving final total Threulsen lists
536,750, with 564,325
actually available, only slight^ less than ay addition.

"

"

18 December 1930 "Agreement and Consent of Stockholders and

Subscribers
to modification and Partial Cancellation of Certain
Subscription g 3 ements"
caused a reduction in the par value of preferred stock
by 50*. but left
common stock alone.
January 1933; Montauk Research Corporation
formed to keep the patents
and property of Grumaan. Aircraft Engineering
Corporation mder Control
of those who had already invested. Each
of the nine stockholders was
given the same number of shares as he owned
in the company.
"**ny. Each
share
=" *n-re
given a par value of one dollar.

t^HZ
tering
1

ll^L^T T
V

J
ounoed ** *>*1 So public with its stock,
regisL40,CO0 shares of common stock with the Securities
Exchange CommisC
rent t0 ""
50m to Gru2man ***", and
j!

Smif

W2

^^^

si
was held back for exercise of warrants.
40,000

101

Appendix 2:

a=L

-2-

Dimensions;

Speed;

Span;

Landing:

Maximum

Climbi

The Airplanes

34'

6'"

Length;

65 m.D,h.

\ ,

24"
..

.,,

6"

Height;
......

11'

,-J

1"
.

..;

",

:.

..

201 m.p.h. (575 h.p.), 220 m.p.h. (775 h.p.); -2, 207 m.p.h.

Cruising

191-200 m.p.h.

avg.

1,000

1,724-1,800 feet per minute (depending on engine)

initial

Service ceiling;

21,000-25,000 feet (depending

Range/fuel cptyj

800 miles/120 gal. (575 h.p.), 6V7 miles/120 gal. (775 h.p.)

Line sketchings

of the FF-1
Source: Swanborough
and Bowera, United
States Maw Aircraft
Since 1911. o. 196 .

vfUMMAH

Ft.

up->n

engine)

102

F2F
Dimensions; Span* 28' 6" Length;
Wing area; 230 sq. ft.
Speed; Maxt
Cruising;
Landing

Climb Rate;
Average
ilnitial;
ceiling;

Powerplant;
Weight;

n.

5"

Height;

9'

1"

2,500 ft./min.
2,700 ft./min.
27,500 ft.

Pratt
Whitney R-1535-72, Wright "Cyclone" R-1S2Q-F5J
650 h.p.
750 h.p.
3,847 lbs (gross load)
St.

Range/Fuel capacity:
Armament;

21'

237 m.p.h. (MM), 257 m.p.h. (.aright)

215 m.p.h.
66 m.p.h.

750-985 miles/110 gallons

Two Browning .30 in. machine guns in the nose.

. B

si g ,..

1M, nshM

mw

(650

,p

pran

4 Whtaey ;, win . wup

Junl ,.

e ; 8fn; ) ;

103

F3F
Dimensions-;

Span
Wing area

32'
Length'
260 sq. ft.

23' 2"

Height i

F3F-1

F3F-2

240 m.p.h
215 m.p.h.
66 m.p.h

260 m.p.h.
241 m.p.h.
66 m.p.h.

Climb Rate;
Average
Initial
'2,700 ft/min
Ceiling
29,000 ft.

32,000 ft.

2,750 ft/min.
33,300 ft.

750 h.p.
Wright
Cyclone

950 h.p.
Wright
Cyclone

Speed;

Maximum
Cruising
Landing

Powerplant

'

650 h.p.
P&W Twin
Wasp Jr.

Weight/max

4,100 lis.

4,620 lis.

Kange/fuel

720 miles/
110 gal.

975 miles/
130 gal.

4,795 lbs.
980 miles/
130 gal.

one .30 and one .50

Price
:
Experiment:
Production:
per unit 1

$75,840

$26,300

$12,750

$16,525

$16,536

$25,037

^V?

the

4"

264 m.p.h.
242 m.p.h.
66 m.p.h.

Armament

9'

21=3

in..

Brownings

**

fflodi*iO**ian

SfL^LfT"

A M.

./ 26

of the last F3F-2 into the 2F3F-.^

3'
th9 "aVy dd not
-tensive

M F3f

Grumm s

,.,

fM n -^
.

tS

10U

F4? wildcat (Martlet')

Dimensions; Spani 38'

Length:
Ming area: 260 sq. ft.

F4F-3

28'

9"

Height:

JM=2A_

Speed;

331 m.p.h.

312 m.p.h.

11'

10"

JM=4_
318 m.p.h.

Cruising
Landing
Climb Bats;
Average
Initial
Ceiling

Powerplant

37,500 ft.

34,300 ft.

