The US and the International Political System:

What Model for the Future?

Yuriy Matsievsky
Visiting Scholar at the Department of Political Science
North Dakota State University

Abstract
The aim of this paper is to discuss the negative effects of unipolarity both for the
United States and the rest of the world. The main thesis here is as follows: the unipolar
political system with the U.S in a dominant role of the U.S. can no longer be preferable nor
profitable for the interests of either the U.S. or the rest of the International Community.
Domestically, the cost of sustaining the role of the biggest superpower became too high
in all major aspects of life within the U.S. These include the largest number of civilians lost
as a result of September 11 attacks, an economic slowdown and a budget deficit, some
restrictions of traditional freedoms, and a drift toward the imperial presidency.
Internationally, the biggest challenge to the dominant role of the U.S. is a steady
deterioration of the positive image of the country as a traditional democracy, and growing
resentment toward U.S. led economic, political and cultural expansion in societies dominated
by extremist religions and ideologies.
Since U.S. foreign policy is predominantly driven by realist considerations,
expectations for the nations willingness for the transition to more interdependent and
collective security has weak chances to succeed. On the contrary, real politics policies have
already signaled their ineffectiveness, and if not changed to a consensual and cooperative
security alternative, they could lead to a major confrontation most frightening for humanity
to consider. The consequences of this clash of civilizations would be hard to predict.
Real politics thinking is a legacy of the post cold war period and it must be changed
for much more reflective, flexible and prudent policy- making mechanisms to allow for
global survival and development in the 21st century.

Introduction
In discussions between idealists and realists, both recognize that the
world has been in a persistent state of anarchy since 1648. The latter admits that
realism is far from being the perfect form of foreign policy, while the former
seems to passively acknowledge that realism remains the actual means to secure
a states position in the international arena. Historically, a trend toward realism
has often been visible in dominant countries, or at least in those aspiring to
domination. Idealist considerations, on the other hand, have more often been
found in countries, which had no intentions to dominate the others, and have
elected to rely on international institutions, rules and procedures rather than on
their own power. Following the logic of realism, those in dominant positions
have more often than not tended to employ unilateral actions to achieve or
sustain their domination. Unilateralism is the practical embodiment of the basic
premises of realism, just as realism is the theoretical foundation of unilateral
policies. Thus, unilateralism and realism correspond, and reversing their order
in the equation would produce the same effect.
The point that I am going to discuss in this paper is as follows: traditional
realist thinking, dominating U.S. foreign policy in at least the current and
previous administrations, is a legacy of the post Cold War period and must be
2

changed to a much more reflective, flexible, and prudent policy-making

mechanisms to allow for global stability in the 21 st century. Having this premise
in mind, I will, firstly, argue that unilateral actions are inherently egocentric and
anti-democratic in principle, and thus are harmful to the interests of both the
U.S. and the rest of international community, secondly, present a reflective
realism perspective toward foreign policy making, and finally, work out some
prognosis as to the possibilities of a transformation of the international political
system in the 21st century.
Defining Unilateralism
U.S. behavior in the international arena has often been portrayed as
unilateral. Unilateralism can be defined as a form of foreign policy that solely
pursues ones own national interests outside of international law, rules, and
institutions. As Ian Robinson has put it, State policies are often dubbed
unilateral if they (a) are undertaken by a single state, (b) have significant
impacts on people in other states, and (c) are not governed by bilateral or
multilateral treaties.1 Unilateralism, then, is a strategy adopted by the state to
promote a unipolar political system. This strategy is best characterized by what
is known as political realism. 2 Since the U.S. is the only superpower left from
the period of the Cold War, unilateralism became a synonym for U.S. foreign
policy in the last decade.
More serious arguments against unilateralism can be made if it is
redefined as
actions by one or more states that have significant external
impacts, undertaken without the agreement of the government whose citizens
are affected by these actions.3 If a state unilaterally pursues its national
interests at the cost of the interests of other states, it is no longer accountable to
the international community, and potentially poses a threat to any weaker
country. From this perspective both Iraqs intervention in Kuwait and most U.S.
military interventions abroad are of the same nature.
The opponents of this comparison could argue that the U.S. is a
democracy, one of the key principals of which is to promote democratic
institutions worldwide, while Iraq is an undemocratic country ruled by a
dictatorial leader. Following this logic the U.S. had a legitimate right to attack
Iraq in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, and will have the right to do the same to any
non-democratic country as long as it inhibits democracy and promotes
terrorism. However, Iraqs intervention in Kuwait was labeled aggressive,
because it violated international norms and treaties.
This illustration aims not to whitewash Iraq or debate that there are
double standards in assessing deeds of right and wrong states; double

