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Introduction

In humankind’s never-ending pursuit for peace, a philosopher in the 18th century by

the name of Immanuel Kant provided an overarching thesis that maintained that the delicate

intersection between the vertexes of democratic culture, commercial interdependence, and

international organizations will provide humankind the much coveted ‘perpetual peace’.

Kant’s proposition was later to be known as the “triangle for perpetual peace” which was to

become one of the major cornerstones of a new optimistic socio-economic ideology,

Liberalism, which was, in turn, the consequence of the enlightenment period of Europe.

Liberalism maintains an optimistic view on human nature, holding that man is

stronger than reality in which he lives in and that man has the ability to change his reality

(Navon, 2021). A delicate compromise of these three vertexes of the ‘triangle for perpetual

peace’ has been attempted throughout the years since the introduction of the liberal ideals;

most notable of them was Woodrow Wilson’s famous ‘fourteen points’ speech that

emphasized on collective security, open diplomacy, free trade and self-determination that

opened the door for the creation of League of Nations post-WW1 which later evolved into the

United Nations (UN) post-WW2. This was to be the start of liberal institutionalism and

multilateral diplomacy that dominated the international system during much of the 20 th and

21st century.

The theory of liberal institutionalism sees the best way to organize and reform the

international system. Liberal institutionalism focuses on international organizations such as

the United Nations, the European Union, and the World Bank, and advocates that soft power

and cooperation should be paid more attention to through forms and procedures such as

international law, diplomatic mechanisms, and common international organizations. Liberal

internationalists see violence as a last resort, advocate diplomacy and multilateralism as

strategies best suited to states and tend to defend supranational political structures (such as
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the European Union) and international organizations (especially the United Nations). Liberal

institutionalism holds that in order to achieve peace in international affairs, states must

cooperate with each other, in effect, relinquish some of their sovereignty, in order to create

integrated communities that promote economic growth and address regional and international

security concerns (Bell, 2016; Devitt, 2011).

Kant’s international organizations have a stable theoretical ground to stand on and can

be thought as the anti-thesis for the realists presumed anarchic tendencies of the international

system. Realists and specifically offensive realists led by John Mearsheimer hold that the fact

there is no central authority above the members in the system makes the international system

inherently anarchic (J. Mearsheimer, 2001). On their part, realists maintain that it is not the

international organizations that makes the system stable but the balance of power politics that

is inherent in the system. The introduction of international institutions in the liberalist’s world

order, at least in theory, makes the international system more stable.

According to John Mearsheimer’s 2019 article Bound to Fail; The Rise and Fall of

the Liberal International order, he argues that U.S. has led two world orders since the end of

World War II: The Cold War order, which was neither liberal nor international, and is

erroneously referred to as ‘liberal international order’, if anything, it was a realist order in its

defining elements; and the post-Cold War order which was indeed liberal and international (J.

Mearsheimer, 2019).

Professor Azar Gat further divides the post-Cold War into two sub-periods: the 1990s,

and the first two decades of the 21st century. The 1990s era was packed with optimism for the

new liberal international order as it was underlined by Fukuyama’s famous book ‘The End of

History’ highlighting the optimism for the ascendency of liberal hegemony. The second post-

2000 subperiod, which is characterized by War on Terror, US’s entanglement around the

world, 2007/08 global financial crises, and the rise of China. Additionally, democracies were
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perceived as the most stable and economically successful regime types even by democracy

opponents, however, Professor Gat argues, after the 2007/08 global financial crises the

democracies were seen as obsolete and tired. In turn percipitated another significant

development, which was a major motivation for this paper; the rise of capitalist non-

democratic powers in the 2010s. This development gives developing countries another

options for diplomatic alignment which was not available post-WW2 (Gat, 2022). So, it begs

the question, is the rise of capitalist non-democratic powers a threat to the established

multilateral diplomacy that was the domain of the liberal institutions?

The main proponents of multilateralism and cooperative initiatives in the international

system are middle powers (Jordaan E, 2013); according to the 16th century Italian philosopher

Giovanni Botero, middle powers are states that are strong and authoritative enough to prop

their own weight up in the system without outside support. Middle power diplomacy is

characterized by deep allegiance to multilateralism and avoiding direct confrontation with

great powers. Great powers, which are powers that have the leverage to influence other

members in the system, often act unilaterally; while small powers, who are powers that

depend on others to prop their weight up in the system, may have little or negligible influence

other than being a party to foreign policies of the other two powers. Small powers prefer

multilateralism in order to acquire disproportionate leverage to their power, for example,

participation in the United Nations General Assembly whereby consolidating their UN vote

in a voting bloc with other nations (Thorhallsson & Steinsson, 2017).