34,900 ft.

PM

1200 h.p.
2 stage
2 speed twin

1200 h.p.
single stage
2 speed

same as
F4E-3

'.asp

'..'right

Cyo.

'.'.'eight/max

7,065 lbs.

6,876 lbs.

7,964 lbs.

Eange/fuel

S60 miles/
160 gallons

825 miles/
160 gallons

770 miles/
160 gallons

Armament

(4)

.50 MG

.50

(4)

KG

Prices

per unit:

U) $26,472
(2)

323,361

A good view of
the Wildcat's
(Martlet's)
"plank-like"
wing.
Wildcats were the exclusive carrier-b.aea,
fighter aircraft for the U.S.

Navy

in

theA

Jri'rea^f^ejcarjnj^facific. .' ~

go<yd

at the Grumman

fighter
fuselage.
'

(Photo: NAjMJ

"'

^xx^ji-^3

Picture Source: Jlikesh, Robert, ^National

Air and Space Museum," Smithsonian Inst.

105

?5F Skyrocket (XP-50)

XF5F-1
Span
Length
Height
Max. speed

3S0 m.p.h. it
16.500 feet

Cruising speed
Initial rate
of clicb
Ceiling
Powerplant

317 m.p.h.

4CO0 ft./min.
33,000 feet
Two 1,200 h.p.
Wright Cyclones
R-1820-40

'1

XP-50
42 feet
32 feet
12 feet
424 m.p.h.

42 feet

eight/max.

Range/fuel

similar to ?5F
40.000 feet
Two 1,200 h.p.
bright Cyclones
E-1820-67/69
10,553 lbs
585 miles/217 sal

* Proposed specifications since the iP-50 crashed during

its initial flight before statistics could be gained.

i""ii- ***

ijC

'"

*~

jfrt

.-*

'

'

106

F6F Hellcat;

Dimensions;
Span
:
Wing are-s

42' 10"
Length;
334 square feet

33'

XF6F

Speed
Maximum
Cruising
Landing

'

Climb rate
Initial
Average
Ceiling
1

Height;

14'

5"

F6F-3

375 m.p.h.
2GG m.p.h.
82 m.p.h.

F6F-5

391 m.p.h.

410 m.p.h.
200 m.p.h.
32 m.p.h.

200 m.p.h.
82 m.p.h.

2,980 ft. /nan.

2,350 ft./min
35,500 feet

Power plant

10"

3,650 ft./min.
3,100 ft./min.
39,400 feet

similar to -3
3,150 ft./min.
38,800 feet

Originally 1,600
Pratt & Whitney's
Pratt & Whitney z
2000 h.p.
h.p. Wright R-2600 2000 h.p
replaced by P & U
(R-2800-10 or 1DW,
(R-2800-1CW)
2000 h.p. in IF6F-3
'

Weight/max.

11,629 lbs.

13,221 lbs.

12,593 lbs.

Range/fuel

1,500 miles
250 gallons

1,350 miles
250 gallons

1,900 miles
250 gallons

Price

Sources:

Price had originally been approximately $50,000 per

plane, however price cut to $35,000, and even to about
?24,000
Anderton, Hellcat
0'Lary, Naval Fighters of World

'War

II in Action

107

F7F ;

Dimensions;
Span
Wing area

:
:

511 6"
Length J
455 sq. ft.

XF7F-1

45' 6g"

Height;

13'

9"/ 14' 7

F7F-2M"

g7F-3

445 m.p.h.
190 m.p.h.

460 m.p.h.
190 m.p.h.

Speed}
Ma y-iTmim

Cruising
Landing
Climb rate;
average
Initial
Ceiling

Power plant

Weight/max.

430 m.p.h.
ISO m.p.h.
approx. 70 knots

4,200 ft./min.
42,600 feet
Two 1,800 h.p.
Wright Cyclones
SS-26OO-I4

20,107 lbs.

5,200 ft./min.
41,000 feet

6,000 ft. min.

40,000 feet

Two 2,100 h.p.

Pratt & rthitneys
R-2800-22W

Two 2,100 h.p.

Pratt Sc Whitneys
R-280O-34W

21,690 lis.

Range/fuel

1,160 miles
406 gallons

1,800 miles

Armament

Four 20 mm in
wing root and
Four .50 in.
in the nose

Four 20 ram and

rocket capable

Source;

21,906 lbs.
l,9CO miles

O'Leary, United States Nav al Fighter of World

jar II in
I Poole,
Dorset; Blanford Press, 1980),
p. I44.

Ant. -Un

108

JF. J2F :

Dimensions
Sp*"
Wing area

;
i

Length;
39'
409 sq. ft.