standards will always exist. It rather aims to emphasize that unilateral actions
are inherently undemocratic in the sense that they are not accountable before
the people of other countries affected by these actions. Interestingly enough, the
discussion of the international dimension of democracy has been rarely
extended to the arena of international relations. The question of whether
democracy is inherently peaceful or belligerent is a fundamental one to be
addressed by international relations theorists. How many interventions should
democracies really undertake in order to make the world peaceful and
democratic? Democratic peace theory does not say much about it. The central
premise of the theory that democracies do not fight each other does not explain
why democracies fight the others, particularly non-democracies. If we look at
the international system through the lens of realism, democracy, in order to
protect itself from different isms, has to act proactively. This question has not
yet been seriously discussed either by realists or by idealists. My answer to this
question is that democracy as a concept relates to the internal structure of a
state. It has rarely, if ever, been applied to the structure of international political
relations. Overall, this problem demands a separate analysis that goes beyond
the scope of this paper.
Before I proceed to discuss the negative effects of U.S. unilateralism, a
note of clarification is needed. There is a growing tendency both in scholarly
research and media coverage to describe the international political system as
unipolar. Since the end of the Cold War, which was marked by the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the U.S. has remained the only superpower in the world. This
makes most American theorists and politicians believe that the bipolar system
of the Cold War has been changed to one that is unipolar. The U.S., of course,
remains the sole superpower, but there are also several major regional powers
playing significant parts in the configuration of power relationships in different
parts of the world. These are the European Union with the German-France
condominium in Europe, Russia in Eurasia, China in East Asia, India in South
Asia, Brazil in South America and Nigeria and South Africa in Africa. Their
strength and overall potential to influence world politics differ significantly, but
they are indispensable in defining any significant political action in their
regions. Thus, the contemporary international system, as political scientist S.
Huntington has accurately pointed out, remains a strange hybrid, a unimultipolar system with one superpower and several major powers. 4
The problem of some Washington officials is that they believe the U.S. is
the only major power capable of undertaking political action unilaterally,
without the cooperation of major regional powers. This provokes criticism
domestically and discontent internationally with U.S. foreign policy.

Traditional versus Reflective Realism

My aim here is to look at U.S. unilateralism through what I call a
reflective realist perspective. Government and military officials, who tend to
focus exclusively on their own national interests, would be described as having
a traditional realist perspective. The reflective realist perspective can expand to
analyze not only the priorities of all realists, including national security and
domestic stability, but also possible implications and outcomes of unilateral
actions on the international level.
Criticizing US unilateralism in a liberal fashion for being too egocentric
and ignorant of the rest of the international community is a salient trend in
recent international relations theory and international policy analysis
discussions.5 Traditional realism is egocentric because it primarily focuses on
national interests and national security. While being aware of the security
dilemma, traditional realists usually try to balance power, or the threat of using
this power, in order to preserve the status quo or alter it in a preferable way. The
threat posed by counter power normally is measured by the capacity of ones
own power to protect national security, or in the case of a war, to retaliate
adequately. Since the beginning of the atomic era the possibility of Mutual
Assured Destruction (MAD) has served as a factor for preserving a balance of
power in a bipolar system. However, since the breakdown of the Soviet Union,
the U.S. is facing more complex challenges posed by emerging international
constellations. In order to balance those less predictable players, the current and
previous U.S. administrations, driven by traditional realist objectives, have
chosen to enhance their own security by acting proactively. They have been
more enthusiastic in employing missile diplomacy aimed at preventing
rogue regimes, leaders or groups from inflicting damage on American soil,
and protecting American interests worldwide. The September 11 attacks are the
empirical proof of the inadequacy and shortsightedness of such a policy.
Reflective realism, by contrast, would allow reflective realists to balance
not only threats coming from hostile regimes or leaders, but also to calculate
possible implications and predict outcomes of strategies chosen to counter
balance the threat. In other words, it would allow for developing a prognosis for
possible outcomes, emerging from a countrys particular behavior in the
international arena.
Reflective realism is not a subtle version of idealism. The concern of the
latter is global security, while the former is national security. The difference
between idealism and reflective realism can be found in their value orientations.
While both traditional and neo-idealists share the belief that a conflict-free
world is possible, reflective realists emphasize the necessity to reflect on ones
own actions and their implications for ones national security. Thus, reflective