What about states that don’t exactly align with the pre-defined classifications? Where

do we situate middle powers that act unilaterally in the power spectrum? This was the exact

question that confronted me when I looked back at the explanations for the ineffectiveness of

the concerted UN and US mandated multilateral diplomatic efforts to put a stop to the

Ethiopian civil war. Middle powers, Turkey, UAE overtly and Iran covertly, pursuing
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unilateral diplomatic adventures that were infused by realist calculations hindered the

multilateral diplomatic efforts by the international institutions for liberal ideals of human

rights and humanitarian needs. For this paper, I will use the terminology ‘upper-middle

powers’ to describe these powers, powers that meet or exceed the requirements for middle

power but are not yet a great power; however, they are impatient to change the status quo and

hence, are aggressive in their foreign policy and exercise diplomatic adventures unilaterally.

In this paper, the author will argue that the presence of the three elements of realism,

nationalism, and globalization in relation to the ascent of non-democratic ‘upper-middle’

powers in the system makes multilateral diplomacy through the international institutions

ineffective. The author is using globalization in a sense of the alternatives it gives to the

aggressor which subsequently can make the coercive measures taken by the international

institutions more resistible. John Mearsheimer, in his part, contends that the Achilles’ heel of

liberal hegemony is realism and nationalism (Yale University, 2017).

To support the argument in this paper, the case of the ongoing civil war in Ethiopia

will be assessed as well as the efficacy of the multilateral diplomacy by the international

institutions who tried, and so far, failed to put a stop to the war for the past 16 months. How

did a small power like Ethiopia and its federal government resist the diplomatic pressure of

the international institutions? Did it utilize realism, nationalism, and/or globalization to

weather the diplomatic pressure? Could it be explained by the rise of the non-democratic

‘upper-middle’ powers in the 2010s? Or are we witnessing the end of liberal hegemony?

Therefore, in this paper, the above-mentioned research questions will be assessed in

terms of the efficacy of the multilateral diplomacy and international institutions in relation to

its founding liberal ideals by providing viewpoints in favor and against it by liberalists and

realists, respectively. The paper will be organized in four major themes; the first topic will

focus on multilateral diplomacy and its theoretical backgrounds; the second topic will focus
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on the efficacy of the international institutions and their multilateral diplomacy; the third

topic will focus on the case of Ethiopia’s civil war and the critique of the diplomatic efforts,

while the last topic will focus on conclusions of the arguments.

Multilateral Diplomacy

Liberal institutionalism (also known as institutional liberalism) is an international

relations theory that asserts that international cooperation between governments is both

feasible and sustainable, and that such cooperation can minimize conflict and rivalry (Powell,

1994). International cooperation was the main impetus in solidifying the ineffective

European-colonial centric League of Nations into the United Nation in 1945, and the creation

of Bretton Woods institutions and General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) post-

WW2, with both systems later evolving into the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the

World Bank (WB) and World Trade Organization (WTO), respectively.

The Ideal of international cooperation in the spirit of liberal institutionalism was one

of the main theoretical backgrounds that formed the basis for liberal internationalisms which

rests on main thesis of international organizations, multilateral diplomacy, rules and norms-

based institutions that promote liberal democracy, and international organizations’ self-

accorded freedom to intervene in other states for humanitarian and liberal ideals, that’s why it

is sometimes called liberal interventionist in contrast with isolationism and non-

interventionism.

Robert Keohane, a political scientist who was largely responsible for the development

of liberal institutionalism, objects to the terms "liberal" or "neoliberal" being used to describe

his work because he also draws on realism, a school of thought that is frequently contrasted

with liberalism (Keohane, 1992, 2005).

According to liberal internationalism, by exercising multilateral diplomacy through

these multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, it is possible to avoid the worst
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excesses of "power politics" in international relations. Furthermore, liberal internationalists

believe that treating all states equally and cooperatively, whether they are initially democratic

or not, is the best way to spread democracy. Multilateral institutions, such as UNDP,

UNICEF, WHO, and the UN General Assembly, have also been considered examples of

liberal internationalism (Abrahamsen et al., 2019).

Multilateral diplomacy can be defined as the cooperation of three or more countries

working towards a common goal. In international relations, multilateralism refers to an

alliance of several countries pursuing a common goal. International organizations such as the

United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization are multilateral in nature. The United

States is a member of about 50 multilateral organizations, ranging from large and well-known

organizations such as NATO, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the United Nations

to relatively small niche organizations such as the Universal Postal Union (Multilateral

Diplomacy in 2021 - Diplo, n.d.; Schaefer, 2011).