33' / 34'

JF-2

Height;

12' 8"

15'

1"

J2F-5

Speed;

Madman
Cruising
Landing
Cl-;,-ih

rate

185 m.p.h.
155 m.p.h.
65 m.p.h.

138 m.p.h.
150 m.p.h.
65 a.p.h.

1,600 ft. /sin.

1,500 ft./min.

Ceiling

27,000 feet

Powerplant

775 h.p.

wight Cyclone

850 h.p. iiright Cyclone

Ii-1320-50

Weight/luax.

5,760 lbs

Range/Fuel

620 miles/ 150 gallons

Price

$ 20,944 in contract

for 11

Sourcesj

6,711 lbs
780 miles/ 190 gallons
5 33,193 in contract

for 144

''American Planes & Engines for 1938," Aviation,

vol.

(February 1938), pp. 35-66.

37

(Used for JE-2)

Swanborough & Bowers, United States Haw Aircraft Since

1911. 2cd ed.. (Annapolis; U.S. Naval Institute Press.
19681,_p._204._

Source:
"Grumman Utility,"
Aviation, vol. 33 (Dec.
1934), p. 391.

109

Grumman TBF-1C

Avenger Specification

Power Plane One Wright R-26U0-8 (Cyclone

14)) iwo-rott

14-cylinder air-cooled radial engine rated imilitarvl at 1,700

rip at 2.600 rpm from sen icvel to\',000 ft i^l ; miand 1.450 hf
2.600 rpm between 7.H0O tu2.3"5 m) and 12.000 m i* 66;j
m), or (normal) 1.500 hpai 2.400 rpm trom bed level u. .auOf:
(I 770 m) and 1.350 hp al 2.400 rpm between K.9O0 ft (2 71 5
m) and 13.000 ft (3 960 m). Three-bladed Hamilton Standard
^onstant-speed propeller ol 13 ft (3.^6 m) diameter Muncard
internal fuel capacity of 335 US gal
269 !i comprising 147
US gal (557 II main tank with 9-X US gal i356 I) pon and
starboard. Provision for two 58 L'Seal (220 I) underw if*, tanks
and (ferry) 2" : US gal
042 I) jettfsonabie capons ha* tank.
Performance: (Al 16.412 It*" 444 k): Max speed. IX** mpb
(401 krarh)ai^-ak'vel.2.^ 7 mnht4Ukm hi.it 2.000 ti' *.nhti
l u5tl
in); range I.IU1VC. 153 inph.l 2-lo kin hi; Imu. to 0,000*
in), 13 mm. to 20.000 ft \u tW5 ui). 4 -6 rain; service ceiling.
21.400 ft (6 525 mi; max range (internal fuel). 1.105 mis.
(1 778 km), (with two drop tanks), 1 .390 mis (2 236 krr. i: terry
lange (with weapons bay and underwing tanks). 2.ca5 mis
at

Model No. S-44 (Widgeon)

SRUM^iAN

"

s?3?

320 .km).

(4

Weights: Emptv equippec 10 <S5 lb (4 7&fc Kg); loadeit lone

3-2 torpedo). 16.4 2 it' v 7 444 kg), (fotr 500-lb- 226.8-kg
hombs), 16.426 lb (7 450 k*(. (Mk 13-2 tor iedo and underwing tanks). 17.364 lb (7 876 kg)
Dimensions: Span. 54 ft 2 in :6",5l m), folded). 19 ft o m (5. ""3
m); length. 40 ft 9 in (12.42 rn): height (tail .town). 13 ft 9 in
(4.19 m); wing area.490sq ft (45.52 m-); wheel track. 10 ft 10
in (3,50 m)
Armament:
Defensive!. Tw<
fixed for*;.rd-nnnK <J-5-in
12,7-mm) machine guns with MX) rpg, one 0-5-in 12.7-mmj
machine gun with 400 rounds in power-ope. Jted dorsal turret
and one 0-3- in (7. 62 -mm) machine gun with *00 rounds tiring
aft from ventral position Offensive): One Mk 13-2 torpedo.
one 1.000-lb (453.6-kg) bomb or four MlO-tb (226.3-kg)

Mk

Specifica.ions: Span 40

31
JO

ft. overall length

tread
overall height t) ft., landing gi-ur
wing loading 1S..... lb. per so., ti.. power
3.O.J.
1L3B ft- J hp.. weight empty
two lUuger enross weight 4,300, powered by
sea level.
gines with a total rating of 400 h|> -c
r_aige * -p
fu4 capacity 108 gallons, normal
speed
-0 fjalcruising
at
consumption
fuel
miles,

ft.,

in.,

loading

wr hour, wing aret

"f.n>
*.'"
.