realism is a less goal-oriented, but more process-and means-oriented form of

foreign policy than traditional realism.
One additional difference between traditional and reflective realism
consists in the vision of the image of the state. Since traditional realists are not
really concerned about the means used in achieving the ends, they are equally
unconcerned with side effects that may negatively influence the international
image of the state. Reflective realists pay much attention to the means as well as
the processes, and consequently, the international image of the state.
U.S. Unilateralism: Origin and Directions
The September 11 attacks are being proclaimed as a landmark event in
U.S. history, but they have not caused much change in U.S. foreign policy. The
drift toward unilateralism was already visible in the Clinton era, but it is really
in the Bush administration that you see an explicit drive for permanent global
supremacy.
Since the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the U.S. has found itself as the
sole superpower left from the period of the Cold War. On the one hand, it was a
pleasant reward for the long-lasting competition with the Soviet Union. On the
other hand, the U.S. became the biggest challenger to several major regional
and local powers and the object of resentment, jealousy, or hatred in the rest of
the world. To secure and profit from its dominant position, the U.S.
administration has used all means possible, ranging from diplomatic
maneuverings to economic sanctions and missile diplomacy. It is the logic of
a superpower, whose aim is power, influence and control that is steering the
process.
Having tremendous economic, political and military capacities, it is very
difficult for the current U.S. administration to constrain itself, as there are no
visible counterbalances and constraints. While domestically the system of
checks and balances ensures that no single branch of power could dominate the
others, internationally this is not the case. The new agenda of the Bush
administration is the reassertion of American power in the world by a greater
willingness to use force, with or without the support of U.S. allies, even at the
cost of American casualties. As Evan Thomas of Newsweek has pointed out,
some of Bushs top advisers believe that after the Vietnam War the pendulum
swung too far in the directions of multilatiralism and anti-interventionism. Now
they are trying to shove it back. 6
The September 11 attacks have not only changed the way U.S. foreign
policy is conducted, but they also strengthened it. By attacking the U.S., AlQaeda leaders have actually helped the Bush administration to pursue its

interests more overtly than ever before. Iraq, or more probably some less stable
regime in East-Central Asia or in North-West Africa will be the next step in
establishing U.S. military dominance under the convenient label of the global
war on terrorism. The label indeed is really convenient as it provides both
legitimacy for the current and some new interventions abroad, and puts very
limited constraints on the administration as to the terms, weaponry or tactics of
the war.
Many officials in Washington believe that establishing unconditional
dominance of the U.S. over the rest of the world will make the U.S.
invulnerable and the world itself more predictable, better controlled and hence,
more peaceful. This misleading belief stems from the logic of traditional realist
thinking. Not only will major regional powers constantly challenge the U.S., but
what is more serious is that the U.S. will be facing new kinds of threats in the
forms of cultural, ideological, and religious intolerance to American
domination, of which the recent terrorist attacks are an alarming example. Of
these new threats, the current major threat to U.S. unilateralism is Islamic
fundamentalism. The U.S. administration traditionally tries to balance this
threat by labeling some Islamic countries politically and geographically as
rogue nations. The problem here is that Islamic fundamentalism is a new
form of a religious and cultural institution that has no definite political or
geographical boundaries. It differs significantly from traditional political
institutions like states, which have long been primary players on the
international map. The aim of Islamic fundamentalism is to preserve traditional
Islamic culture, religion and values from the influence of the West. Some
extremist leaders like Osama bin Laden employ terrorist tactics that make
fundamentalism not only a conservative, but also an aggressive phenomenon.
To denounce several authoritarian regimes as an axis of evil cannot
stop terrorism, and can hardly prevent others from aiding and abetting them.
The specific trait of extreme form of Islamic fundamentalism is that it is
primarily a religious movement whose legitimacy rests primarily on opposition
to Western political values and institutions. Proclaiming total war on terrorism
can only trigger a new phase of anti-American actions by mobilizing several
targeted nations and deepening the resentment toward the West in the rest of the
Muslim world.
Since U.S. foreign policy is predominantly centered on securing its
national interests throughout the world, the growing contradictions with a
rapidly developing religious institution like Islamic fundamentalism have
already resulted in violence, of which the September 11 attacks are a disturbing
example.