The efficacy of Multilateral Diplomacy

Multilateral institutions are platforms where great powers compete for influence over

the other members of the system and the weaker players in the system try to sway the biggest

players. Great powers also sign multilateral agreements, make rules, and enjoy privileges

such as veto power and special status. Gowan (2018) strongly contends that these multilateral

institutions are not imposed on countries but are created and adopted by them to enhance

their ability to defend their own interests by coordinating their policies. Multilateralism, in

the form of membership in international organizations, helps to restrain powerful states,

discourage unilateralism, and give small states a voice and influence that they would

otherwise not be able to exercise (Gowan, 2018).

During the 1980s and 1990s, there was much debate among liberals and realists about

whether liberal institutionalism was indeed an alternative to realism, with criticism from
 7

Stanley Hoffman and Joseph Grieco pointing out that during the Cold War, international

organizations such as the United Nations were paralysed by the United States-Soviet Union

veto power cageyness and the financial demands of free nations to solve security problems

led to a shortage of resources for the development of the poorest countries.

Even though international institutions and liberal states such as the UN and the US

regard the liberal ideals of inalienable rights and individualism in the highest esteem; it

should be evident to shrewd observers that there is a big difference between ‘Liberalism at

home’ and ‘Liberalism abroad’ (Yale University, 2017). To support the argument of realism

as a boost for foreign policy in liberal hegemony, we can look at the fact liberal foreign

policy has almost always been supplemented with realist ideals of balance of power and high

politics. For example, in the years after the second world war, US interventions for liberal

and humanitarian ideals were almost always supported with realist calculations (‘The

Domino Theory’ in Vietnam).

Ethiopia’s civil war and critique of the diplomatic efforts

At 11:10 PM on the night of November 03, 2020, a civil war broke out in the Tigray

region, northern-most part of Ethiopia. The war was not a spontaneous conflict but a result of

built-up ethnic tensions at the basis of the country’s social fabric, ideological and historical

dissensus on the very reality in which the country exists, exacerbated by political grudges

held by elements who do not hesitate to manipulate the ethnic tensions for their political ends.

Sixteen months, 2.4 million internally displaced peoples (UNHCR, 2021), 2.2 million people

facing ‘famine’ (“Ethiopia Civil War,” 2022), 100,000 children facing ‘risk of death’ from

hunger (UNICEF, 2021), de-facto blockade of 7 million people that created “Hell” on earth

(Blockade Creates ‘Hell’ in Ethiopia’s Tigray, 2022), thousands of ethnic based arrests and

disappearances (Thousands Detained in Ethiopia, Human Rights Group Estimates, 2021),

and hundreds of thousands of unaccounted for deaths later the war is still continuing.
 8

Ethiopia, the second most populous country in Africa, was an absolute monarchy until

1974 when the last emperor of the Solomonic dynasty was overthrown by Soviet-aligned

communist military junta, the Dergue. Ethiopia, during the period of 1974 up to the fall of the

USSR, was a soviet satellite who relied solely on the USSR and Cuba for military assistance

in its fight against liberation rebellions in the country, mainly from Eritrea and Tigray

provinces. The militaristic Dergue, with its communist ideology, fell in 1991, alongside its

ideological puppet master, the Soviet bloc.

After 1991, Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a

coalition of ethnic based fronts, came to power and introduced a federal governance system

to govern the heterogenous and diverse country divided into 9 semi-autonomous provinces

along ethnic lines, which was at odds with the established and arguably ineffective

centralized governance system. Critics of the EPRDF claim that the party was in essence a

minority (Tigrayan) dominated coalition, which consequently cultivated ethnic resentment

against the Tigrayans.

In the mid-2010s, protests and upheavals hastened the resignation of then Prime

Minister Hailemariam Desalegn and brought in Abiy Ahmed as the new PM in internal

political reshuffle. The ousted dominant faction of the party, the TPLF, went back to their

political base in the Tigray region. In the following years, the stage was set for brutal civil

war with increasingly genocidal, at times government-mandated, hate speech campaign (US

Blasts Rhetoric by Ally of Ethiopia PM Who Compared Tigrayans to the Devil, 2021), ethnic

tensions, and Eritrea’s meddling in the internal politics of the country (Reisen, 2021).