;.

3Q.

ft.,

,.a 1T.3
.irua

q.

inelu'.lug aileron.-

aileron area 'total* i-i.u" sti. ft., j;.

;'.rudder area 4 *q. It.. si-..-u
total c.uvutur arcu lU.ij
ft.,
s*i.

>!.

^5.5

Seats

rive.

L'ti-oHMASCE' Cruising |lw1

iiui ut an n;.it'.-le of shJ>- .;

150 miles
.

per

stalling >&ean

ciimb At level aTu

<J1 adka i-'r
min ice. service ceiling l^.UoO ft.
hull.,

per

it.

bombs.

Grumman

flirc.

Engineering Corp.!

21
'Climb to

%M>

) M,.

fl

Oiling.
AImuIuIc Ceiling
Absolute Ceiling

Si-rvtrr

One

lillgilre

24.1NMI

14,OO0Ft.

lbs.)

G*V:

Wight

ie-alane
'lirftline

Orittl

Gross Weight 7500 ibs.

Empty Weight 5320 lbs.

Load

2180

lbs.

mum

fcri

Oil Capac(15 Gals.)

mjonnim Fuel Capac-

gg
ity

(220 Gals.)

112

lbs.

1320

lbs.

"~(750(f lbs.)
__

Speed

at

Speed

at

jyiiiiimm

v'Sq Level

_
205M.P.H.

fjttft.

195

M.P.H.

Cruising Speed at 9600

193 M.P.H.
ft.
(300 H.P.)
Cruising Speed at 3000
ft.
(300 H.P.) ....
184M.P.H.
Cruising Speed at Sea
Level (300 H.P.) ...
175 M.P.H.
Maximum Rate of
Ciimb at Sea Level 1490 Ft. per Min.
Climb to 5000 ft
4.4 Min

Take-off Run at Sea

Level
Take-off Time at' Sea
Level
Take-off Time at Sea
Level (Calm, glassy)
Landing Speed at Sea
I

vi-l

l'l.

_'.\WJ Kt.
Willi

(7500

(Rips Down)

7V0
11

1''t.

Sees.

ISSecs.

H0M.P.I1.

Fuel Consumption with

_J00_H.P
fttrnw

52 Gals, per Hr.

MPTl. Pimer 1*1 /. "iSf 7,ii,

75%
506....
795
75% ... 480
755
46% ... 740
1150
75% ...460
720

9.600 Ft. 193

5.000 Ft. 184
5.000 Ft. 150
Sea Level 175

uo

a,

HW<Js(

111

Appendix 4

Aircraft Prices

U.S. Haval Fighters of the 1930s and World War

Prototype
ordered

Plane

Prototype
Price

II

Production
price

initial
contract
(> in year)

Co5t
per
lb.

Boeing F43-3

5/10/30)

$ 50.000

$17.414

30 in 1931

I 7.59

Boeing F43-4

6/30/31)

82.152

$10.900

38 in 1932

$ 4,65

4/ 2/31)

I 73.975

$19.000

27 in 1932

4/16/32)

(2 at)
| 104. 712

314.731

28 in 1932

$15-313

27 in 1934

$_5^op_

314,815

54 in 1934

$ 5.64

$ 75,340

316,525

54 in 1935

5 26,300*

$16,536

81 in 1937

$ 12,750*

?25,037

27 in 1938

$ 7.70

$28,302

54 in 1938

6.40

54 in 1939

3 5.05

Gruranan FF-1

Curtiss 3FC-2
Curt is a BF2C
Gruiaman F2F

(11/ 2/32)

Grunaan F3F-1

(10/
(

/34)

7/25/36)

Brewster F2A
Gruraaan F4F-3

Gruaazan F6F

Vought F4U

3 5.90

4.85

I 5.75

5.09

(10/-/3S)

26,472

0/30/41)

$35,000

12,000

.63

6/11/38)

$50,000

2,000

^ 5.57

Modification of production airframe

When conparing prices, one should look at the nueber
purchases and
For example, the original F2A and F4F production sales
natch
very well, since both are for the sate nnaber
of airfrai.es and were
purchased in nearly the saae tijne period.
The F6F and F4U are alsa good ConparlBon.
These two show that Gruraan's warbirds were cheaper
to buy. The lower costs of Curtiss' and Boeing's
fighters in 1932 show
that there were other reasons besides cost that
allowed Grunsnan to takeover the carrier fighter market in the nid-1930s.
the year.