Given the current situation, the U.S. will never be the same as it was
before September 11. Having declared a global war on terrorism by military
means, the U.S. put on itself both domestic and international pressures.
Domestically, there is a drift toward imperial presidency, restrictions in
accessing some information, a new phase of economic slowdown, budget
shortfalls for social programs, fear of bio-terrorism, tightened security, and new
sparks of xenophobia. Taken together these pressures do not make life for
ordinary Americans any easier. However, the most troubling among the
domestic problems is that by continuing a spiral of missile diplomacy, the
U.S. has made itself a target for new acts of terrorism.
Internationally, the U.S. is losing support for overseas actions and
consequently obtaining an image of an arrogant nation. It has provoked a
number of Muslim extremists to declare a new Jihad. The last one was against
the Soviets in Afghanistan; this time it is against the U.S. and the whole
Western world. The prospects of a Clash of Civilizations like that described
by S. Huntington are evident now more than ever before.
Models for the Future
The following are three possible scenarios of reconfiguration of the world
political system. To some extent they reflect the major challenges the U.S. will
be facing in the upcoming decade.
1. The smooth transition from the hybrid uni-multipolar system to one that
is truly multi-polar. The U.S. first initiates the process.
2. The U.S. will be pressed by other major powers and will have to yield to
the demands for multi-polarity. The process may be accompanied by
local confrontations and conflicts.
3. The U.S. will try to retain its dominant position by acting unilaterally.
This could
provoke a major confrontation with nations whose religious and cultural
values
are influenced by the extremist ideologies and practices.
Which of these three scenarios will prevail will depend on numerous factors.
The first scenario is the most preferable for the peaceful transition to an
interdependent and cooperative international political system of the 21 st century,
but it is the least probable. In order to transform a uni-multipolar system to a
truly multi-polar and to improve the image of the country on the international
map, several essential steps both in international and domestic affairs would be
necessary.
1. Foreign policy and security interests. The system of unilateral
international security with the U.S. dominating the rest of the world should be

changed into dispersed or multilateral security to make it less competitive and

more cooperative.
2. Military policy and national interests. Instead of investing tremendous
amounts of money into the ironically called defense budget that is actually
used to finance military interventions abroad, the U.S. should direct appropriate
resources into constructing cooperative security programs.
3. Economic policy and development. Instead of considering third world
countries as a source of cheap brains, natural resources and a labor force, the
U.S. should design a more cooperative international economy, empowering the
weak and further strengthening the strong. The construction of a more
cooperative economic order in relationship between the hemispheres dissolving
the differences between the rich North and the poor South would certainly
prevent a growing dissatisfaction in economically unstable regions and deprive
extremists of desperate followers in new acts of terrorism.
4. Media and journalism. Instead of doing war journalism, presenting U.S.
overseas military interventions as humanitarian relief actions, and a war of
good against evil, the U.S. media should provide room for peace
journalism, encouraging self-reflection and criticism in their coverage of
both international and domestic issues.
Considering previous and current U.S. policy, the first scenario has few
chances, if any, to be put into practice. Most likely the U.S. administration will
continue to act in terms of real politics, trying to stop terrorism by violent
means and to retain the domination of the U.S. on the Great Chessboard. The
next targets of the U.S. war on terrorism could be Iraq, Sudan, Libya, Syria, or
some other country depending on its position and attitudes toward the issue of
terrorism.
The second scenario is less preferable for the U.S. and the rest of the
international community. Given the current drift of the U.S. administration
toward unilateralism, one may not expect that a new multi-polarity will be
created through the pure good will of the U.S. or the international community.
A new balance of power most probably will be established as the result of a
political, military and economic confrontation between the U.S. and major
regional powers. Three of them - the European Union in Europe, Russia in
Eurasia and China in East Asia- will try to challenge U.S. domination in
different areas. The form of this confrontation will depend in part on the result
of the Arab-Israeli conflict and current U.S. war on terrorism, and especially
on the future war with Iraq. In this scenario the U.S. war on terrorism is an
intervening variable that will greatly influence the process.
The third scenario is the least preferable, but unfortunately, the most
probable. Traditional realist thinking might lead the Bush administration to