International Diplomatic Response

The civil war broke out on November 03, 2020, while the U.S was distracted by an

election. The federal government’s official narrative was that this conflict was the result of

unprovoked attack on its military bases by the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), and that Eritrea
 9

was not involved. However, studies and reports have come out later that claim the conflict

indeed was a premeditated invasion by the federal forces, and the presence of Eritrean forces

from the beginning (Reisen, 2021).

Multilateral institutions like the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), European

Union (EU), and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an East African

regional bloc, responded with issuing diplomatic lip service, with the AU going the farthest

by assembling an envoy of past African head of states to meditate the conflict, which the

Ethiopian federal government rejected citing sovereignty over internal matters (The

Unfolding Conflict in Ethiopia, 2020).

UN’s diplomatic efforts were reminiscent of the Cold War, with the eastern bloc led

now by China and Russia blocking any open-door UN security council (UNSC) discussion on

the issue citing Ethiopia’s sovereignty over internal matters (“Ethiopia,” 2021), and western

powers repeatedly calling for UNSC meetings; the first UNSC joint statement only came a

year after the conflict began, when the humanitarian situation got to a point of undeniable

dire (UN Security Council Calls for an End to Ethiopia Fighting, 2021). UN’s diplomatic

effort was cautious not to encroach on AU’s diplomatic ‘jurisdiction’; with AU’s mantra of

“African solutions to African problems” often being used by the Ethiopian government as a

smoke screen to hide behind of (Ethiopia (Tigray): Briefing and Consultations: Security

Council Report, 2021).

The Trump administration threaded on the safe side, diplomatically being careful not

to supersede the African Union, even at times towing the federal government lines, and

generally believed that this was an internal issue, and could be resolved internally. Even

though there was the risk of this conflict being internationalized with the potential to

destabilize the Horn of Africa, even after having internal diplomatic reports of Eritrean and

Somalian involvement early in the war, the Trump administration didn’t go further than
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issuing diplomatic statements (Pompeo Blasts Tigray Forces, Praises Eritrea Over Ethiopia

Fighting | Barron’s, 2020; “Secretary Pompeo’s Call with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy,”,

2020; “Exclusive,”, 2020).

The diplomatic efforts by the US intensified after President Biden took office, quickly

assigning special envoy to the Horn of Africa; with the administration seemingly giving

freedom to its officials to use stronger diplomatic language. The U.S. Secretary of State

Blinken stated the conflict was in “the final stages of ethnic cleansing”; while, also,

discussing the possibility of peacekeepers in the region, and war crimes committed by the

Eritrean forces in the region (Hansler, 2021). EU, on its part, appointed a special envoy who

made public that Ethiopian officials had told him in March of 2021, that they intend to wipe

out the Tigrayans for 100 years and that it looked like ethnic cleansing to him (Cara, 2021);

as a result, cranking up the diplomatic pressure on the Ethiopian government. Then, how is it

possible that a government in the 21st century, that is being accused of a crisis that has

hallmarks of a genocide, was able to resist the diplomatic pressure?

Ethiopia’s Diplomatic Counter-Response

Ethiopian government’s diplomatic counter-response was imbued with realist

calculations, and heavily betting on nationalism. In realists’ world of balance of power, there

are two distinct forms of balancing: internal balancing and external balancing. Internal

balancing mainly consists of building up military and economic strength, and shoring up

internal political power base, that is ‘rallying around the flag’ phenomenon, nationalism.

Ethiopia used this mechanism extensively, invoking patriotism in the populace by presenting

the civil war as “a struggle for survival against invaders” for war mobilization purposes

(Ethiopian Government Rallies Protesters against Tigrayan Rebels, 2021), and leveraging the

memories of past victories against imperial forces (First Italo-Abyssinia War, 1896), hoping

it would work this time as well, against ‘new imperial forces of the West’; even alleging,
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without evidence, that foreign western forces were actively participating in support of the

Tigrayan forces (“Abiy Claims Foreign Troops Fighting with Tigray Forces,” 2021;

Jemaneh, 2021).

The Ethiopian government, in its realist calculation on external balancing, deduced

that to counter any possibility of punitive measures from the multilateral institutions, the

governement had to sabotage the institutions’ chances of getting a unanimous decision. This

was not to be a hard task to accomplish, considering UNSC’s voting track record and the

non-binding nature of UN General Assembly’s decisions. Also, keeping in mind its close

economic ties with China and China’s non-interventionist foreign policy, as well as Russia

and China wanting to avoid setting a ‘bad’ precedent of UN intervening in internal issues, it

felt that it had that diplomatic front covered. Ethiopia also employed the tune of ‘Pan-

Africanism’, painting the diplomatic pressure as a “new colonialism, i.e., Africa vs the

colonial West” in a bid to sway the AU; the same with IGAD; as a result, it reduced the

significance of the threat from that diplomatic front (Ethiopians Rally by Thousands to

Support Abiy, Denounce US, 2021).