112

Footnotes

Barrett Tillman, avenger at War

(New York:

Charles Soribner's Sons,

1979), p. 17.
2 ilsbeth
E. Freudenthal, "The Aviation Business in the 1930 's," The
History of the American Aircraft Industry 8. R. Simons^n; editor, (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The KIT Press, 1968), p. 85.
.

^Reginald Wright Arthur, Contact!

Careers of U. S. Naval Aviators
Assigned Numbers 1 to 2000. vol. 1 . (Washington. D. C: Naval Aviator
Register, 1967), p. 328.
4
David A. Anderton, Hellcat . (New York:
1981), p. 22.

Crown Publishers Lie,

'Anderton, Hellcat , p. 4.

Charles D. Bright, The Jet Makers: The Aerospace Industry from

1945 to 1972 (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1973), p. 176.
Bright was actually describing the post-war management, which was made up
of primarily the same men. r.oy Grumman had vacated the presidency and had
becoite Chairman of the Board, and the others advancing up a step.
.

'"what the Factories re Doing," aviation

vol. 32, no. 3 (March 1933),

p. 76.
t>

Richard Threulsen, The Grumman Story (New York: Praeger Publishers,

1976), p. 35. The plan stated is quite similar to the one given by this
.

author.
'United States House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Aeronautics Making an Lnvestigation into Certain Phases -f
the Manufacture of Aircraft and aeronautical Accessaries, and Related
Sub.jects as They Refer to the Navy Department , (.lashington, D. C.:
USGFO,
1934), p. 407. Head of the committee was New York Congressman John Delaney,
thus the inquiry has become known as the Delaney Hearings .

Delaney Hearings

p. 413.

Threulsen, The Grumman Story , p. 41.

12
Temple N. Joyce, "Airplane Design in Relation to Tactical Requirements," USNJP, vol. 57, no. 341 (July 1931), pp. 981-984. The autnor was
the V.P. of the Berliner-Joyce aircraft manufacturing firm.

John B. Lundstrom, The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from
Pearl Harbor to Midway (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1984),
.

p.

12.

Threulsen, The Grunaan Story , p. 113.

^Bill
p.

Gunston, The Plane Makers . (London:

New English Library, 1980),

46.

14

Grey and Leonard Bridgman, Jane's nil The World's jiircr&ft

(Sampson low Marsten a Company, Ltd., 1938} , p. 269c.
C. G.

193S

John W. R. Taylor, ed., Combat Aircraft of the World

and Michael Joseph: 1969), p. 499.

(Ebury Press

Wlit. Coaaander Forrest Sherman, USN, "Fighters," USNJP, vol. 56,

no. 331 (September 1930), pp. 831-33.
The author becaoe a renowned World
War II strategist and later Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).

Delaney Hearings , p. 414.

17

18
19

Delaney Hearings

p. 397.

Threulsen, The Grumman Story, p. 60.

Gunston, The Plane Makers, p. 46.

(See explanation on footnote 20).

Delaney Hearings , p. 1,511. According to the hearings, Britain's

Hawker Ninrod was the fastest naval fighter in the world in 1933-34, with
a speed of 210 m.p.h. By the time the FF-1 reached the service there were
several fighters in the world with 200r a.p.h. capability.
Lt. Harold M. Martin, USN;
no. 342 (August 1931), P. 1040.

"Service Aircraft,"

USHIP

vol. 57,

Bureau of Aeronautics (USN), Tests of Service airplanes," USNJP,

vol. 57, no. 343 (September 1931), p. 1,276.

22
23

Anderton, Hellcat

Delaney Hearings

p. 17.

pp. 470, I484.

^"Jobs Which Are Required in Constructing Aircraft,"

vol. 37, no. 4 (October 1940), pp. 49-51.
25

Delaney Hearings

Aero Digest ,

p. 286.

Gordon Swanborough and Peter Bowers, United States Navy Aircraft

Since 1911 2cd edition, (Annapolis, Maryland 1 Naval Institute Press, 1968),
.

p. 196.

27

Theodore Roscoe, On the Seas and In the Skies: A History of the

(New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1970), p. 239.

U. S. Navy's Air Power

Swanborough and Bowers, Navy Aircraft

Threulsen, The Grumman Story , p. 77.

p.

197.

297

Delaney Hearings

pp.

530, 1484.

Threulsen, The Gruranan Story

p. 76.

^Claude Swanson, Secretary of the Navy,

Havy

Ajrcrv.ft Purchased By the

FI 1934 . Seriate Miscellaneous Document no. 6, 74th Congress,
(Washington, D. C.J USGPO, 1935), p. 3.