enter a new phase of confrontation with the Muslim world in which extremist
practices would take a lead. The results of this confrontation would be hard to
predict.
In reality, according to President Bushs statement soon after the
September 11 attacks: there will be no neutral party in this war, every
country that has not declared its support for America could be considered a
potential target for U.S. missiles. In addition, the borderline between the
Western world and the Muslim world is highly instable and fragile. The chain of
tensions beginning from India and Pakistan continuing through the Middle East
and up to the Caucasus will remain the area of local ethno-religious conflicts in
which the U.S. tries to play a part. It is difficult to predict what will come out of
this situation.
Conclusion
Having defined these three scenarios, there are more grounds to argue
that the future model of the international political system will be
confrontational, rather than cooperative. The U.S. will play a major role in
determining this model. If continued in the current fashion, the traditional
realist thinking of the U.S. that shapes its unilateral quest for global supremacy
will produce quite the opposite effect. Most probably unilateral foreign policy
actions will provoke serious international confrontations, which are desirable
neither for the U.S. nor for the rest of the international community.
If switched to reflective foreign policies, the U.S. has a unique chance to
sustain a global peace, support international security and significantly improve
its image in the international stage. In total, such a transition would allow for
the more cooperative and interdependent international order that has long been
anticipated by humanity for most of its history.

Endnotes

10

Ian Robinson, Progressive Unilateralism? U.S. Unilateralism, Progressive Internationalism and Alternatives to
Neoliberalism. Foreign Policy in Focus. Discussion Paper #3, November 15, 2000.
Retrieved March 3, 2002 from website http://www.foreignpolicy_infocus.org/papers/unilateralism_body.html
2

See classical works on political realism, Hans W. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York:Knopf, 1986).;
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979)., and works of some neo-realists,
Randall L Schweller, and David Priess. A Tale of Two Realism: Expanding the Institutions Debate. Mershon
International Studies Review v.4, 1997, pp.927-930; Fareed Zakaria, Is Realism Finished? National Interests v. 32,
1993,pp.21-32.
3

Ian Robinson, Progressive Unilateralism? U.S. Unilateralism, Progressive Internationalism and Alternatives to
Neoliberalism. Foreign Policy in Focus. Discussion Paper #3, November 15, 2000.
Retrieved March 3, 2002 from website http://www.foreignpolicy_infocus.org/papers/unilateralism_body.html
4

S.Hantington, The lonely Superpower. (US military and cultural hegemony resented by other powers.) Foreign Affairs
v.78, March 1999, p.35.
5
5

Danger of U.S. Unilateralism. Conference highlights. A conference on the Trend Toward Unilateralism in
U.S. Foreign policy, Washington. May 21, 1999. Retrieved March 3,2002 from website
http://www.ciponline.org/africa/archives/riia.htm.; Steven E. Miller, The end of Unilateralism or Unilateralism
Redux? The Washington quarterly, Winter 2002, pp.15-29; Sebastian Mallaby, The Reluctant Imperialist (United States
foreign policy), Foreign Affairs v.81, March-April 2002.
6
6

Evan Thomas, Bush Has Saddam in His Sights. Newsweek, March 4, 2002.