In order to counter against US’s unilateral punitive measures, which later came in the

form of targeted economic sanctions, targeted travel sanctions, arms embargo, and Ethiopia’s

expulsion from the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (US Government Imposes

Economic Sanctions on Ethiopia, 2021; US Removes Ethiopia, Mali and Guinea from AGOA

Trade Programme, 2022), the government needed external support from other states to prop

its weight up economically and militarily. It turned to the ‘upper-middle’ powers of Turkey,

UAE, and Iran for support.

Turkey, from the very beginning, stated that it ‘understood’ the government’s position

and had every confidence that the government would complete its ‘operation’ soon (Ethiopia

Explains Legal Measures in Tigray to Turkey, 2020). In August 2021, Turkey and Ethiopia
 12

signed a bilateral military agreement that included sales of its TB-2 drones that were used in

the civil war, after Ethiopia agreed to hand over Turkish schools that were being administered

by the opposition of the Turkish government (AA, 2021; Zwijnenburg, 2022). Turkey’s

unilateral diplomatic adventures are part of a grander plan to have a foothold in the continent

as can be inferred from the 3rd Turkey-Africa summit in 2021 (Farooq, 2021).

UAE, in its part, continuously supported the Ethiopian PM financially since the time

he took office and has shown no signs of slowing down, and its military ‘air bridge’ provided

logistical and material supply to the military (UAE Air Bridge Provides Military Support to

Ethiopia Gov’t, 2021). It has continued its diplomatic support to Ethiopia, and the tripartite

alliance of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, which, at times, is referred to as UAE’s brain-child

(The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa, 2018). This was in a bid to place a firm

footprint in the Horn of Africa to counter its Gulf rivals, Qatar—who already have a military

presence in Djibouti, and from which it can have greater influence on the ‘mouth’ of the Suez

Canal, and a closer staging area to the war in Yemen (Plaut, 2021).

Iran, which considers Ethiopia as its gateway to the Horn of Africa, analyzes that by

helping the government in the civil war, that it would maintain its strategic depth to maneuver

the region and the rest of the continent (Keynoush, 2022). The support included military

armaments and its drones that actively participated in the civil war (Intel, 2021).

Conclusion

Looking back at the progress of the multilateral diplomacy through the years, we can

observe that the unipolar-like dominance of US liberal hegemony heyday is in decline. The

1990s, after the collapse of the USSR, were characterized by US’s unchallenged hegemony.

However, even then, the US had to act semi-unilaterally through NATO in the case of

Kosovo, 1999; multilateral diplomacy was always ineffective in reaching a consensus on a

course of action. And, it will not improve with the changing world order dynamics.
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The multilateral institutions heavily rely on diplomatic mechanisms, international

cooperation, international law, and soft power to handle the international system. However,

over time, they failed to adjust to changes in the global environment that gradually began to

incline institutions towards extravagance, inefficiency, corruption, and erosion of the very

democratic and liberal principles on which they were founded; this has led the members of

the international system to become disillusioned.

The ascent of non-democratic ‘upper-middle’ powers who have aggressive foreign

policy aiming at a tangible and stand-alone strategic foreign policy end-goals, and with a

confidence to unilaterally explore these opportunities will further hinder the efficacy of

multilateral diplomacy. These powers have amassed economic and political domestic

monopoly in large part due to their non-democratic nature. Even though most of these states

benefit from certain aspects of liberal ideals, mainly commercial interdependence, where they

can utilize the international free trade in a capitalistic system or live off their natural

resources in a rentier state model; their foreign policy is imbued with realist desire of balance

of power rather than liberal ideals.

In the case of Ethiopia, the diplomatic pressure from the multilateral institutions,

seemingly, has died down, and they have acquiesced themselves to working with the very

government they had relentlessly smeared due to its crimes. It is a further indication that

realist calculations can thwart multilateral diplomacy for liberal ideals.

Arching back to the question of whether the ascent of non-democratic ‘upper-middle’

powers is a threat to the efficacy of multilateral diplomacy; the answer is yes, it is. The

combination of it, and the rise of China as a legitimate umbrella of influence to fall under, as

well as it being seen as a near-peer competitor to the US, will give the ‘upper-middle’ powers

a grey area to operate in, away from the eyes of the distracted unipolar police, as well as

diplomatic leverage, signaling a very real threat to the international system.

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