Dep.artr.ient.

1st Session,

united States House of Hepresentatives, Pooling of Patents: Hearings

3efore the Committee on Patents 74th Congress, (Washington, D, C.: USGPO,
1936), p. 62.
.

32

Pooling of Patents , pp. 97, 190.

^ Pooling
-

pooling

of Patents , p. 170.
of Patents

Delaney Hearings

Pooling of Patents
Delaney Hearings
37
j

pp. 3-210.

p. 642.

pp. 6-52.

p. 307.

Delaney Hearings

pp. 644-45.

Delaney Hearings

pp. 472-73.

^'Threulsen, The Grusiraan Story

Delaney Hearings

pp. 17, 79.

pp. 466, 632-33.

^Freudenthal, "The Aviation Business in the 1930s,"

p.

105.

"Naval air craft Expenditures 1920-39," The Congressional Record

vol. 85, Part 2, 76th Congress, 2cd Session, (appendix), pp. 727-28.
42
43

Delaney Hearings , p. 503.

Delaney Hearings , p. 502.

44]Delaney
^

Hearings, pp. 502-3, 644 (quote)

Delaney Hearings, pp. 295, 502-3

40.

Delaney Hearings, p. 273.

Part II
in

"Flying Equipment;
(toy 1934), P. 160.
48

Delanev Hearings

New Ships for the Navy,"

Aviation

vol. 33, no.

p. 273, 470.

Threulsen, The Grumman Story

'Gunston, The Plane Makers

p.

pp. 78-9.
46.

Claude Swanson, Secretary of the Navy, United States Department of

the Navy Annual Report. FY 1934 . (Washington, D. C: USGFO, 1936), p. 2.
52.

W. H. Standley, Acting Secretary of the Navy, Aircraft Purchased bv

the Navy Department. FY 1935 Senate Miscellaneous Document no. L46, 74th
Congress, 2cd Session, (.Washington, D. C: USGPO, 1936), p. 2.
.

53

-^'News of the Month:

(February 1935), p. 65.

Fastest Amphibian," Aviation

vol. 34, n~. 2

'^Paul R. Matt and Bruce Robertson, United States Navy and Marine C^rps
Fighters 1918-1962 (Fallbrook, California"! Aero publisher Inc., 1962),
pp. 68-9.
.

Swanborough and Bowers, Navy Aircraft

Taylor, Combat Aircraft

Delaney Keariigs
56

p. 197.

p. 499.

p. 634.

"Production and import," aviation , vol. 35, no. 4 (April 1936), p. 79.

57

1939.

"Wings of the Navy," Lloyd Bacon, director, aarner Brothers Pictures

This movie uses a F2F in showing the testing of an airplane.

53 m

Threulsen, The Grumnan Story

59
9.

Matt and Robertson, Navy and

gnd Marine Coras Fighters
Threulsen, The Grumcian Story

p. 84.
,

pp. 09-70.

pp. 84-7.

"Production and lixport," Aviation

vol. 35, no. 4 (April 1936), p. 79.

61

Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America, Inc., Aircraft Year Book

for 1935 . vol 17, (Clinton, Massachusetts:
The Colonial Press, 1935), p. 84.
Claude Swanson, Secretary of the Navy, United States Department of
(Washington, D. C: USGPO, 1935} , p. 9.

the Navy Annual Report. FI 1935

,

(Washington, D. C.

,?Y 1936, Senate Miscellaneous Document no. 6,

USGFO, 1937), p. 6.

United States Department of the Navy, United States Naval .iviati-n

1910-1980 3rd edition, (Washington, D. C; USGP", p.
.

"Service Aviation," Aviation , vol. 36, no. 4 (April 1937), p.

Swanoon, Aircraft Purchased by the Navy Dent

"Production and Export," Aviation

FT 1936, p. 3.

vol. 35, no. 4 (April 1936), p. 73.

"Service Aviation," Aviation , vol. 36, no. 4 (April 1937), p.

"Grusman's Amphibian," Aviation, vol. 3o, no. 7 (July 1937), p. 36.

68

Threulsen, The Gruaman Story

p. 97-8.

Threulsen, The Grumman Story

p.

100.

69

Adolphus Andrews, Acting Secretary of the Navy, Aircraft Purchased

by the Navy Department. FT 1937 . Senate Kiscelleneous Document no. 120,
75th Congress, 2cd & 3rd Sessions, (Washington, D. C: USGPO, 1938), p. 2.
'Gunston, The Plane Makers
"News of the Month;
(November 1936), p. 60.

p. 48.

Export Grumman s," Aviation

Taylor, Combat Aircraft

vol. 35, no. 11

p. 499.

71
G. H. Oakes, "Grumman G-22 'Gulf hawk ," Aircruft of the National ,>ir
and Scace Museum (Washington, D. C. :
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1976).
1

"One For Al,

"

Aviation , vol. 36, no. 2 (February 1937), p. 44.

Threulsen, The Gruainan Story

72
"Iiews of the Month;
(January 1937), p. 53.
73

p. 94-96.

Intercity Record," Aviation

Threulsen, The Grurman Story

p.

vol. 36, no. 1

89.

7'

"A Decade of Grumman Progress," Aero Digest , vol. 36, no. 1 (January
1940), p. 52.

Threulsen, The Grumman Story

75
"News of the Month;
(June 1937), p. 67.

p. 91.

Navy Buys Planes," Aviation , vol. 36, no. 6

'""Naval Affairs; Amphibious Contracts," Aviation , vol. 36, no. 9

(September 1937), p. 67.
77
"A Decade of Grumman Progress," Aero Digest , p. 52.
This article
states first delivery as the loth, but Threulsen gives the 3rd.
78
'

79

Threulsen, The Grumman Story, p. 99.

"Industry and Finance; Stock Issue Marks First Appeal to Public,"

Aviation , vol. 36, no. 10 (October 1937), p. 63.

80

Threulsen, The Grunman Story , p. 113.

"Threulsen, The Grucsan Story

106.

p.

Claude Swanson, Secretary of the Navy, Unite-:! States Depart.ze.it of

the Havy Annual Report. FY 1938 . 76th Congress, 1st Session, (,<ashingtnn,
D. C;
USGPO, 1938), p. 1.
8T

W illiam D. Leahy, Acting Secretary of the Navy, Aircraft Purchased

Mag Departje.it. FI 1938 . Senate iiiscellaneous Document no. 6, 76th
Congress, 1st Session, (Washington, D. C.:. USGPO, 1939), p. 3.

by the

34

"""Lets Talk Business," Aviation , vol. 37, no.

^"Brewster aF2a-1," Aviation, vol. 37

7 (July 1938), p. 57.

1938), p. 36.

Leahy, Aircraft Purchased by the Havy Dent., FY 193S . p. 4.

87

"Lets T a lk Business," Aviation , vol. 37, no. 9 (Sept. 1938;, p. 61.

diaries iidison. Acting Secretary of the wavy, Aircraft Purchased by

the Savy Department. FY 1939 Senate Miscellaneous Document no. 131, 76th
Congress, 2cd
3rd Sessions, (Washington, D. C.j USGPO, 1940), p. 3.
,

(it

89
90

"Lets Talk Business," Aviation

fhreulsen, The Gnmaan Story

92

vol. 37, nn, 8 (august 1938), p. 62.

"Let3 Talk Business," .-iviatiou . vol. 37, no. 11

Threulsen, The Grumnan Story

p. 103.

p. 1C6.

(r.'ove/.iber

1938), p. 5S.

93

Tom Lillev, Pearson Hunt, J. Keith Butters, FranK Gilaore, and Faul
Accelerating aircraft Production During ;iorld .i'ar II
(Boston: Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research,
Harvard University, 1946), p. 14.
F. Lawler, Probleias of

^"Naval Affairs: Amphibian Contracts," Aviation , vol. 36, no.

(September 1937), p. 67.

Part III

95

"Aviation tianufacturing;
(June 1939), p. 64.

Grumiiian

3acklog," Aviation , vol. 38, no 6

96

"A Decade of Gruiiuaan Progress," Aero Digest , vol. 36, n". 1 (January
1940), p. 174.

97

'Norman Polaar, Aircraft Carriers:

a Graphic History of Carrier
Aviation and Its Influences on rforlri Events (London: i-iacd-xnald & Co. Ltd.,
.

1969), p. 141.

98
"Aviation Manufacturing;
no. 9 (September 1939), p. 61.

Navy Orders Groanans," Av iation . vol. 38,

99

Captain Eric Brown (RNaF, Set.), Wjggs of the Navy; Flying Allied
Carrier A ircraft of Jorld >var Two (London; Jane's publishing Co. Ltd..
1930), p. 43.
.

100

Anderton, Hellcat , p. 17.

Brown, Wings of the Navy , pp. 43, 47, 51.

102

Owen Thetford, British Naval aircraft Since 1912 . (London;

p. 201.

Putnam

k Company, 1958),
103
J

Bingham (USM ret.), "The united States Navy," Brassev's Naval

Annual. 1940. Rear-Admiral H. Q, Thursfield, editor, (London! a " Clowes &
D. C.

Sons, Ltd., 1940), pp. 121-25.

Lewis Coapton, Acting Secretary of the Navy, united States Department

of the May/ annual Report . FY 1940. Washington. D. C; USGP0, 1940), p. 1.
.

"Two Billions for 19,000 Planes, amy Gets 15,000; Navy Gets 4000,"
Aviation , vol. 39, no. 8 (August 1940), p. 90.

United States Department of the Navy, United States Naval Aviation

1910-1980. 3rd ed.
(Washington, D. G.i USGP0, 19S0), p. 104.
.

IDA

"Aviation Manufacturing: Army Progressing on 19,000 Plane Prograa,

Military Production 3000 a Month by July, 1942," Aviation , vol. 39, no. 10
(October 1940), p. 79.

"aviation Manufacturing:

Ari^y

Progressing," Aviation , p. 79.

"Aviation finance:
(October 1940), p. 87.

Industry Backlogs," Aviation , vol. 39, no. 10

^""Aviation Finance:
(Novenber 1940), p. 98.

Industry Backlogs," Aviation , vol. 39,

m.

11

107

"Aircraft and Engine Plant Juopansi^n in the Early Part of the War,"
Aviation , vol. 39, no. 11 (November 1940), pp. 89-91.

Barry Bluestone, Aircraft Industry Dynamics . (Boston:

Publishing Company, 1981), pp. 25-6.

Auburn House

Robert Colburn, "How to Finance Your Plant Expansion," Aviation .

vol. 39, no. 8 (August 1940), pp. 46-7.
"Expansion Plans For Airplane and Engine Factories," Aero Digest .
vol. 37, no. 5 (November, 1940), pp. 37-41.
108 Thetford, B
ritish Naval Aircraft
109
"Aviation Finance;
(February 1941), p. 162.

p. 201.

Industry 3acklog,"

Aviation , vol. 40, no. 2

"Aviation Finance:
1941), p. 163.

Recent Awards," Aviation

vol. 40, no. 2 (February

Patrick i'iurray, "'Under Urgent Consideration;

American Planes
for Greece, 1940-1941," aerospace Historian vol. 24, no. 2 (Suiuaer/June
G.

E.

'

1977), pp. 61-9.

Ill
Lundstrora, The First lean, p. S.

112
113

Anderton, Hellcat

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THE GRUMMAN CORPORATION, THE FIRST TWELVE YEARS:

THE RISE OF A NAVAL AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER, 1930-1941

by

JAMES ALLEN HEISER

B. S., Kansas State University,

1984

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements fro the iegree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

Manhattan, Kansas

1986

The Grumman Corporation, the First Twelve

Igara

Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation saw its

origins in 1930,
and twelve years later it would be the United
States best supplier of

fighter aircraft.

It

the Second World *ar.

produced by far the most naval fighters used during

This thesis looks at the development of the Company,

primarily its financial growth, and its relationship

to the U. S. Navy.
The Navy was the company's main market thoughout
most of the period, and

both it and the corporation would benefit from

their work together.

The first section of the thesis looks at the

formative years of
Grwanan Aircraft, and how it was able to grow despite
the odds it faced.
These were being a small business unassoci.it
ed with a holding company and
not belonging to the Manufacturers Aircraft
association, thought to be two

necessities to gain military orders, and the impact

of the depression on
the aircraft industry,

* primary reason for the firm's growth was. its

choice of the United States Navy as Its

prime market; and the Navy's

treatment of the new company, giving it a

preferred status while it was

getting established.
The second part observes the Company's
work in the mid-1930s, when
it held a monopoly on U. S. naval
fighters.

It looks at the performance

of these airplanes and the short duration

lives of military aircraft in
this period caused by a technological
revolution.

This section also shows

the upward linear progression of Grumman' s

business figures.

This

progression was still related with the Navy.

The third part shows the growth of the business

from 1938 to 19U,
and the effects the war had on it.

The war in Europe caused the linear

progression to begin to curve upward.

It also forced the ailitai? expert

market to replace the U. S. Navy as the

corporation's prise market.

This

situation was short-lived, for as the

United States began preparing for

war the Navy returned as it dominant

buyer.
The conclusion discusses the benefits
Gruinnan and the Navy gained

from their relationship.

entire twelve years.

It also analyzes the business picture

for the

The statistics show the growth moved in a

parabolic

(wave-like) fashion during the period, and

that the United States Navy
was responsible for most of the
progression.
for its investment in World

'.Jar

II.

The Navy would be repaid